NAGUIAT VS NLRC
warned of several offenses, such as “(a) negligence in the performance of his work
In 1991, CFTI had to close due to “great financial losses and lost business
opportunity” resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement.
CFTI then came up with an agreement with the drivers that the latter be entitled to
a separation pay in the amount of P500.00 per every year of service. Most of the
drivers accepted this but some drivers did not. The drivers who refused to accept
the separation pay offered by CFTI instead sued the latter before the labor arbiter.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the taxi drivers. The National Labor
Relations Commission affirmed the labor arbiter. It was established that when
CFTI closed, it was in profitable standing and was not incurring losses. It ruled
that the drivers are entitled to $120.00 per every year of service subject to
exchange rates prevailing that time.
The NLRC likewise ruled that SFNEI as well as CFTI’s president and vice
president Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat should be held jointly and severally
liable to pay the drivers. The NLRC ruled that SFNEI actively managed CFTI and
its business affairs hence it acted as the employer of the drivers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the NLRC is correct.
HELD: It is only partially correct.
1. It is correct when it ruled that the Sergio Naguiat is jointly and
severally liable to pay the drivers the award of separation pay in the amount
so determined. As president of CFTI, Sergio Naguiat is considered an
“employer” of the dismissed employees who is therefore liable for the
obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees. Moreover, CFTI,
being a close family corporation, is liable for corporate torts and
stockholders thereof shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the
corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance (par. 5,
Section 100, “Close Corporations”, Corporation Code). Antolin Naguiat is
absolved because there was insufficient evidence as against him.
2. SFNEI  is not liable jointly or severally with CFTI. SFNEI has nothing
to do with CFTI. There is no sufficient evidence to prove that it actively
managed CFTI especially so when even the drivers testified that their
employer is CFTI and that their payroll comes from CFTI. Further, SFNEI
was into trading business while CFTI was into taxi services.
GERMAN MACHINERIES VS ENDAYA
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the November 14, 2002 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 71460[2] which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner; and the January 16, 2003 Resolution[3] denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedents of the case as summarized by the labor arbiter are as
follows:
Complainant [Eddie Endaya] alleged that he was employed by respondent
company on January 18, 1993, [as a] car painter with a salary of P8,000.00 a
month for work performed from 7:30 A.M. to 5:15 P.M., Monday to Friday; that
before March 1, 1999, he requested management that his SSS premiums already
deducted from his salary be remitted to the SSS but management did not pay
attention to his request; that on March 29, 1999, he filed a complaint with the
Social Security System against respondent company for failure to remit his SSS
premiums; that when management learned about his complaint, he was
reprimanded and became the object of harassment; that he was shouted at and
belittled; that on August 27, 1999, he at first refused to paint the trusses of the
newly-constructed building, an extension of office of respondent company
because his position is that of a car painter, not that of a construction worker and
besides he finds difficulty working in high places as he was not trained for the
purpose; but, later, he consented to do the painting job; that at about 11:00 A.M.,
he felt thirsty, so he went down to drink; but when he was about to go back to
work, Mr. Andy Junginger who asked him where he came from got irked when
told that he (complainant) went down to drink and, immediately, told complainant
to get his separation pay from the Cashier and go home as he was already
terminated.
Complainant also alleged that on September 6, 1999, he reported for work but he
was surprised that Mr. Joseph Baclig handed him letters of suspension, dated
August 27, 1999 and September 6, 1999 and he was told to go home; that he
reported for work several times thereafter but he was told to stop reporting for
work since his services were already terminated as of August 27, 1999.
Complainant, thus, contends that he was illegally dismissed.
Controverting complainant’s allegations, respondents averred that complainant
was employed, as painter, on January 18, 1993, with a salary of P8,000.00; that he
was performing well in the first years in his employment but in the later years,
particularly in July and August 1999, he became lazy, inefficient and hardheaded;
that on August 27, 1999, after an investigation, complainant was suspended for
acts of insubordination on August 23, 1999, when he did not follow instruction of
the company president who asked him to help and assist a co-worker and instead
turned his back on the president as if he heard nothing; that complainant was also
in quality and efficiency, for doing a below par painting job, (b) evading work by
leaving the working area without permission of his superior, (c) showing no
interest in his work, (d) not cooperating or supporting co-employees during work,
and (e) cutting short working time;” that when complainant returned to work on
September 6, 1999, after his suspension, he was observed to be working
halfheartedly, did not cooperate with his co-employees and did not follow
instructions of his superiors for which respondent called his attention in a
Memorandum dated September 6, 1999; that after he received the Memorandum,
complainant never reported for work; and that respondent sent a Memorandum
requiring complainant to explain his absences from work, which Memorandum
was received by complainant’s wife on September, 28, 1999; and that thereafter,
nothing was heard of the complainant.
Further, respondents alleged that deductions from complainant’s salary were
amounts authorized by law or with the authority of complainant; that he was paid
his holiday pay, five (5) days service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay for 1999
and vacation and sick leaves; that complainant has unpaid cash advances in the
total amount of P8,600.00 secured from May, 1998 to May, 1999 for enrollment
of his children, hospitalization of his parents, medicine and other personal family
needs; that his sick leave, vacation leave and incentive leave had been fully paid
by way of cash advances given to him on July 5, 1999, for the death of his father.
Respondents contended that complainant was never dismissed but he was the one
who voluntarily left the company after his attention was called by management to
his inefficiency and bad attitude toward his co-employees and superiors, which is
chaotic and disorderly and troublesome; and that respondents offered to accept
complainant back during the preliminary conference but he declined the offer and
demanded payment of backwages and to be allowed to finish his painting job
contract.
Respondents, thus, contend that complainant was never dismissed.[4]
On January 8, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of herein
respondent, ratiocinating as follows:
On the first issue – whether or not complainant was illegally dismissed – it has
invariably been ruled by the Supreme Court that, in termination cases, the burden
of proof rests on the respondent to show that the dismissal is for a just cause and
when there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers that matter a case of illegal dismissal. (See Cosep,
et. al. vs. NLRC, et. al., G. R. No. 124960, June 6, 1998).
In this case, the respondents contend that complainant abandoned his work and
submitted in evidence a Memorandum dated September 15, 1999 (Annex ‘E’,
Position Paper for respondent), stating:
Date: September 15, 1999
To : EDDIE D. ENDAYA
From: EBERHARD JUNGINGER
Memo: Absence from work
Since the time you had received the memo dated September 6, 1999
you choose not to report for work since then, and you did not also reply this memo
as required.
Please explain why you do not like to work, and if you fail to do so you can be
considered having abandoned your work.
Also you have failed to explain our charge of insubordination as stated in our
memo.
Very truly yours,
German Machineries Corporation
(Sgd.) Eberhard Junginger
Said Memorandum appears to have been received by one Margie Endaya on
September 28, 1999. (Annex “E-1,” ibid.)
We note, however, that complainant has filed a complaint with the Department of
Labor and Employment, National Capital Region, on August 30, 1999, charging
the respondents of illegal dismissal (Annex ‘F’, ibid.). Summons was issued by
the Chief, Industrial Relations Division of DOLE-NCR on September 13, 1999,
ordering the parties to appear at the DOLE-NCR on September 24, 1999, at 10:00
A.M.
There is, thus, good reason to believe that the said Memorandum, dated September
15, 1999, was issued by respondent Junginger for the purpose of justifying the
prior illegal dismissal of complainant.

Besides, abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal seeking reinstatement, as in this case.
As regards respondents’ charges of absenteeism, painting job contract, bad attitude
towards co-employees and superior and alleged bad working habits, suffice it to
state that complainant was not asked to explain his said offenses and, therefore,
the same cannot constitute as valid causes for dismissal of the complainant.
From all the foregoing, it is clear that complainant did not abandon his work and
respondent has no just or authorized cause to terminate the services of the
complainant.[5]
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. declaring the dismissal of complainant to be without a just or authorized cause
and, therefore, illegal;
2. ordering respondent German Machineries Corporation to reinstate the
complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to pay complainant his full backwages inclusive of allowances and
other benefits, computed from August 27, 1999 up to his actual reinstatement. As
of the date of this Decision, complainant’s full backwages totaled P143,884.06.
Should reinstatement of complainant be no longer feasible due to some valid
reasons, respondent German Machineries Corporation is ordered to pay to
complainant in addition to his full backwages, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months to be
computed as one (1) whole year.
3. Ordering respondent German Machineries Corporation to pay to complainant
the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award in this decision as
attorney’s fees.
The other claims of complainant are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiter’s decision, herein petitioner filed an appeal with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In a decision promulgated on February 28, 2002, the NLRC affirmed, with
modification, the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Accordingly, it disposed of the case as
follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of January 8, 2001 is hereby
MODIFIED in that the award of 10% attorney’s fees shall be based on awards
representing 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
NLRC in a resolution promulgated on April 19, 2002.[8]
On July 3, 2002, herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC.[9] On
November 14, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed resolution
dismissing the petition for certiorari,[10] to wit:
It is axiomatic that for a writ of preliminary injunction to prosper, it must be
shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present petition, the foregoing circumstances are not present. The findings
of fact by the Labor Arbiter were affirmed by public respondent to the effect that
private respondent Eddie Endaya was illegally dismissed by petitioner. It therefore
pains us to conclude that private respondent stands to suffer more due to the said
illegal dismissal. Such that, it is the private respondent who may suffer irreparable
injury should the writ for preliminary injunction be issued. Such being the case,
the prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
Insofar as the prayer of private respondent for the immediate dismissal of the
instant petition is concerned, we find merit in the same. The factual issues raised
in the instant petition had already been passed upon by public respondent. As
such, we give our imprimatur to the same since it is in agreement with that of the
Labor Arbiter, and hence deems (sic) binding and conclusive on us.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF
MERIT and that the questions raised are too UNSUBSTANTIAL to require
consideration.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied the
same in a resolution issued on January 16, 2003.[12]
On March 7, 2003, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction.
On September 24, 2003, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the enforcement of the disputed resolutions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
writ of execution dated October 21, 2002, issued by Labor Arbiter Aliman D.
Mangandog in connection with the decision dated February 28, 2002 and
resolution dated April 18, 2002, issued by the NLRC.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THAT NO DECISION SHALL BE
RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT EXPRESSING CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CLEARLY NOT ONLY
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT ALSO
MISAPPRECIATED THEM TO THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF
PETITIONER:
A. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
THE PETITION ALLOWED THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE LABOR
ARBITER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, TO STAY, IN VIOLATION OF THE TIME-HONORED
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
B. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT DEVIATED FROM
ESTABLISHED RULES AND PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE PROPER RESOLUTION OF THE CASE PRESENTED
BEFORE IT.[13]
In its first assigned error, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals issued the
above-quoted resolution without any analysis of the evidence of the parties or
reference to any legal basis. As such, it violated Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that:
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court
shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
We are not persuaded.
The assailed resolution is not the “decision” contemplated under Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution. The mandate embodied in this constitutional
provision is applicable only in “cases submitted for decision” i.e., given due
course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal
basis thereof.[14] Thus, when the court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the
questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s
decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.[15] In
the present case, the Court of Appeals denied due course and outrightly dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner on the grounds that the factual
issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings
are in agreement with the findings of the labor arbiter, the same are binding and
conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; and that the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these legal bases in conformity
with the requirements of the Constitution.
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative
writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of
judicial discretion.[16] Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 65[17]
of the Rules of Court provides that the court may dismiss a petition for certiorari if
it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or
that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows
that the main issue raised is factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC that
respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner
brought up issues the resolution of which necessarily involves a review of the
evidence presented by both parties. It is settled that resort to a judicial review of
the decisions of the NLRC in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is confined only to issues
of want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
rendering tribunal, board or office.[18] It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor official
or officer in determining his conclusion.[19] It is not for the appellate court to
reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses nor
substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained
expertise in its specialized field. Considering that the findings of fact of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be
accorded due respect and finality.[20]
In its second assigned error, petitioner would have us review the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Settled is the rule that the findings of
the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, are
binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous. It is not the function of
the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.[21] The jurisdiction of this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of
fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on
record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[22] We
find none of these exceptions in the present case.
Petitioner’s main asseveration is that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred
in finding that respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his employment.
A perusal of the records at hand convinces us otherwise. We agree with the Labor
Arbiter’s conclusion that the Memorandum dated September 15, 1999 was simply
an afterthought on the part of the petitioner. In the same manner, we find that the
suspension letter dated August 27, 1999 and the memorandum of September 6,
1999 addressed to Endaya were merely issued to justify his prior illegal dismissal.
Aside from the letter dated August 27, 1999, which Endaya claimed to have been
given to him only on September 6, 1999, petitioner failed to present proof that
Endaya was indeed suspended prior to the filing of his complaint for illegal
dismissal on August 30, 1999. If Endaya was in fact suspended, there should have
been a record of proceedings taken by petitioner to investigate the latter’s alleged
infractions before suspending him; or at the least, petitioner should have handed
out a memorandum, like the ones it subsequently issued, calling Endaya’s
attention for his shortcomings or directing him to explain his side. Despite
petitioner’s claim that there was an investigation, we find no evidence to this
effect. Hence, we are led to no conclusion other than the fact that the letter of
suspension dated August 27, 1999 and the memorandums of September 6, 1999
and September 15, 1999 were all issued as a means of validating the prior illegal
dismissal of Endaya.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining
order issued on September 24, 2003 is forthwith LIFTED. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated November 14, 2002 and January 16, 2003 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TAN VS RAMIREZ
FACTS:
On Aug 11, 1998, the petitioner, representing her parents (sps Crispo and
Nicomedesa P Alumbro)filed with MCTC of Hindang-Inopacan Leyte, a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possessionand/or quieting a title of a
one-half portion of the subject property against the respondents. The petitioner
alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino Jaca Valenzona was the owner of
thesubject property under a 1915 Tax Dec w/no. 2724
LUMANOG VS PEOPLE
THE FACTS
Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of
the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard
employed assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the
ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw
during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of
ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of
police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the
accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who
vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation
in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they
committed the crime.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that “[n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”?
III. THE RULING
1. YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that “[n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally
infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and
while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by
appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the
CA reached its ruling affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The
principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court
actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of
torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances
qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court.
What appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only
the facts narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the legal
authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office
of the Solicitor General’s position, as well as the trial court’s insufficient findings
of fact, appellants anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA.
DUQUE VS GARRIDO
In a verified letter-complaint dated February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta Duque
charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in
Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et
al.
In a Report dated September 6, 2006, the OCA found respondent judge
administratively liable for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day period in
violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally, respondent was found to have
violated the franking privilege under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 26.
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing
less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of
official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to
decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (Emphasis
ours)
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as
follows:
Rule 3.05 — A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory. The
Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to
minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our
courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives
the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it
magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the
Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005 . Thus, the case
was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should
have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued
it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had
been submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of
Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within
the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the
Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it. In this case, granting that it
was for a justifiable reason to render a decision or resolve a matter beyond the
reglementary period, the respondent could have sought additional time by simply
filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not avail of such relief.
Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering the
decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the parties'
memoranda before the case may be considered submitted for decision. He, thus,
would want the Court to consider his Order dated September 13, 2005 resolving
the memoranda of the parties and declaring the case submitted for resolution as
the starting point of the 90-day period for deciding the case and not on August 10,
2005, the date when the last pleading was filed.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the
submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires
or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the
filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so,
whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was
still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the
Court held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda
within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for
failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the
memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case
may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the
rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its
absence the court can do on the basis of the judge’s personal notes and the records
of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of
the privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the
prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a
disciplinary sanction.
Under Section 9(1) , Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the
Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the
penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than
P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-
580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
The Court agreed with the findings of the OCA that respondent must also be
penalized for violation of P.D. No. 26 because he filed his Rejoinder to this
administrative case taking advantage of the franking privilege. Although such
privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to official communications
and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings which shall
be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in mailing his Rejoinder,
made it appear that the same is an official court process as the envelope used bears
his station and the words “FREE FROM POSTAGE”.
REPUBLIC VS ASUNCION
Facts: Alexander Dionisio y Manio, member of the PNP, was assigned to the
Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, when he was dispatched
to Dumalay Street to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble
there. Dionioso proceeded to the place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt.
Romeo Sadang. While trial for homicide was already in progress in the RTC of
QC, the case was dismissed for refilling with the Sandiganbayan on the ground
that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the case. The private
prosecutor moved for dismissal citing the opinion of the Sec of the DOJ that
crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts as provided
in RA 6975 and the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court as
stated in the 1973constitution and as the 1987 constitution provides that the
present anti-graft court shall continue to function and exercise it jurisdiction.
Decision: The Court sanctioned the transfer of cases from the RTC for lack of
jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan. The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan is a
regular court. While it is a special court, it is a regular court within the context of
RA 6975 because “it is a court normally functioning with continuity within the
jurisdiction vested on it” and that the term regular courts is used in Sec. 46 of RA
6975 to distinguish the said courts form courts-martial for it seeks to divest the
latter of such jurisdiction and mandates its transfers to the former pursuant to the
policy of the law to establish a police force national in scope and civilian in
character. The Sandiganbayan is a regular court as stated in the Administrative
Code of 1987.However, for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction it is necessary
that the offenses were committed by public officers in relation to their office. In
here, there is no indication that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was
shot by Dionisio in the course of the latter’s mission. As such, the court directed
the RTC of QC to conduct a preliminary hearing within 15 from receipt of
decision, to determine if the crime was committed in relation to public office. If it
be determined in the affirmative, the case shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan as if the same were originally fined with it. Otherwise, the RTC
should proceed with the trial of the case and render judgment thereon.
GAMINDE VS COA
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner
Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She
assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07,
1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from
the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to
her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998.
Opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on
February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon,
wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their
salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,
1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an
opinion that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02,
1999 as stated inher appointment conformably with the constitutional
intent.”Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U.
Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the
salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff,
effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the
disallowance to the Commission on Audit Enbanc.
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing
petitioner’s appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that
the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be properly addressed by mere
reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February
02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of
her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the
Commission on Audit denied the motion.
ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P.
Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was
appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the
appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
RULING: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V.
Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as
de facto Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive
her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the
Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other
emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court
REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow
the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her
coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999,
until February 02, 2000.
CAPABLANCA VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Uniformed members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are considered
employees of the National Government, and all personnel of the PNP are subject
to civil service laws and regulations.[1] Petitioner cannot evade liability under the
pretense that another agency has primary jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule
that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.[2] When it
clearly declares that a subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of a tribunal, the
party involved in the controversy must bow and submit himself to the tribunal on
which jurisdiction is conferred.
Factual Antecedents
On October 3, 1996, the PNP-Regional Office 10 appointed petitioner
Eugenio S. Capablanca into the PNP service with the rank of Police Officer 1
(PO1) with a temporary status[3] and was assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan
City. On November 29, 1998, petitioner took the PNP Entrance Examination
conducted by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)[4] and passed the
same. On July 28, 2000, he took the Career Service Professional Examination-
Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC)[5] and likewise passed the same. Thereafter, or on October 3, 2000, the
Regional Director of Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon petitioner the
permanent status as PO1.[6]
Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission
On October 15, 2001, the CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII (CSC Caraga)
through its Regional Director Lourdes Clavite-Vidal informed PO1 Capablanca
about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on July
28, 2000. According to the CSC, the “person in the picture pasted in the Picture
Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in the
Personal Data Sheet (PDS)” and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was
different from the signature affixed to the PDS.[7] The CSC further informed
petitioner that such findings of alleged examination irregularities constituted the
offense of dishonesty if prima facie evidence was established.
A Preliminary Investigation was scheduled on November 16, 2001;[8]
petitioner failed to appear but was represented by counsel who moved to dismiss
the proceedings. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to
conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police officers to the
exclusion of the CSC, pursuant to Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals.
[9] Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted on July 28, 2000 was void. Moreover, he
alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the
jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.[10]
In an Order[11] dated November 16, 2001, the CSC Caraga held that there
was no dispute that it was the NAPOLCOM which had the sole authority to
conduct the entrance and promotional examinations of police officers. However,
since petitioner submitted a CSC Career Service Professional eligibility and not a
NAPOLCOM eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent status, then
the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
The dispositive portion of the CSC Order dated November 16, 2001, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Atty. Poculan, for his client,
Eugenio S. Capablanca is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
Capablanca is directed to submit his counter-affidavit within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.[12]
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
To prevent the CSC Caraga from further proceeding with the conduct of
the administrative investigation, PO1 Capablanca filed on January 16, 2002 a
Petition[13] for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Butuan. The said court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order
and set the case for summary hearing on February 8, 2002 to resolve the
application for preliminary injunction.[14]
Instead of filing its Answer, the CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case,
[15] arguing inter alia that: a) PO1 Capablanca failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by appealing before the CSC Central Office instead of filing a petition
before the trial court; b) PO1 Capablanca’s reliance on Civil Service Commission
v. Court of Appeals[16] was misplaced because what he took was a career service
professional examination and not a police entrance examination; and c) the CSC
was not stripped of its original disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving
civil service examination anomalies.
In its March 8, 2002 Resolution,[17] the trial court denied CSC’s Motion
to Dismiss for lack of merit. It held that the CSC had no jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation, much less to prosecute PO1 Capablanca. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent’s motion to
dismiss is denied for lack of merit. As a consequence and for want of jurisdiction,
herein respondent, its Regional Director, Region 13 Caraga, or its officers,
attorneys’ agents, or any person acting for and its behalf, is hereby ordered to
finally, permanently and perpetually desist, cease and stop from proceeding or
conducting any administrative investigation against the petitioner Eugenio S.
Capablanca.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[18]
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Its Motion for Reconsideration[19] unheeded,[20] the CSC Caraga filed a
Petition
for Certiorari[21] before the Court of Appeals praying for the nullification of the
Resolution of the trial court, and at the same time insisting on its jurisdictional
power to prosecute the administrative case involving dishonesty and that PO1
Capablanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
In his Comment,[22] the petitioner contended that there was no need to
exhaust administrative remedies because the proceeding before the CSC was an
absolute nullity, and that it was the NAPOLCOM, the People’s Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB), or PNP which had primary jurisdiction over the alleged
irregularities in the CSP-CAT. He alleged that the case involved a purely legal
issue and that he would suffer irreparable injury if he should still await the
outcome of the administrative action before the CSC Central Office. PO1
Capablanca stressed that the July 28, 2000 CSP-CAT was ineffectual as far as he
was concerned, because it was in the nature of a promotional examination for
policemen and was solely within the province of NAPOLCOM.
On March 22, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[23]
granting CSC’s petition. The Court of Appeals found that PO1 Capablanca
prematurely resorted to court intervention when the remedy of appeal to the CSC
Central Office was available. Upholding the jurisdiction of the CSC Caraga, the
appellate court declared that the subject of the latter’s preliminary investigation
was not with respect to PO1 Capablanca’s acts in the conduct of his duties as a
police officer, but with respect to the authenticity of the documents he submitted
before the CSC Caraga in support of his application for permanent status as well
as the veracity of its contents. It held that pursuant to the CSC's constitutional
duty to protect the integrity of the civil service system, it acted within its authority
to investigate irregularities or anomalies involving civil service examinations, and
to ascertain whether a prospective civil service appointee is qualified in
accordance with all the legal requirements.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner PO1 Capablanca assigns the following errors:
1
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT,
GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT CSC HAS
JURISDICTION AND DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER HEREIN
PETITIONER, A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE.
1-A
GRANTING THAT IT HAS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT IT HAS ONLY APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND IT IS THE NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) WHICH HAS THE JURISDICTION TO
CONDUCT INITIATORY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE, AS HELD IN
THE CASE OF MIRALLES VS. GO, G.R. NO. 139943, JANUARY 18, 2001.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING THAT HEREIN PETITIONER FAILED TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.[24]
Respondent’s Arguments
The CSC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that in
pursuing a case against one who undermines the integrity of the CSC
examinations, the CSC Caraga was only acting within its mandated powers and
duties. The OSG clarifies that the PNP does not have exclusive jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases. Rather, its jurisdiction over such cases is concurrent with that
of the CSC. It also argues that Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals[25]
is irrelevant to petitioner's situation because the ruling therein does not affect the
authority of the CSC to conduct the CSP examination and to investigate
examination anomalies. Lastly, the OSG contends that petitioner should not have
directly resorted to court action, because the CSC proper could still review the
decisions and actions of the CSC Caraga.[26]
Issue
The case at bar boils down to the issue of whether the CSC Caraga has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative
case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination
irregularity.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated
to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service.
[27] The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.[28] Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the “Department of Interior and Local Government Act
of 1990” provides that the “Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department,” to which herein
petitioner belongs.
Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the “Administrative Code
of 1987,” enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC, to wit:
SEC. 12. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on
the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
xxxx
(7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. x x x
xxxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. x x x
In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance
over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations, thus:
Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction
over all its officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service
examination anomalies or irregularities.
To carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional
Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies:
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. - The Civil
Service Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following
cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices provided that the alleged acts or omissions were
committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil Service
examination anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of are
employees of agencies, local or national, within said geographical areas;
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction
when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil
service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner.
However, petitioner contends that a citizen who has complaints against a
police officer should bring his complaint before the following, citing Section 41 of
RA 6975,[29] to wit:
(a) xxxx
(1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is punishable by withholding
of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or
any combination thereof for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days;
(2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where the offense is punishable
by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or
forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period of not less than
sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty (30) days;
(3) People's Law Enforcement Board, as created under Section 43
hereof, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to
specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for
a period exceeding thirty (30) days; or by dismissal.
xxxx
(c) Exclusive Jurisdiction. - A complaint or a charge filed against a PNP
member shall be heard and decided exclusively by the disciplining authority who
has acquired original jurisdiction over the case and notwithstanding the existence
of concurrent jurisdiction as regards the offense: Provided, That offenses which
carry higher penalties referred to a disciplining authority shall be referred to the
appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over the offense.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner avers that the CSC does not have the authority
to conduct an initiatory investigation of the case, but it only has appellate
jurisdiction to review the decision of any of the disciplining authorities above
mentioned. Petitioner anchors his argument on the following provisions of EO
292 stating that the heads of departments, agencies, offices or bureaus should first
commence disciplinary proceedings against their subordinates before their
decisions can be reviewed by the CSC:
Section 47, Book V of EO 292:
Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days'
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office x x
x

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable
to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except
when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
Section 48, Book V of EO 292:
Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.
- (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer
or employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written
complaint of any other person.
We are not persuaded. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil
Service Commission[30] that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply
when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in
connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the
acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations. Thus:
Petitioner’s invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is
applicable to instances where administrative cases are filed against erring
employees in connection with their duties and functions of the office. This is,
however, not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that
the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil
Service (Subprofessional) examination. The examinations were under the direct
control and supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are
government employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has
jurisdiction. x x x
Moreover, in Civil Service Commission v. Albao,[31] we rejected the
contention that the CSC, under the aforestated Sections 47 and 48 of Book V of
EO 292, only has appellate disciplinary jurisdiction on charges of dishonesty and
falsification of documents in connection with an appointment to a permanent
position in the government service. We enunciated, thus:
Pursuant to Section 47 (1), (2) and Section 48 above, it is the Vice
President of the Philippines, as head of office, who is vested with jurisdiction to
commence disciplinary action against respondent Albao.
Nevertheless, this Court does not agree that petitioner is helpless to act
directly and motu proprio, on the alleged acts of dishonesty and falsification of
official document committed by respondent in connection with his appointment to
a permanent position in the Office of the Vice President.
It is true that Section 47 (2), Title I (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the
heads of government offices original disciplinary jurisdiction over their own
subordinates. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days’ salary. It is only when the penalty imposed exceeds the aforementioned
penalties that an appeal may be brought before the Civil Service Commission
which has appellate jurisdiction over the same in accordance with Section 47 (1)
Title I(A), Book V of EO No. 292, thus:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (1) The Commission shall decide
upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office. x x x
The present case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the
integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11,
on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity,
as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list
of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished
from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the
system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of
the service. (Emphasis Ours)
Incidentally, it must be mentioned at this juncture that citizen’s complaints
before the PLEB under RA 6975 pertain to complaints lodged by private citizens
against erring PNP members for the redress of an injury, damage or disturbance
caused by the latter's illegal or irregular acts, an example being that of a policeman
who takes fish from the market without paying for it.[32] Clearly, the PLEB has
no jurisdiction concerning matters involving the integrity of the civil service
system.
Finally, petitioner’s reliance on Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,
[33] is misplaced. In said case, the NAPOLCOM assailed Item 3 of CSC
Resolution No. 96-5487, which provides:
3. Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the
Philippine National Police must have passed any of the following examinations:
a) PNP Entrance Examination;
b) Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and
c) CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.
The NAPOLCOM took exception to this provision, particularly letter (c),
arguing that the requirement of taking a CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination
is only applicable to entrance in the first-level position in the PNP, i.e., the rank of
PO1.[34] NAPOLCOM stressed that what would entitle a police officer to the
appropriate eligibility for his promotion in the PNP are the promotional
examinations conducted by the NAPOLCOM, and not the CSC Police Officer
Entrance Examination.
The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the
CSC, by issuing Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-5487 encroached on the
exclusive power of NAPOLCOM under RA 6975[35] to administer promotional
examinations for policemen and to impose qualification standards for promotion
of PNP personnel to the ranks of PO2 up to Senior Police Officers 1-4. Thus:
Admittedly, the CSC is mandated to conduct the qualifying entrance
examination (CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination) for Police Officer 1.
However, when the CSC prescribes the same examination for appointment of
Senior Police Officer (SPO) under the questioned Item 3, it in effect imposes an
examination for promotion (appointment) of a policeman to PO2 up to other
higher ranks up to SP04. Thus Item 3 encompasses examinations for the positions
of Police Officer as well as that of Senior Police Officer, meaning examination not
only for appointment to PO1 but promotion to PO2 and PO3 up to the four SPO
ranks.[36]
The Court of Appeals thus ordered the CSC to desist from conducting any
promotional examination for Police Officers and Senior Police Officers.
In a Minute Resolution dated September 25, 2001 in G.R. No. 141732, we
affirmed the Court of Appeals thereby sustaining the authority of the
NAPOLCOM to administer promotional examinations for policemen.
It must be stressed however that the subject matter in the above cited case
was the conduct of promotional examination for policemen. On the contrary, the
issue in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the CSC with regard to anomalies or
irregularities in the CSP-CAT, which is a totally different matter.
In fine, we find that CSC Caraga acted within its powers when it instituted the
conduct of a preliminary investigation against herein petitioner. In view of the
foregoing, we need not anymore attend to the issue of the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
PNB VS TEJANO
In this petition for review,[1] the Philippine National Bank assails the January 3,
2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50084, which
reversed Resolution Nos. 980716 and 983099 issued by the Civil Service
Commission, respectively dated April 14, 1998 and December 7, 1998, and
referred the case back to said office for further proceedings. The assailed
Resolutions, in turn, dismissed respondent Cayetano A. Tejano’s appeal from the
resolution of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank which found
him guilty of grave misconduct in connection with a number of transactions with
certain corporate entities.
 The case stems from a number of alleged irregular and fraudulent
transactions made by respondent Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr. supposedly with the
participation of eight (8) other employees of petitioner Philippine National Bank
(PNB) in its branch in Cebu City — namely Ma. Teresa Chan, Marcelino
Magdadaro, Douglasia Canuel, Novel Fortich, Jacinto Ouano, Quirubin Blanco,
Manuel Manzanares and Pedrito Ranile. Respondent, together with the other
employees, allegedly committed grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts violative of Republic
Act No. 3019, relative to the corporate accounts of and transactions with Pat
International Trading Corporation (PITC), Khun Tong International Trading
Corporation (KITC), Pat Garments International Corporation (PGIC), Aqua Solar
Trading Corporation, Dacebu Traders and Exporters, Mancao Mercantile Co., Inc.
and V&G Better Homes Subdivision. All of these transactions transpired at the
time that PNB was still a government-owned and controlled corporation.
Respondent, who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the bank, and
the eight other employees were administratively charged before the PNB
Management Hearing Committee on February 24 and March 17, 1994.[3] At the
close of the hearing on the merits, the Committee found that with respect to
respondent, he was guilty of gross misconduct in misappropriating the funds of
V&G and of gross neglect in extending unwarranted credit accommodations to
PITC, PGIC and KITC which must serve as an aggravating circumstance. The
Committee then recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of forced
resignation without forfeiture of benefits.[4]
The PNB Board of Directors differed. In its Resolution No. 88[5] dated June 21,
1995, it found that respondent’s gross neglect in giving unwarranted credit to
PITC, PGIC and KITC must serve as an aggravating circumstance in relation to
the offense of grave misconduct consisting of misappropriation of V&G funds and
must serve the penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of benefits.[6]
It appears that only herein respondent sought reconsideration but the Board
of Directors, in its Resolution No. 107,[7] denied the same. Thereafter, on
September 21, 1995, respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
[8] and, on October 19, 1995, he submitted his Memorandum on Appeal.[9]
In the meantime, on May 27, 1996, the PNB had ceased to be a government-
owned and controlled corporation, and in view of its conversion into a private
banking institution by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 80.[10] Despite this
development, the CSC, on April 14 1998, issued Resolution No. 980716[11]
dismissing respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[12] on which the CSC required
petitioner to comment. In its Comment, petitioner theorized that even granting
respondent’s appeal was filed on time, the same must, nevertheless, be dismissed
on account of the privatization of PNB which thereby removed the case from the
jurisdiction of the CSC. The CSC found this argument meritorious and,
subsequently, in its Resolution No. 983099[13] dated December 7, 1998, it denied
respondent’s reconsideration on that ground.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for review,[14]
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50084.
Before the appellate court, respondent, on the one hand, ascribed error to the CSC
in denying due course to his appeal on the basis of the privatization of PNB
inasmuch as the incident subject of the case had transpired way back in 1992,
when the bank was still a government-owned and controlled corporation. He
particularly noted that the CSC, before the privatization of the bank, had already
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal upon the filing thereof and subsequent
submission of the memorandum on appeal. This, according to respondent, negated
petitioner’s theory that the CSC could no longer assume jurisdiction and dispose
of the appeal on the merits, especially considering that jurisdiction once acquired
generally continues until the final disposition of the case.[15] On the other hand,
petitioner argued in essence that although the jurisdiction to act on the appeal must
continue until the final disposition of the case, this rule admits of exceptions as
where, in the present case, the law must be construed in a way as to operate on
actions pending before its enactment.[16]
The Court of Appeals found merit in respondent’s appeal. On January 3, 2006, it
issued the assailed Decision reversing the twin resolutions of the CSC. The
appellate court pointed out that respondent’s appeal before the CSC had been filed
on time and that the said commission had not lost jurisdiction over it despite the
supervening privatization of PNB. But inasmuch as the assailed Resolutions did
not permeate the merits of respondent’s appeal, the appellate court found it wise to
remand the case to the CSC for further proceedings. It disposed of the appeal as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, Resolution No.
980716 dated April 14, 1998 and Resolution No. 983099 dated December 7, 1998
of the Civil Service Commission are hereby REVERSED and the case is
remanded to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.[18] Hence, it filed the
instant petition for review bearing the same issue as that raised previously.
At the core of the controversy is the question of whether E.O. No. 80 has the
effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the CSC the appeal of respondent
which was already pending before the CSC at the time the said law converted
PNB into a private banking institution. Petitioner is insistent that, indeed, the law
does have that effect, and this argument is perched on Section 6 of E.O. No. 80,
which materially provides that the bank would cease to be a government-owned
and controlled corporation upon the issuance of its articles of incorporation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and would no longer be subject to the
coverage of both the CSC and the Commission on Audit.[19] Petitioner believes
that while indeed jurisdiction ordinarily continues until the termination of the case,
it advances the opinion that the rule does not apply where the law provides
otherwise or where the said law intends to operate on cases pending at the time of
its enactment.[20]
For his part, respondent submits that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 does not
provide for the transfer of jurisdiction over his pending appeal from the CSC to
another administrative authority, and that neither does the provision authorize its
retroactive application in a way that would deprive the CSC of jurisdiction over
cases already pending before it prior to its effectivity.[21] Additionally, he
invokes estoppel against petitioner inasmuch as the latter has actively participated
in the proceedings before the CSC and, hence, was already barred from raising the
issue of jurisdiction, and alleges that petitioner’s present recourse was taken
merely to cause delay in the final resolution of the controversy.[22]
We draw no merit in the petition.
In essence, Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, also known as the Revised Charter of PNB,
treats of the effects of converting the bank into a private financial and banking
institution. It states:
Section 6. Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank.
- When the ownership of the majority of the issued common voting shares passes
to private investors, the stockholders shall cause the adoption and registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission of the appropriate Articles of
Incorporation and revised by-laws within three (3) months from such transfer of
ownership. Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation under the
provisions of the Corporation Code, this Charter shall cease to have force and
effect, and shall be deemed repealed. Any special privileges granted to the Bank
such as the authority to act as official government depositary, or restrictions
imposed upon the Bank, shall be withdrawn, and the Bank shall thereafter be
considered a privately organized bank subject to the laws and regulations
generally applicable to private banks. The Bank shall likewise cease to be a
government-owned or controlled corporation subject to the coverage of service-
wide agencies such as the Commission on Audit and the Civil Service
Commission.
The fact of the change of the nature of the Bank from a government-owned and
controlled financial institution to a privately-owned entity shall be given publicity.
[23]
In a language too plain to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no
more than the natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private
ownership the majority of the bank’s voting equity. This is very evident in the title
of the section called Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of
the Bank. Certainly, the transfer of the majority of the bank’s voting equity from
public to private hands is an inevitable effect of privatization or, conversely, the
privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the voting equity
thereof to private ownership. And as the bank ceases to be government
depository, it would, accordingly be coming under the operation of the definite set
of laws and rules applicable to all other private corporations incorporated under
the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more importance in the
present case is that the bank, upon its privatization, would no longer be subject to
the coverage of government service-wide agencies such as the CSC and the
Commission on Audit (COA).
By no stretch of intelligent and reasonable construction can the provisions in
Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 be interpreted in such a way as to divest the CSC of
jurisdiction over pending disciplinary cases involving acts committed by an
employee of the PNB at the time that the bank was still a government-owned and
controlled corporation. Stated otherwise, no amount of reasonable inference may
be derived from the terms of the said Section to the effect that it intends to modify
the jurisdiction of the CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees of the
government.
Sound indeed is the rule that where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even
construction.[24] This is based on the presumption that the words employed
therein correctly express its intent and preclude even the courts from giving it a
different construction.[25] Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 is explicit in terms. It speaks
for itself. It does not invite an interpretation that reads into its clear and plain
language petitioner’s adamant assertion that it divested the CSC of jurisdiction to
finally dispose of respondent’s pending appeal despite the privatization of PNB.
In the alternative, petitioner likewise posits that the portion of Section 6 of the
E.O. No. 80, which states that the PNB would no longer be subject to the coverage
of both the COA and the CSC, must be understood to be applicable to cases
already pending with the CSC at the time of the bank’s conversion into a private
entity. We are not swayed.
While there is no denying that upon its privatization, the bank would consequently
be subject to laws, rules and regulations applicable to private corporations —
which is to say that disciplinary cases involving its employees would then be
placed under the operation of the Labor Code of the Philippines — still, we cannot
validate petitioner’s own interpretation of Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 that the same
must be applied to respondent’s pending appeal with the CSC and that, resultantly,
the CSC must abdicate its appellate jurisdiction without having to resolve the case
to finality.
It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil Code, that, generally,
laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in
such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases. This is expressed in the
familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward and not
backward.)[26] The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive: the
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested or impairs the obligations of contract and, hence, is unconstitutional.[27]
Although the rule admits of certain well-defined exceptions[28] such as, for
instance, where the law itself expressly provides for retroactivity,[29] we find that
not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend credence to petitioner’s
argument obtains in this case. Hence, in other words, the fact that Section 6 of
E.O. No. 80 states that PNB would be removed from the coverage of the CSC
must be taken to govern acts committed by the bank’s employees after
privatization.
Moreover, jurisdiction is conferred by no other source than law. Once jurisdiction
is acquired, it continues until the case is finally terminated.[30] The disciplinary
jurisdiction of the CSC over government officials and employees within its
coverage is well-defined in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807,[31] otherwise
known as The Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Section 37[32] thereof
materially provides that the CSC shall have jurisdiction over appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’
salary; demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
It bears to stress on this score that the CSC was able to acquire jurisdiction over
the appeal of respondent merely upon its filing, followed by the submission of his
memorandum on appeal. From that point, the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC at
once attached, thereby vesting it with the authority to dispose of the case on the
merits until it shall have been finally terminated.
Petitioner, however, takes exception. It notes that, while indeed the general rule is
that jurisdiction continues until the termination of the case and is not affected by
new legislation on the matter, the rule does not obtain where the new law provides
otherwise, or where said law is intended to apply to actions pending before its
enactment. Again, petitioner insists that E.O. No. 80 is a new legislation of a
character belonging to one of the exceptions inasmuch as supposedly Section 6
thereof expressly sanctions its application to cases already pending prior to its
enactment — particularly that provision which treats of the jurisdiction of the
CSC.[33]
The argument is unconvincing.
In Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz,[34] the Court had dealt with a situation
where jurisdiction over certain cases was transferred by a supervening legislation
to another tribunal. Latchme involved a perfected appeal from the decision of the
SEC and pending with the Court of Appeals at the time P.D. No. 902-A was
enacted which transferred appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the SEC
from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. On the question of whether the
tribunal with which the cases were pending had lost jurisdiction over the appeal
upon the effectivity of the new law, the Court ruled in the negative, citing the
earlier case of Bengzon v. Inciong,[35] thus:
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction
over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the
cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings
in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court
has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to
the enactment of the statute.[36]
Petitioner derives support from the exceptions laid down in the cases of Latchme
Motoomull and Bengzon quoted above. Yet, as discussed above, the provisions in
Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 are too clear and unambiguous to be interpreted in such a
way as to abort the continued exercise by the CSC of its appellate jurisdiction over
the appeal filed before the privatization of PNB became effective. Suffice it to say
that nowhere in the said Section can we find even the slightest indication that
indeed it expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to another
tribunal over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said
Commission even prior to the enactment of the law.
All told, the Court finds that no error was committed by the Court of Appeals in
reversing the twin resolutions issued by the CSC. The Court also agrees that
because the merits of respondent’s appeal with the said Commission have not been
completely threshed out, it is only correct and appropriate to remand the case back
to it for further proceedings.
With this disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues
propounded by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 3, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50084, which reversed and set aside CSC
Resolution Nos. 980716 and 983099 and ordered the remand of the case to the
CSC for further proceedings, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LOONG VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the
Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to
have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for
the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where
proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the
automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem
to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated
machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused
by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots.
They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the
printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines
failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting
of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu
elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private
respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.)
The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the
misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to
manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong
AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was
not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in
five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These
municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were
rejected because they had the wrong sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the
COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual
count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the
municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of
its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute
Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute
Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at
the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC
resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering
a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC
when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or
not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are
dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-
1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal
but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire
nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and
the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough
considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on
automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section
2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read
correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of
COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the
automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by
the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count
would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes
in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the
electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where
the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing.
We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC
from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people
by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual
counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post
election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC
had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation
caused by the delay in the counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino
memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the
manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later
submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of
the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers
observed the manual count from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is
completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section
6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To
hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory
and will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The
records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now
discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis
of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their
assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election
cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this
Court.
GARCES VS CA
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte
on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio
Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed
by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But
she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from
assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department,
with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling
booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del
Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.
Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the
COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion
as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces
be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same
was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the
case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on
certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court
becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art.
IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo
warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under
the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered
this Controversy.
The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The
settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC that may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that
relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
involving “elective regional, provincial and city officials.”
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational
set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective,
official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with
the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.”
*Petition denied
AGUINALDO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the order, dated September 18, 1995, of the
Sandiganbayan, denying petitioner’s motion to quash the informations filed
against him in two criminal cases (Nos. 20948 and 20949), as well as the
resolution, dated April 12, 1996, ordering his suspension for ninety (90) days as
Provincial Governor of Cagayan.
The background of this case is as follows. Petitioner is the Provincial Governor of
Cagayan. At the time material to this decision he was serving his first term as
Governor of that province.
In 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) found that claims of petitioner for
intelligence operations in 1988 and 1989 in the amounts of P400,000 and
P350,000, respectively, had been charged to the 20% Development Fund and that
some of the claims were covered by disbursement vouchers with only
reimbursement receipts to support them, most of which were signed by only one
person, while other claims had no supporting papers at all. For this reason the
audit team submitted a report (SAO Report No. 90-25), recommending the
following measures to be taken:
Require the submission of the required documents covering claims for intelligence
activities, before making payment. Require claimant to complete the
documentation on payments made with incomplete papers otherwise, refund of the
same should be made. Stop provincial officials from using the 20% Development
Fund for purposes other than for development projects under MLG Circular No.
83-4.
On February 3, 1992, the COA Director, Feliciano B. Clemencio, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a complaint, alleging “anomalies consisting of
irregular/illegal disbursements of government funds.” Named respondents in the
complaint were petitioner and the members of the Provincial Board of Cagayan,
the Assistant Provincial Treasurer and the Accountant.
In a resolution dated May 31, 1994 the Ombudsman found that, in all, petitioner
had distributed the amount of P750,000 to the military, police and civilian
informers to fight insurgency.
[Petitioner] cannot, however submit receipts or documents evidencing
disbursements for intelligence activities which are required under paragraph B-4
of COA Circular No. 77-17D dated April 15, 1977. Under these circumstances,
being an accountable public officer and who could not account for the insurgency
funds when audited, there is prima-facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds to personal use and therefore liable for malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise there is also prima-facie
evidence to charge respondent Governor Aguinaldo with violation of Section 3 ,
paragraph (3) of R.A. 3019.
Two cases of Malversation of Public Funds under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
Code were accordingly filed against petitioner on August 16, 1994.
In Crim. Case No. 20948, the information states:
That in or about the year 1988 in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of
Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, then holding the position of
Provincial Governor of Cagayan Province, hence a public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, taking
advantage of his official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take or misappropriate for his personal use public funds in his custody
in the total amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00), Philippine
Currency, which amount he had earlier withdrawn from the provincial treasury of
Cagayan to be used in the province’s intelligence activities, to the damage and
prejudice of the provincial government of Cagayan.
In Crim. Case No. 20949, the information alleges:
That in or about the year 1989 in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of
Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, Rodolfo E Aguinaldo, then holding the position of
Provincial Governor of Cagayan province, hence a public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, taking
advantage of his official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take or misappropriate for his personal use public funds in his custody
in the total amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00),
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the provincial government of
Cagayan.
Upon motion of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the
Ombudsman to reinvestigate the cases. Petitioner was allowed to submit the
affidavits executed by twelve military officers who acknowledged receipt from
petitioner of unspecified amounts which they claimed had been used for counter-
insurgency operations. In addition petitioner presented his counter-affidavit.
In a letter dated January 19, 1995, Prosecutor Espinosa requested information
from the Special and Technical Audit Division of the COA whether there had been
compliance with the recommendations in the latter’s SAO Report No. 90-25
which, as already stated, required the submission of documents covering claims
for intelligence activities and the complete documentation of payments made, and
the provincial officials to stop using the 20% Development Fund for purposes
other than for development projects. He also inquired whether on the basis of the
affidavits executed by the twelve military officers, the disbursements could be
considered fully liquidated. In reply, COA Special and Technical Audit Division,
through Provincial Auditor Teresita Rios, stated:
[E]xcept for the list of recipients and the machine copies of the duly subscribed
affidavits of some of the recipients, records do not show that this office received
the documents required from the Governor. However, the list of recipients and the
duly subscribed affidavits including the representations made in the letter of the
Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Auditor, may be a convincing proof that
the questioned disbursements were disbursed according to the intended purpose
and not for private consumption. It could also be surmised that even the former
Provincial Auditor may be convinced as to the existence of the recipients of
counter-insurgency/intelligence funds as no notice of disallowance or suspension
was issued on the reimbursements.[1]
Apparently not satisfied with the explanation, Prosecutor Espinosa recommended
to the Ombudsman that the malversation cases against petitioner be pressed. His
recommendation was approved and so, on April 26, 1995, he asked the
Sandiganbayan for the suspension pendente lite of petitioner.
Petitioner opposed the motion and moved to quash the informations against him,
contending that—
First. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED HEREIN WAS
TAINTED BY SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES THAT EFFECTIVELY DENIED
THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND THEREBY
RENDERED THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN THEREIN NULL AND VOID; and
Second. EVEN IF THE IRREGULARITIES THAT INFECT THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ARE OVERLOOKED, NO PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION IS MADE OUT BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE INFORMATIONS
FILED HEREIN ARE INVALID.
In a supplemental motion to quash the informations filed on May 29, 1995,
petitioner submitted to the court indorsements by officials. In a first indorsement
to the Chairman of the COA, Regional Director Rafael Marquez stated that he
agreed with Provincial Auditor Teresita Rios that the documents submitted by
petitioner “may be a convincing proof that the questioned disbursements were
disbursed according to the intended purpose and not for private consumption.” In
turn, in a second indorsement addressed to petitioner, COA Chairman Celso D.
Gangan stated that the documents submitted by petitioner “are substantial
evidence to support disbursements of the intelligence and confidential funds in
question” as required by COA Circular No. 92-385, dated October 1, 1992.
The Sandiganbayan therefore gave the prosecution fifteen (15) days within which
“to firm up its position” on the COA statements, “it appearing that the position
taken by the various officers of the Commission on Audit seemed to be tentative
in the sense that there is no categorical claim that these sworn statements indeed
confirm the disbursement of the aggregate of P750,000.” However, on July 5,
1995, the prosecution reported that it had made inquiries from the legal office of
the COA but the COA did not reply. For his part, petitioner asked the COA
Chairman for a definitive statement of his liability, but his request was referred to
Regional Director Marquez who merely reiterated his previous statement that the
“affidavits [submitted by petitioner] could be considered as sufficient/adequate
documents to liquidate the accountability of Governor Aguinaldo.”
Deeming the COA statements to be lacking in definiteness, the Sandiganbayan, on
September 18, 1995, denied petitioner’s motion to quash the informations and set
his arraignment, during which petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” The Sandiganbayan
said:
Notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the Court as well as of the prosecution to
categorically identify the position of the COA on the matter, what consistently
appears in the various communications is that the COA is of the view that the
affidavits in lieu of the actual liquidation of expenses might serve as adequate
liquidation. This position has been the same view which the prosecution has
earlier seen and has rejected.
Undoubtedly, the COA could have been more responsive to the request both of the
Court and of the accused itself in stating its position on the matter more
categorically. However, the fact is that it did not do so, and even if it had done so,
the same does not appear to have altered the fact that the prosecution at this time is
of the view that the adequate cause exists to proceed with the prosecution of the
accused Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo. It is for this reason that the Instant
Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment wherein the various endorsements of COA
officials are appended is denied as is the Motion to Quash and other pleadings in
connection herewith.
The Sandiganbayan withheld action on the prosecution’s motion to suspend
petitioner pending the pretrial.
Still in an effort to convince the Sandiganbayan that there was no case against
him, petitioner submitted on January 29, 1996 a Certificate of Settlement and
Balances dated January 24, 1996, issued by Provincial Auditor Teresita Rios,
allowing petitioner’s claim in audit and relying for this purpose on the credit
advice of Regional Director Marquez that the documents submitted by petitioner
were “sufficient enough to liquidate these expenses/disbursements.” When asked
by the prosecutor whether Marquez’s credit advice was final, COA Chairman
Celso D. Gangan stated that it was “normally not subject to the review of [COA],
the matter being within [Director Marquez’s] audit competence.”[2]
The Sandiganbayan was unconvinced. On March 4, 1996, it terminated the
pretrial and, on April 12, 1996, ordered the suspension of petitioner as Provincial
Governor for ninety (90) days. Its resolution reads:
It is well to note that prosecution of cases is left in the hands of the prosecutor.
While the COA can and may assist in collating evidence to substantiate a charge
of malversation, it does not preclude the Ombudsman from conducting its own
investigation, and filing the appropriate charge if, by its own determination, the
evidence warrants the same.
The COA is merely the source of the facts in these cases. Any determination
made by the COA outside of the narration of facts duly supported by evidence will
not by itself determine whether or not adequate cause exists to prosecute a case.
To demonstrate this point, the Supreme Court has ruled that “… a public officer
may be held guilty of malversation based on a ‘preliminary’ audit report …” (De
Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337, 348 (1982) and that “…[t]he absence of a
post-audit is not … a fatal omission” nor is it a “… preliminary requirement to the
filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the
suspect has already been established.” (Corpuz v. People, 194 SCRA 73, 79
(1990))
Nor is COA’s final determination required for a malversation case to prosper,
much less will it decide one way or the other the propriety of the suspension of an
accused in a malversation case filed, as sought herein.
Hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that:
1. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion by completely disregarding
the COA findings and post-audit clearances, including the COA Chairman’s
confirmation, which the respondent court itself, together with the prosecution,
sought and solicited during the course of the proceedings;
2. In the higher interest of justice, the consideration of the post-audit findings
of the COA can still be the subject of the motion to dismiss even after arraignment
of the petitioner;
3. And then, the presumptive validity of informations has been conclusively
overcome by the subsequent post audit of accountability of the accused petitioner
by the COA which had since issued a certificate of settlement and balances by
which the accused’s subject claims have been allowed in audit; and such audit was
confirmed by the COA Chairman.
On the other hand, the prosecution argues that the affidavits of military officers
are inadequate for the purpose of liquidating disbursements in view of COA
Circular No. 92-385 which provides that “any disbursement from the confidential
and/or intelligence fund shall be accounted for solely on the certification of the
head of the agency or by the officer-in-charge of the intelligence, confidential or
national security mission” and MLG Circular No. 83-4, dated February 7, 1983,
which provides that the 20% Development Fund should be utilized exclusively for
development projects and excludes expenditures for counter-insurgency
operations.
After due consideration of the petition, the Court finds it to be without merit.
Petitioner alleges irregularity in the conduct of preliminary investigation and lack
of probable cause. In our opinion, the allegation as to irregularity in the
preliminary investigation was properly rejected by the respondent court. As
already noted, after the cases had been filed, the Sandiganbayan, upon petitioner’s
request, ordered the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation.
Petitioner was allowed to submit affidavits and other documents in support of his
defense and an opportunity to argue his case. The prosecutor remained
fundamentally unconvinced, however, by the additional evidence presented by
petitioner.
Indeed, petitioner failed to submit certain documents required by COA rules to
support claims for disbursements. These are COA Circular No. 92-385 which
provides that:
Any disbursement from the confidential and/or intelligence fund shall be
accounted for solely on the certification of the head of the agency or by the
officer-in-charge of the intelligence, confidential or national security mission.
and COA Circular No. 88-293 which provides:
For national defense and related agencies engaged in highly confidential
operations or missions the details of which cannot be divulged without posing a
threat to national security, a certification by the head of agency bearing on the
nature of such highly confidential operations may instead be submitted using
Form # 2 (see attached sample). However, the agency concerned shall maintain a
complete file of all supporting documents for such transactions to ensure the
undertaking of a more extensive audit and examination by this Commission at
anytime it deems desirable or when the operations are completed and declassified.
Such file shall include, among others, the following data: name of asset or
informer; nature and purpose or type of information; date and amount given;
signature if payee and such other relevant information.
Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit in which he stated:
I hereby certify, in my capacity as Governor of Cagayan, that the funds involved
therein were duly appropriated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan and
approved by the Department of Interior and Local Government specifically for
intelligence and counter-insurgency purposes; that all the subject disbursements
were made by me to bona fide officers/personnel of the Armed Forces, para-
military units and civilian components then involved in anti-insurgency operations
in Cagayan for intelligence and counter-insurgency activities and operations; that
said funds were to the best of my knowledge actually spent for the purposes for
which they were appropriated; that the expenses paid for were necessary, lawful
and incurred under the supervision of the officers/men who received them; and,
that the amounts spent were reasonable.
This counter-affidavit falls short of the requirements of COA Circular No. 88-293
which, while allowing the use of “mere certification” to support liquidation
vouchers (Par. VII(G)), nonetheless requires the prescribed form to state that “the
details and supporting documents are in our custody and kept in our confidential
file and may be audited if the circumstances so demand.”
Petitioner alleges in his counter-affidavit that he had receipts from the recipients
of the funds but, he said, the receipts “may have been destroyed or lost beyond
reconstitution” sometime in 1990 when he was suspended and subsequently
removed from office. On the other hand the affidavits of military officers do not
disclose the name of informer, the nature and purpose of information, the date and
amount given to the informer, the signature of the payee and other relevant
information as required also by the same COA Circular No. 88-293. Save for the
personal circumstances of the affiants, the affidavits, which were uniformly
worded, simply state:
3. That [in] the course of the operations of the counter-insurgency program, I
received certain amount in many occasions from the Provincial Government of
Cagayan through Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo in pursuance of the same counter-
insurgency program;
4. That I issued the corresponding receipt for all the amounts I received from
Governor Aguinaldo;
5. That I am willing to testify as to the truth and veracity of my statement if
called upon by the proper authorities.
Thus, the amounts allegedly received by the affiants are unspecified; the date the
amounts received by the affiants are not given; the affiants do not state how the
amounts were spent by them but only that they were spent “in pursuance” and “in
support” of the counter-insurgency operations. Moreover, while the affiants
attested that they signed receipts for the amounts they received from petitioner,
not a single receipt was presented by petitioner. It is noteworthy that while
petitioner claims that he had also required receipts from civilian informants,
runners, couriers and families of victims of counter-insurgency operations,[3] no
receipt nor any form of acknowledgment by the said recipients was presented by
petitioner.
While it is true that petitioner was later given a clearance by the Provincial
Auditor, the clearance is notable for its equivocation. Thus, the Provincial
Auditor, after noting petitioner’s failure to submit the needed documents, opined
that nevertheless the affidavits presented “may be a convincing proof that the
questioned disbursements were disbursed according to the intended purpose and
not for private consumption.” Because the prosecutor pressed for petitioner’s
prosecution, petitioner presented the certification of the Regional Director but, like
the certification of the Provincial Auditor, the certification also lacked firmness. It
stated: “The list of recipients, and the duly subscribed affidavits including the
representations made in the letter of the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial
Auditor may be a convincing proof that the questioned disbursements were
disbursed according to the intended purpose and not for private consumption. It
could also be surmised that even the former Provincial Auditor maybe convinced
as to the insurgency/intelligence funds as no notice of disallowance or suspension
was issued on the reimbursements.”[4]
The indecisive nature of the Regional Director’s certification did not escape the
notice of the Sandiganbayan. It required the prosecution to secure a more definite
and categorical ruling from the COA. The effort failed to produce anything more
reassuring. Instead of concurring in the opinion of the Regional Director, the
Chairman of the COA tossed the matter to the latter on the ground that “final
authority to conduct post audit of confidential and intelligence expenses had been
delegated to Regional Directors like Director Rafael Marquez and the latter’s
decision is normally not subject to review of [the central office].”
Given the indecisive, uncertain and, at best, tentative opinion of COA officials, we
think the Sandiganbayan correctly decided to proceed with the trial of petitioner,
leaving the ultimate resolution of the questions (whether the affidavits submitted
by petitioner constitute sufficient evidence of disbursement of public funds for the
purpose claimed by petitioner and whether charging certain expenditures to the
socalled 20% Development Fund is authorized under the law) to be made after
trial. For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman, having found the COA’s original
finding of failure to comply with accounting rules unaffected by later equivocal
and hedging clearance of COA’s officials, found no reason to reconsider its
decision to prosecute.
In Ramos v. Aquino,[5] we ruled that the fact that petitioners’ accounts and
vouchers had been passed in audit is not a ground for enjoining the provincial
fiscal from conducting a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining
the criminal liability of petitioners for malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents.
The Auditor General, as noted is vested with the power to examine, audit and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever source,
and to audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, all
expenditures of funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the government
as well as the provinces or municipalities thereof. That is one thing. The
ascertainment of whether a crime [is] committed and by whom is definitely
another.[6]
COA’s approval of petitioner’s disbursements only relates to the administrative
aspect of the matter[7] of his accountability but it does not foreclose the
Ombudsman’s authority to investigate and determine whether there is a crime to
be prosecuted for which petitioner is answerable.[8] Therefore, as correctly stated
by the Sandiganbayan in its order of April 12, 1996, while the COA may assist in
gathering evidence to substantiate a charge of malversation, any determination
made by it will not be conclusive as to whether adequate cause exists to prosecute
a case. This is so because the Ombudsman is given the power to investigate on its
own an illegal act or omission of a public official.[9]
Indeed, while the COA may regard petitioner to have substantially complied with
its accounting rules, this fact is not sufficient to dismiss the criminal cases.
Beyond compliance with COA rules and regulations, the question is whether there
was a misappropriation of public funds by petitioner. This is a question of fact to
be established by evidence. All that petitioner’s failure to submit the documents
required in the COA circulars in questions means is that there is a presumption of
malversation sufficient to justify the filing of a case in court. As Art. 217 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
Petitioner may still prove his innocence. Until he does this, however, the
presumption that public funds were put to personal use stands.
What we said in Paredes v. Sandiganbayan[10] is apropos to this case:
[T]his Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless
such discretion is clearly shown to have been abused. As explained in Young v.
Office of the Ombudsman:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it , in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
It is insisted, however, that because COA has the constitutional authority to
examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to the expenditures of the funds in
question, its finding is conclusive and mandatory and not reviewable except on
certiorari and only by this Court. Petitioner cites P.D. No. 1445 (Government
Auditing Code) which provides:
Sec. 52. OPENING AND REVISION OF SETTLED ACCOUNTS.- (1) At any
time before the expiration of three years after the settlement of any account by an
auditor, the Commission may motu proprio review and revise the account or
settlement and certify a new balance. For that purpose, it may require any
account, vouchers, or other papers connected with the matter to be forwarded to it.
(2) When any settled account appears to be tainted with fraud, collusion, or error
of calculation, or when new and material evidence is discovered, the Commission
may, within three years after the original settlement, open the account, and after a
reasonable time for reply or appearance of the party concerned, may certify
thereon a new balance. An auditor may exercise the same power with respect to
settled account pertaining to the agencies under his audit jurisdiction.
(3) Accounts once finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed except as
herein provided.
Petitioner asserts that because of this provision any account already settled by the
COA may only be reopened within three years by the COA itself and not by the
Sandiganbayan.
This same argument was made in Ramos v. Aquino. In rejecting the contention,
this Court, through Justice, later Chief Justice, Fernando, stated:
There is likewise an invocation by appellants of alleged statutory support for their
untenable view. It is likewise in vain. All that appellants have to go on is the
concluding paragraph of Section 657 of the Revised Administrative Code:
“Accounts once finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed except as
herein provided.” The paragraph immediately preceeding should have disabused
the minds of appellants of any cause for optimism. All that it provides is that in
case any settled account “appears to be infected with fraud, collusion or error of
calculation or when new and material evidence is discovered, the Auditor General
may, within three years after original settlement, open such account, and after a
reasonable time for his reply or appearance, may certify thereon a new balance.”
The official given the opportunity for a reply or appearance is the provincial
auditor, for under the first paragraph of this particular section, the Auditor General
at any time before the expiration of three years after the making of any settlement
by a provincial auditor, may, of his own motion, review and revise the same and
certify a new balance. Nowhere does it appear that such a statutory grant of
authority of the Auditor General to open revised settled accounts carries with it the
power to determine who may be prosecuted in the event that in the preparation
thereof a crime has been committed. The conclusive effect of the finality of his
decision on the executive branch of the government thus relates solely to the
administrative aspect of the matter.[11]
Finally, it is contended that while preventive suspension is mandatory in cases
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property,[12] it is not
automatic because a pre-suspension hearing on the validity of the information
must first be conducted. Petitioner quotes from People v. Albano[13] that “[the]
pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused,
and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of
the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs
its validity.”
This was done in the present case. To the prosecution’s “Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite,” petitioner filed a “Consolidated Motion to
Quash/Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite.”
Thereafter, petitioner presented several certifications from the COA purportedly
clearing petitioner of any accountability. On the basis of pleadings and documents
thus submitted by the parties, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to
quash and granted the prosecution’s motion to suspend petitioner pendente lite.
Hence, as we recently held:
[U]pon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes
mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on
the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is
not within the court’s discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused
officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review
before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension
hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been
afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information against
him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the
grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.[14]
All told, we find no basis for holding that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of its discretion in denying the motion to quash and ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
REYES VS COA
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC[1] Provident Fund Board of
Trustees, filed this petition with the Supreme Court on June 17, 1996, as an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the
decision[2] of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing the refund of the
government share in the fund to the employee-members, and the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.[3]
would be unfair and greatly prejudicial to deprive them of the government share to
which they are entitled.
We are not impressed. We deny the petition.
To begin with, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision,
orders of rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.[15] Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or final order of the Commission on Audit
may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65.
However, the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of
elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this Court was only by
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution.[16]
The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by
ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court
entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[17] Hence, a petition for review
on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision
of the Commission on Audit.

By Resolution No. 89-003,[4] the TLRC Executive Committee created a Provident
Fund the primary purpose of which was to augment the retirement benefits of the
officers and employees of TLRC. The Provident Fund also provided additional
benefits[5] to its members, in accordance with the policies and guidelines
approved by the Board of Trustees. The Fund’s sources of capital were from
contributions of each member consisting of 2% of his gross monthly salary and
TLRC’s or the government’s counterpart share equivalent to 10% of the member’s
gross monthly salary, earnings of funds and others.[6]
On June 3, 1993, Corporate Auditor Adelaida S. Flores suspended the transfer of
funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991, amounting to
P11,065,715.84, per Notice of Suspension No. 93-006[7]. Auditor Flores held
that under Par. 5.4 of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, Rules and
Regulations issued under R.A. 6758,[8] fringe benefits were allowed provided that
statutory authority covered such grant of benefits. In this case, there is no law
authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC officers and employees.
Furthermore, all Provident Funds are covered by R.A. 4537,[9] to which TLRC
may not qualify.
On September 14, 1993, the TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees issued
Resolution No. 93-2-21[10], discontinuing the collection of contributions for the
Fund from both the TLRC and the members. It also ordered the members’
personal contributions collected from March 1, 1993 until September 15, 1993,
refunded to them immediately. On September 21, 1993, the Board issued
Resolution 93-2-22[11] dissolving the Provident Fund and ordering the
distribution of the personal and corporate shares to the members thereof, on or
before October 31, 1993.
However, setting aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and treating the petition
as one for certiorari under Rule 65, we find that the Commission on Audit did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the
government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members. As
correctly pointed out by the COA in its decision,[18] the government contributions
were made on the condition that the same would be used to augment the
retirement and other benefits of the TLRC employees. Since the purpose was not
attained due to the question on the validity of the Fund, then the employees are not
entitled to claim the government share disbursed as its counterpart contribution to
the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use of public funds outside
the specific purpose for which the funds were appropriated.
There is no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident Fund
acquired a vested right over the government contributions. "A vested right is one
which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency,"[19] As previously stated, the government contributions were
subject to the condition that the funds would be used to augment the retirement
and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees.
What is more, the Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis.
Thus, contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Commission on Audit.
No costs.SO ORDERED.

On December 2, 1993, Corporate Auditor Flores issued Notice of Disallowance

No. 93-003, disallowing in audit the amount of P11,065,715.84, representing the
government’s share paid to the TLRC Provident Fund refunded to members,
covering the period 1990 to 1991, including all amounts that may have been
transferred to the Fund after 1991.[12]

Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Board of Trustees, appealed

the disallowance to the Commission on Audit. On October 12, 1995, the
Commission on Audit denied the appeal per Decision No. 95-571.[13] The
Commission ruled that the government’s share in the Provident Fund must be
reverted to the TLRC and not be given to the employees. It held that since the
primary purpose of the Provident Fund was not realized or attained due to its
discontinuance and dissolution, then the employees were not entitled to the
government’s share in the Fund.

On December 7, 1995, petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit seeking a

reversal of COA Decision No. 95-571. On May 2, 1996, the Commission on
Audit denied the motion for reconsideration per Decision No. 96-236.[14]

Hence, this petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit.

Petitioner contends that the dissolution of the Provident Fund does not render
illegal the distribution of government’s share to the members. He avers that when
TLRC made its contributions to the Provident Fund, it had divested itself of the
ownership of whatever contributions it gave. Furthermore, the money contributed
to the fund became a trust fund for the benefit of the members. Upon the
dissolution of the Fund, the legal and equitable titles were merged in the members,
as beneficiaries. He asserts that the members have a vested right, not only on their
own contributions, but to the government share as well. He claims that since the
Fund's pretermination or dissolution was not due to the members' fault, then it