Tietz 1

Socio-Legal Discourse Conventions:

Where Textual Attributes and Social Realities Meet

Kris Tietz (300149223)

ENGL 374: Advanced Composition

Professor G. Borrows
19 July 2021
 Tietz 2

Introduction

Language is a social phenomenon, but where do the conventions of written language

intersect with the social realities which create exigences for its usage? It is often difficult to say;

however, a closer look at one discipline in which language carries significant weight toward

social results can reveal such a socio-textual bridge. In legal discourse, students, as initiated

novices, learn to compose legal genres and write legal English by following a commonly sewn

pedagogy as well as the conventions read in practiced genre samples produced by field experts.

In conjunction with discussing legal texts formally, we engage in a more comprehensive,

situational direction. This approach considers how the textual conventions elaborated on

correlate to the rhetorical and social realities germane to law. The approach to genre as social

action has been popularly developed since before Miller’s (1984) work and congealed thereafter;

this paper takes a similar stance by isolating the discipline of law and allowing a cross-genre

analysis to permit observance of socio-compositional commonalities in legal English.

Additionally, we note concepts produced by this synthesis which may help law students write

successfully in their discipline. By reviewing together the textual characteristics of legal

discourse as they have been examined by scholars in the literature and the socio-political nature

of written legal English, we find that certain linguistic and rhetorical devices prove integral to

reflecting and reinforcing the social realities, ideology, and goals of the legal system and that

various analyses across legal genres present valuable, underappreciated opportunities for the

improvement of legal writing skills.

Legal genres constitute one unit of analysis for inquiries into legal discourse. Contracts,

statutes, case briefs, judgements, legal journal articles, and other genre forms which legal writing

takes are written according to their purposes (which vary considerably) and audiences (which
 Tietz 3

vary between other legal experts, mixed audiences, and lay people). Purpose and audience are

crucial rhetorical elements for the suitability of language conventions across genre iterations:

phrasal practices, for instance, such as those that address agents, institutions, documents, or

principles will follow the epistemological need of the audience and practical goals of the legal

argument at play. To make inferences about legal English generally, it makes sense to include a

range of legal genres in our considerations of language conventions. This will help capture these

varied purposes and audiences and aid in conclusion formation. At the same time, this paper

incorporates a range of units of analysis where textual attributes are concerned – our

investigation reviews words, markers, bundles, and similar features which fall between a word

and a sentence in length (i.e.: clauses).

Our findings are epistemologically valuable because the literature surrounding legal

discourse has tended to focus on individual composition devices or sociological analyses of

operational legal systems, including law schools and courts. The literature primarily consulted in

this paper (Breeze (2013), Deegan (1995), Hamzai (2019), Matei (2020), Nadova (2015), & Vass

(2017)) has been selected based on scholars’ ranging foci across textual unit lengths and the

incorporation of some socio-rhetorical elements relating to legal English learning and pedagogy.

Deegan (1995) takes a pedagogical stance by tackling legal discourse literacy in the area of legal

reading and observes a stark separation between law schools’ expectations of entrants’ legal

literacy and the prepatory backgrounds of proficient academic readers. Hamzai (2019) computes

the linguistic productivity of several types of compound words as they are found among legal

research essays and finds that while verb compounds were the second-most frequent type used

by students, they were the most morphologically productive. Matei (2020) investigates optimal

methods for teaching legal discourse marker usage for non-native English speakers by first
 Tietz 4

establishing that successful usage of discourse markers constitutes legal genre success and leads

to professional success for legal writers. Nadova (2015) analyzes the usage of non-finite verb

clauses in British parliamentary legislation and British appellate judgements and finds that the

linguistic and rhetorical uses of these verb clauses correspond to their particular legal genres and

those genre’s associated writing conventions. Lastly, Vass (2017) examines uses of hedging in

judgements as such hedges can be broken down into categories of quotative, deductive, sensorial,

and speculative functions; she finds genre-based differences in their employ, which point to

larger, extra-genre implications for rhetorical devices in law. While these scholar’s works are

valuable and adequately represent the type of research foci present in the literature, we can see

that the aims of this paper fill a connecting space between the textual and sociological spheres.

Specifically, the research in this paper fills the targeted epistemological space by pursuing

the following questions:

1. What textual or rhetorical features characterize legal discourse and legal genres?

2. How do legal textual attributes relate to the socio-political realities of law?

3. What resultant ideas might aid novices in finding success in legal writing?

Analysis

We begin in the microcosm of these units of analysis by first consulting Hamzai (2019).

Hamzai provides us with a look into the creationary powers granted by different types of

compounds used in legal English (specifically, legal research papers), which serve as an

important power considering the confining effect which legal genre expectations can have on

writing diversity. In other words, verb compounds (as they are stressed by Hamzai) may stand as

an outlet for writer intellectual creativity in the confines which legal genres impose and may
 Tietz 5

signify a balancing point between the anchoring effect of genre strictness and the innovation of

new legal understandings and conceptions of legal actions. If legal discourse across genres is

able to permit novel expressions to reflect the innovative nature of the world which law

encompasses (in this case via verb compounds), then it can be argued that linguistic liberty is a

natural antidote to the stiff language ideology Mertz (2007) identifies as common to American

law schools, but also that novice legal writers should recognize the unique power of these

devices.

While verb compounds were the second-most frequent type used by students in Hamzai’s

(2019) corpus, they were the most morphologically productive (the verb compounds more

frequently create new, successful conceptualizations). Since the frequency of verb compounds

are generally lower than for their noun counterparts, the rate of invention that does arise from

usages which depict new phenomena or conceptualizations must be moderate at best. Whether

this status of frequency has a disproportionate or causal relationship with language ideology,

genre purpose, or subject matter is difficult to determine without cross-corpus investigations.

Regardless, it is possible to view the compounds as a gateway to disciplinary innovation,

allowing law to keep pace with societal development.

Hamzai (2019) lists the verb compounds that were found only once each in her corpus

(she do not list others): “fast-forward… downshift... shortchange… house-sit… sleep-walk…

overrule… invigorate… underestimate” (p. 58). This list gives us a snapshot (albeit limited) at

what characterizes some verb compounds used in legal English; while “fast-forward” and

“downshift” connote fundamentals of the reality they describe (time and space) and hence are

unlikely to change the dynamics of any legal understandings, the remaining compounds are more

complex in how they invent understandings or expressions for law-germane phenomena.

 Tietz 6

“Shortchange” connotes both a comparison and a negative action; “house-sit” connotes action,

personification, and colloquialism (which widens audience reception); “sleep-walk” connotes

action and state-of-agency; “overrule” connotes hierarchy, authority, and ethos; “invigorate”

connotes action and state-of-agency; “underestimate” connotes comparison, consequence (which

further implies state-of-agency), and action. Of course, since these are all verb compounds, they

all connote action – where I have explicitly listed action above correspond to verb compounds

which connote strongly with the physical actions of specific agents as they might relate to

particular legal cases, rather than the broadest sense of action.

Of particular interest, connotations of comparison as they are found here stem from the

availability of alternative actions or choices, which broaden as temporal human progress

continues to shape the innovations required by the legal system and profession, among most

others. Because of this perennial quality, verb compounds which are morphologically productive

for applications on choice as it relates to actions taken by agents and the resultant states of agents

may prove to be highly useful for permitting legal writers a degree of linguistic slack when

inventing novel expressions or conceptualization of existing legal dynamics. In contrast, Hamzai

(2019) concludes that “the least productive… [were]… nominal compounds,” and that “such

results are not surprising… since… nouns are expected to be the most commonly used words

in… law” (p. 59). It can be added that low productivity on this frontier is also not surprising

since nominal compounds tend to deal with rather fixed ideas (there are more innovations in how

to do things than there are in things to do). It is notable, though, that as Hamzai points to a

subject (“law”) attribute instead of a corpus- or genre-based one, there is more reason to

approach legal discourse holistically when utilizing textual methodologies.

 Tietz 7

Hamzai (2019) also concludes that use of productive compounds holds a positive

relationship to the writer’s English skills. This builds a clear path toward novice writers’

identities as they relate to English fluency and prior writing development. Students originating

from disciplines comparatively lacking emphasis on composition skills and those who do not

speak English as their primary language will undoubtedly undergo greater challenges in the

adoption of legal English conventions than others. In her final statements, Hamzai furthermore

acknowledges that neologisms appear in legal English corpora where authors are “professionals”

and are “formed based on their competencies and skills in English and their field of research” (p.

59). This positive trend is realized by legal writers as the authorial ethos using language to create

new understandings of the phenomena, often social (action-oriented – as is typified by verb

compounds), in law. Thus, the writer must be or at least feel free to allow competence to

overcome the unknown latent in invention. This authorial confidence would understandably be

absent in novice legal writers but can be highlighted as a critical development for innovations

required to keep legal discourse relevant and operational.

Nadova (2015), like Hamzai (2019), also permits us to view a detailed account of textual

composition features, but, in her article, goes on to make non-trivial connections between those

features (-ing clauses) and their observed legal genres; those legal genres additionally grant a

widening of our scope due to their judicially constructed, professional nature. Nadova analyzes

the usage of non-finite verb clauses in both gerundial and present participle forms within two

comparable corpora of approximately 50,000 words each: (1) British parliamentary legislation,

and (2) British appellate judgements. Nadova finds that the linguistic and rhetorical uses of these

verb clauses correspond to their particular legal genres and those genre’s associated writing

conventions. Nadova gives credence to her approach by recognizing that syntax analyses are
 Tietz 8

“extremely useful for understanding specialists’ behaviour because the… construction…

provides key evidence of its organization of logical thought” (p. 14). Carrying this

acknowledgement into Nadova’s focus on -ing clauses, it is plausible that to adopt legal English

verb clause conventions is then to adopt an integral piece of the legal discourse’s common

structure since it is predicated on accepted thought patterns, and hence, orientations and

approaches. Consciousness of this aspect for a novice can mean an easier path to imitating

practiced legal texts. Consciousness of the convention adoption would simultaneously grant the

student knowledge and inform their consent of the adoption, rather than it being a subconscious

or subliminal process.

In Nadova’s (2015) corpus of appellate judgements, she highlights that the discursive I

and we pronouns are written by justices with the rhetorical effect of meshing their personal

opinion with a sense of neutrality. Another predominant rhetorical effect found in appellate

judgements is “their interdiscursive or intertextual character” (p. 26, Nadova citing Mazzi, 2007

and Vazquez Orta, 2010); we can infer that even slight genre distinctions – such as that between

trial and appellate judgements – will motivate legal writers to utilize different rhetorical devices.

This can be traced back to a key component of the judgement genres: their chronological

position as determined by their place and purpose in the court system hierarchy (i.e.: that judges

in appeal courts are writing after and in response to trial judgement writers, while trial judges do

not know whether the case will be appealed). This relationship between institutional structure

and rhetorical device suitability makes sense, given that institutional organization tends to shape

elements of the rhetorical situation (i.e.: audience), but it is the system design’s effect on

temporal rhetoric which is interesting and worth noting. Students of legal composition may find
 Tietz 9

their arguments more persuasive if they work to develop an encompassing, worldly

comprehension of their legal system and how their document fits into that system.

The primary role of -ing clauses, Nadova (2015) identifies, is their contribution to a

writing economism highly valued in law. That is, economic efficiency in the delivering of

information within legal texts with considerations for media richness and capacity. Valuations

like this help form part of the language ideology of law, however based in practicality they may

be. Linguistic or informational economism demands from legal writers both a degree of

competent expediency and its adoption as a professional value. As Nadova points out, legal

genres will vary in accessibility because the genres are written by varying levels of legal

professionals. While students would generally do well to begin imitating genre samples situated

at the lower end of the authorial-professionalism scale in order to better grasp certain textual

features, writing economism appears to be pervasive. Surely, other such features of the discourse

exist and together stand as a learning curve for all uninitiated students of legal composition.

Pervasive conventions of the linguistic ideology of law such as economism are likely closely tied

to the qualitative nature of the entire legal ethos, which we will describe using ideas such as

order and authority under Vass’ (2017) work below. In the social world, legal decisions,

communications, and dictates take detailed and intertextual forms, often to establish legitimacy

by promoting existing information, transparency, and clarity. If writing economism were not

valued as an integral function of legal language, not only would legal communication constantly

act as an impediment to timely action due to its lengthy and detailed presentation, but it is not

clear whether the discourse would be anywhere near as unified in its conventions as it currently

is, as writing by different legal authors may take on idiosyncratic attributes.

 Tietz 10

Proceeding onward from word-length conventions, one commonly analyzed

compositional feature across corpus investigations has been hedging, often due to the rhetorical

functions and importance of hedging in argumentation. Vass (2017) specifically undertakes such

an analysis of verb hedges in legal English in a corpus which includes the genres of academic

law journal articles, majority and dissenting judicial opinions and observed that law journal

articles incorporated comparatively disproportionate amounts of both speculative and sensorial

verb hedges, while quotative and deductive verb hedges were found likewise in the judicial

genres. Vass’ discovery, like Nadova’s (2015), reveals an author-professionalism spectrum of

legal English writing conventions which spans genres. This observation aligns with the more

academic nature of the law journal article genre, which is closer to general arts and humanities,

and, by its contemplative nature, furthest from practice. Field practice is, after all, the targeted

domain for which law’s order is meant, and thus, for which the more constricting writing

conventions are needed.

The quotative and deductive characterization of verb hedges in judicial genres also

matches Nadova’s aforementioned data, as these hedges contribute to the ethos of ‘objectivity’

demanded by judicial decision; in a wider sense, we can conclude that the order of law is

enforced firstly by word – spoken or written – so it is reasonable to expect the enforcement of

order, especially in judicial decisions, to come firstly from the language employed. In fact, Vass

found that quotative verb hedges were, overall, the most common throughout her corpus, “with

‘argue’ being the most frequent” (p. 23); the frequency of quotative rhetorical devices (surely

even more than the verb hedges Vass examined) showcases the power that law confers to

language because it highlights the words of legal actors as a type of bedrock for justification,
 Tietz 11

authority, and legitimacy.1 It is imperative that any writer understand the power of language, but

it is perhaps more so for novices to legal writing because of the gravity of legal undertakings.

Seeing how rhetorical devices like hedges correspond to the societal contribution of the genre

(i.e.: scholarship’s contribution to thought vs. judgement’s contribution to social order) will help

students write with greater awareness and competency.

Furthermore, Vass (2017) identifies an attribute unique to hedges within her study: that

dissenting opinions wield the possibility of error or future inapplicability (doubt as the function

of their hedges) for critique, whereas majority decisions wield the same for openness and

adaptability. We know that writing conventions will follow the purpose of their enveloping

genre, but to witness this differentiation in hedge function as two opposing sides of the same

genre coin (majority decision judges against dissenting judges) is to witness purpose-driven

language manipulation at work. Vass considers majority decisions and dissenting opinions one

genre since they coexist in the same judgement texts, which is a logical notion, and that

consideration allows us to separate the rhetorical purpose which moulds writing conventions

from genre purpose via argumentation. Socially, both components to this genre ultimately fulfill

the same role: to inform and guide future judicial decisions for similar cases. However, the

presence of argumentation in the text, irrespective of the number of authors (enough to form

adversarial argument), introduces a new, distinguishable layer of rhetorical purpose which pits

authoritative, authorial ethos’ against one another. This manifests socially as a critical check-

and-balance in the judicial system, ensuring that a single groupthink does not always rule,

inputting enough chaos to challenge the ruling order. This rhetorically deliberative nature of law
1
Note: A digression into legitimacy as grounded in language is worth adding; Breeze (2013) claims that “[l]egal
discourse… seeks to define the consequences of actions, or the conditions in which something may or must be
done” (p. 243, emphasis added) – to define is to decide (think of the judiciary). To decide consequences
legitimately, as well as to compel actions, significant authority and proper ethos is demanded by society. Thus,
legitimacy is the heart of the law’s central authoritative spirit, including its dispensing of pathos (discussed shortly).
 Tietz 12

may very well pose both the threat against and reason for the ethos of order (it is a controlled

acting-out of the socially chaotic variances among opinions). New writers to legal English must

be wary of the intricate workings of textual argumentation as it is, but a richer development of

purpose comprehension would undoubtedly benefit them – extraordinarily if a thorough writing

pedagogy touched on this kind of word-purpose, adversarial-deliberation interplay.

In continuance of our turn to elements of dialogical development, we can look to

Breeze’s (2013) study of lexical bundles as they appear throughout legal documents, case law,

legal academic journal articles, and statutes. Breeze defines lexical bundles as “repeated multi-

word sequences in language systems” (p. 229), which, in law, are in “special abundance” (p.

232). This ubiquity might be chalked-up to the logical, formulaic nature of legal writing. Breeze

goes on to categorize the bundles between three prevalent uses: expressing stance (attitudinally

and epistemologically), organizing the dialogue, and referring to entities or their characteristics,

whether intangible or otherwise. Breeze’s classification breakdown shows her corpus’ lexical

bundles’ suitability to the law, especially in light of our discussion of the spirit of the law thus

far; the first category fulfills an ethos role, the second is one of logos, while the third is

rhetorically comparable to the sub-logos idea of case. All are central to the spirit and identity of

both legal writers and law, as it is expressed through the writing of legal actors. It is evidence

that the language conventions of the discipline are informed by its social ones, and that, in turn,

the social conventions are reinforced and social action is performed through that very same

writing; it manifests as an open system.

Another note to make on Breeze’s (2013) categorization is that she also finds legal lexical

bundles to most often refer directly to abstracts, people, documents, procedures, and institutions,

which ought to capture our interest since the majority of these references are inanimate and
 Tietz 13

authority-based, corresponding to the emphasis on ethos, logos, and case. Although ethos is

important in law, pathos is typically minimized and personal agency also, which leaves legal

ethos to be grounded in formal authority alone, devoid of much of the meaningful, substantive

agency content we would otherwise derive from the incorporation of pathos in legal discourse

and practice (an example of language ideology rooted in practicality; the reduction of

irrationality and subjectivity). We are, however, presented with an appropriate yet edifying

genre-based cleavage in the use of lexical bundles in Breeze’s analysis: where academic law

journal articles and case law both mention the rhetorical particular via bundles, statutes and legal

documents tend to mention the rhetorical universal. The reason for this being appropriate is

genre domain. Legal academic articles and case law alike deal with specific cases of legal

situations (though case law’s genre purpose is to influence universal application); legislation and

documents often deal with setting up language that will apply universally, if successful (contracts

may represent an important deviation from this pattern and should be studied further).

The exchange within these genres involving domain and purpose warrant a greater

understanding for legal writers to be successful. In the situation of articles as well as case law,

genre domain is quite limited per individual text, but the purpose is to conclude or learn

something of relevant significant and apply that outcome beyond the borders of the original

domain. Legislation, on the other hand, has both a wide domain (by way of intertextuality and

universalism) and a wide purpose (owing to universalism again). Interestingly, documents have a

rather limited domain but a wide purpose. The diversity of these combinations means that legal

writers should contemplate the jurisdiction of their genre at hand in addition to its purpose, as

this may affect how often appropriate lexical bundles are used and will, regardless, develop their

compositional skills.
 Tietz 14

Moreover, students of legal English can select their study texts by identifying where the

genre fits along the spectrum of authorial professionalism. For instance, interning law students

may help compose legal documents, but journal articles and case law will always be developed

by those at the height of the merit/stature professional hierarchy (it is worth noting that it is here

that legal authors deal with more abstracts through lexical bundles than others (Breeze, 2013)).

So, students can target certain legal composition skills and disciplinary writing conventions

according to their study text. Academic articles and case law furthermore exclude chronos to a

much greater degree than other legal genres (Breeze, 2013), substituting this rhetorical element

for heavier authorial ethos (i.e.: the stature of the scholar or judge). Putting this information into

the context of the speculative attributes of these two genres may indicate that such a substitution,

as a genre convention, is due to authoritative opinion being expressed in a contemplative

vacuum. Given the nuance and indirect language that often accompanies abstract discourse, a

rhetorical analysis for kairos (where texts lack chronos) could be undertaken to test this theory.

Two Foci of Legal Literacy in the Literature

When we think about how law schools teach their students, several key scholars who

have shared interest in the topic come to mind. Mertz’s (2007) work contributes greatly to our

understanding of the American cultural, social, and ideological influences on United States law

school pedagogy, highlighting that the presentation of legal discourse as “neutral” (p. 5)

masquerades the strong lingual, interpretive philosophy implicitly taught to law students when

texts and instructors emphasize authority and form over the complex, underlying social dynamics

and questions of morals often involved in legal cases. Mertz explores the sociologically and

linguistically dominating conventions prevalent in American law schools by analyzing audio

 Tietz 15

recordings and written notations from eight contracts courses, each from a separate law school.

She finds that law schools in the United States teach the discipline through a largely implicit

ideology of language which substitutes the ethos of the legal process and system for meaning-

laden interpretations of the social realities involved in many legal cases and stands behind a

sheen of alleged neutrality. While a critique of legal ‘neutrality’ can certainly be made, Mertz’s

(2007) investigation grant us another perspective valuable to our focus – the apparent trend that

law schools tend to shy away from examinations of social complexities surrounding applications

of the law. As students learn to adopt legal writing conventions, we have demonstrated that a

thorough comprehension of the enveloping social realities can aid legal writing novices develop

their rhetorical and lexical choices as they are based, primarily, in the ethos of the law from its

social practice. Due to this seeming gap in legal education, we turn briefly to Matei (2020) and

Deegan (1995).

Matei (2020) explores some effective methods of teaching discourse markers in legal

English and their roles for legal audiences, which offers a needed methodological difference

from Mertz’s (2007) sociological orientation of legal pedagogy and confers an opportunity to

delve into detailed, textual usages of specific composition features. Matei investigates optimal

methods for teaching legal discourse marker usage for non-native English speakers by first

establishing that successful usage of discourse markers constitutes legal genre success and leads

to professional success for legal writers. Matei recommends raising the practical roles of

discourse markers in the legal profession to students’ attention and teaching them their

conventions and communicative functions using mostly context-based approaches. The very fact

that scholarly attention such as Matei’s must be paid to this topic means that the development of

the subject in legal education is underwhelming or lacking. Matei’s work is particularly

 Tietz 16

enlightening because she raises our awareness of writing devices (discourse markers) for which

their “pragmatic meanings and functional roles… due to their being utterly context-based, are

constantly changing in full accordance with the dynamics of language use” (p. 329). This is a

marked difference from devices like verb compounds prior discussed under Hamzai (2019) and

the contextual core of discourse markers make it hard to learn their adoption in a new discipline.

When covering her methodology, Matei (2020) claims that the optimal way for novices to

adopt discourse markers in legal English when they are non-native speakers is to study them in

large quantities across varying contexts. Her recommended approach is understandable for her

study’s purpose, but it begs the question of whether the method would differ if the focus were on

native English users. On one hand, we might expect the initial method to remain the same since

devices that are entirely context-based demand a demonstration of a full range of contexts to be

adequately learned. On the other, the quantitative approach Matei suggests leaves a void where

potential, deeper understanding of discourse markers’ significance is switched out for a learning

outcome akin to imitation. Matei mentions one difference in legal students between these native

language groups: non-native English speakers are expectedly ignorant of the “pragmatic

dimension” (p. 330) of their writing. If we assume that native English speakers are aware of this

element, we could also expect them to more easily grasp other social ties to their language use,

since pragmatism is necessarily a social concept.

The fact that discourse markers, in any discipline, are structurally critical to the dialogue

and are yet fully contextual shows the requirement of language to be adaptable and versatile. In

law, pragmatic attitudes of writers in the implementation of versatility devices may influence

legal writers (and, thus, actors) to behave in rhetorically adaptable ways; images of the

archetypal smarmy, say-what-pleases lawyer come to mind. The connections between these
 Tietz 17

socio-psychological archetypes, disciplinary culture, and discourse ought to be followed up on to

gain better insights on such contextual devices as discourse markers, where analyses of contexts

(in conjunction with specific textual uses) can be carried out.

A second area where legal education seems to be insufficient in relation to its disciplinary

writing conventions is the reading side of disciplinary texts. Under the umbrella of literacy,

reading and writing influence each other to a significant degree. However, Deegan (1995) points

out that law schools “assum[e]… that students… enter law school with intact literacy skills, and

that those skills can be readily transferable to the texts of law” (p. 157) and that work done by

Lundeberg (1987, as cited in Deegan) reveals challenges in the reading of case law for students

who are proficient readers in non-legal subjects. This is an important institutional gap due to the

centrality of language in law and the earlier link between reading and composition: how students

interpret legal texts influences how they compose them. In Deegan’s conclusion, she states that

further research is called for in deciphering how the strategies legal readers use (i.e.:

“problematizing” (p. 166)) affect their success in writing and furthermore acknowledges that

tactics academic readers successfully employ in their previous disciplines may not work in law.

The disconnect Deegan finds between law schools and their students in the activity of legal

reading could indicate a broader disconnect between those of the disciplinary social in-group and

out-group. Students conscious of this dynamic might be better off if their awareness leads to the

discovery of more opportunities for improvement in legal reading comprehension, and in turn,

legal composition.

Conclusion
 Tietz 18

Our exploration of the literature has revealed that authorial/actor creativity, rhetorical

invention, and innovation where discipline meets world in legal writing can be realized from

some textual attributes like verb compounds, the connotations of which reflect social realities

like agency choice, though linguistic and professional proficiencies are required for needed

confidence. We have also found that to adopt syntax conventions is to adopt discursive structure

and conventional approaches, that the slightest genre differences determine non-trivial

differences in rhetorical strategy as a result of their place in the legal system’s institutional

structure, with the aspect of time determining audience and purpose, and that law promotes

informational economism pervasively and such pervasive features act as a learning curve.

Furthermore, we have concluded from Vass (2017) that legal genres follow author-

professionalism hierarchies, that language is central to the law’s enforcement of order with legal

actors’ words creating justification, authority, and legitimacy, and that genres which introduce

multi-authorial argumentation create new rhetorical purpose divisible from genre prupose,

informing how information is rhetorically handled by writers.

From Breeze (2013), we have observed that law, in writing and in practice, is an open

system, that genre purpose and domain are consequentially distinguishable, that lexical bundles

in law support ethos, logos, and case, and that research is needed on the link between contextual

devices and social dynamics. Moreover, we find from our investigation that writing pragmatism

can stand as a gateway to other socio-compositional ties, that legal reading and writing skills are

insufficiently promoted together with explicitness, and that there is a social disconnect between

law school and their entrants as a dynamic of in-group vs. out-group, which systemically affects

how novices learn to adopt legal English conventions. In conclusion to our third research

question, student awareness of the observed socio-compositional dynamics in this paper mean an
 Tietz 19

informed rather than subliminal adoption process, an extent of agency power as a wielder of

language, a more rounded legal writing identity, awareness of professional hierarchy and what

inexperience means for their composition, and finally, how their writing fits with the overarching

legal system and knowing how viewing their genres in light of societal contribution can alter

their rhetorical strategies.

We witness the spirit of the law in the letter of the law. What is perhaps too often

forgotten is that every legal actor who writes contributes to that letter of their legal profession

and that because writing is a social action, the conventions that determine the words, markers,

influencers, and bundles legal actors use are not just found in texts produced across genre

boundaries but originate and rebound to the complex social sphere. Further research in this area

is much needed, the lack of which in combination with the brevity of this paper create limitations

for our work. Understanding the hidden intricacies of how legal language intertwines with socio-

legal realities can help legal writers understand their social actions as they write. As the letter is

to the law, so is the law to the letter.

 Tietz 20

References

  
Breeze, R. (2013). Lexical bundles across four legal genres. International Journal of Corpus Linguistics,
18(2), 229-253.

Deegan, D. H. (1995). Exploring individual differences among novices reading in a specific 

domain: The case of law. Reading Research Quarterly, 30(2), 154.
  
Hamzai, J. (2019, Dec). An investigation of morphological productivity of nominal and verbal 
compounds in legal discourse. SEEU Review, 14(2), 51-61.
  
Matei, M. G. (2020). Teaching the pragmatic functions of discourse markers in legal English. 
Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov. Series VII: Social Sciences. Law , 13(2), 329-
338. 
  
Mertz, E. (2007). The language of law school: Learning to “think like a lawyer.” NY: Oxford 
University Press.
    
Miller, C. R. (1984). Genre as social action. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70(2), 151-167.

Nadova, Z. (2015). Ing clauses and their functions across legal English corpora: A comparative 
genre-based study. Electronic Journal of Applied Linguistics, 14, 13-34.
    
Vass, H. (2017, Oct). Lexical verb hedging in legal discourse: The case of law journal articles and 
supreme court majority and dissenting opinions. English for Specific Purposes, 48, 17-31.