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Boys play on a destroyed Syrian army tank in north-western Aleppo. UNICEF/Romenzi photo
That’s no fewer than 1,800 T-55, T-62 and T-72 tanks plus BMP fighting vehicles
exploded, burned, disabled or seized by rebels—with potentially thousands of crewmen
also being killed, injured or captured.
The high attrition of Al Assad’s combat vehicles should give hope to the opposition that
it can defeat government forces even without air support, sophisticated anti-armor
weaponry or large numbers of its own tanks.
But with 75 percent of tanks and fighting vehicles remaining, Al Assad probably has
sufficient heavy forces to continue fighting for years. To say nothing of light forces.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xkpZdieKh14
Isolated armor
Before the civil war, Al Assad’s Syrian Arab Army possessed 1,600 T-72s, some 1,000
T-62s, 2,250 T-55s and 2,450 BMPs, according to the U.S.-based Washington Institute
for Near East Policy.
But the army’s doctrine did not take advantage of all this mobile, protected firepower.
“The bulk of the army … is now a garrison force best suited to static defense in depth
and has limited real-world maneuver, combined-arms and joint warfare training,”
Anthony Cordesman wrote in his 2008 book Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War.
In other words, the tanks were meant to sit in one spot and fire on an attacking enemy,
more or less like artillery. And they weren’t combined with foot soldiers—an essential
tactic in urban fighting, where the tanks need the infantry’s protection and the infantry
needs the tanks’ firepower.
So when Al Assad sent his army to retake cities and towns controlled by rebels, it’s no
wonder that the lightly-armed opposition fighters were able to isolate and take out many
of the tanks and BMPs. Hundreds of videos posted to the Internet or handed out by rebel
media reps depict opposition infantry attacking tanks with roadside bombs, rockets and
even grenades dropped into turret hatches.
To be sure, assaulting an army tank is dangerous business for the rebels. One fighter
named Basel, attached to the Sham Falcons brigade in Idlib, earned the nickname “Tank
Killer” for destroying just one armored vehicle in 2011.
And the LiveJournal user provided fresh stats for the period April to October, adding 363
more vehicles to Al Assad’s losses. All told, Al Assad has lost no fewer than 1,836
armored vehicles since the fighting began, if the estimates are to be believed.
The analysts counted only destroyed, damaged and captured vehicles—not dead, injured
and captive crew members. One video posted online recently shows rebels hitting what a
tank which then bursts into flames. One of the two men in the turret bails out and
sprints away. The fate of the other turret crewman is unknown.
The driver, apparently injured, pulls himself out of his hatch and falls to the ground,
where he is quickly shot dead. It’s worth noting that no regime infantry are anywhere in
view as the rebels finish off the tank and its crew.
Usually the crew survives a hit on a vehicle, according to one Syrian tanker. “Rarely does
anyone actually die inside the crew compartment,” the soldier told an interviewer. “Most
of the time both the tank and crew are still combat capable.”
It’s not unheard of for crews to abandon perfectly functional armored vehicles, allowing
them to fall into rebel hands. The opposition Free Syrian Army possesses dozens of
captured tanks and enough trained crewmen to use them.
The tanks are used as a kind of mobile reserve, moved from hot spot to hot spot to
reinforce opposition infantry. Rebel fighters in Areha, near Idlib, in late 2013 kept at
least one tank and one BMP hidden among buildings, periodically sending the tank
forward to fire a few rounds at regime positions.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHbbnr-jTMc
Endangered species?
There is scant evidence Al Assad’s army is getting any better about blending tanks and
infantry. Some pro-government militias have been seen working in conjunction with
armor. But increasingly the regime relies on the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah for
ground troops—and Hezbollah is strictly a light infantry force that has never practiced
combined arms.
Whereas the rebels, for all the internal divisions that threaten their overall strategy, have
become steadily more experienced and better-armed. Opposition forces have gotten
their hands on a few anti-tank guided missiles—either paid for by the rebels’ Middle
East supporters and smuggled over the border, or seized from the regime. A missile can
be seenWrite
About striking a tank
Help in the video above.
Legal
But Al Assad still has the advantage of sheer numbers. “Equipment losses, especially for
Get
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regime, appalso been significant, but they do not appear to have seriously affected
have
the regime’s ability to operate,” according to the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy.
And besides, air power, not armor, is the regime’s biggest advantage. Just as the rebels
have fought for years without the advantage of heavy armor, Hezbollah likewise conceivably
could continue to fight for the regime without the Syrian army’s tanks backing it up.
It seems that even taking out 1,800 tanks in 24 months is not enough to win a war.
Updated on Nov. 18 with fresh stats. Sign up for a daily War is Boring email update here. Subscribe to
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