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SYLLABUS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE - LLB - As Amended by AM – No. 19-10-20-SC

PART I: RULE 1 AND INTRODUCTORY MATTERS –

A. Legal Principles pertaining to Jurisdiction:

(1) What confers jurisdiction upon the courts?

- Jurisdiction is conferred on Law and the Constitution. It is provided in Art 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution as
provided:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

(2) The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction – definition is lodged in the case as below:
G.R. No. 148106 July 17, 2006 EURO-MED LABORATORIES, PHIL., INC., represented by LEONARDO H.
TORIBIO, petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor, HON. HERMILANDO I.
MANDANAS, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing, on pure questions of law, the March 7 and May 16, 2001
orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City2 in Civil Case No. 5300.
Civil Case No. 5300 was a complaint for sum of money3 filed by petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. against
respondent Province of Batangas. The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
3. On several occasions, particularly from the period of 19 August 1992 to 11 August 1998, defendant
[respondent here], thru its various authorized representatives of the government hospitals identified and listed
below, purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) products from the plaintiff [petitioner here], with an unpaid
balance of Four Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos and Eighty Centavos
(P487,662.80), as of 28 February 1998, broken down as follows: x x x x which purchases were evidenced by
invoices duly received and signed by defendant’s authorized representatives, upon delivery of the merchandise
listed in said invoices.
4. Under the terms and conditions of the aforesaid invoices, defendant agreed and covenanted to pay plaintiff,
without need of demand, its obligations in the above-enumerated invoices on various terms indicated therein.
5. Plaintiff made several demands for defendant to pay its accountabilities, including setting up several
dialogues with plaintiff’s representatives, but these proved fruitless.
6. Despite repeated demands by plaintiff for defendant to pay and settle its unpaid and outstanding accounts
under the aforementioned invoices, said defendant has failed and still fails to comply therewith.4
In its answer,5 respondent admitted most of the allegations in the complaint, denying only those relating to the unpaid
balance supposedly still due petitioner. Respondent alleged that some payments it had already made were not reflected
in the computation set forth in the complaint and that it was continuously exerting genuine and earnest efforts "to find
out the true and actual amount owed."6 Pre-trial and trial followed.
At the conclusion of petitioner’s presentation of evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss7 the complaint on the
ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioner’s money claim was lodged with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Respondent pointed out that petitioner’s claim, arising as it did from a series of procurement transactions with the
province, was governed by the Local Government Code provisions and COA rules and regulations on supply and property
management in local governments. Respondent argued that the case called for a determination of whether these
provisions and rules were complied with, and that was within the exclusive domain of COA to make.
Finding the motion to be well-taken, the RTC issued on March 7, 2001 an order8 dismissing petitioner’s complaint
without prejudice to the filing of the proper money claim with the COA. In a subsequent order dated May 16, 2001,9 the
RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The resolution of this case turns on whether it is the COA or the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon
petitioner’s money claim against the Province of Batangas. We rule that it is the COA which does. Therefore, we deny
the petition.

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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.10 It
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the
judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view11 or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.12
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although petitioner’s collection suit
for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC,13 the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s claim brought it
clearly within the ambit of the COA’s jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money against a local government unit.
This brought the case within the COA’s domain to pass upon money claims against the government or any subdivision
thereof under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:14
The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to x
x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. x x x x.
The scope of the COA’s authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed, however, by an unbroken line of cases
holding statutes of similar import to mean only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from
vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers.15 Petitioner’s claim was for a fixed amount
and although respondent took issue with the accuracy of petitioner’s summation of its accountabilities, the amount
thereof was readily determinable from the receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the
COA’s jurisdiction under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Second, petitioner’s money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of respondent’s public
hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local Government Code provisions on
supply and property management16 and their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA17 pursuant to
Section 383 of said Code.18 Petitioner’s claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on
procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but
within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC’s jurisdiction over the matter after it had
filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the
issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as
the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the
convenience of the parties.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 7, and May 16, 2001 orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City are hereby AFFIRMED.

(3) The Doctrine of Non-Interference of Jurisdiction

This principle states that courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction cannot interfere with each other's orders.
(Lapu-lapu Dev v. Group Management) Another term for the non-interference doctrine is "judicial stability." no
court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
Hence, a RTC has no power or authority to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by
another RTC. This principle also bars a court from reviewing or interfering with the judgement of co-equal
court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review.

(4) The question of Jurisdiction is imprescriptible

Unless if barred by laches or estoppel.
When it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the action has prescribed, the court is
mandated by the Rules to dismiss the claim outright. When dismissed on the ground of prescription, the
refilling of the same action or claim is barred.

(5) Jurisdiction by Estoppel

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert

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a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean
vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order
of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

(6) The Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Courts

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve
questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action.
Where courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, such concurrence of jurisdiction does not
grant the party seeking relief the absolute freedom to file petition in any court of his choice. Pursuant to this
doctrine, a case must be filed first before the lowest court possible having the appropriate jurisdiction,
EXCEPT, if one can advance a special reason which would allow a party a direct resort to a higher court.

(7) What determines Jurisdiction of the Court

It is the filing of the complaint which enables the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff.
This jurisdiction is implied from the fact that by seeking affirmative relief from the court, he recognizes the
jurisdiction of the court. In other words, by the mere filing of the complaint, the plaintiff, in a civil action,
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

B. Rule making Power of the Supreme Court - Section 5(5), Art. VIII 1987 Constitution. – Extent and Limitations

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

C. Applicability of the Rules of Court – in all courts except those as may be provided by the Supreme Court. (Section 1
and 2, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure),and when not applicable (Section 4)

RULE 1
Applicability:

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Section 1. Title of the Rules. - These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of Court. (1)
Section 2. In what courts applicable. - These Rules shall apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the
Supreme Court. (2)

When not applicable:

Section 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (4)

D. Case governed – Section 3, Rule 1

a) Distinction between: a) civil and criminal actions; b) ordinary and special civil action page 256 of the GN; c)
civil action and special proceedings.

RULE 1, Section 3. Cases governed. - These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil
or criminal, and special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION

GOVERNING LAW
Governed by theordinary rules. (Sec. 3, Rule 1) Governed by ordinary rules but subject to specific
rules prescribed. (Sec 3, Rule 1)
CAUSE OF ACTION
It is based on a causeof action (Sec. 1, Rule 2) Not all special civil actions are based on a cause of
action, i.e. declaratory relief (Rule 63) and
interpleader. (Rule 62)

Declaratory relief – action is brought before there is

breach.

Interpleader – plaintiff files a complaint even if he

has sustained no actual transgression of his rights.
(Riano, 2012)
VENUE
1. If personal action–residence of theparties;2. If real G.R.: Governed by the general rules of venues. XPN:
action –location of theproperty. (Sec. 1-2,Rule 4) Otherwise indicated by special rules (Regalado, 2016)
JURISDICTION
May be filed initially in either the Municipal Trial There are special civil actions which can only be filed
Court or Regional Trial Court depending upon the in a Municipal Trial Court like the actions for forcible
jurisdictional amount or nature of the action entry and unlawful detainer. There are also special
involved.(Riano, 2012) civil actions which cannot be commenced in the
Municipal Trial Court foremost of which are the
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
(Ibid)

(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seek s to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

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b) Classification of Actions:

a) According to cause/nature/foundation
REAL ACTION
- When it affects title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein. (Sec. 1,
Rule 4)
- When it is founded upon the privity of a
real estate. The realty or interest therein
is the subject matter of the action. NOTE:
It is important that the matter in litigation
must also involve any of the following
issues: 1. Title 2. Ownership 3. Possession
4. Partition 5. Condemnation (Albano,
2017) 6. Foreclosure of mortgage 7. Any
interest in real property (Riano, 2014)
- A real action is ‘local’ – i.e., its venue
depends upon the location of the
property involved in the litigation. Venue
of action shall be commenced and tried in
the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof is situated.
(Sec. 1, Rule 4)
ACTION IN PERSONAM (PERSONAL ACTION
- The power w/c the court has over the
defendant’s person which is required
before a court can enter a personal or an
in personam judgement
- Scope: recover of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery
of damages.
- Basis: founded on privity of contract such
as damages, claims of money.
- Venue: transitory; the place where the
plaintiff resides or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff. Sec.
2 Rule 4
- How: jurisdiction over the plaintiff is
acquired as soon as he files the complaint
or petition. Whereas over the person of
the defendant is acquired either by
voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by summons.
- JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON IS
REQUIRED, OVER THE RES NOT THAT
REQUIRED

YUSINGCO vs BUSILAK: In a number of cases, this Court had occasion to discuss the three (3) kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property, to wit:

xx x (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (a) accion reivindicatoria

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer
(desahuico) [sic].1âwphi1 In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished
from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue
is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case
of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to
physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine
the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint
more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other
hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary
civil proceeding.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel
of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of
ownership. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the
property to the lawful owner. 13 It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges
proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. 14

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According to place where instituted
LOCAL ACTIONS
- Must be brought in a particular place
where the subject property is located,
unless there is an agreement to the
contrary. (Sec. 4, Rule 4)
- No privity of contract and the action is
founded on privity of estate only. (Riano,
2014)
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TRANSITORY ACTIONS
- Dependent on the place where the party
resides regardless of where the cause of
action arose. Subject to Sec. 4, Rule 4.
- Founded on privity of contract between
the parties whether debt or covenant.
(Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines v. Samson, supra.)

b) According to the object.

“Res” is a thing or object, means everything that may form an object of rights, in opposition to
‘persona’ w/s is the subject of rights.
In personam, directed against the specific person and seeks personal judgement against him.
In action in rem or quasi rem is directed against the thing or property or status of a person
and seeks a jdugement with respect there to as against the whole world; one rendered for or
against the thing itself and not against a person.

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E. Commencement of Actions – Section 5, Rule 1.

1) Elements of a valid jurisdiction in civil cases. How obtained.

a) jurisdiction over the subject matter;
referred to as the power of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before it. Also refers
to the jurisdiction of the court over the class of cases to which the particular case belongs. Like real actions,
personal actions, and actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.

b) jurisdiction over the parties;

The power w/c the court has over the defendant’s person which is required before a court can enter a
personal or an in personam judgement; element that is essential in all actions.

c) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and

the power of the court to try and decide the issued raised in the pleadings of the parties. An ISSUE is a
disputed point or question to which parties to an action have narrowed down their several allegations and upon
which they are desirous of obtaining a decision. It is conferred and determined by the allegations in the
pleadings of the parties. The pleadings present the issues to be tried and determine whether or not the issued
are of fact or law.
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to how the law is on a certain
set of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts. A question of law exists when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
but, in contrast, a question of fact exists when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the facts alleged. A
question of law does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or by any of them; the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set
of circumstances.30 When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn from the facts is correct is a question of law. The general rule is that in a petition for review under Rule
45, only questions of law may be raised. the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.

d) jurisdiction over the res or thing involved in litigation.

2) Distinction between jurisdiction and venue in civil cases page 257 of GN

JURISDICTION VENUE

Interpleader (Rule MTC – where the value of the claim or the
62) personal property does not exceed P300,000
outside Metro Manila or P400,000 in Metro
Manila or where the value of the real property
does not exceed P20,000 outside Metro Manila or
P50,000 in Metro Manila
Where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff
resides or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides at the option of the
plaintiff. (Sec. 2, Rule 4)

RTC – if the value exceeds the above amounts or if

the subject matter is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. (Judiciary Act of 1980;
Secs. 19[2] and 33[3], BP Blg. 129, as amended by
RA 7691)

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Declaratory Relief Declaratory relief – RTC, since the subject in a Where the petitioner or the respondent resides at
and Similar Reliefs petition for declaratory relief is incapable of the election of the petitioner.(Sec. 2, Rule 4)
(Rule 63) pecuniary estimation Similar reliefs under second
paragraph, Sec. 1, Rule 63:MTC - where the value
of the real property does not exceed P20,000
outside Metro Manila or P50,000 in Metro Manila

RTC – if the value exceeds the above amounts or if

the subject matter is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the RTC (Melana v. Tappa, G.R. No.
181303 September 17, 2009)

NOTE: It would be error to file the petition with

the SC which has no original jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for declaratory relief. (Tano v.
Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, August 14, 1997)

Review of Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65 Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65
Judgments of
COMELEC AND
COA (Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65)

Certiorari, 1. RTC; 1. RTC, if it is directed against a municipal trial

Prohibition, 2. CA; court, corporation, board, an officer or a person;
Mandamus (Rule 3. SC; Sandiganbayan, COMELEC in aid of their
65) appellate jurisdiction (A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC). 2. CA or with the SB, whether or not the same is in
aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction;

3. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a

quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or the Rules, the petition shall be filed with
and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals;

In election cases involving an act or omission of

MTC/RTC, it shall be filed exclusively with the
COMELEC, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (Sec.
4, Rule 65)

Quo warranto RTC, CA, Supreme Court (Sec. 7, Rule 66) Where the respondent or any of the respondents
Sandiganbayan in aid of its appellate resides. When the Solicitor General commences
jurisdiction(PD 1606, as amended by RA No. 8249) the action, it may be brought in the RTC of the City
of Manila, in the CA, or in the SC. (Sec. 7, Rule
66)NOTE: Subject to the principle of Hierarchy of
Courts

Expropriation RTC since incapable of pecuniary estimation RTC since incapable of pecuniary estimation
(Rule 67) (Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. (Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No.
138896, June 20, 2000) 138896, June 20, 2000)

Foreclosure of RTC since incapable of pecuniary Where the land or any part thereof is located.(Sec.
REM (Rule 68) estimation.(Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of 2, Rule 4)
Pastor, G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000)

Partition (Rule 69) RTC since incapable of pecuniary estimation (2000 1. Real property – where theproperty is located2.
BAR, as cited in Riano, 2012) Personal property – the placewhere the plaintiff or
defendantresides at the election of theplaintiff
(Sec. 13, Rule 69).

Forcible Entry MTC, MTCCs, MCTC, MeTC; covered by Rule on Where the property is located because it is a real
(Rule 70) Summary Procedure (Sec 3, RA 7691). action.(Riano, 2012)

Unlawful Detainer MTC, MTCCs, MCTC, MeTC; covered by Rule on Where the property is located because it is a real
(Rule 70) Summary Procedure. (Sec 3, RA 7691) action. (Ibid)

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Contempt (Rule MTC, RTC, CA, Supreme Court Where the charge for indirect contempt has been
71) committed against RTC or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it,
the charge may be filed with such court. Where
such contempt has been committed against a
lower court, the charge may be filed with the RTC
of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but
the proceedings may also be instituted in such
lower court subject to appeal to the RTC of such
place. (Sec. 5, Rule 70)

3) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution (concurrent original and exclusive
appellate); page 98 of RIANO
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

ORIGINAL CONCURRENT
1. The SC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the CA in petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
against the:
a. RTC (sec 21[1] BP 129)
b. CSC RA 7902
c. Central Board Assessment (already exercised with the CTA)
d. NLRC
e. other quasi-judicial bodies/agencies (BP 129)
The jurisdiction is subject to the hierarchy of courts.

2. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the CA and RTC in petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
against the lower courts and bodies, and in petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus. This jurisdiction is subject to
the hierarchy of courts.

3. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the RTC in cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls
(sec. 2 (2) bp 129, sec 5 art 8 of the 1987 constitution)

EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE
By way of petition for review on certiorari (appeal by certiorari under rule 45) against the CA, RTC, SB on pure
questions of law…. And the CTA

4) Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7902 (original concurrent, original
exclusive and exclusive appellate);
"Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

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"(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
CONCURRENT WITH SC: Petitions for issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
following:
2.1.1 National Labor Relations Commission under the Labor Code (Section 9 of B. P. Blg. 129 as amended by RA
7902, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998,
295 SCRA 494)
Note: However, the petitions should be filed with the Court of Appeals; otherwise, they shall be dismissed. (A.
M. No. 99-2-01-SC)
2.1.2 Civil Service Commission (RA 7902)
2.1.3 Central Board of Assessment Appeals (PD 464; Sec. 9 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7902)
2.1.4 Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies (Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
2.1.5 Regional Trial Courts and lower courts
CONCURRENT WITH RTC AND SC:
2.2.1 Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
2.2.2 Petitions for issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the lower courts or bodies
(Sec. 9[1] and Sec. 21 [1] of BP 129; Vergara v. Suelto, No. L-74766, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 763 [1987])

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts; and

"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

"The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice."
5) Jurisdiction of SANDIGANBAYAN in civil cases under P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 (original concurrent
and original exclusive)
A. Original
1. Exclusive

1.1 Violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft), RA 1379 and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII of Revised Penal Code; and other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office, and private individuals charged as co-principals,
accomplices and accessories including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

1. Officials of the Executive branch xxx classified as Grade '27' or higher xxx specifically including xxx
2. Members of Congress xxx
3. Members of Judiciary xxx
4. Members of Constitutional Commissions xxx
5. All other national and local officials classified as grade '27' and higher
In cases where none of the accused are occupying the above positions, the original jurisdiction shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court or metropolitan trial court, etc., as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions. (Section 2, RA 7975, as amended by RA 8249)

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In cases where there is no specific allegation of facts showing that the offense committed in relation to the
public office of the accused, the original jurisdiction shall also be vested in the proper regional trial court or
metropolitan trial court, etc., as the case may be. (Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G. R. No. 128096, January 20,
1999, 301 SCRA 298)

1.2 Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. (Sec. 2 of RA
7975 as amended by RA 8249 [1997])

PD 1606 as amended by RA 10660

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ’27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads:
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
2. Concurrent with Supreme Court

Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancilliary writs in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, including quo warranto arising in cases falling under said Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. (Ibid. As
amended by RA 8249)

PD 1606 as amended by RA 10660

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated
and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. XXX

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6) Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in Civil Cases, under B.P. 129, as amended (original concurrent,
original exclusive, exclusive appellate, special jurisdiction). READ Page 139 of RIANO [for annotation]
BP 129:
ORIGINAL CONCURRENT:
1. concurrent and original with the SC
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls. SEC 21(2) BP 129
2. concurrent and original with the SC AND CA
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions; SEC 21 (1) BP 129;
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; sec 9 (1) BP 129

ORIGINAL EXCLUSIVE:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: EDIT AS PER THE NEW
AMENDED LAW --- check handout
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; edit as per 117569? 400k flat as amended
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in
such other abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)

EXCLUSIVE APPELATE
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be
decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the
Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
SPECIAL JURISDICTION
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts
to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall
under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in
the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
COMPUTATION OF DOCKET FEES SHALL BE BASED ON THE TOTAL AMOUNT (DAMAGES, FEES ETC) 2Million
a) Personal actions, monetary claims and damages

b) Real Actions 1) SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE vs. SPOUSES TEOFEDO AMARILLO
EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO, G.R. No. 149554, July 1, 2003 –

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, it was held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Moreover, in Singsong v.
Isabela Sawmill, we ruled that: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of

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pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Petitioners’ argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering that it is for
annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken. As stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by
what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where,
as in this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Huguete vs. Embudo, 405 SCRA 273,
G.R. No. 149554 July 1, 2003

c) Actions not capable of pecuniary estimation – Test for determining whether subject is not capable of
pecuniary estimation. (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; Copioso vs. Copioso, 391 SCRA 325).

Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738

The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that: [I]n determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed
of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.

The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided
his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the
property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which
is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Russell vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA
738, G.R. No. 119347 March 17, 1999

Copioso vs. Copioso, 391 SCRA 325

As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession or bare
ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for
reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
But as herein before stated, the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the issue of
annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the
parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when necessary, in the
resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction. Copioso vs. Copioso, 391 SCRA 325, G.R. No. 149243
October 28, 2002

The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in
relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On
the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1), applies to cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases
involving sum of money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real property, jurisdiction is determined on the basis
of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of the real property involved, such that where the sum of money or the

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assessed value of the real property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, jurisdiction lies with the
MTC; and where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC.

d) Mijares, et al vs. Ranada, et al., G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an
action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the
foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on
the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party
aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is
essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction
to properly determine its efficacy.

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment, even if
such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party
an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the
foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in
consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to
safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending
litigation of the same disputes, and—in a larger sense—to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated
to be the goal of all law: “rest and quietness.” If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation.

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in
this jurisdiction. This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially
when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The
defense is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy
exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of
the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case. The public policy defense can safeguard against possible
abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our
constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize
foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they
do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted
as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of
law requiring it.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been
authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally
accepted principles of international law. Mijares vs. Ranada, 455 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005

7) Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC) and Municipal Trial Courts
(MTC) in civil cases pursuant to B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691 (exclusive original, delegated and special
jurisdiction).
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of

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the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs,
the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further,
That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in
such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession; and

"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."

DELEGATED
1. Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots
where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than
one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts."

Hence, the MTC, acting under its delegated jurisdiction, may be deemed to be acting as a RTC. The decision of
MTC in cadastral and land registration cases, therefore, shall be appealable to the CA following the procedure in
Rule 41. (BAR 2009)

The jurisdiction is only delegated one because it is the RTC w/c normally has jurisdiction over cadastral and land
registration cases. Without such delegation made by the SC the MTC cannot exercise jurisdiction over cadastral
and land registration cases.

SPECIAL
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or
city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the
absent Regional Trial Judges sit.

The special jurisdiction includes the authority to hear and decide applications for bail in criminal cases in the
province or city where the absent RTC judges sit.

8) What vests upon the court jurisdiction over the case, Payment of Docket Fees (Manchester Development
Corporation vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562; Sun Insurance Office Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 275).
Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562
ln the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that
the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of
P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over
the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence, as the amended complaint
superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the
computation of the filing fee. In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the
allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.

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As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that
was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee
should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed
the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the
amount of over P 78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose
than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing
fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of
the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of
this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended
complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in
the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket f ee is
obvious.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and
said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment
of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed. Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, No. L-75919 May 7, 1987

Sun Insurance Office Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 275
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd., (SIOL) vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274, G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

9) Section 6, Rule 1 Construction – Liberal construction in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. (Ismael Santos, et. al. vs. CA, Pepsi, et. al., G.R. No. 141947,
July 5, 2001)
In Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Dando, G.R. No. 177456, September 4, 2009, the Supreme Court, held that:

“There are reasons justifying the courts to suspend strict adherence to the procedural rules such as, (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits
of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (e) lack of any showing that it is merely frivolous or dilatory; and (f) the fact that the
other party will not be prejudiced thereby.”

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Celada, 479 SCRA 495, 502, the Supreme Court even applied the
principle of liberality of the rules of procedure and not to dismiss the case on technical grounds just because the counsel
for petitioner failed to indicate his Roll of Attorneys’ number which is even more important as it indicates if counsel is a
member of the court or not, when It held that:

“ x x x On the other hand, the failure of counsel to indicate his Roll of Attorneys’ number would not affect
respondent’s substantive rights, such that petitioner’s counsel could have been directed to comply with the
latter requirement rather than dismiss the petition on purely technical grounds.”

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“ x x x Moreover, we have held time and again that cases should, as much as possible, be determined on
the merits after the parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than
on technicality or some procedural imperfection. After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in
themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In
appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of
substantial justice. (citing Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines vs. Celebrity Travel and Tours,
Inc., 436 SCRA 356).

Ismael Santos, et. al. vs. CA, Pepsi, et. al., G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001
It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held that there is substantial compliance if the same
is executed by an attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him are true to his knowledge and belief.
However, the same does not apply as regards the requirement of a certification against forum shopping.

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the certification must be made by petitioner himself and not
by counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any
similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.

Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness of the filing thereof
with the Court of Appeals. There are three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was received;
second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof
was received. Petitioners failed to show the first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the
impugned NLRC Decision as well as the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration.

Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect
the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter
disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 521, G.R. No. 141947 July 5, 2001

PART II. – CIVIL ACTIONS

A. ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS – (Rule 2 to 56)

Rule 2 – Cause of Action – must be based on the sources of obligation

Sections 1 and 2 –
Basis of every ordinary civil action;
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. (Sec. 1, Rule 2). Having a cause of action would be vital if
one were to seek the aid of courts. Without a cause of action, once cannot, as a rule, seek judicial relief for a violation of
one’s rights.

Cause of action;
Definition: It is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. (Sec. 2, Rule 2) The question as to
whether a plaintiff has a cause of action is determined by the averments in the pleadings pertaining to the acts of the
defendant. Whether such acts give him a right of action is determined by substantive law. (Herrera, 2007)
Elements:
1. A legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
2. A correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such rights; and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff; or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief with a resulting injury or damage which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of
relief from the defendant. (Riano, 2019, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Ley Construction and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 185590, December 3, 2014)
NOTE: A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Otherwise, there will be splitting of a
single cause of action, which is prohibited.

CASE CAUSE OF ACTION

Breach of contract a. The existence of a contract; and
b. The breach thereof.

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Liability of employer based on
the negligence of his employee
Collection of sum of money
based on a promissory note
Unlawful detainer
Forcible entry
Malicious prosecution
Environmental cases
Distinction between right of action and cause of action:
An action is the suit filed in court for the enforcement or protection of a right, or prevention or redress of a wrong. A
cause of action is the basis of the action filed.
Definition
Requisites
Nature
Basis
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The employer’s liability is presumed. (Art. 2180, NCC)It shall only cease if the
employer successfully proves the diligence required of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
a. Requires an allegation that a debt exists; and
b. That such debt is due and demandable.
a. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice of the plaintiff;
c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
d. Within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
a. Prior physical possession of the property;
b. Deprivation of possession either by force, intimidations, strategy, threat, or stealth
(FISTS); and
c. The action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building.
a. Prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he
instigated its commencement;
b. The criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
c. In bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
d. The prosecution was impelled by legal malice – that is, an improper or sinister
motive
a. Statement that it is an environmental case; and
b. The law involved
CAUSE OF ACTION RIGHT OF ACTION
It is the act or omission by which a Right of a plaintiff to bring an action
party violates the rights of another. and to prosecute that action until final
(Sec. 2, Rule 2) judgment. (Marquez v. Varela, 92 Phil.
373)
1. The existence of a legal right of the 1. There must be a good cause
plaintiff; 2. A correlative duty of the (existence of a cause of action); 2. A
defendant to respect one’s right; and compliance with all the conditions
3. An act or omission of the defendant precedent to the bringing of the
in violation of the plaintiff’s right. action; and 3. Right to bring and
(Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries maintain the action must be in the
Association v. Nicolas, G.R. No. person instituting it. (Albano,
168394, October 6, 2008) Remedial Law Reviewer, 2014)
It is predicated upon substantive law It is procedural in character and is the
on quasi delicts under the NCC. consequence of the violation of the
(Riano, 2014) right of the plaintiff. (Riano, 2014)
Based on the allegations of the Basis is the plaintiff’s cause of action.
plaintiff in the complaint. There is no right of action where
there is no cause of action. (Ibid.)
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Effect of Affirmative Defense
19
Not affected by affirmative defenses May be taken away by the running of
(fraud, prescription, estoppel, etc.) the statute of limitation, estoppel or
other circumstances which do not at
all affect the cause of action.(Turner v.
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, G.R.
No. 157479, November 24, 2010)

“THERE IS NO RIGHT OF ACTION WHERE THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION”

FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION

Definition Insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading.(Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 133775, January 20, 2000)
How interposed May be raised as an affirmative defense in
the defendant’s answer. (Sec. 12, Rule 8,
Rules of Court 2020)
Determinat ion Determined only from the allegations of
the pleading and not from evidentiary
matters. (Riano, 2014, citing Domondon v.
Lopez, supra)
When made Can be made at the earliest stages of an
action(Dabuco v. CA, G.R. No. 133775,
January 20, 2000), i.e. filed in an answer.
Whether dismissal amounts No, dismissal due to the failure to state a
to res judicata cause of action does not constitute res
judicata. Dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a cause of action does not
bar the subsequent re-filing of the
complaint.(Sec. 13, Rule 15, Rules
Where the evidence does not sustain the
cause of action. (Domondon v. Lopez, A.M.
No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002)
Raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule
33 after the plaintiff has rested his case.
Resolved only on the basis of the evidence
he presented in support of his claim. (Riano,
Domondon v.Lopez, supra)
Made after questions of fact have been
resolved on the basis of stipulations,
admissions, or evidence presented.(Dabuco
v. CA, G.R. No. 133775, January 20, 2000)
Yes, because dismissal on the ground of lack
of cause of action is a decision on the
merits.

Effect of lack of cause of action on the jurisdiction of the court

Lack of cause of action does not affect the authority of a court to hear and decide a given case, if the court has
jurisdiction over its subject matter, over the parties therein, and, in an action in rem, over the res. (Herrera, 2007)

TEST OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

Whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. (Misamis Occidental II Coop., Inc. v. David, G.R. No. 129928, August 25, 2005)

GR: The sufficiency of the statement of cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and its existence is
only determined by the allegations of the complaint. (Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Roxas, G.R. No. 133576, July 13,
2000)

XPN: In some cases, the Court considered, in addition to the complaint, the appended annexes or documents, other
pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records so that such annexes are considered as parts of the complaint.
(Riano, 2019, citing Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 168394, October 6, 2008; Sps. Zepeda
v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172175, October 9, 2006)

NOTE: The truth or falsity of the allegations is beside the point because the allegations in the complaint are
hypothetically admitted. (Riano 2014, citing PNB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121251, June 26, 1998; Sta. Clara
Homeowner’s Association v. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002)

Illustrations:
IMELDA RELUCIO vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002;
Nature: The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals that
denied a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the case against her
inclusion as party defendant therein.

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FACTS: Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for “APPOINTMENT AS SOLE
ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.,” against defendant Alberto Lopez and
petitioner Imelda Relucio. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is
legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for
his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez,
after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976. A Motion
to Dismiss the Petition was filed by Relucio on the ground that Lopez has no cause of action against her. Respondent
Judge denying petitioner Relucio’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or
indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in
her name. Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals likewise denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc.
against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner - NO

RULING: “A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other.”
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved.
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does
not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. Relucio vs.
Lopez, 373 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002

As a general rule, averments in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss
grounded on the failure to state a cause of action. However, this rule does not apply as regards epithets of fraud, legal
conclusions, erroneous statements of law, inferences or conclusions from facts not stated, allegations of fact the falsity
of which is subject to judicial notice, matters of evidence, surplusage and irrelevant matters, scandalous matter inserted
merely to insult the opposing party, legally impossible facts, facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in
the pleading, or by a document referred to, or general averments contradicted by more specific averments.[2]cralaw

The allegations that Alberto Lopez placed substantial conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Imelda Relucio and
that she received the benefits and fruits of the conjugal properties of Alberto Lopez and respondent Angelina Lopez,
being matters of evidence, are not deemed hypothetically admitted by the petitioner. Neither are allegations that
conjugal properties were fraudulently concealed or the share of Alberto Lopez in the co-ownership between him and
petitioner Imelda Relucio shall accrue to or be forfeited in favor of the respondent are admitted by the petitioner, the
same being mere epithets of fraud and conclusions of law, respectively.

Furthermore, contrary to respondent's contention, we find that a final determination of the case may be had without
petitioner being joined as a party to it. The character of an action is determined from the issues raised by the complaint,
from the nature of the right or grievance asserted, and from the relief sought therein.[3]cralaw In the assailed decision,
we ruled that in the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto
Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to
respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal
partnership or absolute community property with respondent.[4] IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, finding no valid and
compelling reason to warrant the reversal of our decision, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit. This denial is FINAL.

PHILIPPINE CROP INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 169558, September 29, 2008;
FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is a government-owned and controlled corporation
engaged in the business of crop insurance. Private respondents are all retired employees and officers of petitioner.

Prior to the effectivity on July 1, 1989 of Republic Act No. 6758,4 or the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, private respondents were employed with PCIC and were receiving cost of living allowance (COLA) equivalent to
40% of their basic salary, amelioration allowance equivalent to 10% of their basic salary and additional COLA known as
equity pay.

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To implement the law, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular
(CCC) No. 105 specifying that the COLA, amelioration allowance and equity pay previously granted to government
employees shall be deemed included in the basic salary. It disallowed without qualification all allowances and fringe
benefits granted to said employees on top of their basic salary effective November 1, 1989. Pursuant to DBM-CCC No.
10, petitioner stopped paying the aforecited benefits to private respondents.

On August 12, 1998, the Supreme Court nullified DBM-CCC No. 10 in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit6 due to its non-
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country.7

On February 4, 2003, private respondents instituted an action for specific performance against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5. They prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay them the
subject benefits from July 1, 1989 up to their respective retirement dates or the publication of DBM-CCC No. 10,
whichever is earlier. But petitioner still refused to pay them.

On March 11, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss10 on the grounds that (1) the complaint stated no cause of
action since the parties have no contractual relationship; (2) the subject benefits have already been integrated into the
basic salaries of private respondents; and (3) private respondents’ reliance on the De Jesus case was misplaced since
said case involved the payment of a different benefit which was not integrated into the basic salaries of the employees
concerned.

In their opposition,11 private respondents averred that the sufficiency of the complaint should be tested based on the
strength of its allegations and no other.

On May 13, 2003, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. It noted that the allegations in the
complaint for specific performance constituted a valid cause of action on which the court could render a valid judgment.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari12 with the Court of Appeals. It argued that public
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying its motion
to dismiss.

The appellate court dismissed the petition and thus affirmed that the complaint stated a cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was cause of action

RULING: Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving
the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three
indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
These elements are present in the case at bar. Private respondents have sufficiently alleged in their complaint that (1)
they are entitled to the subject benefits under Rep. Act No. 6758; (2) petitioner is bound by said law to pay the subject
benefits; and (3) petitioner has refused to pay said benefits.

Although the complaint is labeled as an action for specific performance thereby giving the impression that it is based on
contract, the allegations therein reveal that the action is based on law, i.e., Rep. Act No. 6758. We have ruled that the
cause of action is determined from the allegations of a complaint, not from its caption. Moreover, the focus is on the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The determination is confined to the four corners of the
complaint and nowhere else. Philippine Crop Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 567 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 169558
September 29, 2008

Everything considered, there was no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals when it affirmed public
respondent judge's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS; namely, CONCEPCION B. LICAROS and ABELARDO B. LICAROS vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157438, October 18, 2004;
FACTS: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 13,
20022 and the February 6, 20033 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0005. The decretal portion of the
first assailed Resolution reads: "WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED."The second
challenged Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

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Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, served as governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines from
1970 to 1980, during the incumbency of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. He died on August 3, 1983.
On July 17, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines -- through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) -- filed a Complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against former President Marcos and his alleged crony, Lucio C. Tan.

Aside from the main defendants (Marcos, his wife Imelda R. Marcos, and Tan), twenty-three other persons -- who had
purportedly acted as their dummies, nominees or agents -- were likewise impleaded in the Complaint. It alleged, among
others, that Tan -- with the connivance of some government officials, including Central Bank Governor Gregorio S.
Licaros -- had fraudulently acquired the assets of the General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), now known as the Allied
Bank.

On September 13, 1991, four years after the filing of the original action,7 the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint and for Admission of a Second Amended Complaint, which impleaded the Estate/Heirs of Licaros for the first
time. The Amended Complaint, reiterating earlier allegations in the Expanded Complaint, detailed Licaros’ participation
in the alleged unholy conspiracy. The Amended Complaint restated the same causes of action originally appearing in the
initial Complaint: (1) abuse of right and power in violation of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code; (2) unjust
enrichment; (3) breach of public trust; (4) accounting of all legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets in
excess of lawful earnings and income; and (5) actual, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages.

The Sandiganbayan held that the averments in the Second Amended Complaint had sufficiently established a cause of
action against former Central Bank Governor Licaros.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Second Amended Complaint states a cause of action against petitioners.

RULING: A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
and not to violate that right; and (3) an act or omission constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff or violating the right of the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint clearly and unequivocally outlines its cause of action against
Defendant Licaros.

It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,
the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself.
Whether these allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted. The issue rather
is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? So
rigid is the norm prescribed that if the court should doubt the truth of the facts averred, it must not dismiss the
complaint but require an answer and proceed to hear the case on the merits.” Heirs of Gregorio Licaros vs.
Sandiganbayan, 440 SCRA 483, G.R. No. 157438 October 18, 2004

Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457 SCRA 744).

FACTS: For Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 3 December 20021 and 7 January 20032 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002 entitled Victoria M. Rodriguez, Pedro
R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. In the assailed Orders, the RTC denied the application for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.

Complaint3 for Recovery of Possession of Property, filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and herein petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago against respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on 12 March 2002, before the RTC of Olongapo City,
Zambales, Branch 74. Included in said complaint was a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order.

In their Complaint filed before the RTC, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, alleged that:

Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez
Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name
plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R.
Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years
plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago is presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land
Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two aforesaid parcels of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo,
defendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over them. More particularly, defendant is using these two parcels of land
for its (sic) own commercial and other purposes.

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It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover possession of the property from the defendant so that she could comply
with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs.

Lately, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago was informed by purported agents or employees of the defendant that he should vacate the
premises he and his family are occupying since defendant would be needing the same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to
do this since it is not the owner of the premises, and the owner, Victoria Rodriguez (sic) has already leased the premises to plaintiffs
Santiago and Mateo.

Respondent SBMA, in its counter statement of facts,5 contends that sometime in 1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner
Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue of her employment with respondent SBMA, availed herself of the housing privilege accorded to the
latter's employees; that due to said privilege, she was allowed to lease a housing unit6 inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone; that the
lease agreement, however, "shall be terminated if the lessees are no longer employed with SBMA;"7 that on 31 January 2002,
Liwanag Santiago's employment contract concluded; that since said contract was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an
employee of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy, she and her family
were asked8 to vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit.

On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order[9] against respondent SBMA from ousting petitioner Santiago and
his family from the premises of the subject housing unit within seventy two (72) hours from receipt. Further, it was likewise
restrained and enjoined from committing any other acts that would prevent the latter and his family from occupying the premises
they have allegedly leased from Victoria Rodriguez.

Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

On 5 April 2002, instead of filing an Answer, respondent SBMA filed a Motion to Dismiss10 the abovementioned complaint on the
argument, inter alia,11 that the latter failed to state a valid cause of action.

On 3 December 2002, the RTC issued its first assailed order. In denying and dismissing the application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and complaint respectively, the RTC stated that since the alleged right of complainant Rodriguez stemmed
from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, it cannot be considered a right in esse. The RTC took
judicial notice of Presidential Decree No. 892,12 which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their
lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,13 within six months from effectivity of the decree,
or until 16 August 1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens System. Significant parts of the assailed Order of the RTC read:

Plaintiffs' complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they claim is still a valid, subsisting and enforceable title. Despite the fact
that said title was never registered under Act 496, the land Registration Act (later PD 1529), plaintiffs still claim that they have a
cause of action.

The court is not convinced.

The action filed by plaintiffs is for recovery of possession based on the ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the disputed property
evidenced by a Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of law particularly the enabling clauses of PD 892, said type of title can no
longer be utilized as evidence of ownership. Verily, Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land
ownership. (Citation omitted.)

As such and on its face, the complaint indeed failed to state a cause of action simply because the court can take judicial notice of the
applicability of PD 892 and of the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to the case at bench.14

Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the second assailed Order dated 7 January 2003.

ISSUE: whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.

RULING: Before anything else, it should be clarified that “the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue” and “the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action” are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different
affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between “the lack of legal capacity to sue” from “the lack of personality to
sue” is a fairly common mistake. The difference between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals: Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue
and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the
character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof
that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term “lack of
capacity to sue” should not be confused with the term “lack of personality to sue.” While the former refers to a
plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or
any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-

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interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity
to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same
ground, requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist
Fathers, this Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is
concerned: It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action, and not on whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically
admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer of said complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the face of
the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a complaint
states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court may not
inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and
it is improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said
motion. In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause of action, the trial court should
have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into
the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or attached to the
Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court evidently erred in making
findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April
1994 and 02 June 1994; and questioning the existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of said
Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the merits.
Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457 SCRA 744, G.R. No. 157447 April 29, 2005

Sections 3 and 4 –
One suit for a single cause of action,

Tests to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action (EDE)
1. Evidence – Whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (Same
Evidence Test);
2. Defenses – Whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other; and
3. Existence – Whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint
(Umale v. Canoga Park Development. Corporation, G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011)

Splitting of cause of action - It is the act of instituting two or more suits on the basis of the same cause of action. (Sec. 4,
Rule 2) It is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and bringing several
actions thereon. (Riano 2014, citing Quadra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147593, July 31, 2006) This practice, which
applies not only to complaints but also to counterclaims and cross-claims, is discouraged.
Here the pleader divides a single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts and brings a suit for each part.
This cannot be done because splitting a single cause of action is expressly prohibited by the ROC.

Effect of splitting a single cause of action,

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (Sec. 4, Rule 2)
The filing of one or judgment on the merits to any one shall be a ground for the dismissal of the other. (litis pendentia
or res judicata.

Remedies against splitting cause of action

The defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on either of the following grounds:
1. Litis pendentia – that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or
2. Res judicata, if the first action has already been terminated – that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or
by the statute of limitations. (Section 12[a], Rule 15, Rules of Court 2020)

Sections 5 and 6 –
Joinder of causes of action and misjoinder of causes of action;
Joinder of causes of action (2005 BAR) - It is the assertion of as many causes of action a party may have against another
in one pleading alone. (Sec. 5, Rule 2) It is the process of uniting two or more demands or rights of action in one action.
(Riano, 2019, citing Unicapital, Inc. v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 192073, September 11, 2013)

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Misjoinder of causes of action
There is a misjoinder when two or more causes of action were joined in one complaint when they should not be so
joined. This is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the
initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately by filing a motion in relation thereto. (Sec. 6, Rule 2)
There is no sanction against non-joinder of separate causes of action. However, if the plaintiff refuses to sever the
misjoined cause of action, the complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the 2019 Amendments to the
Revised Rules on Crivil Procedure.

Conditions to effect a valid joinder of causes of action;

Requisites of joinder of causes of action
1. The party shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties (Sec. 6, Rule 3):
a. Right to relief exists in favor of or against several persons;
b. Right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transaction; and
c. There is common question of law of law or fact.
2. The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;
3. Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies
therein; and
4. Totality Test - Where claims in all causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test for jurisdiction. (Sec. 5, Rule 2) (2002 BAR)
NOTE: A joinder of causes of action is only permissive, not compulsory; hence, a party may desire to file a single suit for
each of his claims. (Riano, 2014)

Totality or Aggregate Rule

Where there are several claims or causes of actions, principally for recovery of money, between the same or different
parties embodied in one complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transaction. (Sec. 5[d], Rule 2)

NOTE: Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes
of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two
or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 3 (permissive joinder of
parties).The totality rule is not applicable if the claims are separate and distinct from each other and did not arise from
the same transaction. If there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents are separate
and distinct, then neither falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction.(Floresv. Judge Mallare-Phillipps, G.R. No. L-66620,
September 24, 1986)
ILLUSTRATION DR. MACATODAS AND ATTY TALUNAN?
DISTINCTION OF COMPULSORY AND PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM, HOW DOES IT APPLY TO THE TOTALITY RULE

Joinder of claims in small claims cases

The plaintiff may join, in a single statement of claim, one or more separate small claims against a defendant provided
that the total amount claimed, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed ₱300,000. (Sec. 8, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, as
amended)

Claim for damages

If the main action is for the recovery of sum of money and the damages being claimed are merely the consequences of
the main cause of action, the same are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount.However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of thecourt.(Albano,2010)

Effects of misjoinder.
This is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative
of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately by filing a motion in relation thereto. (Sec. 6, Rule 2) There is no
sanction against non-joinder of separate causes of action. However, if the plaintiff refuses to sever the misjoined cause
of action, the complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the 2019 Amendments to the Revised Rules on
Crivil Procedure.

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SPLITTING OF CAUSE OF ACTION JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

- It is the practice of dividing one cause of action into Assertion of as many causes of action as a party may have
different parts and making each part the subject of a against another in onepleading alone. (Sec. 5, Rule 2)
separatecomplaint. (Bachrach v. Icaringal, 68 Phil. 287)
- Prohibited. A party may not institute more than one Encouraged. No sanction against nonjoinder of separate
suit for a single cause of action. (Sec.3,Rule 2) causes of action since a plaintiff needs only a single cause
of action to maintain an action.
- It cause multiplicity of suits and double vexation on the It minimizes multiplicity of suits and inconvenience on the
part of the defendant. (Riano, 2014) parties.
- The filing of one (litis pendentia) or a judgment upon No adverse effect on the action.
the merits in any one (res judicata) is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. (Sec. 4, Rule 2)

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION JOINDER OF PARTIES

It refers to the procedural device whereby a party who It may be employed when there are various causes of
asserts various claims against the same or several parties, actions that accrue in favor of one or more plaintiffs against
file all his claims against them in a single complaint one or more defendants i.e. there is plurality of parties
It will not necessarily involve a joinder of parties It may or may not be involved in a joinder of causes of
actions.(Riano, 2014)
Merely permissive, as evidenced by the use of the word Indispensable parties – required to be joined either as
“may” instead of “shall.” (Sec. 5, Rule 2; Riano, 2014)(1999 plaintiffs or defendants. (Sec. 7,Rule 3)Necessary party –
BAR) one who is not indispensable but ought to be joined if
complete relief is to be accorded, or for a complete
determination or settlement of theaction. (Sec. 8, Rule 3)

SPECIAL AND ORDINARY CAUSES OF ACTION

Rule 3 – Parties to Civil Action -

1) Section 1 – Who may be parties ( plaintiff and defendant)
1. Natural persons;
2. Juridical persons:
a. The State and its political subdivisions;
b. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; and
c. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member (Art. 44, NCC);
3. Entities authorized by law:
a. Corporation by estoppel is precluded from denying its existence and the members thereof can be sued and be
held liable as general partners (Sec. 21, Corporation Code);
b. A contract of partnership having a capital of three thousand pesos or more but which fails to comply with the
registration requirements is nevertheless liable as a partnership to third persons (Art. 1772 in relation to Art.
1768, NCC);
c. Estate of a deceased person (Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Fragante, G.R. No. L- 770, April 27, 1948);
d. A legitimate labor organization may sue and be sued in its registered name (Art. 242[e], Labor Code of the
Philippines);
e. The Roman Catholic Church may be a party and as to its properties, the archbishop or diocese to which they
belong (Versoza v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L- 25264, November 22, 1926); and
f. A dissolved corporation may prosecute and defend suits by or against it provided that the suits:
i. Occur within three (3) years after its dissolution; and
ii. The suits are in connection with the settlement and closure of its affairs. (Sec. 112, Corporation Code)

Action if the party impleaded is not authorized to be a party

It can be raised as an affirmative defense based on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiff not authorized – a motion to dismiss on the ground that “the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue.”
(Sec.12[a], Rule 8, 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure)

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Where the plaintiff has a legal capacity to sue but is NOT the person who should sue because he is not the real party in
interest, the complaint is dismissible pn the ground that the complaint ‘states no cause of action ‘.

2. Defendant not authorized – complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the “pleading asserting a claim states no
cause of action” or “failure to state a cause of action”, (Sec.12(a), Rule 8, 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure) because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil
action. (Riano, 2014)

Lack of legal capacity to sue vs. Lack of legal personality to sue

LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE LACK OF LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE

It refers to plaintiff’s general disability to sue such as on The plaintiff is not the real party in interest. (Columbia
account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of Pictures, Inc. v. CA, supra.)
juridical personality or any other general disqualifications
of a party. (Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No.
110318, August 28, 1996)
Remedy: File an answer and raise as an affirmative Remedy: File an answer and raise as an affirmative
defense defense that the complaint states no cause of action.
lack of capacity to sue. (Sec. 12, Rule 8, 2019 (Sec. 12, Rule 8, supra.)
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure )

Rules with regard to the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts
1. If it does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
(Agilent Technologies v. Integrated Silicon, G.R. No. 154618, April 14, 2004)
2. If it does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts. (Id.)
3. If it is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated
transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction. (Id.)
4. If it is without license to do business and is not doing business in the Philippines is not disqualified from filing and
prosecuting an action for unfair competition and may be sued for acts done against a person or persons in the
Philippines, or may be sued in Philippine Courts.
5. If it does business in the Philippines without license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said
corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought before
Philippine courts. (Herrera, 2007)

Entity without a juridical personality as a defendant

Neither a natural or juridical person but is allowed by the ROC to be a party to an action as a defendant, lodged in Sec
15, Rule 3 of the ROC.

Averment of capacity to sue or be sued

Capacity of the party to sue or be sued, or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, or the
legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, MUST BE AVERRED. (Sec 4, Rule 8 ROC)

2) Section 2 – Parties in Interest – Real party in interest RIANO PAGE 241

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Sec. 2 Rule 3 ROC

Must be REAL, a present substantial interest. That is material and direct.

UNLESS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY LAW, ”every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest“ Sec 2 Rule 3. If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss
may be filed that the complaint states no cause of action, because it goes into the very substance of the suit. If either of
the parties is not the real party in interest, the court cannot grant the relief prayed for because that party has no legal
right or duty with respect to the other.

The rule on real party in interest ensures that the party with the legal right to sue brings the action and to bring to court
a party rightfully interested in the litigation so that only real controversies shall be presented.

Determining the real party in interest

Requires going back to the elements of the cause of action. The owner of the right violated stands to be the real party in
interest as plaintiff and the person responsible for the violation is the real party in interest as defendant.

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Doctrine of relativity of contracts
A suit for violation of a contract. That contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and cannot favor or
prejudice a third person. Hence one who is not a party to a contract, cannot maintain an action on it.

Doctrine of Locus Standi RIANO PAGE 245

Refers to the personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
because of the challenged governmental acts.

As a rule, locus standi required personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Hence a party will be allowed to
litigate on when he can demonstrate that (a) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (b) the injury is fairly traeable to the challenged action; (c) the injury is likely
to be redressed by the remedy being sought. Otherwise he/she would not be allowed to litigate.
3) Kinds of Parties: - requisites (Sections 3 to 21)
a) Representative parties
b) Spouses
Rule on spouses as parties
GR: Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. (Sec. 4, Rule 3)
NOTE: Husband and wife shall sue and be sued jointly inasmuch as both are co-administrators of the community
property under the system of absolute community of property, as well as the conjugal partnership property.
(Feria & Noche, 2013)
XPNs:
1. Arts. 101 & 108, Family Code (FC) – A spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligations to the family with respect to marital, parental or property relations;
2. Art. 111, FC - A spouse of age mortgages, encumbers, alienates or otherwise disposes of his or her exclusive
property;
3. Art. 145, FC - The regime of separation of property governs the property relations between spouses.
NOTE: In the foregoing exceptions, the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall
be sufficient basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. Despite the separation of property,
one spouse may end up being sued and held answerable for the liabilities incurred by the other spouse because
“the liability of the spouses to creditors for family expenses, however, be solidary.” (Riano, 2014, citing Art. 146,
Family Code of the Philippines)
4. Art. 135 - Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
a. That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
b. That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
c. That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
d. That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations
to the family as provided for in Art. 101;
e. That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power;
and f. That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
5. Art. 142 - The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by
the court to the other spouse:
a. When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
b. When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
c. When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or
d. When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case.
NOTE: If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just
cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.
c) Minors or incompetent persons
A minor or an incompetent may sue or be sued. He can be a party, not through, but with the assistance of
his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. (Sec. 5 Rule 3 ROC)
d) Permissive parties
e) Indispensable parties (Lozano vs. Ballesteros, 195 SCRA 681).
f) Necessary parties
g) Class suit
h) Alternative defendants
i) Unknown defendants
j) Entity without juridical entity
k) Indigent party

4) What is the effect if :

there is non-joinder of necessary parties;

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The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action. A final
determination can be had but only among the parties already impleaded even if a necessary party, for some
justifiable reason, is not joined. But it would be better that all necessary party is joined to obtain complete relief.

Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted, a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth
the name of the necessary party and state why such party is omitted.

If the reason given for the non-joinder is found by the court to be unmeritorious, it may order the pleader to join
the omitted party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order of the court to include a necessary party, without justifiable cause, shall be
deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.

co-plaintiff is unwilling to join the other plaintiffs;

Unwilling co-plaintiff is a party who is supposed to be a plaintiff but whose consent to be joined as a plaintiff
cannot be obtained as when he refuses to be a party to the action.

Sec 10 Rule 3: unwilling co-plaintiff

(a) may be made a defendant and (b) the reason therefore shall be stated in the complaint.

there is mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties. (Sections 9, 10 and 11).

A party is misjoined when he is made a party to the action although he should not be impleaded.
A party is not joined when he is supposed be joined but is not impleaded in the action.

Neither misjoinder nor non0joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just.

If there is any claim against a party misjoined, the same may be severed and proceeded with separately.

When may be dismissed: the failure to obey the order of the court to drop or add a party is a ground forthe
dismissal of the complaint under sec 3 rule 17 ROC.

5) Section 16 – Duty of counsel when a party dies RIANO PAGE 262

The death of the client extinguishes the attorney-client relationship and divests the counsel of his authority to
represent the client. Neither does he become the counsel of the heirs, unless his services are provided.

Whenever a party to a pending action dies, it is the duty of the counsel of the deceased party
1. to inform the court of such fact within 30 days after such death;
2. to give the name and address of the legal representative of the deceased;
3. duty is MANDATORY and FAILURE to comply therewith is a ground for DISCIPLINARY ACTION.

5) Sections 17, 18 and 19 – Effect when a party who is a public officer dies or separated from the service;
becomes incompetent or incapacitated, or there is a transfer of interest during the pendency of the action.

6) Section 20 – Effect if defendant dies in an action based on contractual money claims (recovery of a sum of
money based on contract, express or implied) – Actions that survive and actions which do not survive or
extinguished by the death of the defendant..

6) Notice to the Solicitor General (Section 22).

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