CONDITIONS FOR GRANTING AMENESTY

ADMISSION OF GUILT
In Vera vs. People, G.R. No. L-18184, January 31, 1963, the Supreme Court En
Banc rejected the argument of the petitioners that it is not necessary for them to
admit the commission of the crime charged to be entitled to the benefits of
amnesty proclamation. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and
when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have
any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain
conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the
existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea
of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations
against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which,
if proved, would being the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty
proclamation.
EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
Under Amnesty Proclamation no. 8, dated September 7, 1946 issued by President
Roxas and concurred by Congress, declares amnesty in favor of persons, who
committed felony in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy during the
Japanese occupation. The proclamation tasked the Amnesty Commission to
determine if the crime is committed within the terms thereof. However, while the
Commission can take cognizance of the applications for amnesty, the courts are
not excluded to decide any claim for amnesty. An accused charged before the
courts may claim amnesty as a defense, waive the filing of an application therefor,
and submit evidence thereof in the trial of his case (to prove that the crime was
committed in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy). In sum, while all
applications should be passed upon by commissions, an accused may, instead of
filing an application, choose the alternative remedy of just raising the issue in a
court of justice in the trial of his case (People vs. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-4316, May
28, 1952). If a person opted to file an application for amnesty with the
commission, but he is unable to obtain his release through executive channels
although he is entitled to the benefits of this proclamation, it devolves on the
courts to protect his right (Tolentino vs. Catoy, G.R. No. L-2503, December 10,
1948).

MODE OF EXTINGUISHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, amnesty totally extinguishes
criminal liability, the penalty for the crime and all its effects. However, if the
granting of benefit under amnesty proclamation is subject to a condition, the
criminal extinction will only occur upon happening of the condition and not upon
the issuance of the proclamation by the President, or concurrence of Congress.
Under Amnesty Proclamation no. 8, dated 1946, the amnesty covers crimes
committed in furtherance of resistance against the enemy as determined by the
Commission. In Vera vs. Nanadiego, G.R. No. L-26539, February 28, 1990, the
Supreme Court ruled that the criminal liability of the appellee had been
completely extinguished by virtue of the amnesty extended to him by
Commission in 1956.
Amnesty Proclamation no. 76, dated June 21, 1948 issued by President Quirino,
granted amnesty to huks, who have committed the rebellion subject to the
condition that they must presented themselves with all their arms to the
authorities within 20 days from the date of concurrence by the Congress.
Compliance with the condition as determined by the amnesty commission or the
court shall extinguish his criminal liability (Tolentino vs. Catoy, G.R. No. L-2503,
December 10, 1948).
REVOCATION OF AMNESTY
Can the incumbent President revoke the amnesty proclamation issued by a
former President and concurred in by Congress?
No. Amnesty proclamation issued by a former President under express authority
of the Constitution and concurred in by Congress has the nature, force, effect,
and operation of a law (People vs. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-4316, May 28, 1952).
Hence, an incumbent president cannot unilaterally revoke the bilateral acts of the
former President and Congress in making an amnesty proclamation. Same as a
law, amnesty proclamation can only revoke by concurrent actions of the
President and Congress. Moreover, amnesty extinguishes the criminal liability of
the amnesty beneficiary. Hence, revocation made after the criminal extinction
will not prejudice the amnesty beneficiary.
Can the incumbent President nullify the decision of the Department of National
Defense for failure to file application for amnesty as an express precondition to
the granting of the benefit under an amnesty proclamation and failure to admit
his guilt?
Yes. The Department of National Defense is under the control power of the
President. Hence, he can nullify its decision granting amnesty benefit despite of
the failure of the beneficiary to comply with conditions of the amnesty
proclamation. But the nullification is subject to the judicial review. If the court
finds that amnesty beneficiary made an application and admitted his guilt therein
and the Department of National Defense properly approved the application, it
may reverse the decision of the President on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The proper approval of
the amnesty application extinguishes the criminal liability of the applicant for the
crime covered by the proclamation.