Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EMPIRICAL STUDY
Author(s): M.P. Singh
Source: Journal of the Indian Law Institute , OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1971, Vol. 13, No. 4
(OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1971), pp. 612-640
Published by: Indian Law Institute
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43950302
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
INTRODUCTION
"THE LIFE OF THE LAW", said Justice Holmes, "has not been
has been experience".1 This statement made in relation to the who
law is more accurately applicable to the field of constitutional law
branch of law does not consist only "of usages, commonly calle
tions, which without being enacted are accepted as binding by a
concerned in government."2 Although for the most we have
legal rules in the form of our Constitution but at the same time
conventions cannot be ruled out. Rather it has been accepted
Constitution implies various conventions of British constitution
be followed.3 Though if is nowhere mentioned in the body of our
tion that the British or any other conventions are to be followed, ye
the natural consequence of its framework. As will be discussed he
any other view of the Constitution will give a picture of the Con
which shall make it unworkable and out of tune.4
It is not to be inferred that for all times to come we have to depend
on British constitutional conventions and that we cannot establish our own.
Once they are adopted and followed we can modify and develop them accord-
ing to our own needs. But in bringing about any modification and change
a historical phenomenon is to be carefully noticed. And that phenomenon
is that the development in Britiain as well as in this country during the
British regime (at least from the beginning of the 20th century) has been
from autocracy to democracy and representative government. With this
historical factor at work the Britishers had been fighting since long against
their own political institutions while we had been fighting against the British
rulers. If this fact is lost sight of then we shall be doing something derogatory
to that for which we and our ancestors fought for gaining freedom and
to write and think on concrete problems which arose out of the emergence
of different parties in the legislatures, coalition governments and defections.
The offfice of the Governor attracted the attention of the people and became a
subject of controversy and criticism in regard to the part Governors played
during this period. The lawyers and the political thinkers started writing to
place the position of the Governors in the right perspective so as to put them
beyond controversy and criticism by giving the proper guidelines with respect
to their position in our constitutional structure. But no one can faresee
all the situations and problems that may arise in future requiring fresh
thinking and new solutions. The situation created by the dismissal of
Ajoy Mukherji's ministry in 1968 in West Bengal and the situation created
by the U.P. Governor's action in 1970 asking Chief Minister Charan Singh
to resign were entirely different. The two situations being different, the
solution in one cannot become a precedent for the other. The best way
to deal with different situations and problems is to correctly appreciate the
constitutional provisions so that they give the right guidelines to meet them
avoiding the possibility of a fresh controversy and criticism. For that
purpose one has to look upon the relevant constitutional provisions as parts
of the whole organism and not in isolation.
Bearing these principles in mind, it is proposed to discuss the subject
on the following lines :
In order to find out definite and workable answers to the above and
other allied questions, these are studied in their order and sequence.
"With respect to the relation of the executive to the legislature",
says Garner, "governments may be classified as cabinet government (the
terms 'ministerial', 'parliamentary' and 'responsible' are sometimes
preferred), and what, for lack of more suitable terms has been ca
dential or congressional government."9 He defines cabinet o
mentary government as :
1. A Historical View
24. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 549 at 556. One may say that the view expressed in this
case is merely an obiter , but it may be submitted that in terms of article 141 of the
Constitution even abiter dicta of the Supreme Court are binding as law. See, I.T. Commr.
v. Vazir , A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 814 at 821.
25. For details see, K.V. Rao, supra note 11 at 58-83; Shiviah, 1 J.C.P.S. (1968)
p. 77.
26. 4 'No system of representative government has a history so continuous or so
successful as that of Great Britain", Laski op . cit., p. 13.
27. It should not be taken as denial of governorship in India prior to that but then
the word used was Subahdar under the Muslim rulers.
28. S. 46.
he was not bound in all cases by the advice of his Council29 or of the Ministers3
and in the latter case he could refuse such advice if he saw "sufficient cause
to dissent" from their opinions.31 The Ministers were made the represent
tive of the people and not the official or nominated members.82 Th
system of government, "diarchy" as it was called, however, could not function
well as the Governor frequently used to dissent from the opinion of his
Ministers.33 The people went on fighting for a transference of powers fro
the Governor to the representatives of the people, i.e., the Ministers.34 A
a result thereof, the Government of India Act 1935 was passed by Britis
Parliament. The Act contemplated a federal government and in the pro-
vince, abolishing the difference of 'reserved' and 'transfereď subjects, it
made a provision similar to the present article 163(1) of the Constitution
in so far as the exercise of his functions by the Governor was concerned.3
What the Governor could do in his discretion was the choosing, summonin
and dismissal of ministers. Apart from discretionary powers, certa
responsibilities were also imposed upon the Governor to be exercised by
him in his individual judgment.36 While the Ministers were to be th
representatives of the people no provision was made for making the
responsible to the legislature or to any of its Houses. On the other hand
the Governor was to act under the control and direction of the Governor-
General in regard to the matters in his discretion or individual judgment.
As this Constitution also was not up to the wishes of the people, the feder
tion at the centre could never come into being and the provincial governments
could also not function properly and the Governors had more opportunit
of interference in the governmental business.38 In the course of the effor
to provide a Constitution according to the wishes of the people, a Constituent
Assembly was established in 1946. Hardly had the Assembly been able to
proceed due to the internal differences, when the decision was take
to grant independence to India on 15th August, 1947 by dividing i
into two dominious - India and Pakistan. Under the authority of the
29. S. 50(2).
30. S. 52(3).
31. Ibid.
32. S. 52(2) provided that "No minister shall hold office for a longer period than
six months unless he is or becomes an elected member of the Local Legislature."
33. See, Gwyer & Appadorai "Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution
1921-47" Vol. I XXXIV-XXXVI (1957).
34. Id. at XXXVIII.
35. S. 50(1) : "There shall be a council of ministers to aid and advise the Governor
in the exercise of his functions except in so far as he is by or under this Act required
exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion."
Similar provision was there for the Central Government, see, S. 9(1) - "There shal
be a council of ministers not exceeding ten in number, to aid and advise the Governo
General in the exercise of his functions except in so far as he is by or under this Act
required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion."
36. S. 52(1), (2).
37. S. 54.
38. S. Gwyer & Appadorai, op. cit. P. XLVII.
The specific provisions which require the Governor to act in his discretion
are article 239(2)44 and paras 945 and 1 846 of the 6th Schedule of the Constitu-
tion.47 Apart from these three provisions there are certain provisions
in the Constitution which impose 'special responsibility' upon the Governor.48
But there is no scope to read discretion in 'special responsibility' and the
Governor has to act on the advice of his Council of Ministers.49 At the
most by imposing 'special responsibility' on the Governor, the Constitution
authorises the President to give directions to the Governor to implement
those provisions and in case of non-compliance to take action under article
365.50 In so far as the implied discretion of the Governor is concerned
it has been said that
The words, therefore, at the end of article 163 that "except in so far
as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions
or any of them in his discretion" are to be read with reference to these
provisions and not in a sense giving a general discretion to the Governor
to disregard the advice of the Council of Ministers. And looking from
that angle "these discretionary powers do not affect the normal position,
that like the President of India, the Governor must act on the advice of
his Council of Ministers."54 To read anything else in article 163(1) or in
any other article would not only subvert the principle of parliamentary
government but will also make the Constitution unworkable55 as the Gover-
nor cannot dispense with the necessity of keeping a Council of Ministers56
and the Council shall not like to remain in office if the Governor does
not act on its aid and advice. The specific mention of a few discretionary
powers, however, may be defended consistently with the principle of
parliamentary government57 in so far as the Governor himself cannot do
anything even in these matters except through the President or under his
superintendence, who himself acts upon the advice of his Council of
Ministers58 who are responsible to the Lower House of Parliament.59 The
Constitution-makers have taken in this way every care to establish and
protect the responsible or parliamentary form of government and every
effort must be made to uphold that principle avoiding any misleading
51. Basu op. cit. p. 266. See also Seervai op. cit. p. 775-76.
52. Art. 200 relates to the ascent of the Governor to the Bills passed by a State
Legislature and its second proviso is that " . . . . the Governer shall not assent, but
shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the
Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to
endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill."
53. Under article 356(1) the Governor may report to the President that the govern-
ment of the State cannot work according to the Constitution.
54. Seervai, op. cit., p. 776. For a similar view see, P.S. Choudhri op. cit. p.
52-53.
55. ". . . it must be realised that, theory apart, all the great organs of the State
must act in harmony and co-operation, if Government is to go on." Seervai, op. cit.,
p. 775.
56. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the provisions in article 74(1) and
163(1) that "there shall be a Council of Ministers" is mandatory and there can be no
exception. U. N. Rao v. Indira Gandhi , A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1002. It has also been
held by the Orissa High Court that functioning of the Governor in Orissa in Jan., 1971
for about two days without a Council of Ministers was unconstitutional. See, Navbharat ,
dated 22-6-71.
57. Cf. "But the whole idea of vesting discretionary powers in the head of the
State is against the basic characteristics as well as imperative conditions of smooth working
of responsible parliamentary government", Shukla, V.N., 2 J.C.P.S . No. 56 (1968),
58. Art. 74(1).
59. Art. 75(3),
60. This conclusion is supported by the Ram Jawaya case, op. cit ., and which has
been relied upon and accepted by the Constitutional authorities and others. For reference
one may look to Seervai, op. cit. p. 774, Basu, op. cit. 4th Ed. Vol. 2, p. 418.
61. Reliance by the King on the advice of anyone else except his ministers has
been characterised as 'patently unconstitutional', Laski, op. cit. p. 413.
62 . ses, V.N. Shukla - 'Federalism and Parliamentary Government' 2 J.C.P.S.
47, (1968).
63. See, Laski for expressing the similar views about the position of the King in
Britain, op. cit., p. 530-31.
64. Id. at 396.
65. Similar view has been expressed by Lord Esher and supported by La
with respect to England. "If the Constitutional doctrine of ministerial respons
means anything at all, the King would have to sign his own death warrant, if
presented to him for signature by a minister commanding a majority in Parliam
there is any tempering with this fundamental principle, the end of monarchy is in s
cited in Laski, op. cit. p. 429.
( b ) Dismissal of Ministers
The pleasure of the Governor in this sense has been held exclus
without any limitations.71 But, with all respect to the decision gi
the Court, this is neither a practice in any other parliamentary governm
nor is it practicable in India to uphold this view in our present constitu
set-up. While drawing a distinction between the parliamentar
presidential systems of government, Dr. Ambedkar so emphat
explained this constitutional position that it cannot be expressed in
words than his own :
This statement applies mutatis mutandis to the position in States and this is
one of the basic principles which distinguishes the cabinet government from
the presidential type of government.74 However, before pursuing this
point further, to understand the position clearly, it is necessary to draw a
distinction between the dismissal of individual ministers and the dismissal
of the entire Council of Ministers.
(/) that the Governor cannot dismiss a minister against the advice
of the Chief Minister; and
(//) he cannot retain a minister whom the Chief Minister does not
want.
For other constitutions see, Jennings, op. cit. p. 831, p. 207 ; the Canadian
Const. Sec. 11; the Australian Const. Sec. 62.
71. See, Mahabir Prasad v. P.C. Ghose, A.I.R. 1969 Cal. 196.
72. E.g., in England it is a recognised law of the Constitution, bee, Jennings,
op. cit. p. 207, Laski, op. cit. p. 229, Lowell, The Government of England (1912), p. 56.
73. B. Shiva Rao, op. cit. Vol. 3, p. 421.
74. See, Garner op. cit. p. 324 and 341.
75. Jennings, op . cit., p. 208,
"A minister always holds his office 'at the disposal of' the Prime
Minister, so that he may be said to have resigned - and the news-
papers will announce he has resigned- when he knows nothing
whatever about it. There are parts of the world where no public
servant is ever 'dismissed' because 'discontinued' is not such a
harsh term; similarly in Britain a minister is not dismissed, he
'resigns in order to facilitate a reconstruction of the Government'
76. Id. at 207. See also Lowel, op. cit., p. 56 and Laski, op. cit. p. 229.
77. See, Dawson, Government of Canada (1949) pp. 190 and 206, and Kerr, Law
of the Australian Constitution, (1925) 218.
78. Id. at 208.
79. Id. at 210-211. About this practice Jennngs says, "there is a tradition
a kind of public-school fiction - that no minister desires office, but that he is prep
carry on for the public good, that tradition implies a duty to resign when a hint is
op. cit. p. 215.
80. Id. at p. 215.
81. For example Dr. S.P. Mukherjee and Dr. John Mathai resigned in 1950 for
reasons of difference with Prime Minister Nehru and similarly Deputy Prime Minister
Morarji Desai resigned in 1969 for differences with Mrs. Indira Gandhi and four other
ministers also resigned in the same year at the behest of the Prime Minister.
should resign,92 or
(i'O the Chief Minister should resign, if he has lost the majority
support in the legislature, without waiting any longer.
But the U.P. case which arose in 1970 was unique and quite strange. On a
rift having been created in the Congress party in 1969 the then Chief Minister
of U.P., Shri C. B. Gupta, resigned on February 10, 1970 when he lost the
majority support. An alternative government was formed on 17th of February
1970 by the B.K.D. with Mr. Charan Singh as the Chief Minister. The New
Congress - the largest single party in the Assembly - agreed to support it from
outside but it later on joined the government with the larger share on 19th
April, 1970.93 There was an understanding among the leaders of the New
Congress that the B.K.D. would merge into the New Congreess. Buton28th
August, 1970 the B.K.D. decided against the New Congress and withdrew its
support to the government but its ministers did not resign and insisted upon
remaining in office. The Governor stripped them of their [portfolios on
27th September94 but did not dismiss them and meanwhile asked for th
advice of the Attorney-General of India and of the Advocate-General of th
State. The former advised for the resignation of the Chief Minister and
the latter for the dismissal of the ministers named by the Chief Minister
On 28 th of September the Governor wrote to the Chief Minister expressing
his inability to accept his advice to dismiss the Ministers and asked him to
resign immediately as his continuance in the office had become unconsti-
tutional since the withdrawal of support by the major partner in the coali
tion.95 Meanwhile the Chief Minister had written several letters to the
Governor asserting his claim of majority support in the State Legislature
and requested the Governor to wait for few days till the Assembly met on
6th of October or to call the Assembly even on an early date. However,
the Governor, on 29th of September, reported to the President to
impose Presidential rule in the State as the Constitutional machinery had
broken down.96 The report was considered by the Union Cabinet on the
same day and was sent by a messenger to the President who was touring in
Russia and Presidential rule was imposed on the 2nd of October in the State
The action of the U.P. Governor, the advice of the Attorney-General and the
action of the President were largely deplored through newspapers and public
speeches.97 Writ petitions were also filed in the High Court of Allahabad
92. This was done by the new Congress in U.P. when after bifurcation of their
party in 1969 they withdrew their support to Chief Minister C.B. Gupta.
93. The number of Ministers of the two parties was like this: B.K.D- 10 cabinet
ministers including the C.M., 2 Ministers of State and 8 Deputy Ministers.
New Congress- 13 Cabinet Ministers, 7 Ministers of State and 6 Deputy Ministers.
94. See, The Hindustan Times , dated 28.9.70.
95. The Hindustan Times , dated 29.9.70.
96. See, The Hindustan Times , dated 30.9.70 and for report dated 2.10.70
97. See, The Hindustan Times, dated 30.9.70 to 3.10.70. For several weeks, a large
number of lettęrs to the editor appeared in the papers.
is to resign and form a new team, if he is in that position, which may supp
his views.102 Therefore, in a situation like that of U.P. where the Ch
Minister tendered his advice to the Governor to dismiss the majority of
Council of Ministers, while the Ministers were determined not to res
and were asking the Chief Minister to resign, the Governor could hav
justified his stand in not accepting the advice of the Chief Minister by reso
ing to article 167(c) of the Constitution and could have avoided much of
misunderstanding and criticism.
It is submitted that even a literal reading of article 167 (c) does n
convince the writer that the word "Minister" used therein includes C
Minister by implication, rather it suggests a meaning quite opposed t
The provision runs as :
(a)
(b)
(c) if th
tion of
a decis
not be
True it
office d
the Chie
provisio
within
in claus
which i
absurdit
theword
would am
"It shal
(c) if th
of the
been ta
been co
Actuall
Constitu
102. Cf.
103. One
does not
Chief Min
in clause
Chandrab
with respect to the centre, i.e., article 78.104 However, as is evident from
Constituent Assembly Debates,105 it was introduced just to give pl
certain conventions recognised and accepted in Britain and to reconc
Governor's functioning on ministerial advice with his duties, to "pr
protect and defend the Constitution". Hence what is being done
name he must remain informed of that so that he may properly warn, g
or encourage his Council of Ministers about the decisions on which
are going to take his signatures. Almost no discussion took place on
78 in the Constituent Assembly106 but there was a good debate on
167(c)107 before it was adopted . However, there is nothing in that d
ion which suggests that the term 'Minister' was meant to include the
Minister also. On the contrary, the discussion shows that it was m
to apply to the Ministers other than the Chief Minister so that he could
a better hold on his colleagues.108
The British conventions also do not throw much light on this
because such conventions seem to have fallen into disuse there.109 It, how
does not mean that there has never been such practice when the K
Queen might have asked the Prime Minister to put a matter befor
Cabinet, on which any Minister had taken a decision without the Ca
consideration.
A number of such instances are available during Queen Vict
reign.110 Not only that but there are also instances available wher
issues have been raised by the Queen or the King, like any Cabinet M
and the Prime Minister has been asked to take immediate action w
104. There was no provision similar to Art. 167 or Art. 78 in the Gover
of India Act, 1935. Nor such provision existed in the Draft Constitution prepare
Constitutional adviser. It was at the stage of the consideration of this draft
Drafting Committee introduced cl. 58- A (Art. 78) and 128- A (Art. 167) which
Articles 65 and 147 in the Draft Constitution prepared by the Committee.
Shiva Rao, op. cit., Vol. III. pp. 350, 353-54, 358, 367 and 433.
105. Speech by Dr. Ambedkar VIII C.A.D. at 533.
106. VII C.A.D. at 1363.
107. See. C.A.D. Vol. VIII, pp. 533-547.
108. For example, defending the article K.M. Munshi said, "when a Minister acts
behind the back of his colleagues, behind the back of the Chief Minister who is responsible
for all the action of the Ministers, why cannot the Governor say, 'Here is a particular
order I feel that . . .all the Ministers must meet and consider it together' .... Therefore,
it is a safeguard which presumes the collective responsibility and powers of the Prime
Minister, and not a power which interferes with the Government." Id. at p. 541.
109. Basu, op. cit. Vol. 3, p. 280.
1 10. For example Lord Palmerston's decision to receive some foreign deputations
was sent for the consideration of the Cabinet: See, Jennings, op. cit. p. 209. And again
Jennings says, "Queen Victoria frequently asked for foreign office despatches to be sub-
mitted to the Cabinet. In 1858 and on many other occasions, she asked the Prime Minister
to bring before the Cabinet the question of the national defences," Id. at 364.
It should, however, be noted that on no occasion was the Prime Minister holding
the portfolio of either the defence or of foreign affairs, and actually the British Prime
Minister never keeps any important portfolio for himself.
Governor may block the way, even if the Chief Minister sug
he has informally consulted his colleagues on telephone or
Governor may do so, for example, if he wants to malign th
in the eyes of the people and at the same time to give a chance t
tion to rise to the occasion. A little delay caused by the Gov
emergent cases may be enough to ruin the administration an
fall of the government.114 And the motive for such an acti
of Governor cannot be outrightly rejected in India.115
Even if it be accepted that article 167(c) is meant to
Chief Minister also, it cannot help in the matter of app
or dismissal of the Ministers. Political considerations apart
discretion of the Chief Minister as to whom he wants to keep in
no matter whatever be the number of Ministers. The dismissal of the indivi-
dual Ministers is also not a matter which must have the approval of the
Council of Ministers. It is the concern of the Chief Minister and he must
know the consequences of the exclusion of a particular Minister. This
principle would apply whether the government is of a single party or it is
a coalition. How, after all, can the Governor keep those Ministers in
office whom the Chief Minister does not want ? Either they should vacate
their offices or the Chief Minister would make them to vacate ultimately
by his own resignation.116
The impracticability of any other approach on this point may be further
demonstrated by the fact which has already been suggested to have been
established in the Constitution117 that in the matter of appointment of the
Ministers the Constitution, in very clear terms, confers the full authority
on the Chief Ministers and there is no need to take guidance on this point
even from the British Constitution or any other Constitution having a
parliamentary form of government. In the choice or appointment of
Ministers the Constitution does not impose any restrictions on the Chief
114. And if the same principle is applied to article 78(c) relating to the centre then
such an action on the part of the President may put the independence and sovereignty of
the country in doubt in the cases of national peril such as war.
115. Such motive on the part of the Governor may arise for two reasons. Firstly,
the Governor is the appointee of the Central government and the party in power at the
centre may be the party in opposition in that State and to boost the opposition the
Governor may be influenced by the centre. Secondly, he himself, generally being a
politician, may be having allegiance to the party in opposition and, therefore, may remain
in search of a chance to wreck the government. See, Siwach, op. cit. 2 J.C. P. S. 75.
116. The English law on this point is that by the resignation of the Prime Mini ster
the offices of other Ministers do not fall vacant even if they have resigned till the Queen
accepts the resignation and they may be taken in the new Ministry without formal appoint
ment. See, Jennings, op cit. p. 86-87. But this proposition may not be exactly
applicable in India where the Constitution does not expect any Ministers outside the Council
of Ministers and the Council of Ministers is nothing without a Chief Minister at its head.
(Art. 164(1) ) and it should be regarded to have been dissolved as soon as the resignation
of the Chief Minister is accepted.
117. See, supra, appointment of Ministers. It is an established rule in England
also that for appointing the Ministers, the Prime Minister is not required to consult
his cabinet. See, Jeanings, op. cit. p. 66, 68.
118. The Government of India, Act, 1935, for example had provided a maximum
limit of ten ministers at the centre (Sec. 9). The A.R.C, has also recommended a limit
on the number of ministers. See , Report of A.R.C, on State Admn. p. 9.
119. For example in the case of U.P. if the Governor was to support his move by
taking recourse to article 167(c), then it could be defeated by the Chief Minister just
by appointing four new ministers of Cabinet rank from any of the parties which were ready
to support him.
120. "The point is that as soon as he tries to get what is virtually a group to favour
his view; he is abandoning that neutrality in action which is of the essence of his position.
From intrigue within a Cabinet to intrigue with the opposition is a gravely short step."
Laski op. cit . p. 280.
". . . the King will be conscious that he does not give an impression that he is partial
to any party", Keith, The King and the Imperial Crown , 177.
121. It was the first occasion after the commencement oi the Constitution that
any Council of Ministers was ever dismissd. Such dismissals prior to the commence-
ment of the Constitution do not create any precedents as the then constitutional provi-
sions were different from the present ones. Hence, as has been observed later here,
those cases cannot be relied upon at all to support the Governor's power to dismiss the
Ministeries.
may ascertain the will of the nation,"128 or at least he can exercise this p
in "grave circumstances."129 But now the statements of law by
and Keith remain merely a part of constitutional theory clearly de
from constitutional practice and almost all the modern writers agr
that point. "There can never be," according to Wade and Phillips
justification for the dismissal against the advice of the Prime Minist
a Ministry which commands a majority in the House of Commons.130
is no justification for the Queen not to accept the advice of the Cab
till "the Constitution functions in the normal manner"131 is the view of
Jennings and for Laski it would be the violation of the Constitution by the
King if he refuses to accept the advice of the cabinet on the pretext of saving
the Constitution.132 He goes further and says that Kieth's view that
the power of dismissal "exists only for wise employment in grave circum-
stances" is unsound and no wise king would take the responsibility upon
himself to decide about "wisdom" and "gravity" of the circumstances
because a single unwise exercise of that power may put the existence of
monarchy in doubt.133 Thus in England it is a well recognised principle of
constitutional practice that even in matter of dismissal the Queen acts on
the advice of the cabinet. There are no examples available from other
parliamentary democracies where the governments were dismissed by the
Head of the State. The only examples available are from India itself which
happened under the Government of India Act, 1935. But they cannot
be cited as precedents134 to interpret the power of the Governor under article
164(1) and for the exercise thereof, for the simple reason that under that
Constitution the Governor was expressly empowered to dismiss the ministers
in his discretion. The only exercise of such discretion by the Governor
of West Bengal is enough to show that such an exercise of power is neither
the law nor it can become the practice if the parliamentary democracy is
to work.
Sir Ivor Jennings mentions few exceptional cases in which the Queen
may refuse to accede to the policies of the Cabinet to see the normal
functioning of the Constitution.135 But in the case of India none of those
140. Wade & Phillips, op. cit. p. 82; J.R. Sivach, op. cit. p. 75.
141 . The reason is that the members of the legislature may be criticising the govern-
ment or its individual ministers yet they may support their policies when put before them
in the House and if they do so then their criticism is no justification for treating the govern-
ment in minority.
142. Eeven defeat on any matter is not treated the defeat of the government suffi-
cient to justify the resignation. It is only when the government is defeated on a major
policy issue or a motion of no-confidence is passed that the government is required to resign
See, Basu, op. cit. p. 456; Chalmers & Hood Phillips, Constitutional Law of Great
Britain , p. 198. (1946).
143. If the Governor's choice of the new Chief Minister is found wrong on a test
in the Assembly then he would be in a very awkward position and such a position is very
much likely to arise in the present çonditions of Indian State legislatures where no single
party forms the majority,
Conclusion
144. See, Wade and Phillips, op. cit. p. 82, Laski, op. cit. 410. In England King
George V accepted the advice of a P.M. who had fallen into minority.
In India also the minority government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi was allowed
dissolution of the Lok Sabha in Dec. 1970. It must, however, be noted that the minority
was not proved in the Parliament by the defeat of government. Similarly the Orissa
Government of R.N. Singh Deo would have been allowed such dissolution in Jan. 1971
but for the technical reason that the formal decision on that matter was taken after the
resignation of the Chief Minister had already been accepted. In June 1971 the Punjab
Governor allowed dissoluton of the Assembly to the Badal Ministry which had fallen
into minority.
The A.R.C, has also recommended the acceptance of the advice even of a defeated
Chief Minister to dissolve the Assembly, see, Centre-State Relations , Recommendation
No. 13.
145. Art. 355.
146. Art. 356,
M.P. Singh *
147. A.R.C, has also made a similar recommendation. See, Report on State
Administration , p. 11.
♦ LL.M., Faculty of Law, University of Delhi.