Bache & Co v Ruiz

Facts:

On 24 February 1970, respondent Misael Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Judge Vicencio Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against
petitioners for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code and authorizing respondent de Leon to
make and file the application for the same.

In the afternoon of the following day, de Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the CFI of Rizal
and brought the necessary documents for the application for search warrant. The Clerk of Court took
first their depositions because Judge Ruiz was still conducting a hearing. But after the session, Judge Ruiz
was able to take Logronio’s oath and signed the application. Thus, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70.

Three days after, which was on a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant at petitioner’s
corporate office in Ayala, Makati. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal
complaint, transcript or testimony was attached. The agents nevertheless proceeded with the search
and yielded 6 boxes of documents.

On 03 March 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal praying that the search warrant be
quashed and be considered null and void. But respondent Judge dismissed the petition. Consequently,
the BIR made tax assessments against petitioners based on the seized documents. Hence, this present
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may object against search and seizure?

RULING: YES.

Among others, the issue that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
seizures is being raised in this case.

The Court ruled that although it is of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a
violation of a statute of the state of its creation, nevertheless, they do not wish to be understood as
holding a corporation not entitled to immunity against unreasonable search and seizures. After all, a
corporation is an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of
law, and is protected under the 4th amendment against unlawful discrimination.
In addition, the Court states, citing the case of Stonehill v. Diokno, the imlied recognition on the right of
a corporation to object against unreasonable search and seizures, to wit:

“It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners may not validly invoke object to the use
as evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporation, since such right belongs exclusively to the corporations, the whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity.”

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

FACTS:

Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to have committed acts
in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code.”

Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject
of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and
Revised Penal Code.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into (2) major groups, namely:

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and

(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and the Rules
of court by:

(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.

The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; The
defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners consent; and in any event, the effects are admissible
regardless of the irregularity.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a resolution,
the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the
corporations.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD: NO the search warrant is invalid.

The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the
case at bar, none of these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”

In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract.

As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.

As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as
alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or codes.

The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.

Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against
their corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.

The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

FACTS:

l The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-
editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants
issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.

l Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:

1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.

2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.

3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.

4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles, instruments,
etc.

5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted surveillance
of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause.

l Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only impugned the search
warrant six months later.
ISSUE:

WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

HELD:

l NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.

l Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending
to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

l The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used
and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was
a grave error for the respondent judge to have done so.

AAA v Carbonell

Fact; Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from February
28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a book
to an office located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been turned
off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.

On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go near
him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement.
He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for
help but to no avail because there was nobody else in the premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when
she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to her
parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.

On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution4 finding probable
cause and recommending the filing of an information for rape. Arzadon moved for reconsideration and
during the clarificatory hearing held on October 11, 2002, petitioner testified before the investigating
prosecutor. However, she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.

On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint5 with a comprehensive account of the
alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo.
During the preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003,
the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution6 finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and
recommending the filing of the information.

Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to review
the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the clarificatory questioning, the panel
issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution7 finding probable cause and denying Arzadon’s motion for
reconsideration.

An Information8 for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union
on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415. Thereafter, Arzadon filed a "Motion to Hold in
Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine
Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest."9 On March 18, 2004, respondent Judge
Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness
stand for determination of probable cause.

Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause before the
Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found no
probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.10

Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales reversed the
July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution11 finding that probable cause exists. Thus, a new
Information12 for rape was filed against Arzadon docketed as Criminal Case No. 6983.
Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the
Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest."13 In an Order dated August 11, 2005, respondent Judge
Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.

Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the
documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. Pending resolution
thereof, she likewise filed a petition14 with this Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal Case No.
6983. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re: Transfer of
Venue of Criminal Case No. 6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, San Fernando City, La Union, to any Court in Metro Manila.

In a Resolution15 dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioner’s request for transfer of venue.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and docketed as Criminal Case No.
06-242289. However, the proceedings have been suspended pending the resolution of this petition.

Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
hence, this petition

Issues:

whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case
No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.

Ruling:

We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.

Principles:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required... to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a... warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The... determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating... prosecutor.

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The... determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating... prosecutor.[

The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of
probable cause.[27] Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates... the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the... respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require that the
evidence would justify conviction.

Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the... respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require that the
evidence would justify conviction. [34]

People v Pastrana

Facts: On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBJ) Special Investigator Albert Froilan
Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant5 before the RTC, Makati City, Branch
63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and
Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he
received confidential information that respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign
investors. Some of their employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they would convince to
invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were
instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were actually
purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana's
personal account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents with
lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that the
scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).6

In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed H.
Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia;7 the affidavits of respondents' former employees
who actually called clients abroad;8 the articles of incorporation of domestic corporations used by
respondents in their scheme;9 and the sketch of the place sought to be searched .10

On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City,
issued Search Warrant No. 01-118, viz:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Search Warrant No. 01-118 For: Violation of R.A. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and Estafa (Art.
315, RPC)

-versus-

AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD of 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath the applicant NBI [Special
Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his witnesses RONNIE AROJADO and MELANIE O. BATO,
that there is probable cause to believe that AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD have in their
possession/control located in [an] office premises located at 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St.,
Makati City, as shown in the application for search warrant the following documents, articles and items,
to wit:
Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their personal files;
incorporation papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales agreements with clients; copies of
official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from the clients; copies of credit advise from the
banks; clients['] message slips; company brochures; letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal
assets of Amador Pastrana; list of clients and other showing that these companies acted in violation of
their actual registration with the SEC.

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day of the premises above-
described and forewith seize and take possession thereof and bring said documents, articles and items
to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their search within the validity of the warrant.

This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this Date.11

Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino
and Gerardo Denna, Chief Security Officer and Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate
Center. Pursuant to the Return,12 dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory Sheet13 attached thereto, the
NBI and the SEC were able to seize the following:

1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:

a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;

b. List of brokers and 201 files;

c. Sales agreements;

d. Official receipts;
e. Credit advise;

f. Fax messages;

g. Clients message slips;

h. Company brochures;

i. Letterheads; and

j. Envelopes.

2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;

3. Offshore incorporation papers;

4. Lease contracts; and

5. Vouchers/ledgers.

On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in
connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC,
which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants
are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Further,
Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.14

On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the search warrant, respondent
Abad moved for the inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of three (3) months
without action on the motion to quash clearly showed Judge Salvador, Jr. 's aversion to passing
judgment on his own search warrant.15
In an Order,16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.
Hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.

The Regional Trial Court Ruling

In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void
because it violated the requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one
specific offense only. It added that the SRC alone punishes various acts such that one would be left in
limbo divining what specific provision was violated by respondents; and that even estafa under the RPC
contemplates multifarious settings. The RTC further opined that the search warrant and the application
thereto as well as the inventory submitted thereafter were all wanting in particularization. The fallo
reads:

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, 2001 is hereby QUASHED and NULLIFIED.
All documents, articles and items seized are hereby ordered to be RETURNED to petitioner/accused. Any
and all items seized, products of the illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in evidence and cannot be used in
any proceeding for whatever purpose. The petition to cite respondent SEC and NBI officers for contempt
of court is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.17

Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal before the CA.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search
"Warrant No. 01-118 clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which prohibits the
issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense, because the application failed to specify
what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type of estafa was committed by respondents. The
appellate court observed that the application for search warrant never alleged that respondents or their
corporations were not SEC-registered brokers or dealers, contrary to petitioner's allegation that
respondents violated Section 28.1 of the SRC which makes unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks
in a dealer or broker capacity without the requisite SEC registration.
The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed to pass the test of particularity. It
reasoned that the inclusion of the phrase "other showing that these companies acted in violation of
their actual registration with the SEC" rendered the warrant all-embracing as it subjected any and all
records of respondents inside the office premises to seizure and the implementing officers effectively
had unlimited discretion as to what property should be seized. The CA disposed the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Omnibus Order dated May 10,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated 11
March 2011. Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WHICH
QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT GAERLAN'S APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 SHOW THAT SAID WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799.

II.

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED THEREIN WHICH SHOW A
REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING AS STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LICENSE
FROM THE SEC. THE IMPUGNED STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF ITEMS DID
NOT INTEND TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE "SHOWING
THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL REGISTRATION WITH THE SEC."19
Held: It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant
to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items;
and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however, required that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities.55

In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,56 it was pointed out that one of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.57

In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal property may be the subject of a search
warrant: (i) the subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense.58

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense alleged
committed by respondents. Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing judge as well
as the applicant for the search warrant to determine that the items sought to be seized are connected to
any crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and items enumerated in the search warrant failed the
test of particularity. The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all
documents pertaining to the transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure.
Even the phrase "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration
with the SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was indeed
issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations'
certificate of registration with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers
or dealers.

In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one offense and
for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.

Soliven v. Judge Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)

FACTS:
Luis Beltran was a columnist for the newspaper Philippine Star. Maximo Soliven was the paper’s editor-
in-chief. They were sued for libel by then President Corazon Aquino due to an article written by Beltran
wherein he alleged that the president “hid under the bed” during a bloody coup attempt staged by
military rebels in December 1989. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Ramon Makasiar. Judge
Makasiar then issued a warrant of arrest against Beltran et al. Beltran et al filed a certiorari petition
before the Supreme Court alleging, among others, that (1) the warrants of arrest against them were
irregularly issued due to the fact that Judge Makasiar did not personally examine the complainant
(President Aquino) and her witnesses before issuing the arrest warrants, and (2) President Aquino
cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her presidential immunity from suit; A
president cannot be sued, however, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to
be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a
witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a judge is required to personally examine the complainant and/or his witnesses in
determining probable cause prior to issuing a warrant of arrest.

RULING:

No. Sec. 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: “xxx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce…”. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)

FACTS:
In pursuant to Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, magazines, publications
and other reading materials that are alleged to be obscene, pornographic and indecent were seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks and later
burned in public at the University belt along CM Recto Avenue Manila in the presence of Mayor
Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. One of which was Pinoy
Playboy magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita, the plaintiff.

The plaintiff then filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narciso Cabrera (superintendent of Western Police District of the City
Manila), seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs
magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming such materials is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine and that publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

Then, an Urgent Motion was filed by the petitioner for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
was later granted.

In defense of Mayor Bagatsing, he claimed that the confiscation and seizure was done in pursuant to PD
No 960 which the materials were voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities and the plaintiffs’
establishment was not raided.

While, the plaintiff filed his Memorandum raising the issues as to whether or not the defendants and/or
their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding
is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not".

The trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or
burned by the defendants, are obscene per se or not". Later, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to
be given three days to file a reply to the defendant's opposition; however, after following such order,
the plaintiff’s motion was denied and the case was dismissed for lack of merit.

The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the
police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on
the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the
trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to
it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure was constitutional

RULING:

No. As strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption
is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a
danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the
speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts
notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with,
and be held accountable for, due process.

The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below.
First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize
property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, the Court defined
police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare ." Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police
power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt
our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the
commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, specifically.

Pasion vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 68 (1938)

FACTS:

Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a
search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion
Vda. de Garcia, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her
activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he
has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia
keeps and conceals in her house and store, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other
papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and
provided." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to
the office of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's
bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at the
time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet
containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to
Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury
Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently
filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel,
demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized. By motion, the legality of the
search warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the devolution
of the documents demanded. By resolution, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part. A
motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order. Pasion de Garcia registered her
exception.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrant is valid by reason of waiver of constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

RULING:

No. Warrant was declared null and void.

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant
to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by
the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the
obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court. Herein, the
existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the
judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It
does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description
of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is
sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court
which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal and
used by him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the warrant was
issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was issued
primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the
justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her
bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of
constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. As the
constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional
rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

MATA V. BAYONA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MATA V. BAYONA G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

FACTS:

l Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE PHILIPPINE JAI-
ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A
FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA AREA".

l The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai
Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine
Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."

l During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the warrant is missing from the records of the case.

l This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized

l The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP and the court made a certification that the documents
were not attached immediately and that there’s nowhere in the rules which specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records.

l Petitioner’s MR was also denied

l Hence, this petition praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and
all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Furthermore, While the SC held that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot
be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the
return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

Del Castillo v. People, 664 SCRA 430 (2012)

FACTS:

Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of
petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to
implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small
structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his
men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of
Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where
the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.

ISSUE:

Whether there was violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizures

RULING:

No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well
as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical
materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the
drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the
prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own
starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent
of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy
the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT
FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu, and the
second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to
search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a witness
Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.

The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in QC to
serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left
unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began to force their way
inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the
finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.

Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to review the purported
warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and took his
cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.

The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit appealed the said
decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence
against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana seized
from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that
the operatives employed unnecessary force in executing the warrant.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was inadmissible in evidence
against him.

2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain view
doctrine.

HELD:

1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.

2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain view when
it was seized.

RATIO:
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.
Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The
warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be
noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two different provisions
in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that
does not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize
marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to
indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place
to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on
record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.

2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid
portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for
admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There
was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents
wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold
that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.

PEOPLE V. SUCRO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PEOPLE V. SUCRO G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

FACTS:

l Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by their Station Commander to
monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro
was selling marijuana

l As planned Roy Fulgencio monitored the activities of the accused under the house of Regalado and
near the chapel where the accused was selling marijuana to a group of persons around 5 pm.

l Pat reported this to their station commander and instructed him to continue his monitoring.

l At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

l At that point, after Macabante bought from the accused, they pursue Macabante and told them he
bought it from herein accused-appellant.
l The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts.
The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante,

l Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags were seized without serving upon him a search warrant.

l The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, is a violation of his rights granted under
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

l He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest
warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused
two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently

WON the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:

YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where an arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
From the records of the case, Fulgencio saw Sucro three times dealing drugs inside the chapel where he
is 2 meters away monitoring his nefarious activities then after the 3rd deal, the police intercepted the
buyer Macabante and when confronted by the police, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
marijuana from Sucro. Therefore, Sucro had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored accused-appellants nefarious
activity.

The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio
himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported
Sucro's activities only three days before the incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that
after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality.
Hence, it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend
and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable information was
given by some informants that selling was going on every day, he was constrained to report the matter
to the Station Commander.

On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of
a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed.

The general rule is that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule... Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the RCP which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Since the arrest was considered valid, the evidence presented is admissible in evidence.

Hence, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged.
The trial court's decision must be upheld.

People vs. Go, GR 116001, 14 March 2001

FACTS:

SPO1 Piamonte and SPO3 Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba
Police, received an intelligence report from a police civilian that he saw Luisito Go also known as “King
Louie” with a gun tucked in his waist, entered the Flamingo Disco House. Together, the three policemen
proceeded to the said disco house. When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the
owner that they were conducting an “Operation Bakal,” whereby they search for illegally possessed
firearms. The owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. The police officers saw Go
and his lady companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked Go to stand up. When
the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of
the gun, but Go was unable to produce any. Instead, Go brought the driver’s license of a certain Tan
Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the gun, and invited Go to the police precinct for
questioning.

On the way out of the disco, Go asked permission to bring his car, which was parked outside. The police
officers Go to his car. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and
floor of the car. They asked Go why he had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, Go
suggested that they talk the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that
they should talk at the police headquarters. Go took out an attache case from the car and opened it.
There were two black clutch bags inside. Go opened the first bag, which contained shiny white
substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.

The police officers brought Go to the police station. When they arrived at the precinct, they turned over
the attache case together with the two black clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator found
eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the
attache case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an
improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.1

Consequently, two Informations were filed against Go before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 34. The first Information, charged accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A.
6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The other Information, charged Go with violation of P.D. 1866,

ISSUE:

Whether or not Go was lawfully arrested.

RULING:

Yes. The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest
having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence
recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when,
in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting
officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In this case, the police saw the gun tucked in Go’s waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible.
No search was conducted as none was necessary. Go could not show any license for the firearm,
whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence
of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the
recognized exceptions under the Rules.

Reyes vs. People, GR 229380, 6 June 2018

FACTS:

At around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a group of police officers from Cardona,
Rizal was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers
approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had
just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog in which a woman identified to be Reyes.

The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal
kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something out from her breast
area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the
sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-1”.

Thereafter, PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the
seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed10
that the substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerousdrug.

Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5, 2012 and not November
6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to board a jeepney, when a man
approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the
jeepney until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1
Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied
having. She was then brought to the police station where the police officers extorted from her the
amount of P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police
officers took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of the petitioner is lawful.

RULING:

No. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it identifies three (3) instances
when warrantless arrests may be lawfully affected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and
(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Here in this case, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself
admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that
she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking
while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.

In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and
in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent thereof
established by clear and positive proof, which were not shown in this case. In fine, there being no lawful
warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes on account of the search is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. And since the
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from criminal liability.

UMIL V. RAMOS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

UMIL V. RAMOS G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

FACTS:

l Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be
one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.

l Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando
Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).

l Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
l Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.

l In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on
the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a
valid ground for his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113,
Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the
New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion which,
like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the
St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two
(2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there
and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents
or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts
mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it
would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would
have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace
officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is
therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without
limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest
of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of
arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative
sanctions.

LUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (667 SCRA 421)

FACTS:
PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle
drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza invited Luz to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down Luz is almost in front of the said sub-station. While
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and
kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. Luz obliged and slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket which contained a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to
three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife.
Upon seeing the said container, he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the former spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of
which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

Luz was later charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that there was no lawful
search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully arrested.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, Luz filed a case to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

WON Luz can be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic violation under the city ordinance, and
such arrest lead to a valid search and seizure?

Assuming that Luz was deemed arrested, was there a valid warrantless search and seizure that can still
produce conviction?

1. No. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for
this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of
his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.

2. Even if one were to work under the assumption that Luz was deemed arrested upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The subject
items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.

MARTIN VILLAMOR Y TAYSON v. PEOPLE, GR No. 200396, 2017-03-22

Facts:
A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into
private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are
instances where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the
constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at
bar.

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an
illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a
cellphone, and cash.

Another Information[5] was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law

On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to the
latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Floren... t... cio inside their
house. Villamor gave Bonaobra P2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra then
went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later identified
as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in
the act ka!" Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men
entered the house and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service
vehicle and brought in for investigation at the police headquarters.

the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng... respectively as a
collector or agent... and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor... he RTC gave credence to the
testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto
committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng,"

Issues:

whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under Section 3(c) for
Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be
upheld.

Ruling:
The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated
by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest
or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and
seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is
inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of
probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the
said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any
evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

In... warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely
"(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer."

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless
arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established petitioners had just committed, or were actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the
arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some
15 to 20 meters away from petitioners.

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners,
the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was
ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental
to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded
by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the
compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD
Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually
being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the
police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately
preceding the arrest.

People vs. Gerente G.R. No. 95847-48 March 10, 1993 219 SCRA 756 (1993)

Facts: Edna Edwina Reyes testified that appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and
Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is
about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day.
She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Appellant allegedly
agreed: “Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya.” Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan
to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace,
followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head
and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim’s head. Thereafter, the three
men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day,
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together
with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the
mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two
roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes that she saw
the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen
proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house
and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to
the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

Issue: Whether the Personal Knowledge of the policeman of the crime committed by the accused is
justified and valid in arresting the latter without securing an arrest and search warrant.

Held: Yes, “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.” The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they
found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since
the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did. The search conducted on Gerente’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as
an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.” The frisk and search of appellant’s person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be
arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

PEOPLE V. DON RODRIGUEZA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PEOPLE V. DON RODRIGUEZA G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992

FACTS:

l The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City, received a confidential information regarding an ongoing
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay.

l The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-buyer. He was told by the informant to look for a certain
Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs.

l Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia
where be could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be
returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant.

l After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100 grams of marijuana, Don left Taduran and Segovia and
when he came back, he’s already bringing with him a plastic containing Marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran
returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.

l Based on that information, they apprehended the accused without a warrant of arrest.

l Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a search warrant the house of the father(Jovencio
Rodrigueza) of herein accused-appellant. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe, among others.

l The next 2 days, the father was released and Don and co-accused remained.

l The three accused (Don, Segovia, Lonceras) presented different versions of their alleged participation.

l RTC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) while the two co-accused were
acquitted.

l Hence, this appeal raising the issue of the legality of his arrest.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest was in consonance to his constitutional right

HELD:

NO. The arrest and seizure were illegally conducted.

As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant.

l when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion;

l when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;

l when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;

l when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration
laws;

l when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;

l in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulations,

In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant.

It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases above.

Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM
agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.

The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana
leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant.
From the records of the case, Taduran (poseur-buyer) bought 100 grams of marijuana from Don but the
evidence presented were the prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called
follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.

The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of
appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and
the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the
existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to
the cause of the prosecution.

Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly
shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant should not be allowed
to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against him.

Go vs CA

G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992

Facts:

Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s
car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene
of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that
he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests.

Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police
station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had
the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no
lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception
to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go;

Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation

Held:

1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides as follows:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.”

Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however,
constitute “personal knowledge.”

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning
of Section 5 of Rule 113.

2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there
had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation.”

In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before
respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of
petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a
legitimate one

People v. Pasudag, GR 128822, 4 May 2001

FACTS:

While the team of SPO2 Pepito Calip was conducting their anti-jueteng operations in Sison, Pangasinan,
he urinated at a bushy bamboo fence where he saw marijuana plants growing in between the corn
plants and camote tops in a 70 square-meter garden. He reported the same to his chief and dispatched
his team to conduct an investigation. He went straight to the owner of the garden, Alberto Pasudag, and
asked him to bring them to his backyard garden. They took pictures of Pasudag standing beside one of
the marijuana plants. The police then brought Pasudag and the confiscated marijuana plants to the
police station. There, he admitted that he owned the marijuana plants. He was charged and found guilty
by the trial court of illegal cultivation of marijuana.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in holding Pasudag guilty of illegal cultivation of marijuana.

RULING:

Yes. The arrest of the accused was tainted with constitutional infirmity.

The procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the
person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Any evidence obtained in violation
of this provision is inadmissible.

The police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. With the illegal
seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant. Moreover, it was revealed that the accused was not informed of his
constitutional rights. The court did not agree with the Solicitor General that the accused was not under
custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that
custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Even if the confession or admission
were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such
assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the accused was acquitted from the crime
charged.

People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)

FACTS:

Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation.

Later on, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen and both were charged for Illegal
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The fiscal absolved Ali after a thorough investigation. Then trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. His defense,Aminnudin,
disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two
shirts and two pairs of pants.

· He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant.

· At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana,
the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed.

· He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling
watches and sometimes cigarettes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.

RULING:

No. Aminuddin was arrested illegally.

The mandate of the Constitution is clear that a valid search or arrest warrant shall be served first before
the authorities can check his personal properties or deprived him of his liberty.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after a personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly
called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by
the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

As to the Court’s exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant,
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must, therefore, be discharged on the
presumption that he is innocent.

Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted.

People vs. Omaweng G.R. No. 99050, September 2, 1992. 213 SCRA 462 (1992)

Facts: “In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the Mt. Province PC
Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per
instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
going to Sagada and the other to. They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the
checkpoint. At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw
and flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc
Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by appellant and had no passengers.
Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant acceded to the
request. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially
covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. Layong and
his companions asked permission to see the contents of the bag. Appellant consented to the request but
told them that it only contained some clothes. When Layong opened the bag, he found that it contained
forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances. Layong gave a packet
to his team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was
marijuana. The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and proceeded to
the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the
evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling. Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa,
La Trinidad, Benguet, who has conducted more than 2500 professional examinations of marijuana,
shabu and cocaine samples, conducted two chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the
plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana. A criminal
complaint was filed against the accused where the judge convicting the accused of the crime of
transporting prohibited drugs penalized under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Hence
the appeal.

Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of the accused against unreasonable search was violated even if
he consented the opening of the said bag.

Held: He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his
vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of (sic) his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof, he right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
“Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the
officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said packages were
identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on formally offered in evidence, the accused did not
raise any objection whatsoever.

Veroy vs. Judge Layague 210 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Petitioners questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained in violation of their constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure when a .45 caliber gun was seized from their home during the
conducted search to verify an information that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding in their house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seized evidence is admissible.

HELD:

No. Petitioners alleged that the permission given to Capt. Obrero to enter their house was merely for
the purpose of ascertaining the presence of alleged rebel soldiers. The permission did not include the
authority to conduct a room to room search. The items taken, were therefor, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights and are inadmissible in evidence against them.

The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it
does not follow that the subjects may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is
still necessary. Items confiscated illegally cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the
criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.

People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457 (1992)

FACTS:

The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan City.

They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they earlier
arrested.

They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with Bernie
Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant.

Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper.
Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house.

The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was
absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. In one of the rooms,
they saw subversive materials which they confiscated. They likewise brought the persons found in the
house to the headquarters for investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the
house and owned the items confiscated.

Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE/S: Whether the evidence obtained in the warrantless search is admissible

RULING: NO

The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and
seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is present in this case.

Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly
authorized to do so on his or her behalf.

In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz was
indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to
open his house in his absence.

Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation of her
employer.

Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is inadmissible

People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645 (1991)

FACTS:

Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July 1985, in Dumaguete City, by Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
elements. His arrest was the result of a "buybust" operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the
buyer while the other team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. Quindo
approached the accused-appellant, who was with a group of friends in front of the Gamo Memorial
Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced
two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously marked P5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the
signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the accused-appellant.
He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The
other team members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep,
where they boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station. The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked
and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive results. Kalubiran
contended however that one Quindo approached and frisk him on the same night, and found nothing on
him. However, he was called back by one Villamor, who told him at gun point to board the jeep and
taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was released the following day with the help of
a lawyer. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Dumaguete City found Kalubiran guilty as charged and
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the 19 sticks of marijuana found in his possession
during his arrest.

RULING:

No. Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a
crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of
Rule 116. In addition to the Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and
seizures under the conditions established in the case. However, Kalubiran was accused only of selling
the two sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also have been
charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time of his arrest. It is
unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for the second offense because he has not been
impleaded in a separate information for violation of Section 8 of the said law.

ESPANO V. CA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ESPANO V. CA G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998

FACTS:

l The accused was caught in flagrante by herein police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, where they are conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of
drug pushing. The agents frisked the accused after he completed his transaction to a buyer and there
found with him 2 tea bags of Marijuana.

l Accused was asked by the police officers whether he has some more of the marijuana and told them he
got more at his house. They went to the accused house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana.

l During the trial, accused denied all the allegations against him and made an alibi that he was in his
house sleeping when the police officer went to his house looking for his brother in law and instead
handcuffed him to take his part for allegedly having in his possession 10 teabags of Marijuana.

l The trial court did not believe his alibi and found him guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

l Accused appealed and said that the arrest was illegally done and the search of his house is deemed a
violation of his constitutional right.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD:

YES. Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court ). He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two pieces of cellophane of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being the fruits of the crime.

As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.

The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this
case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest at Pandacan and
Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

Petition denied with a modification that the 10 bags of marijuana seized from his house is inadmissible
in evidence since no search warrant was served to him

People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990)

FACTS:

In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San
Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance
mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando,
Pampanga. The surveillance mission was aimed not only against persons who may commit
misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous
drugs based on information supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person
carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was
requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused,
only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag where
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was
asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel
Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves.
The accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation;
and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, found Medel
Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine
of P20,000 and to pay the costs. Tangliben appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless search incident led to a lawful arrest, even in light of the Court’s ruling in
People vs. Aminnudin.

RULING:

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The
warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful
of its decision in People v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had earlier
received a tip from an informer that accused appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and
was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he
descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained
marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was
seized illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured. However,
herein, the case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript
of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying
marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not
enough time to secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin
herein. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors
of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.

Picardal v People

he Facts:
While conducting a beat patrol, POI Peniano and his companions chanced upon a person urinating
against the wall. They accosted him and invited him to the police station. While being handcuffed, the
accused, Ramon Picardal attempted to run away, but POI Penano managed to subdue him. When
frisked, Ramon yielded in his possession one Caliber .38 revolver containing five live bullets. He was
arrested and subsequently charged with violation of MMDANo. 96-009, which prohibits urinating in
public, among others, and illegal possession of firearms before the RTC.

Both the RTC and the CA found the accused guilty as charged, ruling that all the elements of the crime
had been proven. Meanwhile, the MTC dismissed the charge for violation of MMDA regulation. Ramon
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Ramon is guilty of illegal possession of firearms;

Whether or not there was a valid search

Ruling:

The Petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court,
are generally final and conclusive on the Court. The foregoing rule, however, is subject to the following
exceptions:

1. the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

2. the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;

7. the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;
8. the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;

9. the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion;

10. the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and

11. such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the ninth exception applies. The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed facts
that: (1) the firearm subject of this case was seized from Picardal after he was frisked by the police
officers for allegedly urinating in a public place; and (2) the aforementioned case for “urinating in a
public place” filed against Picardal was subsequently dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila. The act supposedly committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished only by
Section 2(a) of Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No. 96-009 (MMDA
Regulation), which provides that:

Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts

a) It is unlawful to dump, throw or litter, garbage, refuse, or any form of solid waste in public places and
immediate surroundings, including vacant lots, rivers, canals, drainage and other water ways as defined
in Section 1 of this Regulation and to urinate, defecate and spit in public places. (Emphasis supplied)

The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for a violation of the said section is only a
fine of five hundred pesos (PhP500.00) or community service of one (1) day. The said regulation did not
provide that the violator may be imprisoned for violating the same, precisely because it is merely a
regulation issued by the MMDA.

Stated differently, the MMDA Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere regulation, and not a law or an
ordinance.

Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place, the police officers
involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the
regulation. It was not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been
any lawful arrest to speak of.

In Luz v. People, a man who was driving a motorcycle was flagged down for violating a municipal
ordinance requiring drivers of motorcycles to wear a helmet. While the police officer was issuing him a
ticket, the officer noticed that the man was uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket. When the
officer ordered the man to take the thing out of his jacket, it was discovered that it was a small tin can
which contained sachets of shabu. When the man was prosecuted for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the Court acquitted the accused as the confiscated drugs were discovered through an unlawful
search. Hence:
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the
latter[.]

xxxx

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the
failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of
Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense. (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same principle applies in the present case. There was similarly no lawful arrest in this case as
Picardal’s violation, if at all committed, was only punishable by fine.

In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People, reminds:

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which, such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should
be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be used in any
prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As there is no
longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31,
2017 and Resolution dated October 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38123 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Ramon Picardal y Baluyot is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

ANG YU ASUNCION v. CA, GR No. 109125, 1994-12-02

Facts:

Specific Performance was filed by Ann Yu Asuncion

On July 29, 1987 a Second Amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ann Yu Asuncion
and Keh Tiong, et al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 31, Manila in Civil Case No. 87-41058, alleging,... among others, that plaintiffs are tenants
or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants described as Nos. 630-638 Ongpin
Street, Binondo, Manila; that they have occupied said spaces since 1935 and have been religiously
paying the rental and complying with... all the conditions of the lease contract; that on several occasions
before October 9, 1986, defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises and
are giving them priority to acquire the same; that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a
price... of P6-million while plaintiffs made a counter offer of P5-million; that plaintiffs thereafter asked
the defendants to put their offer in writing to which request defendants acceded; that in reply to
defendants' letter, plaintiffs wrote them on October 24, 1986 asking that they... specify the terms and
conditions of the offer to sell; that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter
dated January 28, 1987 with the same request; that since defendants failed to specify the terms and
conditions of the offer to sell and because of... information received that defendants were about to sell
the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property
to them.

plaintiffs are tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants... defendants
informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire the
same

Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price... of P6-million while plaintiffs made a counter offer of P5-million; that
plaintiffs thereafter asked the defendants to put their offer in writing to which request defendants
acceded... hat since defendants failed to specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell and
because of... information received that defendants were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were
compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property to them.
The trial court found that defendants' offer to sell was never accepted by the plaintiffs for the reason
that the parties did not agree upon the terms... and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was
no contract of sale at all... lower court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer their
property for sale at a price of P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal.

The court a quo in the aforestated decision gave the plaintiffs-appellants the right of first refusal only if
the property is... sold for a purchase price of Eleven Million pesos or lower;... find no reason not to grant
the same right of first refusal to herein appellants in the event that the subject property is sold for... a
price in excess of Eleven Million pesos.

Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale (Annex D, Petition) transferring the property in question to
herein petitioner Buen Realty and Development Corporation... onsideration of the sum of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (... hus, at any time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party may
stop the negotiation.' The offer, at this stage, may be withdrawn; the withdrawal is effective...
immediately after its manifestation, such as by its mailing and not necessarily when the offeree learns of
the withdrawal

Issues:

Buen Realty can be held bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, carried
over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the... latter's purchase of the
property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs.

Ruling:

We affirm the decision of the appellate court.

An obligation is a j... uridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The obligation is
constituted upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or
juridical tie which is the efficient... cause established by the various sources of obligations (law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the object which is the prestation or conduct,
required to be observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subject-persons... who, viewed from
the demandability of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.
Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code), which is a meeting of minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service (Art. 1305, Civil Code). A contract undergoes various... stages that include its
negotiation or preparation, its perfection and, finally, its consummation. Negotiation covers the period
from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the... time the
contract is concluded (perfected). The perfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence of
the essential elements thereof. A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established upon a
mere meeting of minds, i.e., the... concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the cause
thereof. A contract which requires, in addition to the above, the delivery of the object of the agreement,
as in a pledge or commodatum, is commonly referred to as a... real contract. In a solemn contract,
compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law, such as in a donation of real property, is essential
in order to make the act valid, the prescribed form being thereby an essential element... thereof. The
stage of consummation begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the
contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof.

Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding
juridical relation. In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the case at bench belongs,
the contract is perfected when a person, called the... seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to
deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the buyer, over which the latter
agrees. Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money
or its equivalent.

"A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional."

A negotiation is formally initiated by an offer. An imperfect promise (policitacion) is merely an offer

Thus, at any time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party may stop the
negotiation.' The offer, at this stage, may be withdrawn; the withdrawal is effective... immediately after
its manifestation, such as by its mailing and not necessarily when the offeree learns of the withdrawal

PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

FACTS:

l Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup d’état on
December 1989 against the Government.

l Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC .

l Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was
being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post.

l Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo
when a group of five men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car.

l Major Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area. However, as they passed the area,
the five men drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the driver.

l Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the
crossfire.

l Thereafter, the search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.

l Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping
through the door in the office of a certain Colonel Matillano,

l No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much
disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and
there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts
were consequently closed.

l Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion but was acquitted
of attempted homicide.

ISSUE/S:

WON appellant is guilty of illegal possession of firearms

WON there were a valid search and seizure in this case.

HELD:
1. YES. There is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally
possessed several firearms, explosives, and ammunition without the requisite license or authority
therefor.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order
and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and
explosives, and which criminal acts have resulted in the loss of human lives, damage to property and
destruction of valuable resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country
during the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest
to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the
bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management.

Moreover, When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special
law.

The Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the
Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the
room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant
denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding
the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because
there was no intent on his part to possess the same since he was merely employed as an errand boy of
Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot
inspire credence.

2. YES. It is a valid search and seizure.

The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the
first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19
Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

PEOPLE V MUSA

FACTS:

On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2 wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt. Amado Ani in a
buy-bust operation in Zamboanga City.

The said buy-bust operation was planned since a civilian informer told that Mari Musa was engaged in
selling marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was conducted the day prior to the said buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa, Musa entered his house to get
the wrappings. Upon his return and with the inspection of the wrappings, Musa was arrested, but the
marked money used as payment cannot be found with him, prompting the NARCOM agents to go inside
his house. There, they could not find the marked money, but they found more marijuana leaves hidden
in a plastic bag inside the kitchen.

The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory, who later
on served as a witness, along with T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust operation and
Sgt. Ani.

The defense gave a different version of what happened on 14 December 1989 wherein he and his wife,
Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got
inside their house since the door was open, and upon entering, declared that they were NARCOM
agents and searched the house, despite demands of the couple for a search warrant. The agents found a
red bag whose contents were unknown to the Musas.

Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court.
On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also questioned
the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag as evidence since it
violates his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.

ISSUES:

1. WON Musa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt

2. WON the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence.

HELD/RATIO:

1. Yes. The testimony given by T/Sgt. Belarga only strengthened the testimony of Sgt. Ani since it was
the testimony of the latter that served as direct evidence, being enough to prove the consummation of
the sale of the prohibited drug, and that their testimonies were not conflicting as well.

2. No. Although the warrantless search done falls under Sec. 12 of Rule 126 and that the search may
include premises or surroundings under the accused’s immediate control, it does not fall under the
“Plain View” doctrine. The agents found the plastic bag inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the
contents of the bag, the accused did not answer, making the agents open the bag and find marijuana
leaves. Even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure
of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object.

People v. Pasudag, GR 128822, 4 May 2001

FACTS:

While the team of SPO2 Pepito Calip was conducting their anti-jueteng operations in Sison, Pangasinan,
he urinated at a bushy bamboo fence where he saw marijuana plants growing in between the corn
plants and camote tops in a 70 square-meter garden. He reported the same to his chief and dispatched
his team to conduct an investigation. He went straight to the owner of the garden, Alberto Pasudag, and
asked him to bring them to his backyard garden. They took pictures of Pasudag standing beside one of
the marijuana plants. The police then brought Pasudag and the confiscated marijuana plants to the
police station. There, he admitted that he owned the marijuana plants. He was charged and found guilty
by the trial court of illegal cultivation of marijuana.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding Pasudag guilty of illegal cultivation of marijuana.

RULING:

Yes. The arrest of the accused was tainted with constitutional infirmity.

The procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the
person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Any evidence obtained in violation
of this provision is inadmissible.

The police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. With the illegal
seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant. Moreover, it was revealed that the accused was not informed of his
constitutional rights. The court did not agree with the Solicitor General that the accused was not under
custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that
custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Even if the confession or admission
were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such
assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the accused was acquitted from the crime
charged.

People vs. Valdez

Posted on March 2, 2017 by thecasedigester in Criminal Procedure

G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante
delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana
plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant
was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then
ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who
testified how the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its details under
the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut.
They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-
foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that
they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the
cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented a certification
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where
the growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged
in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in
his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm
when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to
see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants
were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and
they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and
told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning
the marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law
enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s
person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the
seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The
protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific
instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless
of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search
and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence
for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as
evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible
error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as
evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of
a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed
and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must
not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is
“generally admissible” evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the
court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it
was error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied
upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an accused’s
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

PEOPLE V. COMPACION [G. R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001]

FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing
and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong conducted a surveillance of the residence
of accused who was then the Barangay Captain. During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the
backyard of the accused which they suspected as marijuana plants. The team proceeded at the
residence of accused despite failure to obtain a warrant. SPO4Villamor knocked at the gate and called
out for the accused. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution
contends that the accused opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked
by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated
the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. The operatives then uprooted the
suspected marijuana plants. However, the accused, in his version, stated that while he and his family
were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. After he opened the gate, 4 persons
whom he thought members of the military went inside his house. One of the four men told him to sit in
the living room. Some went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for
his permission to search his house.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search on the backyard of the accused.

HELD: No. The search and seizure conducted was not authorized by a search warrant. Neither does it fall
within the exceptions. The accused’ right against unreasonable search was clearly violated. It is extant
from the records that accused’ did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While
such rights may be waived, either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused in allowing the members of the
military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure
could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and
seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless
search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and
heavily armed. As a general rule, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Thus, the following elements must be present; a prior valid intention based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and plain view justified were seizure of evidence without
further search. Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. The police entered accused house without
the latter’s consent, and with the intent to seize evidence.. The agents did not come across the
marijuana plants inadvertently. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not
simply wait for one to be issued.