MIAA v.
MIAA is a GoCC, which owns Prior notice and hearing –
Airspan and operates NAIA. Its
properties, facilities, and
services are available for public
use, subject to fees, rates,
charges fixed by law.
Petitioners are uses, lessees
and occupants of petitioner’s
properties.
MIAA issued Res. No 97-51
which announced an increase
in rentals on its buildings, and
land. Business concessions
were also increased.
MIAA issued 98-30 adopting
20% increase recommended by
Punongbayan and Araullo.
Thus, it issued A.O 1 to reflect
the new schedule of fees
charges and rates
MIAA issued Res. No 99-11
which further increased other
airport fees and charges and
rentals for hangars.
Respondent requested that
the implementation be
deferred for lack of prior
notice and hearing. The
request was denied. Petitioner
also refused to renew the ID
cards of respondents and their
Petitioner: MIAA contends that its charter authorizes increase of fees without need for public
hearing. It argues that its service is not a public utility where its fees are subject to state
regulation. It insists that the fees, charges, rates are contractual in nature, hence if
respondents are not amenable, they are free to leave. Moreover, it charter, being a special
law prevails over the PSA and Admin Code.
Respondent: MIAA is an attached agency of the DOTC and in case of conflict between the
charter and Admin Code, the latter prevails. Its increases must be approved by the DOTC.
 The charter of MIAA provides “The Authority may increase or decrease the rates
subject to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 325, whenever practicable. They
did not see this because BP 326 was inserted through an amendment.
 BP 325 provides: “The revision of rates shall be determined by the respective
ministry heads or equivalent functionaries conformably with the rules and
regulations of the Ministry of Finance issued pursuant to Section 4 hereof, upon
recommendation of the imposing and collecting authorities concerned, subject to the
approval of the Cabinet. . .”
 Hence the authority to adjust fees, etc. is limited by BP 325 to mere
recommendatory power. It is the “ministry head” and further approval of the
Cabinet that determines.
 Further, it is an attached agency of the DOTC. Hence, the ministry head is the Sec. of
DOTC. Clearly, it has no authority to increase its rates, etc.
 As an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the Administrative
Code. Sec 9, Book VII specifically requires notice and public hearing: “(2) In the fixing
of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first
hearing thereon.”
 Hence two grounds:
o Ultra vires – they don’t have authority to increase the rates, etc.
o Lack of prior notice and public hearing – null and void
petitioner's theory that its fees, charges, and rates are contractual in nature and thus,
respondents are free to terminate the lease contracts should they be unable to pay the
increased dues is unacceptable.
vehicle stickers. Hence
respondents filed a Complaint
for Injunction with the RTC.
Subic International Air filed a
Complaint in Intervention. RTC
rendered a summary
judgement nullifying the
resolutions of MIAA
Section 17. Licensing
Procedure. -
Section 18. Non-expiration of
 As the country's principal airport for both international and domestic air transport,
petitioner's properties, facilities, and services are imbued with paramount public and
even national interest. Petitioner is not at liberty to increase fees, charges, or rates at
will, without due regard to parameters set by laws and regulations.
 Among the considerations mentioned, EO 903 provides that fees and charges
should reflect adequately the costs and increases in price levels and the volume of
traffic.
Petitioner’s claim that it will redound to the benefit of the PH
 Such increases will be passed on to the ordinary Filipino. The lesse corporations who
are unable to pay exorbitant fees, charges, and rates imposed by petitioner could be
left with no choice but to close shop leaving hundreds if not thousands of Filipinos
jobless.
 No one needs reminding that higher prices and more unemployment are the last
things our country's challenged economy needs at this time. Balancing of interests
among the parties concerned, in a public hearing, is obviously called for.
Fair and Reasonable increases— question of fact – cannot be raised
Petitioner: its charter authorized it to increase its fees, charges, and rates in order to reflect
current price levels. In addition, it asserts that the increases it imposed were duly approved,
or validated, by an independent accountant. Petitioner also avers that its imposition of higher
fees, charges, and rates will ultimately redound to the benefit of the country
Resp: Reasonableness is a question of fact. In any case, respondents allege that petitioner's
private accountant erroneously based its recommendation on the price levels of other
countries. Respondents also draw attention to the fact that the increases implemented by
petitioner actually exceeded what its private accountants, Punongbayan and Araullo,
recommended.
(1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by
notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as
practicable. (Secs. 10-15)
(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public
security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended,
revoked or annulled without notice and hearing.
Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license
 License. -
Sy Trading v. Petitioner is engaged in the
Central Bank business of trading fruits from
different parts of the world. It
wrote to Deputy Gov. of
Central Bank requesting
authority to import from
Japan on “no-dollar” basis for
the amount of $700k.
The CB denied the request as
only those enumerated under
CB Cir. 247 are allowed no-
dollar importation.
Petitioner asked for
reconsideration explaining
their case is very special and
that the fruits it will be
imported will be needed this
coming Christmas.
Later the Monetary Board of
with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire
until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency
1. A license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty
2. It is not a property in any constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional
prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend.
3. A license is a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms.
4. It is not in any way vested, permanent, or absolute.
5. A license granted by the State is always revocable.
6. This power to revoke can only be restrained by an explicit contract upon good
consideration to that effect.
7. The absence of an expiry date in a license does not make it perpetual.
Notwithstanding that absence, the license cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority
under which it was issued.
Basic principles of Admin Law
 License or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or
permittee, and is not a property…
 A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to
do what is within its terms. It is not in any way vested, permanent, or absolute. A
license granted by the State is always revocable.
 Notwithstanding the absence of an expiry date, the license cannot last beyond the life
of the basic authority under which it was issued.
The license covers only the Christmas season of 1968
 The cause or compelling reason why it sought the Special Import Permit because the
importation of fresh fruits calls for 175% Special Time Deposit for 120 days and
"(w)ith the fast approaching Christmas season" petitioner-appellant "cannot cope
with the demands of [its] buyers
 The omission of an expiry date in the Special Import Permit affords no legal basis for
petitioner-appellant to conclude that the said permit is impressed with continuous
validity… It was petitioner-appellant itself which furnished the life span of the permit,
consistently pointing out that "the main purpose of this importation is to serve the
requirements during the Christmas Season" of 1968. Logically, the MB did not have to
specify the expiry.
Petitioner asserts that the validity of the Special Import Permit has been passed upon in the
Alikpala case
the CB approved the request
for only $350k subject to 100%
special time deposit. Hence
petitioner sent another letter
request asking if they be
allowed to put up 20% special
time deposit instead of 100%
for 120 days. The request was
denied.
Thereafter, petitioner started
to make its importation on Feb
25, 1969. By June 1970, it has
already used up $314/350k.
Prudential Bank was agent in
issuing release certificates for
the entry of the goods.
Petitioner requested from
Deputy Gov. an amendment of
the country of origin of the
importation to include other
countries except communist
countries. However, Deputy
Gov replied that the Special
Import Permit was intended
only for Christmas of 1968.
Later, Collector of Customs
issued warrants of seizure and
detention against the fruits
consigned to petitioner, being
imported in violation of CB Cir. Petitioner cannot rely on Ramos v. CB
289 – since fresh fruits are non-
essential consumer goods they
are banned. ITC, the SCourt
 No, that case involved the question of due process. It did not make a ruling on the
continuity of the special import permit.
The petitioner is estopped
 It was petitioner that brought up the reason that it needed the permit to meet the
special demands of Christmas. Upon this representation, the Monetary Board granted
the permit.
 Where conduct or representation has induced another to change its position in
good faith or the same is such that a reasonable man would rely thereon, the
consequences of such conduct or representation cannot later on be disowned.
Petitioner invokes doctrine of promissory estoppel – it points to a letter issued by Dir.
Antiporda informing Prudential to continue issuing release certificates to cover the No-Dollar
Importation after noting that only 144k has been utilized out of 250k.
 Doctrine of promissory estoppel: "an estoppel may arise from the making of a
promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise
should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it
would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other
injustice."
 However, a promise cannot be basis of estoppel if any other element is lacking.
Justifiable reliance or irreparable detriment to the promises are requisite factors.
 ITC, the letter cannot have been justifiably relied upon by petitioner. On the
contrary, the letter states that it may continue to release the certificates… "to the
same terms and conditions imposed by the Monetary Board" on the Special Import
Permit,
 ASSUMING that it applies, it cannot produce estoppel against the issuing authority.
Jurisprudence points that the "doctrine of estoppel" does not operate against the
Government. Moreover, estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by
law or against public policy.
 To hold that merely the Antiporda's letter could be the basis for such estoppel would
be going in the direction of suspending and repealing the conditions or terms of the
Special Import Permit without any action on the part of the Monetary Board.
 In that case, what was involved was a contractual obligation. The Special Import
Permit is not a contractual obligaton. It is a mere privilege. For a permit to be
impressed with a contractual character, it must be categorically demonstrated that
 ordered release of the
importation to petitioner.
(alikpala case)
Petitioner commenced an
action for injunction with the
CFI. CFI ordered release of the
goods. The Commissioner and
Collector sought to have the
order declared before the SC.
Petitioner also filed for
mandamus with damages to
direct release of the imported
fruits and provide the
necessary certificates therefor.
The Judge dismissed. Petitioner
appealed.
Judicial Section 10. Compromise and
Function Arbitration.
Section 11. Notice and Hearing - (1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall
in Contested Cases.
Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:
the very administrative agency, which is the source of the permit, would place such a
burden on itself
Petitioner cannot rely on Commissioner v. Auyon Hian
 This case involved a cancellation of license. ITC, there is no such cancellation of
permit or license. The legality of the issuance of petitioner-appellant's Special Import
Permit is not in question. On the contrary, what is being sought in this case is the
enforcement of the terms and conditions of the Special Import Permit, one of which,
is the resolutory period of 1968.
Authority fo the CB to regulate no-dollar imports
 Such authority clearly emanates from its broad powers to maintain our monetary
stability and to preserve the international value of our currency as well as its corollary
power to issue such rules and regulations for the effective discharge of its
responsibilities and exercise of powers.
 CB Cir. 269 prohibits importation of non-essential consumer goods like fresh fruits.
 CB Cir. 247 specifically enumerates which items are exempted from the requirement
of release certificates. These are mostly personal effects. Fresh fruits not included.
 It can thus be readily seen that petitioner-appellant's "fresh fruits" importations of
June and September, 1970 violate the quoted Central Bank Circulars, hence, liable
to seizure action by the Customs.
To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate
expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable
settlement, compromise and arbitration
be served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time
and place of the hearing.
(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If
not precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation,
agreed settlement or default.
(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is
not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the

Section 13. Subpoena. -
Section 14. Decision. -
Section 15. Finality of Order. The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt
CSC v. Respondent filed a petition for R43 applies to quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of quasi-judicial fxns:
Magoyag correction of date of birth
from July 22, 1947 to 1954. The
decision was amended with a
direction to direct the Local
Register and the CSC to effect
the correction.
Respondent, then Deputy
Collector in the BoC requested
the CSC to correct his date of
birth in his employment
records.
copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified
copy thereof may be accepted.
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to
submit rebuttal evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable
technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and
afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.
In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon
request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless
otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the
RTC within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish
contumacy or refusal as contempt..
Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each
case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the
decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to
them
of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative
appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may
be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.
 A[n agency] is said to be exercising judicial function where [it] has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.
 Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature…
 The Court disagrees that the “mere responses to the request” is not an exercise of
quasi-judicial function because the result of the resolutions is the denial of the right
of the respondent as conferred by the Court. What’s worse is that petitioner admits
he did not conduct hearings.
 In denying the request, petitioner did not give weight to the certified copies of
He claims that the discrepancy
arose when he applied for
employment in Amanah Bank
in 1974 when he mistakenly
placed 1947 instead of 1954 as
his year of birth hence the
wrong date appears in his
records with GSIS
CSC denied his request on the
ground that the RTC decision
has not yet attained finality.
respondent’s school records because it stated that he graduated in 1967 which
would be improbable if he was born in 1954. This would have merited an
investigation. Thus, the CSC’s unsubstantiated presumption has led itself to go
beyond its administrative function.
 A petition for correction is an action in rem. The world is bound by the decision.
However, petitioner did not acknowledge it. The Court emphasizes the doctrine of
finality of judgement. The right of the winning party to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case is also an essential part of public policy and the orderly
administration of justice.

CSC argues:
 The case is not
reviewable under R43
because petitioner was
not exercising its QJ
fxn but administrative
function. Although
discretion was
exercised by petitioner
in denying the request,
said exercise of
discretion cannot be
said to be judicial in
nature because there
were no investigations
or hearings held to
determine or ascertain
the facts.
 Assuming petitioner is
legally bound to
comply with the
decision of the RTC,
R43 is inappropriate
 because the
resolutions being
assailed are not those
contemplated under
R43.
Power to Issue Subpoena, declare contempt
Section 13. Subpoena. In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon
request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless
otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the RTC
within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish
contumacy or refusal as contemp
P.D.902-A (SEC Reorganization Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
Act) following powers: xxxxx
(b) To punish for contempt of the Commission, both direct and indirect, in accordance with
the pertinent provisions of, and penalties prescribed by, the Rules of Court; xxxxx
(e) To issue subpoena duces tecum and summon witnesses to appear in any proceedings of
the Commission and in appropriate cases order search and seizure or cause the search and
seizure of all documents, papers, files and records as well as books of accounts of any entity
or person under investigation as may be necessary for the proper disposition of the cases
before it
 Evangelista v President created the Whether the Agency can issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding functions
Jarencio Presidential Agency on  Admin agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only for legislative or
Reforms and Gov’t Ops under judicial in nature, but in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information
EO 4. The President vested it upon which future action of legislative or judicial nature may be taken
with powers of an  ITC 1
investigating committee under  The power to issue subpoenas is not merely exercised in the agency’s exercise of
Sec 71 including the power to quasi-judicial function under (b)2 This would imperil or render the Agency’s
summon witnesses by investigatory powers under (e) and (h).
subpoena or subpoena duces  Nor can it be limited to the Rules – where a subpoena may be issued only when
tecum, administer oaths, take there is a pending case before it. However, that is a judicial subpoena.
testimony or evidence.  Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable
Evangelista (PARGO Usec) cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.
issued Manalastas (City Public  Purpose: look for evidence, not prove a pending charge.
Service Office) a subpoena  In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if
commanding him to appear the inquiry is
before PARGO and testify in a o (1) within the authority of the agency;
certain investigation. o (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and
o (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
Manalastas filed a petition There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the
with the CFI. The CFI issued Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City
preliminary injunction to Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of
restrain Evangelista from authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando
further issuing subpoenas. Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the
Evangelista elevated the case investigations.
to the SC
Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any
unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. Anyway, by all means,
respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to
1
Summon witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation: with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena
duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.;
2
"b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities
which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
"e. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed
"h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact->nding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public o:cial or employee and to >le and
prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency."
 disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
Teehankee, dissent
Guevarra v. COMELEC issued a Show Cause The COMELEC’s power
COMELEC Order why petitioner should
not be punished for contempt
in posting an article in the
Sunday Time entitled "Ballot
Boxes Contract Hit", which
tended to interfere and
influence COMELEC in a case
pending before it.
Background
 COMELEC awarded to
NASSCO, ACME and
ASIATIC, contracts to
manufacture and
supply COMELEC ballot
boxes. Later however,
COMELEC cancelled the
award to ACME for
failure to sign the
contract within the
designated time.
Petitioner filed a MTQ:
 COMELEC has no JD to
 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B1 that
respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a
respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn
statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged
"fact-finding investigation."
 Hence, the petitioner may rightly refuse to take the witness stand against the order of
the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged
unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal
one and his position and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
 Consti: It provides that it "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all
other functions which may be conferred upon it by law.
 The Revised Election Code: shall have the power to summon the parties to a
controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and
otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and
delegate such power to any officer…Any controversy submitted to the Commission on
Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted from the
time the corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is filed. The
Commission or any of the members thereof shall have the power to punish
contempts provided for in Rule 64, ROC, under the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein...”
 It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to
try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with
the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for contempt in
those cases provided for in Rule 64
 While the COMELEC may not be characterized as a court of justice, it may exercise
quasi-judicial powers in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law
come under its jurisdiction.
 As to what is under its JD is not clear.
o Consti: all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
 punish for contempt as appointment of election inspectors and other election officials
there is no law granting o The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which
such power as if RA inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and
180.5, and R64 grants which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this
that power, it would be much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy
unconstitutional should arise.
 If it does have that  [However,] Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission
power, it cannot be is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the
applied ITC where the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments
COMELEC is exercising of members of the board of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation
a purely administrative of polling places to the preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to put in
function of purchasing readiness on election day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that
ballot boxes the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the
 If it does have the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission
power, it cannot apply is bound to perform if the elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave
ITC because the case rise to the contempt case before us. It stems from the ministerial act of the
on purchasing ballot Commission in requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with the
boxes is already last elections and in so proceeding it provoked a dispute between several dealers
closed. who offered to do the job.
 Assuming the case was  Thus, while a controversy arose between several dealers, this merely refers to a
pending, the article is a ministerial duty which the COMELEC has performed in its administrative capacity in
fair report because it relation to conduct of elections. Hence, it did not exercise any judicial function and
would be assumed that thus could not exercise the power to punish for contempt.
the news report of  The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
respondent was based attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to
on the MR filed by making effective the power to elicit testimony And the exercise of that power by an
Acme where there was administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid
an allegation of fraud. Power to Punish for Contempt
COMELEC denied the MTQ.  inherently judicial in nature.
 inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts,
and, consequently, in the administration of justice"
 Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective
the power to elicit testimony
 And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid
Catur v CIR Catura (President) and
Salvador (Treasurer) of
Philippine Virginia Tobacco EE’s Act:
Associ, a legitimate labor
organization.
A complaint was filed against
them by the prosecution
division of the CIR. The
complainants are employees
constituting 10% of the labor
organization. They were
charged for unauthorized
disbursement of union funds
and they demanded full and
detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union open
to inspection by the members.
However, the petitioners
refused to comply. Thus, the
members referred the matter
to DOLE which issued
subpoenas for the
presentation of such books of
account. After exhausting all
remedies, the complaint
sought to declare the
petitioners guilty of ULP under
the Industrial Peace Act and for
them to C&D from committing
such.
Later, respondent Tabaniag
and other members sought an
injunction to now prevent
The power of the Court to assure compliance with internal labor organization procedures
with corresponding authority to investigate alleged violations is found in the Industrial Peace
 "The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and
representatives of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-
laws of the organization."
 "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other
than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or those expressly
authorized by a resolution of the majority of the member."
 "The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate
labor organization shall be open to inspection by any official or member thereof."
On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory
power conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may
not be effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if
respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law.
 Laurel: the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least,
requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be
produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not
there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law.
 It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative
agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to
protect the rights of union members against its officers.
 The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it
force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be
exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to
priority.
Procedural Due Process
 If the books and records sought to be delivered and deposited in court for examination
were the private property of petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the absence of due
process would not be entirely lacking in plausibility.
 The Industrial Act makes it clear however that the books of accounts and other
records of the financial activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor
organization.
 There would be no point for a hearing before the order could be issued.
Furthermore, they filed an MR which cured the defect.
 There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property without due process
 Catura who was again elected where the adverse party was heard on a motion for reconsideration constituting as it
as President from taking his does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of
oath in view of his continued the controversy.
persistence in abuse of
authority in disbursement of
union funds. Instead of
granting injunction, CIR Judge
ordered Catura and Salvador
to deliver and deposit to this
Court all the said Association's
book of accounts, bank
accounts, pass books, union
funds, receipts, vouchers and
other documents related to
the 6nances of the said labor
union at the hearing of this
petition Petitioners Catura and
Salvador sought MR on the
ground that no hearing was
done before the order was
issued.

They argue
 The CIR does not
possess such power to
Order them to deliver
the books of accounts,
among other
documents.
 They were not
accorded procedural
due process

Tolentino v. Cinco filed a complaint with the NLRC WN the NLRC has the power to cite Tolentino and Judge Angeles in contempt
Inciong charging Tolentino for violating the  Villegas v. Subido: The government itself is merely an agency through
constitution of Batangas Labor Union by which the will of the State is expressed and enforced. As such there is no
refusing to call for the elections of
officers for Nov and prayed that it be
conducted immediately.
Thereafter, Tolentino sent a telegram to
NLRC for cancellation of the hearing of
the complaint as he had to appear
before the CIR.
Later however, Tolentino was notified
that NLRC issued an order directing
Batangas Labor Union to hold the
elections. Petitioner received a copy of
the Order, and filed an MR alleging that
due process was not observed in issuing
such order. The MR was not acted upon
despite demand, thus Tolentino filed a
notice of appeal with the SOLE praying
that pre-election conference by
suspended. Chairman of the NLRC
informed Tolentino that the elections
would proceed as scheduled
presumption that they [agents of the state] are empowered to act. There
must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the
absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power.
 The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong that the objectives of PD
No. 21 be attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising a power not
conferred by such decree. He ought to have known that the competence,
"to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" certainly cannot
extend to a judge of the CFI… Correctly construed, it cannot cover the
case likewise of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to
avail himself of a judicial remedy. It must ever be borne in mind by an
administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there be
compliance with the law.
 It is admitted that Judge Angeles, after hearing the case, reserved his
resolution therefor. The proper step of the administrative official is to seek
dismissal of the case before the court, precisely on the ground that it did
not fall under the power conferred to it. Instead, respondent cited
Tolentino in contempt.
o There was nothing wrong with Tolentino seeking judicial remedy. It
would be wrong to deny an dindividual access to courts under
these circumstances.

Batangas Labor Union filed a petition

for the CFI Batangas for prohibition and
preliminary injunction against Cinco
and NLRC and SOLE to annul the Order
and prohibit the NLRC from enforcing
such order.

Later, Tolentino was served a copy of a

subpoena issued by Chairman Inciong
of the NLRC requiring him to appear
before the NLRC to explain why he
should not be held in contempt for
trying to use old society tactics to
 prevent the union election ordered by
the NLRC.

The present case was filed. Inciong sent

a letter arguing (1) the case is moot
because they do not intend to continue
with the contempt proceedings (2) The
power to punish for contempt is
provided under PD 21, Sec 7 and 10.

1987, 1973
The right of the people to be The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
secure in their persons, houses, unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
papers, and effects against be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
unreasonable searches and cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
seizures of whatever nature and authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
and no search warrant or warrant the persons or things to be seized.
of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Qua Che Gan v. Special Prosecutor Galang charged
Deportation Quee Che Gan et. al. for purchasing
Board (1963) $130kUSD without the necessary license
from the Central Bank the remitted it to
HK.
Petitioners also tried to bribe PH and US
officers to evade prosecution for
Petitioners question the power of the President to deport aliens and the
consequent delegation to the DB to investigate on the ground that there must be
legislation authorizing the same
 CA No 613 (Immigration Act) – the Commissioner of Immigration is
empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of alien after determination
by the Board of Commissioners that there exists a ground therefor.
 Sec 69m Act 2711 (Admin Code): A subject of a foreign power residing in
the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said
unauthorized purchase.
After the charges were filed, a WoA
against the aliens were issued by the
Deportation Board. Petitioners filed a
MTQ:
(1) The charges do not constitute a
legal ground for deportation of
aliens
(2) Board has no JD to entertain
such charges.
The MTQ was denied. They filed a
petition for habeas corpus and
prohibition which went to the CFI
Board filed its Answer:
 The Deportation Board, as agent
of the President, has JD over
charges filed and authority to
order their arrests
CFI upheld
 the validity of the delegation by
the President to conduct
investigations for the purpose of
determining whether the stay of
an alien in the country would be
injurious to the security and
welfare of the State.
 The power of the DB to issue
warrants of arrest for aliens and
fix bonds while their cases are
pending.
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive
or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is
contemplated…
 Admittedly, the provision lays down but the procedure before the
President can deport aliens. Nevertheless, Sec 69 was expressly listed an
exception from the repealing clause in the Immigration Act – showing a
clear indication of the recognition and ratification by legislature of the
existence of the power in the Executive.
 HENCE, there are two ways of deporting an undesirable alien:
o by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Sec
69
o by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the
Board of Commissioners, under Sec 37
Petitioner contend, even granting the President has power to deport, he may only
do so under the grounds enumerated in CA No 613,
 True, the legislature defines which may be the grounds for deportation
 The charges against petitioners are acts of profiteering, hoarding or
blackmarketing of US dollars are in violation of CB regulations – an
economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under RA 503.
 Therefore, the President may order the deportation of these petitioners
after investigation.
Delegation
 Under Sec 69 – the President or his authorized agent
 EO 494 of Gov. Gen. Murphy created the board to take action on
complaints against foreigners
 EO 33 of Quezon created the DB to receive complaints against aliens and
to conduct investigation pursuant to Sec 69
Whether the President can order arrest; whether the power can be delegated
 Unlike CA 613 (Commissioner of Immigration), Sec 69 of the RAC does not
specifically grant authority to make arrests.
 EO 398 of Quirino recognized that the Board is authorized to issue
warrants of arrest of alien complaints of and to hold him under detention
during the investigation unless he posts bond.
 However, the Court notes: the right of against unreasonable searches and
seizures is recognized. The requirements “to be determined by the judge”

Vivo v. Montesa Priv. Respondents Calacday arrived
from HK and sought admission as
Filipino citizens. After investigation, the
is not found under the US Constitution, Philippine Bill and Jones Act – all
do not specify who shall determine probable cause.
 By express terms of the Constitution, only a judge. The Constitution does
not distinguish between criminal and administrative warrants.
o If one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a
determination fo the probable cause against him, by a judge, why
should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature
deserve less guarantee?
 Of course, it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final
finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or
agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then there is no
determination of PC.
 Therefore, the power of the President to order arrest when there is an
order of deportation. However, pending investigation, it is enough for the
alien to post bond to insure appearance for investigation.
 Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding—
and nothing herein said is intended to so decide—on whether or not the
President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of
investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been
issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding
without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the
alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the
Deportation Board.
 The power to investigate may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a “prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized
agent.”
 The discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is
personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. Ministerial
duties may be delegated, however official functions requiring discretion
and judgement may not be so delegated.
EO 398 which allows the DB to issue WoA upon filing of formal charges against
alien/s and to fix bond is declared illegal. The order of arrest of the DB is void.
Whether the CFI can issue an injunction to restrain the deportation proceedings
 No. These are within the DJ of the immigration authorities under Sec 29
and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act. The JD is not tolled by a claim of
Board of Special Inquiry found them to
be legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen
(Isaac Calacday) thus they were
admitted.
Later however, Isaac Calacday
confessed that they were not his sons.
He later retracted this confession,
explaining that he made it in a fit of
anger.
Commissioner of Immigration Vivo
issued WoAs against private
respondents, citing provisions of the
Immigration Act for having entered the
Philippines "by means of false and
misleading statements and that they
were not lawfully admissible at the time
of entry, not being properly
documented for admission"
The warrants directed any immigrant
officer to bring the respondents before
the Commissioner for them to show
cause why they should not be
deported.
Manuel was arrested, while the others
remained at large. The respondents
filed before CFI (1) to restrain the arrest
(2) release Manuel and (3) prohibit
deportation of all petitioners, claiming
they are Filipino citizens
The CFI issued an injunction, restraining
Filipino citizenship
 It is noted that when the CFI case was filed, the deportation proceedings
were not yet finished. The Board has not reached a decision. It still has to
conduct a hearing where the main issue of citizenship or alienage will be
tackled. Hence there is nothing for the Court to review.
 The Court below misapprehended the warrants issued by the
Commissioner. The warrants required respondents to be brought before
immigration authorities, not to be deported, but to show case why they
should not be deported. There was no case of "summarily arresting and
deporting" the respondents Calacday, as unwarrantedly assumed by the
court below.
 The Calacdays claim they have evidence to support their citizenship. Thus,
they should appear before Immigration officials and submit these
documents as evidence.
 Nevertheless, we opine that the issuance of warrants for the sole
purpose of investigation contravenes Sec 1 (3), Art III, Const. This
provision limits the power to determine PC for a WoA to judges exclusively
unlike the previous organic laws.
 The Court cited the ruling in Qua Chee Gan. Following this is Morano v.
Vivo which distinguished between administrative arrest in the execution of
a final deportation order and arrest as preliminary to further
administrative proceedings.
ITC, we do not see why the bond requirement in EO 69 of Roxas should not apply
to deportation proceedings issued by the Immigration Commissioners
considering the identity of ends sought to be served. Such notice and bonds should
suffice to ensure the subject's appearance at the hearings, without prejudice to
more drastic measures in case of recalcitrant respondents
 the arrests and ordered release of
Manuel.
Santos v. Petitioner filed for habeas corpus
Commissioner who was detained under a WoA
issued by Commission on the
ground of being a Chinese citizen
who illegally entered the country.
He denied he was an alien
The lower court issued habeas
corpus, commanding the
Commissioner to produce Santos.
Respondent filed his Return
stating that Santos is not a Filipino,
but a Chinese and he illegally
entered the country, and
deportation proceedings were
pending before the Board of
Special Inquiry and that Santos
confessed he was an illegal
entrant.
The lower court ordered the
release of Santos upon posting
bond
Appeal was taken
Harvey v. Petitioners are among 22
Defensor- suspected alien pedophiles who
Santiago were apprehended after close
surveillance by CID Agents in
Pagsanjan Laguna.
2 days after apprehension, 17/22
opted for self-deportation. 1 was
released and another was not
Qua Chee Gan applies. This case, however, is governed by the former Constitution. The
conclusion reached by the lower court, therefore, finds support in Qua Chee Gan. We
cannot set it aside.
In Qua: WN the power of the President to investigate leading to deportation carries with
it the power to order arrest – NO
 Under the express terms of the Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of
an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation.
It is different when an executive or legislative officer makes a final finding of a violation,
for which an order of arrest is issue to carry it out, because it is not the warrant
mentioned in the Constitution. The one mentioned in the Constitution is issuable only
on probable cause.
ITC, the arrest of petitioners were based on PC determined after close surveillance of 3
months. The existence of PC justified the arrest and seizure of the photos, posters
without a warrant. These articles were seized incident to a lawful arrest and therefore
admissible.
ASSUMING, the arrests were not valid, the records show that formal deportation
charges have been filed against them as undesirable aliens
 "Where a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in
relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition
charged for being a pedophile but
working within a visa hence 3 were
to face deportation.
Deportation proceedings were
initiated under Sec 69, RACC and
they were charged for
deportation. WOAs were issued by
respondent for violation of
Immigration Act and RAC. The BSI
commenced trial against
petitioners
Petitioners filed an Urgent
Petition for Release under Bond
alleging that their health was
affected by their continuous
detention. They were examined by
a CID doctor who certified they
were in good health
Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail
however, respondent denied
considering the certification.
Later, Harvey filed a Motion stating
he agreed to self-deportation and
praying to be provisionally
released and placed under custody
of Atty. Asinas before voluntary
deportation. BSI allowed
provisional release for 5 days
however they filed this petition for The denial of Commissioner of petitioner’s release on bail is in order as well because
Habeas Corpus.
The questions:
for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic"
 That they were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal.
Petitioners were found with young boys in their rooms. The CID had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed “pedophilia”
While not a crime under the RPC, it is contrary to public morals and violative of
the policy of the state to promote and protect the well-being of the youth (Art
II, Sec 13, 1987 Const)
In any case, the filing of a petition to be released from bail constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest, and they are estopped.
Sec 37(a) of the PH Immigration Act: The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of
the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien;
 The provision is not contrary to the Constitution. The constraints in the 1935
and 1987 Consts contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in nature. Hence, an order of
deportation cannot be construed as a punishment. It is a preventive measure.
 The ruling in Vivo v. Monesta cannot be invoked here. They Commissioner’s
WoA did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not
be deported. They were issued specifically for violations of the Immigration Act
and the RAC. Before this, deportation proceedings had commenced and arrest
was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.
 To rule otherwise would render the authority of the Commissioner nugatory
to the detriment of the State. This case is not a deviation from Qua Chee Gan v
DB; Vivo v. Montesa because probable cause was already shown to exist before
the warrants were issued.
 What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section
37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be
substantiated by competent evidence.
 in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but
discretionary on the part of the CID
 The use of the word “may” under Sec 37(e)3indicates that the grant of bail is
  No provision in the PH permissive and not mandatory. The exercise of the power is discretionary. As
Immigration Act or Sec 69 deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the
which allows the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said
Commissioner to arrest proceedings
and detain petitioners
pending determination of
PC leading to an
administrative
investigation
 Respondents violated Art
III, Sec 2 since the CID
agents cannot issued
WOAs
 The confidential
information and suspicion
of activities that they are
pedohpiles is not enough
to order their arrest and
detention unless in
flagrante delicto. Being a
pedophile is not a crime.
Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national who was Petitioner insists that the respondent Liwag has no authority or jurisdiction to cause
Nghia v. Liwag admitted to the PH as a temporary his arrest because under the 1987 Const, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
visitor. His status was changed to issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
immigrant based on his examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
representation that he is produce . . . "
financially capable and will invest  Unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien
in the PH. However, he still has not pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close
made any investment surveillance for a three-month period during which their activities were
monitored, petitioner was "invited" by a combined team of CID agents and
CID Commissioner Liwag received police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued
a complaint from a certain by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single
Cabrera Jr allegedly Nghia’s individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously
landlord, accusing petitioner as an absent.
undesirable alien for "committing Even assuming that the arrest was not legal, certain events render the petition moot
3
"any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration."
 acts inimical to publc safety and
progress." Hence Commissioner
Liwag issued a mission order to a
team of 7 CID agents to "to locate
and bring subject to Intelligence
Division for proper disposition"
and "submit report."
CID agents went to petitioner’s
residence to invite the latter to the
CID headquarters for verification
of his status but Nghia and a lady
companion locked themselves
inside their bedroom and refused
to talk to the agents.
and academic.
 Petitioner was no longer under confinement. He posted bail bond during
pendency of the administrative proceedings
 Formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before
the BSI of the CID. Thus, any restraint (if any) against Nghia’s person has
become legal.
This case would be different if it were shown that there were restrictions on his liberty
after he was released from detention.
 Here, Nghia’s only condition under the bail bond is “to appear and answer the
complaint x x x; will at all times hold himself ... amenable to the orders and
processes of the Court; and after conviction, he will surrender himself ... in
execution of such judgment ... .”

The agents sought to assistance of

the Western Police District but
still Nghia refused to be taken.
After a struggle, and both parties
injured, Nghia was brought into
the CID Intel Office.

A WoA4 was issued by

Commissioner but there was no
showing that the warrant was
served on Nghia prior to his
apprehension.

By reason of the injuries he

sustained when he was “brutally
seized” petitioner was transferred
from his detention cell to the PGH.
4
"That he applied for and was granted permanent status on his representation that he is financially capable of investing in the Philippines but he made no investments but
engaged in tutoring in French and practice of acupressure; that he willfully refused to recognize the authority of immigration agents who were sent to invite him to CID for
verification of his status and physically resisted being taken in by the agents resulting in physical injuries to himself and the agents; that he has thereby made himself an
undesirable alien subject to deportation."
 Petitioner filed the petition for
habeas corpus to question the
validity of his detention.

Salazar v. A sworn statement was filed
Achacoso against Salazar for refusal to
return PECC card. Atty. Marquez
sent Salazar a telegram5 directing
the latter to appear before the
POEA concerning a case filed
against him.
Later, after ascertaining that
Salazar had no license to operate
recruitment agency, Administrator
Achacoso issued a Closure and
Seizure Order.
Atty Marquez, Abara and Vistro
were assigned to implement the
said Order thus they went to
Salazar’s residence and served the
Order. They found several
performers there and the team
confiscated assorted costumes.
Salazar wrote a letter to POEA
requesting return of the seized
I: WON the POEA or the SOLE could issue warrants of search and seizure or arrest under
Art. 38 of LC?
 Under the Const, only a judge may issue a warrant of search and arrest. In one
case, it was held that a mayor could not exercise such power, neither by a
prosecuting body
 Sec 38 LC was inserted as an amendment during the time of Marcos, in the
exercise of his legislative power. Then the Min. of Labor exercised only
recommendatory powers6 Later however, Marcos gave the Labor Minister
search and seizure powers as well under PD 20187 which is now Art 38 LC
 As the rule stands, a SOLE is not a judge thus cannot issue search or arrest
warrants. Art 30 is unconstitutional.
Cf. Power of the President in deportation cases to order an arrest of undesirable aliens
 It is valid because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in foreign
affairs “The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens”… "The
right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified"
 The power of the President to order arrest of aliens is an exception. It cannot
be made to extend to other cases like here. Under the Constitution, it is only
the courts.
Even assuming that search and seizure order herein is valid, it is in the nature of a
general warrant.
 Why: “and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment,”

5
"YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG
MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."
6
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.
7
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the
closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do
so.
 property:
(1) no prior notice and hearing
(2) violation of unreasonable
searches an seizures
(3) allegation of robbery and
violation of domicile.
Later, petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition.
Board of Santiago Gatchalian is recognized
Commissioners by the BI as a native-born Filipino Petitioner: It is the CA which has exclusive appellate JD over decision of quasi-judicial
(CID) v. De la citizen.
Rosa
His grandchild, William Gatchalian, the RTC.
along with other family members
sought admission as Filipino
citizens. After investigation, the
BSI rendered a decision admitting
them as Filipino citizens.
The SoJ issued Memo No 9 setting
aside all decisions rendered by the
BoC and the BSI and directed the
BoC to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Philippine
citizen.
On July 6, 1963, the BoC reversed
the decision of the BSI and
ordered exclusion, among others,
Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion
was issued on the same date. The
actual date of the decision became
was the issue in Arocha v. Vivo
where the Court sustained the
JURISDICTION OVER THE BOC AND BSI
agencies such as the BoC and BSI
Respondent: petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not equal in rank with
 It is true that under BP 129, CA has exclusive appellate JD over quasi-judicial
agencies, however it does not say that it extends to ALL. The quasi-judicial
bodies appealable to the CA are those which under law are specifically
appealable to the CA.
 ITC, the Bureau of Immigration or the CID is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies specified by law which are appealable to the CA.
 Instead, Sec 25, Ch 4, Book VII provides that “agency decisions are subject to
judicial review by the court specified in the statute or in absence thereof,
subject to review by any court of competent JD in accordance with the ROC”
 As the BI is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealed or
reviewed by the RTC.
It is true that BI has exclusive authority and JD to try and hear cases against an alleged
alien and in the process determine its citizenship. A mere claim of citizenship cannot
operate to divest the BoC of its JD over deportation cases.
 However, the rule admits of exceptions. What if the claim of citizenship is
satisfactory? It should be with the Courts. In Chua Hiong v DB: "When the
evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings.
 Thus, the Doctrine of Primary JD of the BoC is without exception. Judicial
intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
 validity of the decision within the the claim is correct.
reglementary period. Petitioners invoke the Court’s ruling in Arocha v. Vivo and Vivo v. Arca which already
settled the respondent’s alienage.
In 1973, Gatchalian filed a motion  No. The issue there when the actual date of the July 6 decision was. The Court
for re-hearing with the BSI. The did not address the issue on citizenship. Gatchalian was not even party to that
BSI recommended reversal of the case.
July 6 decision and recall the  Neither can it be said to be res judicata. The decision did not make any
WoAs issued therein. The statement that Gatchalian is Chinese. Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata
Commissioner affirmed the does not apply to questions of citizenship.
decision and admitted Gatchalian  Res Judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship when the following are
as a Filipino citizen. present:
o 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
NBI wrote to the SOJ controversy where said person is a party;
recommending that Gatchalian o 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part
among others those covered by in the resolution thereof; and
the warrant of exclusion be o 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
charged by violations of the  Gatchalian was not even party to that case
Immigration Act. The SOJ indorsed Petitioners: Arrest of Gatchalian follows based on the Warrant of Exclusion issued on
the recommendation of the NBI to July 6, 1962 + Arocha and Vivo cases:
the Commissioner of Immigration.  Under Sec 37 (a), the Commissioner of Immigration may issue WoA only after
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for
BID Commissioner issued a deportation against the alien. It must be for the sole purpose of executing a
mission order commanding the final order of deportation. A WoA issued by the Commissioner of Immigration
arrest of respondent Gatchalian. solely for investigation is void.
Gatchalian appeared before the  The mission order/WoA issued by Commissioner of Immigration clearly shows
Commissioner and was released it is for investigation8
after posting bond  It made no mention of a final order of deportation.
There is another thing that petitioners failed to state: The July 6 decision was made
[DelaRosa case] Gatchalian filed a because of a forged cable gram by the DFA which was dispatched to the PH Consulate in
petition before the RTC. the HK authorizing the registration of applicants as PI citizens. The BSI concluded that
Petitioners filed a MTD on the the cablegram only led to issuance of Certificates of Identity which took the place of a
ground that the RTC has no JD over passport for their authority to travel to the PH. Thus, even if they entered in the PH
the BoC or BSI. RTC denied. illegally, they are still citizens.
 This order admitted the respondent Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen and on this
8
"1.Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
"3.Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain
 Gatchalian’s wife also filed a
petition with the RTC alleging that
the petitioners are without JD to
institute deportation against
Gatchalian. Resp. Capulong issued
the TRO
Arguments of Board of
Commissioners:
 The RTC Judges had no JD
over the petitioners, JD is
with the CA
 Assuming they do, they
acted with GAD in pre-
empting the exercise of
the authority and JD to
hear the deportation case
against Gatchalian
 Dela Rosa GAD in ruling
that the deportation
proceedings are beyond
the JD of the petitioners
Camara v. Camara was charged for violating
Municipal Court the San Francisco Housing Code for
refusing, after 3 efforts by the city
housing inspectors to secure his
consent, to allow a warrantless
inspection of his leased property.
 It was being used for
residential purposes
which violated the
apartment building’s
occupancy permit.
Appellant claims that the
inspection ordinance9 is
basis, Gatchalian exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. Consequently, the
presumption of citizenship lies in his favor.
Prescription
 Respondent’s arrest came 28 years after the cause of deportation arose. Sec
37 (b) states that deportation shall not be effected unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within 5 years after the cause arises.
 ITC, the CoA arose in 1962. The WoA was issued only in 1990.
 Further, the penal sanctions provide for imprisonment for 2 years. Under Act
3326, prescription of offense punishable by 2 years under special laws prescribe
after 8 years.
Dissent: 5 years applies only if effected under clauses of Sec 37(b) – other than clauses
2,7, 8, 11, 12 and no period of limitation is applicable in deportations under those.
 The penal provisions say such offenses are punishable by correctional penalty.
These prescribe in 8 years being a special law.
 The Court therefore holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien
after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BSI
prescribes.
Appellant argues that the inspection ordinance is contrary to the Fourth 10 and
Fourteenth Amendments in authorizing the municipal officers to enter a private
dwelling without a warrant and without probable cause.
 The basic purpose of the 4th amendment is to safeguard privacy and security.
Hence, the rule has been a search without consent is unreasonable unless
authorized by a search warrant.
In Frank, the Court allowed a warrantless search on a private property for locating and
abating public nuisance.
 There the inspections were done merely to determine whether physical
conditions exist which did not comply with minimum standards under local
regulatory ordinances. Since property owners were not asked to open his doors
for a search for evidence of a criminal action, the interests under the 4th and 5th
amendments were not violated. – Court does not agree
 Even accepting Frank’s premise, inspections of these kind still jeopardize “self-
 unconstitutional protection interests” of property owners – these regulatory laws are enforced
through criminal processes.
In Frank, there were 2 justifications for permitting a health and safety inspections
without a warrant
o (1) The inspections are “designed to make the least possible demand on
the individual occupant” – there are safeguards in place and
reasonableness is still the test.
o (2) Warrants cannot function effectively – the decision to inspect is
based on legislative or administrative assessment of broad facts – age’s
area and condition.
 The Court disagrees with these reasonings. These discount the purpose behind
the warrant requirement. Under this system, occupant will not know whether
inspection will be needed to enforce a municipal code; no way to know the
limits of the search; no way to know whether the inspector is properly
authorized. – Practically the occupant is left to the discretion of the inspector.
In Frank, a final justification for a warrantless administrative search is that public
interest demands such a rule: health and safety of entire urban populations is
dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing and sanitation standards, and
the only way to effect these are those systematized inspections.
 We think this misses the point. The question is not whether inspections may be
made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. The question is not
whether public interest so demands it, but whether the authority to search
should be evidenced by a warrant.
 It is not shown that the fire, health and housing code inspection programs
could not achieve their goals without the warrant requirement.
Appellant argues that not only is a warrant required; but it also requires that it issued
for probable cause
 We disagree. Unlike a criminal investigation, the inspection programs here are
aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards of
private property.
 In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and thus in

9
"Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall,
upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by
the Municipal Code."
10
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

See v. Seattle, Appellant sought reversal of his
conviction for refusing a
representative of the City of
Seattle Fire Dept to enter and
inspect the appellant’s locked
warehouse without a warrant and
PC. The inspection was being
conducted in compliance with the
determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that
inspection-the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these
reasonable goals of code enforcement.
 There is uniform agreement that the only way to enforce minimum standards
of municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections.
 We think there are several factors to support the reasonableness of area
code-enforcement inspections
o They have an history of judicial and public acceptance
o The public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be
prevented/abated.
o They involve limited invasion of privacy – not aimed at discovering
evidence for crime.
 Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search of private
property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that
"probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.
 HOWEVER, such standards will vary with the program being enforced and will
not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of a particular
dwelling
 Reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies
the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably
restricted search warrant.
Since our holding emphasized reasonableness, nothing forecloses prompt inspections,
even without a warrant during emergency situations.
 In most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect.
Moreover, most citizens allow inspections without a warrant. Thus, as a
practical matter, warrants should be sought only after entry is refused.
The Court held that Camara applies – we reverse
 The only question which this case presents is whether Camara applies to similar
inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences.
 We see no reason to relax the 4th Amendment safeguards where the official
inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws prescribing minimum physical
standards for commercial premises.
 In Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if
conducted without a warrant. The businessman has a constitutional right to go
 Seattle’s Fire Code11. He was
convicted and fined. He claimed
that Sec 801 would violate the
Fourth and 14th amendment
In Camara v. Municipal Court:
Fourth Amendment bars
prosecution of a person who has
refused to permit a warrantless
code-enforcement inspection of
his personal residence.
The only question which this case
presents is whether Camara
applies to similar inspections of
commercial structures which are
not used as private residences.
11
"INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as
often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of
any other ordinance concerning fire hazards."
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private
commercial property. His right would be placed in jeopardy if the decision to
enter and inspect for violation.
We have dealt with 4th Amendment Issues of administrative subpoena of corporate
books and records. We find strong support in these subpoena cases for our conclusion
that warrants are a necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and
inspect commercial premises.
 It is settled when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or
records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently
limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.'
 Given the analogous investigative functions performed by the administrative
subpoena and the demand for entry, we find untenable the proposition that
the subpoena, which has been termed a "constructive" search, is subject to
Fourth Amendment limitations which do not apply to actual searches and
inspections of commercial premises.
Clark Dissenting
 [The Majority] would permit the issuance of paper warrants, in area inspection
programs, with probable cause based on area inspection standards as set out in
municipal codes, and with warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing
magistrate. In my view, this degrades the Fourth Amendment.
 Each of the ordinances here is supported by findings as to the necessity for
inspections of this type and San Francisco specifically bans the conduct in
which appellant Camara is admittedly engaged. Indeed, the inspectors all have
identification cards which they show the occupant and the latter could easily
resolve the remaining questions by a call to the inspector's superior or, upon
demand, receive a written answer thereto.
 In most instances the officer could not secure a warrant-such as in See's case-
thereby insulating large and important segments of our cities from inspection
for health and safety conditions.
 The majority propose two answers to this admittedly pressing problem of need
for constant inspection of premises for fire, health, and safety infractions of
municipal codes.

Oceanic Steam A steamship company sought to
Navigation Co v. recover the money it paid to the
Stranahan collector of customs, exacted by
the order of the Sec. of Commerce
and Labor.
They were fined under Sec 9: "That
o First, they say that there will be few refusals of entry to inspect.
 It is true that in the required entry-to-inspect situations most
occupants welcome the periodic visits of municipal inspectors. In
my view this will not be true when consent is necessary.
 1/6 entries were refused in Portland, Oregon. This will place an
intolerable burden of securing warrants. Homeowners generally
try to minimize maintenance costs and some landlords make
needed repairs only when required to do so. Immediate
prospects for costly repairs to correct possible defects are going
to keep many a door closed to the inspector.
o The basis of "probable cause" for area inspection warrants, the Court
says, begins with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement;
in determining whether an inspection is reasonable "the need for the
inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code
enforcement."
 Court concludes that probable cause exists "if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."
These standards will vary, it says, according to the code program
and the condition of the area with reference thereto rather than
the condition of a particular dwelling.
 The majority seem to hold that warrants may be obtained after
a refusal of initial entry; I can find no such constitutional
distinction or command.
 Why the ceremony, the delay, the expense, the abuse of the
search warrant? In my view this will not only destroy its integrity
but will degrade the magistrate issuing them and soon bring
disrepute not only upon the practice but upon the judicial
process.
It is argued that the law in this case is contrary to the Constitution because it defines a
criminal offense and authorizes a purely administrative official to determine whether
the defined crime has been committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment.
 It is apparent from Sec 9 that it does not define or punish a crime. It merely
entail[s] the infliction of a penalty, enforcible in some cases by purely
administrative action and in others by civil suit.
 Based on the report of Senate committee, the sole purpose of Sec 9 was to
it shall be unlawful for any person,
including any transportation
company other than railway lines
entering the United States from
foreign contiguous territory, or the
owner, master, agent, or
consignee of any vessel, to bring to
the United States any alien
afflicted with a loathsome or with
a dangerous contagious disease;
and if it shall appear to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of the
Treasury (Secretary of Commerce
and Labor) that any alien so
brought to the United States was
afflicted with such a disease at the
time of foreign embarkation, and
that the existence of such disease
might have been detected by
means of a competent medical
examination at such time, such
person or transportation company,
or the master, agent, owner, or
consignee of any such vessel, shall
pay to the collector of customs of
the customs district in which the
port of arrival is located the sum of
one hundred dollars for each and
every violation of the provisions of
this section; and no vessel shall be
granted clearance papers while
any such fine imposed upon it
remains unpaid, nor shall such fine
be remitted."
impose a penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the statute
provided, thus, by the avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure the
efficient performance by the steamship company of the duty to examine in the
foreign country, before embarkation, and thereby aid in carrying out the policy
of Congress to exclude from the United States aliens afflicted with loathsome or
dangerous contagious diseases as defined in the act.
But it is argued nevertheless that doctrine does not warrant the conclusion that a
penalty may be authorized, and its collection committed to an administrative officer
without the necessity of resorting to the judicial power. In all cases of penalty or
punishment, it is contended, enforcement must depend upon the exertion of judicial
power, either by civil or criminal process, since the distinction between judicial and
administrative functions cannot be preserved consistently with the recognition of an
administrative power to enforce a penalty without resort to judicial authority.
 It is settled that Congress has not only tariff powers but as to internal revenue,
taxation and other subjects. It has power to impose appropriate obligations
and sanctions and their enforcement by reasonable money penalties by giving
executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without invoking judicial
power.
 If we were to buy the argument that penalties must undergo judicial process to
enforce penalties, this assumes that it is within the competence of judicial
authority to control legislative action as to subjects over which there is
complete legislative authority…
 As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United
States embraces every conceivable aspect of that subject, it must follow that
if Congress has deemed it necessary to impose particular restrictions on the
coming in of aliens, and to sanction such prohibitions by penalties enforcible by
administrative authority, it follows that the constitutional right of Congress to
enact such legislation is the sole measure by which its validity is to be
determined by the courts.
It is urged that the fines which constituted the exactions were repugnant to the Fifth
Amendment, because amounting to a taking of property without due process of law,
since, as asserted, the fines were imposed, in some cases, without any previous
notice, and in all cases without any adequate notice or opportunity to defend.
 No but there was a notice and opportunity to be heard.

Civil Aeronautics PAL was imposed a 5000 fine for
Board v. PAL unauthorized operation of a
flagstop.
PAL had an excess of 20
passengers who could not be
accommodated on its regular
flight. PAL thus required the
Tuguegarao – MNL flight to pass
by Baguio to pick up these 20
 The lower court found that upon discover of an immigrant afflicted with the
disease, the owner of the vessel was notified thereof. The fine was imposed
after the Sec of Comm and Labor was given the certificate of the examining
medical officer that a particular alien had been found afflicted with a disease
and based on its opinion, it existed at the time of embarkation and could then
have been detected by a competent medical examination. The action of the
Sec. of Comm was notified to the steamship company. Under Cir. 58, the
steamship company was given 14 days to intervene
 Even so, we think the statute expressly excludes the idea of giving the
steamship company the opportunity to be heard, in the sense of raising an
issue and tendering evidence concerning the condition of the alien immigrant
upon arrival at the point of disembarkation, as the plain purpose of the statute
was to exclusively commit that subject to the medical officers for which the
statute provided.
 In effect, all the contentions pressed in argument concerning the repugnancy of
the statute to the due process clause really disregarded the complete and
absolute power of Congress over the subject with which the statute deals. They
mistakenly assume that mere form and not substance may be made by the
courts the conclusive test as to the constitutional power of Congress to enact a
statute. These conclusions are apparent, we think, since the plenary power of
Congress as to the admission of aliens leaves no room for doubt as to its
authority to impose the penalty, and its complete administrative control over
the granting or refusal of a clearance also leaves no doubt of the right to endow
administrative officers with discretion to refuse to perform the administrative
act of granting a clearance as a means of enforcing the penalty which there was
lawful authority to impose.
Authority of CAB
 Under RA 776, the CAB was given the general supervision and regulation of,
and jurisdiction and control over, air carriers as well as their property, property
rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise, in so far as may be necessary for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act."
 CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any
administrative decision or order" of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on
matters pertaining to "imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with
the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued
thereunder."
passengers.
The CAB found (1) no other airline
served Manila – Baguio thus no
one was affected by the flagstop
(2) The expenses for flagstopping
at Baguio exceeded the revenue it
derived from the 20 passengers so
it was motivated solely by PAL’s
desire to meet a public need.
The CAB issued two resolutions:
(1) imposition of 5k
(2) lower to 2.5k after MR
PAL argued
 There is nothing in RA 776
which expressly
empowers the CAB to
impose a fine
 It argued that "the power
and authority to impose
fines and penalties is a
judicial function exercised
through the regular courts
of justice, and that such
power and authority
cannot be delegated to
the Civil Aeronautics
Board my mere
implication or
interpretation".
 The power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and make compromise in
respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator (Sec.
32(17) Republic Act 776).
 The fine imposed on PAL is not a criminal penalty because the "fine" in this
case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's violation of C.A.B.
rules on flagstops without previous authority on "May 12, 1970 and on
previous occasions",
 As explained by CAB: "imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty
for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist
from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the
government regulating agency . . ."
 It is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to
impose without criminal prosecution. It is similar to the power granted to the
Commissioners of Immigation and COC for violation of the Immigration law and
Tariff and Customs Code.
There is no doubt that the CAB is authorized to impose fines in the nature of civil
penalty for violation of its rules and regulations. To deprive this power would amount
to an absurd interpretation of the legal provisions because CAB:
 Is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to "impose, remit,
mitigate, increase or compromise" "fines and civil penalties", a power which is
expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator whose orders or decision
may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB.
 If deprived, would negate its effective general supervision and control over air
carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations
designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. – If they
had to go to court every time in protracted litigation, then it could not exercise
a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers.
PAL argues that the fine imposed is not consummate with the nature and extent of the
violation done since by doing the flagstop, it actually served a public need.
 Appellant's argument overlooks the fact that when it violated the rule on
unauthorized flagstop, it might have done some public service to the Baguio
passengers but to the prejudice and inconvenience of the five Tuguegarao-
Manila passengers.
 Moreover, the fine was not only for the violation of unauthorized flag stopping

Scoty Dept. Micaller was a salesgirl at Scoty’s
Store v. Micaller Dept Store. She filed charges for
ULP against her ER alleging she
was dismissed because of her
membership in the National Labor
Union
The court found Scoty Dept store
guilty of ULP and fined 100.
Among other arguments,
petitioners contend that the
cannot be legally punished by fine
of 100
12
"SEC. 25. Penalties. — Any person who violates the provisions of section three of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.
"Any other violation of this Act which is declared unlawful shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than five hundred pesos for each offense."
but also for violation "on previous occasions" and the "need to stress upon the
air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulation or
requirements of the government regulating agency".
whether the industrial court is justified in imposing a fine not only upon Yu Ki Lam,
who was the manager of the store, but also upon Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen
Yang, who were mere owners thereof but had no participation in its management.
Petitioners: Sec 2512, RA 875 is penal in nature and should be strictly construed. Thus,
their guilty can only be established by clear and positive evidence and not merely be
presumptions or inferences as was done by the industrial court. They argue that the
evidence is not strong enough as basis for conviction and fine.
 Sec 25 does not specify which Court will act when the violation calls for
imposition of the penalties provided. It merely states that they may be imposed
“in the discretion of the court”
 The Court rules that the word cannot refer to the CIR for it will be violative of
the right that "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law" and "In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . .
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf"
 The procedure laid down by law of the CIR in dealing with ULPs negates these
constitutional guarantees. The law provides:
o "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of
Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure."
o "the Court shall not be bound solely by the evidence presented during
the hearing but may avail itself of all other means such as (but not
limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of well-informed persons
which results must be made a part of the record."

US v. Barrias Law authorized CoC to license
craft engaged in lighterage13 or
other exclusively harbor business
of the ports of the Islands, and,
required all vessels engaged in
lightering to be license…
 Collector of Customs for
the Philippine Islands is
hereby authorized,
empowered, and directed
to promptly make and
publish suitable rules and
regulations to carry this
law into effect and to
regulate the business
herein licensed.
 Any person who shall
violate the provisions of
this Act, or of any rule or
regulation made and
13
Lighterage is the business involving the transfer of cargo by means of a lighter (barge/ boats) with a charge levied for
such transfer.
 This means that the accused may be tried without the right of confrontation
and may be convicted by mere preponderance of evidence. This is against due
process.
 Illustration: Comparison between the CIR and the Court of Agrarian Relations:
o While they have the same penalty clauses, the law under which the CAR
provide: "Criminal proceedings should be prosecuted as in ordinary
cases"
o This be clear indication that Congress intended to confer criminal
jurisdiction upon an administrative court, it expressly says so in an
unmistakable language.
o This was made more apparent when the law was subsequently amended
to remove the provisions on criminal jurisdiction of the CAR.
 Hence the power to impose penalty under Sec 25 is lodged in ordinary courts
and not the CIR. Thus, the fine is illegal and nullified
Cir. Of the Insular Collector of Customs
 The basis of the punishment and conviction by the lower court: Under Act No.
1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but
also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.
 It is a rule that: the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not
be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain;
and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
constitution itself is changed.
 ITC, the law authorized the Collector to make suitable regulations and fix
penalties thereto which is an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The
Collector fixed the penalties for the violation. However, it has been held that
a law providing that violation thereto would be a misdemeanor was valid
since the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the
administrative officer, but of the Congress itself. (see bold below)
Authority of the Collector
 the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage
or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with
certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so
 issued by the Collector of
Customs for the Philippine
Islands, under and by
authority of this Act, shall
be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon
conviction shall be
punished by
imprisonment or by fine of
not more than $100
Appellant was charged for violation
of Par 70 in rel. to Par 83 of a
Circular of the Insular Collector of
Customs. It was shown that as
captain of the lighter, he was
moving and directing movement,
which was heavily laden (with
hemp), in the Pasig River, with the
use of bamboo poles.
Sec 70 provides that '"No heavily
loaded casco, lighter, or other
similar craft shall be permitted
to move in the Pasig River without
being towed by steam or moved
by other adequate power."
Sec 83 provides that person
responsible for violation of these
regulations will be fined 5-
500pesos at the discretion of the
court.
Appellant argues:
 Sec 70 is unauthorized by
licensed. (Sec 1-3, Act 1136)
o The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized,
empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules
and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business
herein licensed. (Sec 5)
o Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or
regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the
Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more
than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine
and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court: Provided, That
violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in
section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section, or by both."
(Sec 8)
 The power to fix penalties is lodged with the legislature.
 ITC, the law authorized the Collector to fix penalties for violation of the
regulations. Thus, it is invalid. Instead, Barriage is convicted of a misdemeanor
and punished by a fine of $25 pursuant to the Law
Here, the penalty was set by Congress itself. Thus, it is valid.
 Sec 19, Act. No 355.
 If the Collector is
authorized to promulgate
such a law, they are void
as an illegal delegation of
legislative power.
RCPI v. Board of Case 1:
Communications Morales claims that while he was
in MNL, his daughter sent him a
TG informing him the death of his
wife. However, the TG never
reached him and had to be
informed personally. Thus, he had
to take a plane, and allegedly
suffered inconvenience and
additional expenses.
Case 2: Innocencio claims that
Lourdes sent a TG to him to
inform him the death of their
father. The TG never reached him.
Despite this, the sender was never
notified of the non-receipt and
non-delivery. Thus, Innocencio
wasn’t able to attend his father’s
burial. He was allegedly shocked
when he learned of the death and
suffered mental anguish and
personal inconvenience.
After hearing, RCPI was imposed a
fine of 200 pursuant to CA 146
Perez v LPG BP 33 penalizes illegal trading,
Refillers hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, under delivery, and
Petitioner: respondent Board has no JD to entertain and take cognizance of complaint
due to contractual breach under Art 1170 and quasi-delict or tort under 2176. – YES
Being a creature of legislature, the Board can exercise only such jurisdiction and
powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute".
 As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of
Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that
provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission.
 One of these powers is provided under Sec 129 of the PSA -- to issue certificate
of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience
does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not
related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the
performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest.
 Even assuming that the Board has JD over RCPI in the exercise of its supervision
to insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to the fine
under Sec 21 because the provision of law subjects a fine to every public service
that violates or falls to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate
or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
 ITC, the petitioner is not being charged due to violation of the T&C of the
certificate of public convenience or any order, decision of regulation of the
Board. The cases deal with contractual breach through negligence. The charge
does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of
transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of
public convenience.
 The proper forum for complainant would be regular courts, not the Board.
Neither can it impose the fine of 200. The only power granted to the PSC (now
the Board) is to fix rates. It is not vested with the power to impose fines.
WN the RTC erred in declared the Cir. void.
Petitioner: the penalties are sanctioned under law BP33. RA 7636 also authorize the Doe
to impose penalties provided in the Cir.
underfilling of petroleum
products, and possession for trade
of adulterated petroleum
products and underfilled LPG’s.
The penalty ranged from 20k to
50k
To implement, DOE issued Cir. No
2000-06-010 imposing penalties
for various offenses relating to the
above on a per cylinder basis
which varies based on the number
of times it was violated.
LPG refillers assailed the Circular
for being contrary to law.
The lower court nullified it on the
ground that it included new
offenses, not in the law. The Cir.
Provided for penalties on a per
cylinder basis which might exceed
the maximum penalty under the
law.
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of
penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by
the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by
the statute itself.
(1) BP 33 gives a general description of what constitutes a criminal act. The Circular
merely lists the various modes by which they may be perpetrated: no price display
board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no
authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, etc.
These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law,
which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
 all the administrative regulation did was make a LISTING OF EXAMPLES which
would constitute illegal trading. – Constitutes filling in of details/interpretation
of the law.
(2) The Circular is in accord with the law. The penalty under BP 33 is limited to 20-50k.
Under the Circular, retail outlets may be imposed a maximum of 20k. However, it is
silent on the maximum imposed as to refillers, marketers and dealers.
 This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid
statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides
penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since
B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, BP 33 defines what constitutes punishable acts involving petroleum products,
and minimum and maximum limits are set. The Circular merely implements the said
law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and
dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended
to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to
effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving
petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this
case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming

Public Hearing The pollution control division of The Court agrees with petitioners that respondent was already estopped from
Committee of the LLDA conducted an inspection
LLDA v SMPH from the wastewater of SM City
Manila Branch and showed that
the samples failed to conform
with the effluent standards for
inland water under law.
LLDA directed SMPH to perform
corrective measures to abate or
control the pollution and to pay
the penalty of 1000 per day of
discharging the pollutive
wastewater from date of
inspection until full cessation of
discharging the pollutive
wastewater.
SMPH’s Pollution Control Officer
requested a re-sampling, claiming
that they already undertook
measures to meet the standards
set forth by LLDA.
Petitioner issued an Order to Pay
required SMPH to pay fine of 50k .
Respondent asked for a waiver of
the fine on the ground that they
immediately undertook corrective
measures and that the pH levels of
its effluent were already
controlled even prior to the
public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.
questioning the power of LLDA to impose fines as penalty –
 respondent actively participated during the hearing of its water pollution case
before the LLDA without impugning such power of the said agency. In fact,
respondent even asked for a reconsideration of the Order of the LLDA which
imposed a fine upon it
 By asking for a reconsideration of the fine imposed by the LLDA, the Court
arrives at no conclusion other than that respondent has impliedly admitted the
authority of the latter to impose such penalty. Hence, contrary to respondent's
claim in its Comment and Memorandum, it is already barred from assailing the
LLDA's authority to impose fines.
In any case, the Court has held that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the
exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.
 the Court has held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains
to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as
the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum.
 In another case, the Court recognized the power of LLDA to impose fines under
Sec 4-A which entitles the LLDA to compensation for damages resulting from
failure to meet established water and effluent standards.
 LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws [PD 813 and EO 927], to carry
out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
 Sec 4 (d), EO 927 – provides that the LLDA has the power to "make, alter or
modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished."
 Sec 4(i) states that the LLDA is given authority to "exercise such powers and
perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and
responsibilities under this Executive Order."
 Section 4 (c) authorizes the LLDA to "issue orders or decisions to compel
 request for resampling.
After several denials, SMPH filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA.
The CA granted, and held an
administrative agency's power to
impose fines should be expressly
granted and may not be implied,
Under LLDA’s charter, Republic Act
No. 4850, it is not expressly
granted any power or authority to
impose fines for violations of
effluent standards set by law.
Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards
Interest of Law and Order
Rubi v. Rubi and various other
Provincial Board Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to
remove their residence from their
native habitat and to establish
themselves on a reservation at
Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro
and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they
escaped
One of the Manguianes, Dabalos,
escaped from the reservation and
was taken in hand by the
provincial sheriff and placed in
prison at Calapan, solely because
he escaped from the reservation.
compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing
rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing."
Indeed, how could the LLDA be expected to effectively perform the above-mentioned
functions if, for every act or violation committed against the law it is supposed to
enforce, it is required to resort to some other authority for the proper remedy or
penalty. The intendment of the law, as gleaned from Section 4 (i) of E.O. No. 927, is to
clothe the LLDA not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those which are
implied or incidental but, nonetheless, are necessary or essential for the full and proper
implementation of its purposes and functions.
History of the attitude against “non-Christians”
 The attitude was to place Indios in redducciones. It was found that some
Spaniards who deal with indios are troublesome – dirty way of living, robbers,
gamblers, vicious and useless. Hence the improve the condition of the “less
advanced”, they were concentrated on “reducciones”
 After acquisition by the US, it was suggested in Pres. McKinley’s Instructions
that in dealing with the uncivilized tribes, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in dealing with the North American Indians.
The Jones law later established the “Bureau of non-Christian tribes”
 Later, Act 547 was enacted which established the Local Civil Gov’t for the
Manguianes in the Mindoro which authorized the provincial governor, subject
to approval of the Sec. of Interior, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him. Refusal to comply
shall be cause for imprisonment.
 The provision was retained in the Admin Code.
 These different laws, if they mean anything, denote an anxious regard for the
welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their
The Manguianes sued out a writ
of habeas corpus in this court,
alleging that they are deprived of
their liberty in violation of law.
The Return of the SG states
provincial governor of Mindoro
with the prior approval of his act
by the Department Secretary
ordered the placing of the
petitioners and others on a
reservation.
advancement.
“Non-Christian”
 It has a geographical meaning. Under the PH Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Many laws have made reference to
certain parts of the Philippines inhabited by Moros and non-Christian tribes.
 Based on legislative, judicial and executive authority, “non-Christian” is
intended to relate to the degree of civilization.
o For ex., the Bureau of non-Christian tribes is charged to conduct
"systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . .
with special view to determining the most practicable means for
bringing about their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity."
o The uniform construction of executive officials who have been called to
interpret and enforce the law.
o Ex. The Attorney-General’s opinion was sought on the effect of baptism
– Does he remain a non-Christian? Yes because uncivilized.
ISSUES:
Delegation of Legislative Power – petitioner argues that Legislative could not delegate
this power to provincial authorities
 A recognized exception to non-delegation is delegation to local authorities.
 Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?"
 As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection
of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune
of being in a backward state?
Religious Discrimination – the statute is clear – it provides for segregation of non-
Christians and no other.
 We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippine Islands
of a low grade of civilization, and that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
 of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals on account of religious
differences
Due Process; Liberty; EPC – That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
 Civil liberty means the freedom to be enjoyed in a “civilized community”. In
general, it may be said that liberty means the opportunity to do those things
which are ordinarily done by free men. However, Liberty" as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is "liberty regulated by law." No man can do
exactly as he pleases. It is regulated by police power.
 "Due process of law" means simply . . .
o 1, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government;
o 2, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
o 3, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and
o 4, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class."
Police power
 What was the intention of legislature in enacting the measure?
 The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro sets out the
reasons:
o (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-
Christian people of the province; and
o (2) the only successful method for educating the Manguianes was to
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement.
o The Solicitor-General adds the following: (3) The protection of the
Manguianes;
o (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam;
o (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes
 The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly
relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
 civilization
 What the Government wished to do by bringing them into a reservation was to
gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the
health and morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization.
Segregation really constitutes protection for the Manguianes.
 The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they
are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true,
indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a
low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of
the State.
 Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest
of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity.
The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the
sluggard.
Application
 On locomotion. Could he not be kept away from certain localities? The remedy
of the oppressed Manguian would be the Courts.
 In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of
government renders imperative a power to restrain the individual to some
extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited.
 Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts
cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.
 Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. there exists
a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
 The idea is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach
the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all
must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich
 and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions
must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulIll this governmental policy, must be confined for a
time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Moir dissent
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar
to that accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the
court's decision to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with reference to
the Indians.
 all the Indian nations in the United States were considered as separate nations
and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separate treaties made
by the United States Government with the Indian nations, and, in compliance
with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on which they lived
and were protected from intrusion and molestation by white men.
 The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the
Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a
certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the
Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights
and privileges of any other citizen of this country
The Manguianes were charged with two: (1) Caingin (2) they will become a heavy
burden to the state and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who
want to abuse them
 As to two, The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
 But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those
who want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to involuntary
servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they
have been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely
confined on a narrow reservation from which they may not escape without
facing a term in jail?
 I think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will all be subjected

Public Interest
People v. Rosenthal and Osmena were
Rosenthal charged before the CFI for
violations of the Blue Sky Law.
The informations alleged that as
promoters, organizers, founders
and incorporator of Mining
Corporations, the shares of which
are speculative securities
(dependent on proposed promise
of future promotion and
development of the oil business)
traded in and made successive
sales of said shares.
From 5-6 to 100-300
The Trial Court found them guilty.
They assail the constitutionality of
Act 2581 for which they were
convicted.
 Undue delegation – the
law does not provide a
standard to guide the
issuance/cancellation of
the permit
 EPC
 Vague and ambiguous
One of the findings was they were
found guilty for selling such stock
to involuntary personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has been. How
will they live?
Act No. 2581 is an undue delegation of legislative authority. The law provides no
standard or rule which can guide the official in determining when the issue or cancel
the permit
 The difficulty lies in the fixing of the limit and extent of the authority. While
courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to decide
each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome
legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
 The certificate or permit must show that the person to be issued has complied
with the provision of the act.
 On the other hand, the certificate/permit may be cancelled when it is in the
public interest
 In view of the intention and purpose of the Act – to protect the public against
speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky"
and against the "sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells,
distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations" – public interest is
a sufficient standard.
 The law prohibited the trading of speculative securities, this was known as the
“Blue Sky Law”, because speculative securities had no basis for their valuation
and stood on nothing which was just as clear as the blue sky. The authority of
the Insular Treasurer to cancel certificates was based on a sufficient standard of
public interest.
 The public interest means, not the general reference to public welfare, but the
purpose of the Act, the requirements, and the context.
Act 2581 is vague because speculative securities is vague
 Under Sec 1(b) “speculative securities”; as used in this Act shall be deemed to
mean and include: (b) All securities the value of which materially depend upon
proposed or promised future promotion or development rather than on present
tangible assets and conditions.
 At the time of issuance of the shares, the mining companies only had
exploration leases. There was nothing tangible. The value of those shares
 without have the requisite permit
Justice, equity and substantial Merits of the case
International The SOLE certified to the CIR that
Hardwood v. there was an industrial dispute
Pangil between petitioner and certain
Federation employees of respondent union
and it was a controversy to be
depended upon future development and the uncertainty of “striking” oil. The
shares issued under these circumstances are clearly speculative because they
depended upon proposed or promised future promotion or development rather
than on present tangible assets and conditions.
They are not covered under the exception.
 Who are exempted: (1) Persons who hold speculative securities but who are not
the issuers thereof; and (2) persons who have acquired the same for their own
account in the usual and ordinary course of business and not for the direct or
indirect promotion of any enterprise or scheme within the purview of this Act,
provided such possession is in good faith.
 ITC, the shares were not acquired on account of his business. Moreover, he was
not in GF since as member of the Board he should’ve known that no written
permission was given by the Insular Treasurer.
 The successive and repeated sales of those shares, although such actions were
his because they were obtained from the corporation by means of subscription
and payment of the corresponding amount, proves that this claim of ownership
was only used as a means to circumvent the law
Act 2581 denies EPC because it discriminates an owner who sells his securities in a single
transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions
 It is enough to say that they are within the power of classification which a state
has. A state 'may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists
without covering the whole Celd of possible abuses, and it may do so none the
less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed . .
. If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature
seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with although
otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in
the law.
Petitioner argues that determination of minimum wages was specifically provided for
under Sec 5 – the President shall order the CIR to conduct a study and set based on
conditions prevailing in an industry/locality.
 Under Sec 5, minimum wages are determinable in reference to a given
industry/locality, which should be of general application and have the force and
 dealt with under Sec 4 of CA 103. effect of law, after approval of the President.
 Sec 5 does not contemplate (an industrial dispute) arbitration and settlement
The demands made by respondent of industrial or agricultural disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or
union: lockout, and is designed merely to provide for a workable device whereby a
 Set the minimum wages scheme of minimum wage or share for laborers or tenants in a given industry or
 Set a schedule of rate of locality may be evolved, whenever conditions therein warrant.
wages  Meanwhile, Sec 414, construed with other sections, is designed to provide for
 Rate of wages should be compulsory arbitration in order to prevent non-pacific methods in the
higher. determination of industrial and agricultural disputes.
The employees were getting .70 a  The intent of the law – there was no suitable instrument in avoiding strikes.
day. The CIR was created for the purpose of intervention in conflicts.
The CIR set wages for mountain o Hence, Sec 4 empowered the CIR to "take cognizance for purposes of
camps at 1/day while those in the prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement, of any industrial or
plains not less than .9/day agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regard wages, shares or compensation, dismissals,
While MR was pending before CIR lay-offs, or suspensions of employees or laborers, tenants or farm-
en banc, Petitioner assailed the JD laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or employment,
of the CIR between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers."
(1) the CIR has no authority to  If we take the view of petitioner, and if an industrial dispute arose causing or
determine minimum wage under likely to cause a strike/lockout, the CIR would be without authority to take
Sec 4 (2) such authority would cognizance of the dispute. To adopt such a narrow construction would be to set
constitute an undue delegation of at naught the plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to "settle
legislative power to the CIR all question, matters, controversies, or disputes arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees" and to frustrate the very objective of the
law, namely, to create an instrumentality through which the intervention of the
Government could be made effective in order to prevent non-pacific methods
in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes.
Petitioner claims that if Sec 4 empowers the CIR to determine wages in connection
with industrial dispute, it is an undue delegation of legislative power because
determination of wages is a legislative function and Sec 4 does not indicate in what
manner, by what standards, or in accordance with what rules, the Court of Industrial
Relations shall determine minimum wages under said section"

14
"take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regard wages, shares or compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or suspensions of employees or laborers, tenants or farm-laborers, hours of labor, or conditions
of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers."

What is moral, educational or amusing
Mutual Film Complainant is engaged in the
Corp v. business of purchasing, selling and
Industrial leasing films. It also has film
Commission exchanges in Detroit and Michigan.
It claims that it has at least 2500 Undue burden
reels of films which it intends to
and will exhibit in Ohio but it will
be impossible to do unless it be
approved by the board of censors.
The statute will require
examination and payment of a fee
therefor.
The board has demanded
complainant to submit its films to
censorship and threatens to arrest
those who exhibit any film without
being censored.
Thus, complainant sought to
restrain the enforcement of the
Act creating the board of censor of
motion picture films.
 Unlawful burden on
interstate commerce
 Sec 20 provides that in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act,
the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms.
 Based on this section, the legislature has set a sufficient standard to guide the
exercise of its discretion.
 We have already ruled that the discretionary power conferred is judicial in
character and does not infringe upon separation of power, non-delegation and
equal protection (Antamok v. CIR)
What is the law?
 Sec 4: "Only such films as are in the judgment and discretion of the board of
censors of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character shall be
passed and approved by such board." The films are required to be stamped or
designated in a proper manner.
 Only those films which are "to be publicly exhibited and displayed in the State
of Ohio" which are required to be examined and censored” (?)
Violation of Free Speech
 Films of a "moral, educational or amusing and harmless character shall be
passed and approved" are the words of the statute.
 These films may be used for evil and this is what the statute intended to
protect.
 There are some things should not have pictorial representation in public places
and to all audiences. And not only the State of Ohio but other States have
considered it to be in the interest of the public morals and welfare to supervise
moving picture exhibitions. We would have to shut our eyes to the facts of the
world to regard the precaution unreasonable or the legislation to effect it a
mere wanton interference with personal liberty.
 IT DOES NOT COVER FILMS. We immediately feel that the argument is wrong or
strained which extends the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the
multitudinous shows which are advertised on the bill-boards of our cities and
towns and which regards them as emblems of public safety.
o It seems not to have occurred to anybody in the cited cases that freedom
of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the power which was
illustrated. 'he rights of property were only considered as involved. It
  Violates free speech and cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a
publication business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
 Undue delegation of spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio
legislative power, as the constitution; we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of
law is without a standard public opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and
to determine whether it sentiments published and known, vivid, useful and entertaining no
offends the statute doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the
greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.
Undue delegation. The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what
is educational, moral, amusing or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary
judgment, whim and caprice.
 But the statute by its provisions guards against such variant judgments, and its
terms, like other general terms, get precision from the sense and experience of
men and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct.
 The exact specification of the instances of their application would be as
impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and experience,
therefore, the law properly relies.
 If the law cannot rely on sense and experience, the many administrative
agencies created by the state and national governments would be denuded of
their utility and government, in some of its most important exercises, becomes
impossible.
What is Sacrilegious?

Burstyn v. The New York Statute permits the Violation of Free Speech; Mutual film abandoned
Wilson banning of motion picture films on  It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the
the ground they are communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a
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”sacrilegious” variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to
the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression." The
Appellant is a corporation importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by
engaged in distributing motion the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.
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it unlawful "to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture
film or reel [with-specified exceptions not relevant here], unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department ...
"The director of the [motion picture] division [of the education department] or, when authorized - by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be
promptly examined every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman,
sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor.
pictures. It has the exclusive right
in the US to distribute the film
“The Miracle” After examination, a
license was issued authorizing the
exhibition. Later however,
hundreds of protests and defenses
were raised on the film. Thus, a
review was requested and later the
Board of Regents was of the
opinion that the picture was
“sacreligious”
Hearing was conducted and
appellant appeared before the
Regents. It challenged the JD of
the committee to proceed with
the case. Later, appellant’s license
was rescinded.
Appellant brought the action
before NY Courts, claiming:
 The law constitutes a prior
restraint on free speech
and press
 Violation of separation of
church and state
 The term sacrilegious is
vague and offends due
process.
Summary: A poor simple-minded
girl is tending a herd of goats on
the mountainside. She comes
across a stranger who she views as
her favorite saint, St. Joseph. She
was seduced with wine. She later
 That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does
not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded
by the 1st Amendment.
 To the extent that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, supra, is out of harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer
adhere to it.
Whether the standard “sacrilegious” is a valid exemption to free expression?
 In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of "sacrilegious" given
by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a
myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those
provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest
such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor.
 Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it
virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would
be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular
sentiments sacred to a religious minority.
 Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other respects, might raise
substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate church
and state with freedom of worship for all.
o It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or
imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they
appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.
We hold only that under the First, and Fourteenth Amendments a state may not ban a film on
the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is "sacrilegious."
 on discovers that she is pregnant.
Being naïve of the seduction that
happened, she believes that her
child is divinely conceived. Village
people mock her. She goes into the
mountain top church and stayed
there, accompanied by her goat,
until she gives birth. She seems to
regain sanity because of her
motherhood.
Adequate and Efficient Instruction
PACU v. Petitioning colleges and universities
Secretary ask Act No. 2706 to be declared
unconstitutional
 Deprive schools, teachers,
and parents of liberty and
property without due
process
 Deprive parents the natural
right and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency
 Unlawful delegation on the
Sec. of Edu.
Act 2706 "An Act making the
inspection and recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for
the Secretary of Public Instruction."
 Been up for 37 years
Petitioners have no been directly
injured.
Deprive schools, teachers, and parents of liberty and property without due process.
PET: They contend that a citizen has a right to own and operate a school and a law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit to exercise that right amounts to
censorship or prior restraint.
OSG: No issue because they all have permits and are actually operating. They do not
assert that the Sec. of Educ. will revoke their permits.
 Sec 3 provides a private school may be opened to the public it must first
obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education
 Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy.
 Notwithstanding, we choose to look into the issue based on the SCOTUS cases
cited by petitioners outlawing censorship of this kind.
 The Board of Educational Survey conducted a study and survey on the
education in the PH which found that many schools are only operating for
profit and youth is not being given the education they need. The Board
recommended to enact a legislation requiring prior permission of the Sec. of
Public Instruction before they could put up schools.
 In any case, the Constitution provides "All educational institutions shall be
under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State."
Unlawful delegation
  They point against Sec 1: "It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public
Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools
and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate
instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction
given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized
representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said
schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given
in the same,"
 Sec 6: he Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and
publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary,
intermediate, and high schools, and colleges…
Petitioner: no description in the act on what constitutes 'general standard of
efficiency.' or 'adequate instruction to the public.
 The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of
Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as
shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars,
entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students
etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily
in operation for 37 years
o This shows that the Legislature could and did validly rely on the
educational experience and training of those in change of the DOE to
ascertain and formulate these minimum requirements.
 Anyway, “adequate and efficient instruction” should be considered sufficient
in the same way “public welfare”, “in the interest of law and order” etc. had
been upheld.
 No justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not show how these standards have
injured any of them or interfered with their operation.
Assessment of 1% levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Gov’t
expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation
 Sec 11A: The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be
met by the regular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act:
Provided, however, That for additional expenses in the supervision and
regulation of private schools, colleges and universities and in the purchase of
textbooks to be sold to students of said schools, colleges and universities the
President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy
an equitable assessment from each private educational institution equivalent

Reasonableness and Implied Standard
Wisconsin Wisconsin Inspection Bureau filed its
Inspection Rule Book. The Commissioner
Bureau approved and issued an Order
v.Whitman approving some and disapproving
other proposed rules and
regulations in the Rule Book. IT was
found that certain rates were
unreasonable and placed rates in
to one percent of the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . .
and non-payment of the assessment herein provided by any private school,
college or university shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation by the
Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted to it
 Petitioners: This is a tax on exercise of a right to open a school;
 There are good grounds in support of the Government's position. If this levy of
1 per cent is truly a mere fee — and not a tax — to finance the cost of the
Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise private schools, the
exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and
examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower
courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within
the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance
Sec 1, RA 139: "The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or
authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks)
which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may
find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and
people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of
the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable. Petitioners: This is
censorship.
 Here, the question lies: whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the
State's constitutional power to supervise and regulate private schools.
 But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuation strictly adheres to the letter of
the section and wisely steers a middle course between the Scylla of
"dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for complaint
will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop. Anyway, and again,
petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative
appeal to the National Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124.
Do riders need to be disapproved or merely internal matters?
 All regulations or rules of any such rating bureau shall be filed with the
commissioner of insurance, and no such regulations or rules shall be in force
before such filing, nor, in any case, after written order by the commissioner of
insurance, disapproving such regulations or rules.
The argument that “all regulations or rules of any such rating bureau” refer only to
matters affecting its internal management is completely refuted by the provisions of
sub. (2) of sec. 203.36, which provides: “No regulation or rule shall be adopted which
lieu of those placed. shall limit or prohibit the exercise, by any company, of its right to make a different rate,
as provided in section 203.40.”
Plaintiffs filed a petition for review  The Court first highlighted that the law was enacted to make state
The rating law was enacted to make supervision over rate fixing more efficient and attainable.
rate-making more efficient and  The bureaus became authorized to prepare deviations from the standard
attainable. policy form through riders, and these were brought up to their respective
 Under the old law, rate- bureaus thus, there was a uniformity of practice. This enabled the
making was very difficult commissioner to correct irregularities in practice and required the companies
because the commissioner themselves to provide the machinery by which the irregularities were to be
could not supervise the disclosed.
rate making of the  Obviously, the rule above applies to member companies in relation to the
innumerable local boards. insured, and not internal affairs of the bureau.
 It required that every  If the construction contended for by the plaintiffs is given to the act, then -
company writing the neither the insured nor the commissioner of insurance nor any one
insurance be part of the representing the insured has any voice as to the terms of the riders except the
rating bureau; and the bureau.
rates were to be   The statute took from the local boards of underwriters the rule-making power
established by these and vested it initially in the bureaus for the purpose of securing uniformity.
bureaus The insured might confer with a local board. As a practical matter he cannot
 To provide a check upon the confer with the bureau. If the plaintiffs’ construction of the statute is
operations of the various adopted, he must then accept insurance upon the' terms prescribed by the
member companies and bureau or decline it' altogether.
their-agents, a stamping  In order that this situation should not place the bureau in a place where it
office was provided for. The might arbitrarily work hardship to the insuring public, the power to
act recognized the long- disapprove the proposed rules and regulations was lodged with the
established practice of commissioner of insurance as the representative of the insured. Every
insurance companies in the consideration requires that the law be construed as conferring upon the
classification of risks and commissioner power to disapprove the rules and regulations filed with him by
the determination of rates the bureaus. Otherwise, the way is open for the insured to become the victim
applicable by base rates, of the abuses which the standard fire policy law was enacted to suppress.
and the continuance of Petitioners argue that the insurance commissioner can do what it wants. It can not
these practices was only disapprove the form filled by the bureau, but indicate what form he will
authorized. The approve it. It is challenged as:
commissioner was  Unlawful delegation of legislative power – it can make rules by just
authorized to-review any disapproving and setting conditions until it conforms with the Rules.
rate “for the purpose of  If it is a delegation of legislative power, there is no standard by which to guide
determining whether the -
same is unreasonable or Delegation
discriminatory.”
the discretion of the commissioner.
 From that time to this it has been held that the legislature might make a
general provision and give powers to those who are to act under such general
provision to fill up the details. 
 In 1891, the standard policy law authorized the Commissioner “to prepare,
approve and adopt a printed form in blank of a contract or policy of fire
insurance, together with such provisions, agreements, or conditions as may be
indorsed thereon or added thereto…” The Court concluded that the power
was an unlawful delegation of legislative power. `
 In Hamptom v. US: In determining what it may do in seeking assistance from
another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed
according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
co-ordination.
 The power which can be exercised by the commissioner of insurance under
the provisions of the rating law, compared with the whole volume of power
exercised by other administrative agencies in this state, is insignificant. It is -
manifest that it is the substance of the power delegated rather than the
number of acts which may be performed pursuant to it that should determine
whether it falls within or without the field of power which may be delegated.
 The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law; to determine - the
general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to - fix the limits within
which the law shall operate, — is a - power which is vested by our
constitutions in the legislature and may not be delegated. When, however, the
legislature has laid down these fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is
necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose -- “to fill up the
details” to make public regulations interpreting the statute and directing the
details of its execution.”
 The general purpose to be achieved by uniformity of rules and regulations,
proposed by rate-making bureaus is indicated and the power of the
commissioner of insurance is limited to disapproving those which-in his
judgment would not further the legislative purpose or run counter to it.
 Two checks on agencies:
o every such agency must conform precisely to the statute which grants
the power
 o Such delegated powers must be exercised in a spirit of judicial fairness
and equity and not oppressively and unreasonably.
It is further urged that if the statute be held constitutional as conferring upon the
commissioner of insurance the power to disapprove rules, and regulations proposed
by a rating bureau, it prescribes no standard in accordance with which the
commissioner of insurance must act.
 Considering the nature of the subject matter, it is apparent that any standard
would be necessarily general.
 While the statute does not in terms provide that the commissioner of
insurance shall exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in the disapproval
of proposed rules and regulations, that condition is necessarily implied.
o Administrative officers or bodies must act not only within the field of
their statutory powers but in a reasonable and orderly manner
o The rule of reasonableness inheres in every law, and the action of those
charged with its enforcement must in the nature of things be subject to
the test of reasonableness.
 In determining whether or not the power granted by legislative act in a
particular case to an administrative agency is of the kind which may be
delegated, due regard must be paid to the nature of the subject matter with
which the act deals
 As already indicated, an attempt to specify a standard for rules and
regulations to be promulgated by rating bureaus and approved by the
commissioner of insurance would be nothing more nor less than the
prescribing of the rules and regulations and riders themselves. If this were
done by legislative enactment, the flexibility in practice necessary to meet
changing conditions in the business world would be destroyed. The general
purpose of the law is indicated. The commissioner of insurance must act
within the boundaries of reason and not oppressively. Therefore, the standard
prescribed, considering the subject matter dealt with, meets the test already
indicated.
Any finding or order of the commissioner in an investigation upon his own motion
shall be subject to court review the same as if made after hearing upon a complaint
as herein , provided.
 The Commissioner failed to adhere to the proper procedure in hearing the
plaintiff’s motion for review.
 The provision above clearly contemplates that the commissioner shall, in

To promote simplicity, economy or efficiency
Cervantes v. RA 51 was approved authorizing the
Auditor General president to effect such reforms
and changes in GOCCs for the
purpose of promoting simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their
operation.
acting on his own motion, proceed in the same way as if acting in response to
a complaint
 In view of the fact that under the statute the parties affected by the order of
the commission were entitled to a rehearing and review, it cannot be held
that there was a denial of due process in this case; but the error of the
commissioner in proceeding as he did arbitrarily to find the rates established
by the Bureau unreasonable and discriminatory from his own -predilections
and conceptions and to evolve from his inner consciousness a reasonable
rate, is an error so fundamental in character as to pervade the whole
proceeding.
 In his order of June 30, 1923, the commissioner announces that he is firmly
convinced that his order of August 1, 1922, was right. It is quite apparent that
the issue in the mind of the commissioner was not whether the rate fixed by
the bureau was a reasonable or unreasonable rate, but whether or not his
order of August 1, 1922, was right or wrong. The burden of proof was shifted
so as to compel the bureau to show that the rate fixed by the com- - missioner
was unreasonable and discriminatory instead of - requiring evidence to be
adduced to show that the rate fixed - by the bureau was unreasonable and
discriminatory, thus exactly reversing the position of the parties.
 There has never been a hearing and a finding by the commissioner made
upon the statutory basis, for it is quite evident from the language of the
statute itself, particularly when taken in connection with the language of sec.
200.11, that orders fixing rates are to be based upon evidence which is to be
preserved. As to rates, the order of August 1, 1922, was void.
 In his findings the commissioner of insurance ought to point out for what
reasons and in what respects a particular rate is unreasonable or
discriminatory.' The statute contemplates that the rate is to be fixed by the
bureau, and that the rate so fixed remains unless and until the commissioner
finds upon sufficient evidence that it is unreasonable or discriminatory.
NAFCO, being a GOCC, is without doubt under RA 51 and EO 93.
 Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control Committee
created in the EO.
 The Control Committee has the power to pass upon the program of activities
and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors
 Thus, it is no question that the Control Committee had the power to pass

Pursuant to this power, President
promulgated EO 93 creating the
Gov’t Enterprises Council to advise
the President in the exercise of his
power of supervision and control
over these corporations and to
formulate and adopt such policy and
measures as might be necessary to
coordinate their functions and
activities. The EO also provided for
the Control Committee16
Petitioner was manager of NAFCO.
By resolution of Board of Directors
of NAFCO, he was granted quarters
allowance of not exceed P400/mon.
However, the resolution was
disapproved by the Control
Committee of Gov’t Enterprises
based on the recommendation of
NAFCO auditor that (1) that quarters
allowance constituted additional
compensation prohibited by the
charter of the NAFCO, which Exes
the salary of the general manager
thereof at a sum not to exceed
P15,000 a year (2) the precarious
financial condition of the
corporation did not warrant the
granting of such allowance.
Hence this petition for review
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(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations owned or controlled by the Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy
in their operations; (2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the respective Boards of Directors of the said corporations (3)
To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government Enterprises Council with the approval of the President"
upon and dis/approve the resolution of NAFCO Board of Director granting
the quarters allowance to petitioners.
 That the Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the
resolution is also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the
NAFCO auditor, the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase
of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter.
Unlawful delegation
Petitioners: EO 93 is void for being based on a law that is unconstitutional as an (1)
illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive (2) promulgated beyond the
period of 1 year limited by the law
 (2) Ignores the rule on computation of time for doing an act. First day
excluded, last day included. Act was approved Oct 4, 1946 and he was given 1
year, and he promulgated on Oct 4, 1947. So it is in.
 (1) Rule: so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation.
o RA 51 lays down a standard and policy the purpose shall be to meet the
exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and
independent Government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations.
Petitioner: quarters allowance is not a compensation and granting it would not
contravene the NAFCO charter.
 Regardless whether compensation or not, the resolution was still disapproved
by the Control Committee which it had power to do
 Maintain monetary stability, promote rising level of production and real Income
People v. Jolifee Jolifee is a Canadian, born in China Petitioner concedes he has no license but maintains that CB Cir. No 21 17 requiring
and residing in HK. He made several said license and Sec 34 of RA 265 refer only to consummated exportation
trips to Manila, either for business  This section explicitly applies to "any person desiring to export gold" and,
or what. hence, it contemplates the situation existing prior to the consummation of the
exportation. Indeed, its purpose would be defeated if the penal sanction were
One time he came to collect his deferred until after the article in question had left the Philippines, for
debt from one Woo. He was paid in jurisdiction over it, and over the guilty party, would be lost thereby.
gold brought to him by a passenger Petitioner: Not wilfull violation
in his hotel room and carried to gold  Belied by the fact that he hid the bullions and tried to bribe the collector
around his body. He was accosted Petitioner: Cir 21 is not a valid penal law because it did not comply with Sec 74 of RA
by a secret agent and searched. 265 because…
It was not approved by the President
4 pieces of gold bullion were found  Presumption of regularity. As a consequence, it must be presumed — in the
tied to his body and a $100 absence of proof to the contrary, which is wanting — that such duty has been
travellers check. He even tried to fulfilled in the case at bar.
bribe the Deputy Collector of  Further, it is not essential that the administrative acts of the President be
Customs to have the case settled. made in writing unless the law says do
 Villena v Sec of Interior: all executive and administrative organizations are
He was charged and convicted for adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
violating CB Cir. 21 requiring a departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
license for any person desiring to cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to
export gold in relation to RA 265 act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
prescribing the penalty for its Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive
violation Power of the MB to suspend to restrict sales of exchange by the CB and subject
transactions involving foreign exchange to license is temporary in nature and could be
exercised only during an exchange crisis, as an emergency measure. The circular ITC
does not indicate that it was a temporary emergency measure.
 It is not necessary, however, for the legality of said circular that its temporary
character be stated on its face, so long as the circular has been issued during
an exchange crisis, for the purpose of combating the same
 It is presumed that the provisions of Sec 74 of RA 265 have been complied
with
17
"Any person desiring to export gold in any form, including jewelry, whether for reEning abroad or otherwise, must obtain a license from the Central Bank. Applicants for export
licenses must present satisfactory evidence that the import of the gold into the country of the importer will not be violation of the rules and regulations of such country.
  Besides, the fact that there has been an exchange crisis in the Philippines
and that such crisis, not only existed at the time of the issuance of said
circular in 1949 and 1950, but, also, has remained in existence up to the
present, may be taken judicial cognizance of.
 The MB could have specified the period of its effectivity but their failure to
do so does not impair its validity. As a measure taken under the police power
of the state, said period had to be commensurate with the crisis that led to its
adoption, and the duration of said crisis could not be anticipated with
reasonable certainty. Upon the termination of the aforementioned crisis, as
determined by competent authority, the circular would become inoperative.
Petitioner: Cir No 21 as published did not bear the approval of the President and thus
said publication was not sufficient to give the law effect
 NO, the original circular subjecting to licensing by the CB transactions
involving gold and foreign exchange is Cir 20 which was adopted by the MB
with approval by the President. Moreover, Cir 20, last par provides hat
"further regulations in respect to transactions covered by this circular will be
issued separately." Thus, the President had approved not only the "licensing
by the Central Bank" of "all transactions in gold and foreign exchange," but,
also, the issuance, subsequently to the promulgation of Circular No. 20, of
"further regulations in respect" of such transactions. Said further regulations
were incorporated into Circular No. 21, which thus bears the stamp of
presidential sanction, although this is not specifically required by law
Petitioner: Cir 21 is an undue delegation of legislative power.
 one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and
another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that
the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing
the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the
field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether
he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will."
 ITC, Sec 74, RA 265 conferred upon the MB and President the power to
subject to licensing all transactions in gold and FOREX "in order to protect
the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and
to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take
constructive measures to combat such crisis."
o The Board is also authorized "to take such appropriate remedial
 measures as are appropriate" to protect the international reserve is
falling, as a result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the
opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the national welfare"
o It should be noted, furthermore, that these power must be construed
and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the
Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability
in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production,
employment and real income in the Philippines' (Section 2, Rep. Act No.
265.)
o These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the
delegated authority the character of administrative details in the
enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority
beyond the category of delegation of legislative powers.
Petitioner: Art 45 RPC authorizing forefeiture of proceeds of a crime and instruments
or toolls which it was committed does not apply ITC since the crime involved a special
law
 However RPC 10 provides the provisions of said Code shall be
"supplementary" to special laws, "unless the latter should speciEcally provide
the contrary", and there is no such provision to the contrary in Republic Act
No. 265
The check was not confiscated – no intent in connection therewith – not forefeited in
favor of Gov’t