Antiporda Jr v. Garchitorena|December 23, 1999|Buena, J.

(First name Arturo) Nature of Case:

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition Petitioner(s): Licerio Antiporda Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor
Gascon, and Caesar Talia Respondent(s): Francis Garchitorena, Edilberto Sandoval, Catalino Castaeda
SUMMARY: The prosecutor failed to allege pertinent details in the original information that would
have vested jurisdiction to Sandiganbayan of the criminal case. The accused then questioned the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and their authority to have ordered an opportunity to amend the
information. Their action would have prospered were it not for the fact that they already questioned
the jurisdiction of the RTC stating that the crime was work related. This resulted in their being
estopped.

FACTS:  Accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla were charged

with kidnapping Elmer Ramos The information was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan,
comprised of the petitioners o The information did not allege the pertinent details to be clear that the
crime was office related (sandiganbayan e) o The court wanted to clarify the propriety of the
proceeding with the Information as it stands o Prosecutor informed court that there was indeed
inadequacies in the information so she was allowed to submit an amendment  The amendment
contained such details like o Antiporda being the Municipal Mayor o Gallardo being a Barangay
Captain o And Rubiaco being a barangay councilman o That the kidnapped was brought to the
residence of the Mayor for more than 5 days  In light of the amendment, accused then filed Urgent
Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants
of arrest be deferred.  Motion was denied o There was nothing in the Amended Information that
was added to the original information so that the accuse could not claim a right to be heard
separately in an investigation o Also, since none of them submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court, the accused were not in a position to be heard on the matter  Accused then filed a Motion
to Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged o Denied since the
accused have failed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court o The amended information
vests the court jurisdiction as it includes the office related character of the offense  A motion for
reconsideration was filed o Accused reasons that their filing of the motion to quash and the
appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to voluntary submission to the
court  Still denied, hence the case at bar

ISSUE/S & RATIO: 1. WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case, and therefore the
authority to order the amendment of the information.

Yes. (But only by estoppel) a. As held in Arula v. Espino, three requisites must concur for a court to
acquire jurisdiction over a case i. Jurisdiction over the offense ii. Jurisdiction over the territory iii.
Jurisdiction over the person b. It is undisputed that Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the territory

2.

Sandiganbayan also acquired jurisdiction over the person when the accused filed their motion to
quash i. Accused cited Layosa v. Rodriguez 1. It was ruled here that the voluntary appearance of the
accused at the presuspension hearing amounted to his submission to the court’s jurisdiction even if
no warrant of arrest has been issued The petitioners countered the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person by citing De los SantosReyes v. Montesa i. The accused have no right to invoke the processes
of the court since they have not been placed in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of their
liberty by reason of the filing of the information The court held that the two cases did not conflict
with one another, they both discuss ways for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a person i. Through
warrants ii. Through voluntary submission Since the 2 requisites have been fulfilled, the court now
tries to discuss the last requisite The court found that the Sandiganbayan DID NOT have jurisdiction
over the offense i. The pertinent details were not alleged in the original information HOWEVER, the
petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan as they themselves
challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC and they clearly said that the crime was work connected. It is a
well settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent, and after obtaining of failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction So since Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction, they were allowed to have ordered the
amendment of the information i. Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus 1. Section
14. Amendment – The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or in form, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

WON a reinvestigation is necessary in view of the Amended Information. No. a. A reinvestigation is

only proper when the accused’s substantial rights will be impaired b. The amendment merely
described the positions that they held, and where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped c. It
must be stressed that the preliminary investigation is inquisitorial i. It is a means of discovering the
persons who may be charged of a crime, in order for a prosecutor to prepare the complaint or
information ii. The purpose of the preliminary investigation has already been achieved and the court
sees no reason to conduct another one

TREÑAS vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 195002, JANUARY 25, 2012 Doctrine: In criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed
outside its limited territory. Sereno, J.

Facts: Elizabeth Lucia gave P150,000 to Atty. Hector Treñas for the titling of the property in the name
of her aunt Margarita. Treñas prepared Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He also gave Lucia
BIR receipt for P120,000, comprising the CGT and DST. However, when she consulted with the BIR,
she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Treñas admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Lucia demanded the
return of the money. To settle his accounts, Treñas issued in favor of Lucia a Bank of Commerce check
in the amount of P120,000 but when the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal
and verbal demands, Treñas failed to pay. An Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA which also rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Treñas asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱
150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile,
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in
Iloilo City. Treñas claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to
him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any
direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things
happened according to the ordinary course of nature.

Issue: WON RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy. Ruling: No.

The Supreme Court held that, the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In this
case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was committed within the jurisdiction
of the RTC of Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Lucia does not contain any
allegation as to where the offense was committed. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information,
no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements
was committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the
prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. There being no
showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over
the case. The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. DISPOSITION: There being no showing that
the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

Ruel Francis M. Cabral vs. Chris S. Bracamonte [G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019]

PONENTE: Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta

SUBJECT:

SUBJECT:

1. REMEDIAL LAW:

i. Office of the Solicitor General – Authority to represent the State

ii. Territorial jurisdiction

iii. Jurisdiction over the subject matter

– How is it determined/ How is it conferred

– Barred by Laches

2. CRIMINAL LAW:

i. Estafa -Elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code.

FACTS: In 2009, Chris S. Bracamonte and Ruel Francis Cabral executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) in Makati City for the purchase of shares of stock in Wellcross Freight Corporation
(WFC) and Aviver International Corporation (AVIVER). Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA,
Bracamonte issued a postdated check to Cabral. When the check was presented for payment,
however, the drawee bank in Makati City dishonored the same for lack of sufficient funds.
Consequently, for failure to settle the obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against
Bracamonte in Parañaque City. Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed an Information with the
RTC of Parañaque City.

After arraignment and presentation of prosecution evidence, Bracamonte moved to quash the
Information contending that the venue was improperly laid in Parañaque City, because the postdated
check was delivered and dishonored in Makati City. Thus, the prosecution failed to show how the
supposed elements of the crime charged were committed in Parañaque City. In contrast, Cabral
maintained that the averments in the complaint and Information are controlling to determine
jurisdiction. Since the complaint affidavit alleged that negotiations on the MOA were conducted in a
warehouse in Parañaque City where Cabral was convinced to sell his shares in the two corporations,
then the RTC of Parañaque City properly had jurisdiction. Moreover, Cabral contented that
Bracamonte’s motion should be considered barred by laches as it took him four (4) years before he
raised the issue of jurisdiction, actively participating in the proceedings by cross examining the
prosecution witness.

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash explaining that it has jurisdiction over the case because
Bracamonte employed fraudulent acts against Cabral in Parañaque City prior to the issuance of the
postdated check. According to the trial court, based on the complaint affidavit, Cabral narrated that it
was during their meeting in the old warehouse of AVIVER and WFC in Parañaque City that
Bracamonte was able to persuade and convince him to sell his entire shares of stock. There, they
triumphed in misleading and fooling him until he finally accepted their offer. Thus, since the
complaint affidavit and the Information in the instant case duly alleged that Bracamonte deceived
Cabral in Parañaque City, the Parañaque RTC appropriately had jurisdiction over the instant case.
In an appeal, however, the CA set aside the RTC Order and dismissed the Information against
Bracamonte. Cabral moved for Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

Aggrieved by the CA’s denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Cabral filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

A. Whether Cabral, a private complainant in a criminal case has the authority to file appeal in
CA and SC?

a. Who has the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Supreme Court and the CA? Are there any exceptions?

B. Whether the RTC Parañaque City has jurisdiction over the estafa case filed by Cabral.

a. What is territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases?

b. How is jurisdiction over the criminal case determined?

c. What are the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code?

C. Whether Bracamonte’s motion should be considered barred by laches.

RULING:

A. In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only
be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.

Here, Cabral filed the present petition without the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides
that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in
the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG
is the law office of the Government.

Thus, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only
be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the
offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused
is concerned [Chiok v. People, 774 Phil. 230, 245, (2015)].

The rationale behind is that, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and
not the private complainant. The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited only to the civil liability. In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to
that of a witness for the prosecution.

There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a
decision of a lower court, when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State
or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party,
when there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so
requires [Morillo v. People, et al., 775 Phil. 192, 210-211 (2015)].
In the instant case, however, the petition before the Court essentially assails the criminal, and not
only the civil, aspect of the CA Decision. Thus, the petition should have been filed only by the State
through the OSG and not by Cabral who lacked the personality or legal standing to question the CA
Decision.

B. Nevertheless, even assuming the procedural propriety of the instant petition, the Court still
resolves to deny the same. Time and again, the Court has held that “territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where
any one of the essential ingredients took place.” [Brodeth v. People, G.R. No. 197849, November 29,
2017].

Moreover, it has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction [Treñas v. People, 680
Phil. 368, 380 (2012)].

Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of such crime consists of the following: (1) the offender has
postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or
issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank
or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has
been defrauded.

In the present petition, Cabral vehemently insists that since he alleged in his complaint affidavit that
the business transactions with regard to the terms and conditions of the subject MOA were
conducted in a warehouse in Parañaque City, the element of deceit definitely occurred therein, and as
such, the RTC of Parañaque City has jurisdiction over the case. The Court, however, cannot subscribe
to said contention.

It was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by Cabral in his complaint affidavit, that the crime
of estafa was committed in Parañaque City because it was there that he was convinced to sell the
subject shares of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did not present any evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would support or corroborate the assertion.

On the contrary, and as the appellate court pointed out, what were actually proven by the evidence
on record are the following: (1) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2)
Bracamonte issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the signing of the
agreement; (3) the check was presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati
City. As such, the Court does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial
court. Not only were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City,
it was even expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as venue for any
action arising from the MOA because that was where it was executed. It is clear from the foregoing
that the element of deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and
delivered, while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the
drawee bank.

While Cabral is not wrong in saying that the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and
may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place, the
pieces of evidence on record point only to one place: Makati City. Time and again, the Court has ruled
that “in criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was
committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could
not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not
evidence and could not be made equivalent to proof.”There being no showing that the offense was
committed within Parañaque City, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

C. As to Cabral’s contention that Bracamonte’s motion should be considered barred by laches as it

took him four (4) years before he raised the issue of jurisdiction, actively participating in the
proceedings by cross examining the prosecution witness, the rule is settled that an objection based on
the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered
motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over
the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express
waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized
the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law [Fukuzume v. People 511
Phil. 192 (2005)].

Navaja v. De Castro, G.R. No. 182926

G.R. No. 182926 June 22, 2015

ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner,vs.

HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, or the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, DKT
PHILS., INC., represented by ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents

Facts:

The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc.,
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still
its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal
expenses in the amount of ₱1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of ₱810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna,
Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory
portion of the Information filed against her reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in
the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (₱810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN PESOS (₱1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim
reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of
which received the amount of 1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the amount to be proved during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of
Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a
Resolution7 dated January 24, 2006. Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing
the November 2, 2005 Order and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.

On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal
basis or merit. Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA. In the Decision dated August 28, 2007,
the CA dismissed Navaja’s appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.

Issue:

WON THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
YES, the Municipal Trial Court of Jagna, Bohol have jurisdiction over the case. Venue in criminal cases
is an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle was explained by the Court in Foz, Jr. v. People,
thus:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus,
it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15

In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood
from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed
constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Furthermore, in Union Bank of the Philippines v. People, the Court said that both provisions
categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the
offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that
the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.

In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually
falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not
the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended.

Foz vs People (2009) G.R. 167764

Facts:

Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel. Upon arraignment,
they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter
ensued, finding both of them guilty. Petitioners moved for recon but was denied. Dissatisfied, they
appealed to CA who affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion for recon which CA
denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information
charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo
City.

Issue: WON the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged.

Held: SC ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of
the RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that
petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written
defamation: The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:

The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region” only showed that Iloilo was the place where
Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed
and first published in Iloilo City.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information
failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC
of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime
of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of
competent jurisdiction.

Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R. 143647

Facts:

Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires,
accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume
to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his
disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires
belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to
be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned
uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused
by NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.

Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts’ decision
modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling
that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed
by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the
prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified
during his direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s
house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte
are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes
inaccurate.

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave
any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap
wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of
Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from
the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the
prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court
convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010

Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with
homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private
complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the
motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the
trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate
court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not
guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex
Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime
of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information.
Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the
petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for
a preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to
whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as
it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did
not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed
amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and
declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.

LINO BROCKA vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

FACTS: • Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a
demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a petitioners arrested
by Northern Police District Officers – Jan 28 ‘85 • Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146
par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC • All petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for
Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as
leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended • Urgent petition for
bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 ’85 a On Feb. 7 or 9 ’85, RTC QC Judge
Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et al’s provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000
each a Brocka, et al filed respective bail bonds BUT… • Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al
remained in detention a respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
allegedly issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 ‘85 o Neither original nor certified true copy of this
PDA was shown to Brocka, et al. • Feb 11 ’85 – Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim
cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows: o 10:30 AM counsel informed by
phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a
another phone call subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to
be at 2:00PM o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal a complainants’ affidavits had
not yet been received o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of
complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition o 3:15PM counsel inquired from
Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka, et al had been officially received a informed that
said charges were never coursed through the Records Office o ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting
Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are, almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of
the crim cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a matter
of Constitutional right a appears that respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the right
to bail o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under
RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that they be given 7 days within which
counsel may conferwith their clients a no such requirement required under the rules • Brocka, et al
released provisionally on Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres. Marcos a release narrated in Court’s
resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al: o In Return
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released a four on Feb15
’85 and one on Feb.8 ’85 o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become
moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid
charge of inciting to sedition. • Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contend: 1. bad faith and/or
harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution 2. second offense of Inciting to
Sedition manifestly illegal – premised on one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney
strike a matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is…

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined –

YES RULING: We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second
offense of inciting to sedition. •

GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final

EXCEPTIONS: 1. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice When the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation When double jeopardy is clearly apparent When the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution Where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by lust for vengeance When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground had been denied 11. Preliminary injunction has been
issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners In the case at bar, criminal
proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state officials in bad faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et al’s release from detention BUT this
PDA was issued on Jan.28 ’85 and invoked only on Feb.9 ’85 upon receipt of TC’s order of release a
violates guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in Metro, Manila or 48 hours outside Metro,
Manila Despite subpoenas for PDA’s production, prosecution merely presented a purported xeerox
copy of it a violates Court pronouncement that “individuals against whom PDAs have been issued
should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by
the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile) 2.
SolGen’s manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information instead of a
petition for Habeas Corpus The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. However, it noted
that such course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then
prevailing: 1. Spurious and inoperational PDA 2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation Clear
signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the second offense could
be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew "Infinitely more important
than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to
be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution. If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this
case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges
were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are
filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined. The petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No
costs.

FRANKLIN P. BAUTISTA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000 BELLOSILLO, J:
Facts: Petitioner Franklin P. Bautista, incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur,
was charged for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019. The letter-complaint, which was prepared by
the Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and initiated by the Good Government Employees of
Davao del Sur, alleged, among others, that petitioner caused the hiring of one hundred and ninety-
two (192) casual employees in the municipal government for political considerations and that the
payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to the peace and order fund of the municipality.
Despite arguing in his counter-affidavit that the hiring of 192 casual employees and the use of the
peace and order fund for their honoraria and salaries did not justify the charges filed against him,
Graft Investigation Officer (GIO II) Corazon A. Arancon, in his Resolution, found a prima facie case for
violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, which was approved by the Ombudsman. An Information for
such violation was filed against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, which read – […] the
abovenamed accused, a high ranking public officer, being the Mayor, Municipality of Malita, Davao
del Sur, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to his office, with manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally caused the hiring of some one hundred ninety-two (192) casual employees
in flagrant disregard of Secs. 288 and 289 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual
(GAAM), the honoraria and salaries of whom were charged to the peace and order fund and to the
project component and other services activity fund, respectively and which represented 72.5% of the
total personnel services expenditures, thereby giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference to the said casuals, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Malita. Petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash the Information, stating that the acts charged did not constitute the offense
indicated in Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, and that more than one (1) offense was charged in the
Information – the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the casual employees
in question and causing undue injury to the Municipality. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion by
stating that all the essential elements for the crime charged were sufficiently alleged in the
Information which charged only 1 offense.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the
Information despite the fact that there were two (2) offenses charged, and as such, should be charged
in separate Informations.
Ruling: No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the
Information since the latter was only charged with 1 offense. There were two (2) ways of violating
Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, namely, (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government, and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation, or as different
modes of committing the offense

(Santiago v. Garchitorena). This does not indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but
rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both. For hiring 192 casuals and
the charging of their honoraria and salaries to the peace and order fund, the petitioner gave them
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference and caused undue injury to the Municipality of
Malita; or thereby caused undue injury to the Municipality of Malita. In either case, the Information
will not suffer any defect, as it is clear that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA
3019, as amended, with either mode of commission obtaining or with both manners of violation
concurring.

ntellectual Property Law Sasot vs. People G.R. No. 143193 (June 29, 2005) TOPIC: 1. UNFAIR
COMPETITION UNDER ART 189 OF RPC IS A PUBLIC CRIME; 2. THE PHILIPPINES IS UNDER AN
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT, AS SIGNATORY TO THE MULTILATERAL TREATY AND AS A MATTER
OF NATIONAL INTEREST, TO PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
EVEN WHEN THE LATTER IS NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES.
FACTS: The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint
by the NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code on unfair competition. The Report stated that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture,
printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment products. Before arraignment,
petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds: I. THAT THE FACTS
CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED8 Petitioners contend that
complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected
by Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been
using the business name "ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC." since 1972, and their designs are original
and do not appear to be similar to complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo or design.10
The trial prosecutor filed his Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that the State is
entitled to prosecute the offense even without the participation of the private offended party, as the
crime charged is a public crime.11 The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments and denied
petitioners’ motion to quash in its Order dated March 5, 1999.12 Petitioners filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which was dismissed. According to the CA, the petition is
not the proper remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds raised therein
should be raised during the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the
Decision but this was denied by the CA.16 ISSUE: WON A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED
AND LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR
COMPETITION

Intellectual Property Law HELD: The petition must be denied. *** the crime of Unfair Competition
punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code34 is a public crime. It is essentially an act
against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The complainant’s
capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial. In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,35 ***,
the Court succinctly ruled that: More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition.
What preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging
Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. If
prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the
Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer
the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the
State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated.
Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We
cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched
contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue. In upholding the right
of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement
of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of
foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the
Philippines and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international
commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which
we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so.36 (Emphasis supplied)