Tomlinson

Conscious Reflection and Implicit Learning in Teacher Preparation.
Part I: Recent Light on an

Old Issue
Author(s): Peter Tomlinson
Source: Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 405-424
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OxfordReviewofEducation,Vol. 25, No. 3, 1999 ;
Conscious Reflection and Implicit Learning in

Teacher Preparation. Part I: recent light on an old
issue
PETER TOMLINSON
ABSTRACT In spiteof critiquesby philosophers fromRyle throughto Dreyfus,the

assumption that acquisitionand exercise of intelligentcapabilityrequiresconscious
contemplation has remained powerful in teachereducation,apparently sustainedbyrecent
emphases on teacher thinking, and
influences Schon'spromotion
cognitive-constructivist
of in
reflection professionallearning.In thisfirstoftwo linkedpapersI drawattentionto
recentempiricalworkand connectionist modelling within as
psychology addingstrong
supportand furtherarticulation to thesetraditionalcritiquesby way of evidencinga
powerfulroleofimplicit learningin theacquisition ofcapability.Thisin turnprompts a
re-examination oftheprocedural-declarative/knowing how--knowing thatdistinction
and
a considerationofsomeofthemanywaysin whichimplicit and explicit
processing
may
be involvedin the deployment of humancapability.A secondpaper to appear in the
Decemberissue of thisjournal will considerimplications of thisworkfor the initial
preparationof teachers.
INTRODUCTION
Although it is the past couple of decades that have seen the term reflection become
central to teacher education discourse across many countries, a central emphasis on
conscious thinkinghas arguablybeen one of the definingfeaturesof the whole post-war
tendency to construe the preparation of teachers as education rather than training.
Indeed, this emphasis seems rooted in a long-standingpsychological dualism which
narrows the notion of intelligentaction to that guided by conscious deliberation.The
present paper seeks to show how traditionalphilosophical critiques of this stance are
strengthenedsignificantly by recentresearchin implicitlearning,expertiseand connec-
tionistmodelling,but also how certaincentraldistinctionshave been prone to reductive
interpretation.A second, linked paper will propose that the combination of available
sources offersa more balanced and effectiveapproach to the preparationand develop-
ment of teachers.
1. CONSCIOUS REFLECTION FOR INTELLIGENT ACTION AND LEARN-

ING: THE PERSISTENCE OF DUALISM
The view of persons and human action which has long dominated Western culturewas
perhaps most famouslyarticulatedby GilbertRyle in his 1949 book The ConceptofMind,
as one holding that intelligent
actionrequiresdeliberatethought.The roots of this emphasis
ISSN 0305-4985 (print)/ISSN1465-3915 (online)/99/030405-20© 1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd

406 OxfordReviewofEducation
appear to go back a verylong way, at least to the dualism of Descartes and his medieval
forebears,which separated mind, the contemplativevehicle of thought,frombody, the
means of action. It persiststo this day, as indicated in recent research on developing
theories of mind (see for instance Subbotsky, 1996) and in other manifestations
suggested below. Although often simply assumed as 'common sense', when required,
its strongestrationale has been that where contextscan varyand thus pose any degree
of uncertainty,irregularity,complexity, unpredictability,as is clearly the case in
professional activitieslike teaching, then routine deployment of specific procedures
cannot on its own be expected to sufficeforthe achievementof purposes: 'what works'
depends on the dynamicallychangingcontext.That is, unpredictabilityposes problems
and problems require solving,which means conscious deliberation. Correspondingly,
inculcation and regular execution ('drill') of specific acts ('teaching behaviours') in
response to particular circumstances cannot, at best, be all there is to the way such
capabilities are acquired. This approach has its echoes, extensions and reformulations
in recent approaches to professionallearning familiarin teacher education, of which
three strands seem particularlyworthyof mention.
Emphasis on TeacherThinking
A firststrand,as the thirdHandbook ofResearchon Teaching(Wittrock,1986) empha-
sised in a clear and self-consciousway, is that fromthe late 1970s onwards the study
of teacher thinkingcame to hold a dominant position in educational research, this
cognitiveparadigm being seen by many (e.g. Freeman, 1994) as a welcome replace-
ment forthe Behaviourismassociated with the formerprocess-product approach. This
shiftpersiststo this day, with a considerable range of perspectivesand methodologies
having been used to studyan increasingset of aspects of teacherknow-how (cf. Carter,
1990; Calderhead, 1995). The traditionallyassumed centralityof conscious processes
has arguablybecome even more firmlyensconced by association withthe narrative-phe-
nomenological approaches that have increased in popularityover the last decade or so
(cf. Bruner, 1986; Carter, 1993).
CognitivePsychologyand SkilfulExpertise
A second consciousness-emphasisingstrand seems evident in education's assimilation
of certain paradigms in modern psychological theorising. A central, if paradoxical
example is provided by the psychologyof skill. Whilst many educationalists still seem
to reject any attemptto see teaching in terms of skill preciselybecause of this term's
association with Behaviouristpsychology(cf. Tomlinson, 1998), by contrastthe more
developed modern psychologicalapproach to the studyof human action and skill,now
typicallyreferredto as expertise, was actually firmlycognitive (cf. Miller et al., 1960;
Welford, 1968; Gellatly, 1986; Bereiter& Scardamalia, 1993; Zeitz & Glaser, 1996).
Indeed, by allowing us to consider teaching capability as a particularlyopen form of
intelligentskill,whose purposes and contextsare typicallycomplex, multi-layeredand
ill-structured,it can be argued that cognitivepsychologicalresearch on skilfulexpertise
offersa number of highlyrelevantand well-grounded insights,as well as providinga
conceptual frameworkthatis highlycompatible withrecentinsightsfromothersources,
most obviously Neo-Vygotskianand sociocultural ideas (cf. Tomlinson, 1995, 1998).
But by the same token, this allows re-emphasis on conscious processing. Whilst the
cognitivepsychologicaltraditionin skillpsychologyhas highlightedthe role of automa-

ConsciousReflection
and ImplicitLearning 407
tisationand intuitionin attemptingto account foraction, it has also had a centralplace

for conscious deliberation and reflection.Indeed, its classical view of skill acquisition
(cf. Fitts & Posner, 1967; Anderson, 1990) has seen the novice-expert contrastvery
much in terms of painstakinglyeffortful, conscious processing evolvinginto smoothly
intuitivefluency.And whilst even problem-solvingand reflectivethinkingmay them-
selves eventuallybecome automatic and intuitivewith practice, withinthis perspective
it would appear thatin complex, ill-structured,open contextssuch as teaching,a degree
of conscious problem-solving('thinkingon your feet') will always remain as part of the
competence of even the most expert practitioner.
Perhaps preciselybecause of the relativecomplexityof the cognitiveparadigm, it is
quite easy to consider one or more of its central elements in relativeisolation. Thus
some writers(e.g. Reason, 1990) have reserved the term 'skill' for the automatised
aspects of action, whilst attention to actual performance has often been seen as
Behaviouristicanyway! Comparably, by contrast,it has always been possible to focus
on conscious-deliberativeaspects of the cognition approach whilstforgettingthe intu-
itive-automatised aspects. In this way, following on cognitive psychology's central
emphases on feedback and anticipatoryreading of situations,the veryterm 'cognitive'
often seems to be understood interchangeablywith 'conscious'-perhaps by assimi-
lation to the consciousness-dominatedview assumed in everydaydualist thinking.More
generally, although this consciousness bias is perhaps rare amongst the ranks of
cognitiveexperimentalists,it does seem to have characterisedthinkingin educational
circlesregardingthe cognitivedevelopmental and meaningfulverbal learningideas that
have had lasting impact since the 1960s and 1970s. This seems to have been particu-
originallyassociated withPiaget and now widelyregarded
larlytrue of the constructivism
as a key feature of human perception and learning, often being referredto as if a
separate paradigm (cf. De Corte & Weinert, 1996, passim). Thus in education,
constructivism'scharacterisationof human learningas an active formof problem-solv-
ing in which people build meaningful conceptions of their reality has if anything
increased the dualist tendency to emphasise conscious processing.
Schdn's Influence:theEmphasis on Reflection
Linking more closely with the previous perspective than is often recognised, another
consciousness-emphasising source has been extremely influential in the realm of
teacher education and development over the last decade and a half: Donald Schon's
ideas on reflection.Paradoxically, their initial appeal seemed to lie in the apparent
bridging of the dualist thought-action divide, as suggested by Schon's innovative
expression reflection-in-action. Yet, whilst the nature of his expositions allowed this
terminology to be pressed into service under a rather disparate range of adoptive
meanings (Calderhead, 1989) and we had to wait too long for healthy critiques (cf.
Gilroy, 1993; Eraut, 1994, 1995), what Schon was centrallyand most usefullyseen as
referring to seems to be, as Eraut puts it, a formof practical metacognition(cf. Simons,
1996).
This characterisationsuggests how easily Sch6n's emphasis on reflectionis assimil-
able to the traditionaldualist model of thought-and-action,according to which 'you've
got to thinkabout what you're doing'. That is, this model has recourse to a meta-level
consciousness as condition forthe intelligenceof first-order processes, whetherthese be
physical or cognitive. On such an interpretationSchon would be seen not as breaking
with the dualist tradition,as seems often to have been assumed, but if anythingas

building on and therebyre-emphasisingit. For him, namely, (consciously) reflective
thinkingshould not just occur beforeor afterthe action, but ifpossible also in the midst
of it. Schon's influencemay thereforehave been innovativein importantrespects,but
may also have boosted still furtherthe traditionaltendencyto see conscious delibera-
tion as vital to intelligentaction and capabilityin teaching.
2. ALTERNATIVES TO DELIBERATIVE RATIONALITY
There are, however, various indications that the dualist-conscious story is seriously
limited as an account of intelligentcapabilityand its acquisition, and that the implica-
tions drawn fromit regardingtrainingand development are at least inefficient,if not
actually dangerous in some respects. These indications come from a disparate set of
sources, each of which has weaknesses. Yet their complementyelements lend them
considerable strength.I discern four such strands.
Resistanceto ReflectiveDeliberation
Practitioner
A firststrandconcerns the failureof the relevantpractitionersthemselvesto confirmthe
importance of reflection.Published work on student-teachers(cf. Sanders & McPeck,
1976; Calderhead & Shorrock, 1997; McIntyre et al., 1994) echoes my own experience
that large numbers of them still appear to espouse a practical immersion view of
learningto teach, along with an antipathytowards deliberate reflectiongenerallyand
formal 'theory' in particular. Corresponding views amongst a noticeable number of
experienced teachers engaging in mentor preparation at my own institutionwere
consistentwith published studies (e.g. Anning, 1988) and with such work as we have
on the folk psychologyof skill and its acquisition (cf. Bereiter& Scardamalia, 1989).
A traditionalteacher educator response to this might once have been to comfort
oneselfwith the view that 'it's just the good ones who are reflective',pointingout that
studentsof skilland its counterparthuman error(e.g. Reason, 1990) have oftennoted
the widespread human tendency to preferautomatic (easy) modes of processing as
opposed to effortful deliberation.We may also remind ourselvesthat withhis reflective
practice emphasis, Schon was not afterall describingwhat people typicallydo engage
in, but proposing what could work for professionallearning in the context of a crisis
concerning what did not. Nevertheless,by now one of the more acceptable lessons of
the post-modernistwave is hopefullythat we should open-mindedlycontemplate the
possibilitythat these opponents of reflectionmay have some sort of valid point. Either
way, the extentof practitionerresistance to reflectionappears to imply a dilemma for
pro-reflectionists:between believing on the one hand that there may be substantial
numbers of teacherswho are professionallylacking,in thattheyare not and do not wish
to be reflective,and on the otherhand admittingthat theremay be many teachers who
manage to become professionallycompetent withoutbeing reflective.
PhilosophicalEmphaseson Intuitionin ActionKnowledge

A second anti-dualiststrand comprises the well-knownobjections by a long series of
philosophersto what mightbe labelled 'deliberativerationalism' in human action and
learning, objections most famouslyassociated with Martin Heidegger, Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty, Michael Oakeshott, Michael Polanyi, Gilbert Ryle and, more recently,
Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. Their contributionsregardingthis central issue have had

ConsciousReflection
considerable impact on writingabout teacher professionallearning,although it seems

to me that certain issues, even confusions,remain.
Ryle (1949) is well known for emphasising a distinction between knowingthat
somethingis the case and knowinghow to do an action effectively, thisbeing part of his
argument against the widespread 'intellectualistmyth' that the exercise of skill or
know-how necessarily entails the separate contemplation of relevant propositions or
prescriptions,i.e. knowing-that.Whereas for him this myth holds that engaging in
competent action entails 'the double operation of consideringand executing',that is 'a
bit of theoryand then [ ... ] a bit of practice' (p. 30), Ryle insisted that 'When I do
somethingintelligently,[...] I am doing one thingand not two' (p. 32). As Argyrisand
Sch6n (1974) put it, the knowledge involved is embedded in the action, whence their
expressions 'knowledge in action' and 'theoryin use'. Not only may such knowledge
not need to be articulatedconsciously in order to act effectively, according to Polanyi
(1967) it may even be entirely tacit: we may know it but not be able to tell it, even to
ourselves.
This line of argumentwas recentlyresurrectedby Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus(1986)
in theirattack on the North American artificialintelligenceresearchprogrammesof the
1970s and 1980s. Explicitlyrelatingtheir approach to the contributionsof Ryle and
Merleau-Ponty, the Dreyfuses propose a rich conception of skill and its acquisition
throughfivelevels, culminatingin expertise.Whilst theirapproach stressesperception
by way of learningto read situationsin ways useful foreffectivedecision-making,their
strongemphasis is on tacit knowledge and intuition.This is in contrastto 'deliberative
process' (which they call 'the Hamlet model of decision-making') and to 'calculative
rationality'using explicit rules, which they castigate psychologyfor relyingupon. In
contrast,as Eraut (1994) points out, theirown emphasis is almost entirelyon learning
fromexperience and the only image we are given of this process is that of the gradual
accumulation of memories of cases. With Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus and Dreyfus claim
that 'perception and understandingare based in our capacity forpickingup not rules,
but flexible styles of behaviour'. Although the Dreyfuses' view of skill acquisition
includes a firstphase in which novices are said to be in need of (explicit) general rules
of procedure, in the remainder of the progress towards expertise they seem to be
espousing a 'learning by immersion' view of the sort even more clearly expressed by
Ryle's view that:
... it would be quite possible fora boy to learn chess withouteven hearing or
readingthe rules at all. By watchingthe moves made by othersand by noticing
which of his own moves were conceded and which were rejected, he could
pick up the art of playing correctlywhile still quite unable to propound the
regulations in terms of which 'correct' and 'incorrect' are defined. [...] We
learn how by practice, schooled indeed by criticismand example, but often
quite unaided by any lessons in the theory. (1949, p. 41)
The last sentence of this quotation may well remind us of the teachers and student-
teachers cited in the previous section, and it is perhaps worthpointingout that in this
excerpt Ryle does not even appear to be using 'theory' to referto abstract formal
models of underlyingprocesses, only to explicit articulationsof rules for action.
Researchon ImplicitLearning
A third anti-dualism strand has come recently from empirical research on implicit

learning. The possibilityof implicit learning may have been compatible with, even
assumed by the Behaviourist psychologywhich held sway at least in North America
duringthe pre- and earlypost-Second World War period, but this was not so regarding
the cognitivepsychologythat came into ascendancy in the 1950s. In spite of the irony
that it was Piaget (1976) who appears to have coined the phrase 'the cognitive
unconscious', not only has psychological research offeredlittle support for the em-
phases of the previous section until the last decade or so, but as Perner (1996) points
out '... until the early 1980s it was still heresyin some circles to thinkthat there was
implicit, unconscious knowledge. By the early 1990s it has become an intensively
researched field'.
This workto which Perneris referring has tended to use laboratory-basedexperimen-
tal methods centrallytargetingperception,learningand memoryprocesses (cf. Berry&
Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993; Berry, 1996, 1997; d'Ydewalle, 1996; Underwood &
Bright,1996) and whilstthere remain controversiesin this still developing field,there
is a range of tasks which, as Berry(1996, p. 221) recentlysummarised:
show transferspecificity,they can be learnt under incidental conditions,
subjects cannot say how they arrived at their answers, their confidence is
unrelated to their accuracy, and performanceon the tasks is fairlyrobust in
the face of time and impairment.(Berry, 1996, p. 221).
By way of illustration,a series of studies by Broadbent and others (Berry& Broadbent,

1988) used simulated systems such as a city transportsystem, a sugar factoryor a
person interactiontask, in each of which the behaviour of the systemfollowed a set of
equations (the 'rules of the system') involvinga number of variables (including input
and output variables within the total of four), some of these being interdependent.
Experiments would be set up so that participantswere given startingvalues for all
variables and asked to reach specifiedtargetvalues forthe two output variables. They
were not given access to the rules governingthe system,just feedback on the outcome
of their adjustment of the input variables on each trial. It was found that practice
significantlyimproved abilityto control these tasks (typicallyto a level of acceptable
target accuracy around 80% of the time afterabout 60 trials), but had no effecton
abilityto answer post-taskwrittenquestions. In contrast'detailed verbal instructionon
how to reach and maintain the target value significantlyimproved ability to answer
questions, but had no effecton control performance' (Berry & Dienes, 1993, pp.
21-21). Implicitlearninghas also been establishedusing otherexperimentaltasks, such
as artificialgrammar learning, sequence learning and the abstraction of invariant
characteristics(cf. Berry,1996; Underwood & Bright, 1996).
Later researchon such tasks has to led to some modificationof earlyconclusions and
raised new issues. For example, it now appears that performance and verbalisable
knowledge are not totallyseparate. By way of supportingthe primacyof implicitaction
knowledge, verbalisable knowledge may develop through high numbers of practice
trials, emerging only after implicitlyprocessed task performancehas improved (cf.
Stanley etal., 1989). Similarly,researchhas suggestedsome complex inter-relationships
between implicitand explicitlearningprocesses. For instance, the salience or obvious-
ness of the relation between situational featuresand response alternativesappears to
influencethe type of learningand what is needed forit. Thus Berry(1991) found that
individuals acquired an implicitperformanceabilitybut not conscious insightthrough
directparticipationin a non-salientversion of the controltask. However, they did not
profitin eitherrespect from simply watching another person engaging in the control

ConsciousReflection
task, unless the input-outputrelationshipwas obvious, when the learningbecame both

effectivefor action and explicit.
Thus extensive empirical work indicates not only tacit processes in the conduct of
action, but also tacit learning in the firstplace. There is no implication here that
particulartasks are always learned eitherin an explicit or an implicitway: individual
tasks may involve varyingmixturesof such learningprocesses on particularoccasions
and these mixes are likely to depend on the interplayof circumstances and learner
individual differences,particularlybackgroundhistories.In general the stance taken by
Cleeremans (1997) seems suitably measured: that implicit learning is the default
learning mode for humans, though consciousness is equally a feature of our normal
state, that in the balance with explicit learning, graded and dynamic dimensions of
processing are involved, and that not least amongst the featuresof such processing is
the 'exquisitelydetailed sensitivity',as he nicely puts it, which individuals can acquire
to the properties of extremelycomplex stimulus situations, without evidencing con-
scious access to the informationtheyare using. Cleeremans and othersfeel thatrecently
developed connectionist models appear well suited to accounting for this important
feature.
Before turningto consider some basics of the connectionistapproach, we may note
that Claxton's recent (1997) advancing of the psychological case for taking intuitive
processes more seriouslyprompts us to note that whereas explicit learning can some-
times occur very rapidly, as when we use our working memory capacities to link
hithertoseparate items or see a new patternof elements, explicit action control seems
to be relativelyslow (because deliberate, amongst other things). Conversely, implicit
learning tends to occur slowly, over a large number of events, though implicitly
generated action seems to be a much faster, 'automatised' or 'ballistic' mode of
behaviour. Nevertheless,it is importantto remember that, consistentlywith connec-
tionist ideas, when it comes to professional learning, work in the various implicit
learningparadigms indicates that what can be acquired implicitlyis in fact a capacity
for flexible,implicit responding to contextual variations, something which we might
wish to call 'intelligentadaptability' (cf. Lewicki et al., 1997; Dienes & Altman, 1997).
Connectionism
's Constructs
Linking with the previous three strands, though not arising from them, a recent
paradigm shiftin psychological theorisingabout the way human knowledge is repre-
sented and used may furtherlegitimateconcerns neglected by traditionalrationalism
and point to new ways of thinkingabout learning and teaching.
Mind as Symbol Container.As we have seen, the traditional model underlyingboth

everyday'folkpsychology'and various formalpsychologicalattemptsto theorisehuman
cognition over many centuries (cf. Bereiter& Scardamalia, 1996) is one that sees the
mind as a containerof information, that is, of knowledge units that representparticular
aspects of reality.Justas traditionalfolkpsychologytends to talk about the mind as a
place holding ideas and thoughts,cognitivepsychology,especially in its 'multi-store'
phase (cf. Eysenck & Keane, 1995), similarlyportrayedthe cognitivesubject as a set of
boxes representingfunctionssuch as sensoryreception,memorystorage and behaviour
production. Such models were serial in as much as they viewed information as
proceeding item by item throughthe human system,fromstore to store.

Within such a perspective,centralfocuses have concerned the formof the cognitive
items and the nature of the cognitiveapparatus that processes them: is the currencyof
thought verbal, iconic or perhaps something else, and how many and what sort of
separate processing units and memory stores (if any) deal with the items? More
importantly,the various versions of this symbol container approach shared two major
tenets: (a) that the symbol units map on to meaningful,discerniblefeaturesin external
realityand (b) that these knowledge contents are directlyor indirectlyaccessible to
consciousness. Thus, for example, when you meaningfullyperceive the numeral 5 on
the page, your cognitive apparatus is somehow mapping the external item on to a
correspondinginternalsymbol.
Doubtless this sort of assumed isomorphism arose at least partlybecause its terms
stay close to what we appear to ourselves to be doing when we consciously deal with
distinctaspects of reality:in more recent terminology,it corresponds to our everyday
conscious metacognition. Nevertheless, such an approach runs into various kinds of
difficulty,many of them associated with the messier and more implicit capacities
humans display. For instance, this symbolicapproach has problems accounting forour
capacity equally to recognise 5 , , 5 or even S or S all as 'really' 5s, cases of that
which we referto linguisticallyas 'five'.
Mind as PatternRecognising Network.Althoughtherehad been partialprecursors,it was

in 1986 that David Rumelhartand his colleagues published a major two-volumework
proposing a radically alternativeapproach to the portrayal of mind, now generally
referredto as connectionism, parallel distributed processing(PDP) or artificialneural
networks(ANN). A number of accessible introductionsto this vigorous new area of
cognitive science are available (cf. Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991; Bereiter, 1991;
Orchard & Phillips, 1991). At its core is the idea of an interconnectednetwork of
neurone-likeunits capable of being stimulatedand changed slightlyeach time theyare
activated.
Roughly put, recognisingsomethingsuch as S involves a particularpatternof light
fallingon to the retinaof the eye, which is actuallya surfacearrayof tinyreceptorcells.
Figure 1 portrays part of that retinal area schematically, with each small square
representinga cell. Each cell can only respond to and thus 'pick up' a small constituent
'microfeature'of the figure,which tells verylittlein itself.Registeringthe whole figure
as such requires responding to the entire pattern of microfeatures,that is, to the
individual featuresand their spatial relationshipsto each other.
This integratedrepresentationcan happen if the individual receptor cells are some-
how connected, so that their collective activations can have a joint effect. When
stimulatedby light,the retinal receptorcells will feed signals forwardto furthernerve
cells up into the brain. The integrationof the signals fromthe input cells can occur
througheach cell feedingforwardnot just to a singe cell, but to numbers of cells in the
next layer of units. Any particularfeed forwardconnection may be excitatory, tending
tendingto decrease it. And
to increase the activationlevel of its targetcell, or inhibitory,
the strengthor weightingof this excitatoryor inhibitoryconnection may vary. So how
far or even whether at all a cell in the next layer is activated will depend on the
combination of excitatoryand inhibitorysignals it receives fromfirstlayer cells. If we
were to lay out part of one of the rows of cells fromthe retinalinput arrayin Fig. 1 and
show a side view of theirconnections with the cells in the next layer,thingsmightlook
somethinglike Fig. 2 (in which only some of the weights are labelled).

ConsciousReflection
I I I I I I I I I
1I I
Il
* ql II
- I
. U
~~~~~~~~~~~~~L(L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I
I
l
m.
Mt
UI
II
l I
a
74
I
_r
I
m II .
I
I a EI
I ro !
I i I I
FIG. 1. Part of retinalfieldwithlightpatternfromstimulusfigure'5'.
The sortsof networkshownin Fig. 2 can act as patternrecognisers.That is, the

second level unitswould show different patternsof activationdependingon (i) the
particular and
excitatory inhibitory weightings on theconnectionsfromtheinputlevel
units and (ii) the actual patternof lightfallingon those input units. Thus the
second-level'5' unitmightbe activatedstrongly enoughto reachthethreshold at which
it sends a signalfurther
up the system,whilstthe '3' and '4' unitswereinsufficiently
activatedto do so: thusa '5' has been recognisedand may(or maynot) also become
consciouslyidentified.
We need to rememberthatthisis a theoretical model ofthewayinformation might
be processedbythehumannervoussystem.Such modelshavebeen testedbyprogram-
mingtheminto computersand then comparingthe behaviourof the systemto the
humanperformance theresearcher is trying
to model.It is thuspossibleto experiment
A( 4\
i ~ ~~~~35 ^ \ (~ ~ output
layerunits
w
Vi
w3i
5i _y L - 5input
1 ~ 1 vi layerunits
T t Tt inputfromfigure
lightpattern
t Ti T
FIG. 2. A two-layerneuralnetwork.

with differentkinds of possible networkarchitecture,forinstance, auto-associativenets
in which cells withina given level are connected with each other,and nets which have
three or more layers,including 'hidden units' at intermediatepoints. Differentfunc-
tional characteristicscan also be programmed. In particular,networksmay be set to
'learn' by having the strengthsof theirconnection weightingschange slightlyeach time
a signal is passed and any of a range of particularconditionsis fulfilled,as occurs in the
real nervous system.
As in otherareas, thereare degrees of controversyconcerningconnectionism.But the
allure of the connectionistapproach, as Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) put it, stems
froma number of ways (in addition to achievingthe cognitivefunctionsin question) in
which neural net functioningresembles human processing:
(i) Similarityto Human Brain Structure.Because network models were based on

simplifiedconceptions of the structureand workingof neurones in the firstplace, they
are generallymore compatible than symbolicmodels withwhat we know of the nervous
systemand some of the basic constraintson cognitivefunctioning,though connection-
ist researchersvary in the extent to which they use the approach to model cognition,
biology or both. Thus one of the major claims for connectionismis that it avoids the
traditionalhomunculus/infinite regress problem in the philosophy and psychologyof
mind. That is, ratherthan having to assume an internalexecutiveintelligently directing
cognitive sub-processes, and then within that executive another, and so on, the
achievementsof neural nets are a functionof the interconnectednessof large numbers
of what are in themselves essentially quite simple and 'meaningless' units. Many
known, overt featuresof human cognition are thus thoughtof as emergentproperties
of structureswhose constituentsare more modest and inaccessible to consciousness. As
Bereiter(1991) and othershave put it, 'the knowledgeis in the rules' (i.e. the weighting
of connections and activation), though it should be noted that these rules are implicit
to the system,preciselyin contrastto the consciously explicitformulationsthat others,
such as implicit learning theoristsand critics like Dreyfus and Dreyfus, are talking
about when they referto 'rule-based systems'.
(ii) TypicallyHuman Flexibilityof Operation.Symbolic models operate at the level of

meaningfulunits and thus tend to involve all-or-nonerules that act in a deterministic
fashion: in the relevant jargon, these models have 'hard constraints',whereas network
model constraintsmay involve varyingdegrees of softness, depending on their design.
Networks therebybetter represent the messiness of awareness and human decision
making,and the ways in which people respond and adapt to novel situations.They can,
moreover,account economicallyforour coping withboth regularityand exception (e.g.
in language use) throughthe same softconstraintkind of mechanism, an area in which
symbol systemshave considerable problems. For instance, one of the exciting early
discoveriesregardingneural networksthat learn was that theytend to formprototypical
concepts of the sort highlightedby Eleanor Rosch's (1978) work on natural concepts
such as 'dog', 'child' and so on. In short,connectionistmodelling appears to be a strong
candidate for illuminatingthe sort of direct similaritybased learningtransferPerkins
and Salomon (1996) referto as 'low road', in contrastto the 'high road' formbased on
metacognitionand superordinacy.

ConsciousReflection
(iii) GracefulDegradation. Similarly,human capacities are not generally'all or none'

and connectionistmodels echo the resilience and 'graceful' or gradual degradation of
cognitivefunctionshumans exhibitunder informationalstressor physicalbrain damage
from accidents or ageing. Within cognitiveneuroscience, in fact, this sort of work is
making stridesin understandingthe nature of such educationally relevantproblems as
dyslexia (e.g. Plaut & Shallice, 1994).
(iv) ContentAddressableMemory.Because knowledgeis distributedin networksthrough

very many interconnectedconstituentunits, a particular piece of knowledge can be
accessed throughquite small parts of its content. Stimulatingjust some of the input
receptorswitha relevantsub-patterntends to recruitactivationin the best-fitting larger
network pattern available. As in everydayhuman cognition, there is smooth passage
fromone thoughtto another (sometimes this process breaks down whilststill showing
some of its underlyingfeatures,as in the 'tip-of-the-tongue' phenomenon). Perhaps still
more usefully,contentaddressabilitycan be seen as a mechanism forthe assimilationor
'head-fitting'now widely recognised in human perception and learning,and centralto
the constructivistemphasis. Accounting forsuch aspects of human cognitionin symbol
systemsis much more problematic.
It should be recognised that whilst able to claim signs of precocious talent, connec-
tionism is still in its infancyand its full potential remains the object of some dispute.
Whilst some commentatorseven question how far ANN simulations succeed in their
own terms (e.g. Norris, 1991), the major issue formany (e.g. Eysenck & Keane, 1995)
concerns the extent to which symbol notions may still be required as part of an
adequate modelling of human cognition.Nevertheless,even back in 1991, Bechtel and
Abrahamsen could feel that connectionismwas already findingways of accounting for
such aspects withoutbuilding symbolicfeaturesas such into the system.Given that the
main focus of connectionism has been on adequately modelling the sub-details of
relatively familiar cognitive phenomena, it is perhaps not surprising that specific
educational implicationshave not been particularlyobvious so far. The approach may
neverthelesshave some interestingrelevance for ways of thinkingabout pedagogical
issues (cf. Bereiter, 1991; Demsetz, 1995; Bereiter& Scardamalia, 1996), not least in
relation to currentconcerns with constructivismand situated cognition, and particu-
larlyteacher preparation,as I shall suggest below.
3. COMBINING THE STRANDS

The foregoingsections,particularlythe previous two, confirmand extend a view which
already has considerable currencyin cognitivepsychology(cf. Boreham, 1994), that in
broad terms humans have two major forms of information-processing:(i) a conscious
serial mode that is deliberativelyfocused and flexible, but also relativelyslow and
severelylimitedin capacity and (ii) a tacitparallelmodewhich is a veryfastprocessor of
much informationsimultaneously,but which is relativelyinflexibleand not open to
direct access or control. As noted earlier,it appears that when it comes to the rapidity
of the learningthat establishes capacities in these two modes, the picture is to some
extent reversed. Deliberative mode is able to see connections and formnew concepts
immediatelyto the extentthatworkingmemorycan carrythe combined load and 'grasp
them in the same thought', whilst the tacit mode requires many trials to achieve the
automatisationwhich in turn makes rapid action possible.

However, this is only one aspect of the story.Before consideringthe contrastand
potential interplayof explicit and tacit modes in relation to teacher preparation,we
need to consider anotherdistinctionwhich is confounded with it withinthe traditional
juxtapositions of knowing-howand knowing-that,procedural and declarative knowl-
edge.
theProcedural-Declarative
Deconstructing Distinction
Just as I suggested earlier that Schon's emphasis on reflectionmay actually have

sustained Ryle's 'intellectualistmyth'of deliberationas the basis requiredforintelligent
action, so the legacy of Ryle's own knowing-how versus knowing-that distinctionmay
even more paradoxicallyhave helped sustain the psychologicaldualism to which he was
objecting.
This arises out of the possibilityof interpretingthis pair of termsin two ways, which
are importantlyrelated,but which should not be confused. The traditionaldistinction,
in other words, actually seems to contain two sub-distinctionswhich are typically
confounded together:(a) a distinctionbetween differentmodesofknowingin which, as
just indicated, the issue is about the levelofconsciousness or way in which we possess or
deploy the knowledge, and (b) a distinctionbetween different
kinds ofknowledge object,
where the issue is about whatwe know. In fact,closer scrutinyof the currentlypopular
formulation of the traditional distinction as proceduralversus declarativereveals a
curious juxtaposition in which these terms are seen to be the poles of two different
contrasts.
Proceduralknowledgeseems clearlyto signal knowledge or capacityforaction, thatis,
being able, knowinghow to do something,and this seems relativelyclear in its Rylean
versionknowinghow.The referenceis most obviouslyto whatis known,which we might
call the object of the knowledge:what is known here is 'what to do'-it is 'action
knowledge'. Thus to find an alternativeto 'procedural' in termsof what is known, we
need a different knowledge object and the contrastofferedby the Rylean distinctionis
knowing-that, that is, knowingin the sense of possessing a grounded awareness of some
sort of reality, often described as 'knowing what is the case' (or might be, given
particularcircumstances).Here the knowledge object is a state of affairs,as opposed to
action upon it. More generally,the knowledge-objectsub-distinctionmightbe signalled
respectivelyand perhaps more simplyby contrastssuch as: (knowing)what to do versus
(knowing) what thereis (or mightbe), capacityfor action versus awareness of reality,
prescriptionversus description or in Piagetian terms, operativeschemeversus figurative
scheme.In this vein, the obvious contrastto proceduralwould surelybe somethinglike
representational or descriptive,so that the traditionallyoffered alternative declarative
actually seems to be introducingsomethingto do with a differentkind of dimension.
Alternatively, startingthe otherway round, declarativeknowledge suggestsknowledge
thatcan be declared, articulated-knowledge thatis explicit.Its obvious contrastwould
then be knowledge that is not or cannot be articulated explicitly.It seems clear that
thereis here no referencein eithercase to the knowledge object, to what it is that can
or cannot be articulated.Rather,the distinctionis about what we may call the knowledge
mode,thatis, the articulatability or declarabilityof one's knowledge (whateverits object
happens to be), which we mightmore preciselylabel the levelof consciousness at which
the knowledge is held. Correspondingly,this particular distinctionis perhaps more
clearlysignalled by such contrastsas explicitversus implicit,consciousversus unconscious,
articulatedversus intuitive,declarativeversus tacit. And yet the traditional contrast

ConsciousReflection
TABLE withintheprocedural-declarative
and theirintersection
I. Sub-distinctions knowledgedistinction.
Knowledge object
Action Reality
(procedural/ (descriptive/
prescriptive
capacity) contemplativeawareness)
(A) (B)
Explicit Deliberativeaction capacity Explicitrepresentational
awareness
Knowledge (conscious, declarative)
mode
(D) (C)
Implicit Intuitiveaction capacity Implicitrepresentationalawareness
(unconscious,tacit)
offeredfordeclarativehas been procedural,even though the formerterm seems to refer

to knowledge mode and the latterto be about knowledge object, as we have seen.
So the terms of the procedural-declarative formulationthemselves seem to signal the
existenceof two sub-distinctionsand to invitetheirconfounding,in that two alternative
sub-dimensionpoles are simplyjuxtaposed as iftheywere dealing with the same single
dimension. The original Rylean terminologyis also somewhat open to either or both
interpretations,in that although knowing-how versus knowing-thatperhaps points pri-
marily towards a distinctionregarding knowledge object, Ryle also seemed to treat
knowing-thatas explicit and knowing-howas implicit. In turn, it is thereforeperhaps
not surprisingthat although some writers(e.g. Ohlsson, 1996; Winne & Butler, 1996)
do recognise these subdistinctions and see the traditional terminologyas properly
referringto the knowledge object contrast,others apparentlydo not, but run the two
togetherwithvaryingemphases in different sub-contexts(e.g. Anderson, 1990; Bechtel
& Abrahamsen, 1991).
The importance of gettingthese sub-distinctionsclear is that theirtraditionalblur-
ring tends to make us thinkthat descriptiveawareness is always conscious, but action
knowledge always intuitive. Correspondingly,I suggest that in spite of his opposite
intention,Ryle's emphasis on the implicitnessof action knowledge tends actually to
sustain the traditional mind-body dualism he was attacking, which separates con-
sciously explicit,reflexivelyaccessible, representationalthoughtfromaction, the latter
seen simplyas brute 'doing'. By contrast,when it is instead recognised with the aid of
an externalmemorytool, such as Table I, thatthereare actuallytwo kinds of issue here
concerning knowing, then it becomes clear that the Rylean and dualist positions
actually deal in only two out of the four possibilities generated by crossing the two
sub-distinctions,namely those indicated in quadrants (B) and (D).
But as this matrix indicates, there are also two furtherpossibilities. First that
know-how/actioncapacity and its deploymentmay sometimes be consciously delibera-
tive (quadrant A), as in 'Do you know how to bake a fruitcake?'-'Yes, I'll tell you.
First you take some dried fruit,some flour ...' and so on. Indeed, although some
importantqualificationsneed to be added furtherbelow, recognitionof this possibility
seems a crucial assumption forthe verypossibilityof deliberate purposefulaction and
in particular for the effectivenessof reflection,not to mention certain aspects of
teaching and training.Second, the matrix converselyreminds us also that descriptive
awareness may be implicit(quadrant C), as forexample when we experience something

about a situation,but take some time to become conscious of what it is (cf. 'I didn't
realise at the time,but I must have unconsciouslypicked up the fearin his voice/some-
how known that he was afraid').
a Non-reductiveView
Reconstructing
Having analysed an issue into what are proposed as its constituentaspects, it may be
temptingto remain at this apparentlymore respectable level of precision. However, to
do justice to what is at stake it is usually importantto consider in turnhow the aspects
inter-relatewithin the whole. In the present case the juxtaposition and interplayof
aspects seem to apply both to issues of implicitness-explicitnessand to those concerning
action and awareness, but also to the way these two dimensions interact.
(a) The Interplayof Implicitand ExplicitProcesses

As Claxton (1997) has recentlypointed out, thinkingthat one has to choose between
explicit and implicit modes in order to understand human action would be a silly
reductionism.It appears that human beings unavoidably have and probablyneed both
modes. At the extreme, even if we 'really' were parallel processors whose conscious
construals were merelyredundant epiphenomena as far as generatingbehaviour were
concerned, it should be pointed out that we simply do have a conscious-deliberative
mode, which seems inalienablycentralto our lived experience and identity.But in fact
both implicitand explicitmodes do appear to combine in much action, whetherby way
of (i) mixture,(ii) embeddedness
or (iii) developmental
evolution.
Mixtureand Performance
(i) Implicitness-Explicitness Period Time Pressure.Perhaps the
most obvious possibility is that implicit and explicit cognitive processes may exist
side-by-sidewithin the same activity.A number of workersin the field of expertise,
much of theirworkbroughttogetherby Eraut (1994, chapter7), have pointed out that
most thinkingis neither purely intuitivenor purely analytical, but that the balance
between them depends to a considerable extenton time pressureswithinthe 'perform-
ance period' in question. Fast-changing,dynamic contextsrequire instantpattern-read-
ing and intuitivelymatched response. Eraut labels this kind of action 'routinised
unreflective'and sports commentatorsoftencall it 'pure instinct',though any dualism
suggested by such phrases needs correcting.What is speedily directhere is the linking
of an appropriateclass of action to the perceived situation:the response is adapted and
flexible,and in thatsense intelligent,thoughimplicit.At the otherextreme,where there
is ample time, one can engage in consciously deliberativeanalysisand decision-making,
as forinstance in the preactive('planning') phase of teaching.The intermediatekind of
case, which Eraut labels 'rapid mode', involves the more Schonian kind of decision-
making where there is at least some time for on-the-hoofdeliberation, interspersed
withinthe flowof implicitadaptation. The literatureon teacher decision-makingduring
the interactivephase of classroom teaching (cf. Clark and Peterson, 1986; Calderhead,
1987) seems to indicate just this kind of implicit-explicitmix.
(ii) Implicit Processesembeddedwithin Explicit Process. Another kind of possibility,

perhaps an inevitability,is that explicit cognitive processes involve implicit processes
embedded withinthem. The cognitivepsychological concept of an informationchunk

ConsciousReflection
can usefullyilluminatethis,with respect both to action and perception/representation.

Chunkingoriginallyreferredto the grouping of items to achieve economy of memory
storage (cf. Miller, 1956): ifthe number of items to be rememberedexceeds short-term
retention capacity, then retentionmay neverthelessbe achieved if the items can be
grouped into a number of chunks not exceeding memoryspan. We may extend this to
the idea that any givenitem may itselfbe considered a chunk made up of its connotative
constituents. Such constituentsmight, consistent with the traditional symbol-based
approach, themselvesbe consciously discernible sub-items. For instance, the numeral
5 may be analysed as the particularconfigurationof a horizontalline top portion,joined
to an uprightlink line in the middle, joined to a curve at the bottom. When the unit of
focus is particularnumerals, for normal adults the processing of these components is
typicallyimplicit.When one triesto take the decomposition any further,and certainly
when one considers the sort of messy variationin writtennumerals illustratedearlierin
this paper, then even the identifiability of furthersub-component identifiersbecomes
highlyproblematic,let alone the likelihood of theirbeing processed explicitly.Corre-
spondingly,as we saw, connectionismproposes an altogetherfinergrain of perceptual
analysis within the human cognitive system, one which we may not ever be able to
access consciously.
This line of approach may also illuminate why Ryle's down-playing of conscious
articulationwithinknowing-howhas had such a strongappeal: it points to a potential
gap between the articulationof procedural knowledge and the actual possession of the
practical capabilityin question. That is, a practitionermay be able to articulatehow to
read and what to do in a situation. But he or she will only be articulatinga real
know-how, a true action capacity, as long as they can also handle the constituent
perceptual and behavioural connotationsof the termstheyuse. In otherwords, only as
long as they know the meaning of these terms in practice, i.e. can recognise or select
theirreferentswhen they respectivelyencounter or require them. Otherwise theywill
only be giving a verbal-symbolicaccount which they cannot actually implement. The
converse of this has been pointed out by Pierce (1931), whose theory of pragmatic
meaning proposed thatthe meaningfulnessof an utterancefora person depends in part
on that person having what the terms referto withintheir experience.
This furtherlinkage between the terms of a person's explicit account of know-how
and their actual interaction with the task context is likely to be implicit, achieved
perhaps by the sorts of detailed formsof cognitiveprocess modelled by connectionism.
The extent of such implicitnessmay vary in that the practitionermay quite likelybe
able to 'unpack' this detail at least to some extent, but there will always remain
somethingineffableabout theiraction capacity. Conversely,a person's abilityto give an
otherwise accurate account of how to do something may be some indication of a
correspondingpractical capacity,but is never fullysufficientas assessment evidence of
it: for that one has also to examine the consistencyof their actual achievements.
(iii) DevelopmentalEvolution:Explicitto Implicit,Implicitto Explicit.These possibilitiesof

mixtureand embeddedness of implicit and explicit processes fitwith the tendency of
theirrelationshipsto change as a functionof experience. On the one hand there can be
development fromexplicitto implicit.As indicated earlier,the classical account of skill
acquisition phases (cf. Fitts & Posner, 1967) correspondsto much everydayexperience
in highlightingthat new tasks can at firstbe achieved, if at all, only with careful
conscious attentionand effort,but with enough appropriate experience can be run off

with intuitiveease. The overall balance between implicitand explicit processing does
not necessarilyshiftquite so simplyas thisproceduralisation
mightimply,however,since
in turn such automatisationfrees attentionalcapacity for conscious thinking,strategic
or otherwise.
On the other hand, as we saw, a reverse process is possible, whereby sufficient
implicitprocessingmay not only establish an intuitiveperformancecapability,but also
lead to explicit awareness of what is going on. Indeed, Karmiloff-Smith(1992) has
recently built an influential theory of cognitive development around the idea of
progressive'explicitation'through'representationalredescription',which she considers
to involve four levels of implicitness-explicitness,rather than just the traditional
dichotomy. Her research supports the conclusion that psychological development at
any age or in any area involves bothproceduralisation (automatisation) and explicita-
tion, a principlewhich ought to apply to studentteacher developmentno less than that
of children,by way of correctingthe overemphasison deliberativemode which Claxton
(1997) has also recentlysought to redress.
(b) The Interplayof Proceduraland Descriptive

(i) DescriptiveEmbeddedwithinProcedural.Distinguishingthe sub-dimensionsof knowl-
edge mode and knowledge object also helps us see how procedural or action knowledge
(expertise,skill,know-how),whethertacit or deliberative,has also to includedescriptive
knowledge, whethertacit or explicit. Action always takes place in and on a context,
which must be 'read' in relevantways in order to be acted upon appropriately.That is,
consistentsuccess can only be achieved on the basis of some sort of stored representa-
tion of that context,minimallyat surface level as a grounding for the recognitionof
relevantimmediate featuresto react to, more systematicallyas understandingof how
the context works, as groundingfor the respondent and anticipatoryactions required
forflexiblecapability.
Thus, to employ one of Ryle's othernotions, seeing knowing-howand knowing-that
as differentconcepts on the same level would fromthe knowledge-objectangle be a
categoryerror,in as much as knowing-howdoes not stand totallyapart fromknowing-
that. Rather, action capacity includesawareness of context, itselfoften tacit, but not
always. This is brought out ratherclearlyby the production systemmodels of action
recentlyfavouredby cognitivepsychologists(cf. Anderson, 1990), whose basic units are
if-thenprescriptionsin which the antecedents include states of the situation,as in:
ifthe goal is X {xI, x2, x1} and the situation is Y {yl ... y,,} thendo Z {z, ... z,,}
(ii) The SkilfulNature of Representation: Cognitionas Expertise.A final element in this

reconstructionconcerns the insight nicely suggested by Gellatly's (1986) title The
SkilfulMind, that not only may the nature of skillbe illuminatedby a psychologyof its
constituentcognitiveprocesses but that, conversely,such processes themselvesin turn
share characteristicsof skill. A major effectof practice, forinstance, is the economical
compilation and proceduralisingof the process involved (cf. Anderson, 1981) and this
appears to embrace perceptual as well as behaviour executive learning.
Having considered these perennial issues in the light of modern work on implicit
learning and connectionistmodelling, and having offeredsome general discussion of
interrelationsamongst the constituentsof a general frameworkfor consideringknowl-
edge objects and modes, more specific implications for teacher preparation will be
considered in a linked paper to be published subsequently in this journal.

ConsciousReflection
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Dr Peter Tomlinson, School of Education, Universityof Leeds, Leeds

Correspondence:
LS2 9JT, UK.


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Conscious Reflection and Implicit Learning in Teacher Preparation.

Part I: Recent Light on an

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Conscious Reflection and Implicit Learning in

ABSTRACT In spiteof critiquesby philosophers fromRyle throughto Dreyfus,the

1. CONSCIOUS REFLECTION FOR INTELLIGENT ACTION AND LEARN-

ISSN 0305-4985 (print)/ISSN1465-3915 (online)/99/030405-20© 1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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tisationand intuitionin attemptingto account foraction, it has also had a centralplace

Schdn's Influence:theEmphasis on Reflection

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2. ALTERNATIVES TO DELIBERATIVE RATIONALITY

PhilosophicalEmphaseson Intuitionin ActionKnowledge

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considerable impact on writingabout teacher professionallearning,although it seems

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By way of illustration,a series of studies by Broadbent and others (Berry& Broadbent,

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task, unless the input-outputrelationshipwas obvious, when the learningbecame both

Mind as Symbol Container.As we have seen, the traditional model underlyingboth

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Mind as PatternRecognising Network.Althoughtherehad been partialprecursors,it was

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FIG. 1. Part of retinalfieldwithlightpatternfromstimulusfigure'5'.

The sortsof networkshownin Fig. 2 can act as patternrecognisers.That is, the

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(i) Similarityto Human Brain Structure.Because network models were based on

(ii) TypicallyHuman Flexibilityof Operation.Symbolic models operate at the level of

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(iii) GracefulDegradation. Similarly,human capacities are not generally'all or none'

(iv) ContentAddressableMemory.Because knowledgeis distributedin networksthrough

3. COMBINING THE STRANDS

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Just as I suggested earlier that Schon's emphasis on reflectionmay actually have

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offeredfordeclarativehas been procedural,even though the formerterm seems to refer

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(a) The Interplayof Implicitand ExplicitProcesses

(ii) Implicit Processesembeddedwithin Explicit Process. Another kind of possibility,

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can usefullyilluminatethis,with respect both to action and perception/representation.

(iii) DevelopmentalEvolution:Explicitto Implicit,Implicitto Explicit.These possibilitiesof

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(b) The Interplayof Proceduraland Descriptive

(ii) The SkilfulNature of Representation: Cognitionas Expertise.A final element in this

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ANDERSON,J.A. (Ed) (1981) Cognitive Skills and theirAcquisition (Hillsdale, NJ,

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Dr Peter Tomlinson, School of Education, Universityof Leeds, Leeds

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