Republic vs Lim 08/07/2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y.

LIM, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.\

In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29,
1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City.  Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her
record of birth to Iligan City.  She alleged that both her Kauswagan and
Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they
be corrected.

The trial court then issued an Order,[1] which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, let the hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before
this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 o’clock
in the afternoon at which date, place and time any interested person may
appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the

City of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134
Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.

During the hearing, respondent testified thus:

First, she claims that her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo”.  She
has been using “Yu” in all her school records and in her marriage certificate.
[2]
  She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI)[3] to further show the consistency in her use of the surname “Yu”.
 Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was
written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)” when it should have been “Yu Dio To (Co
Tian).”

Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should

have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got
married.  Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
Filipina.  She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact
that she is a Filipino citizen.

Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she

was a legitimate child when she should have been described as
illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.

Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a

Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from
Camiguin.  She added that she and her daughter’s father were never
married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in
China.

In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by

officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio
To from 1948 to the present.

The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not
present any evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by
attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s petition
and rendered judgment as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of
the petitioner straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted
and the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed to make the following
corrections in the birth records of the petitioner, to wit:
1.       Her family name from “YO” to “YU”;
2.       Her father’s name from “YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)” to “YU DIOTO
(CO TIAN)”;
3.       Her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” by changing “YES”
to “NO” in answer to the question “LEGITIMATE?”; and,
4.       Her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino”.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision.[5]
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF
THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM “CHINESE” TO
“FILIPINO” DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER
DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO
CONTINUE USING HER FATHER’S SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD. [6]

To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error
respondent’s recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what
indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the
civil register.  To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or
adversary in nature.  

If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then

the procedure to be adopted is summary.  
 If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. 

 This is our ruling inRepublic v. Valencia[7] where we held that even

substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.  

An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial

court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.[8]

As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the

Republic’s failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case
properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that
the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.

Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that

respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.  It cites Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of
a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship.[9] 

Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of

Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement
to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry.  The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.”[10]
 Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children.  These do not apply in
the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering
that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married.  As such,
she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen.  By being an illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth.  Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to
elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, [11] citing In re

Florencio Mallare,[12] we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all
the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42
Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954).  Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled.[13]
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.  She
registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.
[14]
 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. [15]

In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of

Appeals’ decision in allowing respondent to use her father’s surname despite
its finding that she is illegitimate.
 The Republic’s submission is misleading.  The Court of Appeals did not
allow respondent to use her father’s surname.  What it did allow was the
correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using ever
since she can remember.  In this regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname.

We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:

Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old.  To bar her at this time
from using her father’s surname which she has used for four decades
without any known objection from anybody, would only sow
confusion.  Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing one’s name
or surname is to avoid confusion.

Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law

regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name “by which he
has been known since childhood.”

Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same

issue.  In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,[16] we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of
aliases, allows a person to use a name “by which he has been known since
childhood” (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio,
102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot
enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De
Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).[17]
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,
[18]
 there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a
person has already been using since childhood. [19]
 The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent
that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice
or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the
community in general.[20] In this case, the Republic has not shown that the
Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future
mischief.  In respondent’s case, the change in the surname that she has
been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in
general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review
is DENIED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893
dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED.  Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan
City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of
respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
1.       Her family name from “YO” to “YU”;
2.       Her father’s name from “YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)” to “YU DIOTO
(CO TIAN)”;
3.       Her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” by changing “YES”
to “NO” in answer to the question “LEGITIMATE?”; and,
4.       Her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino”.
Tecson vs COMELEC 08/07/2014
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434.  March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634.  March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824.  March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the

state believes are deserving of the privilege.  It is a “precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,” [1] that cannot be
taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a
single question of profound importance to the nation.  The issue of
citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land.  Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath.  Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and

American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and
common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

 On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections.  In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be  20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled

"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"
initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before
the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject.  Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.  Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -  first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January

2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary
exhibits –
1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ,
 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita
Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering
his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley,
3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid,
4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe,
5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management
and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the
National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and
6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of

evidence, the more significant ones being –
a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births
for San Carlos, Pangasinan,
b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found,
c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe,
d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No.
23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou,
g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou
and Bessie Kelley, and
h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War

II.
 On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack
of merit.  Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion
for reconsideration.  The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc.  On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary

restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would
include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy
for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a
natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
“Section 78.  Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false” –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
 “Section 52.  Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.  In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections” -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed

by the Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule
65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.  Section 7, Article IX, of the
1987 Constitution also reads –

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members

any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution.  A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself.  Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1,  Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides

that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law which power “includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
 It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824
was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this
Court.  A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the
land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted before it.  The Constitutional
provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution.  The omission

in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the
sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this
Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as “not (being) justiciable”
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President.  The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear
and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same."  Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal.  Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be
deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
 Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario.  Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.  A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the"Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
“Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President of the Philippines.
“Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing
of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President.  An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto.  A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
“Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President
or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.”

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President"
or "Vice-President", of thePhilippines, and not of "candidates" for President
or Vice-President.  A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being
an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario.  In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest.  This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined
by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
 Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et
al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr."
would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief
historical background on the concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by

Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer
to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of
the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who
would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. [7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. 
 Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its ideal setting, a
citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his
private interests to the general interest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the

centuries.  In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large,
to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual
freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its
meaning expanded during the 19th century to include 
political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the
exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of 
social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security. [11] The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western
Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the
rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]
 The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish
regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records,
the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of
the archipelago.  Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during
the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law.  Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended
by Royal Decrees.[14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima

Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the
law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing
views among experts;[15] 

however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to

Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,
[16]
 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political
status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley
Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. [18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine

Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which
the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would
be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction
on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
“(a)    Persons born in Spanish territory,
“(b)    Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,
“(c)    Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
 “(d)    Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.”[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history.  Already

in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole
colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States.  An
accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty,
while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have
no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between

Spain and the United States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the
United States would be determined by its Congress –

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory

over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof
to such laws as are applicable to foreigners.  In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to
have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they reside.
Thus –

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of

the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined
by the Congress."[22]
 Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the
United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become
American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American
laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the

first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the
Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23]

Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one

who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on
the 11th day of April 1899.  The term “inhabitant” was taken to
include 1)  a native-born inhabitant, 2)  an inhabitant who was a
native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines

from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law
was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United
States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.[25]  More about this later.
 In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the
following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of
the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein." [26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of

"Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized.  The word "Filipino"
was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the
Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos."  In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others
as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized  to provide
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."
 Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or

not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution
brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting,
once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the  basis of Filipino citizenship -
“Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution.  The following are citizens of
the Philippines -
“(1)    Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution
“(2)    Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
“(3)   Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(4)    Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
“(5)    Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together

with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women
would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to
still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.   Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of
Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution
crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns -
“Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
 “(1)    Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
“(2)   Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
“(3)    Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
“(4)    Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided
that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
“The following are citizens of the Philippines:
“(1)    Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
“(2)    Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
“(3)    Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
“(4)    Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
 The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August

1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.  Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis[28] – had been in vogue.  Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born”
citizen of the Philippines.  Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long.  With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate
that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe.  While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954.  The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father,
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes.  Introduced
by petitioner was an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936.  The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of
their marriage to be on 16 September 1940.  In the same certificate, Allan F.
Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen,
and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. 

 The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20

August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to
Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
 Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of
some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some
degree of certainty from the documents would be that -
1.       The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2.       FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3.       Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4.       The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe (Filipino Citizen as
stated on his death certificate; and
5.       At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe
was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact

that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen?  The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer.  The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and
Exhibit "3" for respondent.  The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent.  The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5."  While the last
two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility
thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of
Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument.  All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
“Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
“x x x                                     x x x                             x x x
 “(d)    When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
office or is recorded in a public office.”

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the

marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate
of FPJ,  constitute prima facie proof of their contents.  Section 44, Rule 130,
of the Rules of Court provides:
“Entries in official records.  Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the
entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in
the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually
affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of
most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more
likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.  It could
thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870
when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain.  Petitioner would argue that
Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898
to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office.  Petitioner, however, likewise
failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same
period.  In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to
be San Carlos, Pangasinan.  In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death.  It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and
Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.
 Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation
(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an
illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines
from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity.  Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary.  Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil
Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
“In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed
and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if
the father refuses.  In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge
the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified.”

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove

voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was
required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document
of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
 "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted,
the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1),
which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized.  No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it.  While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753.  For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to
be entered in the civil register.  Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her
own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,
nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found.  There
being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed,
by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be "some other public document."  In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this
Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public
documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials
by reason of their office.  The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first
class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
 The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory.  Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.  Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural.  Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases
when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation.  Unlike an
action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child,
and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,

"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the
father.  The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged
before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article
173, and Article 175 provide:
“Art. 172.       The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
“(1)    The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
“(2)    An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
“(1)    The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
“(2)    Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
 “Art. 173.       The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.  In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
“The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
“x x x             x x x                 x x x.
“Art. 175.  Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.”
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256
of the code reads:
"Art. 256.       This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.”
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.  Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if
the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before
August 30, 1950.  Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-
legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child.  The provisions are intended to merely govern the
private and personal affairs of the family.  There is little, if any, to indicate
that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also
affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State.  While,
indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of
civil law; particularly –
 "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property.  It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations
of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."[37]
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38]  the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of
the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of
their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law
of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship.  Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on
successional rights and family relations.[40]  In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political
status.
 Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy.  This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property
laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members
of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children.  In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the
concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in
the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code.  Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil
law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.  The Civil
Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and
family relations.  The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern.  For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
“Act or Declaration about pedigree.  The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.  The word
`pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives.  It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.”
 For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person
must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose
pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy
has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas,
sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC,
might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his
children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family  -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently
residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with
law do hereby declare that:
“1.     I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
“2.     Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
“3.     Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan
Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or
`FPJ’.
“4.     Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St.
Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
“x x x                x x x                 x x x
“7.     Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became
engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines in
1936.  I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same
year.
“8.     Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in
1938.
“9.     Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three
children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together
with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
“10.   Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four
(4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
 “x x x                x x x                 x x x
“18.   I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my
nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
“Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January
2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.  A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity.  In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this
Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available.  Fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing.  The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.  The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from
the mother and the other from the father.  The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage.  Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge.  Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should
not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.  For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in
aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."

Petitioner’s Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
 Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to
Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a
certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child.  The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be most doubtful at best.  But the documentary evidence introduced
by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was
born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother
who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September
1940.  Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child.  Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his
stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs.
de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.
Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each
of them.  If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis.  But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine.  I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
“First, Morano vs. Vivo.  The case was not about an illegitimate child of
a Filipino father.  It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather.  Nothing about jus
sanguinis there.  The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
 “Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon.  This case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father
who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution.  No one was illegitimate here.
“Third, Serra vs. Republic.  The case was not about the illegitimate son
of a Filipino father.  Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother.  The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized.  There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
“Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46]  This is a more complicated case.  The case
was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio
Chan.  Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate
son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.  Quintin therefore argued that
he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father.  But the Supreme Court said
that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother.  The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino.  If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin.  Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
“The Court should have stopped there.  But instead it followed with
an obiter dictum.  The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's
father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate.  This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case.  x x x  It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
“x x x             x x x                 x x x
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice.  First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
 “The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established
long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47]  I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences.  x x
x  But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction.  Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
“x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective
public service?  What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer.  It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison.  Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own?  To disqualify an illegitimate
child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents.  There is neither justice nor rationality in
that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and
must be reprobated.”
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member
of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at
bottom, have expressed similar views.  The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child.  It was to ensure
a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with
the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child.  It was to help
the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is

that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day,
month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than
it is.  Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states
that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.”  There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
 (1)            The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.  G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003
which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for
the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate
of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
(2)            The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having
been directly elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only
tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under
the Constitution.  Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly
be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
 (3)            In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse
of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on
the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father.  Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954
at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the “en masse Filipinization”  that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902.  That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ.  The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4)            But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48]must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
 1.  G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2.  G. R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,” for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections  in dismissing
the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
In Re: Mallare 08/07/2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE, respondent,
RESOLUTION
 
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P.
Vivo, this Court ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of
Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March
5, 1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should be
stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines.

After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer

Investigator, a decision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968,
holding that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent
Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his
mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese
national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded
from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was
ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued to
him
.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was
denied by the Court in its resolution of January 10, 1969. On February 4,
1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for
new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the
introduction of which could alter the decision previously promulgated.

The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of

(1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion
Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare
(respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and
 (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare
and his mother during their lifetime.

By resolution of July 31, 1969, this Court ruled:

Considering that the respondent, as a duly admitted member of the
bar, should be given ample opportunity to establish the true facts about his
citizenship and that no effort should be spared to ascertain the truth before
strippling him of the privilege granted to him by this Court since 1962, and
denying him the practice of his chosen profession which he has honorably
discharged as far as the records show:

The Court Resolved to set aside the decision of April 29, 1968 and to
grant the re-opening and new trial prayed for, which shall take place before
the Court's Investigating Officer on the days specified by him upon notice to
respondent Mallare, the Commissioner of Immigration and the Solicitor
General, wherein said parties may adduce all proper additional evidence that
they may desire to present. The proofs taken at the original investigation
shall not be retaken, but considered as part of the evidence in the new trial.
Thereafter, the Court Investigator shall submit his report on this Tribunal.
(Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the parties submitted their respective additional

evidences before the Court's investigator.
Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29,
1968, as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three
basic arguments, to wit:
(a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana
Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen;
(b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt
acts, had chosen Philippine citizenship; and
(c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino
citizen.
 The determinative issue in this controversy, therefore, revolves around
the citizenship of respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, for if Esteban were a
Filipino as respondent claims, the latter axiomatically would also be a Filipino
and the objection against his inclusion in the Roll of Attorneys in the
Philippines would lose legal basis.

After a painstaking study of the original and additional evidences

herein presented, the Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite
setting aside of Our decision of April 29, 1968, and a definitive declaration
that respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with
qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.
To support his contention that respondent Florencio Mallare is not a
Filipino, the Commissioner of Immigration presented:
Exhibits "A" and "B", Opinions Nos. 90 and 166 of the Secretary of
Justice dated March 31, 1955 and July 10, 1959, respectively, to the effect
that respondent and his brothers and sisters had failed to establish their
claim to Philippine citizenship;
Exhibit "C", the death certificate of Esteban Mallare dated June 7,
1945, wherein he was reported to be of Chinese nationality;
Exhibits "D", "E", "F" and "G", the
birth certificates of respondent, his brothers and sisters, dated October
23, 1929, November 8, 1932, October 26, 1939, and February 10, 1943,
respectively, stating that their father was a Chinese citizen, born in Amoy,
China, and wherein respondent was reported to be a Chinese, born in
Macalelon, Quezon;
Exhibits "H" to "M" — the records of Civil Case No. 329-G and Special
Proceeding No. 3925, both of the Court of First Instance of Quezon; and
Exhibit "N", respondent's alien certificate of registration, dated August
25, 1950.

Upon the other hand, respondent submitted —

Exhibit "1", the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in
Civil Case No. 329-G, dated November 18, 1959, upholding the validity of a
contract of sale, the vendees therein (including respondent) being citizens of
the Philippines;
 Exhibit "2", an order by the Acting Commissioner of Immigration,
canceling respondent's alien certificate of registration on the strength of the
court's decision in Civil Case No. 329-G; Exhibit "3", identification certificate
No. 11712 issued by the Bureau of Immigration, declaring respondent "as a
citizen of the Philippines by birth being the legitimate son of Esteban Mallare,
a Filipino citizen as 'per order of this office dated 8 June 1960 CEBNO 4223-
R'";
Exhibit "4", final order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, dated
November 28, 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 3925, ordering the Municipal
Treasurer of Macalelon, Quezon, to correct the entry in the Registry of Birth
book of the municipality by changing respondent's nationality from "Chinese"
to "Filipino";
Exhibit "5", respondent's affidavit dated October 7, 1961 showing him
to be a registered voter of Macalelon, Quezon;

Exhibit "6", respondent's passport issued on March 5, 1962,

showing that he is a citizen of the Philippines;

Exhibit "7", opinion of the Solicitor General, dated July 25, 1962,
recognizing respondent Florencio Mallare as a Filipino citizen;
Exhibit "L", landing certificate of Te Na (respondent's mother), dated
July 7, 1926, wherein she was certified as "wife of P.I. citizen";
Exhibit "K-9", certification by the municipal treasurer of Macalelon,
Quezon that Esteban Mallare was registered in the Registry List of Voters on
April 14, 1928; and
The entry in the baptismal registry of the Immaculate Concepcion
Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Esteban Mallare was
the natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina.

Respondent also presented the following residents of

Macalelon, Quezon:
 (a) Damiana Cabangon, 80 years old who — declared that she was
with her mother, the "hilot" who attended to Ana Mallare during her delivery,
when Esteban Mallare was born; 1 that she was present when Esteban was
baptized;2 that Ana Mallare had lived continuously in Macalelon and was
reputed to be unmarried; 3 that she had never met (seen) Esteban's father,
a certain Mr. Dy. 4

(b) Rafael Catarroja 77 years old and former mayor of Macalelon who
declared that he knew Esteban Mallare even as a child; 5 that Esteban was
then living with his mother, Ana Mallare, a Tagala, who was cohabiting with
a Chinese;6 that Esteban started voting in 1934, and became one of his (the
witness') campaign leaders when he ran for the mayor ship in 1934.  7

(c) Salomon Gimenez, 75 years old and former mayor of Macalelon,

who declared having known Esteban Mallare; that in the elections of l925,
when Esteban campaigned for a rival candidate against him, he (the
witness) wanted to seek for Esteban's disqualification; that he sought the
counsel of Judge Gaudencio Eleazar (a relative of the witness), who advised
him that a disqualification move would not prosper because Esteban's
mother was not married to Esteban's Chinese father;  8 that as of 1940, when
witness was municipal mayor, there were only about 3,000 residents in
Macalelon. 9

(d) Joaquin Enobal, 69 years old, who declared that he was a

classmate and playmate of Esteban Mallare, whose house was only about
five houses away from theirs; 10 that he had not seen the husband of Ana
Mallare; 11 that Ana was a Tagalog who had lived in Macalelon. 12
 In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a
Filipino was denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of
his father, Esteban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother)
can not be considered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines continuing to reside therein who
was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate issued by the
Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's mother, Te Na, as
"wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination
of the evidence presented by therein applicant and consequently carries little
evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of her said husband; and that the
affidavit of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939, to the
effect that he had chosen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino
mother was not only self-serving, but also it can not be considered a
re-affirmation of the alleged election of citizenship since no previous
election of such citizenship has been proved to exist.

With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the

authority granted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of
respondent's citizenship has been duly filled.

The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge

of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban,
were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had
continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly
born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the
birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation has been held
admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the
question of whether a child was born alive. U

Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may

proceed from persons who are not members of the family — the reason for
the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the question of the
existence of marital relations. 13
 The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural
community where relationships not in conformity with established
contentions become the subject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus, the
public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified
to by the witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former.

Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly

improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare" after his
mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the
imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by
Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not
concede that alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or
legally-oriented.

The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that
Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be
assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The
declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community
regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but
they must have certain factual basis.

For it must be realized that in this Philippine society, every region

possesses certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally
detect if a person hails from the same region even from the way the latter
speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having known, and lived
with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog should
receive a high degree of credibility.

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore

himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all
the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42
Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954).
 Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-
Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled. 14
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to
an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It
has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as
of April 14, 1928 (Exh. "K-9"), and that as early as 1925 (when he
was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are
sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 15 Indeed, it would
be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect
considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June
7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to
elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1,
subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.

It is true that in the death certificate of Esteban Mallare (Exh. "C"), he

was referred to as a Chinese national, and in the birth certificates of
respondent and his brothers and sister (Exhs. "D", "E", "F" and "G"), they
were declared to be of Chinese nationality. Respondent likewise appeared to
have applied for alien registration on August 25, 1950 (Exh. "N"). While said
documents are public and the entries therein are, consequently, presumed
to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to
more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.
 Artemio Mallare, Esteban's eldest son and who supposedly supplied the
data appearing in Exhibit "C", denied having any hand in the funeral
arrangements and the preparation of the said death certification of his
father. He declared that he was merely 16 years old when his father met his
death in an accident in 1945, and he came to know of it only when he was
brought to the funeral parlor on the following day. 16 The entries in the birth
certificates (Exhs. "D", "E", and "G"), on the other hand, appeared to have
been prepared upon information given by the nurse or midwife who attended
to respondent's mother during her deliveries and who would have no
knowledge of the actual fact of the place of birth and the citizenship of
Esteban, the father; and in the case of respondent Florencio Mallare, the
informant was neither his father or mother; it was Maria Arana a "hilot". In
the case of the birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare (Exh. "F"), the
informant appeared to be Esteban Mallare himself. It is noted, however, that
no proof has been presented to show that it was Esteban Mallare who
personally gave the information that the child's and parents' nationality is
Chinese.

And any error on his part can not affect respondent Florencio Mallare.
With respect to the registration of respondent as a citizen of China in 1950
(Exh. "N"), it was explained that this was secured by respondent's mother,
on the belief that upon the death of her husband, Esteban Mallare, she
and her children reverted to Chinese citizenship. At any rate, even
assuming that said documents were prepared with actual knowledge and
consent by respondent or by his parents, on the erroneous belief that
Esteban was a non-Filipino, such acts would not cause the loss or forfeiture
of Philippine citizenship 17 which Esteban acquired from his Filipino mother.
Complainant places much emphasis on the convicting testimonies of
the expert witnesses on the entry in the baptismal registry of the
Immaculate Concepcion church. The discrepancy in the testimonies of said
witnesses, however, loses significance in the face of the finding, based on
other evidence that Esteban Mallare is the natural child of Ana Mallare, born
to her in 1903 at Macalelon, Quezon.
 Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and
additional evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court dated April 29,
1968, is hereby definitely set aside, and the complaint in this case is
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
 08/07/2014
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 914.  October 1, 1999]
RE:  APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority?  This is the question sought
to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to
the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a
Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia
West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.  Since his birth, Ching has resided
in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws

course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take
the 1998 Bar Examinations.  In a Resolution of this Court, dated September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition
that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18

November 1998, the following documents:
1.  Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing
that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2.  Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in Tubao, La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the
said place; and
 3.  Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E.
Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were

released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees.  The oath-
taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999.  

However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship,

he was not allowed to take his oath.  Pursuant to the resolution of this
Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship.  In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar
and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being
the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship” [1] in strict
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An
Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen."

The OSG adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority."[2] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be
effective, namely: 
 (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of
the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon reaching the age
of majority.’”[3] The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority:"
 The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority
which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27,
1940).  Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when
a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid.,
citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).  But
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was
not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.  However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase “reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his

Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both
dated 15 July 1999.  In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1.  I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2.  I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as
one in my school records and other official document;
3.  I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved
for Filipino citizens;
4.  I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible
to vote;
5.  I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6.  I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7.  My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by
me before a notary public;
 8.  I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9.  I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999,
the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship
within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by
election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution.  Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.

[4]
 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.[5] Likewise, this recognition by the
1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states
that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens.[6] It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not
be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. [7] If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.[8]
 C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in
order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship.  Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry.  The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made.

  The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced
upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.[9] In the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship,
this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.  In these decisions,
the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.[10] The phrase
“reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. [11] However,
we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,[12] that the three (3) year period
is not an inflexible rule.  

We said:
 It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice
has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. [13]

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to

elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16,
1923.  He became of age on February 16,1944.  His election of citizenship
was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of
age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority.  It is
clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of
majority.”[14]
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of
C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had
reached the age of majority.  Based on the interpretation of the phrase
“upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege.  It should be stated, in this connection,
that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what

Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.  Ching cannot
find a refuge in the case of In re:  Florencio Mallare,[15] the pertinent portion
of which reads:
 And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally
married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he cane
of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.  It has
been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14,
1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban
was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s].  These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship.[16]

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced.  The facts and circumstances

obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability.  First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No.
625.  Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be
applicable to him.  Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a
Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother.  In this regard, the
Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore

himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all
the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42
Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954).  Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled.[17]

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[18] where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an
informal process.
 In the case of In re:  Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court
held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.  In the
exact pronouncement of the Court we held:
“Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship” (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)”
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage.  He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
expected to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens,
we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship.  For those already Filipinos when the
time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding.  Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
electing is an alien.  Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries.  There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have bean superfluous but would also
have resulted in an absurdity.  How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?[19]

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of

Ching.  However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of
Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent
belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us
to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
   Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship.  The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship.  The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process.  All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.  Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply
glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can

be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. [20] One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship.  As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude.  Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente

D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
 08/07/2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, 
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, 
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent
Ong, Jr.
 
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that
determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November
12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated
February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the
petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
 The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be
the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17,
Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391
[1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The
exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution
has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant
of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full,
clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39
Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full,
clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the
Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may
be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the
1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants
the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any
final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail
it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under
our constitutional grants of power?
 In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the
Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-
786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court
ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial
interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The
Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it
has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so
grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an
expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other
branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they
have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section
1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or
not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its
nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
 As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the
Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the
government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs —
independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful
regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the
Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso
v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present
Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an
unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.
There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because
of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional
functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not
be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to
this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no
denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the
exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's
grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which
he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In
Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors,
resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
 As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of
Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized
into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-
Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in
1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent
who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He
decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes
of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a
branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the
private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order
declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose
Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then
a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province
of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in
Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family
constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no
showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in
search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary
and college education.
 In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in
1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The
respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door
apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took
and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent
looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines
as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his
family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on
the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil
Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional
Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since
it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar,
where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as
a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those
elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the
management of their family business decided to be of greater service to his
province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in
1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar
as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two
petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000
votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution;
 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only
to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to
those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before
that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position
which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973
Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the
election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to
extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in
section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected
Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am
I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
 Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father
Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on
natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend
Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution
in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his
election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a
natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we
will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it
strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before
January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-
born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers
would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born
Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make
the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow
interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not
always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and
intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence
to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of
Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
 A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the
spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v.
Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA
413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution,
any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic
living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous
situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those
born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing.
They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made
to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens
made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in
order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all
those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in
nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd
situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would
have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions.
(See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342
[1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born
Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of
whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
 Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers
before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was
his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when
the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when
he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court
held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the
exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply
the In Re Mallare rule.
 The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where
there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has
lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization
when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked
for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for
taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political
exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen.
There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine
customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to
show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of
Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know
him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of
his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship.For those already Filipinos when the
time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also
have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong
elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of
age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of
the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that
had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as
such." (Emphasis supplied)
 The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a
naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr.
Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just
so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a
collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a
person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
(See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose
Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process.
Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the
words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by
his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains
now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this
case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to
Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET
committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not
through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant
only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino
when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and
father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor
of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of
election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could
possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having
committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-
born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention
of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the
respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both
bodies.
 Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional
Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a
difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to
call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil
Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in
said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the
status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were
considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were
born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any
town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence.
This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil
Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang,
Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then
issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of
the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11,
1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this
place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the
meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
 Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always
returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his
visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that
he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil
Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his
domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was
also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as
one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a
place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other
logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen
under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the
private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document
presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule.
The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the
original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the
transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent
fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the
originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session
of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be
found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of
the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to
the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN,
December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN,
February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
 The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who
as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the
proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-
24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also
testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty.
Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the
degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown
that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found.
(see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were
adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be
proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the
documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former member of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented
as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during
the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private
respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of
the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the
plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest
against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates
present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide,
Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates
to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not
do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by
the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections
respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
 The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications
of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of
the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be
a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the
controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at
only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished
to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we
cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We
have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the
Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous
with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress
continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p.
87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
 Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to
reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol.
11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given
to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as
domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin
v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said
permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to
be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized
by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET
sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961,
another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in
1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which
were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November
18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no
property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place
is misplaced.
 The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the
private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-
owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still
in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property
in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61
Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a
house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he
should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or
relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be
eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification.
The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship,
voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be
qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the
purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There
was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the
contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he
always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather,
undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a
continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and
other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is
such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was
part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and
of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily,
some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the
private respondent.
 Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth.
Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do
not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny
it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated
naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who
were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating,
and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose
lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial
process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law
to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane,
more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is
essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED.
Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took
no part.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul
the decision * of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which
declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the
resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration.
 In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare
private respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of
Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained
the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare
private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives and to proclaim
him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private
respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position
of Representative or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was
proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen
thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest
number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests
against private respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos.
13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and
were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for
a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional
elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held
that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior
to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared
qualified to continue in office as Member of the House of Representatives,
Congress of the Philippines, representing the second legislative district of
Northern Samar.
 The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in
the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal
spouses Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His
place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising
the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August
24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived
in Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he
took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was
celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church
in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was
a natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire
Philippine citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of
First Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a
decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and
declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges
and duties, liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to take his
oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath
as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines
as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
 9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee
and a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had
attended grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he
finished his secondary as well as his college education. While later employed
in Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to four
times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of
Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in said
municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all
voters in the country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of
Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee
indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision
having been denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's
jurisdiction to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal,
considering the constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power
and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present
controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the
Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision
of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
 The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of
the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero
vs.Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that ". . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not,
in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than
perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a
disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with
great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal
should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the
sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications
for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the
Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably
remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution,
were it to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to
sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because the House
Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal
would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review.
 Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private
respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are
here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are
entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional
direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is
vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy
proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the
tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored
principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance
simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution
of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems
ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme
Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36). 4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern
to determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so
important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my
considered opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of
Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born
(Filipino) citizens as:
 Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-
quoted constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV
states the basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957,
while still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by
declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the time of
her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the
moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of
CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth
without his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine
citizenship. 6
 I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such
kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was
born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and
Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In
other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a
natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen
(not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was
enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only
those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino
citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be
considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-
born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of
the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from
birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the
citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473)
minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the
Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become
Filipino citizens, 8 this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not
born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not
confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did
not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino
citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be
considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473,
petitioners however contend that the naturalization of private respondent's
father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct
proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible,
and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in
an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
 Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the
challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the
Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct
proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in
such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded
the character of impregnability under the principle of res judicata. 9 Section
18 of CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled
upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.

In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:

An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance
with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with
the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore,
to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he
takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons,
no other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to
grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive
it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights as against
the government, from which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating
as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the
highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor." 11
 Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the
petitioners that the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan,
is a nullity, the Court should make a ruling on the validity of said
naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is
claimed that a foreigner is holding a public 
office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of
private respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino
citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is nothing from which
private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a
spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private respondent to
avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization
of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense
against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan,
took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine
Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15
May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue
the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the applicant to take
the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the
requisite oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision
favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore,
improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of
said order and before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect
any appeal from said order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance
of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken
null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of
Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
 It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization
of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows
that the private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a
Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of
court to issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter
to take the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting
naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15
May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent
acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the
undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in
turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation
to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. The right or privilege of election is available, however,
only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and
before the 1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of
its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in
"distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of
"natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship — all
in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support private
respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of
Representatives. 15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3)
of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate
children of Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973
and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine
citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the
status of natural-born Filipino citizen. 16
 The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional
provisions' interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made
during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed,
without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935
Constitution is more than persuasively established by the extensive
interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission. 17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine
citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent,
contrary to the conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine
citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the
controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional provisions in
question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations
petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may
be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus —
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers. 18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to
Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to
negate the contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers
before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner
Treñas specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in
question, thus:
 MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to
extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided
in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who have
elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be considered
natural-born. Am I right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of that
section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter
really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has been
debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall that during the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born citizenship of one
of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged precisely because he was a citizen
by election. Finally, the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a
natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a
person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a citizen
by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971
Constitutional Convention formalized that recognition by adopting paragraph
2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this
proviso is simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may be so that
these people born before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and
people who are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are
considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in
proposing this is to equalize their status. 19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens,
Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1935
Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether the
election was done before or after 17 January 1973. 20
 And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo
explained the purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1,
paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under the
1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were
natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien
fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but not
natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino
mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973
when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of
alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of
Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a
Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a
chance to a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects
Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a Filipino
father — namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a
mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize
the status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17,
1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours
later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before
January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but
he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily
was born 24 hours later — maybe because of parto laborioso — is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. 21
 It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the
position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming
natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973,
effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers
(with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born
Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January
1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election,
which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made
before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution which is to
protect and enhance the people's individual interests, 22 and to foster
equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17
January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have
elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of
majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private
respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that
private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling
of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic]
The acts of the petitioner in registering as a voter, participating in elections
and campaigning for certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as
sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even
without complying with the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's
Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld. 23
 I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently
erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine
citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to elect Philippine
citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare 25 which held
that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of
implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar.
The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the
age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was
approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935
Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed
to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act
625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the
option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section
1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he
was an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her
citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that,
inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter
dictum.
 The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA
473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's
acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father,
the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For,
assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father
was valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect
Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet,
this did not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law
amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by
the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from
one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during
one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did
not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or
within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3),
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am
constrained to state that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence
is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of
required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of
the House of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen
and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be
elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the
petitioners can replace private respondent as the Representative of the
second legislative district of Northern Samar in the House of
Representatives.
 I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may
take the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives
representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court
in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC
and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal,
who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as
mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the
second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office
is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election
protest. 28 It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but
not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. 29
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the
votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is
a nullity. 30
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is
a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate
who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the
candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was elected.
This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —
 Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite different from
that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it
be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In
the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. . . . 31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
as a natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L.
Ong, both of them having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino
citizen, alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is
himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially
impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not supported by the
evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted
the same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The
tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of
protestee's citizenship based on an entirely different set of circumstances,
apart from the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in
issue in connection therewith are too far removed in point of time and
relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view
these two issues as being already inconsequential. 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision
on the alleged citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father
(Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private
respondent.
 Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by
Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting
his citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials
of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the protests and submitted to the
Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong
Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is inescapable that
protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold
the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong
were dismissed, following the report of the Committee on Election Protests
and Credentials.35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the
case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935Constitution; the present case, on the other hand involves
the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-
born citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and
specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art.
IV thereof and private respondent does not qualify under such definition in
the 1987 Constitution;
 c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of
Emil L. Ong was a decision of apolitical body, not a court of law. And, even if
we have to take such a decision as a decision of aquasi-judicial body (i.e., a
political body exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L.
Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the
present judicial controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no
identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves
the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules
and logic, the evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and,
therefore, also before this Court, does not support the allegations made by
Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially
adopted by private respondent in the present controversy. This leads us to
an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a
"natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid
stress on the "fact" — and this appears crucial and central to its decision —
that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and
therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971
Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born subsequent thereto,
"shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section
4, Philippine Bill of 
1902). 36
 The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, is whether or not Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's
grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside
therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these
requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino
citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the
House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which
are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897
which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he
is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted
and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management
and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the
"Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that
Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore,
could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899,
contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or
evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority
decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the
alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of
1902. It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and
father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim Filipino
citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through
naturalization.
 Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House
Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed the factual question or
issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to look into the
question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as
held in Lee vs. Commissioners of 
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong
vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984. In connection with said
resolution, it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this
Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for
membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to
look into the circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation
to the Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were
both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election.
Valle filed a petition for disqualification with the Commission on Election on
29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a
natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the
Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The
motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with
this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamuswith
preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
 In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any
further hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle
vs. Emil Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-
03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this morning, it
was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of
November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the
citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner
(p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of
the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in evidence without
objection and bears out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that
petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective
immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC
from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00
o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same.This is
without prejudice to any appropriate action that private respondent may
wish to take after the elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was
rendered without the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court
or by the COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite
significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein
petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
 It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born
citizen under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further
proceeding in regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is
no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such recognition. How much more when
the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987
Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such proceedings
because the 1987 Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who
unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective
position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives
for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office
by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had
participated in this case, with the result that the legislative district would
cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is
the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore,
that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar
cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and
believed that he was fully eligible and qualified for the office because he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not
prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution
mandates that members of the House of Representatives should be "natural-
born citizens of the Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court
says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the
same voting majority, in effect, says, "even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L.
Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J.,  concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
 I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of
fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that
determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.  1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its
judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was held that
this Court can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then
the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts
and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply
whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the
new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the
Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to
review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of
power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due
process of law. 5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion
with which men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that
the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion because the
majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court
to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
 The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose
Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications
to be a member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question,
the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands
exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on
the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees
upheld the citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of
Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the
Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with the
requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need
not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands"
(Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule
were Spanish subjects who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects who were natives
of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving their Spanish
nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
 As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the
Philippines in 1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also
issued a certificate of registration. He established a business here, and later
acquired real property. Although he went back to China for brief visits, he
invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in
the Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old. And Ong Chuan was
admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing certificate,
his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 — i.e., as
a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the
1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a
minor, in the Philippines — obviously because he had long considered the
Philippines his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is presumed to
have continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as already adverted
to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained. The only
conclusion then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the
Civil Code of 1889 — and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified
as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902. 8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently
sought naturalization in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen,
but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and
his son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been registered as
Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan
himself believed the was alien, to the extent of having to seek admission as
a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind,
is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law,
rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one
thinks his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a
particular state or not. Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's
citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture
of Philippine citizenship; it does not even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs.
Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only to questions of fact
and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9
 It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the
Committee, and on November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by
the Convention in plenary session. 10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil
Ong, but in all candor, I speak from experience, because when the
Convention approved the Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents
and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on
a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa) 11 in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the
question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the
Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and
not his brother; I submit, however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will
overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
 
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul
the decision * of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which
declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the
resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration.
 In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare
private respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of
Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained
the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare
private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives and to proclaim
him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private
respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position
of Representative or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was
proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen
thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest
number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests
against private respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos.
13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and
were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for
a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional
elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held
that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior
to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared
qualified to continue in office as Member of the House of Representatives,
Congress of the Philippines, representing the second legislative district of
Northern Samar.
 The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in
the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal
spouses Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His
place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising
the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August
24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived
in Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he
took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was
celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church
in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was
a natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire
Philippine citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of
First Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a
decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and
declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges
and duties, liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to take his
oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath
as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines
as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
 9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee
and a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had
attended grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he
finished his secondary as well as his college education. While later employed
in Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to four
times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of
Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in said
municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all
voters in the country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of
Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee
indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision
having been denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's
jurisdiction to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal,
considering the constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power
and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present
controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the
Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision
of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
 The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of
the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero
vs.Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that ". . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not,
in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than
perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a
disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with
great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal
should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the
sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications
for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the
Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably
remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution,
were it to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to
sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because the House
Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal
would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review.
 Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private
respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are
here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are
entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional
direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is
vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy
proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the
tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored
principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance
simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution
of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems
ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme
Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36). 4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern
to determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so
important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my
considered opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of
Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born
(Filipino) citizens as:
 Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-
quoted constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV
states the basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957,
while still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by
declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the time of
her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the
moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of
CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth
without his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine
citizenship. 6
 I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such
kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was
born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and
Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In
other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a
natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen
(not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was
enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only
those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino
citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be
considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-
born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of
the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from
birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the
citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473)
minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the
Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become
Filipino citizens, 8 this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not
born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not
confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did
not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino
citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be
considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473,
petitioners however contend that the naturalization of private respondent's
father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct
proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible,
and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in
an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
 Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the
challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the
Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct
proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in
such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded
the character of impregnability under the principle of res judicata. 9 Section
18 of CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled
upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance
with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with
the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore,
to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he
takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons,
no other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to
grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive
it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights as against
the government, from which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating
as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the
highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor." 11
 Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the
petitioners that the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan,
is a nullity, the Court should make a ruling on the validity of said
naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is
claimed that a foreigner is holding a public 
office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of
private respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino
citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is nothing from which
private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a
spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private respondent to
avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization
of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense
against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan,
took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine
Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15
May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue
the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the applicant to take
the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the
requisite oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision
favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore,
improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of
said order and before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect
any appeal from said order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance
of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken
null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of
Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
 It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization
of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows
that the private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a
Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of
court to issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter
to take the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting
naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15
May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent
acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the
undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in
turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation
to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. The right or privilege of election is available, however,
only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and
before the 1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of
its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in
"distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of
"natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship — all
in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support private
respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of
Representatives. 15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3)
of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate
children of Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973
and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine
citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the
status of natural-born Filipino citizen. 16
 The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional
provisions' interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made
during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed,
without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935
Constitution is more than persuasively established by the extensive
interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission. 17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine
citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent,
contrary to the conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine
citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the
controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional provisions in
question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations
petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may
be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus —
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers. 18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to
Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to
negate the contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers
before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner
Treñas specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in
question, thus:
 MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to
extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided
in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who have
elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be considered
natural-born. Am I right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of that
section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter
really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has been
debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall that during the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born citizenship of one
of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged precisely because he was a citizen
by election. Finally, the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a
natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a
person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a citizen
by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971
Constitutional Convention formalized that recognition by adopting paragraph
2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this
proviso is simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may be so that
these people born before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and
people who are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are
considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in
proposing this is to equalize their status. 19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens,
Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1935
Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether the
election was done before or after 17 January 1973. 20
 And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo
explained the purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1,
paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under the
1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were
natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien
fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but not
natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino
mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973
when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of
alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of
Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a
Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a
chance to a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects
Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a Filipino
father — namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a
mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize
the status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17,
1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours
later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before
January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but
he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily
was born 24 hours later — maybe because of parto laborioso — is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. 21
 It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the
position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming
natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973,
effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers
(with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born
Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January
1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election,
which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made
before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution which is to
protect and enhance the people's individual interests, 22 and to foster
equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17
January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have
elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of
majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private
respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that
private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling
of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic]
The acts of the petitioner in registering as a voter, participating in elections
and campaigning for certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as
sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even
without complying with the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's
Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld. 23
 I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently
erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine
citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to elect Philippine
citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare 25 which held
that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of
implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar.
The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the
age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was
approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935
Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed
to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act
625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the
option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section
1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he
was an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her
citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that,
inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter
dictum.
 The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA
473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's
acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father,
the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For,
assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father
was valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect
Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet,
this did not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law
amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by
the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from
one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during
one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did
not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or
within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3),
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am
constrained to state that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence
is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of
required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of
the House of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen
and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be
elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the
petitioners can replace private respondent as the Representative of the
second legislative district of Northern Samar in the House of
Representatives.
 I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may
take the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives
representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court
in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC
and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal,
who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as
mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the
second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office
is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election
protest. 28 It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but
not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. 29
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the
votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is
a nullity. 30
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is
a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate
who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the
candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was elected.
This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —
 Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite different from
that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it
be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In
the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. . . . 31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
as a natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L.
Ong, both of them having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino
citizen, alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is
himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially
impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not supported by the
evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted
the same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The
tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of
protestee's citizenship based on an entirely different set of circumstances,
apart from the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in
issue in connection therewith are too far removed in point of time and
relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view
these two issues as being already inconsequential. 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision
on the alleged citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father
(Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private
respondent.
 Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by
Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting
his citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials
of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the protests and submitted to the
Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong
Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is inescapable that
protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold
the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong
were dismissed, following the report of the Committee on Election Protests
and Credentials.35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the
case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935Constitution; the present case, on the other hand involves
the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-
born citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and
specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art.
IV thereof and private respondent does not qualify under such definition in
the 1987 Constitution;
 c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of
Emil L. Ong was a decision of apolitical body, not a court of law. And, even if
we have to take such a decision as a decision of aquasi-judicial body (i.e., a
political body exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L.
Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the
present judicial controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no
identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves
the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules
and logic, the evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and,
therefore, also before this Court, does not support the allegations made by
Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially
adopted by private respondent in the present controversy. This leads us to
an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a
"natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid
stress on the "fact" — and this appears crucial and central to its decision —
that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and
therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971
Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born subsequent thereto,
"shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section
4, Philippine Bill of 
1902). 36
 The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, is whether or not Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's
grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside
therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these
requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino
citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the
House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which
are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897
which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he
is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted
and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management
and Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the
"Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that
Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore,
could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899,
contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or
evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority
decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the
alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of
1902. It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and
father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim Filipino
citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through
naturalization.
 Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House
Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed the factual question or
issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to look into the
question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as
held in Lee vs. Commissioners of 
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong
vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984. In connection with said
resolution, it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this
Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for
membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to
look into the circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation
to the Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were
both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election.
Valle filed a petition for disqualification with the Commission on Election on
29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a
natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the
Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The
motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with
this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamuswith
preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
 In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any
further hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle
vs. Emil Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-
03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this morning, it
was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of
November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the
citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner
(p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of
the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in evidence without
objection and bears out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that
petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective
immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC
from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00
o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same.This is
without prejudice to any appropriate action that private respondent may
wish to take after the elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was
rendered without the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court
or by the COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite
significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein
petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
 It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born
citizen under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further
proceeding in regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is
no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such recognition. How much more when
the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987
Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such proceedings
because the 1987 Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who
unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective
position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives
for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office
by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had
participated in this case, with the result that the legislative district would
cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is
the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore,
that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar
cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and
believed that he was fully eligible and qualified for the office because he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not
prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution
mandates that members of the House of Representatives should be "natural-
born citizens of the Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court
says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the
same voting majority, in effect, says, "even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L.
Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J.,  concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
 I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of
fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that
determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.  1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its
judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was held that
this Court can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then
the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts
and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply
whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the
new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the
Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to
review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of
power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due
process of law. 5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion
with which men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that
the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion because the
majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court
to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
 The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose
Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications
to be a member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question,
the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands
exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on
the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees
upheld the citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of
Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the
Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with the
requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need
not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands"
(Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule
were Spanish subjects who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects who were natives
of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving their Spanish
nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
 As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the
Philippines in 1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also
issued a certificate of registration. He established a business here, and later
acquired real property. Although he went back to China for brief visits, he
invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in
the Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old. And Ong Chuan was
admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing certificate,
his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 — i.e., as
a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the
1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a
minor, in the Philippines — obviously because he had long considered the
Philippines his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is presumed to
have continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as already adverted
to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained. The only
conclusion then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the
Civil Code of 1889 — and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified
as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902. 8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently
sought naturalization in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen,
but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and
his son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been registered as
Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan
himself believed the was alien, to the extent of having to seek admission as
a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind,
is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law,
rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one
thinks his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a
particular state or not. Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's
citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture
of Philippine citizenship; it does not even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs.
Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only to questions of fact
and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9
 It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the
Committee, and on November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by
the Convention in plenary session. 10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil
Ong, but in all candor, I speak from experience, because when the
Convention approved the Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents
and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on
a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa) 11 in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the
question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the
Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and
not his brother; I submit, however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will
overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
 08/07/2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183133               July 26, 2010
BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND
VALERIANO CABILING MA, Petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members
of the Board of Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G.
CATRAL,Respondents.
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother
and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon
reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered
foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to
obtain alien certificates of registration?

Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into
the inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino
citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and
spent as Filipinos.

The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference

in the lives of herein petitioners.

The Facts
 Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.),
Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma
(Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix
(Yao Kong) Ma,1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. 2
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano
were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years
1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.3

They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country
for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not
speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan,
and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled
abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the
Philippines.4

During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of

Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). 5
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines. T
 hus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose
L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. 6 On 14 January
1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary
Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. 7In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of
allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City,
the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005. 8

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners,

however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil
registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act
Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall
be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on
27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine
citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. 9 On the other hand, there is
no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement.
Individual certifications10 all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office
of the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that
all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No.
0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous registrations are no
longer available because of the mandatory general registration every ten
(10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage,
Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay
Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.11

Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in
Surigao City in 195312 and 1959,13respectively. The Office of the City Civil
Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that the documents showing that
Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its
Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other supporting documents appear
to show that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no
document exists that will provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas
and Isidro.
 The Complaint
On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the
Complaint-Affidavit14 of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that
Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and
overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however, did not participate in the
proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint
against them was politically motivated because they strongly supported a
candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local Elections. 15
On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of
Immigration charged them for violation of Sections 37(a)(7) 16 and 45(e)17 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended. The Charge Sheet18 docketed as BSI-D.C. No. AFF-
04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) reads, in part:
That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals, failed and continuously
failed to present any valid document to show their respective status in the
Philippines. They likewise failed to produce documents to show their election
of Philippines (sic) citizenship, hence, undocumented and overstaying foreign
nationals in the country.
That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent themselves as Philippine
citizens in order to evade the requirements of the immigration laws.
Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration
After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity
to refute the allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau
of Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a
Judgment dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children
violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation
to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and
22 August 2001, respectively.19
The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine citizenship after the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved on 7 June
1941, they were governed by the following rules and regulations:
 1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, providing that the election
of Philippine citizenship embodied in a statement sworn before any officer
authorized to administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with
the nearest civil registry;20 and Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID, now Bureau of Immigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April
1954,21 detailing the procedural requirements in the registration of the
election of Philippine citizenship.
2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 195622 of the CID, requiring
the filing of a petition for the cancellation of their alien certificate of
registration with the CID, in view of their election of Philippine citizenship;
3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and
DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985, requiring that the records of the
proceedings be forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice
for final determination and review.23
As regards the documentation of aliens in the
Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of
Immigration24 requires that ACR, E-series, be issued to foreign nationals who
apply for initial registration, finger printing and issuance of an ACR in
accordance with the Alien Registration Act of 1950. 25 According to public
respondents, any foreign national found in possession of an ACR other than
the E-series shall be considered improperly documented aliens and may be
proceeded against in accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or the
Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.26
Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid
claim to Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, public respondents
concluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are
undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens. 27
Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit any document to
support their claim that they are Philippine citizens. Neither did they present
any evidence to show that they are properly documented aliens. For these
reasons, public respondents likewise deemed them undocumented and/or
improperly documented aliens.28
The dispositive portion29 of the Judgment of 2 February 2005 reads:
 1. Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances, summary
deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano
Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese],
under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation to BI M.O.
Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001,
respectively;
2. Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,
Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli
Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 37(a);
3. Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr.,
Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro
Ma in the Immigration Blacklist; and
4. Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr.,
Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro
Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)(15). (Emphasis supplied.)
In its Resolution30 of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially
reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February 2005. They were convinced that
Arceli is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section
13(g).31 However, they denied the Motion for Reconsideration with respect to
Felix Ma and the rest of his children.32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and Valeriano filed the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532.
They sought the nullification of the issuances of the public respondents, to
wit: (1) the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, ordering the summary
deportation of the petitioners, issuance of a warrant of deportation against
them, inclusion of their names in the Immigration Blacklist, and exclusion of
the petitioners from the Philippines; and (2) the Resolution dated 8 April
2005, denying the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition 33 after
finding that the petitioners "failed to comply with the exacting standards of
the law providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in
the Philippines either as aliens or as its nationals."34
On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution35 denying the petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.
 To reiterate, a person’s continued and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, his being a registered voter or an elected public official cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file
the same with the nearest civil registry. The constitutional mandate
concerning citizenship must be adhered to strictly. Philippine citizenship can
never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. 36
Our Ruling
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) xxx;
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. 37
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the
manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in
a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest
civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
 In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D.
Ching,38 we determined the meaning of the period of election described by
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority." Our references were the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the
case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice.39 We pronounced:
x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced
upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.40 In the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship,
this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. 41 The phrase "reasonable
time" has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 42 However, we held in
Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice,43 that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
time after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option to
elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite.
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923.
He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was
made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age,
or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear
that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority. 44
 We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,45 a case in which
we adopted the findings of the appellate court that the father of the
petitioner, whose citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine
citizenship within the reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the
age of majority; and that "the belated submission to the local civil registry of
the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance x x x was defective because
the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the
delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not
satisfactorily explained."46

In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they

belatedly complied with all the requirements. The acts of election
and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all done
beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age
of majority.

The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners

complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the
civil registry that was belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to
elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to
complete the statutory requirements for such election.

Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in

line with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare, 47 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives,48 and Re:Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching.49
 In Mallare, Esteban’s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age was deemed to be a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.50 The Court of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot
support herein petitioners’ cause, pointing out that, unlike petitioner,
Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence, no other act would be
necessary to confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino
citizen,51 and that Esteban was born in 192952 prior to the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625. 53

In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of
suffrage, as he established his life here in the Philippines. 54 Again, such
circumstance, while similar to that of herein petitioners’, was not appreciated
because it was ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of
Ong would have resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had already
elected Philippine citizenship for him55 as, apparently, while he was still a
minor, a certificate of naturalization was issued to his father. 56
In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for
admission to the Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the requirements, to
wit: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry were
complied with only fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority.
Ching offered no reason for the late election of Philippine citizenship. 57
In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners’ argument of good
faith and "informal election" unacceptable and held:
Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application for Admission to
the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was decided on 1 October
1999], is obviously flawed. It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court, in
said case, did not adopt the doctrine laid down in In Re: Florencio Mallare.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court was emphatic in pronouncing that "the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. 58
 We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being
elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines,
and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the
place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in
petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the
registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be
allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine
citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice
to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the
election of Philippine citizenship.
For what purpose is registration?

In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,59 we elucidated the principles of civil law

on registration:
To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities
are unanimous on the meaning of the term "to register" as "to enter in a
register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list." 60 In
general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry,
including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to
the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the
right of ownership and other real rights.61Simply stated, registration is made
for the purpose of notification.62

Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the

person who has knowledge thereof. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice
thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or
instrument to others."63 As pertinent is the holding that registration "neither
adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one
between the parties."64 It lays emphasis on the validity of an unregistered
document.
Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.
 In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is
to give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract does not
affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons;
and that neither does such failure affect the partnership’s juridical
personality.65 An unregistered contract of partnership is valid as among the
partners, so long as it has the essential requisites, because the main
purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be
assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their
contract.66 The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its
validity. Registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as
between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third
persons.67
Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode
of acquiring a right. In an analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of
sale, we reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring
dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with
notice to the world at large.68
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the
instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is
not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has
been claimed.
Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of
marriage.69 Thus, has it been admitted through existing rules that the late
registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth.
Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the
failure to have the marriage certificate registered with the designated
government agency.
 Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the
Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity
to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their
identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as
Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners
can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon
reaching the age of reason.
Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of
Appeals that since the ACR presented by the petitioners are no longer valid
on account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are
deemed not properly documented.70 On the contrary, petitioners should not
be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with
the election of citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts
made public, among others, their exercise of suffrage, election as public
official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth.
The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners’
election of Philippine citizenship.
The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of
Filipino mothers have been indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that
liberalized the requirement on time of election, and recognized positive acts
of Philippine citizenship.
The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the
evolution of the constitutional provision on Philippine citizenship.
Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino
mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of
majority,71 upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically
become Filipinos72 and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. The 1973 provision reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) xxx.
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 73
Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution
now classifies them as natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine
citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:
 Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof 74 shall be deemed natural-
born citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission.
MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.
xxxx
x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935
Constitution merely gave them the option to choose Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if the father were an
alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under the 1973 Constitution,
children of mixed marriages involving an alien father and a Filipino mother
are Filipino citizens, thus liberalizing the counterpart provision in the 1935
Constitution by dispensing with the need to make a declaration of intention
upon reaching the age of majority. I understand that the committee would
further liberalize this provision of the 1935 Constitution. The Committee
seemingly proposes to further liberalize the policy of the 1935 Constitution
by making those who became citizens of the Philippines through a
declaration of intention to choose their mother’s citizenship upon reaching
the majority age by declaring that such children are natural-born citizens of
the Philippines.75
xxxx
xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973
Constitution and not that of the 1935? 76
xxxx
 FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the modification of the
1935 rule on citizenship was a recognition of the fact that it reflected a
certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of remedying that this
proposed provision was put in. The idea was that we should not penalize the
mother of a child simply because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the
question on what citizenship the child would prefer arises. We really have no
way of guessing the preference of the infant. But if we recognize the right of
the child to choose, then let him choose when he reaches the age of
majority. I think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we
have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control. But certainly it
is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine government to require that [at] a
certain point, a child be made to choose. But I do not think we should
penalize the child before he is even able to choose. I would, therefore,
support the retention of the modification made in 1973 of the male
chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution.77
xxxx
MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino citizen
by election, which the Committee is now planning to consider a natural-born
citizen, he will be so the moment he opts for Philippine citizenship. Did the
Committee take into account the fact that at the time of birth, all he had was
just an inchoate right to choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by
subsequently choosing Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his choice
retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that under the Gentleman’s
proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born citizen? 78
FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-born who
lost his status is that the natural-born who lost his status, lost it voluntarily;
whereas, this individual in the situation contemplated in Section 1,
paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose.79
xxxx
[on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship]
MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important because
his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but
a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him to run for Congress, to be a
Justice of the Supreme Court x x x.80
 We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973
Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-
born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the
omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents
of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine
citizenship.1avvphi1
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of
the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine
citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the
civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the
permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements
may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting
their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry,
although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the
appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other
requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of
the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied
with within a reasonable time.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution

dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532
affirming the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8
April 2005 of the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-
STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma.
Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice within which to COMPLY
with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in its
Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that
all requirements, including the payment of their financial obligations to the
state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the
petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
 JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
 08/07/2014
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.
 
QUIASON, J.:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this
Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in
these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R.
No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated since they principally involve
the same issues and parties.

I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed
by the Republic of the Philippines:
 (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted
private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and

(2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on

February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization

captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as
a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-
23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition

for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order
and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation,
for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least
six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the
posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set

Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention to run for
public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing
the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled
hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be
moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein
the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order
was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the

sole witness. He submitted the following documentary evidence:
 (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued
by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A");
(2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition
(Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club
with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of
Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City
(Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-
Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private
respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization
issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the
assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO,

is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a
natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit

Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that
the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a
new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor
General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. 105715

 This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of
the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R.
Lee against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private
respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which
dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition
sought to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of
the Province of Sorsogon.

Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong

Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the
May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same
position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the

proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of
Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that
private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being
questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent
is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in
favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the
basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.

On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution

which dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, citing Section
19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling
of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or
proceedings was three days.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue of private
respondent’s disqualification in the guise of technicality.
 Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name in the
list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at
the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private
respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before
us.

Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent’s

proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of
private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for the position of
governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining
votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private respondent; (4) the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from
taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification
case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.

G.R. No. 105735

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with
prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with
the parties

in G.R. No. 105715.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate resolution
of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for the cancellation of private
respondent’s certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H.
Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
 The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an
American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the position
of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court’s decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal
infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the decision to be
valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same
day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530,
which provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance
can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on
February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of
the last publication of the order and petition.

The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s

certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of
registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.

In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent

denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not
being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was
aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-
admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3)
that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.

Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private

respondent’s certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the
petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before
election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878
(1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be
summarily decided (Rollo,
p. 50).
 The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired
his Filipino citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet
final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of
disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said
petition was filed out of time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied
much of its time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-
016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the
period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that
the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed
before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo
warranto proceedings sought private respondent’s disqualification because of
his American citizenship.

II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent’s
citizenship.
In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him
Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent alleges that the
precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled
him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce
his Philippine citizenship.

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available
remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
 He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that
repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino
women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to
foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a
bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the
maneuvers of his political rivals.

He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to

an earlier date, without publication, was made without objection from the
Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the
hearing, the court was jam-packed.

It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial

compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of his petition
for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the
taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes that
the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an
opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the
grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so.

In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be

dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-
known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a
former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an
anomaly.
 Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship
thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to
follow the procedure prescribed by the said law.

It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the

requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case
and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance
value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly
a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a
special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former
Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her
Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the
decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void
for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the
Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization
and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter
and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an
anomaly.
 Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship
thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to
follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even
sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are
inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was
never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of
her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the
decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void
for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the
Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization
and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205
SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and
the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v.
Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by

Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly:
(1) that the petitioner is of good moral character;
(2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten
years;
(3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the
principal dialects;
(4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of
the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and
 (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from
said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least

two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of
private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law.

Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate

of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled
date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of
hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication
of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the
finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-
year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only

after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General
is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy
of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195
[1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship
in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from
its promulgation in order to be able to observe if:
(1) the applicant has left the country;
(2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling
or profession;
 (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
government promulgated rules; and
(4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of
the country or contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot
implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization before its
finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is
not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715
after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition
for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC,
dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private
respondent’s proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and
composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance
with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino
citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that
private respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed
the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for
questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of
R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the
disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed Governor on grounds
of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo
warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we
held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondent’s title and
seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not
covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer’s entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged."
 Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the
electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the
Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to
public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted
for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally
reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of
private respondent be considered stray and that he, being the candidate
obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo,
Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified to
hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See
also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil.
238 [1912]).
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715,
we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715
are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED.
Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same
to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes
final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 08/07/2014
HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners, vs. THE
CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA and any person having or claiming an
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Hubert
Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co seeking to reverse and set aside the
Order[1] dated September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26, dismissing their petition for correction of entries in the Civil
Register.  Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Order dated
April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the said order.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974.  His sister, Arlene Tan Co,
was born on May 19, 1975.  In their respective certificates of birth, it is
stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are
Chinese citizens.

Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a

citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270.  His application was granted and he was
conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1055.  The Chairman of the Committee issued on February 15, 1977
Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor.  Thus, on February 15,
1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen.  In the meantime,
Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned their respective degrees in
architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.

On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of entries in
their certificates of birth.  The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No.
98-90470.  They alleged, inter alia, in their petition that:
 (3) They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate children of CO
BOON PENG;
(4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, was conferred
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under Presidential Decree No. 1055
and had taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
15th February, 1977 in the City of Manila;
(5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO BOON
PENG was still a Chinese citizen that is why entry in their respective birth
certificates as to their father’s citizenship was Chinese;

(6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon

Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in the Philippines and still
minors at that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of
naturalization.  

Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act

No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535 which provides:
“Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof;”

(7) The naturalization of petitioners’ father in 1977 was an act

or event affecting and concerning their civil status that must be
recorded in the Civil Register, Article 407 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides:
“Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the Civil Register.” [2]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, the trial court
render judgment correcting and changing the entries in their respective birth
certificates as to the citizenship of their father Co Boon Peng, from “Chinese”
to “Filipino.”[3]
 On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an order dismissing
the petition outright on the ground that the petition was insufficient, solely
because the petitioners’ father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under
LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under
PD No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.  [4]

The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the assailed order

arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were designed to grant citizenship
to deserving aliens; hence, should be construed together.  They averred that
the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473 should also be granted to the
petitioners whose father was granted naturalization under LOI No. 270. 

 However, the RTC issued an Order on April 27, 1999, denying their
motion for reconsideration for the following reasons:  (a) although
Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter of Instructions No. 270 are statutes
relating to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial
effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant.  Section 15 of CA
No. 473 expressly provides for the effect of the naturalization on the wife
and children of the applicant while LOI No. 270 does not have any proviso to
that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers to qualified individuals only.  The
rules and regulations promulgated by the Committee established pursuant to
LOI No. 270 and the amendments issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (LOI Nos. 292 and 491) clearly speak of qualified individuals only; no
proviso therein referred to its effect on the wife and children of the
individual; (c) Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be deemed and
incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the application of the
so-called “pari materia” rule of construction made by the petitioners is
misplaced, as what should be applied in the instant case is the rule on strict
construction of legislative grants or franchise.  The court a quo stressed that
legislative grants, whether they be of property, rights or privileges, whether
granted to corporations or individuals, must be strictly construed against the
grantee and in favor of the grantor.

Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing the court a
quo’s Order dismissing their petition outright and its Order denying their
motion for the reconsideration of the same.
 The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding that their
petition was insufficient.  They assert that contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, they are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473,
which provides that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who
were born in the Philippines shall likewise be considered citizens
thereof.  They contend that although LOI No. 270, under which the
petitioners’ father was naturalized does not contain a provision similar to
Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter provision should be deemed
incorporated therein.  

They point out that both laws have the same purpose and objective,
i.e., to grant Philippine citizenship to qualified aliens permanently residing in
the Philippines.  The petitioners invoke the rule that statutes in pari
materia are to be read together.[5] They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No.
270 should be harmonized and reconciled since “all statutes relating to the
same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in
connection with it, and should be construed together as they constitute one
law.”[6]

The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No.
270 was to grant the privilege of Philippine citizenship not only to
qualified aliens but also to their minor children who were born in the
country. 

 They assert that this is apparent from paragraph 4-A thereof, which
extends the option to adopt Filipino names not only to qualified applicants
for naturalization but also to their wives and minor children.  They submit
that when then President Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must
be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of CA No. 473 and
did not intend to abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section
15 thereof; otherwise, Pres. Marcos would have expressly repealed Section
15 of CA No. 473 in relation to LOI No. 270.  
 Thus, according to the petitioners, the naturalization of their
father during their minority is an act or event affecting their civil
status that must be recorded in the Civil Register pursuant to Article
407 of the Civil Code.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the court a

quo did not err in issuing the assailed orders.  Contrary to the petitioners’
theory, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are separate and distinct laws;
therefore, are not in pari materia.  He points out that although LOI No. 270
and CA No. 473 both govern the naturalization of aliens, CA No. 473 deals
with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by judicial decree;
LOI No. 270, on the other hand, deals with the requirements and procedure
for naturalization by presidential decree.

The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners’ contention

that the naturalization of their father is an event affecting and concerning
their civil status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has no legal
basis.  The correction sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court must be one that reflects a fact existing before or at the time of
birth.  In the petitioners’ case, the naturalization of their father in 1977 took
place long after they were born.  Moreover, according to the Solicitor
General, under LOI No. 270 and its amendatory laws, the naturalization of a
father did not ipso facto render his children also naturalized.  The petitioners
thus cannot invoke Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court to avoid strict compliance with the naturalization laws.

The petition is meritorious.

The rule on statutory construction provides that:
Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together
because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are
supplementary or complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislations on the subject and to have enacted its new act with reference
thereto.[7]
 Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the
purpose of an expressed national policy, thus:

On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it

has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is
held that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the
new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in
those prior statutes, and they all should be construed together.  

Provisions in an act which are omitted  in another act relating to the

same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act,
when not inconsistent with its purpose.  Prior statutes relating to the same
subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions; and if possible
by reasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect is given to
every provision of each.  Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent
conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with
each other.[8]

LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of
qualified aliens residing in the Philippines.  While they provide for different
procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI
No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have
the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing
in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for
and loyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture,
tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the
economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be
integrated into the national fabric by being granted Filipino
citizenship.
 Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by
naturalization is more expeditious, less cumbersome and less
expensive.  The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are
able to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to
contribute to the cultural, social and political well- being of the country and
its people.
 Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly
posit, statutes in pari materia.  Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of
CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter
law as an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose.  

Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473,[9] which extends the grant of

Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder,
should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under
LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.

It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate

of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine
citizenship.  They are likewise mandated to prove the following material
allegations in their petition:  
(a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
(b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,
(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as
a Filipino citizen;

The petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as

amended, is appropriate.  Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry
in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.  The
law does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed.  But the
Court approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to
implement the law.[10] The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil
Code are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 407.  Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
Art. 408.  The following shall be entered in the civil register:
 (1)  Births;  (2) Marriages;  (3) deaths;  (4) legal separations;  (5)
annulments of marriage;  (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning;  (7) legitimations;  (8) adoptions;  (9) acknowledgments of
natural children;  (10) naturalization;  (11) loss, or  (12) recovery of
citizenship;  (13) civil interdiction;  (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and  (16) changes of name.
Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status
but also nationality.[11] The acts, events or factual errors envisaged in Article
407 of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the
petitioner.  However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will
not be corrected or changed.  The decision of the court granting the petition
shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil
register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. [12]

To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the

faults or error from.”  To change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.  Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind
of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the
effect that the correction or change may be.[13] Such entries include not only
those clerical in nature but also substantial errors.  After all, the role of the
Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about
the facts recorded therein.[14]

The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the
entries in the civil register sought to be corrected are clerical or innocuous in
nature.  However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed are
substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the
citizenship of their parents,[15] the proceedings are adversarial in nature as
defined by this Court in Republic v. Valencia, thus:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it.  Excludes an adoption proceeding.[16]
 In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective
defendants are (a) the local civil registrar; and, (b) all persons who have
claims any interest which would be affected thereby. [17]

In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the
legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese
national.  In view of their father’s naturalization, they pray that the entries
in their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their father be
changed from “Chinese” to “Filipino.”

The petitioners’ recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court, as amended, being appropriate, it behooved the trial court to do its
duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:
Sec. 4.  Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the
petition.  The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing the
petition or issue an order granting the same.  In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in the certificates of birth of the petitioners.  The
judgment of the court shall form part of the records of the local civil register.
[18]

In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in violation
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.  Patently, then, the trial court erred in so
doing.
 IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.  The
assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are SET
ASIDE and REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the petition
in Special Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and ORDERED to
continue with the proceedings in the said case under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,concur.
 08/07/2014
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION, petitioners, 
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court.

Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations

engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the people’s rights to
self-governance and justice.

Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the

President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments
including those of Supreme Court Justices.

Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment

would fill up the vacancy in this Court.

Petitioners allege that:

On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation
of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of
respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported
the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.

On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the
appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in
view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S.
Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been
cancelled by the Office of the President.
 On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that
respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there
except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC)."

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to

respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently
unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this

fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth
certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add,
reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his
father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.

Petitioners invoke the Constitution:

 Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2
of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine Citizenship."1

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years

after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship
by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks

for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the
Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the
civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth
certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the
fact that Ong’s citizenship at birth is Chinese.

Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long
as Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar
Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth
certificate.2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong’s

new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over
the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is
a natural-born Filipino.
 They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not
have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that
respondent Ong’s old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a
natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ong’s remedy is an action to
correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.

Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling

the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be
issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain
respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of
respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming
the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court.

The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.

Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment,
essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant
to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution,
thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.

Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed

respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by
and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of
the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment,
however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of
respondent Ong’s citizenship."3 To date, however, the JBC has not received
the referral.

Supporting the President’s action and respondent Ong’s qualifications,

respondent Executive Secretary submits that:
 1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed
a person, duly nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the appointee’s
qualifications.
2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by
the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice, which
have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of
citizenship.
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-
born citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order. 4
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to
file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the
JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of
those it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his
view failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one
who extended the appointment.

As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one

Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was
allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that
these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a
result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that
time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a
Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the
daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen,
who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondent’s mother was a
Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when
respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng,
was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his
mother were included in the naturalization.
 Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:
I. PETITIONERS’ LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT
SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES
TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE
FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER
MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO
MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE
AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY
PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH
FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY
THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM
"INDIOS."
IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO
JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO
BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO.
 V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL
AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A
DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG,
AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E.,
IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT
RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING
NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE
POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. 7

Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted

their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this
Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of
transcendental importance.

They claim that the President’s appointment of respondent Ong as

Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ong’s birth certificate, unless
corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is
binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that
respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father
when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The petition has merit.

First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as

people’s organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification
– nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this Court.
Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances. 10
 Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary
party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary
who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his
Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from
extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing
it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.

Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent

Ong’s qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of
primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate.
As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims
under the Constitution,11 the Court is the proper forum for resolving the
issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.

Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case – is respondent Ong a

natural-born Filipino citizen?

On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of

respondent Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E.

No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that
date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is
a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese
citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of
eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of
his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and
the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate12 states that he
was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a
Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese
citizen.

Specifically, the following appears in the records:

PETITION
 COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court
respectfully states:
1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26
years of age, having been born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to
spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the
Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked
as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other
than natural born, state how and when citizenship was acquired and attach
the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father)
See Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
xxx
VERIFICATION
Republic of the Philippines )
City of Manila ) S.S.
I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I
am the petitioner in the foregoing petition; that the same was prepared by
me and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein are true
to my knowledge.
(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of August, 1979,
City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No.
A-___________, issued at ________________, on __________________,
19__.
 (Sgd.)
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1979
PTR No. 3114917
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM
 Doc. No. 98;
Page No. 10;
Book No. VIII;
Series of 1979.13
In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant,
wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979 stating that in
connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he
has to submit:
1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and
2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the
Solicitor General.

Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.

It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take
the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent

Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition
of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father.

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or

correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order,
and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and
evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to
the contrary admitted.15
 Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth
certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to
the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should,
therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.16

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the

nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births, marriages and
deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper
judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos,
respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still
appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of
proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the
time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing
so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed

against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from
accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office,
until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the
appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 08/07/2014
RENALD F. VILANDO, G.R. Nos.  192147
           Petitioner,   & 192149
   
  Present:
   
  CORONA,* C.J.,
  CARPIO,
  VELASCO, JR.,*
  LEONARDO-DE
- versus - CASTRO,*
  BRION,*
  PERALTA,
  BERSAMIN,
         DEL CASTILLO,
  ABAD,* * 
  VILLARAMA, JR.,
  PEREZ,
HOUSE OF MENDOZA,  
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL SERENO, and
TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY REYES, JJ.
LIMKAICHONG AND HON.  
SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES,  
                                   Respon  
dents.  
Promulgated:
   August 23, 2011
  
X
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-X
 
DECISION
 
MENDOZA, J.:
 
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the March 24, 2010 Decision[1] of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo
warranto and declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy
Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and its
Resolution[2] dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.
 
                  
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental.  She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. 
 
On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No.
8062[3] issued onMay 18, 2007. 
 
On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of
Representatives.
 
Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the
proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC)which reached the Court. 
 
 The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against
Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120); [4] Olivia
Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);[5] and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-
41).[6]  These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for
certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint
Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases
against her.
 
On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of
Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the
three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before
the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto. 
 
 On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F.
Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of t
congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo
Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET.  These petitions were
consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and
the same respondent.  Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese
citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed.  They
alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had
not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of
Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.  Also, they invoked the
jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s
citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of
the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

          For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-

born Filipino citizen.  She averred that the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already
attained the status of res judicata.  Further, she claimed that the validity
of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.
 
          On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and
declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives. Pertinent portions of the HRET decision reads:
          
                    By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of
proof to sustain their theory that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen and therefore not qualified as Representative of the First District,
Negros Oriental.  This being so, their petitions must fail.
 
            WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant petition for
lack of merit and declares that respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is not
disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the
First District, Negros Oriental.
 
            As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of
copies thereof shall be sent to the President of the Philippines, the House of
Representatives through the Speaker, the Commission on Audit through the
Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Chairman, Commission on Elections, for his information and appropriate
action.
 
                        SO ORDERED.[7]
 
          The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision,
but it was denied by the HRET in its Resolution dated May 17, 2010.
 
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando anchored on the
following
 
GROUNDS:
         
THE ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR
QUO WARRANTO AND THE UTTER FAILURE OF THE HRET TO
DISQUALIFY LIMKAICHONG AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE MANIFEST EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS NOT
A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IS WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS
AND ARBITRARY BECAUSE:
 
  
1.      THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE
AS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF LIMKAICHONG’S
FATHER FOR THE REASON THAT HER FATHER’S CERTIFICATE OF
NATURALIZATION IS OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT FROM THE VERY
BEGINNING, HENCE, THERE IS ACTUALLY NOTHING BEING
ATTACKED OR ASSAILED BY THE SAME.
 
2.      LIMKAICHONG CANNOT DERIVE PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP FROM HER MOTHER GIVEN THAT AT THE TIME OF HER
BIRTH, HER MOTHER IS NOT ALREADY A FILIPINO CITIZEN AS A
RESULT OF HER MARRIAGE TO HER FATHER AS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER SECTION 1 (7) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 2 (1) CHAPTER II OF THE CHINESE REVISED
NATIONALITY LAW OFFEBRUARY 5, 1959.
 
3.      HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE, AMONG OTHERS, THE
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITY OF
LIMKAICHONG EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD
MEAN LOOKING INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
NATURALIZATION.[8]
 
It should be noted that Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative
of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30,
2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold
office has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her
term.  Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.
[9]
 Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.
 
 Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening
event, in a sense, has also rendered this case moot and academic.  A moot
and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or
dismiss it on ground of mootness. [10]
 
          Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the
House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. [11]  For
this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the
merits.  This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a
question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is “capable of repetition, yet
evading review.”[12] The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to
recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable
of repetition.
 
          In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed
no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to
sit as Member of the House of Representatives. 
 
          Vilando’s argument, that the quo warranto petition does not
operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father as
the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid
of merit.
In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground
that she is a Chinese citizen.  To prove his point, he makes reference to the
alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which,
however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the
citizenship of the father.

 In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be

done through a direct action for its nullity.[13]  
The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father
should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.  As
held inLimkaichong v. Comelec,[14] thus:
 As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,[15] where the Court of First
Instance judge motu propio and not in the proper denaturalization
proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization
(who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their
certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held
that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the
proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or
otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the
court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked
in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth
Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper
provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these
officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s
descendant.
         
Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of
Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the
certificate of naturalization. 
 
True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions,
specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of
citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its Members.  This constitutional power is likewise echoed in
the 2004 Rules of the HRET.  Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus:
 
           Rule 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the House of Representatives.
 
Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET.[16]  The power granted to HRET by the Constitution
is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally
in the legislature.[17] Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in
any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.[18]
 
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does
not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.  To rule otherwise
would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as
already stated, is not permissible.  The HRET properly resolved the issue
with the following ratiocination:
 
            xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father –
Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present case.  The Tribunal may not
dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the father if only to
pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office.
 
            Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said
issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of
the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the
Congress. 
 
Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the
naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the
ascendant of respondent.  A petition for quo warranto is not a means to
achieve that purpose.  To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding
will not only be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation of due process on the part
of the persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this case. [19]
 
 Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that “a collateral
attack against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is
void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own
recitals.”[20] Under the present situation, there is no evidence to show that
the judgment is void on its face:

As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and

September 21, 1959 that were offered in evidence, far from proving an
invalid oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization, being public
records, they do in fact constitute legitimate source of authority for the
conferment of status of the father of respondent as naturalized
Filipino.  Absent any contrary declaration by a competent court, the Tribunal
presumes the validity of the CFI Orders of July 9, 1957 andSeptember 21,
1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sy’s acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect.  The oath of
allegiance and certificate of naturalization are themselves proofs of the
actual conferment of naturalization.[21]
 
          The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of
validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of
First Instance (CFI)Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared
Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
         
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born
in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.  The governing law is the
citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof,
reads:
 
Article IV
 
          Section 1.  The following are citizens of the Philippines:
           
            xxx
           
            (3)  Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
 
             (4)  Those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and,   upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.        
 
xxx
 
          Indubitably, with Limkaichong’s father having been conferred
the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen
born to a Filipino father. 
 
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the
subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a
Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that
Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:  
 
                   Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of
those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section
1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the
father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization.  Therefore,
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935
Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the
requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
 
Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support
in paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
 
                    Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine
citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was a natural-born
Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect
citizenship informally when she reached majority age.  Respondent
participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976,
accomplished voter’s affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was
elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004.  These are positive
acts of election of Philippine citizenship.  The case of In re: Florencio Mallare,
elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably
showing a definite choice.  We note that respondent had informally elected
citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution
considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.  The 1987 Constitution provisions,
i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an
alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen,
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred natural-born
status.  It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat
equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.  Thus, those who would elect Philippine
citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are
now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos.  The
following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:
 
 
Article IV
 
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
 
(1)   Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
 
(2)  Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
  
(3)   Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
 
(4)  Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 
Section 2.  Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship.  Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.[22]
 
 
Vilando’s assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine
citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen
when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the
Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959,  must likewise fail.
 
          As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer
in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of
Nationality to prove that Limkaichong’s mother indeed lost her Philippine
citizenship.  Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent
and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling. 
 
          Also, an application for an alien certificate of
registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine
citizenship.  It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit:
 
           An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who
declares that he is not a Filipino citizen.  It is obtained only when applied
for.  It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a declaration by
the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and physical
details that identify the applicant.  It bears no indication of basis for foreign
citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship.  It certifies that a
person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that
such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950 or other special law.  It is only evidence of
registration.
 
            Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The
Civil Register Law), and much less like other public records referred to under
Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a public
document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained
therein.  On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself
or herself to registration.  Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of
the declarant.  This is especially so where the declarant has in fact been a
natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status as such. [23]
 
Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount
to a repudiation of her original citizenship.  Neither did it result in an
acquisition of alien citizenship.  In a string of decisions, this Court has
consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien
certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine
citizenship.[24] For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship,
the same must be express.[25] Such express renunciation is lacking in this
case.
 
          Accordingly, Limkaichong’s mother, being a Filipino citizen, can
transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
 
 
 Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are
beyond judicial interference.  The only instance where this Court may
intervene in the exercise of  its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a
determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to
constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very
clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.[26]  In this case,
there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence.  The HRET
acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo
warranto petition.
 
         
In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the
HRET which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.
 
          WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court
affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong
is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing
the First District, Negros Oriental.
 08/07/2014
AZNAR vs COMELEC

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed
the petition for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed
his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-
PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he
is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation
submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is
an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-
21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at
Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu
Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in
favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of
the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order
the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
 At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner
presented the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is
an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the
Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21,
1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of
private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter
the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate
of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino
citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a
Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder
of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since
birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-
108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of
Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest
number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor
of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the
petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of
sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications
of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides
that:
 'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the
election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for
disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the
petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period
required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said
petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also
be treated as a petition for quo warrantounder Section 253 of the same
Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent
was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the
respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which
he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly
on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
 Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen
and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office
of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and
convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to
present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these
are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation
of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of
the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen
of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that
private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given
clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required
by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino
citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American
under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that
private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship.
As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this
fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No.
87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No.
86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.
 In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in
the United States but claimed that he was forced to embrace American
citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos
government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness
unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon
their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to
an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in
1976, per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in
the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In
fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines,
therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon
and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by
their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total
allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having
taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously
participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus,
private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed.
 In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the
fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an
American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second
in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not
follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and
an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or
certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does
not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student
simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y,
presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not
necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of
Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth
to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true
that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned
upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually
existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of
such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said
law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the
Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice
Sarmiento.
Cortes, J., concur in the result.
 Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
SARMIENTO, J.,  concurring:
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired
American citizenship, only that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino
citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how he obtained
American citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization,
he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1,
1989). If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus
soli it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose
his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to
be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a
citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act
No. 63. The fact that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration,
standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.,  dissenting:
I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R.
Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of
birth, a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some
point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of
citizenship.
 That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the
age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration.
Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that
one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to
so register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could
have, under the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien
Certificates and abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public
office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of
an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not
be awaited for one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.
 
CRUZ, J.,  dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he
is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien"
are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what
really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen
of the local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its
own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A.
No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such
renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the
United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the
case of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989,
the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia
but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was not a
Filipino.
 The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also
invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a
separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily
dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and
different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second
marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The
undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he has
totally and solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he
protests he married a second time simply for material convenience and that
his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would
reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines
after renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and
equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the
repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this
attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple
hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization
is involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the
Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is:
Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882,
January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has
expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is
in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of
losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act
with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the
"commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did
not ask the Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmeña
did.
 It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply
seeking and using an American passport, these acts could not have by
themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The
problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience.
What he actually did was register with the Philippine government as an alien
within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the
jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a
citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien.
Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he
categorically asked the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an
American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was
willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation
of Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental
words are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the
preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar,
Philippine citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can
never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that
must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest
resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive
mother demanding total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough
that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what is worse
is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own territory at that,
and offers his total devotion to the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmeña to improve the
province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov.
Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective
jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to
maintain in public office any person who, although supported by the
electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot
ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.
  
PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario
Renner Osmeña enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and
U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an
American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien
registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine
immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go
Callano 1 express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship
holder-like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act,
voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino
citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation
of desire to be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine
immigration authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re-
enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and
Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980
(Exh E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration
authorities to the private respondent at his request are predicated on the
proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It
should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at
bar, private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born
Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from
Immigration records). This document, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a
duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.
 Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for
Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January
1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein
private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The
importance of this document cannot be underestimated For, if private
respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed
said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino
citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that
private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant proof that
he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a resident
alien (American) in the Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had
already registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the
Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days
after the approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those
residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case
of those residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal
treasurers, or at any other office designated by the
President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988,
private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391
on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in
the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24
years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering
under oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent
thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was
an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and
under its laws.
 At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a
clarification should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p.
81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in
1934 — hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as
an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as
an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration
records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption
that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and
that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is
erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20
years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years
old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in
my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1)
at that time, he was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more
importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14
years or over has to register in person (and not through his parents or
guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen
years of age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he
shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1,
par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual
nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to
be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late) made the
notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship
had been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the
Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention
that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not
renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation
were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines.
In turn the Philippine Government, through the immigration authorities,
accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and
registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
 The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to
discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a
necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2)
different countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among
others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance,
must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in this
country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long
run would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons might
claim to be citizens. 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now
provides —
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While
having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or other factors
accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one
time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many
ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and
sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and
certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and
Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable
phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to
international conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of
citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it
impairs the singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship
and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality,
and this choice should be honored by all countries. However, he should not
be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
 Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he
asked the Philippine Government which, like many other countries, considers
dual allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least
twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That
choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice
must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning,
distinguished and respected person who must be presumed to have known
the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is
inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565
(Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.) I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In
fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private
respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a
citizen of the United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to
the private respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S.
citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a
Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander.
The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not
on distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private
respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of
such citizenship.
 
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,  dissenting:
My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al.
(G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989) andRamon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on
Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I
cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my
relative by affinity, within the fourth civil degree.
 08/07/2014
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000.  August 9, 2000]
CIRILO R. VALLES,  petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July
17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed
by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines  Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian.  In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well.  She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental.  In 1992, she ran for and was
elected governor of Davao Oriental.  Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No.
92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
citizenship.  However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had
renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
 “A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned
resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs
of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her
own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the
perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
 On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important
documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm
the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not
a Filipino.  Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship
under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequence.  The evidence adduced by
petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent
contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship”. [1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for
re-election as governor of Davao Oriental.  Her opponent, Francisco Rabat,
filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the
COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said
petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its
decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an
issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental  in the May
11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner,
Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a
Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
 “Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to
dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table
definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to
disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066.  The present
petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed
upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the
Resolution of EPC No. 92-54.  Not having put forth any new evidence and
matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently
provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
 “WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters
and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation
to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in
EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
 SO ORDERED.”[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail.  The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en
banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public
office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by
virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the
1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby
making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified
to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the
COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring
her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao
Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is
an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
 Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship.  He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia;
and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to
disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her
Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the
Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did
not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino
citizen.  According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for
repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent
to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since
the private respondent was not legally repatriated.  Coupled with her alleged
renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively
become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public
office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in
applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing
the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,[3] that:
“xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered  as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx”
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis.  Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine
of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of  place
of birth.
 Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934
in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian.  Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country.  These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as
the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of
the Philippine islands.   The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens
as:
SEC. 4 xxx  all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
 SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided  in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country:  Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring
ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.  Private respondent’s father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a
fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of
Births.  Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen.  By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established
the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
 (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 [4] and
1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.  The fact of
her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship.  If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession
of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine
citizenship.  To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent’s
application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to
her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign  country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue
of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
 In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express.  Petitioner’s contention that the application of
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit.  This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar
vs. COMELEC[6] and in the more recent case ofMercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact
that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American
passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship
and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship.  For renunciation
to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. [8] As
held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien
certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one’s citizenship.  The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts
of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same.  Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was
an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino
parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing one’s Philippine citizenship.  Since private respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must
go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
 Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private
respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor
of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
 “SEC. 40.  Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
 (d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx”
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified
“dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the
same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.
[9]
 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing
any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained
that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance.  The Court succinctly pronounced:
 “xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d)  and in
R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual
allegiance’.  Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.”
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.  Furthermore, it
was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. [10] The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. [11] This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto.  Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.  Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
 Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,
duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia on May 12, 1992.  And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the
Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by
Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in
Manila.  As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were
enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no
water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue
in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding
challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration.[12] He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the
issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,[13] an
exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case
that in order that the doctrine of res judicatamay be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
 Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya  Lim
Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship.  It
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official
findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.
[14]
 Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved
the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The
evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented
in these two prior cases.  Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions.  However,
the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition
cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA
No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified
to run for governor of Davao Oriental.  No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.
 08/07/2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE
YU, petitioner, 
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR
PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES
and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
 
PADILLA,  J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas
corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from
detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the
Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on
behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the
return. 2Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July
1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file
memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case
to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the
petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1)
jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of
warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining

order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved
to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further
resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated
28 November 1988. 5
 Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for
restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift
TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of
deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2
December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument
on 8 December 1988.

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary

detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on
15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the
TRO.

The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on

7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was
ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu
pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December
1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13
December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for
release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument
dated 8 December 1988. 12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on

7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13 and the vigorous opposition
to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to
give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice
within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen
of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport.  15
 Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December
1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary
release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her
comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order.
Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.

Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a

Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the
same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February
1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese
Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the
Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai
Shun Estate Ltd.20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered

together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese
citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented
himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship
is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
 This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the
Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this
Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that
petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material
facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by
petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and
superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was
given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine
citizenship, but he has failed.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced

his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in
adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less,
upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself
on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were

to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then
resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other
motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from

detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining
order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.