Compilation of Cases Property of The Estate Decedent

I.
SUCCESSION IN GENERAL
A. SUCCESSION
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.
ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano
and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of

Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, respondents
alleged, that a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed,
"may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner which
respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an
advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded
from determining the validity of the donation. The Court of Appeals sustained the probate
court’s ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation bearing in mind that in
intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division. Thus, the property subject
of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a
creditor of the decedent.
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein
petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the decedent
which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.
Whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among
the parties.
HELD:
NO.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,
therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude
other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The
secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory
heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the
illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was
at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives
to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
"stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir,
however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
YES.
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-
siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the
Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the
collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased
Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of
origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and
thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO,
FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER
ALTEZA, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document
entitled "DonationMortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and
their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses’ lot
and the house in Pandacan, Manila, in equal shares. Although denominated as a donation mortis
causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was
witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the
donation on the face of the document. Guadalupe died. A few months later, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their
daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate
of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights
and interests in the property to her.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors’
intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given
its irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights
and interest in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the
registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares. On Asuncion’s appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the latter rendered a decision reversing that of the RTC. The CA held that
Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa,
collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in Asuncion’s favor. The CA further held that,
since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation
inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the
donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the requirements of a notarial
will, rendering the same void. Following the CA’s denial of Jarabini’s motion for
reconsideration, she filed the present petition with this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion, Emiliano,
and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter
vivos.
HELD:
DONATION INTER VIVOS.
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not
controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality

absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is
precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is
the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors
plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even
clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.As Justice J. B. L. Reyes said
in Puig v. Peñaflorida,16 in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter
vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative
and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the
donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the
absolute owner of the property donated.17
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s
subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded
as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer
had. Nemo dat quod non habet.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December

23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549,
and REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.
G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S.
CABATINGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M.
ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAÑETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL,
HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA
NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD
NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD
and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN
and JESUSA C. NAVADA, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner
Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." On
May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died. Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing
donations, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, an action for Annulment
And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of
said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners through their sinister
machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition,
caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to
comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments,
considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents' allegations
contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of
the instruments.
The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and therefore the four
(4) deeds in question are null and void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of
the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and testaments. Raising questions of law, petitioners
elevated the court a quo's decision to Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos.
HELD:
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while
the donor is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following
characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.13
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact
that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses,
uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the
terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her
profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR."
xxx
"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this Deed of
Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 106755 February 1, 2002
APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, DOMINGO COMIA,
TEODORA CARAMPOT, ERNESTO APOLO, SEGUNDA SUMPELO, MAMERTO
SUMPELO and RICARDO SUMPELO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria,

Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one of herein
respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac
during World War II. On December 17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as
"Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation)". On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat
for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of that sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-10434
was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat. Herein
respondents, representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria, all surnamed Sumpelo,
representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria, and Florentino Lumubos filed before the
Regional Trial Court Civil Case against the petitioner for annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and
other relevant documents, and for reconveyance and damages. The trial court dismissed Civil
Case because the donation is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of the New Civil
Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides that it would take effect upon the death of the
donor; that the provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the donation is a
feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of a will; and that
inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void and
produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was valid since
she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
HELD:

The Supreme Court affirm the appellate court’s decision.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on
whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the
deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court enumerated the characteristics of a
donation mortis causa, to wit:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the donation in
the case at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the
donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable),
he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains
beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivosdespite an express
provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property
while he is alive.
Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation,the Court finds and so hold
that in the case at bar the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same ("hindi
na mababawi") is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos.
The other provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against
the irrevocable character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions
which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that there is a
prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same, are proofs that the donation is mortis
causa. We disagree. The said provisions should be harmonized with its express irrevocability.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the
acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that
the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. On the other
hand, donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the
donees during the donor’s lifetime.18
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated June 30, 1989 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954
HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on June 27, 1945, by
respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both
deceased. Their complaint charged that Domingo Bonsato then already a widower, had been
induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan
Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of
land, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs
likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite
formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the
donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services
rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the
use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the
case and for damages in the sum of P2,000. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its
decision finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of
sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without
any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the
properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of
Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided
one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein. On appeal, Court of Appeals,
rendered judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were
donations mortis causaand were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by
law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties
in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations are Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos.
HELD:
Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at

present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition,
and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne
vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus
suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake
of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules
established for testamentary successions.
The Court insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term
"donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate those
dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in
favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil.,
633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed (Bautistavs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by the late
Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of
the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde
como dueño"), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property
remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could
revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is
of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of
revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death
of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del
donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression must be construed together
with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the
donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the
donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the
donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted
a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would
become vested in the donees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court
of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against respondents.
G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990

RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special
Administrator, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA
D. PASCUAL,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and
involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November
18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as
follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P.
Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes
and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong. The
heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for
the administration of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude
some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her.
Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation
Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual
and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an
order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula. In the
meantime, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of
Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes. Benjamin Reyes, private respondent
in filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092,
Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and
Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 115164. The two cases were consolidated. The then Court of First Instance, Branch 8
rendered a joint decision declaring that TCT in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void.
Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was,
however, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The Intermediate Appellate Court issued a
minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation in the present is to be considered Donation Inter vivos or
Donation Mortis causa.
HELD:
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative
factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta
v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-
whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of
donation but on the provisions stated in such deed.
In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481 [1954]) this
Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise:
Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post
mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should
reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v.
Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v.
Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952);
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by
Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition
of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the
properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The
provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the
other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked
ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued on January 5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and
2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is FINAL.
B.TRANSMISSION/ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA,
BR. 31, respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS:
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera
several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is
evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was
succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was
succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757. NHA as the successor agency
of LTA is the petitioner in this case. The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children:
Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera passed away on
October 27, 1971. On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late
Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining
relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive
legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera. The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The
surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-
Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna. A Decision in Civil Case No. B-
1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null
and void. In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by
Francisca Herrera, holding that: on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over
the lots in question in favor of the protestee. Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office
of the President. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the
resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of
the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for
"Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 31. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals in a Decision reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within
its jurisdiction." The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca
Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of
rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in arguing that assuming that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA. That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is
an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original
awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before it."
HELD:
NO.
The Supreme Court is not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time
of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng
aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and
shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article
774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights

and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original
applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The
NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application
made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer
all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may
have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had
over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the
property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly
distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita
Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell
was an obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death
either by will or by operation of law. The Court did not delve into the validity of the will. The
issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved
and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument
maker.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated
March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004
Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners,
vs.
Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet
are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife. On December
10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the
children. Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita
occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their
construction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed
rental of P500 per week. Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement.
They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the
subject lots in order that they could all live near one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael),
and help in resolving the problems of the family. They added that it was the policy of
respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their
children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered had been allotted to Ismael as advance
inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to
petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents’ house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lots were allotted to petitioners as part of their inheritance and given
in consideration for past debts.
HELD:
NO.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only
upon the latters’ demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment
of death of the decedent. Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership
nonetheless remained with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons
in the future is not inconsistent with the owners’ taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient. Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits,
petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of inheritance
"allocation." Petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a dation in payment, Lot T-
78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondents’ debts. The evidence
presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the parents arising from the
latter’s purported purchases and advances. There was no sufficient proof that respondents had
entered into a contract of dation to settle the alleged debt. Petitioners even stated that there was a
disagreement in the accounting of the purported debt, a fact that disproves a meeting of the
minds with the parents.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS.
G.R. No. L-24098 November 18, 1967

BUENAVENTURA BELAMALA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator, oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case No. 1922 filed
before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the same Mauricio Polinar
above mentioned and against other accused, for Frustrated Murder. The administrator Marcelino
Polinar is one of the legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar now deceased.
On May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed in the Justice of the Peace of
Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar, et al, and when said case was remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Bohol. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision
thereof, convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and
sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the
amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral
damages. The accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed to the Court of Appeals from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. While the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was
pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and that there was no Notice or Notification of his
death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
said Criminal Case No. 1922, has affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol, in toto, and said decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958;
but said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956. The Court a quo, overruling the
contention of the Administrator-appellant that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, admitted the claim against the estate in the amount of
P2,025.80 with legal interest from the date claim was filed (30 July 1959) until paid. Not
satisfied with the ruling, the Administrator has appealed, insisting on his theory in the Court
below.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability has been extinguished.
HELD:
NO.
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of
the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to
be considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were
terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that
imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter
acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil Code,
Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an
obligation of the offender's estate. Furthermore, it does not appear that the award of the trial
Court was based on evidence submitted to it; apparently it relied merely on the findings in the
criminal case, as embodied in decisions that never became final because the accused died during
the pendency of said case.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby reversed and set aside, but without
prejudice to the action of appellee Belamala against the Administrator of the Estate of Mauricio
Polinar.
C.OBJECT OF SUCCESSION
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
HILADO, J.:
FACTS:
The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered
its decision in case of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to
install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that
the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a
proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of
two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O.
Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the
opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its
Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2)
tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said
Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City",
subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail.
Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law. If Pedro O. Fragante
had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his
lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the
option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration
for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have
survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility
of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply
with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply
for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence established that the
public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship
and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or
obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through
nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal
standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the
Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly
the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue
certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations,
or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the
further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong
entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
HELD:
YES.
The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for
the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise
during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations
of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue
from the opposite course.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example,
under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority
of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed
to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the
constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the
framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional
immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure
estates of deceased persons.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he
was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was
that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and
maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In
the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be
also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate
or enjoining them from inheriting it.
WHEREFORE, decision affirmed, without costs.
G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928

BASILIA ARAYATA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FLORENTINO JOYA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of lease to
six lots of the friar lands at Santa Crus de Malabon, municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite.
Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government
acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and Act No. 1120 of the Philippine Commission. While married
to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on
installments, from the Government. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco
buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his
right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by donation. These transfers were approved by the Director of
Lands and noted in the proper registry book. Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot to Florentino
Joya consideration of the sum of P2,000 said conveyance having been approved by the Director
of Lands and registered in the proper registry book. On May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his
right to lot to Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of the sum of P450,
conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper registry
book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya executed a will devising lot to Florentino Joya, Pablo
Joya, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, Feliciano and
Asuncion Bobadilla, and Marcelina and Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya
had not yet completed the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular
Government. All the lots in question except one, are in the possession of the defendants, who
enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920 some lots were transferred to Florentino Joya as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya.
On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, his executor, the herein defendant Florentino Joya,
presented said will for probate to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after
the proper proceedings. In the course of the testamentary proceedings, the executor Florentino
Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the legatees, which agreement was
disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff's opposition, who alleged that her
signature had been obtained by fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession and the products
of the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government, which, by virtue of the law, pass
exclusively to the surviving spouse upon compliance of the legal requirements,
HELD:
YES.
While a deceased heirs or legatees acquire the ownership of the property given them in
the will and may taken possession of their respective portions upon the death of their
predecessor, yet upon the appointment of an administrator, the latter, by virtue of his
appointment, acquires a right to the possession of the property of estate, subject to the orders of
the court, unless he consents to the heirs continuing in possession thereof. But such consent does
not, however, relieve the administrator of all responsibility for the management of the same and
its fruits; because until the judicial partition is made, said property continues to belong to the
testamentary estate. (Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Fernandez vs. Tria, 22 Phil., 603.)
Being a matter of law, the defendants-appellants cannot plead ignorance of the fact that
until a judicial partition of the property left by Cecilio Joya is made, said property belongs to the
lather's estate and it together with its products, is subject to the payment of the testator's debts, if
any. Only after judicial partition has been made do they acquire the title to their respective
legacies, if the latter are valid. (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil.,
895.) We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the defendants were void. If the
lands, which are the subject matter of said legacies and which are in the possession of the
defendants, still belong to Cecilio Joya's estate, because no judicial partition has as yet been
made of the property he left, which is subject, together with its fruits, to the payment of his debts,
said defendants cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to possession in
good faith insofar as the fruits are concerned; because even when the legacies are valid they
acquired only when the latter judicially assigned to them in the final partition, and because, while
said lands are under administration, the administrator is obliged to render an account of his
management of the same and the products thereof.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified, and it is
ordered that Feliciano and Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor
return lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153, and 2352 to the plaintiff-appellant, Basilia Arayata, together
with their products, or the latter's equivalent in cash from the year 1920 until their restitution,
deducting the necessary expenses of cultivation, preservation, and production. Without any
special pronouncement as to costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES,
ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO
YANES, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the
other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party
in this case. Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of
Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of
around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also
cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the
province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to
Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in
question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar
produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and
Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of
Title covering Lot 773-A. TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the
cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804. The bigger portion
of Lot 773 was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago. Said transfer certificate of
title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT
No. 8804. Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of
the sum of P7,000.00. Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292
were issued in Fuentebella's name.
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix
thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-
B. By virtue of a court order granting said motion, on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos.
T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother
Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots
773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the
filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting,
the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be
ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. During the pendency
in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason. Meanwhile, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs,
and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein
plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the
defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are correct in their contention that the liability arising from the
sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be
the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
HELD:
NO.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on
the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children
and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,

rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is
not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That
petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction,
the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we
have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts
of the estate. It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the
value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there
are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in
favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000

RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED
DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
BUENA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is
the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings. Private respondents Auto Truck
Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc.
and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and
which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim
died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George
Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent corporations, whose
properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for
the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
decedent. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the private respondents' twin
motions. Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private respondent
corporations themselves. Petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime,
organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the
instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included
in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
HELD:
NO.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of
the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it.
It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities
connected with it.
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct
and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction
and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character
alien to the persons comprising it. Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see
through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they
could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not
for the existing corporate fiction. The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may
be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation.
Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to
be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate corporate personalities.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set
aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated
04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 145736 March 4, 2009

ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, in her capacity as
(a) Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A. Llenado and (b) Judicial Guardian of the
Minor children of Orlando A. Llenado, and (c) in her Own behalf as the Surviving Spouse
and Legal Heir of Orlando A. Llenado, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA. DE
LLENADO and REGISTER OF DEEDS of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land denominated as Lot 249-D-1 (subject
lot) consisting of 1,554 square meters located in Barrio Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
registered in the names of Eduardo Llenado (Eduardo) and Jorge Llenado (Jorge) under Transfer
of Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-1689.4 The subject lot once formed part of Lot 249-D owned
by and registered in the name of their father, Cornelio Llenado (Cornelio), under TCT No. T-
16810.
On December 2, 1975, Cornelio leased Lot 249-D-1 to his nephew, Romeo Llenado
(Romeo), for a period of five years, renewable for another five years at the option of Cornelio.
On March 31, 1978, Cornelio, Romeo and the latter’s cousin Orlando Llenado (Orlando)
executed an Agreement whereby Romeo assigned all his rights to Orlando over the unexpired
portion of the aforesaid lease contract. The parties further agreed that Orlando shall have the
option to renew the lease contract for another three years commencing from December 3, 1980,
up to December 2, 1983, renewable for another four years or up to December 2, 1987, and that
"during the period that [this agreement] is enforced, the x x x property cannot be sold,
transferred, alienated or conveyed in whatever manner to any third party." Shortly thereafter or
on June 24, 1978, Cornelio and Orlando entered into a Supplementary Agreement amending the
March 31, 1978 Agreement. Under the Supplementary Agreement, Orlando was given an
additional option to renew the lease contract for an aggregate period of 10 years at five-year
intervals, that is, from December 3, 1987 to December 2, 1992 and from December 3, 1992 to
December 2, 1997. The said provision was inserted in order to comply with the requirements of
Mobil Philippines, Inc. for the operation of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on
the subject lot. Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda Llenado
(Wenifreda), took over the operation of the gasoline station. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1987,
Cornelio sold Lot 249-D to his children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia and Cornelio, Jr.,
through a deed of sale, denominated as "Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan," 7 for the sum of
P160,000.00. As stated earlier, the subject lot, which forms part of Lot 249-D, was sold to
Eduardo and Jorge, and titled in their names under TCT No. V-1689. Several months thereafter
or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio passed away. Sometime in 1993, Eduardo informed
Wenifreda of his desire to take over the subject lot. However, the latter refused to vacate the
premises despite repeated demands. Thus, on September 24, 1993, Eduardo filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against
Wenifreda.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to his sons, respondents Eduardo and
Jorge, is invalid for (1) violating the prohibitory clause in the lease agreement between Cornelio,
as lessor-owner, and Orlando, as lessee; and (2) contravening the right of first refusal of Orlando
over the subject lot.
HELD:
NO.
It is not disputed that the lease agreement contained an option to renew and a prohibition
on the sale of the subject lot in favor of third persons while the lease is in force. Petitioner claims
that when Cornelio sold the subject lot to respondents Eduardo and Jorge the lease was in full
force and effect, thus, the sale violated the prohibitory clause rendering it invalid. In resolving
this issue, it is necessary to determine whether the lease agreement was in force at the time of the
subject sale and, if it was in force, whether the violation of the prohibitory clause invalidated the
sale.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations therein are not transmissible
by their nature, by stipulation or by provision of law. A contract of lease is, therefore, generally
transmissible to the heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property right and, as such, the
death of a party does not excuse non-performance of the contract. The rights and obligations pass
to the heirs of the deceased and the heir of the deceased lessor is bound to respect the period of
the lease. The same principle applies to the option to renew the lease. As a general rule,
covenants to renew a lease are not personal but will run with the land. Consequently, the
successors-in-interest of the lessee are entitled to the benefits, while that of the lessor are
burdened with the duties and obligations, which said covenants conferred and imposed on the
original parties.
The foregoing principles apply with greater force in this case because the parties
expressly stipulated in the March 31, 1978 Agreement that Romeo, as lessee, shall transfer all his
rights and interests under the lease contract with option to renew "in favor of the party of the
Third Part (Orlando), the latter’s heirs, successors and assigns" indicating the clear intent to
allow the transmissibility of all the rights and interests of Orlando under the lease contract unto
his heirs, successors or assigns. Accordingly, the rights and obligations under the lease contract
with option to renew were transmitted from Orlando to his heirs upon his death on November 7,
1983.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1988, petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with
Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase
the subject land, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted from the
signing of the Contract. In turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration
for the reservation of its option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall serve formal written
notice upon the lessor Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. The contract
also provided that in case petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession of
the premises. In such an event, the lease shall be for a period of six years, renewable for another
six years, and the monthly rental fee shall be P15,000.00 for the first six years and P18,000.00
for the next six years, in case of renewal. Petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00
provided for by the Contract to Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. Thereafter,
petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of
Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments. Meanwhile, on January 10,
1990, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the properties of Encarnacion,
including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer
Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the
name of Victor Bartolome. Petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was
exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the
month of March. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender
possession of the property to petitioner. Petitioner thus opened Savings Account No. 1-04-
02558-I-1 with the China Banking Corporation, Cubao Branch, in the name of Victor Bartolome
and deposited therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for March as well as P6,000.00 reservation fees
for the months of February and March. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds. Petitioner prayed for the surrender and
delivery of possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of
title for registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment of P500,000.00 as
actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P300,000.00 as attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late
Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it binds her
sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.
HELD:
NO.
The general rule is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1)
their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the
rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the
rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible.
It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates
upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed
by the promissor's personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as
well performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the
service or act is of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the
contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated, death does not
terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance. 11
In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome.
Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property
to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be
performed by her heir Victor.
As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his heirs."
In 1952, it was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to reconvey land to another, and at
his death the reconveyance had not been made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the proper
deed for reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have
inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. It is futile for
Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear provision of Article 1311
of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest between him
and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid and
binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.
In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease, which is a
property right. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which
involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the
party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 121940 December 4, 2001

JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to a
certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of 168 square meters
located in Rosario, Pasig City and denominated as Lot 13, Block 7, Pcs-5816 of the Government
Service and Insurance System Low Cost Housing Project (GSIS-LCHP). The sale is evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale. 2 On February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the
name of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep. Sometime in 1979, for being suspected as a subversive, an
Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) was issued against private respondent. Military men
ransacked his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon learning that he was wanted by the military, he
voluntarily surrendered and was detained for two (2) years. When released, another order for his
re-arrest was issued so he hid in Mindanao for another four (4) years or until March 1984. In
December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was missing. He consulted a lawyer but
the latter did not act immediately on the matter. Upon consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of
Loss5 was filed with the Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy6 of TCT No. 436465 was
issued. Private respondent also declared the property for tax purposes and obtained a certification
thereof from the Assessor's Officer. Private respondent sent notices to the registered owner at her
address appearing in the title and in the Deed of Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for
the ,registered owner in Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog City,
Tacloban City, and in Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their search proved futile. On July
8, 1992 private respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No. R-4659 with the RTC,
Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465
to replace the lost one. To show he was the owner of the contested lot, he showed the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Exhibit "D". The petition was set for hearing and the court's order dated July 10,
1992 was published once in Malaya, a nationally circulated newspaper in the Philippines. On
September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his evidence ex-parte. The trial
court granted his petition. On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a
copy of the abovecited decision. He-claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case
of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime in 1974. Claiming
that he was the present occupant of the property and the heir of Macaria, he filed his "Motion to
Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings''11 on October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued
an order denying said motion. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which, as
earlier stated, was denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration,
but it was denied in a resolution dated September 11, 1995.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent's allegation that failure to send notice to petitioner who
is the actual possessor of the disputed lot is fatal to the present case.
HELD:
NO.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree" is
decisive. It provides:
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. — In case of loss or theft
of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the
owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where
the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate
to him or for :the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss
or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person it interest and
registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after
notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall
contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate
certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property based on the
memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim, that he is an heir
(nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot and the present occupant
thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum of encumbrances. Neither was his claim
entered on the Certificate of Titles in the name of their original/former owners on file with the
Register of Deeds at the time of the filing or pendency of LRC Case No. R-4659. Clearly,
petitioner is not entitled to notice.
Noteworthy is the fact that there was compliance by private respondent of the RTC's
order of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. This is sufficient notice
of the petition to the public at large.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent court is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippines International Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE
PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY
SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special
Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail not
only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also
the validity of the August 11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, in their personal
capacities and without court approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without
securing court approval have appropriated as their own personal property the properties of [the]
Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words,
these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among themselves and
proceeded to dispose the same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by
the Estate Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification
for this action by the heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for
demanding that public respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares
of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
Parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 are not the only heirs
claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez. The records of this caseshow
that as early as March 3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of
Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P.Ortañez with
LigayaNovicio. This claim by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez is
admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement before they executed the
same. This much was admitted by petitioner’s counsel during the oral argument.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or want of jurisdiction in nullifying the sale of stocks by the petitioner [Jose
Ortañez] and his mother [Juliana Ortañez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the
Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez.
2. Whether or not an heir has the right to dispose of the decedent’s property pending the
final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court.
HELD:
1. NO.
Public respondent can never be faulted for not approving the subsequent sale by the
petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his mother [Juliana Ortañez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to
the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez.
It is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed
Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the
intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or
claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the
appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and
Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
2. NO.
Whileitistruethatan heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary
property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent.However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to
him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is,
after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares.This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any
specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner
FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the
intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as
what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court
approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of
the decedent’s estate. In the early case ofGodoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale
of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and
passes no title to the purchaser.
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband
ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted
by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA,
CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving
several personal and real properties located in Angeles City,Dagupan City and KalookanCity. He
also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and
with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada,
Alfonso “Clyde” P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada,
Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour
and their children. They are petitioner TeodoraRiofero, who became a part of his life when he
entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to
Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995,
petitioner TeodoraRioferio and her children executed anExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in
Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupanissued Certificates of
Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners TeodoraRioferio, Veronica Orfinada-
Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that
petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by
executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement
of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the
Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the
property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties
originally belonging to the parents of TeodoraRoofers and that the titles thereof were delivered to
her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
name. Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-
interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator.
HELD:
YES.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision
of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle
that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite
the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.
II. WILLS
A. CONCEPT AND NATURE OF WILLS
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENACOSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS,respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as
a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation
until he dies, every year to give Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export
sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza
dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil.
In the said Codicil, testatrix AlejaBelleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to
his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the codicils should be given effect.
HELD:
YES.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly
worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
CoscolluelaBelleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied
with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered
as modal and not conditional.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly
followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby
defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES
AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE,petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites
Agape, EstebanaGalolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112 for the
probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes.
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring
“xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion “Oning” R. Reyes the following properties
to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins,
antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in
common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban,
Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.”.
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will
which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio Vivares
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors failed to
present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person
during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the trial court’s
decision admitting the will for probate but the modification that paragraph II including
subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring that the contested testamentary
disposition in the will is valid.
HELD:
No.
TheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrindeclaringthatthesaidtestamentarydispositionsare valid.As a
general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or
not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the
testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the
will’s provisions.The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually
comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is
apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is
intrinsically invalid.The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because “practical
considerations” demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions
are doubtful legality.Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the
probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late
Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether
or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution
of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the
lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes was his wife did
not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of
Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic
validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
In this case, there is a presumption of marriage wherein the testator himself declared in
his will that Asuncion is his wife. Moreover, in the elegant language of Justice Moreland written
decades ago, he said-
“A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same
force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the
law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do
so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s having meant just what he
said.” (Santosvs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TESTAMENTARY ACT
G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904

ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.
WILLARD, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant contested the validity of the will of Doña Juana Moreno upon the ground that
although the attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of
three witnesses who also each signed in each presence, the will was not actually written by the
testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary that a will be written by the testator herself.
HELD:
No.
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by
someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That section requires (1) that the
will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be
signed by someone in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work
of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was
typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testatrix is of no consequence.
G.R. No. L-2071 September 19, 1950

Testate estate of Isabel V. Florendo, deceased. TIRSO DACANAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PEDRO V. FLORENDO, ET AL., oppositor-appellees.
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a special proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of La Union to

probate a joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses Isabel V. Florendo and Tirso Dacanay
on October 20, 1940. Isabel V. Florendo having died, her surviving spouse Tirso Dacanay is
seeking to probate said joint and reciprocal will, which provides in substance that whoever of the
spouses, joint testators, shall survive the other, shall inherit all the properties of the latter, with an
agreement as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case of his or her
demise.
The relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed the probate of said will on
various statutory grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said joint and reciprocal will may be probated in view of article 669
of the Civil Code.
HELD:
No.
The prohibition of article 669 of the Civil Code is directed against the execution of a joint
will, or the expression by two or more testators of their wills in a single document and by one
act, rather than against mutual or reciprocal wills, which may be separately executed.
Article 669 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
ART. 669. Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same instrument, either
for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
The reason for this provision, especially as regards husband and wife, is that when a will
is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or
character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for
that of third persons whom he or she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but
reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or
desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the
spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of
the other.
G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and GervasiaRebaca, executed a joint
last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land
acquired during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela
Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any
child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the
testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands
aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677,
both situated in sitioBucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu. Bernabedela
Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia
and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due publication as required
by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in
Special Proceedings No. 499. Upon the death of GervasiaRebaca on October 14, 1952, another
petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on
November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of
Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to
appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954.
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and
void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669,
Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the
testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in
1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the
testament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint will executed is valid.
HELD:
No.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive
effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already
decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in
favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court
was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however
erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the
whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and
public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicaeut finis set
litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
The SupremeCourtaddedthat the probate decree in 1939 could only affect the share of the
deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the
wife, GervasiaRebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal
properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then
be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated
during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was
concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is
considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First
Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of
the deceased GervasiaRebaca in the properties in question.
Therefore, the undivided interest of GervasiaRebaca should pass upon her death to her
heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her
favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage
could not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are
only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their
observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).
C. RULES IN INTERPRETATION OF WILLS
G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES
AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE,petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites
Agape, EstebanaGalolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112 for the
probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes.
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring
“xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion “Oning” R. Reyes the following properties
to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins,
antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in
common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban,
Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.”.
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will
which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio Vivares
filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors failed to
present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person
during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the trial court’s
decision admitting the will for probate but the modification that paragraph II including
subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in declaring that the contested testamentary
disposition in the will is valid.
HELD:
No.
TheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrindeclaringthatthesaidtestamentarydispositionsare valid.As a
general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or
not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the
testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the
will’s provisions.The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually
comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is
apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is
intrinsically invalid.The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because “practical
considerations” demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions
are doubtful legality.Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the
probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the
late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1)
whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the
execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied
with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes
was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the
institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will’s
intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
In this case, there is a presumption of marriage wherein the testator himself declared in
his will that Asuncion is his wife. Moreover, in the elegant language of Justice Moreland written
decades ago, he said-
“A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same
force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the
law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do
so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s having meant just what he
said.” (Santosvs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
D. GOVERNING LAW
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILLOF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITHPRAYER
FOR THE APPOINTMENTOF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS,Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a

naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament
she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S..
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of

Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio

Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s
will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding
of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as
administrator of the estate.
The RTC issued an order:(a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing
respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor
designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA),arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in
the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals held that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject
to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the
order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution,
before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by
different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in

the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed.
HELD:
No.
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign
will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the
will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further
state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of
the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the
will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of
it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will
has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.

RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña FlorentinaRella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with
all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial
guardian Clotilde Samson, and AmparoAlsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized
agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial over the then present and existing properties of
the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Florentina.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina, also known as Doña Tinay
separately executed their respective holographic willsthe provisions of which were in conformity
and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic
wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal
properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their
legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also
declared that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half
thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the
four children.
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic will on
the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;aTinay filed before the Court of First
Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective holographic wills.
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;aTinay executed their mutual and
reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the
codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses,
conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their
legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for
themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;aTinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the
said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and
reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well as in all properties
which might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the
surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be
divided equally among the four children. It was also declared in both codicils that upon the death
of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was designated mutually and reciprocally as the
executor or administrator of all the properties reserved for themselves.
On the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a separate but similar codicil
in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above codicil of his wife. Also on the same day
of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay both filed their respective
supplemental petitions for the probate of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings
earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wills and the codicils thereto
were duly admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Doña Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to
serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959. Letters
testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took his oath of office and performed
his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will
in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to
make a list of all his remaining properties with their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer,
Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by
Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This
notarial will and testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had three essential
features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus'
holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the
collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de
Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition
of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain
specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently
acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming
Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Doña Tinay had been
paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of
partition executed on December 19, 1959 and which essentially confirmed the provisions of the
partition of 1949, the holographic will and codicil of Doña Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court
approved the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the
proceedings on the estate of Doña Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the
will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus
Alsua.Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian
Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing
mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed under duress
or influence of fear or threats; or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the main beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with them, or the
signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not executed
according to the formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate
contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon by him, his deceased spouse, Doña
Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial guardian
Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of
1955 and 1956, respectively, essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949
which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the partition of the
estate of DoñaTinay in December, 1959.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not estoppel is applicable in probate proceedings.
2. Whether the respondent court erred in not allowing the probate of the last will and
testament of Don Jesus Alsua..
HELD:
1. No.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings. probate proceedings
involve public interest, and the application therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament,
would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the
state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to
law. The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the right of any
living person, but to determine whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by
the pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of
devolution of his property on death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a
proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and frequently does
receive no personal benefit from the performance of the act. One of the most fundamental
conceptions of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be
compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased person.
2. YES.
The respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November
14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949
was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his participation
therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions.
It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a
partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it
may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the
parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949,
contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was
substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under the old Civil Code (Article
633). On the other hand, there could have been no valid donation to the children of the other half
reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and Doña Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be
divided equally among the children for the simple reason that the property or properties were not
specifically described in the public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633 which
provides as follows:
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made by public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described and in the amount of the
encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public writing; but it
shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice thereof shall be
given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses which
may be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to his or her
share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to give
equally to the children what belongs or-would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is
that Don Jesus and Doña Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of
only one-half of their combined properties which must be charged against their legitime and
cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free
disposal of the spouses with regards to their respective shares.
Upon the death of Doña Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion was
distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil dated
August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the distribution of her properties was subject to her
holographic win and codicil, independently of the holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus
executed by him on the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both wills
and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint wills (Art.
818) and secondly because upon the death of Doñ;aTinay, only her estate was being settled, and
not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doña
Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Doña Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted
both the husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets.
In her holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was made.
G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the
outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home.
Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went
home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an
adulterous relationshipwithhis brother. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce, which
granted. Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children.
Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children.
Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of
Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties
they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry.
2. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD:
1. YES.
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad
provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce
obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity.
2. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the successional rights allowing proof
of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity” since he was a foreigner.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Bulacan, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the
spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire
family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s
will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since
the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that,
by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice
of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two
wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed in the Philippines.
HELD:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or
by Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in theforeign country and not in the Philippines; (3)
the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a
probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in
the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them.
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact -

petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his
heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded
respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be
treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice
by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the
Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the
wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are
given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-

appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in
the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in
the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage
had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico,
Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with
Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacanand after hearing letters of administration were issued to
ApolonioSuntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the
estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in
the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because
of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the
insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said
order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court
sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for the further proceedings. In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court
was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to
the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing
sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the
meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the
files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters
executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded
and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, SilvinoSuntay filed a
petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the
Philippines on November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January
1931.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of the deceased be allowed in the Philippines.

HELD:
No.
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law
on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition
for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so
allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and
the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The
law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy
were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the
order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence
of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of
procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating
or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony,
and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject.
It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were
known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
interested parties residing in the Philippines.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China,does not purport to probate or
allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged
probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and
recorded by a competent court of this country.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he
resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the
national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything
under California law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the

successional rights of his heirs.
HELD:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The
case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law only.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he
died, he had made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his
Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything.
Texas has no conflicts rule (rule of Private International Law) governing successional rights.
Furthermore, under Texas Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore, no legitimes. The
illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of the
legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply).
ISSUE:
Whether or not they are entitled to their legitimes?
HELD:
Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes for under Texas law which we must
apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes.
The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v.

Christensen Garcia, L- 6759, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of another. In the present case,
the decedent was BOTH a national and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that
even assuming that Texas has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence however of proof as to the conflicts of law rule in Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil. 427; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil.
500).
The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039) should be
disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect provides that our prohibitive laws should
not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is WRONG, firstly, because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art.
1039 are special provisions while Art. 17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly,
because Congress deleted the phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article” when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change, the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been its purpose to make the second paragraph of
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself, which must be applied in testate and intestate successions.
As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It
is, therefore, evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
(4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent executed two wills — one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention
in executing a separate Philippine will, it will NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court ruled in
Miciano v. Brimo, 60 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitionervs. HONORABLE
VENICIO ESCOLIN, respondent
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (Husband and Wife) provided mutually in their
respective will a provision wherein they would give all their estate to the surviving spouse, and
upon the death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of what has been inherited by the
surviving spouse from the earlier deceased spouse would be bequeathed to the brothers and
sisters of the later deceased. Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was appointed special
administrator and later executor of the will. No liquidation was made. Upon death of Mr.
Hodges, Magno was appointed Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate and was initially also Mr.
Hodges’ estate but PCIB took over. Probate proceedings for both estated initiated, the two
administrators (PCIB and Magno) differed in the alleged share of Mrs. Hodges in their conjugal
partnership property that she could have bequeathed to her heirs. PCIB alleged that the estate left
by Mrs. Hodges is less than ½ of her share in the conjugal estate (apply Philippine law),
notwithstanding Art. 16 of our Civil Code which mandates the application of Texas Law, Mr.
Hodges being a citizen of Texas. Magno, on the other hand, alleged that Texas Law applicable,
wherein no system of legitime provided so estate of Mrs. Hodges could not be less than her share
or should be more than ½.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, should be applied and not Texas
Law?
HELD:
NO.Texas Law applies but it is yet to be proven. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws
may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between
the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exceptional instances when the said laws are already
within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known, or
they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned
claim otherwise.
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact
to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the
time of her death (and not said law at any other time).
E.TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, petitioner vs.
JOSEFINA VALMONTE, respondent
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United
States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the
Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village,
Makati, which he owned in common with his sister CiriacaValmonte and titled in their names in
TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on
February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October
8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of
two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first
page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was
signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three
instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and
again on the left hand margin.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator’s will,
testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three
witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will
and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the
will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it.
After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer.
The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of
town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did.
Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to
them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood.
He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his
witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer
changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear
dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and
mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid will?
HELD:
NO. We are not convinced. Fraud “is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense,
by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some
extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.”
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the
will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the
self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution
of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact
that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary;
and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken “the cudgels of
taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years.”
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does not even require
that a [notarial] will x xx be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.” More
important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible
witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In
any event, we agree with the CA that “the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed
execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and
the instrumental witnesses.”
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a “grand conspiracy” in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to
receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution.Their testimony favoring it
and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be
affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards
the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary.
As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appelle vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, et al., defendants-appellants
TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
The record shows that the testator, PioquintoPaguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years
prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few
years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing
to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He
retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the
medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his
family.
PioquintoPaguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which
the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the
testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time
with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by
the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that
Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in
the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of
the testator and each other.
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the
testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements
of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able
to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for
some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro
Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state
whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement
were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The
witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing
witness.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator
had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the
testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his
opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state
in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the
testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in
reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years
old and who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according
to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and
discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator
had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr.
Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to
certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
ISSUE:
Was the will duly made?
HELD:
YES. We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens
the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been
for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his
physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was
the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no
doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his
mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not include
from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and
the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If
such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such
exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that the
question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest
degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years
of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to
his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the
execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he
unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the
execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He
seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was
engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several
hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the
proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are
those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-24665 October 13, 1926

ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ISIDRA ABQUILAN. ATANASIO ABQUILAN,
petitioner-appellant vs.
FELICIANA ABQUILAN, opponent-appelle
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
This court refused to legalize an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of
IsidraAbquilan, the deceased. It appears that the deceased left no forced heirs, and her only heirs,
in case of intestacy, are her brother, AtanasioAbquilan, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana
Abquilan, a sister, who is the opponent.
The denial was based on the finding of the trial court that the document propounded as
the will of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to the
supposed will are forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not executed by the
deceased. He therefore denied probate, and the proponent appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the purported last will and testament was executed by the deceased.
HELD:
NO. A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that on November 6, 1924, the date
when the will purports to have been executed, the supposed testatrix was not in a condition such
as to enable her to have participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from
paralysis to celebralhemorrhage in such degree as completely to discapacitate her for intelligent
participation in the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as
signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures leads to the
conclusion that the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other person.
Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely
demonstrate in our opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date attributed to the
questioned document, and that, instead an attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate
another will, which failed of completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to
the making of a will in which the testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was
undoubtedly fabricated later, probably on November 7, at a time when the condition of the
deceased was such as to make rational participation on her part in the act of making a will
impossible.
G.R. NO. 4445 September 18, 1909
CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appelle vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-apellants
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
The court admitted to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of
Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the
sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and
sisters of the deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if
probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or
descending line.
The appellants alleged that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the
execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not
of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased was of sound mind and memory at the time of the execution
of his last will and testament?
HELD:
YES. That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully
established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time
of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the
fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with
severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of
asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in
no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the
evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the
will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels
of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who
wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his
property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heir in the
ascending or ascending line; that a bitter family quarrel had separated him from his brothers and
sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were
adherents of the Aglipayano church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers
or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or
attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his
property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves are
grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of
undue influence on the part of his wife, or in anywise corroborates contestants’ allegation that
the will never was executed.
G.R. No. L-24569 February 26, 1926
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appelle
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was 76 years of age and was in
feeble health for a long time, made his will where he made his cousin Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his properties. The probate of the
will was opposed by Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest relative of the deceased. The ground
cited for the opposition was that the testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed that at time of
the execution of the supposed will, the deceased was suffering from senile dementia and was
under guardianship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during the execution of the will?
HELD:
YES. The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will during its execution.
The Supreme Court held that at the time of the making of the will, the testator may be of old age,
may have been physically decrepit, may have been week of intellect, have suffered a loss of
memory, had a guardian over his person and property and may have been eccentric, but he still
possessed that spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention, and to
summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law terms “testamentary
capacity.”
G.R. No. L-39033 November 13, 1933

IN RE WILL OF THE LATE MATEA ABELLA. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO,
applicant-appelle vs. MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Testatrix MateaAbella of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, went to San Fernando, La Union
accompanied by her niece, to consult a physician. While in San Fernando, she stayed in a
convent under the charge of Father Cordero. After two consultations with the physician, it was
found out that Matea was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.
Thereafter, Matea talked to Atty. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a
will. She was then interviewed by the lawyer twice on separate days in the presence of four
persons at the convent where she was staying. During the interview, the testatrix even directed
her niece to bring her the documents in her trunk which she delivered to Atty. Reinoso.
After the will has been drafted in Ilocano, MacarioCalug, one of of the witnesses, read
the same to her and she approved. The will was then copied clean and was again read to her and
she expresses her approval thereof but inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she did not care to
sign the same suggesting that it be postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932, which was
done in the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other
persons, including Father Cordero. After the signing, Atty. Reinoso delivered the original copies
of the will to the testatrix.
On July 3,1932, Matea died of senile debility at the age of 88 years. Thereafter, a petition
for probate of Matea’s will was filed. The petition was opposed by MarcianaAbella, one of the
grounds cited was that the testator lacked testamentary capacity since the she was 88 years old
and was suffering from senile debility at the time she executed her will.
The probate court admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MateaAbella possessed the mental capacity at the time she executed her
will?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court believed that based on the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will of the deceased showed that the testatrix was not so physically weak, nor so
blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with full understanding
thereof, dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor
deafness, nor poor memory is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person from making his will.
The mere fact that in her will MateaAbella disposed of properties, which she had already donated
to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental insanity. At most, it constitutes
forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the irrevocability of certain donations.
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA
BUENVIAJE, respondents
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
On 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona FlorentinaRalla, together with all their
children entered into a duly notarized agreement over the then present and existing properties of
the spouses.
On 1955, the spouses separately executed their respective holographic wills, the
provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of
November, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his
or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half already to be partitioned as part of the
legitime of the four living children.
On 1959, Dona Florentina died. About 2 weeks after the death of his wife, Don Jesus
executed a new will, thereby revoking and canceling his previous holographic will which he
made on 1955 and also its codicil. On 1962, Don Jesus died. Petitioner herein Alsua-Betts, as the
executrix named in the will filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.
Oppositions thereto were filed by his children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned will was executed in accordance with the requisites
prescribed by law pertaining to the soundness of mind of the testator during execution of his
will?
HELD:
YES. Don Jesus was of sound mind at the time of the execution of his will. Between the
highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity and incapacity and while on one hand it
has been held that mere weakness of mind, or imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person from making a will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
enable him to know what he is about to do and how and to whom he is disposing his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity
does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appelle vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants
ABAD-SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris,
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided
for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en
plenodominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez "en nudapropriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions
for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are
invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code;
(c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski,
who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to
them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.
HELD:
YES. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate
in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime.
Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he
shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the
deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because
the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred
for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en plenodominio" as her legitime and
which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in
the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for
as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as
to costs.
G. R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988

HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, petitioners vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
A petition was filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22, 1981
seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late HerminiaMontinola executed on January
28, 1980. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March 29, 1981 at the age of
70 years, devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons.
On April 29, 1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an
urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With the conformity of all the relatives
and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court appointed private respondent as Special
Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.
On June 29, 1981, MatildeMontinolaSanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the
deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, 7
alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix
herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession
of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon
the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will; and that the will failed
to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate.
The court admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator was of sound mind at the time of the execution of her last will
and testament?
HELD:
YES. The fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her
real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound
mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in
intestate successor.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory
heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right
to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof
of neither fraud or undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The exercise of improper pressure
and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.
Finally, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation of the respondent court-
There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. The most authentic
proof that deceased had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will
itself which according to a report of one of the two expert witnesses reveals the existence of
significant handwriting characteristics such as spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could
not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind/or under
undue influence or improper pressure when she executed the Will.
F. FORMS OF WILLS
GR. No. 13431 November 12, 1919

IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appelle vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants
AVANCEÑA, J.:
FACTS:
The will of Ana Abangan executed on July, 1916 was duly probated. The opponents
appealed. The document consists of two (2) sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and
under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these
sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants’ contention, are defects whereby the probate
of the will should have been denied. Further, appellants alleged records do not show that the
testatrix knew the dialect which the will is written.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of
which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin
Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The
following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three
instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and
the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants'
contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the
opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formal requisites prescribed
by law?
HELD:
YES. In requiring that each and every page of the will should also be signed on the left
margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act no. 2645 (which is
the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself)
to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator’s disposition. But
when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator
and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin on the left margin of
said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute
took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have
referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to
know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But when all the dispositive parts of a will
are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this
single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
As to the allegation that the testatrix did not know the dialect in which the will is written,
the circumstances appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in the city of Cebu, and
the dialect in the locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any
proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which the will is written.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which
contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by
the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the
testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their
truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as
to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that
it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So
when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.
G.R. No. L-28946 January 16, 1929
IN RE ESTATE OF PIRASO, deceased. SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant vs. SALMING
PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Benguet,
denying the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso.The will was written in
English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know thus the proponent-appellant contends
that the will is not valid for it was not written in a dialect understood by the testator. The
proponent-appellant further contends that the will should have been in the Ilocano dialect, the
dialect that is known to the testator.
The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the lower court:
1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have been drawn up in
the Ilocano dialect.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to
understand a will drawn up in said dialect.
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.
The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which reads as
follows:
The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although
imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion
that his will should have been written in that dialect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will herein is valid?
HELD:
NO. The fact that the will was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did
not know, is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the
law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard
or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into
effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it
be written in the language or dialect known by the testator," etc.
Moreover, the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs.
Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the
locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, can not be applied in this case
because, in the instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of
Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record
contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorot dialect, with a
smattering of Ilocano.
G.R. No. L-19079 January 15, 1923

PRIMITIVO GONZALES Y LAUREL, applicant-appelle vs.
JOVITO LAUREL Y TAPIA, opponent-appellant
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Batangas allowed the probate of the last will and testament
of the deceased Maria Tapia. Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from that ruling of the court
below, alleging, among others, that court erred: 1. In holding that the supposed will of the
deceased Maria Tapia was executed with the solemnities prescribed by the law, notwithstanding
that there was no proof of the dialect known by the said deceased; 2. In not holding that the
signatures of Maria Tapia appearing in the will had been obtained through deceit, surprise, fraud,
and in an illegal and improper manner
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid for being written in a dialect not known to the testator?
Whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing and
signing the will?
RULING:
YES. The deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog
region, where said deceased had real properties for several years. She requested Modesto Castillo
to draw her will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a presumption arises that said
Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect, which presumption is now conclusive for not having been
overthrown nor rebutted.
YES. With respect to the second issue, the preponderance of evidence established that the
will was executed and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without fraud,
deceit, surprise, or undue influence or machinations of anybody, she being then mentally
capacitated and free.
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981

NENITA DE VERA SUROZ, complainant vs. JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy
Clerk of Court, respondents
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Mauro Suroza and his wife Marcelina Salvador reared a boy named Agapito who used
the surname Suroza. Agapito got married to Nenita and begot a child named Lilia. Agapito
became disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian when he was declared an
incompetent.
Meanwhile, a couple entrusted their child Marilyn to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl
friend of Agapito). The child was later delivered to MarcelinaSuroza who brought her up as a
supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. She stayed with Marcelina but was not
legally adopted by Agapito. Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will when she was 73
years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. In that will,
Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Upon learning of the existence of a testamentary proceeding for the settlement of
Marcelina's estate, Nenita and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed a motion to set
aside the order ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of
the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that
Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter. In spite of the fact that
Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's
estate, he issued an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.
In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her
contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and
because it is written in English which is not known to her.
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by
Nenita.
ISSUE:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to
probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to
the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses
did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
HELD:
YES. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in
English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived
that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated
that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it
is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must
be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the
anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the
supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was
still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court,
respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally
conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the
will was validly executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be
inexcusable.
G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-
NOBLE, petitioner, vs.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray died in 1943. Both died
without legitimate children. Respondent Abaja filed a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children
EulogioAbaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
NicanorCaponong opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he
died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be
disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2)
it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by
Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo,
Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela
Tronco also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of
Abada and Toray. The RTC admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not
file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray’s will became final
and executory. Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly
that the testator signed the will and it’s every page in the presence of three witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that f Abada’s will has an attestation clause. While the
attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that
three witnesses signed it. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in
permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure
of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. The
Court applied the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly show
four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there
are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde.
With respect to the allegation that the attestation clause does not expressly state the
circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
the testator and of each other, the Court has ruled that precision of language in the drafting of an
attestation clause is desirable. However, it is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in
CA- G.R. CV No. 47644.
G. NOTARIAL WILLS
G.R. No. L-5149 March 22, 1910

GREGORIO MACAPINLAC, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO ALIMURONG, opponent-appellant.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
Facts:
Simplicia de los Santos having died on June 19, 1907, her surviving husband, Gregorio
Macapinlac, submitted her will to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for probate. Macario
Alimurong, a nephew of the deceased, opposed the proceedings and requested that "the will of
the deceased, Doña Simplicia de los Santos, be declared null and void for either of the two
reasons" which he expresses, and which are:
(1) Because the will was not executed and signed by the witnesses in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure now in force.
(2) Because it was executed under duress and undue and illegal influence on the part of
the persons benefited thereby or of a person acting in their interests.
the trial court declared the following facts to be proven:
(1) That at 6 o' clock on the evening of June 17, 1907, Simplicia de los Santos, who was
sick but in full possession of all her faculties, executed her will, which is the document
attached to the record, Exhibit No. 1 of the petitioner.
(2) That after the execution of such will on Monday, the testatrix died early on the
morning of the following Wednesday.
(3) That, as a preliminary act, a rough copy of the said will was made up, which rough
copy was read to the testatrix, and the latter ordered an additional clause to be added
thereto, in connection with a legacy that she desired to make in favor of some of her old
servants who and rendered good service.
(4) That, after the rough copy was amended by the addition of the above-mentioned
clause, a clear copy thereof was made up and was again read to the testatrix, who
approved it in all of its parts, and as she was unable to sign, she requested Amando de
Ocampo to sign for her and the latter wrote the following words with his own hand. "At
the request of the testatrix D.a Simplicia de los Santos, I signed — Amando de Ocampo."
Immediately afterwards and also in the presence of the same testatrux and of each other,
the witnesses Jose Juico, Gabino Panopio, Eusebio dayao, Juan Angeles, Jose Torres,
Alejo San Pedro, and Gregorio Sangil signed at the bottom of the will.
In view of the said facts—the lower court concludes—the will executed by Simplicia de
los Santos must be admitted to probate. The provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings are fully complied with. The will
bears the name of the testatrix written by Amando de Ocampo in her presence and by her
express direction, and has been witnessed and signed by more than three trustworthy
witnesses, in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
Issue:
whether or not the will was signed in accordance with the law
held:
no. inasmuch as the law requires that when a person signs in place of the testator he should write
the name of the latter in the will as the signature; this was not done by Amando de Ocampo in
the will in question, as he did not sign it with the name of testatrix.
It is shown by the evidence that the will was wholly written in the handwriting of the subscribing
witness, Gregorio Sangil, and at the foot thereof. it is claimed that the form of signing for the
testatrix "At the request of the testatrix Da. Simplicio de los Santos, I signed: Amando de
Ocampo," is not in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Wherefore, The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
G.R. No. 2586 January 19, 1906
TOMAS GUISON, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MARIA CONCEPCION, respondent-appellee.
Teodoro
WILLARD, J.:
Facts:
Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904. the witness Feliciano
Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. Probate of the
will was refused in the court below on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed
thereto, and the petitioner has appealed.
Issue: can the will be admitted for probate?
Held:
No. It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the
testatrix on the will, wrote his own. As such, it cannot be admitted for probate on the ground that
the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto.
Wherefore, The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance
herewith and the case remanded to the court below for execution.
G.R. No. L-9150 March 31, 1915
MARIANO LEAÑO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ARCADIO LEAÑO, objector-appellee.
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
Cristina Valdes, deceased, placed her costs against her name, attached by some other person to
the instrument offered for probate which purports to be her last will and testament, in the
presence of three witnesses whose names are attached to the attesting clause, and that they
attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each other.
Issue: whether or not the placing of a cross opposite her name at the construction of the
instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure?
Held: yes. the placing of the cross opposite her name at the construction of the instrument was a
sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which prescribes that except where wills are signed by some other person than the testator in the
manner and from herein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator. The right of a
testator to sign his will by mark, executed animo testandi has been uniformly sustained by the
courts of last resort of the United States in construing statutory provisions prescribing the mode
of execution of wills in language identical with, or substantially similar to that found in section
618 of our code, which was taken from section 2349 of the Code of Vermont. that the evidence
of record satisfactorily establishes the execution of that instrument as and for her last will and
testament in the manner and form prescribed by law.
Wherefore, The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be reversed, without
costs in this instance, and the record remanded to the court below, where judgment will be
entered admitting the instrument in question to probate in accordance with the prayer of the
petitioner.
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA,

petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
Facts:
1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan 1943. The said will
was written in Ilocano dialect.
2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of the
testator followed below by 'A ruego del testador' and the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it
was signed by another although under the express direction of the testator. This fact however was
not recited in the attestation clause. Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.
3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the attestation failed to recite the facts surrounding the signing of the
testator and the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid
HELD:
NO
the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that Antero or the testator caused
Atty. Javier to write the former's name under his express direction as required by Sec. 618 of the
Civil Procedure. Finally, on the cross affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that it is
not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid signature.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 6845 September 1, 1914
YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
August, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong, deceased. Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of
August, 1909. Together with the petition was the will, signed by deceased, as well as Anselmo
Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. During the hearing, Timoteo Paez and Pablo
Agustin declared that they knew the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had died on the
11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament; that
he was present at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a witness;
that Aselmo Zacarias and Severo Tabora had also signed said will as witnesses and that they had
signed the will in the presence of the deceased; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed
the will voluntarily; and in their judgment, she was in the possession of her faculties; that there
were no threats or intimidation used to induce her to sign the will; that she signed it voluntarily.
It was ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and
admitted to probate. From the record it appears that no further proceedings were had until the
28th of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition,
alleging that they were interested in the matters of the sail will and desired to intervene asked
that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represented them in the cause. The court appointed
guardian ad litem of said parties, Gabriel La O, appeared in court and presented a motion in
which he alleged, in substance:
XXX
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not
then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to sickness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the testator had clear
knowledge and knew what she was doing at the time of signing the will.
HELD:
NO. Article 800 of the Civil Code states that: “The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of
the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be
insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.”We find the same conflict in the declarations of the witnesses which we
found with reference to the undue influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong
relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony
related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in question (Exhibit
A). Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she
was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession
for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a
preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of
sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. In
view of the conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court, we do
not feel justified in reversing his conclusions upon that question. Upon a full consideration of the
record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did
execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all of her faculties, the will
dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A).
Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is hereby affirmed with
costs.
G.R. No. L-30289 March 26, 1929
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:
Facts:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a
niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no
heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will
for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the
ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix
of the estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and
made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the
delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia
de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as ordered,
Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be
cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both
Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted,
Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally
on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
simplify the proceedings.
Issue: 1 whether or not the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of
the testatrix in the will; and
2. whether or not the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not
stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.
Held:
1.The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in the case of the
Estate of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881.”the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the
proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or
testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the testator or
testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original
meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting.
A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.”
2. As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-
mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and
the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of
the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing
alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last
clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it
leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the
will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is
without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
Wherefore, In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed
without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO,

AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS
CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA
RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA *
ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS
CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, already in the
twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses and he
was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declared therein that, among other
things that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after,
he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament but
the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could
finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will,
sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate but due to his death, he
was succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate
court.
PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that it
was not executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since the testator was already in a
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise
contend that the will is null and void because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it
fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing
the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound and
disposing mind and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they also contend that the
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective
such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to
Article 809 of the Civil Code.
Held:
1. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting
witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of
the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding
the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact
that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under
the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result
in the invalidity of the will, should state:
1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the
will and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the
will in the presence of the testator and of one another. “Attestation” and “subscription” differ in
meaning. Attestation is the act of sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation
clause herein assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its
pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that
were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
What is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
2. The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to
probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause
obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the
language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance
rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the
language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should
it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These
considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the
total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since
there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement,
or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the
testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to
forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will
and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the
matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed
with the settlement of the estate of the said decedent.
G.R. No. L-9089 January 5, 1915
In re the state of the deceased SOTERA BARRIENTOS. SAMUEL PERRY, petitioner,

respondent-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE ELIO, petitioner, respondent-appellee.
ARAULLO, J.:
Facts:
Upon the deceased of Sotera Barrientos, a resident of the municipality of Mambajao,

Province of Misamis, 68 years of age, the wife of Samuel Perry in her third marriage, in the said
municipality on August 31, 1912, two documents were presented in the Court of First Instance of
the said province, each of which, according to those who respectively presented them, was the
last will and testament of the said deceased.
The first document was filed on September 4, 1912, that is, four days after the death of the
testatrix, by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and her brother-in-law; and the second on
December 20 of the same year, 1912, by Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. Perry opposed
probate of the first document, and Elio, in turn, that of the second. By agreement of both parties
the two petitions were heard jointly, in order that the evidence introduced to support the one
might be used to impeach the other. Likewise the court, on February 1, 1913, made one single
order in both cases, whereby, after giving due weight to the evidence introduced and setting forth
the findings of fact and of law that he deemed pertinent with respect to each of the said petitions
and to the documents to which they respectively referred, he held that the said two wills were
true and authentic, but that the one executed on September 21, 1910, had been revoked by the
one subsequently executed on August 26, 1912. He therefore denied the probate of the first, that
is, of the one executed in favor of Samuel Perry, and ordered that the second will, in favor of the
other petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the last will and testament of the said Sotera
Barrientos, disallowing with costs the claim of the respondent Perry.
Issue: is the will valid?
Held: in order that a will may be deemed valid, that is executed by one person and signed by
another on account of the testator’s inability to sign, the law requires (sec. 618, Code Civ. Proc.)
that it shall have been signed under the express direction or by the express order of the testator.
In the present case, as we have already seen, when Elio and his companions took the said
document to the house of Sotera Barrientos, there to be executed as her will, it already contained
a statement in the paragraph preceding the space reserved for the signatures of the testatrix and
the witnesses, to the effect that, as the testatrix was unable to sign the will by reason of her
advanced age and her debility, she authorized and begged Santos Matayabas to do so at her
request. There is no proof whatever that Vicente Elio was instructed by Sotera Barrientos to have
that statement inserted in the said document, when, as he testified, the drafting and preparation of
the instrument was commended to him. It is evident, therefore, that it was all merely the idea and
purpose of Elio himself.
For the foregoing reasons, and taking account of the fact that Samuel Perry, the widower of the
deceased Sotera Barrientos, has also requested the probate of the document presented by him,
under date of September 21, 1910, as being the last will and testament of the decedent — a will
the legality and due execution of which were recognized by the lower court in the order appealed
from, notwithstanding which it was not admitted to probate for the reason that it was held to have
been revoked by the other later document presented by Vicente Elio as the will of the said
decedent — we revoke the order appealed from and deny the petition for the probate of the
aforementioned document dated August 26, 1912, presented by Vicente Elio as the last will and
testament of the said decedent, Sotera Barrientos; without special finding as to costs. In view of
this decision, the lower court will proceed as the law requires with regard to the petition made by
Samuel Perry for the probate of the document presented by him dated September 21, 1910, as the
last will and testament of the said decedent. So ordered.
G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906
GERMAN JABONETA,Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.,Defendants-

Appellees.
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
On the 26th day of December, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed under the following
circumstances the document in question, which has been presented for probate as his will.
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document
in question be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as
witnesses, executed the said document as his will. They were all together, and were in the room
where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing
afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two
witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the
presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being
in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana
took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign
in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room the said Julio
Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
Issue: whether or not the will is a dmitted for probate?
Held:
yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in
the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining
witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will,
convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act
of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being
written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the
purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at
the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically
present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took
place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to
prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he
finally left the room.
The principles on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between the testator and the
witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether the witnesses signed the instrument in
the presence of each other, as required by the statute, and applying them to the facts proven in
these proceedings we are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the
instrument were complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on
the ground stated in the ruling appealed from.
Wherefore, The judgment of the trial court is reversed, without especial condemnation of costs,
and after twenty days the record will be returned to the court from whence it came, where the
proper orders will be entered in conformance herewith.
C.A. No. 4 March 21, 1946
In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra. TRINIDAD NEYRA,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE BLANCO,
oppositors-appellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. BLANCO,

petitioners-appellants,
vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
DE JOYA, J.:
Facts:
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants,
executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor
of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other relatives named Teodora
Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in
said will in favor of her only sister Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that when
the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due
deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty offered by
Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her; that in
order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious organization in not accepting the
generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose,
about one week before her death, sent for one Ricardo Sikat, an attorney working in the Law
Offices of Messrs. Feria and LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will;
that Attorney Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the express instructions
given by Encarnacion Neyra, merely prepared a draft in the form of a codicil, marked as Exhibit
M, amending said will, dated September 14, 1939, again naming said religious organization,
among others, as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of
the said religious organization, for their consideration and acceptance.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's
disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente
Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession, after which she expressed her desire to
have a mass celebrated in her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might
take holy communion, in view of her condition; that following the request of Encarnacion Neyra,
Issue: whether or not the testator has testamentary capacity when she made the will?
Held: yes. it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, at the
age of 48, died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, after an illness of about two (2)
years.
In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the
testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the
testimony of alleged medical experts.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the
testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of, and the persons who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. (Bugnao vs.
Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the opponents to the probate
of a will, who stated that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect the full
possession of the mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs.
Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the
physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or
last stage of tuberculosis.
After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find it legally
impossible to sustain any of the errors assigned by the appellants. The judgment appealed from
is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan.

GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
Facts:
1. On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed on
July 1916. It is from this decision which the opponent appealed. It is alleged that the records do
not show the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will was written.
Issue: Whether or not the will was validly probated
Held:
YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself, that it was executed in Cebu City and in the
dialect of the place where the testarix is a resident is enough to presume that she knew this
dialect in the absence of any proof to the contrary. On the authority of this case and that of
Gonzales v Laurel, it seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that
the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution, and, 2) that
the testator must be a native or resident of the said locality
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 15566 September 14, 1921
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia
and Jose Garcia, objectors-appellants.
STREET, J.:
Facts:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of
one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the
capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for
the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who
testified — with details not necessary to be here specified — that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing
faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at
the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their
absence accounted for by the proponent of the will. The will was signed on the right margin.
Issues: whether or not the will is valid despite the fact that the signatures where on the right
margin instead of the left?
Held:
yes. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of
Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case
where the signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in
such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends,
any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as
attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered
too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from will
be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA

VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for
his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on
September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was
prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.
2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the
will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to
sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages
simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was
signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a
page is sufficient to deny probate of the will
RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence.
Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not
intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since
the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed
carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of
the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the
purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and
there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be
signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
G.R. No. L-21151 February 25, 1924
In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased.

RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,
HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, legatees-appellants,
vs.
FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:
as a will was propounded by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate. and contested by

Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and Virgilio Rustia, the court of First Instance
of Manila having denied its probate.
The applicant takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the lower court in holding the
attestation fatally defective and in not finding Act No. 2645 void.
The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit:
(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the will.
(b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will.
(c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will.
(d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.
(e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with
knowledge on the part of the testator that they were signing his will.
(f ) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of the testator.
(g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of the will and was
attached to the will after the death of the testator.
(h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not authentic.
Issue: is the attestation clause made in accordance with the formalities required by law?
Held: yes. In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states that the requirements
prescribed for the will were complied with, and this is enough for it, as such attestation clause, to
be held as meeting the requirements prescribed by the law for it.
The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does not affect its
validity, for, as above stated, the law does not require that it be signed by the testator.
We find no merit in the assignment of error raising the question as to the validity of Act No.
2645, which is valid. For the purposes of this decision, it is not necessary to reason out this
conclusion, it being sufficient for the adjudication of this case to hold the first error assigned by
the appellants to have been demonstrated.
G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir. Agustin
Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground, among others:
1. The first sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or in Arabic
numerals.
2. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.
3. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.
4. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known by Don Sixto
Lopez.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD: Yes, the will is valid.
1. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by
other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or
characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal
sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their
meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which
starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned
“Testamento”.
2. The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in
Liboro’s appelant’s brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be
supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.
3. Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The
reason for this was that he was suffering from “partial paralysis.” There is nothing
curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of
authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good.
4. There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly placed in the
will that the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a matter that may be
established by proof aliunde.
AMADO
Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs.

Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator
of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
FACTS:
Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament before three
attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declare
therein that, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his
real and personal properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to
Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last
will and testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away
before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the
legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate
but due to his death, he was succeeded by William Cabreara, who was appointed by RTC which
is already the probate court. In the course of the hearing, herein petitioners claiming to be
nephews and nieces of the testator, appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the
testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in
the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same; and that the
signature of the testator is not genuine. The probate court rendered a decision that such will is the
Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the
requisites of the law. Upon appeal to CA, the petitioners asserted that the will in question is null
and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically
state the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their
presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another. However, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling and ruling that
the attestation clause in the Last Will substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
Due to denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, hence this appeal before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective such
that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to
Article 809 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify
that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the
same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution
and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the
essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805,
such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state:
The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the attesting witnesses; and
That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and
that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the
will in the presence of the testator and of one another. “Attestation” and “subscription” differ in
meaning. Attestation is the act of sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation
clause herein assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its
pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that
were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
What is then clearly lacking, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be
characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would
warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the
Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the
language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should
it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These
considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the
total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since
there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement,
or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the
testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Rosario Feliciano VDA. DE RAMOS, et al., petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, Marcelina (Martina) GUERRA, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
Adelaida Nista claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the
alleged will and testament as well as codicil of the late Eugenia Danila. Adelaida prayed that
after due notice and hearing, the alleged will and codicil be probated and that she or any other
person be appointed as administrator of the estate. Buenaventura and Marcelina, both surnamed
Guerra, filed an opposition alleging among others that they are legally adopted children of the
late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the purported will and codicil were
procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required by law for the
execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with; that the late Eugenia Danila had
already executed her last will and testament was duly probated and not revoked or annulled
during her lifetime; and that Adelaida is not competent and qualified to act as administration of
the estate. Afterwards, the parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by
the lower court. The petitioners herein filed a motion for leave to intervene as co-petitioners and
filed a reply partly admitting and denying the material allegations in the opposition to the
petition and alleging among other things, that oppositors repudiated their institution as heirs and
executors because they failed to cause the recording in the Register of Deeds the will and
testament in accordance with the Rules and committed acts of ingratitude when they abandoned
the testatrix and denied her support. Subsequently, the intervenors (petitioners herein) also filed a
motion for new trial and/or re-hearing and/or relief from judgment and to set aside the judgment
based on the compromise agreement and consequently, the oppositors interposed an opposition
to the motion to which the intervenors filed their reply. The lower court allowed and admitted to
intervene the petitioners herein, the compromise agreement was disapproved except as regards to
their lawful rights, and the original petition and amended opposition to probate of the alleged
will and codicil stand. The lower court also denied the motion for the appointment of a special
administrator filed by the intervenors. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. The lower court then allowed the probate of the will although two of the instrumental
witnesses testified that they did not see the testatrix sign the will. The oppositors herein appealed
to the Court of Appeals set aside the order of allowing the probate. Hence, this present action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in
accordance with the formalities of the law considering the complicated circumstances that two
(2) of the attesting witnesses testified against their due execution while other non-subscribing
witnesses testified to the contrary.
RULING:
There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince the Supreme Court that the will and codicil
were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and
convincingly that the documents were prepared by a lawyer and the execution of the same was
evidently supervised by his associate and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The
solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within
the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. If there should be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a
will, other than an interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty as
members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no showing that the lawyers
who participated in the execution of the will had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently,
the Court of Appeals failed to consider the presumption of regularity on the questioned
documents. There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion
of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented
to prove their occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil
carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly,
the attestation claim far from being deficient were properly signed by the attesting witnesses.
Neither it is disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the
presence of each and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary
Public who was all the time present during the execution.
Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs.

Hon. Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR and Manuel LUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
FACTS:
Agapita Cruz is the surviving spouse of the deceased Valente Cruz. Agapita filed before the CFI
an opposition for the allowance of the will of his late husband alleging that the will was executed
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence because the said instrument was
executed without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to
what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed
in accordance with law. However, due to unfavorable decision, Agapita appealed by certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed last will and testament was executed in accordance with law.
RULING:
Of the three instrumental witnesses, one of them is at the same time the Notary Public before
whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the last will and testament in question was not executed
in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his
having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow. Consequently, if the third
witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having
signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality
into two.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would
be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to
act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of
witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be that
only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstance,
the law would not be duly observed.
Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs.

Hon. Conrado M. VASQUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969
FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried and leaving no descendants, ascendants, brother or
sister thereafter, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. De Precilla, niece of the deceased petitioned for
probate the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria dated December 1960 and that she be
appointed as special administratrix. Various parties opposed the petition contending that the
1960 will was not intended by Gliceria to be her true will and that there was a 1956 will executed
by Gliceria were the oppositors were named as legatees. Consequently, Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis an
ophthalmologist testified that Gliceria’s left eye suffered form cataract in 1960 which made her
vision mainly for viewing distant object but not for reading prints.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 808 regarding blind testator be followed in the instant case to make
Gliceria’s will valid?
RULING:
For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was like a
blind testator and the due execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions
of Article 808 of the Civil Code.
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by the notary public
before whom the will is acknowledged.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself, is to make the provisions of the will known to the testator, so that he
may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to
insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the
handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the
requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different
persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator’s) other senses.
Brigido Alvarado,
Cesar ALVARADO, petitioner vs.
Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled, “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son, Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed a holographic will
at the time awaiting probate before RTC. As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the
notary public and Cesar, the testator did not read the final draft of the will, instead, Atty. Rino, as
the lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. While the testator’s will was admitted to
probate, a codicil was subsequently executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to
generate cash for the testator’s eye operation because he was then suffering from glaucoma. But
the disinheritance and the revocatory clauses remained and as in the case of the notarial will, the
testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was Atty. Rino who read
it alound in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and of the notary
public. Upon the testator’s death, Atty Rino as executor filed a petition for probate of the notarial
will which was in turn opposed by Cesar alleging that the will sought to be probated was not
executed and attested as required by law. Upon failure of Cesar to substantiate his Opposition, a
Probate Order was issued from which an appeal was made to IAC stating that the probate of the
deceased’s last will and codicil should have been denied because the testator was blind within
the meaning of the law at the time his “Huling Habilin” and the codicil thereto was executed;and
that since reading required by Art. 808 was admittedly not complied with. CA concluded that
although Art. 808 was not followed, there was, however, as substantial compliance.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of Article 808 at the time his
“Huling Habilin” and codicil were executed.
If so, whether or not the requirement of double-reading in said Article was complied with such
that whether or not, they were validly executed.
RULING:
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
“incapable of reading their wills. Since the deceased was incapable of reading the final drafts of
his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his “poor,” “defective,” or
“blurred” vision, there can be no other course but to conclude that he comes within the scope of
the term “blind’ as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with
his instruction. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is
essential to ascertain whether or not Art. 808 had been complied with.
There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will and codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the
“Huling Habilin,” the day of the execution was not the first time that the testator had affirmed the
truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. Moreover, with four persons following the
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents. This is especially true considering the fact that the three instrumental
witnesses were persons known to the testator.
The spirit behind that law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure authenticity of the
will, the formal imperfection should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account may only defeat the testator’s will. Substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of will are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and
trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary
privilege.
Abangan v Abangan
Avancena;
Nov 12, 1919
FACTS:
Trial Court admitted Ana Abangan’s probate. The will is described in thefollowing manner:
First sheet:
Contains all the disposition of the testatrix.
Signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of Ana
Abangan) Signed by three witnesses
Second sheet:
Contains only the attestation clause. Duly signed by the same three witnesses at the bottom. Was
not signed by the testatrix herself Anastacia Abangan (different person) et al. appealed from this
decision. She says that the probate should have been denied on three grounds: Neither of the
sheets were signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses the pages were not
numbered by letters It was written in a dialect that the testatrix did not understand.
Issue: WON the probate should have been admitted.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court was correct in admitting the probate.1. Re: signing on the left
margin- The object of Act 2645, which requires that every sheet should be signed on the left
margin, is only to avoid the substitution of any sheet, thereby changing the dispositions of the
testatrix.- Act 2645 only took into consideration cases of wills written on several sheets, which
did not have to be signed at the bottom by the testator and the witnesses.- But when the
dispositions are duly written only on one sheet, and signed at the bottom by the testator and the
witnesses, the signatures on the left would be purposeless.- If the signatures at the bottom
already guarantee its authenticity, another signature on the left margin would be unnecessary.-
This interpretation of Act 2645 also applies to the page containing the attestation clause (the
second sheet). Such a signature on the margin by the witnesses would be a formality not required
by the statute.- It is also not required that the testatrix sign on the attestation clause because the
attestation, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not the testator since the
testator does attest, but executes the will.2. Re: Page numbering- Act 2645’s object in requiring
this was to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed.- But when all the dispositive
parts of the will are written on one sheet only, the object of the Act 2645 disappears because the
removal of this single sheet although hot numbered, cannot be hidden.
FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO,

substituted
by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006, Tinga, J. (Third Division)
Facts:
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written
is fatally
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
defective. And perhaps
most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally
defective. Any one of
these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for
judicial rejection.
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will
consisted of
two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of
pages
and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed
their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda Castillo
opposed
the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will was not executed
and
attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedent’s signature did not appear
on
the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with
law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore “the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will…with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom
in
expressing his last wishes.” According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will
under
the sub-title, “Patunay Ng Mga Saksi,” comprised the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement,
and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held that the signing
by the
subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation
clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose
of
identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial
court’s
decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving
of
probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that “the number of
pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause” is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as “the substantial compliance rule.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and, hence,
should be admitted to probate
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses
is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment,
but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A
notarial
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE –
CIVIL LAW
Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal requirements of
wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant therefrom is the requirement that
the
attestation state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in
force a
rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section 618. Article 809 of
the
Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the
“substantial compliance rule.” However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule “must be
limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all
the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are
three or the will was notarized...But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required
to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the
probate proceedings.” The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554,
May 28, 1993,
222 SCRA 781): “the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal
and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in
the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.”
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will
against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase
or
decrease in the pages. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if
the
will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and
Taboada. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause
or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of
the
number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of
the
will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates
the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the
will
be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify,
among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will.
On
the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to
the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing
the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’
undertakings in
the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly
different
avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong
10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By no manner of contemplation can
these words
be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It might be
possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to the usual language
thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – CIVIL LAW
before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by
the
fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and entrusted into a
separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be
“acknowledged”,
and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the
instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and
subscribed
to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious
wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree
of
assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those
persons he/she had designated in the will.
Guerrero vs Bihis
G.R. No. 174144 April 17, 2007
Facts:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero andrespondent
Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTCQC. Respondent Bihis
opposed her elder sister’s petition on the following
grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; itsattestation clause and
acknowledgment did not comply with the requirementsof the law; the signature of the testatrix
was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and
improper pressure andinfluence. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article
806 of
the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was “acknowledged” bythe testatrix and
the witnesses at the testatrix’s residence at No. 40 Kanlaon
Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissionednotary public for
and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the instrumental witnessesbefore a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy therequirement under Article 806 of the
Civil Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is
that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by thetestator and the witnesses. This formal
requirement is one of theindispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a
notarial willthat is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and theinstrumental
witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.The Notarial law provides: SECTION
240.Territorial jurisdiction.
—
The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with theprovince. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No
notary shall possess authority to do any notarialact beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.Sine
Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in QuezonCity, he lacked the
authority to take the acknowledgment of the testratix andthe instrumental witnesses. In the same
vain, the testratix and theinstrumental witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will
beforehim. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Bu
enaventura’s last will and testament was, in
effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
Taboada v. RosalGutierrez,Jr. (Nov. 5, 1982)Pet: Apolonio Tobadoa, for the probate of the will
of Dorotea PerezRes: Hon. Avelino S. Rosal, Judge CFI Leyte who denied the probate of the will
for want of formality inexecvution.Doctrine: Specific requirements for a Notarial Will may be
liberally construed to prevent the will of thetestator from being defeated by purely technical
considerations. Here, witness signatures at the marginwas sufficient compliance of the req. for
attestation and subscription by 3credible witnesses.
Facts:1. FILED: Probate of the will of Dorotea Perez, written in the Cebuano-Visayan Dialect
consisting of twopages. Page1: the entire testamentary dispositions and signed at the end by the
testatrix. Thewitnesses signed at the left hand margin. Page2:Attestation and acknowledgment,
signed by thetestatrix at the left hand margin, signed by the three witnesses at the end.2.
The petitioner complied with the requirement of publication and no opposition was filed. Hence
thecourt commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence which was accordingly presented.3.
CFI: J.Pamatian
–
DENIED the probate of the will for want of formality in execution. It also requiredthe petitioners
to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses sothat they could be
properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.4.
Instead of complying Pet FILED: M for 30day period(extension) to deliberate. And the 10day
periodof submitting the list be held in abeyance.5.
Pet FILED: MR
–
but was not acted upon by J.Pamatian coz he was transferred. And M forAppointment of a
Special Administrator.6.
New CFI J. Rosal (Resp.)

–
DENIED the MR as well as the motion because the pet failed to complywith the order requiring
him to submit the list of intestate heirs.Hence pet filed the present petition.
Issue: w/n for the validity of a notarial will, does Art 805 NCC, require that BOTH the testatrix
and the3witnesses to sign at THE END of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and one
another?
Decision: No. Liberal Construction, would permit the testatrix to sign at the end and the
witnesses at themargins.1.
Art 805 NCC provides:

Every will, other than a hol,ographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator’s name written by sonme other person in his presence, and by his
express dirextion, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in thepresence
of the testator and one another
…
2.
Lower Court’s Stand: Both the testatrix and the witnesses should sign at the end.
Pet. Stand: Art 805 does not make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity
forwitnesses to sign specifically at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix.3.
Note that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed differently:
“Attestation” –
witnessing the execution of the will
“Subscription” –
is the signing of the witnesses names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of
such paper as the will which was executed by the testator
IN RE WILL OF ANTONIO VERGEL DE DIOS, RAMON J. FERNANDEZ vs.

HERMELO VERGEL, et al.
G.r. No. L-2115, February 25, 1924
Facts:
The question in this case is as to the validity of the will of the late Antonio Vergel de Dios,
which was propounded by Ramon Fernandez for probate, and contested by Fernando Vergel de
Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and VirgilioRustia, alleging that the attestation clause was fatally
defective since the witnesses did not sign the attestation clause in the presence of the testator and
of one another.
Issue:
Whether or not the signatures of the testator and the paging of the will are also necessary in the
attestation clause
Ruling:
The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other. This refers to the contents of the text of the attestation, not the requirement or
signatures thereof outside of its text. It does not require that the attestation clause be signed by
the testator or that the page or sheet containing it be numbered. In the case at bar the attestation
clause in question states that the requirements prescribed for the will were complied with, and
this is enough for it, as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements prescribed
by the law for it. The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does not
affect its validity, for, as above-stated, the law does not require that it be signed by the testator.
Furthermore, although the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause does not
appear in the upper part thereof, yet if that numbering is found in its text, as when it is said
therein that
the will consists of three sheets actually uses, correlatively numbered, besides this one, that is to
say, the sheet containing the attestation clause, the requirement prescribed by the law is
substantially complied with, for if the will consists of three sheets besides the one containing the
attestation clause, it is evident that the latter is the fourth page is to say, that the document
consists of four sheets.
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido
died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of 2
pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the
notary public who notarized the testator’s will, after the te
stator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told
them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his
witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9
August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he
did not like the document to appear dirty. Petiti
oner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no
longer of sound mind. 2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses
in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the
execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will. 2. W/N the
signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property
he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects
of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of
some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant. 2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact,
in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for fraud, he would not have made. The party challenging the will bears the burden of
proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to
the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Omission of some
relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
“because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed
execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and
instrumental witnesses.
Canopong- Noble v. Alipio Abaja
Facts:
Abada died sometime in May 1940.[4] His widow Paula Toray (“Toray”) died sometime in
September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja (“Alipio”) filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,[5] docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668),
for the probate of the last will and testament (“will”) of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja (“Eulogio”) and Rosario Cordova. Alipio
is the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong (“Caponong”) opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will
when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should
be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law;
(2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds
invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada (“Joel Abada, et al.”), and Levi,
Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco (“Levi Tronco, et al.”), also opposed
the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray.
Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of
Toray’s will became final and executory.
s prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar[11] is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula
Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been issued
in his favor and after taking his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue
discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
Issue:
Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws
Held:
Yes. Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number
of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on
substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause
does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,[30] the Court recognized that there are two
divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on
liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,[31] the basic case
on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly
shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that
there are three witnesses to the will.
CEFERINO ALDABA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
LUDOVICO ROQUE, opponent-appellant.
Facts:
It appears from the record of the case that on July 9, 1918, Maria Roque y Paraiso, the widow of
Bruno Valenzuela, resident of the barrio of Mambog, municipality of Malolos, Province of
Bulacan, executed her last will and testament in the Tagalog dialect with the help of Vicente
Platon and in the presence of three witnesses who signed the attestation clause and each of the
four pages of the testament. Maria Roque died on December 3, 1919, and when her will was filed
in court for probate, it was contested by Ludovico Roque on the ground that it had not been
prepared nor executed in conformity with the requirements and solemnities prescribed by law.
After due proceedings had been had, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by its decision
rendered on February 27th of the following year, pronounced the testament in question valid, and
ordered its probate, appointing Ceferino Aldaba as the administrator of the estate.
Issue:
whether or not the ommission of the numbering of pages render the will invalid
Held:
No. In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause on another.
Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way; and it was held:
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and
is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that
both sheets be further signed on their margings by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
This means that, according to the particular case, the omission of paging does not necessarily
render the testament invalid.
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on the upper part of
the sheet, but if the paging should be place din the lower part, would the testament be void for
his sole reason? We believe not. The law also provides that the testator and the witnesses must
sign the left margin of each of the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right
margin, would this fact also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held in
Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145):lävvphì1·né+
It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their
names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is
to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied
with. The same doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court.
Maravilla v. Maravilla
Facts:
ppellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner and husband of the decedent, died on 16 July
1966, after the case was submitted for decision. Upon motion for intervention filed by
Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and Rose Mary Kohlhaas, this Supreme Court allowed their
intervention on 24 July 1967, upon showing that their interest as substitute heirs was vested
definitely upon the death of Herminio Maravilla, and that said movants for intervention merely
adopt the pleadings and briefs filed in behalf of the deceased Herminio Maravilla so that the
intervention will not delay the disposition of the case. 2
Appellees Pedro, 3 Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed "Maravilla," who are allegedly the
brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla and oppositors to the probate, had moved to
require the P. C. Laboratory to submit explanations of the photographs of the will and the
signatures thereon previously filed, 4 but this Court, considering that such explanation would
amount to new evidence not heard at the trial, denied the motion on 3 August 1967. 5
Herminio Maravilla’s petition for probate was opposed by the appellees in an amended
opposition filed in the course of the trial in the court below and admitted without objection. The
opposition alleged the following grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged testatrix and the instrumental witnesses did not
sign the alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the presence of each other.
Issue: wether or not there is proper attestation in the will
Held:
Yes. The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "A," which is typewritten in the Spanish language,
purports to have been executed in Manila on the 7th day of October, 1944; it consists of five (5)
pages, including the page on which the attestation clause was completed. The purported
signatures of the testatrix appear at the logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin
of all the other pages.
Upon the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Mansueto did not actually see Digna Maravilla
sign the will in question, basing such conclusion upon the fact that while Mansueto positively
identified his own signature ("I identify this as my signature") but not that of the testatrix, his
five answers to the questions of counsel, in reference thereto, being "this must be the signature of
Mrs. Digna Maravilla."cralaw virtua1aw library
In our opinion, the trial court’s conclusion is far fetched, fanciful and unwarranted. It was but
natural that witness Mansueto should be positive about his own signature, since he was familiar
with it. He had to be less positive about Digna Maravilla’s signature since he could not be
closely acquainted with the same: for aught the record shows, the signing of the will was the only
occasion he saw her sign; he had no opportunity to study her signature before or after the
execution of Exhibit "A." Furthermore, he witnessed Digna’s signing not less than fourteen years
previously. To demand that in identifying Digna’s signature Mansueto should display a
positiveness equal to the certainty shown by him in recognizing his own, exceeds the bounds of
the reasonable. The variation in the expressions used by the witness is the best evidence that he
was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of truthfulness rather than the reverse.
We are satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that the testament, Exhibit
"A," was duly executed by a qualified testatrix and competent witnesses, in conformity with the
statutory requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the 1944
will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament is hereby ordered
probated. Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformable
to law. Costs against oppositors-appellees.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO,

Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS
and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng Seangio. However, petitioners Dy
Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very
healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the
power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3)
Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4)
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents. Thereafter, a
petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by the petitioner and
reiterating that the probate proceedings should take precedence over the petition filed by the
private respondents because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the
intestate proceedings. The two petitions were then consolidated. Private respondents moved for
the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and
thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code, of which
petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. RTC then issued an order dismissing
the petition for probate proceedings. Due to petitioner’s denial of motion for reconsideration,
hence this present action.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the holographic will is valid.
 Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid.
RULING:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need to be witnessed.
Secundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance

instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be
clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of
the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s

intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article
916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal
cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can
be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter
presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the
Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated, it is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent to
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of
his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the
former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing
in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the
widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal
heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied
as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez
and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will.
Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory

heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not
apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of
P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person
the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11
years before her death. The will stated as follows:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the
property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34,
residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this
seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration
with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and
Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of
the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that
they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated,"
although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:
May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with
respect to the free portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code
states that “(T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.”
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them.
They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for.
It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate.
Remedios’ claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that
she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the
institution of devisees and legatees must be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance
as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly
and expressly stated in the will. Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.
HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN,

represented by FE D. ORENDAIN,
Petitioners,[1]
- versus -

TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a last
will and testament. The will was admitted to probate. At the time of her death, the decedent left
no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of her
properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of Doña Margarita
Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
properties and the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the
will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint the desire of the decedent:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties, after the necessary
deductions for expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual administration

(pangasiwaan sa habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be divided among,
and distributed to the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to certain beneficiaries, to

be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of
Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to
dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than
twenty years, in violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may be perpetual citing the case of Palad, et al. v.
Governor of Quezon Province where the trust holding the two estate of one Luis Palad was
allowed to exist even after the lapse of twenty years.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not a trust may be perpetual.

 Whether or not the named trustees may be considered as heirs to the estate.
RULING:
The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the twenty-year allowable period, the
estate may be disposed of under Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of the law by the trust constituted by Luis
Palad because the will of the testator does not interdict the alienation of the parcels devised. The
will merely directs that the income of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment,
maintenance and operation of the high school.
Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the socialization of the ownership of
property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles.
The trust involved in the Palad case covers only two lots, which have not been shown to be a
large landholding. And the income derived therefrom is being devoted to a public and social
purpose – the education of the youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a sense
socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different situation as the testatrix specifically
prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were definitely more than the two
(2) properties, unlike in the Palad case. The herein testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be
subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain
with her even in the afterlife.
Apparent from the decedent’s last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set
of properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that
the decedent intended any of the trust’s designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties.
Therefore, the probate court must admit the case to determine the properties to be subject to
intestate succession as well as the nearest relative of the deceased that may inherit the said
properties under the perpetual trust.
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO,

petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ,
BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-
SALONGA respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal apetition for probate,ante mortem,
of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are
nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowedwith the bulk of her estate
designated for respondents, all of whomwere Basilia’s legally adopted children. The
petitioners, claiming tobe the nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had
notin fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,thereby making them mere
strangers to the decedent and withoutany right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that
thiscircumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open tointestacy with
petitioners being the compulsory heirs.It is alleged by petitioners that the language used
imply thatBasilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound tobequeath one-
half of her entire estate to the respondents as thelatter's legitime, with the inference that
respondents would nothave instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of
spuriousadoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from theuse of the
terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and"sapilitang mana" (legitime), the
impelling reason or cause for theinstitution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that
underthe law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the CivilCode applies
whereby, “the statement of a false cause for theinstitution of an heir shall be considered as
not written, unless itappears from the will that the testator would not have made
suchinstitution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barringthe petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim evento properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.
HELD:
No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled underarticle 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First , the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated
in the will;second , the cause must be shown to be false; andthird , it mustappear from the
face of the will that the testator would not havemade such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause. The decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal
mannerthe cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at otherconsiderations.
The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of herestate, which largely favored the
respondents, compared with therelatively small devise of land which the decedent left for
her bloodrelatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give therespondents more
than what she thought the law enjoined her togive to them. Excluding the respondents from
the inheritance,considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed tothe bulk of
the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert theclear wishes of the decedent. Testacy is
favored and doubts are resolved on its side,especially where the will evinces an intention on
the part of thetestator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done inthis case.
Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of thetestator should be allowed to prevail.
Granted that a probate courthas found, by final judgment, that the decedent
possessedtestamentary capacity and her last will was executed free fromfalsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence, it follows that givingfull expression to her will must be in
order.
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia
was a natural child of thedeceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the propertiesof
the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testatorexpressly recognized in his will
as his daughter) and Helen Garcia.In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in
thewill thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled andthe properties passed to both
of them as if the deceased diedintestate.
issue:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equallydivided or whether the
inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir shouldbe merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover
the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.
Held:
he inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to coverthe legitime of Helen
Garcia.Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as hisnatural daughter and limited her
share to a legacy of P3,600.00.When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than
thelegitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even asa relative, and willed the rest
of the estate to other persons, theheir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be
annulledentirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
[G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005]
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO
BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia),
and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children
with Antonia, namely: JosefaTeves Escaño (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four
(4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: MariaEvelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose
Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (MilagrosReyes) and Pedro Reyes
Teves (Pedro).The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais
Cadastre, which was originallyregistered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian
and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land wasamong the properties involved in an action for
partition and damages. Thereafter, the parties to the case enteredinto a Compromise Agreement
which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. The property was toremain
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. The Compromise Agreement lays down the effect of
theeventual death of Don Julian that in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties now
selected andadjudicated to Don Julian shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Don Julian and his four minor children.On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio
and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumptionof Liabilities in favor of
J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed
aninstrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Supplemental
Deed. Thisinstrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Don
Julian died intestate.Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken
possession over the subject lot after theexecution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they
entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. At
the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale,respondents discovered
that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime?
Held:
yes. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in
favor of petitioner,Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the
subject lot would only pass to his heirsfrom the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as
the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained theabsolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her childrenon the ground that it
had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.The adjudication in
favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative
uponthe approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly
dispose of Lot No. 63 infavor of respondents. All things which are not outside the commerce of
men, including future things, may be theobject of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts. No contract may beentered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. Well-entrenched is the rule thatall
things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. Theexception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance,
and the exception to theexception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080. The first
paragraph of Article 1080, which providesthe exception to the exception and therefore aligns
with the general rule on future things, reads: ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall berespected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.. . . .The partition inter vivos of the properties of
Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However,considering that it would
become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from thesecond
marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a
mereexpectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a futureacquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of
property, and the interest to which itrelated was at the time nonexistent and might never exist
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL.,

petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by universal title to his
children by his secondmarriage with preterition of his children by his first marriage.- Eleuterio,
Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina are all Neri’s children by his first marriage.
The trial court annulled the institution of the heirs and declared total intestacy.- The children by
the second marriage filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that:1) there is no
preterition as to the children of the first marriage have received their shares in the property left
by thetestator 2) assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the
annulment of the institution of heirs but simplythe reduction of the bequest made to them. The
children by the second marriage anchor their argument on the concept of ―heir‖ whose A814
definition is deemed repealed by that of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is maintained that the
word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is notsynonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of
Civil Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is nolonger personally liable for the
debts of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code
ISSUES
1. WON there is preterition
2. WON there should be annulment of the institution of the heirs and open the estate to total
intestacy
HELD:
YES, there is preterition-
According to the court’s findings, none of the children by the first marriage received their
respective shares from the
testator’s property
- Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said clause states that the children by his first marriage
had already receivedtheir shares in his property excluding what he had given them as aid during
their financial troubles and the money theyhad borrowed from him) the Court can rely only on
the findings of the trial court that the inventory indicates that theproperty of Neri has remained
intact and that no portion has been given to the children of the first marriage.- Neri left his
property by universal title to the children by his second marriage and did not expressly disinherit
hischildren by his first marriage but did not leave anything to them. This fits the case of
preterition according to A814, CCwhich provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled
and intestate succession should be declared open.2. YES- The word "heir" as used in A814 of the
Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of CivilProcedure, but this does
prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in substance the subject-matter of
A814 of the Civil Code.- It may also be true that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may
receive the bequest only after payment of debtsleft by the deceased and not before as under the
Civil Code, but this may have a bearing only upon the question as towhen succession becomes
effective and can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or special
title.- Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs, its
nullity as provided in article814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code
of Civil Procedure. The basis for its nullity is thenature and effect of the bequest and not its
possible name under the Code of Civil Procedure.- In addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the Code of
Civil Procedure affected A814 and A851 of the Civil Code. But thesesections have been
expressly repealed by Act No. 2141, thus restoring force to A814 and A851
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall beinherited by
Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for thelast 30 years. The
will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adoptedson. Bernardo, as the
adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under theterms of the
decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether
it was a valid disinheritance.Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.Preterition
consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs oranyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited.Disinheritance is atestamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heirs of his share in the legitime fora cause authorized by law.By virtue of the dismissal of the
testate case, the determination of thatcontroversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The
conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion,
however, that from the faceof the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still
questionable. TheSpecial Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.
G.R. No. L-8927 March 10, 1914
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,

vs.
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal which involves a question which arises from the interpretation of the first
andsecond clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson.The court below found that the
children of the deceased sisters should take only that portionwhich their respective mothers
would have taken if they been alive at the time the will wasmade; that the property should be
divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number ofsisters; that each living sister should
take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one-
sixth to be divided among said children equally.The appellants asserted that under a proper
construction of the paragraphs of the codicil, theproperty should be divided equally between the
living sisters and the children of the deceasedsisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the
same share that a sister receives. Hence, thisappeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take percapita and
in equal parts the property passing under the codicil in this case.
Held:
Yes. The appellants' contention is well founded.The court finds expressions which seem to
indicate with fair clearness that it was the intention ofthe testatrix to divide her property equally
between her sisters and nieces.Upon looking at the codicil, it can be observed that: first, that the
testatrix, in the first paragraphthereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires that "my
sisters and nieces, ashereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs; in the second place, that the
testatrix, in thesecond paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then
living, in eachone of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property.
Among thosementioned specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to
in no waydifferent from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as
clearlyas the other and under exactly the same conditions; and in the third place, the last clause
of thesecond paragraph of the codicil, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph,
isdecisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of
thepersons whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that they must take and enjoy
theproperty in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."We have then in the first paragraph a
declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall becomethe owners of her property on the death of
her husband, her nieces as well as her sisters. Wehave also the final declaration of the testatrix
that she desires that the sisters and the nieces shalltake and enjoy the property in equal parts.
Thus, of the property passing under the codicil, theliving sisters and the children of the deceased
sisters shall take per capita and in equal parts.
December 22, 1928
G.R. No. 29789

In re estate of Jose Macrohon Tiahua. FRANCISCO BARRIOS, administrator-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDA ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., heirs-appellants.
IGNACIO MACROHON, appellant.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Facts:
surviving spouse of the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua, and the latter's legitimate children on
the one side, and Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son, on the other, from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga, laying down the following conclusions of law: (1) That an
adulterous child may be instituted heir within the limits provided by law; (2) that in making
Ignacio Macrohon an heir under his will, the testator did not observe the limitations prescribed
by law; (3) that the institution of Ignacio Macrohon as heir under the will ought not to be
declared absolutely void, but he should so share in the inheritance as not to prejudice the
legitimate of the other heirs; (4) that as Exhibit 1 deals with certain acts contrary to law, such as
not presenting the will to the court, and as some minors took part in it through their guardian
without the latter being authorized by the court to enter into the transaction in their behalf, said
exhibit cannot bind the parties, nor do the admissions made by them therein constitute estoppel;
whereupon it disapproved the scheme of partition presented by the administrator and ordered
him to file another in consonance with the conclusions therein laid down.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Macrohon Tiahua have a right to dispose of a part of his estate by will in
favor of his adulterous son
Held:
Yes. As to the first question, while it is true that article 845 of the Civil Code provides that
"illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children shall be entitled to support
only," and therefore cannot demand anything more of those bound by law to support them, it
does not prohibit said illegitimate children from receiving, nor their parents from giving them,
something more than support, so long as the legitimate children are not prejudiced. If the law
permits a testator to dispose of the free third of his hereditary estate in favor of a stranger (art.
808 of the Civil Code), there is no legal, moral or social reason to prevent him from making over
that third to his illlegitimate son who has not the status of a natural son. On the contrary, by
reason of blood, the son, although illegitimate, has a preferential right over a stranger unless by
his behaviour he has become unworthy of such consideration. For these reasons, we are of
opinion and so hold, that Jose Macrohon Tiahua could dispose of the free third of his estate in
favor of his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon.
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La
Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara,
deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented
by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena. And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a
judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de
Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment
on said amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction
restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that
the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction. The
court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as
fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
Issue:
whether or not there is a simple substitution in the Will
Held:
none. Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say whether the
death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the whole
context it appears that in making the provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in
mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the
children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the
hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that
the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared null
for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that
fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond the second
degree." Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is
the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say
the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in
due time to the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of
fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation from Manresa inserted above. Lastly,
clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is
therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates
the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying
the inheritance. The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a
fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are
present in the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was
instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the
whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the
"whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving
the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in
case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. 3.
A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second
heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S. GARCIA,
respondents.
MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died
during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking for the probate
of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2)
correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In
deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia
as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from
decedent’s will.
RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and as a result,
Sonia’s institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854
“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid…
The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the
testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property
that the testator could freely dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate
and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927

Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
Facts:
The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated February 6, 1923,
composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to be signed by the testatrix and three
witnesses on the left margin of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the
three witnesses after the attestation clause. The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to
such probate was filed by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other relatives. The three
attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared that the signature of the testatrix
were written in their presence and that they signed their names in the presence of the testatrix
and of each other. The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her
right hand; but as the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she learned to sign with her
left hand and for many years thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that
hand. Opponents allege that Florencia Mateo did not sign this will.
Issue:
whether or not testatrix has the right to choose her heirs in the will
Held:
Yes. there is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the opponents, or in her having
left all of her estate to the only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her
nieces. And not only is it not strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the evidence of
the testatrix when the former was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of her death
had never been separated from her. The opposition presented Doctor Banks as expert. He
testified that the signatures of the testatrix in the will are not genuine. The petitioner, on the other
hand, presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who affirmed that these signatures are
genuine. But, over the testimony of these experts, we have the categorical and positive
declaration of veracious witnesses who affirm that these signatures were written by the testatrix
herself.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon
and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only
legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.
Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the
oppositors-appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and
written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60,
household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the
estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and
Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their
respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the
will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on
the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will
less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in
number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched.
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14,
1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of
the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of
the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor
proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the
properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated
to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums
by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proper partition
Held:
in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as
well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will
and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly
provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing
that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to
their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory
heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated
the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas,
who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
G.R. No. L-353 August 31, 1946
PACIENCIA DE JESUS, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
IÑIGO S. DAZA, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.

La O and San Jose for respondents.
HILADO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners pray for the writs of certiorari and mandamus whereby they would have this
Court annul the order of the respondent judge dated January 29, 1946, entered in civil case No.
3174 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in the matter of the estate of the deceased Gavino
de Jesus, which order petitioners denominate "a writ of possession," and command the
respondent provincial sheriff of Batangas and the respondents Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus and
Gregorio Leynes to return to said petitioners the possession of the two parcels of land covered by
original certificates of title Nos. 1292 and 1344, issued by the Register of Deeds of Batangas and
mentioned in their petition.
Among other things, it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the respondents' answer that
petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the late Gavino de Jesus whose estate is the
subject matter of the aforesaid special proceeding No. 3174
in connection with this action for legal redemption, respondents in paragraph 4 of their answer,
after admitting the institution of said action for legal redemption, allege that on March 11, 1946,
the Court of First Instance of Batangas issued an order dismissing the amended and supplemental
complaints in said civil case No. 3960 (they attach a copy of the order of dismissal as Appendix
1 of their answer), but petitioners in their reply aver that within the period prescribed by law they
had perfected an appeal from said order of dismissal.
From what appears in the allegations of the parties, as well as their appendices and annexes, the
said for legal redemption is still pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs can claim Legal Redemption
Held:
Yes. The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, thus commencing, civil case No. 3960 of said court, carries with it an
implied but necessary admission on the part of said petitioners that the sale to respondent Justina
S. Vda. de Manglapus of the shares of Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga in the oft-repeated
estate, particularly, the two parcels of land in question, was valid. The sale was duly approved by
the probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by the probate court the purchaser
stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the purposes of the distribution of the estate, and Rule 91,
section 1, confers upon such purchaser, among other rights, the right to demand and recover the
share purchased by her not only from the executor or administrator, but also from any other
person having the same in his possession. It is evident that the probate court, having the custody
and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within
the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power
and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the
parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and litigate an
entirely different action. There can be no question that if the executor or administrator has the
possession of the share to be delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same
estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person entitled thereto, and we
see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same power to the probate court to be exercised
within the same estate proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of
"any other person," especially when "such other person" is one of the heirs themselves who are
already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate proceeding.
The probate proceeding over the testate estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus was a
proceeding in rem And by the publication of the notice prescribed by the Rules and by the fact
that petitioners herein were and are among the testamentary heirs of the decedent, they were and
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Batangas sitting as a probate court
when the said court's order of January 29, 1946, was entered and thereafter. If, even the action
for compulsory recognition of a natural child may be instituted and decided within the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the ancestor (Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343,
348), it would be absurd were we to declare now that for the mere object of ordering the delivery
of possession of a portion of the inheritance which has already been assigned to a certain person
within the estate proceeding, the probate court lacks jurisdiction to make the order within the
same proceeding, but should require the institution of an independent ordinary action.
We, therefore, conclude that, without prejudice to the final result of the legal redemption case,
the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, with costs to petitioners. So ordered.
G.R. No. 109972. April 29, 1996
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C.

ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES,
ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND
VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot
(identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, located along Magallanes Street,
now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City). Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales,
seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the
late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the
second, following the latter’s death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria
was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A.
Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely,
David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after Macaria’s
death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow
Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima
Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In a duly
notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold
for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely to save on
the tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City Treasurer’s Office.
On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9,
Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to
Zosima. The latter refused to accept the amount for being much less than the lot’s current value
of P80,000.00. No settlement having been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private
respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against petitioner an action for “Legal Redemption
with Preliminary Injunction” before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court handed down its
decision holding, in fine, that private respondents’ right to redeem the property had already
lapsed.
Issue:
Whether or not Socorro Rosales can claim for the right of redemption being not a co-heir
Held:
Yes. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by
affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;[3] however, Socorro’ s right to the property
is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria’s estate but that she is a legal heir of
her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother’s inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother’s death. When Macaria died on 08
March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who
thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own
estate, which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on
to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
“ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children
and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the
entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should
there be any, under Article 1001.
“xxx xxx xxx
“ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.”[4]
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon
became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of
redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
“ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in
payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.”
“ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all
the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.”
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-
owners[5] required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code –
”ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.”
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent
Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered
the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on
16 October 1987, before the trial court.
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Third Division, respondents.
Jose Gaton for petitioners.
Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 forpetitioners to exercise
the right to legal redemption had already elapsed and thatthe requirement of Article 1088 that
notice must be in writing is deemed satisfiedbecause written notice would be superfluous, the
purpose of the law having beenfully served when petitioner Garcia went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds and was for himself, read and understood the contents of the Deeds of Sale.
Issue:
Whether or not there is legal redemption and is there proper notice
HELD:
The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale assufficient notice of sale
under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496 appliesonly to registered lands and has no
application whatsoever to a casewhere the property involved is unregistered land.If the intention
of the law had been to include verbal notice or nay other meansof information as sufficient to
give the effect of this notice, then there would havebeen no necessity or reasons to specify
in Article 1088 that the saidnotice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or
informationwas sufficient. In the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623)
Written notice is indispensable actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners
by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by
the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any
doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative
method of notifications remains exclusive, thought the Code does not prescribed any particular
form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000
JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES MAESTRADO-

LAVIÑA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and
NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Facts:
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the
contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of 57.601 square meters, however, is
still registered in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses
Ramon and Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived by the
following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves,
Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated intestate
proceedings[3] in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was appointed administrator of said
estates in the process. An inventory of the estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a
project of partition. Thus, they filed an action for partition[4] before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as
receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a decision approving the project of partition.
However, the records of said case are missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they
failed to present a copy of said decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No. 3046 situated in
Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of coconut land was distributed
equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a) Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c)
Amparo Chaves-Roa; and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all
located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting of an aggregate area of 14 hectares
was distributed equally between petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen
Chaves-Abaya. Scmis
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His share was given to his
only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of Salvador’s father. In 1956, the year the partition case
was decided and effected, receiver Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said heirs in
accordance with the above scheme. Subsequently, Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while
Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the
other half to Amparo.
Issue:
Whether or not oral partition can be considered
Held:
Yes. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses
Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners’ ownership over said lot was acquired by reason of
the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses’ heirs sometime before 1956. That
oral agreement was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on
August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the partition of the decedents’
estate, was not presented by either party thereto. The existence of the oral partition together with
the said quitclaims is the bone of contention in this case. It appeared, however, that the actual
partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral partition despite a contrary court order.
Despite claims of private respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly delivered to the
petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a period of twenty-seven (27) years from 1983. Ol-
dmiso
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition entered into by
the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can make sense out of the actual partition of the
properties of the estate despite claims that a court order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual
partition, petitioners were not in possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or another, it
was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of the estate of the deceased
Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the heirs questioned petitioners’ possession of or
ownership over said Lot No. 5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral
agreement of partition among the said heirs and the distribution of the properties was consistent
with such oral agreement. In any event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but
no such move was done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No.
5872, who have established a superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. It may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs themselves through a public
instrument filed before the register of deeds. In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing
to the existence of the oral partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and
distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one among
the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27) years.
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral partition is the fact
that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing
scheme in the oral partition. No one among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years.
G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents. ULANDU
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Facts:
ne Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and
Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land
located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of
1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject
of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from
him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his
son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his
estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered
in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other
brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died
without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented
by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private
respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died,
his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as
co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father,
Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of
meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all
earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid extrajudicial Partition
Held:
The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on the
division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were
debts existing against the estate which had not been paid No showing, however, has been made
of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs
should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of
donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed
the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and
Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was
not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but
rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom,
Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made
by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners
thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal
effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998
MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9,
CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Facts: The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco,
Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of the spouses, the property
should have been divided among their children, however, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses
was not settled in accordance with the procedures.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from her
brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that a third party
named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property from
Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an action for
quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in favor of Nique and
declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but
later withdrew the same.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had been declared by
the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase. The trial court segregated
the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and Laurencia.
Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made
Held: Yes.
1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right.
Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The legality of
Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was upheld in the
Quieting of title case which had become final and executory by Laurencia's withdrawal of her
appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property
that were adjudged in his favor, he was in effect calling for the partition of the property.
However, under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the
heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the
course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person
designated by the testator.
2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the segregation
of the property in favor of Nique However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate
was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the
property sold to Nique. Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the absence of
notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.
3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the
intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them had
acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to
settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as
regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document to be valid between the parties.
G.R. No. 49286 August 16, 1947
EUSEBIO QUIZON and FLORDELIZA QUIZON, petitioners,

vs.
MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents..
PERFECTO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners seek the annulment of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, issued on
July 26 and August 18, 1944.
In the first one, the lower court, acting on a petition for the execution of the decision in
special proceeding No. 3906, intestate of Gregorio Mayo Villapando, dated October 25,1943,
declaring all the parties therein heirs of the deceased and dividing all the estate into three parts,
one to each of the three sets of heirs, ordered petitioners to deliver one-third of the estate to
Josefa Mayo Villapando, unless they should post a bond in the amount of P2,000 pending the
decision of the Supreme Court on the appeal interposed against the lower court's decision of the
petition. The order issued on August 18, 1944, amended the first one to the effect that petitioners
should deliver two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo Villapando, and Amando, Ciriaco, David
and Jose Morada, unless they should file a bond in the amount of P2,000, pending the decision of
the Supreme Court.
Ten days before the decision became final, on May 9, Josefa Mayo filed a motion for execution
upon the ground that the appeal bond at P2,000 having been rejected, her share in the fruits of the
estate was left without guarantee. The petition was filed without notice to petitioners. On May
19, petitioners filed their amended record on appeal as well as the appeal bond of P60. On May
24, Josefa Mayo filed a petition, also without notice to petitioners, praying that the hearing on
the amended record on appeal be suspended until after her motion for execution be acted upon,
and the lower court issued an order on the same day, setting for hearing the motion for execution
sometime after June 15. On June 6, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order of May
24, upon the ground that the motion for execution should not have been acted upon as it was
filed without notice in violation of section 2 of Rule 39, besides having been filed during the
efficacy of the resolution of January 14, 1944, issued by the Supreme Court, suspending all
proceedings in the intestate of Gregorio Mayo Villapando, case No. 3906, and that the amended
record on appeal is the only valid pleading then pending and should be acted upon before
anything else.
On July 3, the respondent judge issued an order setting for July 18 the hearings on the motion for
execution, on the amended record on appeal and on the motion for reconsideration. On July 14,
petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for execution alleging, among other reasons, that
the lower court had no power or authority to order the execution during the time for perfecting
the appeal and that said decision, being declaratory in nature could not be executed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction
Held:
Yes. The facts in this case show that the respondent judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
he issued the orders of July 26 and August 18, 1944. Said orders, purportedly to execute the
decision of October 25, 1943, provided for the delivery, at first, of one-third of the estate to
Josefa Mayo and later of two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo and to the Morada brothers,
unless petitioners should file bond in the amount of P2,000. No law nor legal authority has been
mentioned in respondent's answer in support of said orders and none can be cited. The decision
of October 25, 1943, provided only for the declaration of heirs and of the shares each set of heirs
was entitled to. Nothing was provided in said decision as to the delivery of shares from one
person to another. The orders of July 26, and August 18, provided for the execution of something
supposed to be executed by the decision of October 25, 1943, which in fact is not provided
therein.
Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of shares to the heirs, when no project of partition
has as yet been filed and approved.
G.R. No. L-273 March 29, 1947
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA
HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
Plaintiff Cresencia, intervenors Maria & Aquilina; and Pedro and Basilia(not parties
herein) are brothers and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel
of land. An oral partition of the land was allegedly made by the siblings. The intervenors sold
1800 square meters of the parcel to Zacarias Andal in consideration of P860. After the sale, the
plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her complaint, dated
February 3, 1944, she offered the purchaser P150 as price of repurchase. Such amount was the
supposed price paid for Aquilina and Maria’s shares. But Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with
the property in favor of Cresencia.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint wherein the she alleged that when
the cause was called for trial, she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase the
lot from Andal and reimburse Andal for his expenses. Meanwhile, respondent Andal resold the
land fictitiously to the vendors for the amount of 970 pesos.
In their answer, the intervenors alleged that a partition was made after which everyone
took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his/her portion in the partition. They
charged the plaintiff with bad faith for allegedly delaying the sale in favor of Andal. The court
handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land in favor of Maria and Aquilina was
illegal and in bad faith. The court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court as
well as Article 1248 of the Civil Code, parole evidence of partition was inadmissible.
Issue:
Whether or not oral evidence for proving a contract of partition is admissible.
Ruling:
Yes.
ORAL PARTITION ENFORCED IN EQUITY WHEN PERFORMED.
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity
have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be reduced
to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the
transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential
purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The Civil Code, too, requires the
accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or
contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been
admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co.
vs. Hernandez, 45 Phil., 746.)
-SECTION 1 OF RULE 74, NOT CONSTITUTIVE BUT MERELY EVIDENTIAL OF
PARTITION.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the public instrument
therein required is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its
effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule,
to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties de-pendent on the execution of a public
instrument and its registration. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts
and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice
to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
law.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon
and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only
legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.
Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the
oppositors-appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and
written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60,
household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the
estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and
Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their
respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the
will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on
the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will
less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in
number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched.
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14,
1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of
the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of
the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor
proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the
properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated
to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums
by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proper partition
Held:
in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as
well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will
and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly
provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing
that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to
their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory
heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated
the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas,
who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by his wife CEFERINA DE PALMA- FELICIANO,

ANGELINA DE LEON, representing the heirs of ESTEBAN FELICIANO, TRINIDAD
VALIENTE, AND BASILIA TRINIDAD, represented by her son DOMINADOR T.
FELICIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO CANOZA, DELIA FELICIANO, ROSAURO FELICIANO, ELSA FELICIANO
AND PONCIANO FELICIANO, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
In May 1930, Antonio Feliciano died leaving behind a parcel of land. In 1972,
an extrajudicial settlement was executed by Leona Feliciano, Maria Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano,
and Salina Feliciano. The four declared that they are the only heirs of Antonio; they did not
include the heirs of their dead siblings Esteban and Doroteo Feliciano. Thereafter, Pedro sold
his share to Jacinto Feliciano; Salina sold her share to Felisa Feliciano; and Leona and Maria
sold their share to Pedro Canoza.
Subsequently, Jacinto and Canoza applied for their respective titles covering the lands they
purchased. In November 1977, a free patent was issued to Jacinto. In February 1979, a free
patent was likewise issued to Pedro Canoza.
In October 1993, Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina De Leon (surviving heirs of Esteban) as well
as Trinidad Valiente and Basilia Trinidad (Surviving heirs of Doroteo) filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud by reason of
the exclusion of the other compulsory heirs (Esteban and Doroteo).
The trial court ruled in favor of Eugenio et al but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court on the ground that Eugenio et al’s action has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by Eugenio et al is barred by prescription.
HELD: Yes. It is undeniable that the extrajudicial settlement executed by Leona Feliciano, Maria

Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, and Salina Feliciano in 1972 to the exclusion of Esteban and
Doroteo’s heirs is attended by fraud. As such, the deed of extrajudicial settlement can be
attacked in action for annulment in court. However, such action should be filed within 4 years
from the discovery of the fraud. In this case, the fraud was actually committed in 1972 but it was
only deemed discovered in 1977 and 1979. In 1977, because this was the time when a free patent
was issued to Jacinto and in 1979, when a free patent was issued to Canoza. These years are the
reckoning point because the free patents released to Jacinto and Canoza served as constructive
notices to Eugenio et al and to the whole world. And so, when Eugenio et al filed their complaint
in 1993, the complaint was already filed out of time (16 years late in case of Jacinto; and 14
years in case of Canoza).

CELESTINO BALUS, G.R. No. 168970
Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA
BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On
January 3,1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as asecurity for a loan he
obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a
result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed
by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed
aDefinite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, anew title was issued in the name of the
Bank.On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject
property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible
time. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought
the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was
executed by the Bank in favour of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of
respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995,
respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner,
contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of
the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the
disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA
ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new titlein
the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership by him andrespondents over the subject property persisted even
afterthe lot was purchased by the Bank and title theretotransferred to its name, and even after it
was eventuallybought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Held:
The court is not persuaded. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with
respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents'
father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during
the hearing conducted bythe trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite
Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption
expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo
died on July 6, 1984. Hence,there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of
the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property
and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death,
the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim.
Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed
co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided
or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the
same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in
each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to
put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE
FIDES VIADO, respondents. LEX
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seek a
reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered
on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23, adjudicating
the property subject matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual setting found
by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by the trial court.
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of
property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982.
Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children
-- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non,
and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left
behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children
Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property.
Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and
respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between
the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed
absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion
occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the
property in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93). Jjä sc
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two
documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half
conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial
settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of
Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and
interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were
executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646
was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments,
contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian
Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred
that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial
settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment. Finally,
petitioners asseverated at the assailed instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were
registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely,
Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died. ScÓ jj
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado
and her children as being the true owners of the disputed property.
Issue:
Whether or not there can be a partition shall be rescinded
Held:
No. When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog
property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs --- her husband Julian and their
children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which
vested from the moment of death of the decedent,[1] remained under a co-ownership
regime[2] among the heirs until partition.[3] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.[4]
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents
rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title
solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the documents on the grounds
heretofore expressed. Sjä cj
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of the
evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The
Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners
to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that
Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the
parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however,
on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof
why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights
and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that
she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument
merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite
difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the
tenor of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did
not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial act[5] and merely created a constructive notice of
its contents against all third persons.[6] Among the parties, the instruments remained completely
valid and binding. Supremeä
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests
on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad
faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value
of the share pertaining to her.
H. WITNESSES TO WILLS
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
ESGUERRA , J. :
FACTS :
Of the three instrumental witnesses namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. As the third
witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses
appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private
respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will, following the
reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal
requirement of having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of
them .
ISSUE :
Whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was executed in
accordance with law .
HELD
NO .
We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question
was not executed in accordance with law .To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or
one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two
attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be
requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that
the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the will.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is declared not valid and
hereby set aside.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
GUERRERO , J. :
FACTS:
On June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a
will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein
petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to
have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to
the death of Isabel Gabriel.The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the
Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church,
all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in
specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago
Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria,
Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial,
Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago.
To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as
"akingmahalnapamangkinnaakingpinalaki, inalagaan at minahalnakatulad ng isangtunaynaanak"
and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or
personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses,
debts and legacies as aforementioned.
ISSUE :
Did the respondent Court abuse its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court.
HELD :
NO .
We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and
admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses,
namely, MatildeOrobia, CelsoGimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is
satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which
findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not
pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that
anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or
write.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No.L-8774. November 26, 1956
EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON and PILAR PEREZ-NABLE, Petitioners-Appellees, vs.
ENRIQUE TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO GOMEZ, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS :
Mariano Molo and Juana Juan was a couple possessed of much worldly wealth, but
unfortunately, not blessed with children. To fill the void in their marital life, they took into their
home and custody two baby girls, raising them from infancy, treating them as their own
daughters, sending them to school, and later to the best and exclusive centers of higher learning,
until they both graduated, one in pharmacy, and the other in law. These two fortunate girls, now
grown up women and married, are Emiliana Perez-Molo-Peckson, a niece of Juana, and Pilar
Perez-Nable a half sister of Emiliana.
Mariano Molo died in January, 1941, and by will bequeathed all his estate to his wife. Juana,
his widow, died on May 28, 1950, leaving no forced heirs but only collateral, — children and
grandchildren of her sisters. She left considerable property worth around a million pesos or more,
and to dispose of the same, she was supposed to have executed on May 11, 1948, about two
years before her death, a document purporting to be her last will and testament, wherein she
bequeathed the bulk of her property to her two foster children, Emiliana and Pilar. These two
foster daughters, as Petitioners, presented the document for probate in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.
ISSUE :
Was the probate court correct in rulint that the instrument in question was the last will and
testament of Juana ?
HELD :
YES .
We have carefully gone over the evidence of the record, and we are convinced that the great
preponderance thereof is in favor of the probate of the will .
While the written opposition to the probate of said will consists of a litany of supposed
abuses, force and undue influence exercised on the testatrix, yet the evidence shows that these
supposed abuses, force and undue influence consist only of failure on the part of the deceased to
invite the Oppositors in all the parties held in her house through the alleged influence of Mrs.
Nable, of paying more attention, care, and extending more kindness to the Petitioners than to the
Oppositors .
Neither do we find anything unusual or extraordinary in the testatrix giving practically all her
property to her foster daughters, to the exclusion of her other relatives.
Oppositors-Appellants in their printed memorandum contend that, two of the attesting witnesses
to the will in question, namely, Miss Navarro and Miss Canicosa, who were employed as
pharmacist and salesgirl, respectively, in the drugstore of Pilar Perez-Nable, one of beneficiaries
in the will, may not be considered credible witnesses for the reason that as such employees, they
would naturally testify in favor of their employer. The relation of employer and employee, or
being a relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will.
In view of the foregoing, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from the same
is hereby affirmed. No costs.
I. HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
III REVOCATION OF WILLS
IV REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS
V PROBATE OF WILLS
VI INSTITUTION OF HEIR
VII PRETERITION
VIII SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
IX DISPOSITION WITH CONDITIONS OR TERMS
X LEGITIME
A. CONCEPT
B. INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO LEGITIME
C. COMPULSARY HEIR
D. SHARES/LEGITIMES
G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988
VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON

FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA, MARIA
FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA BONIFACIA
FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE
FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA
HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf
and as Guardian ad litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY
GLEN, all surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao Bijon
Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which affirmed the trial court's decision finding that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the off-spring, hence, not a legal heir of the late Esperanza
Cabatbat.
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841), praying for the partition of the
estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her
estate was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the
possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and
Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters,
Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her deceased
brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza
and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal
adoption proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat were: 1) the
absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was
born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter was born; 2) the absence of the birth
certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly born; 3)
certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office
of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat alleged to
have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16,
1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central
School, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her
parents; 5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on
May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became acquianted with
a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up to
be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil Code should be considered?
HELD:
No. Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This
legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed, but
with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the
widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of
Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving sisters of
the deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the
Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written
in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed
as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who
has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene
because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it
did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate.
She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the
CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed
the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child
she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a
consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her

legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed
in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole,
universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to PROBATE and that
letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the PROBATE of the will on
the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors –
who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in
consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that
the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the
conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal
heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
HELD:
Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition
of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.Preterition “consists in the omission in the
testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”.
Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share
in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.Where the one sentence will institutes the
petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no
specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And
intestate succession ensues.
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
It is petition assailing the RTC’s reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed filed

action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner and respondents father.
Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, were married on June 14, 1962, begotten
seven children. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio married another woman named Lolita
Enrico on August 26, 2004. Six months later, Eulogio passed away. Respondents filed an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage between Petitioner and the respondent’s late father on two
grounds: 1. that the marriage lacks the requisite of MARRIAGE LICENSE , and; 2. the lack
of marriage ceremony due to respondent’s father serious illness that made its performance
impossible. Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her
exemption from getting marriagelicense. She sought then the dismissal of the respondent’s filed
action by citing the AM-02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par.(a) Rule of the family code.
Pursuant to “AM-02-11-10-SC” embodied the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC dismissed the respondents filed action.
Respondents filed motion forreconsideration invoking the ruling in the case of Niñal v.
Bayadog, holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a voidable
marriage even after death of one of the spouses. RTC granted the motionand issued an order for
reinstatement of the case. Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but denied, thereby
petitioner assailed a petition directly to Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.)Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death
of Eulogio.
2.) Whether which of the two rule “AM 02-11-10-SC” or “Niñal v. Bayadog” shall
govern the instant case
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail the validity of

the second marriage after the death of their father; because the rule on “AM 02-11-10-SC” shall
govern the said petition, under the Family Code of the Philippines. Particularly Sec 2, par. (a)
Provides that a petition for Declaration of AbsoluteNullity of a Void Marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern
this case not the held decision on Niñal v. Bayadog casewhereas the two cases expressed a
common cause of issue?Here the court resolved that; in Niñal v. Bayadog case the heirs were
allowed to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s second marriage even after
their father’s death because the impugned marriage there was solemnized prior to the affectivity
of the Family Code. Unlike in this case Enrico v Heirs of Medinaceli wheresame holding cannot
be applied because the marriage here was celebrated in 2004 where the Family Code is already
effective and under family code is embodied the rule on “AM 02-11-10-SC” where this rule
shall governpetitions for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages.
Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that the heirs have still remedy
to protect their successional rights not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding forthe settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to
challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.
DECISION
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in

Mabini, Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced
in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.
ISSUE:
whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign
law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount
of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare
nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to
file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its
proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe
Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them
remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondentherewith. They were
blessed with six children.
On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be
the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held thatthe divorce
acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that
aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid
according to their national law. The petitioner herselfanswered that she was an American citizen
since 1954. Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she
obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estatewas
ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan
children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsiderationwas granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to
the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not
declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of
Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2)Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as
surviving spouse of Arturo.
HELD:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at
the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already
an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountry’s national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary
beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals

ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null
and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.

ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES
and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of

successional rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the
sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed
alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have
a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground
of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in so
far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested rights of
respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled
reception that laws shall have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore,
the Family Code in this case cannot be given a retroactive effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August
31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented
by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF
DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties:
FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES
CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.,
respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock
in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory
and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to
dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15
February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case
to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the
conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates
presented by respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of
illegitimacy.1âwphi1.nêt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions,
respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as
being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was
merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such
heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to
likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in
an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the
complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. 1 It decreed that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were
seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Issue:
Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from
him.
Ruling:
No. in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in
exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been
first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. 16 Indeed, a child
so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No

costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina
Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before
the RTC of Makati City.
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled
without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss
alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and
not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of
Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and
all liabilities.
4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling
that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have
validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-
forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards
RULING:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must
necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in
order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release
or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their
supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It
would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the
latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if
the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one
complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to
dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA

CRISTOBAL SIKAT, Petitioners,
vs.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS
OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square
meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and
private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint 2 for Annulment of Title
and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of
the Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of TCTs
No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in the individual names of private
respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance with the law of succession and
the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of
Elisa, 3 Anselmo, 4 and the late Socorro 5 were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born
on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification 6 issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901,
1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
Issue:
(1) whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal;
(2) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject
property executed by the private respondents;
(3) whether or not petitioners’ right to question the Deed of Partition had prescribed; and
Held:
1. the baptismal certificates of Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the late Socorro 17 were presented.
Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in
accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on
31 January 1909, she produced a certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909,
1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners enjoyed that
common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura
Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by
continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. 19
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof to
refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed, children
of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
2. the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of
the subject property, the partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an
extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the subject property
by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded
therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private respondents
among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the transfer and registration of the
subject property in the names of private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by
private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, as
one of the children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject
property. 21 This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the subject property. She learned
afterwards that the title to the subject property had been transferred to the names of private
respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the
first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs
of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject
property. Since petitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition,
which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Buenaventura Cristobal
by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on them.
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of
petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the
subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession
prescribes.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135,
in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be
partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title
be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA

PANGILINAN MARAMAG, Petitioners,
vs.
EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL
BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR
LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
(1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a
concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive
any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) 4
and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);5 (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto
—Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the
legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian
and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be
deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged, among
others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been released in favor of Odessa, while
the rest of the proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, both minors,
upon the appointment of their legal guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total amount of
P320,000.00 as actual litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa,
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the
insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal
wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released
Odessa’s share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and
Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint
or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation
of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No.
A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to
declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no
settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been
determined. Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating
the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
In its own answer7 with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated
as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a misrepresentation in
his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than 65 years
old when he signed it in September 2001; that the case was premature, there being no claim filed
by the legitimate family of Loreto; and that the law on succession does not apply where the
designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not known to
petitioners, summons by publication was resorted to. Still, the illegitimate family of Loreto failed
to file their answer. Hence, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, declared them in default in
its Order dated May 7, 2004.
Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the motion to dismiss?
Held:
The petition should be denied.
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the petition failed to
state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads –
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate
heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular
and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a
suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance
policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser
share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the
Insurance Code,19 Eva’s share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former
having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of
the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs
of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112483 October 8, 1999
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR
VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO
VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER
VILLALON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of
Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son,
petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several
lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as one of
"Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court
of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing
the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms: (1)
Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and
(2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to
deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of
Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to
defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only
two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son,
Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the
motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue, survived only
by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four
years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of
the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, Civil Case
No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" with the
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended
complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue
advantage of the latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said
property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and
predecessor-in-interest.
Issue:
Whether or not that the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
Held:
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is
brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to
the extent that it impaired Victor's legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding
share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable,
what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature,
class and quality; 25 (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in
cash or marketable securities; 26 or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much
of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976, affirming in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is reversed and set aside.
No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006
ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE RIVERA,

TEOFILA RIVERA and CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
*
HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA represented by MELCHOR VILLANUEVA,
ANGELINA VILLANUEVA, VICTORIANO DE LUNA, CABANATUAN CITY RURAL
BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners- half brothers, half sister and children of the half brother of the deceased,
Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are the Heirs of Villanueva, represented by Melchor. They were
allowed to be substitute for Villanueva upon his death. The remaining respondents are Angelina
and her husband Victorino, are allegedly the daughter and son-in-law of the late Villanueva.
From 1927 until 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was
married to Amanda Musngi who died in 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties
including the properties contested in this case. Gonzales died without a will. In 1980, Villanueva and Angelina executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales’ estate comprising a number
of the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the
estate to Angelina. Later on, the Petitioners filed a case for partition of Gonzales’ estate and
annulment of titles and damages with the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
RTC- 2 Findings:
1. Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and
2. Respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of
petitioners
Petitioners appealed to the CA and the latter affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent
Gonzales
Held:
No.
According to the assailed decision, “the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of
Angelina proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ Illegitimate child. It is well-settled that a
record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of
the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.
Following the logic of Benitez v. CA, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857
should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate.
The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua v. CA that are simply too compelling to ignore.
First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence
of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third,
both claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several
years. There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case which
ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether
illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not
only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause 21 at the time of the alleged
birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales
had been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it
was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor
even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have
validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with
Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 are reversed and set aside, and a new one
entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with sale and REMANDING the case
to the court of origin for the determination and identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the
corresponding partition of her estate.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged
executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he
had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and
that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de
los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will2 was annexed to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an
order granting the petition and allowing the will.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that,
as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the
sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a
creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the
will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of
the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however,
private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was
required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61)
still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61 has lost
jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
Held:
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to
ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.9
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that,
after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle
the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under
the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will
filed by the testator himself. It provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the
allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the
allowance of wills after the testator's death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary
for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the
testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his
will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE
LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE
LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June
17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro
and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three
equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito
Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda.
As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter
Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y
Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic
will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July
30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20,
1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable
properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and
not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was
opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Issue:
whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or
mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion
of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons.
Held:
No.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren
the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191).
The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor.
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is
in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by
operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second
degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition
that they must survive the reservoir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
XIII LEGAL SUCCESSION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts:
that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate.
She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales
Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate
of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;

Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Issue:
is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?

Held:
No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit
by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate
heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for
in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law.
The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right
of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of
a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final
intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the
Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner.

vs.
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in
Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of
Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay
City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner
assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora
Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an
incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and
creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the
administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her
case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the
issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and
consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
ISSUE:
Is the right of representation apply in the case?
HELD:
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law,
"raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and
succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would
have succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending,
line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children
of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate
parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving
spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among
collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring
with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the
Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to
the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made ancestor
and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person
is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father,
four from his first cousin and so forth."
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the
decedent.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48140 May 4, 1942
SINFOROSO PASCUAL, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PONCIANO S. PASCUAL, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural
children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by Adela Soldevilla de
Pascual, surviving spouses, Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the
deceased, Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, Acknowledged
natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, Intestate of Eleuterio
T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving
spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162
(CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition
for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that
of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don
Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the
known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT,
ISSUE:
whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
HELD:
NO. Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by
the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. respondent IAC did
not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother
of their father.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural
children should be treated differently, in the negative.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK
OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.,respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters,
Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala
Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949
without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said
Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria
Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the
time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to
him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over
the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by
right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell,
claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria
Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
ISSUE:
Is there right of representation in the case at bar?
HELD:
NONE. even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot,
by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes
considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown
by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother
were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At
most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992,
Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,

REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years
later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of
Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to
wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate
by right of representation.
ISSUE:
Is there right of representation?
HELD:
Yes. as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father would have
directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written
in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed
as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE:
WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who
has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene
because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it
did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate.
She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the
CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed
the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child
she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a
consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982
MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,

vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.:
FACTS:
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens
Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948.
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro
Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial
Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by
Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced
heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.
On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge seeking a judicial declaration that they are
legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to
surrender the ownership and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the
deed of extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said
deed of extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of
private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be
declared nun and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is right of representation?
HELD:
petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, he
being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of petitioners,
whom they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro Abenojar. If this
claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from Teodoro Abenojar in
view of the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the

legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the
truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an
acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from
Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole
legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the
children of the deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro
Abenojar, their mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding judgment
thereon. The private respondents shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985
EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, EUSTAQUIO, VICENTE, ESTELA, CAMILA,

MAXIMO, LITO, FELIX, OMAN, CRISPINA and REY, all surnamed RAMIREZ,
TRIUNFO, RUPERTA and CARMEN, all surnamed PASSILAN, and DOMINGO
ROQUE, QUIRINO, MANUELA and ANITA, all surnamed LABOG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES PLAN and BERNARDO
MALLILLIN, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of
sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and
damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of
sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao
in favor of respondent Mallillin. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which was however denied
for not being indubitable at that stage of the proceedings. The private respondent, therefore, filed
his answer.
After termination of the pre-trial proceedings and during the trial on the merits, the parish priest
of the Roman Catholic Church, Rev. Father Roque N. Fidol, testified on the witness stand. He
was duly cross-examined by Atty. Aguirre, counsel for the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Can the plaintiff inherit from Lutgarda Capiao, the original owner of the property?
HELD:
NO. The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda is

undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the
surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao Article 992 of the Civil Code, cited by the
movant, the defendant, provides:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.'
Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an
illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992
of the New Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia
Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-
appellant.
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of this
marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic
(Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband
Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this second
marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I).
Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his
only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs
Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs
Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir
as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo
Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was
filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant
herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs,
children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco
Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City
against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful
shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza
who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and
requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by
Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of
Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza
acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died
without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and
administration of the same to the defendants.
ISSUE:
Are the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code applicable in the
case?
HELD:
Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and
her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her
brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New
Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their
own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986,
this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is
per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her
sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004,
NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is,
that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9,
1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976
BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO

ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the
latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO
ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate
of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO,
MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE
SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO,
together with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in
1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if
any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her
daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22,
1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children,
Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his
deceased father, Patricio.
ISSUE:
Is representation present in the case?
HELD:
No. The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation. Even if the
donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's
share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the
third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her
legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin,
could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line,
representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of
the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita
Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up
to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she
has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of
her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in
Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was
survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-
sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito,
all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of
full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs
claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia
Ferraris.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance
or will the former be excluded by the latter?
HELD:
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of
relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that
nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless
concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
It will be seen that brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of
the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and
nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the
latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and
aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and
are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and
EMILIANO CATANIAG,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties
in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee [herein private
respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee [also herein private
respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989,
Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex A-Complaint), assigning [,] transferring and
conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which
the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No.
T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey
Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee [also
herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latter's name.
ISSUE:
Is the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son David Rey Guzman illegal?
HELD:
No. The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of

Appeals, 19 which involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court sad:
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition,

exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and
other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public
lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. 20
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession. 21
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino
citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid."
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino
citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional
provision — to keep our land in Filipino hands — has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42539 October 23, 1936
In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier. SULPICIO RESURRECCION, administrator-

appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
FACTS:
On October 18, 1932, Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband
Sulpicio Resurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in
favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The testatrix died on January 22, 1933, and her will
was probated on March 8th of said year.
On October 12, 1933, the court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in August, 1930, even
before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund
of the estate.
Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of
P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this
amount to the funds of the estate.
The important thing to determine in this appeal is the effect of a legacy made in favor of a person
who was already dead not only before the death of the testatrix but even before the will was
made.
The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or any part thereof
in favor of any person qualified to acquire it (art. 763, Civil Code). Upon being instituted as
legatee by the testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by
death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the
subject of a right (art. 32, Civil Code). Consequently, his institution as a legatee had absolutely
no legal effect and his heirs are not now entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot
even claim under the principle of representation because this takes place only in intestate
inheritance. Furthermore, as the legatee died before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his
heirs (art. 766, Civil Code).
ISSUE:
Should the will be interpreted in the sense that the intention of the testatrix was to leave
the legacy to the heirs of Gil Francisco Javier
HELD:
This court, however, does not find sufficient evidence to establish this fact. The only
witness who testified to this effect was Agustin Javier, Gil's brother, who alleged that he was in
the house of the testatrix in May, 1931, and in a conversation with her he informed her that their
brother Gil had already died, leaving a widow and children. But against this testimony was
presented that of Sulpicio Resurreccion, the widower of the testatrix, who testified that Agustin
Javier was in his house only once, in April or May, 1930, prior to the death of the testatrix.
According to this, he could not have given to the testatrix the information about Gil's death
which took place some months later, or in August, 1930.lâwphi1.nêt
Furthermore, if the testatrix, in making her will, knew that Gil was already dead and that he had
left children, it cannot be explained why she left the legacy to Gil and not to his children, if such
was her intention, particularly because, according to the evidence for the appellants, she knew
one of said children named Jose.
Consequently, in either case, whether the testatrix knew that Gil was already dead or she was
ignorant thereof, as she had left the legacy in favor of Gil, there is no reason to admit that it was,
nevertheless, her intention to leave it to his children.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs to the appellants. So ordered.

Compilation of Cases Property of The Estate Decedent

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Compilation of Cases Property of The Estate Decedent

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

I.

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of

Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

DONATION INTER VIVOS.

In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December

G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002

Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos.

DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria,

Whether or not the Donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.

DONATION INTER VIVOS.

Whether or not the donations are Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos.

DONATION INTER VIVOS.

Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at

G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990

DONATION INTER VIVOS.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-24098 November 18, 1967

Whether or not the civil liability has been extinguished.

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

WHEREFORE, decision affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,

G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby

G.R. No. 145736 March 4, 2009

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 121940 December 4, 2001

A. CONCEPT AND NATURE OF WILLS

G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

Whether or not the codicils should be given effect.

G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TESTAMENTARY ACT

G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904

Whether or not it is necessary that a will be written by the testator herself.

G.R. No. L-2071 September 19, 1950

This is a special proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of La Union to

Article 669 of the Civil Code reads as follows:

Whether or not the joint will executed is valid.

C. RULES IN INTERPRETATION OF WILLS

G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997

G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of

However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.

On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.

1. Whether or not estoppel is applicable in probate proceedings.

1. Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry.

2. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact -

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-

Whether or not the will of the deceased be allowed in the Philippines.