Powers of Administrative Agencies

i. Doctrine of separation of powers to accommodate administrative agencies

ii. Book II, Chapters 1 to 4, EO 292, 1987
iii. Quasi-legislative (rule-making power)
1. Definition
2. Source
3. Legislation vs. Rule-making

Philippine National Oil Company v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 109976, April 26, 2005
En Banc, Justice Chico-Nazario

DOCTRINES: The BIR Commissioner's discretionary authority to enter into a compromise

agreement is not absolute and the CTA may inquire into allegations of abuse thereof.

The discretionary power of the BIR Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior
over the power of judicial review by the courts.

FACTS: The case involves two consolidated petitions filed by the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) against the Court of Appeals. The
case revolves around a compromise agreement between PNOC and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) regarding a deficiency withholding tax assessment. Private respondent Tirso
Savellano provided information to the BIR about PNB's failure to withhold the 15% final tax on
interest earnings from PNOC's money placements.
The BIR issued a demand letter to PNB for the payment of the withholding tax, and PNOC
proposed a compromise settlement. The BIR accepted the compromise, and PNOC and PNB
made the necessary payments.
Savellano claimed that the compromise agreement was invalid and demanded the balance of his
informer's reward.

ISSUE: Whether or not CIR acted within his authority

HELD: The foregoing discussion supports the CTA's conclusion that the compromise agreement
between PNOC and the BIR was indeed without legal basis.

It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with
by the courts; but when the exercise of such functions by the administrative officer is tainted by a
failure to abide by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the courts to set matters right,
with this Court having the last say on the matter.81

The manner by which BIR Commissioner Tan exercised his discretionary power to enter into a
compromise was brought under the scrutiny of the CTA amidst allegations of "grave abuse of
discretion and/or whimsical exercise of jurisdiction." The discretionary power of the BIR
82

Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior over the power of judicial review by the
courts.

The discretionary authority to compromise granted to the BIR Commissioner is never meant to be
absolute, uncontrolled and unrestrained. No such unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. In this case, the BIR
83

Commissioner's authority to compromise, whether under E.O. No. 44 or Section 246 of the NIRC of
1977, as amended, can only be exercised under certain circumstances specifically identified in said
statutes. The BIR Commissioner would have to exercise his discretion within the parameters set by
the law, and in case he abuses his discretion, the CTA may correct such abuse if the matter is
appealed to them. 84

Petitioners PNOC and PNB both contend that BIR Commissioner Tan merely exercised his authority
to enter into a compromise specially granted by E.O. No. 44. Since this Court has already made a
determination that the compromise agreement did not qualify under E.O. No. 44, BIR Commissioner
Tan's decision to agree to the compromise should have been reviewed in the light of the general
authority granted to the BIR Commissioner to compromise taxes under Section 246 of the NIRC of
1977, as amended. Then again, petitioners PNOC and PNB failed to allege, much less present
evidence, that BIR Commissioner Tan acted in accordance with Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as
amended, when he entered into the compromise agreement with PNOC.
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 148191, November 25,
2003
First Division, Justice Panganiban

DOCTRINE: Even if the courts may not be in agreement with its stated policy or innate
wisdom, it is nonetheless valid, provided that its scope is within the statutory authority or
standard granted by the legislature Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane to the object
and purpose of the law; (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the law prescribes;and
(3) be issued for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax laws.

FACTS: Respondent Solidbank Corporation filed a letter-request for refund or tax credit
certificate and a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Solidbank Corporation included in the computation of its total gross receipts the sum of
P350,807,875.15 representing gross receipts from passive income which was already subjected
to 20% FWT.
The Court of Appeals held that the 20% FWT on bank's interest income did not form part of the
taxable gross receipts in computing the 5% GRT because the FWT was not actually received by
the bank but was directly remitted to the government.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: whether or not RR 12-80 Superseded by RR 17-84

HELD: In general, rules and regulations issued by administrative or executive officers pursuant
to the procedure or authority conferred by law upon the administrative agency have the force and
effect, or partake of the nature, of a statute. The reason is that statutes express the policies,
purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature in general terms. The
details and manner of carrying them out are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted
with their enforcement.

In the present case, it is the finance secretary who promulgates the revenue regulations, upon
recommendation of the BIR commissioner. These regulations are the consequences of a
delegated power to issue legal provisions that have the effect of law.

In the present case, there is no question about the regularity in the performance of official duty.
What needs to be determined is whether RR 12-80 has been repealed by RR 17-84.

RR 12-80 imposes the GRT only on all items of income actually received, as opposed to their
mere accrual, while RR 17-84 includes all interest income in computing the GRT. RR 12-80 is
superseded by the later rule, because Section 4(e) thereof is not restated in RR 17-84. Clearly
therefore, as petitioner correctly states, this particular provision was impliedly repealed when the
later regulations took effect.

Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 73140, May 29, 1987
Second Division, Justice Paras

DOCTRINE: AMIN REGULATIONS AND POLICIES ENACTED TO INTERPRET THE

LAW THEY ARE TO ENFORCE HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND ARE ENTITLED
TO GREAT RESPECT; CASE AT BAR

FACTS: Private respondent Rogelio Coria was hired by petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group
as a casual employee on August 1977. Coria was later made a regular employee in 1978 and
thereafter was appointed to different tasks in different departments of petitioner – all with
increased and increasing monthly salary.

However, in 1983, Coria was dismissed from work on grounds of tardiness and unexcused
absences. He then filed a complained with the Ministry of Labor and Employment to which the
Labor Arbiter decided in his favor and reinstated him with backwages. Petitioner thereafter
appealed with the NLRC but in such appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same has been
filed out of time. The NLRC grounded its dismissal of the appeal in Rule VIII of the Revised
Rules of the NLRC, particularly its Section 1 (a) which provides that decisions of a[n] LA may
be appealed within 10 calendar from receipt of notice of the decision; and on Section 6 which
provides that no motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal
shall be entertained.

It appeared that petitioner filed its appeal with the NLRC (backed by a motion for extension of
time to file appeal) 10 days late.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner invoked the liberal construction of the Rules in the interest of
substantial justice and argued that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
its appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the appeal was properly dismissed.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held as follows:

“[I]t is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have
the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in
this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.”

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Chinese General Hospital and Medical Center, G.R.
No. 163123, April 15, 2005
Third Division, Justice Corona

DOCTRINES: WHENEVER NECESSARY, LIBERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

RULES AND REGULATIONS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY IS TO BE
ALLOWED IN CASES WHERE THEIR UNJUSTIFIABLY RIGID ENFORCEMENT
WILL RESULT IN A DEPRIVATION OF LEGAL RIGHTS; CASE AT BAR:

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTIONS;

CASE AT BAR

FACTS: On February 14, 1995, RA 7875 was enacted into law which establishe a National
Health Insurance Program and also created herein petitioner Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth). Philhealth was tasked to implement said law, and in pursuance of
which, it promulgated said rules and regulations implementing said act, Section 52 (b) of which
provides, among others, to wit:

“All claims for payment of services rendered shall be filed within sixty (60) calendar
days from the date of discharge of the patient. Otherwise, the claim shall be barred from
payment except if the delay in the filing of thee claim is due to natural calamities and
other fortuitous events. If the claim is sent through mail, the date of the mailing as
stamped by the post office of origin shall be considered as the date of the filing.”

With the foregoing, respondent Chinese General Hospital and Medical Center filed its claim
representing services rendered to its patients from 1998 to 1999 amounting to some P7.6 million
with the Philhealth. However, the claims were denied by the Claims Review Unit of petitioner on
January 14, 2000 on the ground that it was filed beyond the 60-day period allowed by Section
52(b) of the implementing rules and regulations.

Later, respondent’s claim was denied with finality by petitioner in its Decision dated June 6,
2000. Respondent then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which ordered
petitioner to pay the claims in the amount of P14.2 million on the ground of liberal application
of the 60-day rule under Section 52 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7875.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to be reimbursed.

HELD: Yes. The Court ratiocinated in this wise:

“This Court will not hesitate, whenever necessary, to allow a liberal implementation of the rules
and regulations of an administrative agency in cases where their unjustifiably rigid enforcement
will result in a deprivation of legal rights. In this case, respondent had already rendered the
services for which it was filing its claims. Technicalities should not be allowed to defeat
respondent’s right to be reimbursed, specially since petitioner’s charter itself guarantees such
reimbursement.

A careful reading of RA 7875 shows that the law itself does not provide for any specific period
within which to file claims. We can safely presume therefore that the period for filing was not
per se the principal concern of the legislature. More important than mere technicalities is the
realization of the state policy to provide Philhealth members with the requisite medical care at
the least possible cost. Truly, nothing can be more disheartening than to see the Act’s noble
objective frustrated by the overly stringent application of technical rules.

The fact is that it was not RA 7875 itself but Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations which established the 60-day cut-off for the filing of claims.

While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations of administrative bodies
interpreting the law they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law, these issuances are by no
means iron-clad norms. Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact "bent the rules"
for reasons of public interest. On September 15, 1998, for instance, petitioner issued Philhealth
Circular No. 31-A [which temporarily suspended that 60-day reglementary period for filing
claims.]

And then again, on April 20, 1999, Philhealth Circular No. 50 was issued [which extended the
60-days reglementary period.]

The above circulars indubitably recognized the necessity of extending the 60-day period because
of the difficulties encountered by members in completing the required documents, often due to
circumstances beyond their control. Petitioner appeared to be well aware of the problems
encountered by its members in complying with the 60-day rule. Furthermore, implicit in the
wording of the circulars was the cognition of the fact that the fault was not always attributable to
the health care providers like CGH but to the members themselves.

Delay on the part of members is an ordinary occurrence. There is no need to make a mountain
out of a molehill as far as this particular point is concerned. To this day, members continue to
encounter delay in submitting their documents. There was therefore no compelling reason for the
exacting and meticulous enforcement of the rule when, in at least two instances, petitioner itself
implemented it liberally and on the same ground that it was using against respondent.”

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner
is hereby ordered to pay respondent’s claims representing services rendered to its members from
1989 to 1992.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., G.R. No.
135808, October 6, 2008
En Banc, Justice Chico-Nazario

DOCTRINES: MERE ABSENCE OF IMPLEMENTING RULES CANNOT

EFFECTIVELY INVALIDATE PROVISIONS OF LAW, WHERE A REASONABLE
CONSTRUCTION THAT WILL SUPPORT THE LAW MAY BE GIVEN; CASE AT
BAR

IMPORTANCE OF PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF LAWS;

NECESSITY FOR VESTING ADMIN AUTHORITIES WITH POWER OF

SUBSIDIARY REGULATION; TO RULE THAT THE ABSENCE OF IRR CAN
RENDER INEFFECTIVE A LAW WOULD EMPOWER THE ADMIN BODIES TO
DEFEAT THE LEGISLATIVE WILL BY DELAYING THE IMPLEMENTING RULES;
RULES AND REGULATIONS CANNOT ASSERT FOR THEMSELVES A MORE
EXTENSIVE PREROGATIVE OR DEVIATE FROM THE MANDATE OF THE
STATUTE; WHERE STATUTE CONTAINS SUFFICIENT STANDARDS AND AN
UNMISTAKABLE INTENT THERE SHOULD BE NO IMPEDIMENT TO ITS
IMPLEMENTATION;

FACTS: In August 1994, the Board of Directors of the Interport Resource Corporation (IRC)
entered into an agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). The agreement contained that
IRC will acquire 100% of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. which would assume a power purchase
contract with NAPOCOR and, in turn, IRC will issue to GHB a 55% of the expanded capital
stock of IRC, e.g. some 40.88 billion shares. Moreover, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire
capital stock of Philippine Racing Club, Inc. to which GHB will extent a loan to pay for the
proposed acquisition.

Thereafter, the petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) received reports that IRC
failed to make timely public disclosures such agreement with GHB and that some of its directors,
herein respondents, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. Hence,
petitioner ordered respondent and its directors to appear at a hearing before the Brokers and
Exchanges Department of the SEC.

After said hearing, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts and pronounced that some of its officers entered into transactions
involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30 in relation to Section 36 of the Revised Securities
Act.

Respondents then filed an Amended Omnibus Motion assailing, among others, that the SEC
violated their right to due process when it ordered them to appear before the SEC and show
cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them.

Thereafter, the SEC issued an Omnibus Order, which among others, created a special
investigating panel to hear and decide the case and recalled its earlier show cause orders against
respondent.

Respondents then moved for partial reconsideration questioning the creating of the special
investigating panel which the SEC denied. Thereafter, respondents filed a petitioner before the
CA questioning said Omnibus Order.

Later, the CA issued its Decision and held that there were no implementing rules and regulations
regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts
which the respondents allegedly violation. It also found no statutory authority for the SEC to
initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act. It thus ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held
against the respondents without violating their rights to due process and equal protection clause.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the lack of rules and regulations implementing Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act bar the SEC from initiating investigations against respondents and filing
appropriate cases against them.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ratiocinated as follows:

“Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of
implementing rules to make them binding and effective.

The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against
the respondents without violating their right to due process and equal protection, citing as its
basis the case Yick Wo v. Hopkins. This is untenable.

In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36
of the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is well
settled that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all
intents and purposes. The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate
provisions of law, where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. In
People v. Rosenthal, this Court ruled that:

'In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held
invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will
support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground
that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of
common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities
necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith.'

xxx

The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations is
based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and
varying details of management. To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render
ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert
that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the
Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to
a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. It is well
established that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations
conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into
effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot
assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute.
Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the
case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its
implementation.

xxx

This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act, such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be understood by a person
of ordinary intelligence. [The Court then quoted said Sections.]

xxx

The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and undisclosed
information is the gravamen of illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the protection of
investors against fraud, committed when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of
an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to the other party
or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to disclose or abstain is based on
two factors: first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone; and second, the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.

xxx

Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to promote full disclosure in the
securities market and prevent unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions obtain non-public
information, from taking advantage of an uninformed public. No individual would invest in a
market which can be manipulated by a limited number of corporate insiders. Such reaction
would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities market. To avert the occurrence of such an
event, Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act prevented the unfair use of non-public
information in securities transactions, while Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the
transactions entered into by corporate officers and directors as regards the securities of their
companies.
xxx

The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February 1982. The fact that the Full Disclosure
Rules were promulgated by the SEC only on 24 July 1996 does not render ineffective in the
meantime Section 36 of the Revised Securities Act. It is already unequivocal that the Revised
Securities Act requires full disclosure and the Full Disclosure Rules were issued to make the
enforcement of the law more consistent, efficient and effective. It is equally reasonable to state
that the disclosure forms later provided by the SEC, do not, in any way imply that no compliance
was required before the forms were provided. The effectivity of a statute which imposes
reportorial requirements cannot be suspended by the issuance of specified forms, especially
where compliance therewith may be made even without such forms. The forms merely made
more efficient the processing of requirements already identified by the statute.

For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that no civil,
criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents in connection with
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the absence of implementing rules.
These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. Their requirements are
specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. In particular, Section 8 of
the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the registration
of securities and the particular matters which need to be reported in the registration statement
thereof. The Decision, dated 20 August 1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent
IRC from such requirements. The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of
these provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC from
exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation of Section 8 of the Revised
Securities Act.”

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby
REVERSES the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals x x x and LIFTS the permanent
injunction issued pursuant thereto. This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the
respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be
undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations Code. No
costs.

4. Distinction from legislative power

Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, et al., G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987
En Banc, Justice Melencio-Herrera

FACTS: Sometime in 1985, PD 1987 was enacted creating the Videogram Regulatory Board
which granted to said Board, among others, under Section 11 of said Decree, the authority to
“solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a
fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board.”

Thereafter, on September 1986, herein petitioner Valentin Tio filed this petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of PD 1987. Petitioner argued, among others, that said Decree is
unconstitutional because said Section 11 is undue delegation of power and authority.

ISSUE: Whether the subject decree contains an undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

“Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of
legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit
the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD
to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such
authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as
unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate
remedy in law.”

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995
En Banc, Justice Feliciano

DOCTRINES: CONGRESS MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY DELEGATE AUTHORITY

AND PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT A GIVEN LAW
AND EFFECTUATE ITS POLICIES; ALL THAT IS REQUIRED IS (1) THAT THE
REGULATION SHOULD BE GERMANE TO THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF
THE LAW; (2) THAT THE REGULATION BE NOT IN CONTRADICTION WITH IT,
BUT CONFORM TO STANDARDS THAT THE LAW PRESCRIBES; CASE AT BAR

FACTS: Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor was a utility worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao
City. Sometime in 1991, an official of the Office of the Mayor advised petitioner to apply for
retirement considering that he is already 68 years old with 13 years and 1 month of government
service. Later, petitioner’s Certificate of Membership with the GSIS he exhibited contained a
typewritten statement, i.e. “Service extended to comply 15 years service requirements.”

Thereafter, when informed by the LGU, the Regional Director of the CSC informed the latter
that the extension of services of petitioner is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the
President. Later, Mayor Duterte advised petitioner to stop working effecting August 16, 1991.

Petitioner then sent a letter to the Regional Director (RD) asking for extension aiming to have 15
years of service so that he can avail the benefits thereof. He asked for a 2 year extension.
However, this was denied by RD Cawad.

Thereafter, petitioner wrote to the Office of the President seeking reconsideration. This was
referred to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission which dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the action of RD Cawad. The Chairman of CSC grounded his Decision on CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 which provides, in part, “Any request for extension of
service of compulsory retirees to complete 15 years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the GSIS
and shall be granted for a period not exceeding 1 year.”

Petitioner then sought reconsideration of the above invoking Cena v. CSC. However, the same
was denied by the Commission. Petitioner thereafter sent another letter to Mayor Duterte
requesting he be allowed to continue rendering service. Again, the same was denied.

Hence, petitioner decided to go to the Supreme Court and there he filed a Letter/Petitioner
appealing from the CSC Decision and Mayor Duterte’s letter. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner can be extended or allowed to continue government service to

acquire 15 years of service.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled in this wise:

“It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27,
took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative
agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier
ruling in People v. Exconde, where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:

'It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met
in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to
standards that the law prescribes.'

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which established
passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a
prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines, said:

'The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta —

"The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The Standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained in Calalang v. William is
"safe transit upon the roads."'

In Edu v. Ericta, then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general nature of the
standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of compliance
with the requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rule-making:

'This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare;" x x x "necessary in the
interest of law and order;" "public interest;" and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case."'

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to
be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion)
for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative
bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex
subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so
important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated
legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected
by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.

[The Court considered Civil Service Law contained under EO 292 is the enabling statute of Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990 and not just that of PD 1146; this is so
because the subject-matter, i.e. service of retirees who have reach 65 years of age, 'is an area that
is covered by both statutes.']

xxx

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after
an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not
germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and
psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the
efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons.

xxx

Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself,
quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be
countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government employees
as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable" x x x An employee
who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his
service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This
reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65)
very close to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and
management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case
of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission x x x

xxx

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow.
Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the
government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next
fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the
general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and
effectively becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the
notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that
opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to
younger people, considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age.
That same general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still
significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe,
North America and Japan.

Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1)
thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,
accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the
holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary
authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has
reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service;
this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

xxx

Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so
hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of
petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must
be upheld and affirmed.”

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528, March 26, 1997
Second Division, Justice Torres, Jr.

DOCTRINE: (1) GROWING COMPLEXITY OF MODERN LIFE, (2)

MULTIPLICATION OF SUBJECTS OF GOV’T REGULATION, AND (3) INCREASED
DIFFICULTY IN ADMINISTERING LAWS – REASONS FOR THE CONSTANTLY
GROWING TENDENCY TOWARDS DELEGATION OF GREATER POWERS BY THE
LEGISLATURE; IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT FRANCHISE MAY BE
DERIVED INDIRECTLY FROM THE STATE THROUGH DULY DESIGNATED
AGENCIES – HENCE, PRIVILEGES CONFERRED BY GRANT BY LOCAL
AUTHORITIES AS AGENTS FOR THE STATE CONSTITUTE AS MUCH A
LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE.

TO BE VALID, THE DELEGATION ITSELF MUST BE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY

LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS, OTHERWISE, THE DELEGATION IS AN
ABDICATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

FACTS: In 1994, private respondent GrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity with the respondent Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and requested for the
issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit. After some procedural niceties, petitioner Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL), a holder of a legislative franchise, filed an Opposition to the application,
grounding the same, among others, that CAB has no jurisdiction to hear the application until
GrandAir first obtained a legislative franchise.

Thereafter, the Chief Hearing Officer of the CA issued an Order denying the Opposition. Later,
petitioner opposed GrandAir’s application for a temporary permit.

Thereafter, the CAB approved the issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit in favor of
GrandAir for 3 months. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Later,
said permit was extended for a period of 6 months.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners argue that the respondent Board acted beyond its powers and
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of GrandAir's application for the issuance of a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity, and in issuing a temporary operating permit in the meantime,
since GrandAir has not been granted and does not possess a legislative franchise to engage in
scheduled domestic air transportation. A legislative franchise is necessary before anyone may
engage in air transport services, and a franchise may only be granted by Congress. This is the
meaning given by the petitioner upon a reading of Section 11, Article XII, and Section 1, Article
VI, of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether a legislative franchise is necessary before a Certificate of Public Convenience

and Necessity is issued by CAB to GranAir.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled in this wise:

“Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to
authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally
recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated
agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to
agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that
privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a
legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.

The trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the power to
regulate and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and
as a general rule, courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and
reasonable and founded upon a legal right.

It is this policy which was pursued by the Court in Albano vs. Reyes. Thus, a reading of the
pertinent issuances governing the Philippine Ports Authority, It is this policy which was pursued
by the Court in Albano vs. Reyes. Thus, a reading of the pertinent issuances governing the
Philippine Ports Authority, proves that the PPA is empowered to undertake by itself the
operation and management of the Manila International Container Terminal, or to authorize its
operation and management by another by contract or other means, at its option. The latter power
having been delegated to the to PPA, a franchise from Congress to authorize an entity other than
the PPA to operate and manage the MICP becomes unnecessary.

Given the foregoing postulates, we find that the Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to
issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a
domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the
other requirements prescribed by the law. Such requirements were enumerated in Section 21 of
R.A. 776.

There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative franchise is
an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator.
Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate or
authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue
the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility
may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government
agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.
A reading of Section 10 of the same reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the authority
to regulate the issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services x x x

xxx

Petitioner argues that since R.A. 776 gives the Board the authority to issue "Certificates of Public
Convenience and Necessity", this, according to petitioner, means that a legislative franchise is an
absolute requirement. It cites a number of authorities supporting the view that a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity is issued to a public service for which a franchise is required
by law, as distinguished from a "Certificate of Public Convenience" which is an authorization
issued for the operation of public services for which no franchise, either municipal or legislative,
is required by law.

This submission relies on the premise that the authority to issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity is a regulatory measure separate and distinct from the authority to
grant a franchise for the operation of the public utility subject of this particular case, which is
exclusively lodged by petitioner in Congress.

We do not agree with the petitioner.

Many and varied are the definitions of certificates of public convenience which courts and legal
writers have drafted. Some statutes use the terms "convenience and necessity" while others use
only the words "public convenience." The terms "convenience and necessity", if used together in
a statute, are usually held not to be separable, but are construed together. Both words modify
each other and must be construed together. The word 'necessity' is so connected, not as an
additional requirement but to modify and qualify what might otherwise be taken as the strict
significance of the word necessity. Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed
facility will meet a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities
do not adequately afford. It does not mean or require an actual physical necessity or an
indispensable thing.

xxx

The use of the word "necessity", in conjunction with "public convenience" in a certificate of
authorization to a public service entity to operate, does not in any way modify the nature of such
certification, or the requirements for the issuance of the same. It is the law which determines the
requisites for the issuance of such certification, and not the title indicating the certificate.

Congress, by giving the respondent Board the power to issue permits for the operation of
domestic transport services, has delegated to the said body the authority to determine the
capability and competence of a prospective domestic air transport operator to engage in such
venture. This is not an instance of transforming the respondent Board into a mini-legislative
body, with unbridled authority to choose who should be given authority to operate domestic air
transport services.

'To be valid, the delegation itself must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions, not a "roving
commission" that will give the delegate unlimited legislative authority. It must not be a
delegation "running riot" and "not canalized with banks that keep it from overflowing."
Otherwise, the delegation is in legal effect an abdication of legislative authority, a total surrender
by the legislature of its prerogatives in favor of the delegate.'

Congress, in this instance, has set specific limitations on how such authority should be exercised.

Firstly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 776, as amended, sets out the following guidelines or policies x x x

xxx

More importantly, the said law has enumerated the requirements to determine the competency of
a prospective operator to engage in the public service of air transportation[, i.e. Citizenship
requirement and conditions for the issuance of permit, e.g. applicant is fit, willing and able to
perform the service properly in conformity with the Act and rules and regulations; and such
service is required by the public convenience and necessity.]

Furthermore, the procedure for the processing of the application of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity had been established to ensure the weeding out of those entities that
are not deserving of public service.

In sum, respondent Board should now be allowed to continue hearing the application of
GrandAir for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, there being no
legal obstacle to the exercise of its jurisdiction.”

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS

the instant petition for lack of merit. The respondent Civil Aeronautics Board is hereby
DIRECTED to CONTINUE hearing the application of respondent Grand International Airways,
Inc. for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.

Associated Communications and Wireless Services, LTD. (ACWS) v. Dumlao, et al., G.R. No.
136762, November 21, 2002
First Division, Justice Carpio

DOCTRINES: DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS FATAL ESPECIALLY
WHERE THE CASE INVOLVES NOT JUST ISSUES OF LAW AND OF FACT BUT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

FACTS: Petitioner ACWS operated several radio and television stations nationwide by virtue of
a legislative franchise under RA 4551. Later, PD 576-A took effect which terminated all
franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio or
television broadcasting systems. Hence, ACWS’ legislative franchise was terminated but
continued to operate its stations through permits issued by the Board of Communications and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications pursuant to PD 576-A.

Later, EO 546 created the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and vested it with
the power to grant permits for the operation of radio and television stations. NTC granted ACWS
renewable temporary permits and licenses for the operation of its stations.

Thereafter, before the expiration of its latest Temporary Permit, ACWS applied for its renewal
on June 3, 1997. Thereafter, the NTC informed ACWS of the approval of its temporary permit to
be released upon payment of the necessary fees.

Later, however, the NTC refused to release said permit and instead issued an Order dated
February 26, 1998 directing ACWS to show cause why its temporary permit should not be
recalled for failure to secure a legislative franchise. It also ordered petitioner to cease and desist
from operating its Channel 25. This case was docketed as NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009.

Petitioner then filed its Answer with the NTC and prayed that the same be dismissed. Thereafter,
despite the pendency of the above case, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
Mandamus, Prohibition and Damages with Prayer to TRO and/or WPI. It prayed that NTC be
ordered to release its approved and paid temporary permit.

Eventually, the CA rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s petition as well as its motion to
reconsider. It ground its denial on the fact that the matters in the petitioner were substantially the
same as that of the administrative case pending with the NTC and the on the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the petition of ACWS be given due course.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court that it cannot rule on the petition on the ground of petitioner’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, considering that the administrative case with the NTC
is still pending. It ratiocinated in this wise:
“We cannot rule on the merits of the petition on the grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and litis pendentia.

xxx

Apparently, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for by ACWS before the NTC, the Court of
Appeals and now before this Court are identical and based on the same facts. ACWS did not wait
for the administrative case to proceed to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly denied the petition for premature invocation
of the court's jurisdiction.

xxx

Before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. This rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
was explained thus:

'The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the
principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy
solution to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review
and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts - for reasons of law,
comity and convenience - will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and
correct errors committed in the administrative forum.'

Indeed, the issues which administrative agencies such as the NTC are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. The purpose
of the administrative case was precisely to thresh out the legality of the continued operation of
Channel 25.

The administrative case was the proper forum for ACWS to ventilate its side. The administrative
case also provides an opportunity for the NTC to correct any actual or fancied errors attributed to
it by way of re-examination of the factual and legal aspects of the case. This is the reason why
ACWS was required to file an answer and hearings were held on the matter.

xxx

The special civil actions of prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that a party
can resort to only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are
powerless to afford relief and where there is no other clear, adequate and speedier remedy. In this
case, NTC Administrative Case No. 98-009 was the adequate, speedier and less expensive
remedy to secure the reliefs sought.

It is basic that a party's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal, especially where the
case involves not just issues of law and of fact but of administrative discretion. The available
administrative procedures must be pursued until a definite and final determination is held.”

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 1998, as well as its
Resolution dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47675, is AFFIRMED.

5. Valid delegation of legislative power

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
En Banc, Justice Cruz

DOCTRINES: INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; “ROVING

COMMISSION,” A WIDE AND SWEEPING AUTHORITY THAT IS NOT
“CANALIZED WITHIN BANKS THAT KEEP IT FROM OVERFLOWING;” CASE AT
BAR.
FACTS: This case assails the constitutionality of Executive Order 626-A which was issued by
the dictator Marcos on October 25, 1980. Said EO provides, to wit:

“Sec.1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.”
In January 1984, herein petitioner Restituto Ynot transported six carabaos by a pump boat from
Masbate to Ilolo. They then confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for violation of the above-quoted EO.

Later, the petitioner sued for the recovery of the confiscated animals with the RTC. The RTC
then issued a writ of replevin upon filing of petitioner of a supersedeas bond. However, after trial
on the merits, the RTC sustained the confiscation and ordered the confiscation of the bond. The
RTC also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the assailed EO as it is presumed valid.

Petitioner appealed said decision with the Intermediate Appellate Court which upheld the RTC
disposition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether, the assailed Executive Order is unconstitutional.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled, among others, that the assailed EO is unconstitutional for
being an invalid delegation of legislative power akin to a “roving commission.” It ratiocinated in
this wise:

“We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better
still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There
is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

xxx

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise
of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free
society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.”

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as

affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner.

Belgica, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
En Banc, Justice Perlas-Bernabe

DOCTRINES:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD: