Director of Piadeco applied for registration as
Forestry v. private wood land with the Bureau of
Munoz Forestry. His application was granted
and Certificate was from Dec 1963 to
Dec 1964 thus he conducted logging
operations.
Director of Forestry issued an order
cancelling his registration on the
ground of violation of forestry rules and
regulations and was asking desist in
logging operations.
Piacedo filed with the CFI a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the
Director of Forestry. Later the CFI would
ruled that Piadeco was not violating
forestry rules and regulations and thus
granted the preliminary injunction.
After judgement, Piadeco applied for a
renewal of its Certificate of Private
Woodland registration. The Director of
Forestry denied it was its land was not
registerable under Forestry Admin
Order No. 12-2, effective Jan 1, 1963.
Nevertheless, Piadeco continued its
logging operations. By this time, his
logging activities were gaining national
attention. The Sec of ND directed the
Chief of Staff of AF to impound and
seize the logs cut by Piadeco and others
conducting illegal operations.
Piadeco sought a writ of execution
Is Piadeco’s title registrable with the Bureau of Forestry?
 RAC "SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private
owner of land containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products
shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of
such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be
furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same
shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may require. Upon
application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any
such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof
with a view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry."
 A.O. 12-2 7. Titles that may be registered. — Only the following titles
covering lands containing timber, Frewood and other minor forest products
may be registered under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code; (a) Administrative titles granted by the present
Government, such as homestead patent, free patent, and sales patent; and
(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration
Act (Act 496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as
amended)
 Piadeco: the amendment of AO 12-1 omitted one of the titles registerable
under Sec 1829 – title granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the islands and
duly recognized as valid titles under existing laws."
o RAC 1829 doesn’t specify what can be registered
o It contravenes the Opinion of the Attorney Generay, Secretary of
Interior, and Director of Forestry
Forestry AO 12-2 has force and effect of law and promulgated pursuant to law.
 1817: empowers the Bureau of Forestry to issue regulations deemed
expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of public
forests as to insure continues supply of timber and forest.
 Jurisprudence says: when Congress authorizes promulgation of IRRs to
implement a legislation, "[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should
be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction with it but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes." AO 12-2 is an administrative regulation germane to the objects
and purposes of the law.
from the earlier CFI decision which was
granted. Notwithstanding however, the
forestry officials still refused to ermit
Piadeco to haul its logs. The officials
averred that Piadeco’s registration
already expired and despite the
expiration, Piadeco continued illegal
logging resulting in seizure of its logs.
The judge still came out with an order
that the property is still registered with Therefore, he cannot be considered a private woodland owner for registration. He
the Bureau of Forestry,
notwithstanding that its license (?)
expired. The judge considered the
certification by Utleg that all timber cut
may be transported by Pideco. Thus the
Judge directed the forestry officials and
AFP members to allow Piadeco to haul
its logs. This led to the first case filed by
the Director of Forestry and Chief of
Staff to annul the order of execution
Later, Piadeco wrote to the Director of cancellation by the Director of Forestry
Forestry a request to grant it authority
to cut, gather and remove timber from
its ‘private woodland’ subject to
payment of regular forest charges and
300% surcharge for unlawful cutting in
accordance with Sec 266 of the Tax
Code. Acting Director Utleg replied that
he will consider any cutting and removal
from the land illegal and subject to the
provisions of the NIRC. Piadeco took this
as a cue and thus resumed logging
operations. Utleg notified the Task
Force that Piadeco could conduct
logging activities subject to the NIRC,
 Spanish titles are not similar to administrative titles and judicial titles under
the present system. They may be lost through prescription. If Spanish title
covering forest land is invalid, the land is public domain, and not susceptible
of appropriation.
 ITC, Piadeco’s title which sought to register was issued by Spanish
sovereignty. It is not one of those under Sec 7, thus registration cannot be
renewed.
The Court concluded that it cannot give prima facie value to Piadeco’s title.
need to acquired indefeasible title to be entitled to registration under Sec 1829.
 The purpose of registration is to exempt the title owner from paying forestry
charges
 No copy of the Titulo was presented in Court. What was presented was
merely a description
 Private ownership of the land must be proved not only through genuineness
of his title, but also clear identity of the claim claimed
 What he was claiming was forest land; presumption that it pertains to
state
Even assuming his title is registerable, the corporation cannot complaint against the
 The Director only performed his duty.
 Administrative Order No. 12-2 "[t]he Director of Forestry may cancel a
certificate of registration for any violation of the provision of this Order or
of the forest and internal revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and
conditions embodied in the certificate, or when found that the area is no
longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the landowner thereof, or of
his representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the said
Director of Forestry."
 A condition In his certificate says that he was not allowed to cut the Angat
and Marikina Watershed Reservations. Thus the Director cancelled the
certificate on this ground.
 He even admitted: "it made cuttings on that portion of its own private land
within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservation where it was
constructing its access road to the area covered by P.W.R. No. 2065 to the
 but the army authorities refused to
heed his call, Thus Piadeco filed with the
Court.
Sand v. Abad Abad Santos School of Nursing filed an
Santos action for declaratory relief against
Educational chairman and members of the Board of
Institution Examiners for Nurses seeking to declare
Art VIII, R69.5 of the IRRs of the Board
void and illegal.
The regulation provides for periodic
inspection of nursing schools and bars
graduates of such schools that do not
comply with minimum requirements
and standards” from admission to
nurses’ examination or registration as a
registered nurse.
CFI Judge held that while the Board has
authority under law to promulgate said
rules and regulations, particularly on the Whether there was arbitrariness or oppression in the board’s exercise of powers
periodic inspection of nursing schools,
the board "may apply only the same to
new schools or colleges established or
opened after the promulgation of said
rules and regulations" and they cannot
be given retroactive effective and
enforced against schools already duly
accredited by the Bureau of Private
Schools prior to promulgation of the
1967 Rules and Regulations.
construction of which no objection was interposed by . . . Nawasa as per its
resolution No. 126, Series of 1964."
Absent a valid registration certiFcate under Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code, or a license to cut, gather and remove timber, and more
important, credible evidence of private ownership over the forestry land in
question, Piadeco's logging operations logically descend to the level of unlawful
cutting from public forests.
Thus, it cannot be said the seizure was illegal.
They challenge the authority of the board to promulgate the regulation.
 The Philippine Nursing Act expressly empowers the board to promulgate
such rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the act.
 The same law empowers the board to issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue
certificates of registration for practice of nursing.
 The Board shall study the conditions affecting nursing education and the
practice of the nursing profession in the Philippines, and shall exercise the
powers conferred upon it by this Act with a view to the maintenance of an
efficient ethical technical moral and professional standard in the practice of
nursing.
 On the matter of the board’s power to deny admission:
o Applicants must have all the requisite qualifications as provided by
law
o Schools should be established to prepare qualified applicants
o Should be operated as educational institutions
o With adequate budget
o Prescribed qualifications for faculty and instructors in nursing
amounting to due process
 Respondents: the periodic inspection of nursing schools is under the
authority of the Bureau of Private Education and that the same visitorial
powers is granted to the board may result in conflicting findings and results.
 The contention is on the wisdom of Congress to grant such visitorial powers
to both. It is settled that it is beyond the domain of the courts to inquire into
the wisdom of the act.
 The contention that they will have conflicting results and there will be a
resultant power struggle between the two is pure speculation. If there is any
disagreement, they are both under the Office of the President whose control

Due process – arbitrary and oppressive
American Petitioners challenged R168 under
Tobacco v. "Revised Rules of Practice before the
Director of Philippine Patent Office in Trademark
Patents Cases" authorizing the Director of
Patents to designate any ranking official
of said office to hear “inter partes”
proceedings. These refer to hearing of
opposition to registration of a mark or
trade name, to determine the priority of
adoption and use of trademark, name
and cancellation of registration.
and supervision they pertain.
The view of the CFI that the power of inspection could apply only to newly opened
schools would result in a situation where the Board cannot do anything with
existing schools to maintain the minimum standards required by law
 Moreover, the cited rule is the same provision in the original rules in 1954
and was never challenged by respondent.
 The regulation is valid exercise of police power in the interest of public
health and welfare that schools of nursing are properly conducted in
accordance with the standards prescribed by law.
On the issue that the rule will prejudice graduates of the school and hundreds of
students who have started nursing long ago
 It is reasonable that those who have started nursing schools under the old
curriculum as approved by the Bureau of Private School be allowed to
graduate and take the examination.
 The presumption is that the board would discharge its functions in a just and
reasonable manner in accordance with established norms. If it would
impose new substantive requirements, beyond the minimum
requirements, such requirements would be prospectively imposed.
 However, where the board finds in its inspection that a nursing school does
not meet the standing minimum requirements and standards then it is the
board’s duty to require the deficient school to make the required
improvements and to meanwhile bar the would-be graduates of such
deficient school from the nurses’ examination until its deficiency and would
be graduates shall have been removed.
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the law with petitioner’s contentions:
 Under Sec 3, RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the
assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of
other departments,… when deemed necessary in the consideration of any
matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions"
 Under Sec 78: "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department
Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."
 It has been held that the power conferred upon an administration agency
to issue regulations as necessary/proper to carry out the provisions of law
may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function,

Under the Trade Mark law, the Director
of Patents is vested with JD over these
cases, and similarly the old rules
provided this too. However, it was
amended which adds: Such inter partes
proceedings in the Philippine Patent
Office under this Title shall be heard
before the Director of Patents, any
hearing officer, or any ranking official
of the office designated by the Director
but all judgments determining the
merits of the case shall be personally
and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him.
In accordance with this Rule, the
Director of Patents delegated the
hearing to hearing officers.
The petitioners objected to the
delegation, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and
void because under the law, the
Director must personal hear and decide
inter pares cases
unless by express provision or implication, it has been withheld. ITC, there
is no such provision
 The nature of the power entrusted to the Director of Patents should be
construed as to give the official the necessary flexibility for prompt and
expeditious discharge of his duties in administration of the law.
 He is required to determine the question of priority, decide applications for
reinstatement of a lapsed patent, cancellation of patents, inter partes
proceedings etc. It can hardly be expected to require him to hear
personally each and every case pending in his office. This will not further
the development of orderly and responsible administration.
The rule that requires an administrative office to exercise his own judgement and
discretion does not preclude him from utilizing subordinates to investigate and
report to him facts, of which the office makes his decisions.
 It is sufficient that judgement and discretion is finally exercised by the
officer authorized by law.
 Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require
that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make
the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the
decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question
that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met.
ITC, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the questions raised
during the hearings, the ultimate decision is left to the Director of Patents.
 Rabor v. CSC Rabor works in the Office of Mayor as In Cena, the Court held that a government EE who has reached 65 but not yet
Utility Worker. completed 15 years of government service under Sec 11 (b), PD 1146 to qualify for
Old-Age Pension Benefit may be granted an extension for period as may be
An official in said office advised Rabor necessary to fill up or comply with the 15-year service requirement. The Court also
to apply for retirement considering he held that the extension was discretionary on the head of the agency concerned.
already reached 68 years old since the
age requirement is up to 65 only.  The Court reached this conclusion on the basis of the plain and ordinary
meaning of Sec 11(b) PD 11461 (allowed to continue service to complete 15
Rabor responded by showing his years)
“Certificate of Membership” from the  While Sec 11(b) appeared unqualified, there were two administrative
GSIS saying that his service with be issuances which prescribe the limitations on the extension of service granted
extended to comply with the 15 year to an EE – CSC Cir. No 272 (granted a period not exceeding 1 year) and Memo
service requirement to comply for the Cir. No. 653 (except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the
Age-Old Pension benefit. retention shall not exceed six (6) months)
It was held in Cena that CSC Cir. No 27 was invalid:
The matter was referred to the CSC and  “The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service of an employee
CSC advised Mayor Duterte that who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but has less
extension of Rabor’s service is contrary than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.
to M.C. No. 65 Accordingly, Mayor 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or
Duterte advised him to stop reporting connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into
for work. effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect”
Rabor went to:  The Court reexamined Cena because the conclusions there required a
 CSC – Regional Director and considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented.
asked for 2 year extension since o However, subordinate legislation is precisely there because of the
he was in good health – DENIED inability to anticipate all the situations with respect to a subject
 Appeal to OP – his extensions matter. All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the
cannot be granted for period delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are
exceeding 1 year germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or
 Mayor D30 – he invoked Cena enabling statute
and that the extension was o We consider this test and the enabling statute should be examined.
1
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five (65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of
service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15) years.
2
1.Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent
appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year
3
'Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which
case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months
 discretionary on the part of the
Mayor but the request could not
be granted.
Thus, Rabor wrote a Letter/Petition to
the Court, appealing the CSC’s
Resolution and Duterte’s Letter
Rabor contends his claim falls within the
ruling of Cena v. CSC.
The CSC stressed that in Cena, the Land
Registration Authority of the DOJ was
vested with discretion to grant Cena’s
extension. ITC, Davao City Gov’t did not
have that discretion
Thus, Cena should be modified – Memo Cir No 27 is valid and must be read together
with PD 1146. The agency head is vested with discretion but limited by Memo Cir.
27.
The Petitioner is a licensed Filipino manning Authority of POEA
Conference of agency which hire and recruit Filipino
Maritime seamen.
Manning
Agencies, Inc. They seek to annul Res. No 01 of the
v. POEA, Governing Board of the POEA Memo Cir.
No 05 on the ground of:
 Lack authority to fix and
Here it is not only PD 1146 but also the Admin Code as the extension
of service of retirees is an area covered by both statutes.
o In enacting Memo Cir No 27, CSC was acting as the central personnel
agency empowered by the government to promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for efficient personnel administration. It is
also charged by the Admin Code in providing assistance in the
development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in
the Civil Service" and "enforcement of the constitutional and
statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the
effective implementation of the retirement of government officials
and employees
o The limitation of permissible extensions of an EE who has reached 65
is germane to these provisions of the CSC. An old person will be
obviously less efficient physiologically and psychologically. Thus,
there are policy considerations which guide the CSC in limiting the
maximum extension of service allowable to compulsory retirees.
 Give an undeserved premium to late-comers in the
government service and in effect discriminate against those
who enter earlier;
 Delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank
employees;.
o The ruling in Cena in striking down Memo Cir 27 can lead to absurd
results where a person of 64 who has rendered 1 year of government
service can end up retiring at 79 years old.
 Hence dismissal of Rabor is affirmed.
 Rule-making power of the POEA was already settled in Eastern Shipping v
POEA. In that case, it was clarified that POEA’s power has sufficient standard
under its mandate to: The Administration shall formulate and undertake in
coordination where necessary with the appropriate entities concerned, a
systematic program for promoting and monitoring the overseas
employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration domestic
manpower requirements, and to protect their rights to fair and equitable
 promulgate rates affecting
death and workmen’s
compensation of Filipino
seamen
 If it did have the power, violated
the standard for exercise.
 Violation of the EPC and non-
impairment clauses
Res No 1 adjusted the rates of
compensation and other benefits under
the POEA Standard Employment
Contracts for Seafarers and that it
applies to any Filipino seafarer even
those already on-board any vessel
Respondents counter:
 Valid exercise of rule-making
 Non-appointment of a third
member does not invalidate the
act of the Board
 Consensus on increase of rates
was arrived after appropriate
consultation
4
The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore,
such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects.
employment practices. xxx xxx xxx The Governing Board of the
Administration shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.
 The Court reiterated the established rule on Subordinate legislation. Thus,
the resolution and memo in question merely amended Memo Cir No to
strictly conform to the valid standard of "fair and equitable employment
practices" prescribed in E.O. No.797
Violation of EPC. Petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and
principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing
overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.
 Test for EPC: It must be based on reasonable classification.
o (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
o (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
o (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
o (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
 There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and
sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work
environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to
social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Violation of Contract Clause.
 POEA was created to further implement social justice. Social justice is
identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and
requires the extensive use of such power.
 It cited Calalang’s definition of social justice. The non-impairment clause is
not absolute. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property and has no
application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of
legislature and those involving public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected. It does not prevent a proper exercise of police power
 The freedom to contract is not absolute. The NCC4explicitly recognizes that
labor contracts are not ordinary contracts but they are impressed with
public interest.
 Hence the Resolution is VPP
Appointment of a third member. Petitioner argues that it cannot legally function

Realty Sendino entered into a reservation
Exchange agreement with REVI for a lot in
Venture Paranaque.
Corporation v.  He paid REVI 16k as DP.
Sendino,  Due to alleged non-compliance
with the requirement of
submission of documents, REVI
informed respondent of the
cancellation of the contract
Sendino filed a complaint for specific
performance with the HLURB to comply
with the sale.
HLURB’s authority was challenged by
REVI however HLRUB ruled in favor of
Sendino. The ruling was affirmed under
the OP.
 HLURB has no quasi-judicial
functions
 If it does, the Board of
Commissioners cannot delegate
its quasi-judicial authority to
subordinate officers—they were
deciding in divisions of three
5
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
without it.
 Sec 4, EO 797 declares the immediate creation of the POEA. Hence upon its
effectivity, the POEA attained juridical personality. The appointment of the
third member "who shall be well versed in the field of overseas
employment," provided for in paragraph, (b) of the said Section, was not
meant to be a sine qua non to the birth of the POEA, much less to the
validity of the acts of the Board.
Petitioner argues that HLURB does not have quasi-judicial powers as there was no
express grant under EO 90, and even though it was, the Board of Commissioners is
not allowed to sit in a decision to render judgement and delegate its quasi-judicial
authority to a subordinate.
 Nonjoinder. Rules of procedure are construed liberally in administrative
proceedings. Hence, it was ok for HLURB to act on the substantive matters of
the complaint notwithstanding the non-joinder of the private respondent’s
husband. Moreover, the petitioners are estopped from invoking this as it
was raised only before the OP.
 Authority of HLURB.
o History of HLURB. While EO 85 abolished the Ministry of Human
Settlements, the EO did not abolish the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. In fact, Pres. Aquino expressly recognized
the HSRC later the HLURB.
o EO 81 transferred all functions of the NHA to the HSRC. EO 90 then
constituted HSRC as the sole regulatory body for housing and land
development. HLURB would be rendered dysfunctional if it lacked
the powers of its predecessor which included the power to settle
disputes concerning land use and housing development and
acquisition.
o The question of quasi-judicial powers of the HSRC was answered in
United Housing Corp. v. Hon. Dayrit which recognized HLURB as the
successor of HSRC. The transfer of such functions of NHA to HSRC
resulted in acquisition of its adjudicatory powers5. Clearly, the law
granted HLURB the power to hear and decide cases on unsound real

GSIS v. Board New San Jose mortgaged lots and
of condominium units to GSIS to secure
Commissioner payment of a loan.
s rules of procedure for the conduct of its business and perform such
The mortgaged property was later sold
to Sps. De los Reyes.
New San Jose defaulted on the loan
hence GSIS foreclosed the mortgage.
Sps. De los Reyes found out of the sale
and filed with the HLURB to release the
mortgage and reconvey the lots and
condo units.
GSIS claimed that Sps. De los Reyes had
no CoA since the mortgage was
executed prior to their sale.
estate practices among others.
o We fail to see how it lost its power by mere change of name.
Petitioner argued that the OAALALA should have rendered by the Board of
Commissioners en banc
 It has been held the power conferred to an admin agency to issue IRRs
necessary to carry out its functions is adequate source of authority to
delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by
implication it has been withheld."
 EO 648 empowers the Board to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct
of its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective
accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." Since nothing in the
provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or
authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how
the Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative
responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body should be
denied the power,
 Moreover, there is practical necessity to delegating such power.
GSIS argues that HLURB Revised Rules of Procedure did not vest authority on the
board to entertain appeals.
 EO 648 specifically mandates the HLURB Board of Commissioners to adopt
functions necessary for effective discharge.
 The present composition of the Board of Commissioners practically
necessitates the establishments of a procedure where a case on appeal
may be decided by members of a division.
o Wherein five out of its nine members sit in ex-officio capacity while
the remaining four serve as full time commissioners,
 Since HLURB Rules provides that a MR shall be assigned to the Division from
which order it originated, the HLURB, the questioned cognizance of HLURB
Div 2 is in order.
Whether PD 385 prohibits issuance of CDO
 The CDO was intended for consolidation by the GSIS of ownership of the
condominium unit, not the mandatory foreclosure of the mortgage.
 The law recognizes that an injunction may be issued against a government
institution, hence it obliges the borrower to liquidate the arrearages due in
 Sps. Delos Reyes later filed an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to restrain GSIS
from consolidating its title over the
condominium units.
GSIS opposed alleging that PD 385
prohibits the issuance of a restraining
order against a government financial
institution in any action taken by it in
compliance with the mandatory
foreclosure. HLURB granted De los
Reyes’ motion and issued a CDO.
HLURB 2nd Div. affirmed. PD 385 applies
to on-going foreclosure proceedings
only.
GSIS claimed HLURB acted without JD
since only 3 instead of 9-man board
entertained the appeal.
Kabataan Party RA 10367 was enacted which mandates
List v. COMELEC to implement a mandatory
COMELEC biometric registration system for new
voters in order to establish a complete
and updated list of voters through
biometric technology.
 It also directs registered voters
whose biometrics have not been
captured to submit themselves
for validation.
 Voters who fail to submit for
validation shall be deactivated.
 Nevertheless, they may have
their records may be reactivated
order to safeguard the interests of the government financial institution-
lender.
 Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate
business is broad enough to include jurisdiction over a complaint for
annulment of foreclosure sale and mortgage and the grant of incidental
reliefs such as a CDO.
 Even Presidential Decree No. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree," authorizes the HLURB as successor of the
National Housing Authority to issue CDOs in relevant cases,
Procedural issues
 This is a transcendental public importance issue, hence Court deems it
proper to brush aside the procedural matters.
 The issues require immediate adjudication due to the preparatory activities
being undertaken by COMELEC. It would be best to serve the ends of justice.
Petitioners submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is just
like the unconstitutional literacy and property requirement. They argue that the
deactivation is not a valid limitation on the exercise of suffrage.
 The right to vote is not a natural right but a statutory right. It is a privilege
granted by the State to persons who are most likely to exercise it for public
good (People v. Corral)
 Under Art V, Sec 1, the following are qualification for the right:
o Filipino citizen
o Not disqualified by law
 after the 2016 Elections
provided, they follow the
procedure provided in Sec 28.
COMELEC issued Resolution 9721
implements RA 10367 which provides:
1. registration records of voters
who failed to submit for
validation shall be deactivated
2. the following shall have their
biometrics validated
a. those who do not have
biometrics data
b. those who have
incomplete biometrics
data
3. deactivated voters shall not be
allowed to vote
4. deactivated voters shall comply
with the requirements of
posting, ERB hearing, and service
of individual notes.
COMELEC conducted a public
information campaign “NoBio-NoBoto”
COMELEC issued Res. 10013 Which
provides for the procedure for
deactivation of VRRs who do not have
biometrics
(1) Post the list of voters who do not
have biometrics along with
notice of ERB hearing
(2) Send individual notices to
affected voters
(3) Any opposition shall be filed
until Nov 2015.
o Resident in the PH for at least 1 year and 6 months in the place he
proposes to vote immediately preceding the election.
 Under #2, the State may regulate the right by imposing statutory
disqualification, however this is qualified by the “literacy, property and other
substantive requirement”
 In 1971, the delegates decided to remove the literacy and property
requirements to broaden the political base. Similarly, “other substantive
requirement” carries the same rationale – prevent alienation of a particular
class based on socio-economic considerations which are irrelevant to
suffrage.
 This was fully adopted under the 1987 Const. Under BP 881, there imposed
other legal qualifications (1) final judgement to suffer imprisonment for not
less than 1 year (2) final judgement any crime involving disloyalty to state (3)
insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.
 Registration regulates the exercise of the right to suffrage; it is not a
qualification. The act of registration is only a step towards voting and it is
not one of the elements to make the citizens a qualified voter. It is a mere
procedural requirement which does not fall under the ‘substantive limitation
clause’
 Similarly, RA 8189 governs the process of registration. It was passed to
systemize the present method of registration for a clean, complete, updated,
list of voters. To complement RA 8189, RA 10367 was enacted.
 Under the assailed law, validation is done through the process of taking
biometrics of registered voters. Failure to validate shall be caused for
deactivation. Naturally, this applies to all voters. Hence, there is no violation
of EPC – there is no favor granted to obedient groups. There is no
discrimination. It must be noted that RA 8189 already imposes certain
grounds for deactivation (1) final judgement (2) insane or incompetent
person (3) did not vote in the last 2 elections (4) registration ordered
excluded by the Court (5) lost Filipino citizenship
Petitioners argue that there is no compelling state interest; it is an unreasonable
deprivation of right to suffrage
 It passes strict scrutiny. In applying this test, it is focused on the presence of
a compelling state interest, and the least intrusive means of achieving the
test.
 ITC, the CSI = facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest and credible
 (4) Registration records of voters
with incomplete biometrics
data and corrupted data in the
database shall not be
deactivated and be allowed to
vote
Petitioners filed this petition assailing
the constitutionality of RA 10367 and
COMELEC Res.
 Imposes an additional
substantial qualification to vote
with penalty of deactivation
 It is not a qualification in the
Constitution
 No compelling state interest in
depriving the right to suffrage
 No due process
 Result in premature termination
of the registration period
elections
 The Least Restrictive means – registered voter only required to appear
personally and have his photo, signature and fingerprint recorded. It is only a
a manner of updating one’s registration for those already registered. The
re-registration process is amply justified through the government’s adoption
of novel technology. While registrants may be inconvenienced, these are
typical burdens of voting.
o To make the validation process as convenient as possible, the
COMELEC even went to the extent of setting up off-site and satellite
biometrics registration in shopping malls and conducted the same on
Sundays.
o it only required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1)
time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided
that he remains an active voter.
Petitioners: RA 10367 and COMELEC Reses… violated procedural Due process
because of the short periods of time between hearings and notice, and the summary
nature of deactivation
 COMELEC through its Res. Has directed EOs to:
o "[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin
boards of the City/Municipal hall,
o "[s]end individual notices to the affected voters included in the
generated list of voters without biometrics data."
o Gives concerned individuals the opportunity to file their
opposition/objection to the deactivation of VRRs not later than
November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in
Section 4,
o "[d]eactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made
during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."
o While the proceedings are summary in nature, the urgency of
finalizing the voters' list for the upcoming May 2016 Elections calls
for swift and immediate action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters
who fail to comply with the mandate of RA 10367. Time is of the
essence!
o public has been sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA
10367 and its deactivation feature. It was duly published. COMELEC
conducted a massive public information campaign. COMELEC exerted
 efforts to make the validation process more convenient for the public
as it enlisted the assistance of malls across Metro Manila to serve as
satellite registration centers and declared Sundays as working days
for COMELEC offices within the National Capital Region and in highly
urbanized cities.
Petitioners: poor experience of other countries implementing the biometrics
registration should serve as a warning to this system
 No. Petitioners' submissions principally assail the wisdom of the legislature
in adopting the biometrics registration system in curbing electoral fraud. This
is the wrong forum
Petitioners: Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on
October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189 – “No registration shall, however,
be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.” (Elections in May
2016)
 the 120- and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period
beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted.
 As already resolved, the period only provides a period which may not be
reduced but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities.
Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to enforce and implement election
laws, the COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to fulfil its mandate.
Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices
Section 9. Public Participation. –
 (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
 (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
 (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed
Panay Autobus RR Hancock filed a petition with the PSC is not authorized to delegate to Phil. Railway Co the power of altering its
v. Phil Railway PSC to alter freight rates of PRC freight rates
Co  They asked to be allowed to  whenever it should find it necessary in order to meet the competition of
alter passenger rates at will and road trucks and autobuses,
was granted whenever  or to change freight rates at will,
necessary to meet the  or to regard its present rates as maximum rates and to lower rates
competition of road trucks and whenever it felt like it.
 autobuses.
 It requested that the rates at
present be considered the
maximum, and that they be
allowed to lower rates.
Cebu Autobus filed an opposition to the
petition
 (1) it holds a certificate of public
convenience to operate autobus
for transportation of passengers
and freight
 (2) the sliding rates is repugnant
to fundamental principals of
Public Utility Regulations
 (3) It will promote unnecessary
competition between operators
 (4) sliding rates will promote
discrimination
Later Phil Railway filed with the PSC its
proposed freight classifications in
Panay Division.
 At hearing, Hancock testified
that it wished to reduce its
freight rates because of the
reduction in market prices and
competition which Phil Railway
had to compete with.
 A flexible tariff rate will increase
the earnings of Railway Co. It
said that any reduction of rates
would be applied to all kinds of
cargo without discrimination.
He wished to reduce the present
rate in Iloilo to Capiz.
The Legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing
the rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission
to delegate that power to a common carrier or other public service.
 The Phil Rail may propose new rates however it cannot lawfully make new
rates effective without approval of the PSC and the PSC cannot authorize a
public service to enforce new rates without prior approval of said rates by
the commission. It must be approved or fixed by the PSC after being show it
is just and reasonable.
 In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission
to change its freight rates at will. It may change them every day or every
hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so in order to meet
competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a
procedure would create a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely
defeat the purposes of the public service law.
Under Act 3418, the PSC shall not exercise any control or supervision over vessels
operated within the Philippine Islands, except with regard to the fixing of maximum
passenger and freight rates.
 They reduce their rates without regard to the Public Service Commission,
because its jurisdiction is limited to the fixing of maximum rates.
 Sec 16 of the Public Service law prohibits any public service from exacting
any unjustly discriminatory rate but if the Phil Railway would be allowed to
alter its rates whenever it be necessary to meet competition for road trucks
and autobuses, it cannot prevent its rates from being discriminatory.
 Under the order of the commission, there is no stability of rates. They may
be varied at the will of the railroad officials, provided that they are not
increased. The commission thereby gives up one of its most important
functions, and leaves it to competition to fix the rates.
 The PSC rendered a decision granting
the application for freight
classifications.
 PSC rationed: it is authorized,
upon request in form, to see
and determine in which cases it
is appropriate authorize the fair
and reasonable increase or
reduction, change or alteration
of the rate proposed to be
enforced;
Panay Autobus filed its opposition
 It is an opponent company who
transports passengers at the
rate fixed by PSC
 The rates should not be granted
as it is against the principles of
public utility regulation.
 The rate will create not needed
competition
KMU Labor v DOTC Sec issued Memo 90-395 which Validity of the Administrative Issuances
Garcia allowed provincial operators to charge  Under PSA, the PSC was delegated the power to fix rates of public service.
passenger rates within a range of +/- Under EO 202, the LTFRB was authorized to "to determine, prescribe,
15% of the LTFRB official rate for 1 year. approve and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and
 Hence, respondent Provincial other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation
Bus Operators Assoc. filed an services provided by motorized vehicles."
application for fare rate increase  No where does it say that the PSC and LTFRB could delegate that power to
DOTC issued D.O. 92-587 which defined a common carrier, transport operator or other public service. The
the framework in regulating transport delegation is tantamount to undue delegation. Potestas delegate non
services. delegari potest. This doctrine is based on the principal that the delegated
 It outlined a deregulation policy power is not only a right, but a duty to be performed by the delegate
whereby operators may fix their through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
own fares within +/-15% range intervening mind of another.
 In determining public need (a  The policy of allowing provincial bus operators to change their fares would
requirement to be issued a leave the public at the mercy of transport operators. One consequence of
certificate of operate) the deregulation of transport fees is compounded fare. If transport operators will
 presumption of need for a
service is deemed in favor of an
applicant. The oppositor has the
burden to show there is no
public need.
LTFRB issued Memo Cir. 92-009, the
guidelines for implementation of DO 92-
587.
 This broadened the +/-15%
range system to +20-25% limit
in 1994.
PBOAP availed itself of the
deregulation policy. KMU opposed.
LTFRB dismissed the petition of KMU.
KMU filed a petition
 The authority given by LTFRB to
provincial bus operators to
change rates without having to
file a petition therefor is
unconstitutional and illegal
 The presumption of public need
is in violation of the PSA and
Rules of Court
be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20%
over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly
prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been
computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates.
 Several factors should be considered in fixing rate:
o A rate should not be confiscatory as would place an operator in a
situation where he will continue to operate at a loss. Hence, the rate
should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to
cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the
investments.
o A rate must be reasonable and fair. It must be affordable to the use
user who will utilize the service. A rate which is too high becomes
discriminatory. It is contrary to public interest.
 Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with. The
people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full
opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any fare increase. To do away
with such a procedure and allow just one party, an interested party at that,
to determine what the rate should be will undermine the right of the other
parties to due process
Presumption of Public Need
 Sec 16 of the PSA requires, among other things, that an applicant must
prove that the operation of the public service proposed and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a proper
and suitable manner. It is understood that there must be proper notice and
hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC.
 Meanwhile, Memo. Cir. No. 92-009 provides: The presumption of public
need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the
burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be
the oppositor's burden.
 The provision is entirely inconsistent with Sec 16, PSA. Public convenience
and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a
reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities
do not adequately supply. This is a question of fact which must be
established through hearing.
 Otherwise stated, the establishment of public need in favor of an applicant
reverses well-settled and institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial and

Ynchausti v. Petitioners are engaged in the
Public Utility operation of vessels in the Philippine.
Commission Due to decrease in the volume of
business handled by its members, it filed
with the Public Utility Commissioner a
declaration that it would make 10%
increase in shipping rates than those
allowed under Order 16 of the Board of
Rate Regulation. The Commissioner
granted.
Later it sought another declaration for
further increase of the 10% on freight
rates which would make it 15%
 Reason: there was a strike
which necessitated increase in
wage – increase in OpEx.
The proposal was suspended and
hearing was ordered. Later, the
Commissioner refused to make the
increase on some steamers but granted
a 25% increase for the rest of the
steamers.
This was appealed as the rate allowed
was based on the original cost of the
vessel and not its present value and the
5% p.a. depreciation was allowed upon
the original value of the vessel instead
of cost of replacement
administrative procedures. It allows the party who initiates the proceedings
to prove, by mere application, his affirmative allegations. Moreover, the
offending provisions of the LTFRB memorandum circular in question would
in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding another disputable
presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions...
There is a legal presumption that fixed rates are reasonable. Fixing of rates by the
Government involves discretion and courts will not interfere until there is GAD.
Rates must not be unreasonable or arbitrarily made.
 There are 4 theories of ascertaining what constitutes a reasonable rate, each
is supposed to give a fair return on the reasonable value of the property.
o First, the original cost;
o second, cost of reproduction;
o third, outstanding capitalization; and,
o fourth, present value.
Under modern authorities, the rate is based upon the physical valuation of the
property, because in effect the property is both used and consumed by the public.
 So, on principle, the vessel here is deemed taken and condemned by the
public at the time of the filing of the petition, and the rate should go up and
down as the physical valuation of the vessel goes up and down, and the
purpose of the hearing is to place a physical valuation upon the vessel and
then base a reasonable rate upon that valuation.
 Hence, the original cost of the vessel is not the basis for the valuation and
is not important, except in so far as it may enable the Commissioner to
determine the present value of the vessel.
 When public utility enters into public service, it is subject to reasonable
rules and regulations by the public and to that extent and for that purpose it
is a taking of the property by the public. Hence, when property becomes a
public utility, it ipso facto, for operating purposes, amounts to an actual
taking and appropriation of the property to the public use, so long as it is a
public utility.
 It is elementary that private property cannot be taken without just
compensation assessed at the time of taking. But where the taking is not full
or complete, but continuously taking and appropriation, it follows that
there is a fluctuation in the MV of the property. But in fixing the rate, it
would not be fair to the public to base it upon a peak cost, and, for the same
reason, it would not be fair to the owner of the property to place it upon a

Petitioners contend:
 The 5% depreciation is based on
the original cost, not on
replacement.
 Allowance of 10% p.a. on the
investment is based on the
original cost of the ship, not its
present value
 The average cost of repairs for
the past 5 years should not
substituted for the actual cost of
such repairs for the operating
period it was submitted
Vigan Electric RA 316 granted Vigan a franchise to
v. PSC construct, maintain and operate an
electric light heat and/or power plant
for the purpose of generating and
distributing light, heat and/or power,
for sale in Ilocos Sur. Hence, it obtained
a CPC from PSC.
minimum cost.
Attorney General argues: The Commissioner did not base is exclusively on original
cost – it also considered estimated cost. It only could not accept estimated cost due
to the abnormal war prices. and, as no evidence of the reasonable value was
presented, the Commissioner accepted the original cost, and, hence, it should be
presumed that he was of the opinion that the original cost represented the fair
value…
 The purpose of the hearing was to determine just and reasonable rate.
Based on the cited rules, such rate should not be based upon original cost of
the vessel. Neither should it be based on estimate cost.
 As the above authorities hold, the original cost of a vessel should only be
considered for the purpose of determining its present or market value.
Although it may be true that it was the duty of the owner of a vessel to have
submitted evidence to the Commissioner of the present or market value of
the vessel under normal conditions, yet the failure to do this would not
justify the Commissioner in basing the rate on the original cost.
The basing of the rate on the original cost of the vessel was prejudicial, legal error.
This same principle should apply to the 5 per cent depreciation. The percentage for
depreciation should be based on the market value and not on the original cost of the
vessel. Complaint is made that 10 per cent return on the investment is not sufficient.
The question as to what is a reasonable rate is one which largely rests in the
discretion of the Commissioner, with which, without some good reason, this court is
not disposed to interfere.
As to the repairs, it was made based on average of repairs for the last 5 years and
not the actual repairs during the period covered by the operating statements. Hence
the average for labor and materials were far below.
PSC argues that rate-fixing is a legislative function that legislative or rule-making
powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice or hearing;
 Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when
such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines — may partake of a legislative character, such is
not the nature of the order complained of.
 Here, the rate only applies to petitioner. Furthermore it is predicated upon a
finding of fact – the audit and report conduced which found that petitioner is
Vigan purchased electric from NaPoCor
for resale. 5 years later, PSC advised
Vigan of a conference for revision of
the authorized rates. There was also a
letter-petition from Vigan residents
charging petition for the illegal sale of
electric meters by Vigan to Avegon as
illegal, as they were imported form
japan which properly belongs to the
people.
Vigan was received a letter that it
would be audited. Hence an audit was
conducted on Vigan for examination of
its books and other records of account.
PSC issued an Order, after the audit,
finding that Vigan’s present rates may
be reduced by 17.84% since it had an
excess of revenue rates,
 It is making a profit from than
12% p.a.
 For it to earn 12% p.a., its
should have a computed
revenue by rates of 182k
 It has actual revenue rates =
221k
 Hence, it has an excess revenue
rates of 17% ~
making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital. In fact, this was
denied by petitioner. In other words, in making said finding of fact,
respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the
valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
 Under CA 146, explicitly requires notice and hearing. Since compliance with
law must be presumed, it should be assumed that petitioner's current rates
were fixed by respondent after proper notice and hearing. Hence, a
modification of such rates cannot be made, over petitioner's objection,
without such notice and hearing,
 AmJur: "Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service
commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional
provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing,
prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of
such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand,
legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand,
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights and property
of private or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be
afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission."
Hence violates DP and null and void

Vigan then instituted for certiorari to

annul the order on the ground that:
 Petitioner objected to the
reduction without a hearing,
alleging that its rates could be
reduced only if proven by
evidence validly adduced to be
 excessive;
 Petitioner had not even been
served a copy of the auditor's
report upon which the order
complained of is based, that
such order had been issued
without notice and hearing;
PHILCOMSAT RA 5514 granted PHILCOMT a franchise PHILCOMSAT argues there is no standard in the exercise of its rate fixing and
v. Alcuaz to operate facilities for international
satellite communicates. Thus:
 It put up several satellites
 It is sole signatory to
International Satellite
Organizations
 It has been leasing it satellites to
several corporations
Under RA 5514, PHILCOMSAT was
exempt form the JD of the PSC but
under EO 196, it was placed under the
JD of the NTC which required it to apply
for certificates of public convenience
and necessity. It was granted 2 6-month
provisional authorities but on the third,
PHILCOMSAT was directed to reduce
charges by 15 %.
PHILCOMSAT filed with the SC seeking
to annul the order which reduces the
rates that PHILCOMSAT may charge for
being violative of
 undue delegation – no
sufficient standards
 lack of due process – no notice
and hearing and unreasonable
and unjust.
 The rate reduction is unjust,
adjudicatory power. It clarified that he is assailing the law as an undue delegation
of quasi-judicial powers.
 No.
 The rule is: that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon
the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the
legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power.
 Thus, when an administrative agency establishes a rate, it must be (1) non-
confiscatory (2) established in a manner prescribed by law. For rate fixing,
the standard is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that the requirements as to reasonableness may be implied.
 Under EO 546, NTC is guided by public safety, public interest and
reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities
in communications and broadcasting facilities. Further, NTC is under the
control and supervision of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications which provides that national economic viability of the
entire network or components of the communications systems
contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
Procedural Due Process – it was issued motu propio without notice to petitioner
and hearing. It was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral
evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before
the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and
the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and
demonstrated to respondents.
 In Vigan Electric v. PSC, we ruled that rate-fixing power of administrative
agencies is quasi-judicial. This is true in this case because (1) the order is
directed only to NTC (2) it is premised on a finding of fact—based on the
evaluation of its financial statements.
unreasonable and confiscatory  Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC
based its questioned order.
 Thus, the initial evaluation is not sufficient. There must be notice and
hearing.
NTC admits that it is exercising quasi-judicial functions but notice and hearing is not
required because the order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings, and thus
temporary only. [bc it was only provisional]
 NO! While they may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application, it is not exempted from the statutory procedural requirements
of notice and hearing.
 Sec 16, PSC provides The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice
and hearing … To fix and determine individual or joint rates, . . . which shall
be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service;
 There no reason to assume that it does not apply to the present case. It is
thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order
be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion as in the present case.
Petitioner contends the rate is confiscatory which would result in cessation of its
operations and closure. Respondent claims that petitioner has no vested right. It is a
mere privilege regulated which may be revoked at anytime.
 Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
 The inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to
regulate the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to
the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A
commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to
regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness
comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or
too high as to be oppressive.
 What is reasonable is a question of fact. In determining whether a rate is
confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the

MIAA v. MIAA is a GoCC, which owns and
Airspan operates NAIA. Its properties, facilities,
and services are available for public use,
subject to fees, rates, charges fixed by
law. Petitioners are uses, lessees and
occupants of petitioner’s properties.
MIAA issued Res. No 97-51 which
announced an increase in rentals on its
buildings, and land. Business
concessions were also increased.
MIAA issued 98-30 adopting 20%
increase recommended by
Punongbayan and Araullo. Thus, it
issued A.O 1 to reflect the new schedule
of fees charges and rates
MIAA issued Res. No 99-11 which
o given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility.
o A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair
return upon the value of the property to the public utility.
o Competition is also a very important factor in determining the
reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates
as are necessary to meet competition.
 ITC, the reduction was based on solely on the initial evaluation of financial
statements of PHILCOMSAT. It did not elaborate in how it arrived at the
rate. On the other hand, PHILCOMSAT may suffer severe drawback with
consequent detriment to the public.
 At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing,
rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep
up with the continuing charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a
competitive level with the technological advances abroad. There projected
undertakings were formulated on the premise that rates are maintained at
their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof
may practically lead to a cessation of its business.
Prior notice and hearing –
Petitioner: MIAA contends that its charter authorizes increase of fees without need
for public hearing. It argues that its service is not a public utility where its fees are
subject to state regulation. It insists that the fees, charges, rates are contractual in
nature, hence if respondents are not amenable, they are free to leave. Moreover, it
charter, being a special law prevails over the PSA and Admin Code.
Respondent: MIAA is an attached agency of the DOTC and in case of conflict
between the charter and Admin Code, the latter prevails. Its increases must be
approved by the DOTC.
 The charter of MIAA provides “The Authority may increase or decrease the
rates subject to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 325, whenever
practicable. They did not see this because BP 326 was inserted through an
amendment.
 BP 325 provides: “The revision of rates shall be determined by the
respective ministry heads or equivalent functionaries conformably with the
rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance issued pursuant to Section 4
hereof, upon recommendation of the imposing and collecting authorities
concerned, subject to the approval of the Cabinet. . .”
further increased other airport fees and
charges and rentals for hangars.
Respondent requested that the
implementation be deferred for lack of
prior notice and hearing. The request
was denied. Petitioner also refused to
renew the ID cards of respondents and
their vehicle stickers. Hence
respondents filed a Complaint for
Injunction with the RTC. Subic
International Air filed a Complaint in
Intervention. RTC rendered a summary
judgement nullifying the resolutions of
MIAA
 Hence the authority to adjust fees, etc. is limited by BP 325 to mere
recommendatory power. It is the “ministry head” and further approval of
the Cabinet that determines.
 Further, it is an attached agency of the DOTC. Hence, the ministry head is
the Sec. of DOTC. Clearly, it has no authority to increase its rates, etc.
 As an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the
Administrative Code. Sec 9, Book VII specifically requires notice and public
hearing: “(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless
the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.”
 Hence two grounds:
o Ultra vires – they don’t have authority to increase the rates, etc.
o Lack of prior notice and public hearing – null and void
petitioner's theory that its fees, charges, and rates are contractual in nature and
thus, respondents are free to terminate the lease contracts should they be unable
to pay the increased dues is unacceptable.
 As the country's principal airport for both international and domestic air
transport, petitioner's properties, facilities, and services are imbued with
paramount public and even national interest. Petitioner is not at liberty to
increase fees, charges, or rates at will, without due regard to parameters set
by laws and regulations.
 Among the considerations mentioned, EO 903 provides that fees and
charges should reflect adequately the costs and increases in price levels
and the volume of traffic.
Petitioner’s claim that it will redound to the benefit of the PH
 Such increases will be passed on to the ordinary Filipino. The lesse
corporations who are unable to pay exorbitant fees, charges, and rates
imposed by petitioner could be left with no choice but to close shop leaving
hundreds if not thousands of Filipinos jobless.
 No one needs reminding that higher prices and more unemployment are the
last things our country's challenged economy needs at this time. Balancing of
interests among the parties concerned, in a public hearing, is obviously
called for.
Fair and Reasonable increases— question of fact – cannot be raised

Sy Trading v. Petitioner is engaged in the business of
Central Bank trading fruits from different parts of the
world. It wrote to Deputy Gov. of
Central Bank requesting authority to
import from Japan on “no-dollar” basis
for the amount of $700k.
The CB denied the request as only those
enumerated under CB Cir. 247 are
allowed no-dollar importation.
Petitioner asked for reconsideration
explaining their case is very special and
that the fruits it will be imported will
be needed this coming Christmas.
Later the Monetary Board of the CB
approved the request for only $350k
subject to 100% special time deposit.
Hence petitioner sent another letter
request asking if they be allowed to put
up 20% special time deposit instead of
100% for 120 days. The request was
Petitioner: its charter authorized it to increase its fees, charges, and rates in order to
reflect current price levels. In addition, it asserts that the increases it imposed were
duly approved, or validated, by an independent accountant. Petitioner also avers
that its imposition of higher fees, charges, and rates will ultimately redound to the
benefit of the country
Resp: Reasonableness is a question of fact. In any case, respondents allege that
petitioner's private accountant erroneously based its recommendation on the price
levels of other countries. Respondents also draw attention to the fact that the
increases implemented by petitioner actually exceeded what its private accountants,
Punongbayan and Araullo, recommended.
Basic principles of Admin Law
 License or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the
licensee or permittee, and is not a property…
 A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or
authority to do what is within its terms. It is not in any way vested,
permanent, or absolute. A license granted by the State is always revocable.
 Notwithstanding the absence of an expiry date, the license cannot last
beyond the life of the basic authority under which it was issued.
The license covers only the Christmas season of 1968
 The cause or compelling reason why it sought the Special Import Permit
because the importation of fresh fruits calls for 175% Special Time Deposit
for 120 days and "(w)ith the fast approaching Christmas season" petitioner-
appellant "cannot cope with the demands of [its] buyers
 The omission of an expiry date in the Special Import Permit affords no legal
basis for petitioner-appellant to conclude that the said permit is impressed
with continuous validity… It was petitioner-appellant itself which furnished
the life span of the permit, consistently pointing out that "the main purpose
of this importation is to serve the requirements during the Christmas
Season" of 1968. Logically, the MB did not have to specify the expiry.
Petitioenr asserts that the validity of the Special Import Permit has been passed
upon in the Alikpala case
 No, that case involved the question of due process. It did not make a ruling
on the continuity of the special import permit.
denied.
Thereafter, petitioner started to make
its importation on Feb 25, 1969. By June
1970, it has already used up $314/350k.
Prudential Bank was agent in issuing
release certificates for the entry of the
goods.
Petitioner requested from Deputy Gov.
an amendment of the country of origin
of the importation to include other
countries except communist countries.
However, Deputy Gov replied that the
Special Import Permit was intended only
for Christmas of 1968.
Later, Collector of Customs issued
warrants of seizure and detention
against the fruits consigned to
petitioner, being imported in violation
of CB Cir. 289 – since fresh fruits are
non-essential consumer goods they are
banned. ITC, the SCourt ordered release
of the importation to petitioner.
(alikpala case)
Petitioner commenced an action for
injunction with the CFI. CFI ordered
release of the goods. The Commissioner
and cCollector sought to have the order
declared before the SC.
Petitioner also filed for mandamus with
damages to direct release of the
imported fruits and provide the
The petitioner is estopped
 It was petitioner that brought up the reason that it needed the permit to
meet the special demands of Christmas. Upon this representation, the
Monetary Board granted the permit.
 Where conduct or representation has induced another to change its position
in good faith or the same is such that a reasonable man would rely thereon,
the consequences of such conduct or representation cannot later on be
disowned.
Petitioner invokes doctrine of promissory estoppel – it points to a letter issued by
Dir. Antiporder informing Prudential to continue issuing release certificates to cover
the No-Dollar Importation after noting that only 144k has been utilized out of 250k.
 Doctrine of promissory estoppel: "an estoppel may arise from the making of
a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the
promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal
to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would
result in other injustice."
 However, a promise cannot be basis of estopple if any other element is
lacking. Justifiable reliance or irreparable detriment to the promises are
requisite factors.
 ITC, the letter cannot have been justifiably relied upon by petitioner. On the
contrary, the letter states that it may continue to release the certificates…
"to the same terms and conditions imposed by the Monetary Board" on the
Special Import Permit,
 ASSUMING that it applies, it cannot produce estoppel against the issuing
authority. Jurisprudence points that the "doctrine of estoppel" does not
operate against the Government. Moreover, estoppel cannot give validity to
an act that is prohibited by law or against public policy.
 To hold that merely the Antiporda's letter could be the basis for such
estoppel would be going in the direction of suspending and repealing the
conditions or terms of the Special Import Permit without any action on the
part of the Monetary Board.
Petitioner cannot rely on Ramos v. CB
 In that case, what was involved was a contractual obligation. The Special
Import Permit is not a contractual obligaton. It is a mere privilege. For a
permit to be impressed with a contractual character, it must be categorically
demonstrated that the very administrative agency, which is the source of the
necessary certificates therefor. The
Judge dismissed. Petitioner appealed.
permit, would place such a burden on itself
Petitioner cannot rely on Commissioner v. Auyon Hian
 This case involved a cancellation of license. ITC, there is no such cancellation
of permit or license. The legality of the issuance of petitioner-appellant's
Special Import Permit is not in question. On the contrary, what is being
sought in this case is the enforcement of the terms and conditions of the
Special Import Permit, one of which, is the resolutory period of 1968.
Authority fo the CB to regulate no-dollar imports
 Such authority clearly emanates from its broad powers to maintain our
monetary stability and to preserve the international value of our currency as
well as its corollary power to issue such rules and regulations for the
effective discharge of its responsibilities and exercise of powers.
 CB Cir. 269 prohibits importation of non-essential consumer goods like fresh
fruits.
 CB Cir. 247 specifically enumerates which items are exempted from the
requirement of release certificates. These are mostly personal effects. Fresh
fruits not included.
 It can thus be readily seen that petitioner-appellant's "fresh fruits"
importations of June and September, 1970 violate the quoted Central Bank
Circulars, hence, liable to seizure action by the Customs.