C.

 400-­‐1000:  EXPLORING  THE  SYNTHETIC  ANTECEDENTS  OF  FEUDALISM  IN  

THE  (EARLY)  MIDDLE  AGES  
 
NIKHIL  PANDHI,  I  HISTORY  
 
  Much  has  been  written  about  the  genesis  and  proliferation  of  Feudalism  
in  the  annals  of  history.  The  ‘Feudal  Dynamic’,  which  had  come  into  existence  in  
around   the   10th   century,   close   on   the   heels   of   what   LeGoff   calls   the   ‘birth   of  
Europe’,  represents  one  of  the  most  keenly  analysed  social  formations  in  human  
history.  Its  fundamental  difference  from  the  social  formations  of  Graeco-­‐Roman  
antiquity   as   well   as   its   ostensible   derivation   from   these   pre-­‐existing   modes   of  
production  (as  the  Marxist  school  of  thought  would  have  us  believe)  is  as  much  
plausible  as  it  is  paradoxical.  It  comes  to  us  as  no  surprise  then,  that  the  Feudal  
model   is   mired   by   a   gamut   of   historiographical   arguments.   To   our   mind,   the  
fundamental   debate   surrounding   the   Feudal   mode   of   production   revolves  
around   the   extent   to   which   it   drew   upon   earlier,   pre-­‐existing   modes   of  
production   of   late-­‐antiquity   and   the   extent   to   which   it   resulted   from   the  
interplay  of  factors  completely  divorced  from  antiquity.  A  further  analysis  of  the  
origin  and  development  of  Feudalism  shall  be  incomplete  without  taking  a  glance  
at  the  myriad  historiography  which  underpins  Feudal  history.  
  The   Classical   (Marxist)   view,   formidable   enough   to   have   been   originally  
opined   by   Karl   Marx   himself,   is   developed   by   Perry   Anderson   in   that   the  
‘historical   synthesis’   which   occurred   in   the   early   middle   ages   out   of   the  
catastrophic  collision  of  two  dissolving  anterior  modes  of  production  eventually  
produced   the   ‘Feudal   order’.   The   ‘Feudal   order’   was   novel   and   attractive   enough  
to  have  spread  throughout  much  of  medieval  Europe,  replacing  to  a  large  extent  
the   pre-­‐existing   modes   of   production   (Roman   slavery   and   Germanic   comitatus)  
which  were  at  best  the  ‘primitive  and  ancient’  antecedents  of  feudal  outgrowth,  
the  quintessential  symbols  of  antiquity,  and  at  worst  the  crumbling  bridge  upon  
which  Antiquity  could  find  little  footing  in  the  latter  half  of  the  first  millennium  
A.D.   In   his   exhaustive   critique   of   the   political   economy   of   the   middle   ages,   Karl  
Marx   had   spoken   about   the   transition   from   ‘Wechselwirkung   (interaction)   to  
Verschmelzung  (fusion)  to  Produktionsweise  (mode  of  production)’,  hinting  at  the  
rupture  of  the  roman  social  order  at  the  hands  of  Germanic  conquests.  
  To   the   thinkers   of   the   Renaissance,   the   genesis   of   Feudalism   was  
discussed  within  the  ideological  framework  of  an  emerging  ‘historical  problem’  
which   again   ensued   from   the   convoluted   consensus   (or   lack   of   it)   of   why   and  
how  the  Feudal  mode  of  production  first  came  into  existence.  From  Montesquieu,  
who  regarded  the  origins  of  Feudalism  to  be  Germanic,  the  pale  of  ideas  shifted  
to   Alfons   Dopsch   for   whom   “the   Germans   were   not   enemies   out   to   destroy   or  
wipe   out   Roman   culture,   on   the   contrary   they   preserved   and   developed   it”.  
Again,   whether   Dopsch   advocates   Germanic   (or   indeed   Roman)   origins   for   the  
Feudal  mode  of  production  is  a  veiled  proposition.  
  For   the   Marxists,   who   view   the   ‘Feudal   dynamic’   to   have   been   set   in  
motion   ever   since   the   first   wave   of   Germanic   migrations   tore   through   the  
Western   Roman   empire   in   the   late   fourth   century,   the   typology   of   European  
Feudalism   comprised   a   precise   admixture   of   once   Roman   and   Germanic  
elements.   Thus,   Anderson   states   with   unbridled   conviction   that   vassalage   may  
have  its  roots  in  either  the  German  comitatus  or  the  Gallo-­‐Roman  clientele:  two  
forms  of  Aristocratic  retinue  that  marked  the  high-­‐noon  of  Antiquity.  The  system  
of   Comitatus   evolved   out   of   the   Germanic   tradition   of   the   tribal   chief   having   a  
retinue   of   highly   trained   and   fiercely   loyal   warriors   attached   to   him.   These  
warriors   constituted   the   nucleaus   of   the   fighters   who   accompanied   him   on   the  
often   violent   Volkerwanderung   (migratory   advances)   and   signified   the   warrior  
band   whose   loyalty   to   their   leader   was   pledged   through   their   alleged   military  
service.  The  Clientele  on  the  other  hand  was  a  Roman  construct  that  had  survived  
from   the   days   of   the   great   upheavals   of   the   early   republican   period;   from   very  
early   times,   citizens   who   had   fallen   upon   enduring   days   began   to   seek   the  
protection   of   wealthy   patrons   becoming   their   clients   or   personal   dependents.  
Owing  to  the  confusion  that  accompanied  the  decline  of  the  Roman  empire,  the  
institution   of   Clientele   was   perhaps   greatly   extended,   fuelling   the   system   of  
Vassalage   wherein   the   Vassal   owed   ‘knight   service’   to   his   Lord   and   swore   to  
serve  his  Lord  all  his  life  through  a  ceremony  called  ‘homage’.  
  Other  important  concepts  of  the  Feudal  model,  such  as  the  Manor,  which  
comprised   all   the   cultivable   and   arable   land   in   a   locality,   too   seem   to   have  
derived  their  roots  from  the  Gallo-­‐Roman  fundus  or  villa.  These  were  huge,  self-­‐
contained  estates  whose  economic  fulcrums  remained  taut  around  the  constant  
system  of  Coloni,   peasant  sharecroppers  who  delivered  produce  in  kind  to  their  
magnate   owners   and   gradually   came   to   be   tied   to   the   land:   glebae   adscripti  
(bound  to  the  Earth).  It  is  likewise  to  the  institution  of  the  Colonus   as  well  as  to  
the   slow   degradation   of   free   Germanic   peasantry   by   quasi-­‐coercive   ‘clan  
optimates’  that  Serfdom  perhaps  came  into  existence.    
  The   jurisprudence   that   accompanied   the   proliferation   of   Feudalism   too  
pulled  together  strands  from  the  Roman  legacy  of  a  codified  and  written  law  and  
the   ‘folk   justice’,   a   tradition   of   reciprocal   obligation   that   existed   between   the  
optimates   and   the   subordinates   of   the   tribal   community.   So   prolific   infact   was  
the   synthesis   of   Roman   and   Germanic   elements   in   Feudal   history   that   Perry  
Anderson   classically   remarks,   “…the   institution   of   Feudal   monarchy   itself  
represented   a   mutable   amalgam   of   the   Germanic   war   leader,   semi-­‐elective   and  
with   rudimentary   secular   functions,   and   the   Roman   imperial   ruler,   sacred  
autocrat  of  unlimited  powers  and  responsibilities.”    
  While   acknowledging   the   prevalence   of   the   antecedent   ‘dualism’   that  
Anderson   endorses   for   the   origins   of   Feudalism,   we   must   take   heed   of   an  
alternate   and   equally   influential   perspective   about   the   origins   of   Feudalism   as  
well.   The   Marxist   formulation,   although   built   on   the   legacy   of   Germanic   in-­‐
migration   to   the   Roman   heartland,   essentially   advocates   the   pre-­‐eminence   of  
‘internal   factors’   in   the   genesis   of   Feudalism.   What   Feudal   historiography   was   to  
receive  in  the  1930’s,  something  that  would  at  once  challenge  the  dominance  of  
Marxist   thought   (as   had   earlier   taken   place   at   the   hands   of   the   historiography  
born   out   of   the   Annales   School   of   thought)   was   the   emergence   of   a   diametrically  
opposite  endorsement  of  an  ‘external  impetus’  for  the  origins  of  Feudalism.  
  Henri  Pirenne,  to  whom  this  intellectual  formulation  is  attributed  saw  the  
appearance  of  Feudalism  in  Western  Europe  in  the  9th  century  as  nothing  but  a  
repercussion   in   the   social   sphere   of   the   return   of   society   to   a   purely   rural  
civilization.   Pirenne   viewed   the   return   to   ruralization   as   a   result   of   the  
burgeoning   Islamic   expansion   in   the   southern   and   western   Mediterranean,  
owing   to   which   trade   and   commerce   ceased,   setting   the   stage   for   a   new  
economic  order.  “The  economic  equilibrium  of  Antiquity,  which  had  survived  the  
Germanic  invasions…”  remarks  Pirenne,  “collapsed  under  the  influence  of  Islam”.  
  The   disappearance   of   trade   and   commerce   from   the   locale   of   the  
Mediterranean,   to   which   the   economic   functioning   of   civilization   had   hitherto  
been   centered   and   had   remained   oriented   till   the   period   of   the   Barbarian  
invasions,   resulted   in   a   pan-­‐European   economic   restructuring   which   saw   the  
economic   functioning   of   the   empires   retreat   to   the   rural   confines   of   their   land-­‐
locked  territories.  This  trend  was  true  especially  of  the  Carolingians  who,  though  
had  stemmed  the  Arab  expansion  on  land,  had  failed  to  expel  them  from  the  sea.  
  The   Carolingian   empire   thence   became   confined   to   land   and   the   changing  
economic   order   that   they   witnessed   was   in   many   ways   an   exigency   of   the  
absence   of   sea-­‐borne   trade   and   commerce.   The   (Roman)   estate,   which   had  
survived  unchanged  right  down  to  the  Merovingian  period  remaining  engaged  in  
the  selling  of  foodstuffs  and  the  purchase  of  manufactured  goods,  now  became  a  
consumer   of   its   own   commodities   and   came   to   foster   a   self-­‐sufficient   albeit  
closed   economy.   The   decreasing   incentive   for   trade   in   the   face   of   the   Islamic  
usurpation  of  Mediterranean  sea-­‐trade  left  the  Carolingian  Lord  with  little  choice  
but  to  fall  back  on  his  demesne  and  on  the  dues  of  his  dependents.  
  In  Pirenne’s  thesis,  what  ensued  was  thus  an  era  of  ‘decadence’  in  which  
trade   was   confined   to   specific   groups   and   markets   and   commerce   had  
disappeared   to   such   an   extent   that   every   estate   aimed   at   fulfilling   its   own   needs;  
trade   now   coming   to   be   a   rarity   reserved   for   emergencies   like   famines.   The  
pillaging   and   ransacking   of   the   Western   European   ports   like   Barcelona,   Pisa,  
Tuscany  and  Genoa  by  the  Muslims  further  reduced  the  incentive  from  (and  of)  
trade,   which   was   thereafter   confined   to   landed   units,   specific   groups   and  
markets.  The  Islamic  invasions  ruptured  the  nexus  of  Germanic  sea-­‐faring  and  in  
the   eventuality   ‘land’   became   the   focal   point   of   economic,   social   and   political  
relationships   for   the   Germanic   empires.   It   was   in   this   increasing   centrality  
towards  (rural)  land-­‐based  production  and  self-­‐sufficiency  that  Pirenne  saw  the  
provenance   of   the   Feudal   order.   The   lord,   who   had   to   arrange   to   produce   his  
minimal   wants   like   tools   and   clothes   had   to   deploy   producers   below   him   to  
organize   production   and   to   maintain   his   own   lifestyle.   Initially   this   was   done  
through  workshops.        
  What   comes   through   from   the   Pirenne’s   thesis   is   an   overarching  
emphasis   on   the   external   pressures   levied   by   the   expansion   of   Islam   on   the  
(contracting)   Germanic   empires.   But   the   overarching   importance   accorded   to  
commerce   as   the   sole   sustainer   of   the   economy   and   the   Mediterranean   as   the  
fulcrum  of  civilization,  is  arguable  if  not  erroneous.  
  In   1939,   Marc   Bloch,   one   of   the   fathers   of   the   "Annales"   school   and  
arguably   the   most   prominent   modern   medievalist   after   Henri   Pirenne,   decided  
to   give   up   trying   to   define   "feudalism"   and   settled   for   describing   the   "feudal  
society".  In  his  classical  work  on  Feudal  society,  of  the  same  name,  Bloch  listed  
some  features  of  the  traditional  Feudal  society:  a  subject  peasantry,  widespread  
use  of  the  service  tenement  (i.e.  the  fief)  instead  of  a  salary,  the  supremacy  of  a  
class  of  specialized  warriors,  ties  of  obedience  and  protection  which  ‘bind  man  to  
man’   and,   which   within   the   warrior   class,   assume   the   distinctive   form   called  
vassalage.  He  further  adds  to  the  set  of  features  viz.  fragmentation  of  authority  
leading   inevitably   to   disorder;   and   the   survival   of   other   forms   of   association,  
family  and  State,  of  which  the  latter,  during  the  ‘second  feudal  age’,  would  come  
to  acquire  renewed  strength.    
  What  made  the  Annales  School  differ  markedly  from  the  Marxists  was  the  
chronology   that   they   chose   to   attribute   to   Feudalism.   Bloch   himself   identified  
two   feudal   ages.   The   ‘first   Feudal   age’,   according   to   him,   lasted   from   the   late  
ninth   to   the   mid   eleventh   century   and   was   characterized   by   the   breakdown   of  
central  authority,  owed  in  part  to  the  Viking  and  Magyar  raids.  During  this  phase  
the  feudal  pyramid  extended  from  the  lowest  knight  of  the  kingdom  to  the  king  
at   its   apex.   Each   noble   came   to   be   a   ‘castellan’,   for   he   possessed   a   castle   (defined  
as  a  man  made  hill  with  a  wooden  tower  called  a  donjon  on  top  of  it,  and  a  ditch  
and  pallisade  at  the  base  of  the  hill  for  a  defended  enclosure)  and  was  essentially  
politically   autonomous.   Kings   were   simply   one   lord   among   many,   though   in  
theory   each   king   was   the   ultimate   feudal   overlord   as   the   one   chosen   by   god.  
Further,   authority   devolved   upon   the   localities   and   the   economy   was   primitively  
agrarian.  
  The   ‘second   phase   of   Feudalism’-­‐   c.   1050   to   c.   1300-­‐   witnessed   the  
doubling   of   population   in   western   Europe,   an   agricultural   revolution   (three   field  
rotation,   heavy   plough,   horse   harness,   windmills);   an   expansion   of   commerce  
leading   to   the   growth   of   towns   and   rebirth   of   cash   economy;   the   creation   of   new  
industries   (most   notably   textiles),   especially   in   Flanders   and   northern   Italy;   an  
interconnected   European   economy   with   specialized   production   of   commodities  
and  raw  materials  for  export  (e.g.  English  wool  to  Flanders;  Bordeaux  wines  to  
England)   and   the   concomitant   emergence   of   a   merchant   class.   Culturally,   this  
was  also  the  age  of  the  gothic  cathedral,  scholastic  philosophy,  the  crusades,  the  
papal  monarchy  and  universities.  The  ‘castle’  too  came  to  acquire  a  wider  socio-­‐
political   connotation,   linked   inextricably   to   the   three   centuries   after   1000   that  
Feudalism  reached  its  apogee.  The  economic  changes  also  helped  kings  and  the  
great   princes   of   Europe   to   consolidate   power,   as   feudal   monarchies   arose   that  
were  to  be  the  basis  of  the  modern  European  nation  states.    
  For   the   purpose   of   this   essay,   we   wish   to   consider   the   developments  
taking   shape   roughly   during   the   ‘first   feudal   age’.   We   thus   need   to   trace   the  
developments   in   Europe   from   the   Germanic   invasions   to   the   end   of   the  
Carolingian  era,  by  when  the  nucleus  of  the  Feudal  system  had  definitely  come  to  
be   formed.   Before   elucidating   the   antecedents   of   Feudalism   between   the   4th-­‐10th  
centuries,  it  would  apt  to  make  it  clear  that  insofar  as  historiography  goes,  this  
essay   shall   largely   rest   on   the   underpinnings   of   the   Marxist   and   the   Annales  
school.  For,  Pirenne’s  proposition  although  an  eye-­‐opener,  underplays  the  role  of  
the   independent   evolution   of   the   European   society   and   polity,   which   was  
essentially  based  on  the  exploitation  of  land.  Moreover,  the  undeniable  fact  that  
Western   European   Feudalism   was   very   much   a   product   of   the   fusion   of   many  
antecedent   traditions   cannot   be   denied.   The   Germanic   invaders   who   had   little   to  
do  with  the  Mediterranean,  represented  a  land  based  system,  a  lot  of  which  was  
bequeathed   to   them   by   the   prevailing   Roman   system.   The   increasing   power   of  
the   nobles   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   the   centre   can   be   explained   in   terms   of   purely   internal  
factors   such   as   the   inherent   tendency   towards   regionalization   and   autonomy.   So  
must   the   emergence   of   the   fortified   feudal   residences   be   explained   in   terms   of  
the   Magyar   and   Viking   thesis.   What   we   must   use   thus,   to   understand   the  
developments   of   the   first   phase   of   feudalism   is   a   historiography   synthesized  
from  the  fusion  of  the  historiographies  available.  
 
   The   Germanic   invasions,   which   overran   the   Western   European   empire  
unfolded   in   two   successive   phases,   each   with   a   separate   pattern,   thrust   and  
consequence.  Historically,  contact  between  the  Germanic  peoples  and  the  Roman  
world   existed   long   before   the   empire’s   crisis   in   the   third   century.   While   there  
were   innumerable   confrontations   along   the   Rhine-­‐Danube   border   over   the  
centuries,   Roman   contact   with   the   Germans   for   the   most   part   benefited   both  
societies.   The   Germans   learned   Roman   concepts   of   statehood   and   statecraft,  
agricultural   techniques,   and   eventually   knowledge   both   of   Latin   and   writing;   the  
Romans  used  Germanic  immigration  to  settle  the  land  and  stabilize  the  frontier.  
The   border   between   their   two   worlds  was  in  fact  an  extremely   porous  one,  with  
families,  clan  groups,  warrior  bands,  traders,  travelers,  and  emissaries  constantly  
moving  back  and  forth.  
  It   is   against   this   seemingly   innocuous   background   of   Roman   porosity   that  
the  first  wave  of  Germanic  migrations  must  be  viewed.  The  Germanic  tribes  were  
originally  situated  in  northern  Scandinavia  and  the  eastern  and  southern  Baltic  
coasts,  which  formed  their  permanent  locale  throughout  the  closing  centuries  of  
the  pre-­‐Christian  era  and  the  early  centuries  C.E.  Thereafter,  the  increased  need  
for  food  and  the  desire  to  avoid  Asiatic  nomads  like  the  Alans  and  Huns,  whose  
invasions   played   a   key   role   in   geographically   provoking   and   uprooting   the  
Germanic   tribes,   drove   these   Germans   across   the   Danube   plains   toward   the  
Roman   border.   Thus   by   the   time   the   Romans   became   familiar   with   Germanic  
culture   in   any   detail,   they   encountered   Germans   displaced   from   their  
agricultural   way   of   life   and   living   largely   as   pastoralists,   hunters,   and   warriors.  
Among   a   people   that   lacked   rigid   social   hierarchies,   the   Germanic   tribes   could  
advance  within  the  clan  or  tribe  by  feats  of  arms,  or  perhaps  by  creating  a  new  
group   under   the   direct   rule   of   the   ‘clan   optimate’.   The   brutal   nature   of   the  
Germanic  ‘barbarians’  had  proved  to  be  catastrophic  for  the  Romans  at  the  battle  
of  Hadrianopolis  (378  CE),  in  which  the  Visigoths  overran  the  Roman  territories  
along   the   lower   Danube.   The   Roman   army   had   been   routed   and   the   emperor  
Valens  killed.    
  The   bitter   taste   that   the   Germanic   confrontation   had   left   was   further  
exacerbated  in  the  mid-­‐fifth  century.  It  has  earlier  been  mentioned  that  the  Hun  
invasions   of   the   original   Germanic   territories   had   created   a   geographical  
upheaval   amongst   the   Germanic   tribes.   While   the   Goths   had,   owing   to   their  
aboriginal  militarism,  managed  to  defeat  the  Huns  the  renewed  vigour  that  came  
to   dominate   the   ‘barbarian’   mindset   perhaps   prompted   the   Goths   to   continue  
expanding   into   the   lower   Danube   delta,   where   they   continued   their   onslaught  
and  pushed  into  the  Roman  territories.  In  the  latter  half  of  the  fifth  century,  what  
one  witnesses  is  thus  a  dramatic  increase  in  Ostrogothic  settlements  in  the  lower  
Danube   area.     The   concentration   of   the   Ostrogoths   was   a   telling   sign   of   the  
declining  position  of  the  Roman  political  order.  Meanwhile,  the  political  vacuum  
in   Italy   came   to   be   filled   by   Odoacer,   who   was   an   Ostrogothic   Germanic  
commander.  An  important  point  to  highlight  in  this  regard  is  the  heightened  role  
of  the  Germanic  tribes  in  the  Roman  armies;  the  anointment  of  Odoacer  was  in  
part  due  to  the  backing  he  received  from  the  Germanic  ranks.  The  overthrow  of  
Romulus  Augustulus,  the  last  Roman  king  of  the  Western  Roman  empire  signaled  
the   collapse   of   the   Roman   state   apparatus   within   Italy   and   the   rise   of   the  
Ostrogothic   kingdom   with   their   rulers   like   Odoacer   and   Theodoric,   who   later  
assumed   the   title   of   the   ‘King   of   Italy’   (493   CE),   foretold   a   story   of   social   and  
political  change  in  which  Feudalism  was  a  later  but  a  deftly  crafted  chapter.  
  While   the   southern   part   of   Western   Europe   fettered   under   Ostrogothic  
control,   in   the   western   part   of   the   empire   the   province   of   Africa   witnessed   a  
conquest   by   the   Vandals   much   like   Spain   witnessed   an   incursion   by   the  
Visigoths.  Thereatfer,  Roman  Gaul  was  lost  to  numerous  tribes  such  as  the  Suebi,  
the  Alani,  the  Franks  and  the  Burgundians.  It  was  in  Gaul  that  Feudalism  was  to  
emerge   in   its   classical   form,   though   after   almost   five   centuries   of   political  
intrigues.    
  Taken   together,   the   fourth   century   brought   with   it   the   onset   of   the  
barbarians   who   were   ancestrally   pagan   in   religion,   largely   devoid   of   literacy   and  
of   a   stabilized   property   system.   It   was   understandable   then   that   they   were   not  
themselves   capable   of   substituting   a   new   or   coherent   political   universe   for   it.  
They   therefore   lent   heavily   on   preexistent   imperial   structures,   which   were  
paradoxically  preserved  in  combination  with  Germanic  analogues  to  form  what  
the   Marxists   call   ‘a   systematic   institutional   dualism’.     The   Visigoths   travelled  
from  the  Balkans  to  Spain,  the  Ostrogoths  from  Ukraine  to  Italy,  the  Vandals  from  
Silesia  to  Tunisia  and  the  Burgundians  from  Pomerania  to  Savoy.  To  the  relative  
weakness   and   civilizational   isolationism   of   the   Barbarians   were   added   the  
intrinsic  difficulties  of  their  haphazard  migration  patterns.  There  was  no  case  of  
a  Barbarian  community  occupying  the  Roman  lands  directly  contiguous  with  its  
own   region   of   domicile.   What   resulted   was   thus   a   geography   populated   by  
Germanic   clusters   in   Gaul   (France),   Spain,   Italy   and   North   Africa.   These   were  
some   of   the   areas   where   the   Feudal   society   was   to   emerge   by   the   end   of   the   first  
millennium  CE.    
  Crucial   to   our   understanding   of   the   origins   of   the   Feudal   order   is   an  
analysis   of   the   political   development   of   the   Germanic   tribes   after   their   invasions  
of   the   Roman   heartland.   While   the   Barbarians   originally   possessed   an  
undifferentiated   and   egalitarian   social   order,   a   close   contact   with   centuries   old  
Roman  practices  did  inextricably  cascade  into  a  critical  rupture  away  from  their  
tribal   past   towards   a   sharply   differentiated   social   future.   The   appropriation   of  
the  Roman  sortes  by  the  militarily  powerful  Germanic  tribesmen,  possible  led  to  
these  ‘clan  optimates’  settling  rank  and  file  tribesmen  on  them  as  their  tenants  or  
as  poor,  small  landholders.  This  ‘Romanization’  of  the  Germanic  tribes  is  said  to  
have  taken  place  fairly  uniformly,  but  has  most  acutely  been  discussed  from  the  
point   of   view   of   the   Visigoths   among   whom   Bloch   believed   that   “(sortes)   were  
distributed  unequally,  on  the  basis  of  rank,  by  the  tribal  chiefs  thereby  creating  
Germanic   large   landowners   and   small   peasants   instead   of   dependent   tenants”.  
The  former  became  at  once  the  social  equals  of  the  provincial  aristocracy,  while  
the  latter  fell  directly  or  indirectly  into  economic  dependence  on  them.  Within  a  
generation   or   so,   a   Germanic   aristocracy   was   consolidated   on   the   land,   with   a  
dependent   peasantry   beneath   it.   With   the   gradual   crystallization   of   class  
stratification,  these  once  wandering  tribal  federations  became  territorially  fixed  
within  the  imperial  boundaries  of  the  former  Roman  Empire.  
  In  the  regime  of  hospitalitas  described  above,  it  is  not  difficult  to  identify  
the   pillars   of   an   incipient   feudal   order,   or   of   atleast   a   social   arrangement   in  
which   a   clearly   defined   hierarchy   between   the   ‘clan   optimates’   and  
‘subordinates’   was   taking   shape.   The   typical   Germanic   kingdoms   of   this   phase  
were  still  rudimentary  monarchies,  with  uncertain  rules  of  succession  resting  on  
the   shoulders   of   a   tribal   retinue   and   its   personal   allegiance   to   the   optimates.  
Moreover,  the  political  territorialization  of  the  tribes  after  the  invasions  further  
heightened   a   sense   of   regionalism   where   the   social   structure   (or   absence   of   it)  
came  to  be  built  around  the  tribal  chief  and  his  loyalists.    
  The  Germanic  chiefs,  whom  we  can  refer  to  here  as  powerful  landowners  
and   military   leaders,   gradually   became   answerable   to   the   inhabitants   of   their  
respective   areas.   In   this   kind   of   intriguing   social   arrangement   Bloch   saw   an  
administrative  structure  based  on  feudal  ties  to  be  in  its  embryonic  form.    This  
conceptualization,  that  has  often  been  invoked  by  both  Anderson  and  Bloch  alike  
to   suggest   the   antecedents   of   vassalage,   was   further   grounded   on   the   fact   that  
the   Germanic   chiefs   used   to   have   a   retinue   of   highly   trained   and   fiercely   loyal  
warriors  attached  to  them.  Like  the  vassal,  who  swore  (military)  allegiance  to  the  
lord,   these   warriors   shared   a   very   close   personal   bond   with   their   chief  
constituting   the   nucleus   of   skilled   fighters   who   accompanied   the   chief   on   his  
military   expeditions.   Among   the   Germanic   tribes,   the   term   Gisind   came   to   be  
used  to  mean  ‘companions  for  an  expedition’  which  in  Latin  works  of  the  later-­‐
days  came  to  be  translated  as  comitis  (companion).  The  institution  of  Comitatus  
thus  signified  the  legion  of  warriors  bound  to  a  military  leader  in  its  entirety.    
  While  the  pattern  of  an  emerging  class  of  lords  and  dependents  was  rife  in  
much  of  Western  Europe  around  the  late  fourth  and  early  fifth  centuries,  it  was  
in   the   state   established   by   the   Visigoths   that   it   became   entrenched   most  
ruthlessly.   The   second   wave   of   Germanic   invasions   was   to   have   far-­‐reaching  
consequences  in  almost  all  the  regions  of  the  erstwhile  Western  Roman  empire  
except  in  Spain,  where  the  conditions  prevailing  in  the  Visigothic  kingdom  were  
an   extension   of   the   first   phase   of   Germanic   invasions.   It   was   west   of   Spain,   in  
Gaul   that   the   second   Germanic   Volkerwanderungen   was   to   have   its   most  
profound  impact.    
  Before  elucidating  further  the  socio-­‐political  changes  that  set  the  stage  for  
the   development   of   the   Feudal   order   in   Gaul,   it   would   be   important   for   us   to  
recognize   that   fifth   century   Gaul   was   inhabited   by   a   variety   of   ethnic   and  
linguistic   groups.   Firstly,   Gaul   was   inhabited   by   the   indigenous   Celts   who   had  
lived   there   since   pre-­‐Roman   times.   Then   there   were   the   Latin   speaking   Roman  
settlers,  many  of  them  erstwhile  slaves,  coloni  and  free  peasants.  Alongside  these  
settlers,   the   first   wave   of   Germanic   migrations   had   brought   with   it   diverse  
peoples   of   Germanic   origin:   the   Burgundians,   Suebi,   Alani,   Franks,   Alemanni   and  
the  Visigoths,  who  controlled  parts  of  south-­‐western,  central  and  south-­‐eastern  
Gaul.    
  The  second  wave  of  Germanic  migrations,  that  brought  the  Anglo-­‐Saxons  
to   England   and   the   Lombards   to   Italy   brought   with   it   the   Franks,   Germanic  
peoples   hitherto   based   east   of   the   Rhine,   into   Gaul.   The   Frankish   conquest   of  
Gaul   like   the   other   Germanic   invasions   had   been   aided   by   the   withdrawal   of  
Roman   troops   from   the   Rhine   frontier.   The   Franks   inhabited   contemporary  
Belgium   before   they   infiltrated   southwards   into   Northern   Gaul.     Given   the  
relatively   shorter   distance   between   their   homeland   and   their   newly   inhabited  
territories,   the   Germanic   tribes   had,   in   their   second   migration,   a   greater  
incidence  of  continual  reinforcement.  Likewise,  the  Angles  and  the  Saxons  were  
located   on   the   North   Sea   coasts   of   Germany   opposite   England   and   the   Lombards  
were   based   out   of   Austria   before   they   conquered   Italy.   Besides   resulting   in   a  
more   permanent   peopling   of   the   ex-­‐Roman   provinces,   what   marked   the  
significance  of  the  second  wave  of  Germanic  invasions  was  the  linguistic  shift  it  
resulted  it.  
  The   ascendency   of   the   Germanic   tribes   meant   that   a   large   part   of   the  
Western  empire  now  spoke  Germanic  languages.  Infact,  the  interaction  between  
Germanic   languages   and   Latin   promoted   linguistic   diversity.   The   break-­‐away  
from   classical   Latin   was   due   also   to   the   neglect   of   reading   and   writing   by   the  
Germanic   barbarians.   Eventually,   distinct   languages   descended   from   Latin  
evolved   in   Italy,   France   and   the   Iberian   peninsula.   The   Germanic   languages,  
namely   German   and   Anglo-­‐Saxon   came   to   dominate   Germany,   central   Europe  
and   England.     About   the   linguistic   ferment   of   early   medieval   western   Europe,  
Perry   Anderson   remarks,   “the   cultural   sedimentation   of   the   second   wave   of  
conquests  was  much  deeper  and  more  lasting  than  the  first”.    
  The   rigid   and   brittle   dualism   of   the   5th   century   moreover,   progressively  
disappeared   in   the   6th   century,   paving   way   for   a   slow   process   of   fusion   that  
integrated  both  Germanic  and  Roman  elements  into  a  new  ‘synthesis’  that  was  to  
supersede   both   of   them.   The   system   of   hospitalitas   that   had   prevailed   more   than  
a   century   back   gave-­‐way   to   a   more   amorphous   two-­‐fold   pattern   amongst   the  
Franks  and  the  Lombards  whose  rulers  confiscated  the  local  latifundia  on  a  large  
scale   annexing   them   to   the   royal   treasury   and   distributing   them   to   their   noble  
retinues.  Moreover,  as  the  demographic  mass  of  the  second  wave  of  migrations  
was   definitely   greater   than   the   first   and   its   accretion   on   the   western   provinces  
slower,  steadier  and  more  organized,  the  popular  and  peasant  component  of  the  
new   rural   order   was   also   more   marked.   It   was   in   this   period   that   the   village  
communities   that   were   a   prominent   feature   of   the   subsequent   Feudal   system,  
and   indeed   resonated   with   Pirenne’s   conception   of   the   return   to   ruralization,  
seem  to  have  first  become  entrenched  in  France  and  elsewhere.    
  The  ‘political  development’  of  the  Germanic  peoples,  which  was  in  many  
ways   akin   to   their   ‘romanization’   had   thus   lead   to   the   disintegration   of   the   tribal  
organization   and   the   emergence   of   dependent   Germanic   peasants   on   the   one  
hand  and  a  small  landowning  elite  on  the  other.  The  landowning  elite  consisted  
of  clan  chiefs  and  professional  warriors.  Gradually,  a  monarchical  state  came  into  
existence,  although  initially  kings  had  to  share  power  with  other  tribal  chiefs  and  
clan  optimates.    
  Scholars  like  Anderson,  have  looked  at  Gaul  as  an  interesting  case  in  point  
where   two   convergent   processes   had   taken   place,   which   steered   Gaul   in   the  
direction  of  a  new  mode  of  production.  The  break-­‐up  of  Roman  rule  undermined  
the   stability   of   the   pre-­‐existing   villa   system;   there   soon   emerged   from   beneath   it  
an   older   Celtic   landscape   where   primitive   huts   and   peasant   dwellings   that   had  
been   overlain   by   the   Romanization   of   Gaul   marked   a   comeback.   At   the   same  
time,   the   in-­‐migrations   of   local   Germanic   communities   meant   that   many   of   the  
agrarian   traditions   of   their   tribal   homeland   were   thence   carried   into   Gaul.   In   the  
parlance   of   the   larger   Feudal   model   both   allodial   peasant   plots   and   communal  
village  lands  reappeared  in  Northern  Gaul.    
   The   growing   importance   of   land   could   also   be   visualized   from   the   dual  
roles   all   free   adult   males   of   the   Germanic   tribes   played.   In   times   of   adversity-­‐
such  as  during  the  Volkerwanderungen,  the  free  adults  males  of  the  tribe  served  
as  soldiers  for  military  mobilization.  In  times  of  peace  they  began  cultivating  soil  
and   tending   their   cattle.   These   tribal   men,   who   gradually   came   to   constitute   a  
class   of   professional   warriors   also   began   to   control   the   land   as   well.   As   social  
differentiation   among   the   Germanic   tribes   grew,   a   phenomenon   clearly  
indicating   the   influences   of   the   ‘Roman   legacy’   on   the   barbarians,   there   was   a  
separation   in   the   Germanic   ranks   between   he   who   thereafter   became   a  
‘professional  warrior’  and  he  who  thereafter  remained  a  ‘peasant’,  having  to  play  
a  marginal  role  in  the  army.  In  course  of  time,  the  Germanic  peasants  who  were  
settled   on   estates   taken   over   from   the   Roman   landed   aristocracy,   became  
indistinguishable   from   the   Roman   coloni,   former   slaves   and   other   dependent  
peasants.          
  Here   we   must   take   into   account   the   changes   taking   place   in   the  
geographical   region   commensurate   with   the   growing   Germanic   peasantary.   As  
the   identity   of   the   ‘warrior’   and   the   ‘peasant’   crystallized   and   the   later   became  
relegated   to   non-­‐military   pursuits,   scattered   Celtic   hamlets   gave   way   to  
nucleated   villages,   in   which   the   individual   property   of   peasant   households   was  
combined  with  collective  co-­‐aration  of  open  fields.  Above  these  settlements,  local  
chiefs  and  lords  consolidated  their  personal  powers.  By  the  turn  of  the  seventh  
century  thus,  roughly  200  years  after  first  setting  foot  in  the  Western  empire,  a  
legally   defined   and   hereditary   aristocracy   was   consolidated   in   the   Germanic  
provinces.  The  importance  of  the  second  wave  of  Germanic  invasions  must  thus  
be   seen   from   the   standpoint   of   populating   the   countryside   with   durable   village  
communities  and  clumps  of  small  peasant  property.  These  were  to  find  succor  in  
the  conceptualization  of  the  ‘parcelized’  feudal  order  as  the  serfs,  that  Anderson  
discusses  in  much  detail.  
     
  So   far,   our   characterization   of   the   antecedents   of   the   Feudal   order   has  
been   based   largely   on   the   social   dynamics   of   the   Germanic   tribes,   who   were  
essentially   barbaric   peoples.   To   explore   the   underpinnings   of   Western   European  
Feudalism   further,   we   will   now   look   at   the   Germanic   societies   as   an   evolved  
political  unit,  far  more  advanced  in  terms  of  militarization,  social  differentiation  
and  production  mechanisms  as  opposed  to  their  predecessors.  
  In   the   last   quarter   of   the   fifth   century,   a   Germanic   chief   named   Clovis  
assumed  the  title  of  the  King  of  the  Franks.  His  grandfather  Merovech  had  been  a  
formidable   Germanic   tribal   chief   whose   legacy   was   often   invoked   by   Clovis,   who  
became   the   founder   of   a   dynasty   of   Frankish   kings   called   the   Merovingians,   who  
ruled   over   Gaul   till   751   CE.   Clovis   unified   the   territories   of   northern   France  
which   were   occupied   by   various   Germanic   tribes.   Evicting   the   Visigoths   and  
Burgundians   from   South   Western   and   South   Eastern   Gaul   respectively,   the  
Merovingians   gradually   came   to   control   most   of   Gaul   by   the   second   half   of   the  
sixth  century.    
  One   of   the   important   factors   which   contributed   to   the   growth   of  
Merovingian   power   was   the   conversion   of   Clovis   to   Christianity.   In   this   regard,  
the   Franks,   as   a   Germanic   tribe,   presented   a   peculiar   case   as   being   the   only  
Germanic   peoples   to   have   converted   from   Arianism   to   a   more   orthodox  
Catholicism.   The   Council   of   Nicea   (325   C.E.)   had   rejected   Arianism   and   the  
Vandals,   Goths   and   Lombards   who   practiced   Arianism   occasionally   had   to   face  
the   hostility   of   the   existing   institutions   of   the   Church.   On   the   other   hand,   the  
Franks   could   rely   on   the   position   of   the   Church   for   consolidating   their   power.  
This  was  significant  given  the  fact  that  the  Roman  Church  was  the  only  organized  
institution  which  had  survived  from  the  Roman  period.  The  idea  of  the  Church  as  
a  ‘landed  magnate’  has  received  much  attention  from  scholars  of  all  ideological  
schools.  It  is  an  established  fact  that  the  Church  was  the  only  institution  to  have  
survived  the  crisis  of  late  Antiquity.  It  owned  a  lot  of  property,  had  a  monopoly  
over   literacy   and   education   and   exercised   considerable   political   and   social  
influence.  
  When  Clovis  died  in  511,  the  Merovingian  empire  was  divided  among  his  
four   sons.   The   rulers   retained   sufficient   authority   till   c.   630,   after   which   real  
power   passed   into   the   hands   of   Merovingian   officials   known   as   ‘Mayors   of   the  
Palace’.  Jacques  LeGoff  discusses  how  the  Merovingians  had  gradually  waned  as  
kings   and   were   gradually   dispossessed   off   their   power.   In   the   eight   century,  
palace   mayors   were   selected   from   the   Pepin   family   and   their   function   became  
hereditary.    
  Charles  Martels,  who  succeeded  his  father  Pepin  of  Herstal  in  714  CE,  was  
to  become  the  founder  of  a  new  dynasty,  the  Carolingian  dynasty,  over  which  the  
classical  Feudal  order  was  to  be  established  in  the  next  300  years  or  so.  Charles  
Martels  was  considered  to  be  a  true  king  and  had  proved  his  military  credentials  
against   the   Muslims   in   732.   The   famous   Battle   of   Poitiers,   in   which   the  
Carolingian   monarch   defeated   the   Muslim   chief   Abd   Al-­‐Rahman’s   forces   was  
perhaps  a  historical  turning  point  in  the  history  of  Gaul  as  well  as  in  the  course  of  
Feudalism.   Had   the   Muslims   not   been  evicted  by  the  Carolingians,  Northern  Gaul  
would   perhaps   have   never   conceded   to   a   transition   to   Feudal   society   in   the  
manner  that  it  did,  unlike  Visigothic  Spain  where  the  Muslim  invasions  halted  the  
early  evolution  of  the  Feudal  model.      
      Charles  Martels  is  credited  as  the  first  to  give  concrete  shape  to  some  of  
the   institutions   which   became   an   integral   part   of   European   feudalism.   He  
initiated   a   programme   to   make   the   military   structure   of   the   empire   more  
efficient.   But   the   other   contributions   of   the   Carolingian   empire   were   in   the  
religo-­‐cultural  sphere.  Upon  the  death  of  Charles  Martels,  his  son  Pepin  the  Short  
had   himself   consecrated.   In   light   of   the   Franks’   patronage   to   Christianity,   this  
return  to  the  ritual  of  a  biblical  kingship  consecrated  the  person  of  the  king  as  a  
Christian   leader.   Consequently,   as   the   only   ruler   to   have   been   crowned   by   the  
Church,   Pepin   took   the   title   of   Christianissimus   and   proclaimed   himself   the  
foremost  of  the  kings  of  Christendom.    
  In   accordance   with   the   prevalent   Frankish   custom,   after   Pepin,   the  
Carolingian   empire   was   divided   between   his   sons.   In   771   C.E.,   the   elder,  
Carloman   died,   leaving   the   young   Charles   to   govern.   Charles   was   the   future  
Charlemagne,  and  it  was  he  who  set  the  new  dynasty  of  the  Carolingians  firmly  
upon   the   throne.   The   historiography   of   the   Annales   School   associates   the  
Carolingian   emperor   Charlemagne   with   the   emergence   of   the   Classical   Feudal  
society.   Before   dealing   with   the   rudiments   of   such   a   society,   let   us   first   look   at  
the  character  of  Charlemagne  in  some  detail.    
  Charlemagne   was   first   and   foremost   a   great   warrior   and   the   wars   that   he  
waged   were   simultaneously   Christianization   campaigns.   One   of   Charlemagne’s  
earliest   campaigns   was   directed   against   the   Lombard   kingdom   of   Italy.   The  
Lombard  king,  although  a  convert  to  Christianity,  had  begun  harassing  the  pope’s  
posessions   in   Italy.   The   Papal   States,   as   they   were   called,   were   located   in   central  
Italy   and   were   directly   administered   by   the   Pope.   On   being   usurped   by   the  
Lombards,  the  pope  extended  an  appeal  to  the  Franks  to  take  action  against  the  
Lombards.    Owing  to  his  iron-­‐clad  cavalry,  Charlemagne  won  a  dazzling  victory  
against  the  Lombard  king  Didier  in  773.  The  defeat  of  the  Lombard  king  and  the  
repatriation   of   the   Papal   states   to   the   pope   reinforced   the   prestige   of   the  
Carolingian   monarch   and   strengthened   the   alliance   between   the   pope   and   the  
Frankish  state.    
  Charlemagnes   empire   eventually   included   France,   central   Europe,  
northern   Italy   and   a   small   part   of   Spain.   By   the   beginning   of   the   ninth   century  
the   Carolingian   empire   was   the   largest   and   most   powerful   political   entity   in  
western   Europe.   The   most   important   factor   in   this   situation   was   the   alliance  
between  the  Franks  and  the  papacy;  in  the  Frankish  sovereigns  the  popes  sought  
and  found  a  strong,  secular  arm  to  protect  them  against  enemies.  It  was  against  
the   backdrop   of   the   increasing   bonhomie   between   early   medieval   sovereignty  
and   religiosity   that   Charlemagne   was   crowned   Roman   emperor   by   the   Pope,   Leo  
III  in  800.  Through  his  anointment,  Charlemagne  was  accepted  as  the  undisputed  
master   of   the   western   provinces   of   the   erstwhile   Roman   empire.   The   principal  
seat  of  government  was  at  Aix-­‐la-­‐Chapelle  (Aachen),  located  in  Germany.  
  It   is   interesting   to   note   here,   that   the   new   ritual   whereby   the   Pope  
crowned   the   Roman   emperor   had   some   implications   for   the   concept   of  
monarchy   in   medieval   Europe.   Kingship   came   to   be   seen   as   divinely   ordained.  
This  ‘divine  right’  as  well  as  the  intimate  link  between  the  religious  authority  of  
the   pope   and   the   political   authority   of   the   emperor,   was   proclaimed   through   the  
use   of   the   title   ‘Holy   Roman   Emperor’     by   the   successors   of   Charlemagne.   This  
terminology   and   ritual   helped   the   institution   of   monarchy   to   retain   its   relevance  
within  the  political  structure  that  was  evolving  in  Western  Europe.  In  the  wider  
context   of   the   Feudal   order,   the   role   of   the   Monarchy   in   unifying   the   vassals,  
military  leaders  and  serfs  is  much  merited.          
  Our  understanding  of  the  antecedents  of  Feudalism  would  be  incomplete  
without   taking   cognizance   of   the   European   legacy   of   Charlemagne.   For,   when  
LeGoff  says,  “…the  modern  Carolingian  myth  does  include  certain  basic  elements  
that   are   relevant   to   the   future   Europe”   he   indeed   seems   to   be   referring   to   the  
Europe  in  which  Feudalism  came  to  be  entrenched  for  a  good  five-­‐hundred  years  
or  so.    
  Perhaps  the  most  formidable  problem  with  which  Charlemagne  was  faced  
was  the  virtual  absence  of  a  centralized  apparatus  to  govern  an  empire  as  vast  as  
his.  One  of  the  exigencies  of  his  rise  to  power  was  thus  that  Charlemagne  had  to  
mould   such   an   apparatus   out   of   the   institutions   which   he   had   inherited.   At   the  
same   time   he   had   to   accommodate   the   interests   of   the   regional   and   local   elites  
(the   Feudal   lords)   consisting   of   military   leaders,   former   Germanic   chiefs   and  
whatever   remained   of   the   Roman   oligarchy.   The   seeming   sinecures  
notwithstanding,   the   ‘Feudal   lords’   wielded   enormous   political   and   economic  
power   at   the   regional   and   local   levels.   Their   role   in   the   political   dynamics   of  
eighth   century   Europe   was   enough   for   Charlemagne   to   have   integrated   them  
with  the  machinery  of  the  state.    
  Charlemagne   divided   the   empire   into   a   number   of   administrative   units  
which   were   placed   under   regional   governors   called   ‘counts’   and   ‘dukes’.     They  
had  economic,  juridical  and  military  powers  as  well  and  acted  as  the  officiating  
administrators   in   their   respective   regions.   In   order   to   monitor   the  functioning   of  
these   governors,   the   emperor   created   a   separate   cadre   of   emissaries-­‐the   missi  
dominici-­‐who   were   sent   out   to   review   the   state   of   affairs   in   the   provinces.   The  
overarching   attempt   was   clearly   towards   a   centralized   bureaucratic   system,   in  
which   these   ‘emissaries   of   the   master’   communicated   directives   of   the   central  
government  to  the  counts.    
  The   legacy   of   Charlemagne   was   also   associated   with   his   ingenious  
blueprint   for   the   legal   unification   of   Europe.   Charlemagne   decreed   rules   called  
Capitularies   that  affected  the  major  fields  of  government  and  were  applicable  to  
the   entire   territory   of   the   empire.   In   LeGoff’s   terms,   “they   (the   rules)   affected  
everywhere   and   everybody:   the   large   rural   estates,   teaching,   legislation,   the  
various  divisions  of  the  kingdom  and  the  emperors  own  envoys”.  The  essence  of  
these   capitularies   was   a   revolutionary   vision   harboured   by   the   emperor,   of   the  
possibility   of   European   legal   unity.   The   barbarian   legislations   were   hitherto  
founded   on   personal   rights   and   were   markedly   ethnic   in   character.   By   altering  
the   basis   of   legislation   toward   centralized,   bureaucratized   decrees,   Charlemagne  
sought  to  replace  the  aboriginal  legal  diversity.    
  Yet,   despite   all   the   efforts   of   Charlemagne,   in   the   long   run   the   historical  
situation   was   not   favourable   for   centralization.   The   Carolingian   ‘state’,   for  
whatever   ascribing   it   the   epithet   ‘state’   is   worth,   did   not   have   resources   to  
maintain  a  large  bureaucracy.  There  was  no  standing  army.  The  big  feudal  lords  
(counts   and   dukes)   who   governed   the   provinces   received   grants   of   land   as  
remuneration   for   their   services.   In   light   of   the   feigned   attempts   at   centralization  
on  part  of  the  government,  the  situation  created  by  the  Carolingian  empire  was  
soon  to  cascade  into  one  in  which  the  process  of  centralization  was  completely  
reversed  and  the  feudal  lords  accumulated  more  and  more  power.    For  revenue  
collection,   recruitment   of   soldiers,   payment   of   salaries   to   government   servants  
and  the  appointment  of  officials  was  not  centralized.    
  Another   interesting   trend   towards   the   growing   power   of   regional   units  
was  marked  by  the  ecclesiastical  legitimation  that  these  units  came  to  acquire.  As  
the  newly  created  regional  units  were  placed  under  the  administrative  power  of  
the   counts,   they   simultaneously   came   to   be   presided   over   by   religious  
figureheads:  superior  officials  of  the  Church  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  of  
supervising  the  religious  affairs  of  these  areas.  Alongside  the  count,  who  was  the  
administrative   head   these   ‘archbishops’   and   ‘bishops’   were   the   supreme  
religious   authorities   of   the   provinces.   The   growing   importance   of   the   regional  
units   in   the   centuries   following   the   collapse   of   Carolingian   power   can   in   many  
ways   be   linked   to   their   association   with   the   ‘Church’   which   was,   as   indicated  
earlier,  a  powerful  ‘landed  magnate’  in  its  own  regard.  The  Church,  in  Anderson’s  
terms,   “preserved   the   attainments   of   Graeco-­‐Roman   antiquity   and   transmitted  
them  to  the  Carolingian  era,  acting  as  an  indispensable  bridge  between  the  two  
epochs.   It   was   indeed   the   main   frail   aqueduct   across   which   the   cultural  
reservoirs  of  the  Classical  World  passed  to  the  new  universe  of  Feudal  Europe”.  
Since  the  Church  possessed  large  landed  estates,  it  could  dominate  the  economy  
in  the  regional  areas  and  thus  create  a  situation  in  which  the  importance  of  the  
regional   units  gradually   surpassed   the   importance   of   the   whole   (empire),   as   was  
the  mark  of  the  Feudal  society.        
  Under   the   government   of   bishops   and   a   secular   clergy,   what   one  
witnesses   in   the   ninth   century   is   the   unification   of   a   Europe   of   warriors   and   a  
Europe  of  peasants.  All  the  subjects  of  Charlemagne’s  empire  depended  directly  
upon   the   sovereign   and   were   warriors,   bound   in   duty   to   perform   military  
service.  Every  free-­‐man  was  a  potential  warrior  who,  either  directly  or  serving  in  
a   contingent   of   men   provided   by   his   overlord,   had   to   take   part   annually   in   the  
sovereigns  military  campaigns.  He  was  also  expected  to  provide  his  own  horse,  
shield   and   weapon.   It   can   thus   be   said   that   for   most   of   its   part   the   Carolingian  
empire  lived  off  the  spoils  and  booty  attained  through  its  own  conquests.    
  While  all  free-­‐men  were  in  duty  bound  to  render  military  service  to  their  
lord,   they   were   seldom   all   summoned   for   action   at   the   same   time.   Medieval  
society   and   culture   did   not   involve   huge   numbers   of   individuals   engaged  
incessantly   in   the   act   of   warfare;   its   army   leaders   were   men   whose   wealth  
stemmed  essentially  from  the  income  produced  by  their  large  estates.  The  land  
itself  was  the  other  basis  of  the  fortune  and  power  of  these  future  ‘Europeans’.  
This  must  be  seen  in  light  of  the  fact  that  about  90  percent  of  the  lay  population  
lived  and  worked  on  the  land  owned  by  these  powerful  figures.    
  By  the  time  the  Carolingian  empire  seems  to  be  approaching  its  noon,  we  
thus  see  the  emergence  of  pre-­‐eminent  Feudal  hierarchy  in  which  there  was  an  
inherent   ambiguity   at   the   vertex   of   the   Feudal   dependencies.   While   the   monarch  
would,  in  theory,  form  the  tip  of  the  hierarchical  pyramid,  in  principle  the  highest  
superordinate   level   of   the   feudal   hierarchy   in   any   given   territory   of   Western  
Europe   was   necessarily   different   only   in   degree   from   the   subordinate   levels   of  
lordship   beneath   it.   The   monarch   was   thus   a   feudal   suzerain   of   his   vassals,   to  
whom   he   was   bound   by   reciprocal   ties   of   fealty,   not   a   supreme   sovereign   set  
above  his  subjects.  His  calls  on  the  vassals  would  be  essentially  military  in  nature  
and   he   would   have   no   direct   political   access   to   population   as   a   whole,   for  
jurisdiction   over   it   would   be   mediated   through   innumerable   layers   of  
subinfeudation.  
  To   think   that   Charlemagne,   who   had   all   along   the   7th   and   8th   centuries  
adopted  a  tough  monarchical  stand  was  actually  merely  a  figurehead  in  essence,  
does   indeed   merit   some   thought.   While   attempts   at   the   centralization   of  
Carolingian   Europe   were   indeed   adopted,   they   remained   largely   unsuccessful.  
After   Chalemagne’s   death   in   814   control   passed   onto   his   sons   of   whom   Louis   I  
was   the   only   one   who   held   even   a   vestige   of   power.   Earlier   attempts   at  
centralization   began   to   dismember   in   favour   of   the   regional   counts   and   dukes  
who   exercised   a   greater   degree   of   political,   economic   and   military   sway   in  
different  parts  of  the  empire.  The  strengthening  of  the  position  of  regional  kings  
sowed   the   seeds   for   Feudalism   proper,   which   came   against   the   backdrop   of  
Carolingian  collapse  to  the  Capetian  dynasty  which  ruled  over  France  till  1328.    
   
  It   would   be   important   for   us   at   this   juncture   to   shift   away   from   the  
political   narrative   and   dwell   on   the   conceptual   development   of   Feudalism   that  
developed  by  the  beginning  of  the  tenth  century.  We  have  looked  at  the  attempts  
made   by   the   Carolingian   monarch   to   centralize   his   empire,   which   indeed  
resulted  in  perpetuating  the  decentralization  of  authority  in  actuality.  The  state  
being  inadequately  equipped  to  dispense  centralized  control,  it  comes  to  us  as  no  
surprise   that   the   polity   of   the   feudal   era   was   hard-­‐pressed   to   devolve   political,  
economic  and  military  power  to  the  overlords.    
  Defining  the  pervasiveness  of  the  Feudal  system,  Marc  Bloch  states  that  in  
the   Feudal   era   it   was   common   ‘for   every   man   to   be   another’s   man’.   This  
statement  accounts  not  only  for  the  relationship  between  the  Lord  and  the  vassal  
but  also  takes  into  account  the  subinfeudation  etched  into  the  Feudal  hierarchy  
in  which  every  lord  was  at  the  same  time  someone  else’s  vassal  or  man.  The  term  
‘vassal’  derives  from  the  Celtic  ‘vassus’,  a  term  that  seems  to  have  been  in  fairly  
popular  use  in  Gaul.  An  integral  part  of  the  lord-­‐vassal  relationship  was  that  the  
lord  was  expected  to  provide  for  the  maintenance  of  his  vassals.  For  this  purpose  
a  grant  would  be  made  to  the  vassal  for  his  own  sustenance  and  for  the  support  
of   his   troops.   Such   a   conditional   grant   (of   land)   made   by   the   lord   to   his   vassal  
was  known  as  the  ‘fief’.  A  vassal’s  submission  was  inseparably  linked  to  the  grant  
of  a  fief  by  the  lord  to  the  vassal.  It  was  the  fusion  of  vassalage  (homage  to  the  
lord),  fief  (conditional  land  grant)  and  military  service  that  took  place  in  the  later  
half  of  the  9th  century  and  was  central  to  the  functioning  of  the  feudal  system.    
  According  to  Anderson,  the  core  region  of  European  Feudalism  was  that  
in  which  a  ‘balanced  synthesis’  of  Roman  and  Germanic  elements  had  occurred,  
essentially   northern   France   and   the   zones   contiguous   to   it,   where   the  
Carolingians   held   sway   till   the   mid   9th   century.   To   the   south   of   this   area,   in   Italy,  
Spain   and   Provence   the   legacy   of   Antiquity   remained   dominant   and   the  
dissolution   and   recombination   of   barbarian   modes   of   production   took   place  
under   the   overarching   framework   of   Antiquity.   And   then   there   were   the  
territories  of  modern  Germany,  Scandinavia  and  England,  where  Roman  rule  had  
either   never   reached   or   had   a   shallow   footing   leading   to   a   slow   transition  
towards  Feudalism  under  the  indigenous  dominance  of  barbarian  heritage.    
  The   Carolingian   heartland   thus   formed   the   breeding   ground   for  
Feudalism  in  its  most  classic,  rapid  and  complete  forms.  The  agrarian  economy  
of   northern   France   was   dominated   by   landed   estates   of   the   Feudal   lords.   The  
typical   landed   estate   of   Medieval   Europe   was   the   ‘manor’   or   ‘seigneurie’.   A  
manor   was   the   sum   total   of   all   the   arable   land   in   the   locality   over   which   the   lord  
had   superior   rights.   It   formed   an   estate   which   had   two   separate   components;  
one  portion  under  the  direct  management  of  the  lord  (demesne)  while  the  rest  
would   comprise   peasant   holdings   (virgates).   Production   on   the   demesne   was  
carried  out  partly  by  household  serfs  of  the  lord  and  partly  by  the  peasants  who  
had  been  given  small  plots  on  the  remaining  portion  of  the  manor.  The  peasants  
being   tenants,   were   required   to   pay   rent   in   the   form   of   labour   services.   On   the  
part  of  the  estate  that  they  farmed  themselves  the  peasants  would  try  to  produce  
a  small  surplus  to  sell,  so  that  they  could  buy  whatever  necessary  goods  were  not  
provided  on  the  estate.    
  Each   manor   was   thus   an   integrated   economic   unit,   more   or   less   self-­‐
sufficient   and   capable   of   producing   almost   all   articles   it   needed   for   everyday  
consumption.  Within  the  manor,  the  peasant  families  also  acted  as  both  a  social  
and   an   economic   unit.   It   is   important   to   note   that   all   dependent   peasants,  
whether   coloni,   former   slaves   or   Germanic   tribesmen,   who   were   tied   in   this  
manner  to  the  lord’s  portion  of  the  estate  became  an  undifferentiated  category-­‐
serfs-­‐   by   the   early   medieval   period.   The   serfs,   literally   ‘(those)   tied   to   the   soil’  
had   little   or   no   mobility.   In   the   manorial   system,   based   upon   the   lord-­‐serf  
surplus   extraction   relationship   a   number   of   dues   and   taxes   were   levied   on   the  
serfs   including   corvee,   taille,   tithe   and   banalities.   The   only   type   of   landed  
property   free   from   any   obligations   in   the   medieval   period   was   the   ‘allodium’-­‐  
freehold   land,   which   was   initially   a   peculiar   form   of   tribal   property   and   which  
over   a   period   of   time   became   the   private   property   of   the   family   (of   peasants)  
which  settled  over  it.    
  Perry   Anderson   provides   a   fairly   helpful   glance   of   the   entire   ‘Feudal  
order’  as  it  were,  where  agrarian  property  was  privately  controlled  by  a  class  of  
feudal   lords,   who   extracted   a   surplus   from   the   peasants   by   politico-­‐legal  
relations  of  compulsion.  The  Feudal  system  was  thus  based  on  the  extraction  of  
extra-­‐economic   coercion,   which   took   the   form   of   labour   services,   rents   in   kind  
and  customary  dues  owed  to  the  individual  lord  by  the  peasant.  Its  result  was  a  
juridical  amalgamation  of  economic  exploitation  with  political  authority.    
  At   the   same   time,   the   property   rights   of   the   lord   over   his   land   were  
typically  of  degree  only:  he  was  invested  in  them  by  a  superior  to  whom  he  owed  
knight   service.   The   liege   lord   in   his   turn   would   often   be   the   vassal   of   a   Feudal  
superior   and   the   chain   of   such   dependent   tenures   linked   to   military   service  
would   extend   upwards   to   the   highest   peak   of   the   system-­‐   in   most   cases,   a  
monarch-­‐   who   owned   and   controlled   the   entire   demesne.   The   consequence   of  
such  a  system  was  that  political  sovereignty  was  never  focused  in  a  single  centre.  
As  Anderson  classically  remarks,  “the  functions  of  the  State  were  disintegrated  in  
a   vertical   allocation   downwards,   at   each   level   of   which   political   and   economic  
relations   were   integrated”.   This   ‘parcelization   of   sovereignty’   was   constitutive   of  
the  whole  Feudal  mode  of  production.  
  But  why  Northern  Gaul?  The  collapse  of  the  Carolingian  Empire  in  the  9th  
century   was   followed   by   internecine   warfare   and   Norse   invasions.   Amidst   the  
generalized   anarchy   and   insecurity,   there   occurred   a   universal   fragmentation  
and   localization   of   noble   power,   which   became   concentrated   into   selected  
strong-­‐points   and   castles   across   the   country.   By   the   10th   and   11th   centuries,  
harsh   seigneurial   jurisdictions   were   imposed   over   the   rural   mass   that   became  
enserfed,   part   of   an   overarching   system   built   ground   upwards.   Alongside   the  
Norsemen,   the   year   1000,   whose   crucial   importance   has   been   highlighted   by  
Jaques   LeGoff,   saw   the   in-­‐migration   of   the   Vikings   and   Hungarians,   who  
represented   a   ‘challenge’   comparable   to   a   third   Volkerwanderungen   of   sorts.  
Moreover,  there  was  a  difference  between  Feudal  developments  in  Northern  and  
Southern   Gaul   that   needs   to   be   contextualized.   In   the   former   territories,   the  
nobles  managed  to  gain  control  over  selective  strong-­‐points  through  the  creation  
of  fiefs  while  in  the  territories  of  the  latter,  where  slavery  continued  a  larger,   a  
non-­‐dependent,  peasant  population  existed.  By  the  late  10th  century,  there  were  
over  two  score  distinct  political  divisions  in  Gaul  with  the  Dukes  and  Counts  of  
six   major   ‘potentates’   exercising   autonomous   power:   Flanders,   Normandy,  
France,  Burgundy,  Acquitaine  and  Toulouse.      
  Given   the   extremely   hostile   and   militaristic   nature   of   the   succession  
intrigues  that  played  out  after  the  death  of  Charlemagne,  scholars  like  Heinrich  
Brunner   have   defined   European   Feudalism   in   a   way   of   organizing   society   for  
‘instant   warfare’.   The   insecurities   caused   by   the   Hun,   Germanic,   Slav,   Magyar,  
Scandinavian   and   Arab   invasions   throughout   the   time-­‐period   of   the   4th-­‐11th  
centuries   further   perpetuated   the   need   to   devolve   a   system   that   ensured   the  
regular  supply  of  troops  wherein  each  lord  was  dependent  on  his  vassal  and  so  
forth  for  military  mobilization.    
  Equally  significant    are  some  of  the  technological  innovations  of  a  military  
nature,   which   became   available   during   the   Carolingian   and   Post-­‐Carolingian  
times,  the  most  important  of  these  being  the  introduction  of  the  stirrup.  Scholars  
believe   the   idea   of   the   stirrup   originated   in   the   eastern   orient   and   travelled  
westwards  to  the  Carolingian  heartland  where  it  was  adopted  in  a  modified  form  
by   the   Franks   in   the   first   quarter   of   the   eighth   century.   In   his   classic   Feudal  
Society,   Marc   Bloch   examines   the   impact   of   the   stirrup   on   medieval   warfare  
suggesting   how   it   revolutionized   methods   of   warfare   by   giving   the   cavalry   a  
decisive  edge.  The  stirrup  combined  with  other  innovations,  as  for  instance  the  
horse-­‐shoe,  combined  to  make  fighting  on  horseback  more  effective.    
  A  more  eulogistic  perspective  of  the  stirrup  was  given  by  Lynn  White  who  
advanced  the  novel  hypothesis  that  the  introduction  of  the  stirrup  was  one  of  the  
factors   which   led   to   the   rise   of   Feudalism.   According   to   White,   the   stirrup  
revolutionized  medieval  warfare  by  accounting  for  the  development  of  ‘mounted  
shock   combat’,   in   which   the   rider   and   the   horse   were   welded   together   and   the  
agility   of   the   horse   was   transferred   into   the   force   of   the   weapon,   usually   a   spear.  
The   military   supremacy   of   the   Carolingian   empire,   which   was   central   to   the  
development   of   the   institution   of   Vassalage   founded   on   the   promise   of   ‘knight  
service’   was   probably   adopted   in   the   days   of   Charles   Martels,   who   was  
responsible   for   the   creation   of   a   new   cadre   of   cavalry   (as   separate   from   the  
infantry).   The   Arab   cavalry   and   its   defeat   at   Poitiers,   had   perhaps   set   a  
noteworthy   precedent   for   the   Carolingians.   In   White’s   hypothesis,   often  
criticized   for   containing   a   strong   ‘technical   determinism’   the   credibility   of   the  
vassal,   to   whom   the   monarch   granted   landed   property,   was   based   upon   his  
ability   to   maintain   horses   and   troops.   The   introduction   of   the   stirrup   (and   the  
horse-­‐shoe)   were   liable   to   make   the   vassal   accept   the   land-­‐grant   more   readily.  
Moreover,   the   transition   to   a   cavalry-­‐based   army   consisting   of   professionally  
mounted   warriors   (knights)   was   only   completed   in   the   tenth   century,   ultimately  
tied  to  the  technological  changes  that  had  taken  place.    
  Full-­‐fledged  Feudalism  had  thus  been  established  in  Northern  France  by  
the  tenth  century;  behind  it  a  synthetic  legacy  of  Roman  and  Germanic  elements  
coupled   with   the   social,   political   and   cultural   reorganizations   attempted   by   the  
Carolingians.   Feudalism   would   expand   during   the   11th   century,   reach   its   zenith  
by  the  12th  and  13th  centuries,  witness  its  inevitable  crisis  during  the  onset  of  the  
14th   century   and   eventually   cascade   into   a   social   formation   of   a   different   sort.  
Within  the  ambit  of  our  study,  what  matters  most  is  that  the  centuries  between  
C.E.  500-­‐1000  clearly  make  for  a  case  of  the  advancement  of  Feudal  antecedents.  
The   great   jump   forward   in   the   agrarian   surplus   yielded   by   Feudalism   together  
with   the   technical   innovations   which   were   the   basis   for   advancement,  
essentially,  the  use  of  the  iron-­‐plough  for  tilling,  the  harness  for  equine  traction,  
the   water-­‐mill   for   mechanical   power,   the   horse   show   and   stirrup   for   military  
advancements,   the   three-­‐field   system   for   crop-­‐rotation   were   all   of   great  
significance  in  the  formation  and  consolidation  of  Feudal  social  relations.    
  The  Feudal  social  relations  were  characterized  and  governed  by  a  scalar  
gradation  of  property  in  which  control  over  land  formed  the  overarching  adjunct  
to   class   stratification.   The   Feudal   agrarian   economy   was   thus   characterized   by  
the   spread   of   two   trends:   that   of   Viticulture,   for   the   production   of   wine   which  
was   an   elite   beverage,   involving   a   higher   degree   of   skilled   labour   and  
profitability,  mainly  for  consumption  by  the  aristocratic  lords  and  that  of  cereal  
cultivation  that  was  essentially  the  work  of  the  peasantry  that  consumed  bread  
as  its  staple  food.  The  same  epoch  also  witnessed  a  renewed  wave  of  enserfment  
with   the   adoption   of   the   doctrine   of   ‘glebe   serfdom’   wherein   free   peasant  
holdings,   which   were   hitherto   subject   to   partible   inheritance,   were   converted  
into  dependent  tenancies.  Allodial  holdings  generally  receded  and  dwindled  and  
a  further  spread  of  the  fief  system  was  evident.    
  The   dramatic   quickening   of   the   forces   of   production   had   meanwhile   set  
off   a   corresponding   demographic   boom,   with   the   total   population   of   Western  
Europe   doubling   between   the   10th-­‐14th   centuries.   What   was   to   follow   was   the  
revival  of  trade  after  its  decline  in  the  Dark  Ages  and  the  burgeoning  of  Medieval  
towns,   which   prospered   as   intersection   points   for   regional   markets   and  
manufacturing   centres.   The   majority   of   the   new   towns   were   in   origin   either  
promoted  or  protected  by  Feudal  lords.  The  patrician  strata  controlled  the  urban  
economy   and   the   lowly   plebian   masses   were   located   below   the   merchant-­‐
manufacturer  oligarchy.  The  paradigmatic  medieval  towns  of  Europe  were  thus  
self-­‐governing  communes,  controlled  by  the  Feudal  dynamic  and  politically  and  
militarily   autonomous   from   the   nobility   (and   Church).   The   larger   point   being  
that  while  the  middle  ages  (Germanic  period)  starts  with  the  countryside  as  the  
locus  of  history,  its  further  development  then  proceeds  through  the  opposition  of  
‘town’   and   ‘country’.   This   dynamic   opposition   of   town   and   country   was   alone  
possible  in  the  Feudal  mode  of  production.        
  Our   analysis   has   thus   taken   us   through   a   range   of   historical   trends   that  
took  place  since  the  4th  century  whose  cumulative  result  was  the  emergence  of  
the   Feudal   Order.   What   would   take   place   in   the   forthcoming   centuries   (1000-­‐
1400)   would   be   trends   that   would   emanate   from   these   Feudal   social   relations,  
guided   by   the  staunch   Feudal   Dynamic   that   was   a   motley   admixture   of   Roman,  
Germanic,  Merovingian  and  Carolingian  legacies.    
 
References:  
 
  Anderson,   Perry,   “Passages   from   Antiquity   to   Feudalism”,   Verso,   2006,  
New  York  
  Le   Goff,   Jacques,   “The   Birth   of   Europe”,   Blackwell   Publishing,   2005,  
Cornwall  
  Bloch,  Marc,  “Feudal  Society”,  Routledge,  1989,  New  Haven  
  Deansley,   M,   “A   History   of   Early   and   Medieval   Europe   from   476-­‐911”,  
Methuen  and  Co.  Ltd.,  1960,  London