FABRE vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111127. July 26, 1996

FACTS: Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife are the owners of the minibus. Porfirio J. Cabil is the driver hired by the Fabre
couple in 1981 after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica's
College in Malate, Manila.

November 2, 1984 : Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of
33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back for the amount of P3,000.00.

The group was scheduled to leave at 5PM of November 2, 1984. The group had to take a detour because bridge at Carmen
was under repair. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east
direction, which he described as "siete." Since it was raining thus the road was slippery,the bus which was running at the
speed of 50 kilometers per hour, skidded to the left road shoulder hitting the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road
and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a
series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. Several passengers were injured. One of the passengers, Amyline
Antonio was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It took
three persons to safely remove her from this position.

Police investigated the incident the next day. And filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was
later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage to the
latter's fence. On the basis of Escano's affidavit of desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.

Amyline Antonio, who is now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down, brought this case
in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila.

The trial court rendered judgment against defendants Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil pursuant to
articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner Cabil failed to exercise due care and precaution in the
operation of his vehicle considering the time and the place of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were
themselves presumptively negligent. The Court of Appeals modified damages.

ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
III. WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN THE POSITIVE, UP TO WHAT EXTENT.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MAY BE MADE TO RESPOND TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY

HELD:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
Yes.

Cabil:
Considering the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an
hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain,
Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.

Fabres:
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code Cabil's negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the
Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee.

II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

Yes. This case involves a contract of carriage. The Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them.

Civil Code Art. 1759 :Carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
III. WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN THE POSITIVE, UP TO WHAT EXTENT.

Yes, On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage: the award of moral damages is authorized by
Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabil's gross negligence amounted to bad faith.

Owing to Amyline Antonio's testimony as well as the testimonies of her father and co-passengers which fully establish the
physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result of the injuries caused by petitioners' negligence an award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is warranted.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MAY BE MADE TO RESPOND TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY

Yes. The court used several precedents to explain...

1. In Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

- facts similar to those in this case
- the bus company and the driver jointly and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered by a passenger.

2. In Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

- a driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to let off passengers when a fellow passenger ran amuck,
as a result of which the passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered injuries
- driver jointly and severally liable with the bus company to the injured passengers.

3. The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff
was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an
accident.

Cases cited: Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,Metro Manila
Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals

- bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally
held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs.

The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus: Nor should it make any
difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver
of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177,
that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the
driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for
damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are liable on
quasi-delict.

4. In the case of BLTB

- private respondents and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively
on one theory,
-alleged alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action so long as
private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury.
-the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to
produce the same injury.

5. In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals SC

-exonerated the jeepney driver from liability to the injured passengers and their families
-the owners of the jeepney jointly and severally liable, but that is because that case was expressly tried and decided
exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual.
-As this Court there explained: The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo [the driver] and spouses
Mangune and Carreon [the jeepney owners] were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and
Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally
liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible.
Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the
carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his
driver (see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742) .
 FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORP. VS. CA
G.R. NO. 125948. DECEMBER 29, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387. Sometime in January 1995, petitioner
applied for mayor’s permit in Batangas. However, the Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts
amounting to P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the first quarter of 1993
amounting to P239,019.01 under protest. On January 20, 1994, petitioner filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming
that it is exempt from local tax since it is engaged in transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer denied the
protest, thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas for tax refund. Respondents assert that
pipelines are not included in the term “common carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to entitle the petitioner to the exemption

HELD: Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm or association engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public."

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:
(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as
ready to engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;
(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his established roads; and
(4) The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the
business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for
all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.
 CALVO V. UCPB GEN INSURANCE CO. (2002)
G.R. NO.148496 MARCH 19, 2002

FACTS: At the time material to this case, Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI) owned by Virgines
Calvo entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper
and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to SMC's warehouse at the Tabacalera Compound,
Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila. 

The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.

July 14, 1990: arrived in Manila on board "M/V Hayakawa Maru" and later on unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the
arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc.

July 23 to July 25, 1990: Calvo withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC's warehouse in Ermita,
Manila.

July 25, 1990: goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, who found that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper
were "wet/stained/torn" and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn. SMC collected payment from UCPB the  total
damage of P93,112 under its insurance contract. UCPB brought suit against Calvo as subrogee of SMC.

Calvo: Art. 1734(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers spoilage or “wettage" took place
while the goods were in the custody of either the carrying vessel "M/V Hayakawa Maru," which transported the cargo to
Manila, or the arrastre operator, to whom the goods were unloaded and who allegedly kept them in open air for 9 days
notwithstanding the fact that some of the containers were deformed, cracked, or otherwise damaged.

ISSUE: W/N Calvo can be exempted from liability under Art. 1734(4)

HELD: NO. Mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier, and of their arrival at the place of destination in bad
order, makes out a prima facie case against the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury occurred, the
carrier must be held responsible. Extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered actually or constructively by the
carrier to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive the same.

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.  Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

Concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common
carriers set forth in the Civil Code

Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, "public service" includes:" x x x every person that now or hereafter
may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier,  railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may
be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries
and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock,
ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power
petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other
similar public services. x x x" 

When Calvo's employees withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator, they did so without exception or protest either with
regard to the condition of container vans or their contents.

Calvo must do more than merely show the possibility that some other party could be responsible for the damage. It must
prove that it used "all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for transport and that it
exercised due care in the handling.