Review Center The RPC conducted the Nursing Board Exams.
Whether EO 566 is unconstitutional – Executive exercise of legislative
Association v. It was alleged that handwritten copies of two
Ermita sets of exams were circulated among
reviewees from RA Gapuz Review Center and
Ingress Review Center. The PRC admitted to
the leakage and traced it to two Board of
Nursing members.
The PRC released the results of the exam but
the oath-taking was restrained by the CA.
GMA replaced the members of the Board and
ordered re-examination.
GMA issued EO 566 which authorized CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of
all review centers and similar entities in the
PH. Pursuant to this, CHED imposed a permit
requirement on review centers.
Review Center Assoc. opposed the IRR
arguing that giving permits to operate a review
center to Higher Educ. Institutions will
effectively abolish independent review center.
Following negotiations on the IRR, RIRR was
later approved. Petitioners filed a Petition
with CHED to clarify/amend the RIRR, among
which praying to revise the rules to conform
with RA 7722 limiting CHED’s coverage to
public and private institutions of higher
education. CHED Chairman Neri replied that
while regulation of review centers are not one
of its mandates under RA 7722, GMA issued
EO566 to regulate the establishment of ALL
review centers. To limit it to independent one practice of all professions and to ensure and safeguard the integrity of all
power as it expands CHED’s Jurisdiction
OSG argues that “programs and institutions of higher learning…” is broad
enough to include review centers.
 “Higher learning” – verba legis rule dictates that it must be given its
literal meaning. Thus, it should mean tertiary education. The CHED’s
coverage under RA7722 is limited to public and private institutions
of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and
private post-secondary educational institutions. It does not include
review centers.
OSG argues that GMA is only exercising her Residual Powers under Sec 20,
Title I, Book III of EO 292
 EO 292 speaks of powers vested under law. There is no law granting
the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The
President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order
without a prior legislation granting her such power.
 Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is
also an invalid exercise of the CHED's quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-
making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations.
The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the
confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review
centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher
education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
 Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies
and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he
can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
It is argued that the PRC gives the President how to regulate review centers
since the PRC is mandated to preserve a high standard of admission to all
 will contradict EO 566.
They filed a petition with the SC praying
annulment of the RIRR and declare EO 566
unconstitutional
Brion, concurring
Schechter Corp The Live Poultry Code was promulgated under
v. US Sec 3, National Industrial Recovery Act which
authorized the President to approve “codes
of fair competition” if the President finds: (1)
that such associations or groups "impose no
inequitable restrictions on admission to
membership therein and are truly
license exams.
 RA 8981 is not the appropriate law. The law mandates the PRC to
preserve the integrity of license exams and it has the power to adopt
measures to implement this. However, these should refer to the
conduct of examinations. The enumeration of PRC's powers under
Section 7 (e) includes among others, the fixing of dates and places of
the examinations and the appointment of supervisors and watchers.
These have nothing to do with the regulation of review centers.
o They have the power to investigate irregularities in the
license exams however, it has nothing to do with regulation
of review centers. That would be an unwarranted
interpretation of law.
 Unlike CHED, the PRC has authority or mandate under the PRC Law
to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers.
 The valid grant of the authority to issue subordinate legislation to
the PRC and the exercise of this power by the President as the head
of the executive department of government, however, do not extend
to the authority of the President to take control of the PRC's powers
under the PRC Law, and to assign these to another agency within the
executive branch
 The President took control of PRC’s authority to issue subordinate
legislation to regulate review centers, and transferred it to CHED.
This is illegal sub-delegation. What has once been delegated by
Congress can no longer be further delegated by the original delegate
to another, expressed in the Latin maxim — potestas delegata non
delegare potest.
 We pointed out in the Panama Company case that the Constitution
has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to
perform its function in laying down policies and establishing
standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of
representative," and (2) that such codes are
not designed "to promote monopolies or to
'eliminate or oppress small enterprises and
will not operate to discriminate against them
and will tend to effectuate the policy. Such
codes "shall not permit monopolies or
monopolistic practices."
Whether Congress in authorizing "codes of fair competition" has itself
established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential
As a condition for its approval, the President
legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, has
may impose conditions for protection of
attempted to transfer that function to others
consumers, and provide such
exemptions/exceptions necessary to effect the
policy under Sec 1.
Where a Code has not been approved, the
President may prescribe one.
The Live Poultry Code was approved and
declared purpose to effectuate the policies in
Title I in NIRA. It was established as the code of
fair competition for the live poultry industry in
the metropolitan area.
Among its prohibited practices were “straight
killing” – purchasing poultry for resale to
accept the run of any half coops, coops as
purchased by slaughterhouse operators.
Petitioners were convicted by the Eastern
District Court of NY on 18 counts for violations
of the “Live Poultry Code”
Defendants contend
 The Code has been adopted due to
undue delegation of legislative power
facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.
But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and
validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative
authority which has been developed, by means of them, cannot be
allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if
our constitutional system is to be maintained.
 In Panama Company,
o the subject statute was the National Industrial Recovery Act
on the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum products which are produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted by state authority.
o The issue was the discretion given the President in
prohibiting transportation.
 In this case, whether there is any adequate definition of the subject
to which the codes are to be addressed – what is fair competition?
The act does not define “fair competition”
o The NIRA dispenses with the administrative procedure and
practice of setting up a quasi-judicial body where the “fair
competition” may be determined based on particular
instances, upon evidence and in light of particular
competitive conditions. However there is an agency for
“unfair competition”
 The Recovery Act provides that when a code is approved, its
provisions are to be the “standards of fair competition” for the trade
and industry concerned and any violation is deemed "an unfair
method of competition" under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
 The approval of the President is conditioned on his finding that it
“will tend to effectuate the policy of this title”
o Under Sec 3, whatever "may tend to effectuate" these
general purposes may be included in the "codes of fair
competition." This shows that it doesn’t merely deal with
  It attempted to regulate intrastate
transactions which lay outside the
authority of Congress
 Repugnant to DP of the Fifth
Amendment
The Circuit CA sustained the conviction on 16
counts, but reversed conviction on 2 counts
charged on requirements as to minimum
wages and maximum hours of labor
 10 counts for violation of the
requirements of straight killing1
 1 charge for sale to a butcher of an
unfit chicken
 2 counts charged the making of a sale
without having poultry inspected or
approved
 2 counts for making of false reports or What are the limits to the President’s exercise of discretion?
failure to make reports relating to
range of daily prices and volume of
sales
Commission men sell to the slaughterhouse
operators. Defendants are corporations
conducting wholesale poultry slaughterhouse
markets. After the poultry is delivered to them,
they sell to retail poultry dealers and butchers
who sell directly to consumers.. The poultry
purchased from defendants is immediately
slaughtered, prior to delivery, by shochtim in
defendants' employ. Defendants do not sell
poultry in interstate commerce
1
the practice of requiring persons purchasing poultry for resale to accept the run of any half coop, coop, or coops, as purchased by slaughterhouse operators, except for culls
“unfair competitive practices” which could be subject of
judicial determination or administrative machinery. It
authorizes new and controlling prohibitions through codes
which formulators would propose, the President will
approve as wise and beneficient measures for government
of trades and industries, in accord with Sec 1.
o All of the policies there set forth point toward a single goal-
the rehabilitation of industry and the industrial recovery
which unquestionably was the major policy of Congress in
adopting the National Industrial Recovery Act." However, can
Congress really delegate its authority to empower them to
enact laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the
rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries?
Could trade or industrial associations or groups be
constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such
associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their
enterprises? – the answer is obvious
 The trade/industrial group "impose no inequitable restrictions on
admission to membership" and are "truly representative."
o However, this only relates to the statute of the initiators of
the new law and not the scope of such laws.
 The President must find that the code is not designed to promote
monopolies or eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not
discriminate them
o The President may dis/approve their proposals as he may see
fit
o It is really a matter of opinion.
 Similarly, the President in approving the code may impose his own
conditions, adding or taking what is proposed “in his discretion”
which he thinks will “effectuate the policy”
o Nothing is stopping the President from passing laws as he
“deems beneficial” in so many commercial fields in the
country.
 Section 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no
standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure.
 It authorizes making codes and laws. For this, the law does not set
any standards aside from general arms of rehabilitation, correction
and expansion.
 In view of the broad scope of that declaration, and of the nature of
the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President
in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is
virtually unfettered.
Federal Energy Trade Expansion Act provides that if the Sec. of Undue Delegation – NO
Administration Treasury finds that an "article is being  Even if § 232 (b) is read to authorize the imposition of a license fee
v. AL Gonquin imported into the United States in such system, the standards that it provides the President in its
SNG quantities or under such circumstances as to implementation are clearly sufficient to meet any delegation
threaten to impair the national security," the doctrine attack.
President is authorized to: "take such action, o "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
and for such time, as he deems necessary to principle to which the [President] is directed to conform,
adjust the imports of [the] article and its such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
derivatives so that . . . imports [of the article] legislative power."
will not threaten to impair the national  Sec 232 easily fulfills the test. It establishes preconditions to
security."' President’s acts based on the findings of the Sec. of Treasury.
o The President can act only to the extent "he deems necessary
While parties agree that the provision to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that
authorizes the President to adjust the imports such imports will not threaten to impair the national
by imposing quotas on such importations, the security."
issue is whether the President is authorized to  In authorizing the President to "take such action, and for such time,
control such imports by imposing on them a as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [an] article and its
system of monetary exactions in the for of derivatives," § 232 (b) seems clearly to grant him a measure of
license fees. discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust imports
– either quantitative (quotas) or monetary methods (license fees).
In 1959, pursuant to the predecessor of the  The imposition of quotas may not always be the most feasible
provision in question, Pres. Eisenhower, after method in dealing with national security threats posed by the
being advised by Dictor of ODM that the circumstances.
imports of crude oil were impairing the  In making the Neely Amendment, it was explained that it authorized
national security, established MOIP which
imposed a system of quotas on the imports of
petroleum productions.
As the Cabinet felt that MOIP was not fulfilling
its objective, Pres. Nixon enacted Pres. Proc.
No 4210 which replaced the quota system to a
system of fees applicable to the imports. The
Secretary conducted an investigation and still,
that the amount of crude oil among others
being imported threaten to impair the national
security of the US.
The President agreed with the findings and
issued Proc. No. 4341 which immediately
raised "first-tier" license fees to maximum
levels previously scheduled to be reached
some months later.
4 days after, Respondents (8 Governors, 10
utilities) challenged the license fees against the
Sec of Treasury alleging that the imposition of
fees went beyond the President’s authority,
taken without procedural due process
the President "to take such action as is necessary, including the
imposition of import quotas or the increase in duties, to protect the
domestic industry concerned. While eventually the Byrd-Millikin
Amendment was the one placed into law, it was stated in the
deliberations that both versions were intended to authorize such
monetary exactions.
 Taken as a whole then, the legislative history of § 232 (b) belies any
suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the
statute itself, intended to limit the President's authority to the
imposition of quotas and to bar the President from imposing a
license fee system like the one challenged here. To the contrary, the
provision's original enactment, and its subsequent re-enactment in
1958, 1962, and 1974 in the face of repeated expressions from
Members of Congress and the Executive Branch as to their broad
understanding of its language, all lead to the conclusion that § 232
(b) does in fact
o While Congress in 1958 made several procedural changes in
the statute and established criteria to guide the President's
determination as to whether action under the provision
might be necessary, it added no limitations with respect to
the type of action that the President was authorized to take.
The 1958 renactment, like the 1955 provision, authorized the
President under appropriate conditions to "take such action"
''as he deems necessary to adjust the imports
 We disagree that the rejection of the amendment that enumerates
the authority the President has shows the intent to limit his
authority.
o The amendment was in reality far more than an articulation
of the authority that the Government finds to be contained in
§ 232 (b). Unlike § 232 (b), the rejected proposal would not
have required a prior investigation and findings by an
executive department as a prerequisite to Presidential
action.
o The amendment was in reality far more than an articulation
of the authority that the Government finds to be contained in
§ 232 (b).

White v. Roughton is supervisor of the town of City of
Roughton Campaign Township. He administers the
general township assistance program that
distributes locally collected taxes to needy
township resident.
White received general assistance in the form
of “food orders” for 5 periods, one week each
in 1974. However, his assistance was
terminated in Oct. No notice or reason for the
termination was given nor was he informed of
his right of appeal. A similar occurrence was
experienced by plaintiff Walker.
Plaintiff Silagy applied for the program at least
3 times but was denied and no reason was
given.
Plaintiffs claimed that Roughton
 Operates the program without any
standards for eligibility or amount of
aid given
 Terminates general assistance without
giving notice and hearing
 Denies applications for the program
without notice or hearing after denial
 Fails to inform recipients and
applicants of their right to appeal
Defendant Schwengel is the Chairman of the
Champaign Country Board of Supervisors who
 Final word: The ruling is pro hac vice. It does not mean that any
action the President might take is authorized as long as there is
remote impact.
See debate on Rice Tarrification debates.
There was a violation of due process
 In Goldberg v. Kelly: SC held that procedural due process requires
that welfare recipients must be provided with adequate notice and
an evidentiary hearing before benefits may be discontinued
 This ruling was applied in several cases. Due process requires that
welfare assistance be administered to ensure fairness and freedom
from arbitrary decision-making as to eligibility. Federally subsidized
public assistance is governed by statute and extensive regulations
 In accordance with the General Assistance statute itself, defendant
Roughton as administrator of the general assistance program has
the responsibility to administer the program to ensure the fair and
consistent application of eligibility requirements. This that
Roughton establish written standards and regulations.
 At the hearing in the district court, defendant Roughton admitted
that he and his staff determine eligibility based upon their own
unwritten personal standards. Such procedure clearly violates due
process.
The district court erred by failing to consider the relevant evidence
presented at the hearing on the preliminary injunction
 The district court based its decision as to the eligibility of the
plaintiffs on the court’s own personal standards. Apparently the
preliminary injunction was denied specifically because the district
court did not believe that plaintiffs would prevail on the merits as to
their eligibility.
 However, this was not the issue. It was whether plaintiff’s procedural
DP were violated. Overwhelming evidence was presented—sufficient
to support a preliminary injunction—that plaintiffs would ultimately
succeed on the merits of this issue
 We do not agree with defendants that the plaintiffs were afforded
sufficient DP. DP includes determination of the issues in according
 receives appeals from the decisions of the to articulated standards. The lack of such standards deprives any
township supervisors granting or denying hearing whether before an agency or a court, of its meaning and
general assistance. Plaintiffs alleged that he value as an opportunity for the plaintiffs to prove their
failed to establish a consistent and orderly qualifications for assistance.
appeal procedure.  Because of the significant constitutional rights involved, we are
confident that Judge Wise will expedite this matter on his calendar.
The filed for preliminary injunction to prevent The district court should focus upon the development of written
termination of the general assistance grant for standards for eligibility and for general assistance which may be
plaintiffs White and Walker and to provide given. Further proper notice, hearing and appeal mechanisms should
general assistance to Silagy. The district court be established.
denied. They appealed to the 7th Circuit of the
US CA.
Permissible Delegation --
Ascertainment of Fact
Panama The National Industrial Recovery Act We look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy
Refining Co v. authorized the President to prohibit the with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard for
Ryan transportation in interstate and foreign the President's action; whether the Congress has required any finding by the
commerce of petroleum and the products President in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage  Sec 9 leaves to the States and to their constituted authorities the
in excess of the amount permitted by state determination of what production shall be permitted
authority. Sec. 92 attaches criminal penalties  The Congress in § 9 (c) thus declares no policy as to the
to every violation of such order. transportation of: the excess production. So far as this section is
concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to
Pursuant to the law, Pres. Roosevelt issued EO determine the policy and to lay clown the prohibition, or not to lay
which prohibited “transportation in interstate it down, as he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a
and foreign commerce of petroleum and the crime
products thereof produced or withdrawn  None of the sections under Title I sets a standard or policy
from storage in excess of the amount o The policy declaration contains nothing as to the
permitted by an State law ...” circumstances or conditions in which transportation of
petroleum or petroleum products should be prohibited. The
2
Title I, Sec, 9, (c): "The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn
from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by
fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both."

Title I, Sec 10 (a): authorizes the President “to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes” of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery
Act and providing that “any violation of an such rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed 6 months, or both”
 It also issued another EO authorizing the Sec. general policy declared is "to remove obstructions to the free
of Interior to exercise all powers vested in the flow of interstate and foreign commerce." It is manifest that
President for the purpose of enforcing Sec 9c. this broad outline is simply an introduction of the Act, leaving
This was made pursuant to Sec 10 which the legislative p6licy as to particular subjects to be declared
authorizes the President to prescribe IRRs as and defined, if at all, by the subsequent sections
necessary to carry out the purposes of the law. o The President was not required to ascertain and proclaim the
conditions prevailing in the industry which made the
Pursuant to its powers, the Sec. of Interior prohibition necessary.
issued regulations3 to carry out the o Section 3 provides for the approval by the President of "
President’s orders. codes" for trades or industries. These are to be codes of ' fair
competition" and the authority is based upon certain express
The President issued another EO approving a conditions which require findings by the President. Action
“Code of Fair Competition for Petroleum under § 9 (c) is not made to depend on the formulation of a
Industry” and designated the Sec. of Interior code under § 3. None of these provisions can be deemed to
as administrator. prescribe any limitation of the grant of authority in § 9 (c).
 In Field Clark, the Court dealt with a law which provided: "
Panama (owner of an oil refining plant) and whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied" that the
Amazon (producer having oil and gas leases) Government of any country producing them imposed " duties or
sued to restrain the defendants, federal other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United
officials, from enforcing Regulations IV, V and States" which, in view of the free list established by the Act, the
VII arguing that Sec 9c is unconstitutional President ' may deem to be reciprocally unequal and
delegation of legislative power. District Judge ,unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty," to
granted injunction. Circuit Court of Appeals suspend the free introduction of those articles by proclamation to
reversed the decrees against the federal that effect, and that during that suspension the duties specified by
officials. the section should be levied. The Court upheld.
o As ' the suspension was absolutely required when the
President ascertained the existence of a particular fact," it
could not be said "that in ascertaining that fact and in
issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will,
3
Regulation IV: every producer of petroleum should file a monthly statement under oath with the Division of
Investigations of the Department of the Interior,..
Regulation V: every purchaser, shipper (other than a producer) and refiner of petroleum is required to file a monthly
statement under oath of the residence and post-office address, the place and date of receipt, parties from whom
and the amount of petroleum received…
Regulation VII: all persons embraced in the terms of Sec. 9 (c) of the Act, and the Eos and regulations issued
thereunder, should keep “available for inspection by the Division of Investigations…
 he exercised the function of making laws." "He was the
mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and
declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take
effect."
o Applying that principle, authorizations given .by Congress to
selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the
existence of facts to which legislation is directed, have
constantly been sustained. Moreover, the Congress may not
only give such authorizations to determine specific facts but
may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the
duty to carry out the declared legislative policy, to fill up the
details (Marshall)
o Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised,'
the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation
which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We
think that § 9 (c) goes beyond those limits. As to the
transportation of oil production, in excess of state
permission, the Congress has declared no policy, as
established no standard, has laid down no rule.
o If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a
legislative order of an executive officer, or of a board or
commission, due process requires that it shall appear that
the order is within the authority of the officer, board or
commission, and, if that authority depends on
determinations of fact, those determinations must be shown.
J Cardozo, dissenting
 I deny that such a standard is lacking in respect of the prohibitions
permitted by this section when the act with all its reasonable
implications is considered as a whole. What the standard is becomes
the pivotal inquiry
 There has been no grant to the Executive of any roving commission
to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he
pleases. His act being thus defined, what else must he ascertain in
order to regulate his discretion and bring the power into play? The
answer is not given if we: look to § 9 (c) only, but it comes to us by
implication from a view of other sections where the standards are

Lovina v Residents of municipality complained to the
Moreno Sec. of Public Works and Communications that
Sps. Lovina had blocked the Sapang Bulati
and have it removed under RA 2056. They
were ordered to remove 5 closures of Sapang
Bulati otherwise, the Sec will.
Lovina filed with the CFI to restrain the Sec.
The trial court granted injunction. Secretary
appealed.
Lovina questioned the jurisdiction of the trial
defined.
 If we look to the whole structure of the statute, the test is plainly
this, that the President is to forbid the transportation of the oil
when he believes, in the light of the conditions of the industry as
disclosed from time to time, that the prohibition will tend to
effectuate the declared policies of the act,-not merely his own
conception of its policies, undirected by any extrinsic guide, but the
policies announced by § 1 in the forefront of the statute as an
index to the meaning of everything that follows.'
o Standard: eliminate unfair competitive practices – exists
when " hot oil " is transported in interstate commerce with
the result that law-abiding dealers must compete with
lawbreakers
o Standard: conserve natural resources – disregarding quotas is
wasting oil
o Standard:" promote the fullest possible utilization of the
present productive capacity of industries," and "except as
may be temporarily required" to "avoid undue restriction of
production."
What he does is to inquire into the industrial facts as they exist from time to
time. What was left to the President was to ascertain the conditions
prevailing in the industry, and prohibit or fail to prohibit according to the
effect of those conditions upon the phases of the national policy relevant
thereto.
The Court disagrees.
 The law merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized
obstructions that no private person was anyway not entitled to
make because bed of navigable streams are public property.
 The exercise of the Secretary’s power necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of
the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the
exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions, provided there is hearing which is
expressly provided under the law.
 The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the
court on the ground that RA 2056 is
unconstitutional as it gives the Secretary
authority to pass on issues of whether the
river or stream is public or navigable, whether
a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether
the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
The CFI ruled acc to the location plan that the Bulati creek could not be
considered a navigable stream
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these
acts may affect private, rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial
officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call into
operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners
and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine
appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of
particular laws.
 An example: Bridge cases upholding the constitutionality of a law
that empowered the Sec. of war to take action for the removal or
alteration of bridges unreasonably obstructing navigation.
o The statute itself prescribed the general rule applicable to all
navigable waters, and merely charged the Secretary of War
with the duty of ascertaining in each case, upon notice to the
parties concerned, whether the particular bridge came within
the general rule. Of course, the Secretary's Fnding must be
based upon the conditions as they exist at the time he acts.
 I: American ruling on abatement cannot be done through court
proceedings?
o No. those cases refer to summary abatement without
hearing, and does not apply.
 NO. It does not explain how the plan shows this. The issuance of
Torren title does not confer title to navigable steams nor conclusive
in existence.
 Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in
executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled
to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or
grave abuse of discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in
this case, we agree with appellant that the court below erred in
rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works.
 Judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo
but only ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in
violation of the Constitution or laws and are free from fraud or

Filing in Details
Alegre v. Petitioner has been engaged in production of
Collector of abaca and its exportation. He applied for a
Customs permit to export abaca to England. It was
denied. And he was told that he cannot export
without a certificate of the Fiber
Standardization. He filed with CFI mandamus –
provisions on the Administrative Code for
grading, inspection and certification on fibers
are unconstitutional for granting Fiber
Standardization Board legislative powers.
imposition, and whether they find reasonable support from the
evidence
 Cooley: It may confer an authority in relation to the execution of a
law which may involve discretion, but such authority must be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The Legislature must
declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to
control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be
invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to
which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done
there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to
detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiently both in
provision and execution.
 It must be conceded that the details, spirit and intent of the law
could only be carried into effect through a board or commission.
o Buttfield v. Stranahan: We are of opinion that the statute,
when properly construed, as said by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, but expresses the purpose to exclude the lowest
grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or
unfit for consumption, or presumably so because of their
inferior quality. This, in effect, was the fixing of a primary
standard, and devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury
the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy
declared in the statute."
 ITC, the Legislature has specifically provided for the creation of
"official standards for commercial grades of fibers," and that "the
Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for
the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers," the law provides
in detail for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp and by
whom and how it should be done, and creates the Fiber Board with
power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution.
o In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp
is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected,
graded and baled, and has created a board for that purpose
and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual

Olsen & Co. Petitioner manufactures and exports short filler
Inc. v. cigars from tobacco grown in Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva
Aldanese Vizcaya, La Union, and Pangasinan. Under the Tariff
Act, it has the legal right to export.
Act No 2613 was enacted. It was intended to "to
improve the methods of production and the quality
of tobacco prove the methods of production and the
quality of tobacco in the Philippines and to develop
the export trade therein," and which (1) empowered
the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) to establish
rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and
manufactured tobacco which may be exported into
the US (2) prohibited export of leaf tobacco without
being inspected by the CIR and (3) requires certificate
of origin of the CIR to show that the tobacco to be
exported is standard.
Pursuant to this, CIR promulgated AO 35 “Tobacco
Inspection Regulations” Sec 9 limits the exportation
into the US of Philippine cigars to those manufactured
from long filler tobacco exclusively the product of
the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya.
Petitioner applied for a certificate to export its cigars
but the CIR refused to issue on the ground that “said
cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco
produced exclusively in the provinces of Cagayan,
work.
o That is not a delegation of legislative power. It is nothing
more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber
Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the
very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect,
grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to
do that would have to be vested in a board or commission.
Petitioner: provisions of Act No 2613 and AO No 35 are unconstitutional,
citing the Jones law: "That while this Act provides that the Philippine
Government shall have the authority to enact a Tariff Law the trade
relations between the Islands and the United States shall continue to be
governed exclusively by laws of the Congress of the United States."
Defendants: the Congress is empowered to enact “inspection laws”; and
such is not in conflict with the Constitution of the US
SC: The provisions are unconstitutional
The authority of the CIR to make rules must be founded on some
legislative act, and the must follow and be within the scope of the Act.
 CLAUSE A , Sec 6, Act 2613 limits the power of the CIR to:
Classification, making and packing tobacco as may be necessary
to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and its handling under
sanitary conditions and to the end that leaf tobacco be not
mixed, packed, and marked as of the same quality when it is not
of the same quality when it is not of the same class and origin.
Thus, the rule-making power of the CIR under CLAUSE B to
define the type of leaf and manufactured tobacco to be
exported must be limited to this as well.
 It is shown that Legislature has not defined the standard or
basis on how the CIR should determine the type of leaf or
tobacco that may be exported
Assuming that Legislature could delegate such power, the IRRs issued
must be confined to such power.
 Looking at Sec 9 ,AO 35, Act 2613 is not limited to provinces of
 Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya."
Sy Man v. Collector of Customs (Collector) ordered seizure of
Jacinto two shipments of textiles and sewing machines of Sy
Man. He ordered the delivery of the textiles after
payment of proper customs duties but ordered
forfeiture of the sewing machines in favor of the
Government.
Sy Man sought execution of the decision of the
Collector as the decision had become final after 15
days and not reviewable by the Commissioner.
The Collector contends that the Commissioner is the
head of the Bureau of Customs which had supervision
and control over the Collector, and therefore he had
the power to review and revise decisions of the
collector, even when not appealed pursuant to Memo
Order
Sy Man invokes a section in the RAC which provides
that seizure cases not appealed by the importer
within 15 days becomes final.
Cagayan, Isabel or Nueva Vizcaya. The only power conferred is
to establish general and local rules for classification, marking,
and packing of tobacco and the standard and the type of
tobacco which may be exported to the United States. This
amounts to discrimination which even legislature could not do.
Moreover, the law does not limit the filler to be used.
Defendants cite Buttfield v. Stranahan (tea case)
 This case is different. In that case, there was a standard as to
how the teas would be ascertained through a appointment of a
board of tea experts who would fix and establish the
standards. This was expressly provided by law.
 Moreover, the Act expressly prohibited tea which are inferior
in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption based on the
board of members who shall set the standard based on samples
of tea.
The Commissioner believes that the decisions of the Collector, tho
unappealed does not become final against the Government as long as
it has not been reviewed by him. He does not state the period. Thus,
he claims that the appellant’s claim may be withheld indefinitely. At
least to the importer, this rule is unjust and oppressive.
Second publication
 Sec 551 of the RAC provides that every chief of bureau shall
prescribe forms and regulations…not inconsistent with law to
carry out full effect the laws relating to matters within the
bureau’s JD. However, to become effective, said regulations
must be approved by the Dept. Head and published in the OG.
 ITC, the failure of approval and publication renders it
ineffective.
Furthermore, it must not be inconsistent with law. Thus, if no power to
review under the law, even if published = no effect.
 Sec 1393 provides that in cases of assessment of duties, even if
the importer fails to protest, the Commissioner may order
reliquidation if he believes the Collector’s decision was wrong.
This is further subject to the review of the Dept. Head.
 Sy Man sought to declare (1) void the portion of
Memo Order which provides that decisions of the
Collector are subject to review by the Commissioner,
whether appealed or not and (2) to order the
Collector delivery of his textile shipments.
People v. Several individuals were charged in the municipal
Macaren court for violating the Fisheries Admin Order when
they resorted in electro fishing.
o First, the section does not include seizure cases. There is
no similar provision under seizure cases.
o Second, it never practice to have unappealed seizure
cases sent to the Commissioner’s office. The Memo was
made because of the CoCs who merely submit reports of
the seizure without transmitting the record of the
proceedings.
 Under 1380, in a seizure case, the Collector transmits all the
papers to the Commissioner only after the importer notifies
him of his desire to have the case reviewed.
o If this is true, then a case for seizure not appealed ends
at the Collector
 Under 1388, the owner may pay the fine imposed in case of
seizure, or pay the value of the property in case of forfeiture
and have the properties surrendered.
o Thus, it follows that it is the power and right of
importers to end the case at the Collector’s level.
It is argued that if the Commissioner does not have that power of
review, then in cases where the Collector commits a blunder prejudicial
to the Government, in through fraud or collusion, the Government
cannot protect itself.
 The law presumes that the Collector acts honestly and correctly.
It is often the case that if he is wrong, it is in favor of the
government.
 To protect the Government, 1378 requires the Collector to
immediately notify the Commissioner and Auditor General. If
the seizure is important, the Commissioner may order the
Collector to withhold action on the seizure.
 Before any action is done by the Collector, the Commissioner
or President still has supervision and control over its actions.
 However, if the Government deems it necessary to review or
revise decisions by Commissioner in unappealed seizure cases,
they go request to Legislature.
[irrelevant] The CFI assumes it has JD that electrofishing is punishable
under Sec 83 of the Fisheries law which provides – any violation of law
or rules and regulations promulgated subjects the offender to a fine of

They filed a MTQ. The case was dismissed.
Prosecution appealed, CFI affirmed.
Lower Court: electro fishing is not obnoxious or
poisonous substance under Sec 11 of the Fisheries
Law. Since the law does not prohibit it, it cannot be
considered unlawful.
Note: The law does not really prohibit electrofishing,
however the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources promulgated Fisheries Admin Order 84
which prohibited electro fishing.
200
 This is incorrect. The Administrative Order imposes a fine of 500
thus the Sec. and Commissioner of Fisheries prescribed their
own penalty.
 We raise this because 500 falls within the concurrent JD of the
CFI and municipal court. Thus, the order of dismissal by the
municipal court was directly appealable to the SC. The CFI order
affirming the municipal order is void.
Prosecution argues that Admin Order 84 was not issued under Sec 11
of the Fisheries law. He cites other provisions (1) rule making power of
the Dept. Sec. (2) functions of the Commissioner to enforce the
Fisheries Law and execution of the law consistent with its purpose (3)
declared national policy to encourage, promote, conserve our fishing
resources (4) Sec 83 any other violation of the Fisheries law is subject
to a fine of 200.
 First, Sec 83 is not the same penalty, as already discussed.
 Second, The Fisheries law does not expressly prohibit
electrofishing. There is nothing in the law which punishes
electrofishing.
 It does not fall under “other violations” because the penalty is
also different.
However, at present electrofishing is already punished under PD 704.
An examination of the rule-making power of the executive officials and
admin agencies, particularly the Sec. of Agriculture and National
Resources under the Fisheries law shows that he exceeded his authority.
 Admin agencies are clothed with rule-making power because
the lawmaking body finds it impossible and impracticable to
anticipate and provide for all multifarious situations
encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law, and conform to the standards the law prescribes.
 Admin regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such, the law itself cannot be

Toledo v. CSC Atty. Toledo (59 y/o) was appointed as by COMELEC
Chairman as Manager of the Education and
Information Dept. of the COMELEC.
His appointment papers were endorsed to the CSC
however no prior request for exemption for the age
limit/prohibition under CSRPRP was secured.
Therefore, COMELEC declared the appointment void
ab initio. Petitioner appealed to the CSC. – voidable
Certiorari
extended. The rule-making power must be confined to the
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted.
 The Sec. of Natural Resources has rule-making powers, however
it must be in conformity of law. Admin regulations issued by the
Dept. Head in conformity with law have the force of law.
 Art 7 NCC provides: admin or executive acts, orders,
regulations shall be valid only when not contrary to the laws or
Constitution.
 A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative
agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into
effect a law already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An
administrative agency can have only the administrative or
policing powers expressly or by necessary implication
conferred upon it.
 To declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be
punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it
may not be delegated to any other body or agency.
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly
in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was
issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
Therefore, the Sec. and Commissioner are powerless to penalize it.
History
 RA 2260 is the organic law of the CSC. One of its functions was
to: "with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend,
and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of . . . the Civil Service Law,"
 The Commission adopted rules known as the Revised CSR which
were published.
 It would be noted however that RA 2260 contained no
prohibition on appointing 57 years old and above; or any age
limitation on employment. It was purely the creation of the CSC
 Later PD 807 was enacted establish the independent CSC and
the new commission adopted the CSRPAP
 TLDR: The prohibition on age not in the organic law

CIR v. CA In Aug 22, 1986, President enacted EO 41 which
declared a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income
taxes, later amended to include estate, donors’ and
business tax for years 1981-1985.
ROH Auto Products sought to avail the amnesty and
filed its Tax Amnesty Return and paid its
corresponding due filed on Oct-Nov, 1986 for fiscal
Petitioner contends that the Resolution was invalid since CSRPAP was
not published, thus ineffective
 The CSRPAP was never published
 This was admitted by the Chairman of the Commission. It was
also attested by the National Printing Office.
 RA 2260 and its old IRRs cannot be considered valid and
effective as PD 807 was intended to be controlling. It was mean
to supersede the old implementing rules. Thus rendered it
functus officio.
It may be assumed that the President was aware of the provision on 57-
year old prohibition however when PD 807 was promulgated, he did not
insert the provision. This shows the intent to discontinue to provisions.
 In any case, the provision is not valid. It is not in the statute. The
power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to
implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to
carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived
omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course,
the law itself can not be extended; said regulations 'cannot
amend an act of Congress.'"
 The prohibition also an act of supererogation on the part of the
CSC since it has no relation to the provision of law to be carried
into effect. It was an extension
 Moreover, they were never published.
 Assuming it is valid, it can only apply to EEs under the
supervision of the CJ of the SC or the President as these are only
two officials mentioned as having to give consent to the
employment of said persons.
WON Memorandum Order is valid
 The authority of the Minister of Finance (now the Secretary of
Finance), in conjunction with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the
effective enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be
controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and
regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings,
ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts.
 years Sept 30, 1981-1982.
Nevertheless, the CIR denied his request to have the
deficiency tax notice cancelled in view of the tax
amnesty, on the ground that Revenue Memo Order
No 4-85 construed the amnesty to cover only
assessments issued by the BIR prior to promulgation
of the EO (Aug 22, 1986)
The denial was appealed to the CTA. The CTA ruled in
favor of the tax payer. The CA affirmed.
Land Bank v. Several landowners had their landholding acquired
CA by the DAR under the CARL. They were aggrieved by
the valuation and payment of compensation pursuant
to CARL.
The private respondents questioned DAR A.O. No 6
and sought to expedite the summary proceedings in
determining their just compensation and for
Landbank to deposit in cash or in bonds the amounts
reserved, earmarked and deposited in trust accounts
and to allow them to withdraw.
Respondents: AO is issued without JD because it
permits opening of trust accounts by Landbank, in
Much more fundamental than either of the above, however, is
that all such issuances must not override, but must remain
consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply
and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are
intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the
law.
The real issue is whether the position by the Commissioner coincides
with the meaning and intent of EO 41.
 EO 41 was initially limited to Oct 31, 1986. This was extended to
Dec 6 and later its coverage expanded to include estate and
donors.
 If the law really intended to exclude 1981-1985, the law could
have simply provided for it. The tax amnesty is in the nature of
a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases
specifically excepted by it.
 It mut be remembered that when it was granted, there was
civil disobedience, martial law. Thus, government really
intended a broad tax amnesty.
WON the deficiency assessments were extinguished by availment of EO
41
WON respondent has overcome the presumption of validity of the
assessments
DAR: “deposit” under the RA merely refers to the act of depositing and
does not exclude opening a trust account as form of deposit. Opening
a trust account is a form of deposit
 NO. It is explicit that deposit be made in “Cash” or “LBP bonds.”
The law is clear. It cannot even be inferred that deposit can be
made in other form. If the intent was to include “trust account”
it should have made it express.
 The effect of administrative construction is not absolute and
may be set aside if there is error in law or lack of JD. It must be
stressed that in issued IRRs, they must be only for carrying out
the provisions of the law.
 The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this
is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and
 lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible
bank designated by the DAR. They argue that the
compensation is merely earmarked, deposited in
trust or reserved despite the mandate of
compensation must be paid before taking.
DAR: AO is valid exercise of rule-making power. The
issuance of a Certificate of Deposit is substantial
compliance with the compensation for the land.
GMCR v. Bell BellTel filed with NTC (a second) Application for
Telecom issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity – to install telephone lines.
Deputy Commissioner Dumlao found that the
proposal was feasible. Agreeing with the findings of
the investigations, the Deputy Commissioners
Dumlao and Perez signified their approval on the
financial capability and technical feasibility. In view
thereof, a working draft was being prepared.
While a decision in a quasi-judicial body was entitled
promulgation through a vote of majority, petitioners
claimed that it was practice and policy in the NTC
that the exclusion authority to sign and validate all
orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is with
the Chairman Kintanar.
amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law.
 Clearly, DAR went over its limits to enact rules.
WON they can be allowed to withdraw the amount deposited in trust
pending final resolution of the valuation
 YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the
amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for
their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's
valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been
deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain.
 Hence, we End it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and Enal compensation
under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners'
right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both
situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and
immediately compensated.
Commissioner Kintanar is not the NTC. NTC is a collegial body requiring
a majority vote of 2/3 to validly decide a case.
 The Court cited the CA. When NTC took effect, it did not
promulgate Rules of Procedure thus the Rules of its predecessor,
the Board of Communications (BOC) were adopted. In the
meantime however, Sec of Justice’s Opinion on whether NTC
was collegial body or not was asked. The Puno Opinion stated
that NTC was not however, this is not correct. Under the BOC’s
rules, a decision of 2/3 was required. Thus, even before NTC
was born, it has been consistently been a collegial body.
 If the intent was not to establish a collegial body, it should
have constituted a 3-man collegial body or a commission. The
fact that deputy was used to designate the other members does
not go against its collegiality. The collegiality of the NTC cannot
be broken by the mere nominal designation of the
membership thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such
nominal designations are without functional implications and

Due to the inaction of the NTC after several Motion to
Promulgate, BellTel filed a Petition with the SC.
The SG took the position of BellTel --
The case was referred to the CA who ruled in favor of
BellTel
Assoc. of Assoc. of Phil Coco Desiccators (APCD) sought to
Philippine enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to applicants for
Coconut establishment of disccated coconut processing plants.
Desiccators It alleged that issuance of licenses would violate A.O.
v. PCA 02 as the applications were seeking to operate in
congested areas.
While the case was pending, Resolution was issued by
the PCA Board withdrawing the PCA from regulation
of coconut product processing industry. It continued
registration of coconut product processors however it
was limited to monitoring their volumes of production
and administration of quality standards. It then issued
certificates of registration to those who wished to
operate disccated coconut processing plants. This
was allegedly pursuant to the State policy to promote
free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations
and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes.
APCD appealed the resolution to the OP but no reply
are designed merely for the purpose of administrative
structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC.
On Memo Cir. No 1-1-93
 [A]dministrative regulations derive their validity from the
statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement.
Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null
and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law.
 At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate
the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the
selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
Petitioners, in paranoia, argue that CA actually ordered them to meet
en banc and grant the application
 No. To the propriety of mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial
agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for
adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As to how
this discretion is to beexercised, however, is a realm outside the
o0ce of the special civil action of mandamus.
Exhaustion of Admin Remedies – since there was a pending review with
the OP
 IT does not apply. Only decisions of admin agencies in quasi-
judicial functions is subject to the doctrine. This was issued in
pursuance of quasi-legislative authority.
 Even though, it was justified in filing since OP hasn’t been
replying for 2 months now.
The Court first explained the history of the PCA
 PCA was established to promote the Coconut industry through
regulation. Initially, there was overproduction in coconut
industry and lowered the quality of coconut exports. Thus,
initially, there was a policy to phase out plants. The
establishment of new plants was subject only to certain
conditions.
 In 1987, it adopted a policy of deregulation due to the increase
in demand again and authorized new DCN plants to be opened.
Under AO 002, new plants was authorized to be open in non-
congested areas.
yet.
APCD filed a petition for certiorari against PCA to
invalidate Board Resolution and certificates of
registration issued thereunder on the ground that it
was issued beyond PCA’s power to adopt and compel
said administrative agency to comply with law.
 Thus, the PCA was given the authority — "to formulate and
adopt a general program of development for the coconut and
other palm oils industry"
The PCA disregarded their legislative purpose. The PCA limits its
functions only to monitoring. In case of violation of standards, there
would be nothing to do. It was their duty “To formulate and adopt a
general program of development for the coconut industry”
 PCA now relies entirely on competition to weed out those unfit.
This could repeat the 1982 situation where free enterprise
ruined the market.
The issue is not whether PCA has power to adopt this resolution to
carry out its mandate but whether it can renounce its power to
regulation.
 By limiting the purpose of registration to merely "monitoring
volumes of production [and] administration of quality
standards" of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect
abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market
forces how the coconut industry will develop.
Dissent: in the same way restrictions were imposed in 1982, and relax
in 1987, they can be lifted now without prejudice.
 However, how can they do this when license is not any more
required? Licensing is the mechanism to regulate. If there is
overproduction, PCA cannot do anything.
 Our Constitution has repudiated laissez-faire. Any change in
policy must be made by legislature. The regulatory system was
set up by law thus it is beyond the administrative agency part
to dismantle.
Romero, dissent
 The Board resolution had basis, Sec 3a PD 232: To formulate
and adopt a general program of development for the coconut
and other palm oil industry."
 PCA did not exceed it limits. Considering the responsibilities and
powers assigned to the PCA, as well as its underlying policy,
namely, that "the economic well-being of a major part of the

Ople v. AO 308 National Computerized Identification
Torres Reference System was enacted which established the
ID Reference system among basic services and social
security providers through Biometric and computer
data.
Under the AO, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies without the ID card.
population depends to a large extent on the viability of the
industry and its improvement in the areas of production,
processing and marketing,"
 The PCA after it conducts its studies, adopted the policy of
deregulation to further enhance the coconut industry
competition, since any continuation of the restrictive regulation
in the industry would have detrimental effects.
 Agency is given broad discretion to determine what would be a
general program of development. This include a program
where it lessened its regulatory programs, just like in 1987.
The Resolution clearly recognizes its principal function is registration
Petitioner claims that AO is not a mere administrative order but a law.
It usurps legislative power.
Respondents: AO implements the legislative policy of Admin Code
1987
 AO 308 is not proper for an administrative order. An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law
and sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
legislative policy.
 AO 308 does not implement the admin code. The Code is
general law. AO 308 establishes for the first time the National
Computerized ID Reference System which requires adjustment
of various state policies – primacy of national security, privacy
interest, choice of policy. As said administrative order redefines
the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the
State as well as the line that separates the administrative power
of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that
should be covered by law
Dissent: AO is not a law; it confers no rights, no duty, no protection, no
office.
 No. It creates the ID law where citizens will be refused basic
services without it. People will have a difficult time exercising
their rights.
  Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here
that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for
the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to
respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not
an independent source of power to make laws
Nevertheless, it violates the right to privacy
 It presents a clear and present danger. The AO does not state
whether the data is limited to biological information alone for
ID purposes. In fact, the SG said that it will be used to generate
population data. The indefiniteness of the AO can give the
government roving authority.
 People’s transactions will be recorded. The information base will
get bigger the more it is used. The law does not say who shall
control and have access to the data.
 Our present laws do not have present safeguards to protect us
from these dangers.
 Test of reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy –
o Whether by his conduct, the individuals has exhibited an
expectation of privacy
o Whether this expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable
Kapunan dissenting
 To emphasize, the new identification reference system is
created to streamline the bureauracy, cut the red tape and
ultimately achieve administrative efficiency. The project,
therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely
within the ambit of the Chief Executive’s administrative power.
A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President pursuant to the
quasilegislative powers expressly granted to him by law and in
accordance with his duty as administrative head.
 No actual case or controversy. The encroachment on the right to
privacy is groundless. It is mere surmise and speculation.
Mendoza
 The issue is not really whether AO 308 violaes the right of

PBC v. CIR PBC requested with the CIR for tax credit representing
overpayment of taxes it incurred in 1987. It also filed
a claim for refund or creditable taxes withheld by
their lessees from property rentals in 1988.
Pending the investigation of CIR, PBC filed a petition
for review the CTA. The CTA denied the request for
tax refund or credit on the ground that it was filed
beyond the 2-year reglementary period. The claim
for refund was also denied on the assumption that it
was automatically credited by PBCom against its tax
payment in the succeeding year. These
pronouncements by the CTA were affirmed in toto by
the CA
privacy. The question is whether the establishment of the
Identification Reference System will not result in the compilation
of massive dossiers on individuals which, beyond their use for
identification, can become instruments of thought control. So
far, the text of A.O. No. 308 affords no basis for believing that
the data gathered can be used for such sinister purpose.
There is no basis that the ID of individuals will be used for illegal
purposes. Everything is pre-mature
Whether the CA was correct in denying the tax refund or tax credits on
the ground of prescription?
Petitioner:
 Claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by
prescription. Rev. Memo Cir. States that overpaid income taxes
are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the
tax code and taxpayers may claim refund with the BIR within 10
years.
 Petitioner claims that the government is estopped.
 The rulings of the CIR have no retroactive effect if prejudicial to
taxpayers, citing the NIRC
Respondent:
 The two year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date of
filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return, usually done in Apr
15 following the close of the calendar year. Since the FAITR was
supposed to be filed in 1986, the latter had only until 1988 to
seek relief from court.
Claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised within the time
fixed by law. Sec 230 of the NRC provides the taxpayer may file a claim
for refund or credit with the CIR, within 2 years after payment of tax,
before any suit with the CTA is commenced. The two-year period should
be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return and final
payment of the tax for the year.
When the CIR issued RMC 7-85, the BIR did not simply interpret the
law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by
Congress. The Revenue memorandum circulars are considered

China China Bank and CBC properties were granted by the
Banking Corp Home Development Mutual Fund certificates of
v. Members waiver due to the “Superior Retirement Plan”
of the Board pursuant to the Home Development Mutual Fund
of HDMF (HDMF) Law where employers who have employees-
housing plans may register for annul certification for
waiver/certification for participation in the Home
Development Mutual Fund
administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general
interpretations of tax laws). It is widely accepted that the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose
duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts.
Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored
if judicially found to be erroneous. It has been held that IRRs issued by
admin officials to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the law.
Further, the State cannot be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. Since the interpretation is contrary to law, its
interpretation cannot be given weight, since it would be amending the
law.
Art. 8 of the NCC provides judicial decisions interpreting statutes form
part of the legal system. However, administrative decisions do not
enjoy that level of recognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureau
head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with a shield against judicial
action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong
interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or
overrule the same.
The non-retroactivity of ruling by the CIR is not applicable in this case
because the nullity of the RMC was declared by the courts, not the CIR.
Lastly, a claim for refund is in the nature of a claim for exemption and
should be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer
Petitioners:
 The Amendment and Guidelines are void for being inconsistent
with the enabling law, PD 1752 as amended by RA 7742 which
merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption for coverage,
the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan or
a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans.
 Certiorari is correct since what is questioned is not the orders
denying the application but the validity of the Amendment and
Guidelines.
RA 7742 was enacted. The HDMF Board issued the
Amendment to the IRRs of RA 7742 and pursuant to
the Amendment, the Board issued HDMF Cir. No 124-
B – the Guidelines. Under the Amendment and
Guidelines, a company must have a
provident/retirement and housing plan superior to
that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled
to exemption/waiver from fund coverage
CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of the waiver
of coverage from the fund but the applications were
disapproved as the retirement plan was not superior
to Pag-IBIG Fund. Thus, Petitioner filed with the RTC
and sought to annul the Amendment and Guidelines
alleging that it was issued in excess of its rule-making
power.
Respondents
 There is no question of law. The interpretation of “and/or” is not
a purely legal question and is susceptible of administrative
determination. In denying the application, the Board was
exercising its quasi-judicial function
The remedy is correct
 Certiorari is the correct remedy to question the validity of the
challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
 Further, it falls under the exception to exhaustion of
administrative remedies: (1) where the question in dispute is
purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is
patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction
On the merits..
 The law provides as a condition for exemption from coverage,
the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan,
and/or a superior housing plan, and not the existence of both
plans.
 Respondents contend that “and/or” can be used
interchangeably and not together. It is the option of the Board
to choose.
 The legal meaning of “and/or” should be taken in its ordinary
meaning. If the law intended to use “and”, it should’ve used
“and”. Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual
certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the
plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The
law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is
considered as sufficient basis of the grant of an exemption. To
require the existence of both plans would radically impose a
more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly
envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word
"or" in the implementing rules the respondent Board has

GMA v. 5 petitions question the Constitutionality of Sec 9(a)
COMELEC COMELEC Res. No 9615 which limits TV and radio ads
of candidates and political parties as violative of free
press and impairs the right to suffrage and
information
 National elections – 120 and 180 mins
 Local election – 60 and 90 mins
At issue is the proper interpretation of Sec 6, RA 9006
(Fair Elections Act). In the previous elections, (07 and
10), Sec 6 has been interpreted to mean that a
candidate is entitled to a specified number of minutes
on a “per-station” basis however in the 2013
Elections, COMELEC changed the interpretation of
airtime limits
exceeded its authority.
 The Board cannot restrict the law’s meaning. It is well settled
that the rules and regulations which are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency.
It may be argued that requiring both will strengthen the law and make it
more effective, it still cannot go beyond the law.
Past Elections and Airtime Limits
 Sen. Cayetano alleged: COMELEC effected change without
explaining any basis therefor and no data to support such
change. COMELEC merely maintained that such action “is meant
to level the playing field between moneyed candidates and
those who do not have enough resources”
 Based on the public hearing, Chairman Brillantes argues that
since the Constitution allows the COMELEC to regulate elections,
it should be within their discretion to do so.
COMELEC is duty bound to come up with a reasonable basis for
changing the interpretation and implementation
 COEMLEC is authorized to enforce election laws however, it
cannot exercise its powers without limitations – or reasonable
basis. It does have discretion, but it must be exercised within
the bounds and intent of the law.
 Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a
reasonable and rational basis for any changes in those rules by
which they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a
radical departure from the previous ones.
COMELEC went beyond the authority granted by law in adopting
“aggregate” basis in determination of allowable airtime
 There is evidence to show that the intent was it should be “per
basis”. The previous provision (political ad ban), no candidate
was allowed to directly buy or procure his broadcast or print
campaign ads, and had to get them through COMELEC. RA 9006
relieved them of that restriction and allowed him to broadcast
time subject to the limitation set out by law.
  In Lokin, COMELEC explained that they merely reworded and
rephrased the statutory provision and it did not persuade the
Court. Here, they replaced it with its own idea of what the law
should be. This is not within its authority.
Sec 9a of COMELEC Res. No. 9615 on airtime limits goes against free
speech
 The provision comes up with an unreasonable basis for
determining allowable airtime which candidates and political
parties may avail of. Petitioners show the practical effect of the
regulation leaves candidates with barely 30 secs of airtime per
network per day; and this would make it difficult to make known
his qualifications and stand on public issued. The Court agrees.
The reason – leveling the playing field – is not CSI that would
justify the restriction. Court takes notice that there are a lot of
languages among citizens across the country.
Sec 9(a) Res. 9615 is violative of the right to suffrage
 They have to be informed for their intelligent exercise !
Res. 9615 requires prior hearing before adoption
 Res 9615 was promulgated on Jan 15, 2013 and then public
hearing on Jan 31 to explain what it did. This renders the new
regulation questionable.
 The new regulation is a radical change. There is a need for
adequate and effective means by which they may be adopted,
disseminated and implemented. It is not enough that they be
published, or explained.
 When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature,
its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for
it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to
be heard,
 For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with
 Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regard to the
new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective and
ineffectual.
Res No 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the
broadcast industry
 Court does not agree with GMA that the Reporting requirement
for COMELEC is unreasonable. There is no absolute duty to do
monitoring in real time. GMA exaggerates when it claims that
the non-existent duty would require them to hire and train 39k
personnel.
 Prior notice is not prior restriaint. It is a reasonable requirement
to ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal
opportunities to promote their respective candidacies. The
change of “prior approval” to “prior notice” is more of a content
neutral regulation designed to assist the poll ody to undertake
its job of ensuring fair elections.
 Right to reply is reasonable. ?

Brion
 I concur with the result, but it should be struck down on due
process grounds only.
 Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and,
as this label connotes, are designed to implement a law or
primary legislation by providing the details of the law. A subset
of legislative rules are interpretative rules that are intended to
interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under
which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or
objective is merely to construe the administered statute.
Understood along these lines, it becomes easy to grasp that the
requirements of prior notice and hearing, unless expressly
required by legislation or by the rules, do not apply to them.
 Under the Admin Code, the agent should publish or circulate
notices of rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views. However, this provision is admittedly
directory, not mandatory.
 ITC, COMELEC Res. 9615 is a legislative rule which directly

Maxima The Unit was originally owned by Segovia.
Realty
Management Parkway entered into a contract “to buy and sell” on
v. Parkway installments of Unit 702 for P3M with Maxima. It was
Real Estate agreed that failure to pay any installments will entitle
Development Parkway to forfeit the amounts.
Corp.
Maxima defaulted but was given grace period with a
balance of 1.8M.
Parkway executed a Deed of Assignment, assigning
its right in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima
for the latter to use it as security to obtain a loan with
RCBC to pay the 1.8M balance. Further, Segovia
agreed that it would directly transfer the condo unit
directly to Maxima on the condition of payment of
transfer fees of 50k.
However, Maxima failed to pay the transfer fee to
impacts on the petitioners. More importantly, the perceived
adverse effect of the reduction on the electorate. Given its
constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all election
laws and regulations with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections, the COMELEC had a
duty to be fair and due process requires the prior notice and
hearing to be complied.
 Brion does not agree with the ponencia that the COMELEC
resolution does not have statutory basis and that there is a
violation of various constitutional rights.
o For a legislative rule to be valid, all that is required is that
the regulation should be germane (i.e., appropriate and
relevant) to the objects and purposes of the law, and
that the regulation should not contradict, but should
conform with, the standards prescribed by the law.
There is textual basis in COMELEC’s interpretation, by virtue of verbal
egis.
Receipt of Board Decision– Apr 19, 1994.
Filed with the OP – May 10, 1994
SGMC Realty v. OP: The period to appeal the decision of the Board of
HLURB to the OP is 15 days from receipt, pursuant to PD 957. The Court
ruled that the 30-day period to appeal to the OP from the decision of
the HLURB under 1997 HLURB Rules of Procedure is not applicable
because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the OP
such as PD 597 and PD 1344 must prevail over the HLURB Rules of
Procedure.
If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a
shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the
thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line
with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or
regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the
provisions of the enabling law
ITC, Maxima had until May 4, 1994 to appeal. The appeal filed on May
 Segovia thus it did not effect transfer of the
condominium. Since Parkway was not paid the
balance, it cancelled the agreement to buy and sell
and the Deed of Assignment.
Maxima filed with the HLURB a complaint for specific
performance to enforce the buy and sell agreement.
The HLURB sustained the nullification of the Deed of
Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund the 1.1M
initial payment. Upon appeal before the Broad, it
ordered forfeiture of 50% payments already paid. The
appeal before the OP was dismissed for being filed
out of time.
Lokin v. CIBAC PL participated in the 2007 elections and
COMELEC submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen (1) Villanueva (2)
Lokin (3) Cruz-Gonzales (4) Tugna (5) Galang.
However, CIBAC, through Villanueva, (certificate of
nomination, substitution, ad amendment) withdrew
nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang and
substituted Borje. Members of the CIBAC averred that
Lokin and Tugma were not among the nominees
presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its
proclamation rally.
Later, CIBAC, through counsel, filed with COMELEC en
banc a motion seeking to proclaim Lokin as its second
nominee. It asserted that based on the total votes,
CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and Looking to be
proclaimed winner.
Notwithstanding Villanueva filing the certification of
nomination, substitution, and amendment, COMELEC
failed to act. Thus, Villanueva filed a petition to
confirm said certificate.
10 is beyond the period.
The remedy is correct.
 This case is neither an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto. He is not seeking to unseat a nominee or does it raise
the issue of ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the
following
requisites to be valid:
 Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
 It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
Legislature;
 It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
 It must be reasonable.
The first requisite is present. COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to
enforce all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, recall. It is also charged to
promulgated IRRs implementing the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC
issued Reso. No 7804 (basis of CIBAC to change its nominees) pursuant
to its power under the Constitution, BP 881 and the PL-System Act.
Thus, it met the first requisite.

Later, COMELEC proclaimed CIBAC as one of the PL-
winners. COMELEC issued another resolution that
CIBAC among others is entitled to an additional seat.
Pursuant to this, CIBAC Sec. Gen informed Sec Gen of
HoR for Lokin to be formally sworn.
COMELEC en banc resolved to approve the
withdrawal of Lokin Tugna and Galang as nominees.
The by laws empowered Pres. Villanueva to oversee
and direct corporate activities of CIBAC including the
act of submitting the party’s intent to participate in
the elections. Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed official
second nominee.
Lokin filed for Mandamus
The third requisite is met. The resolution underwent procedural
necessities of publication and dissemination.
The 2nd and 4th requisite is not met. The delegated authority must be
property exercised. Sec 8, RA 7941 provides that no change of names
or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed except (1)
nominee dies, (2) withdraws in writing his nomination (3) becomes
incapacitated. The use of “no” signifies it is a prohibitive law and
mandatory.
 Clearly, Sec 8 takes away the right to change its nominees or
alter the order in the list of its nominees’ names after it has
been submitted to COMELEC. COMELEC can rightly presume that
the submitted list that it reflects the true will of the PL-
organization.
 COMELEC is not concerned with whether the list contains the
real intended nominees of the PL organization, but only
determines whether the nominees pass all the requirements
under law and whether the nominees possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
 Allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees
through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of
the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees
circumvents the voters' demand for transparency. The
lawmakers' exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has
eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.
The exceptions under RA 7941 are exclusive. Sec 13, of Res. No 7804
expands the exceptions.
 Exceptions are subject to the strict rule of construction; any
doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and
against the exception.
 The COMELEC, has neither the authority nor the license to
expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to
implement thereby. Admin IRRs adopted by a particular
department of Government must be in harmony with the law.
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has

Bartolome v John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar
SSS Maritime Services. Hence, he was under the
government’s Employees’ Compensation Program.
However, he got into an accident and died.
Bernadina Bartolome, the biological mother, filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 262 with the SSS.
The SSS denied the claim. She appealed before the
ECC which affirmed the SSS ruling.
 They were denied claim as Bartolome could
no longer be considered a beneficiary under
PD 6264 since John had been adopted by
Bartolome’s great grandfather, Cornelio
Colcol.
 Hence, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s
primary beneficiary.
 This was based on its Amended Rules on
Employee’s Compensation.
ECC: Neither would Bartolome qualify as a secondary
4
that beneficiaries are the “;dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary bene3ciaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary bene3ciary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit.”
added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it has merely
reworded and rephrase the statutory provision's phraseology.
 No. It did not, it established an entirely new grounds not found
in the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list
organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination
already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 did not allow to be done.
Thus, Sec 13, Res. No 7804 – to the extent that it allows the withdrawal
of nominee already submitted – is invalid. COMELEC's approval of
CIBAC's petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBAC's substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007
resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
The EEC overlooked the fact that the adoptive father is already dead.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law
 NCC Sec 7 provides: Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution
 Under Art. 167(j), LC, beneficiaries refer to the dependent
spouse and, in their absence, the dependent parents,
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries
 Pursuant to this, ECC issued the Amended Rules on EEs’
Compensation interpreting the provision as “legitimate
parents”
 The Amended Rules deviate from the LC. “Parents” in
“dependent parents” under the LC should be taken in its general
sense. When the law does not distinguish, so do you. Plainly,
"dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of
support or assistance.
The provision in the Amended Rules on EEs’ Compensation is against
 beneficiary if it were proven that Cornelio passed
away, as the dependent parent referred to as
beneficiaries refer to legitimate parents.
Petitioner qualifies as a dependent parent
5
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. — If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal
custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
shall be extinguished.
the EPC as it is unreasonable
 EPC permits classification however it must pass the test of
reasonableness: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally
to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification
 ITC, there is no reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. It is not germane to the purpose of the
law. We see no pressing government concern or interest that
requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of
unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the
law on the other.
 ECC tried to equate dependency and legitimacy in the exercise
of P.A. Thus, had the petitioner had not given John up, she
could’ve claimed the benefits.
 Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate
parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the ECP.
 The ECC overlooked that when the adoptive parent died less
than 3 years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor.
This is a significant fact because In that case, P.A. reverted to
the biological parents.
 The Court applied Sec 20, RA 85525 by analogy insofar as
restoration of custody is concerned. The manner herein of
terminating the adopter's parental authority, unlike the grounds
for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and
obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the
consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee,
who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between
the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated
 Based on the Sec 190 FC, and Art 984, NCC, it shows that the
biological parent retains their rights of succession to the estate
of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do
not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
 There are also facts to show petitioner’s dependence on John
o Petitioner and John frequently went to their residence.
hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed
actually exercised the same, and that they lived together
under one roof
John named the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for benefits under
RA 8282.