SSH PREFACE sv cenaries ago, Napoleon warned, "Lee Chin sleep; when she ‘wakes, she wil shake the world.” Today China at awakened, and he world hepining to shake ‘Yer many Americans re sll denial about what Chinas erasfor- snason from agrarian bacowatec wo "the bigger player in che history of| ‘he world” means for he United States, What this book's Big Ia? In a phrae, Thucyiders Trap. When a rhng power theates to dplace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound: dangee ahead. China and the Usied Stats are curently on collision course for wat —unless both pares ae dficle and panfl scons to avert [Ara rapidly ascending Chins challenges Americ’ accustomed pre- dominance, these rwo nation ik fling inc a deadly wap fs \den- ‘ied by the ancient Greek hitorian Thacydides, Writing about 3 war that devastated the owo leading cerns of cael Grenee two snd + [al mllennia ago, he explained: “Te was the of Athens and the ir ‘ha this ined in Sparta chat made war inital.” “That primal night describes perlowe Motel paren. Review. Ing the record ofthe ast five hundred years, the Thucydides Trap Project fect at Harvard has found sixteen cues in which & major ations teas disrupted the postion of «dotsnant te. In the mor infamous example, an induntlal Germany ated Briss established postion the top ofthe pecking oder century ago. The catastrophicwt Price ‘outcome oftheir competition necessiated + new category of violent fonfict; world war. Our research finds chat rele oF these sven ned in war and four did not nota comforting io for the rwent)= ‘ra centry's most important geopolitical contest. ‘This isnot book about China. lee about che inp of «sing (Chins on the US and che global order. For seven decades since World ‘War ll role-based framework led by Washington has defined world conde, prodocing an er withour war among great powers. Mos people now think ofthis normal. Historian cll ia ae “Long Peace" To- day, an Snerssingy powerful China i unraveling this order, throwing {neo quetion the peace generations have taken for gence. 1 2015, the Allin published “The Thucpdider Tap: Are che US snd Chins headed for War?” In that ey I argued hat this iste ‘al metaphor provides the bet lene avaable for iominating relations ‘between China and the US today. Since chen, eh concept hs iguted | ‘considerable debate. Rather chan fice the evidence and reflec onthe ‘uncomfortable bur neesnry adjustments both sider might make, pol icy wonks and presidents alike have constructed a straw man around ‘Thucydides claim about “inevitably.” They have ehea put atorch to sa angung at war berween Washington and Beijing isnot pedeter ‘mined, Archeie 2015 summi, Presidents Barack Obama snd XiJiaping coed che Trap at length, Obama emphasize chat despite the steuc- tual res created by Chin's se, “the two countries are capable of| managing thee dssgrement.” At the sme time, they acknowledged ‘hat, a Xt words, "should major counties time and spun make the mistakes of astegie mitealclaton, they mighe crete such taps for themaelies” concur: wa berwsen the US and Chins is ne inevitable. Indeed, ‘Thucydides woold agree that nether war war beeween Athens and Sparta, Read in conten, it clear that he meant his clam about inee= seabiey at hyperbole: exaggeration for che purpose of emphasis. The point of Thucydides Trap eather flim oe pessimism. Tasted, ‘point ws beyond che headlines and regime thetori 0 recognize the Pre secroni srucrual ess that Beljng and Washington must maser to comsrvct pacefilrelasoneip. If Hollywood were making « movie pling China again che Unie State on the path eo war, central eating could not find so beter leading actors than Xi inping and Donald Trump. Each per soniis his county's deep aspeations of naional reatnes. Much as 2X appolatmeat as Inder of China in 2012 accentuated the role of the ring power, Americ election of Donald Trump ia. a campaign ‘hat ville China promises a more vigorous espouse from the raling power. As personales Trump and Xi could not be more difrent. As protagonists ina stroggle to be number one, however they share por- enous smut. Both + Ae deiven by common ambiion: to make shele uation great gi. + Leen the theie dream. + Take pride in their own unique laderthipcapabiies + See themselves playing a central olin revitalcing thee nation + Hive snnotnced dant domestic agendas hat el for radial tangas, “+ Hlave Ged up popait nationalist eppetto “deta the weg” of corruption a home and confront stems by each other to ‘wat cei acon store mission ruled by the other asthe principal obstacle eo ‘Wil the impending clash berween these two grest nations lead to ‘var? Wil Presidents Trump and Xi, or thei accessors, fellow in the agi footsteps of the lender of Athens and Sparta or Britain and Ger- ‘many? Or wiley Sn a wey co void war an effectively as Bein and the US did» century ago or the US and the Soviet Union did through four decades of Cold War? Obviously, no one knows. We ea be cet- ta, however, that che dynam Thucydides dented wilintensiy in the year ahead.: Pr Denying Thucydides Tip docs not make ile real. Recognising ‘edocs not mean jus accepting whatever happens. We ove to Fare rserations to face one of history's moet bral endencier head on and ‘hen do everything we canto defy the ods INTRODUCTION "hae ween my wok, nt atan cay wine appli of the ‘moment, bur ort poet forall ne —Thocyides, Hy fhe Peomsan Hr Hee ea on op ofthe world. We hae sived ash pak to sty hve freer Tere of coer, tis ting eld Botory Borhiory something unpleasant dt hapens to ohe peopl Atel Toyabs ling he 897 damon (ple eer of Quen Viera “ike exh prcaing ora, Fam often ad what the “le sons of inary” ae Tanewer tha he cay leon Ihave lear ‘Som dying the prt there no permaeat winner ed ioe asec Ga by if we only knew.” That wa the best the German chancellor ‘ould offer, Even when a colleague presed Theobald von Beth ‘mann Hollweg, he could aot explain how his choices, and howe of| other Boropean statesmen, had led to the most devastating war the ‘world had seen to that point. By the ene the slaughter of the Gest ‘War finally ended in 1918, the ey players had low ll they fought for: the Austro-Hungarian Empire diclved, the German Kier outed, the Ruslan tar overthrown, France Bled fr a generation, apd England ‘horn ofits treasure and youth. Aad for what? IF we only knew.ati Introduction ‘Bethunann Holley pate haunted the president ofthe United States neatly bal cenery ater. 1962, John F. Kennedy was for Sve yours ld and in hit second year in office, bt stil aruggling ro ge his mind around his eeponsibiles a commander in chief He knew that his Ginger was onthe bution ofa nuclear arsenal tha could ill hhendees of millions of human being aa mater of minutes. Bt for swhar? A slogan atthe time declared, "Beer dead than red.” Kennedy ejected that dichotomy a8 not jst fle, bu fle. “Our goal,” ashe putts ad oe "not peace a the expense of eedom, but both peace fd fieedom:” The question wat how he and is administration could achieve both ‘Ashe vacatoned atthe family compound on Cape Cod inthe sum mer of 1962, Kennedy found hisuelf reading The Gas of August, Ba tara Techman's compelling sceoone ofthe ouebreak of war in 1914 ‘Tuchman traced the thoughts and actions of Germany's Kalser Wil hel and his chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Beit’ King George nd his foreign secretary Edward Grey, Tsar Nicholas, Acstro-Hlungatian cmperor Franz Jove td others ar they sleepwaed into the abyss. "Tuchman argued that nove of these men understood che danger they faced, None wanted the war they got. Given the opporsniy fora do- cover, none would repeat the choke he made Redectng on his own ‘responsibilities, Kennedy pledged that fhe ever ound himself facing ‘choices that could make the diference hetween catastrophic wat and peace, be wold beable to give story berter answer than Bethmann Hollweg “Kennedy had no inkling of what ly ahead In October 1962, just ‘wo months afer he read Tuchman book, he fed off agast Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the more dangerous coufoattin in ha man history. The Cuban Misile Criss began when che United Sates Alacovered the Soviets stemptng to sneak muclen-tpped mises into (Cua, a mere ainety ales ftom Florida The situation quickly excae lated Hom diplomatic these to an American blockade ofthe ialand, ality mobiliacions in both che US and USSR, and several high- stakes clshes, including the shooting down of an American U-2 spy Intron a plave over Cubs, Ar the height ofthe crs, which lated for arate thireen diy, Kennedy cond eo his brocher Rober ha he believed the chance ¢ wos end in nuclear war were "between one-in-three and even.” Nothing historians have diucovered since hat lengthened ‘hos ods ‘Although he appreciated the dangers of hs predicament, Kennedy repeatedly made choles he kev actully ince hers of wa, lading nuclear wat. He chose to confront Khrushchev publely (eather than ty to resolve the sue peestcly through diplomatic chanel) to Arawean unambiguous ed lise requiring the removal of Soviet mises (ther than leave himself more wiggle room) o threaten alr tees to detzoy the mises (knowing this could rigger Soviet retaliation squint Brin); and ill, onthe penkimate day of che cris, tive [hrbchevaine-litedulimaram (Hu, fegjeced, wold have re _gired che US to fe the is sho Teach of thee choices, Kennedy undertond that he wa rising the rik tha further events ad choices by others beyond his contol could lead to maclear bombs deseroying American cies, including Washing- to, DC (wher i fil stayed thoughout the ordeal) For example, ‘when Kennedy elevated the alert level af the American nuclear arse ral eo Defcon The made US weapon les vulnerable toa preempelve Soviet atack but simultaneously relared a score of safety catches. At Defzon Il, German and Turkish lot tock their sets in NATO Sighter ‘bornber loaded with armed nuclear weapons et than wo hour away fom ehete args inthe Soviet Union. Since eleetonte locks on nu eae weapons had uot yet bee invented, there was no physial or tech cal burier preventing pilot fom deciding oy to Moscow, dop 3 nuclear bomb, and start World Wa I “With no way to with away thee “ids ofthe uncontrollable,” Kea ody and is secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, reached deeply {ato cxpminstional pocedne to mniniieescidens cr mites, De- spite thove efforts, historians have denied more than a dozen close call cotsde Kennodysspanof contol dha could haw packed a wat A US ancsubmarinecampiga, for example, dropped explosives arounda Initio Sovie rsbmarines force them to surfice, leading a Soe aptin to believe he wat under attack and sleet fe his nucleararmed otpe- does In another incidens, he plot of 2 U-2 spy craft mistakenly ew ‘over the Soviet Union, casing Khrushchev to far thar Washington ‘wa fining coordinates fora preemptive nuclear tack. IFone ofthese scion had sparked a nuclear World War I coald JFK exphin how his choices contbuted toi? Coad he give beter anver to an ings tors quention than Bethmann Hollweg did? “The compleriey of cemition in bunen sfc bas vexed philoo- pers, jr, abd socks, In analysing how wats break out stories focus primarlly on proximate, or immediate, cae. Inthe case of World War , these include the auastnation of the Hapbarg archdake Fans Ferdinand andthe decision by Tuar Nichola If to mo- biline Rowan fores agains he Cental Powers If the Cuban Mise (Coins had reed in war, the proximate cae cou have been the Soviet mbmarne cept’ derision to Sr his torpedoes rather than al- los his submstine to sink, oF + Turkish plo’'s era choice eo By hie nsclear payload ro otc. Proximate casts for war are undeniably important. Bat che founder of history believed thatthe moss obvious ues for bloodshed mask even more sgnfcant ones. More import- ane than the sparks that lead to war, Thucydides teaches us, are the several Etre that ly it found wise manageable events can exalate with unforseabe severey and ons: conditions in which other produce unimaginable comtequences ‘THUCYDIDES’s TRAP Inthe mot frequently cited one-line inthe tudy of international r- Iacons, the anclent Greek htoran Thucydides explained “twas the rite of Athens and the fue chat eis old in Sparta tht made wae inevitable” “Thueyides wrote about the Peloponnesian War,» conic tht en sclfed bis hoeneland, the cie-atate of Athens, inde fifth century nom, Intron 2 aod which in cime came to consume almot the entcery of ancient ‘Greece, A forme soldier, Thacpdides watched as Athens challenged the dominant Greek power ofthe day, dhe martial eity-sate of Sparta He observed che outbreak of armed hosliies erect the wo powers ad dead the Sightings hors tall. He didnot live tose its biter end, when a weakened Spare nally vanguited Athens, bu ii jae vel fri ‘Whale others Mente an array of contibuing cases of che Plo- ponnesian Wat, Thucydides wen othe heart ofthe mater. When he tured the spotlight on “the rite of Athens and the far that this i soled in Spat,” be ened a primary driver a the o9t of some of Mntory’s mow catatophic and pustling wars. Intentions aide, ‘when sng power threatens te dplace ruling power, the etling ‘nevrurlsrest makes 4 vjlent clash the rule, not the exception. It happened berween Athen and Spares in che fithcentary ace, between ‘Geemany ad Britain a century ago, and lmort led to war berween the Sovlee Union and che Unite Sets in he 19501 and 1960 ke o many others, Athens belived its advance to be benign. Over the half century tha preceded the confit, shad emerged at expe of civilization. Philowoply, drama, architecure, democracy, history, and naval prowess—Atheas had & al, beyond anyehing prevosily sen under che sun. es exp development began treet Spars, ‘which ad grown accustomed toes postion as the dominant power of {he Peloponete. Ar Athenian confidence and pride grew, 20 oo dies demands for respect and expectations that amangements be revised to reflec new relies of power. There were, Thucydides tells, natural reactions toes changing station. How could Athenians nor blieve that theis ners deerved more weight? How could Athenian not expect thar they shold ave gree inflvnce in reslving diferences? Bar it was ako natural, Thueyides explained, tha Spartans should tee the Athenian chime as unrewonable, and even ungrateful Who, Spartans ight asked, provided the scurry environment tat allowed Athens to loursh? Ae Athens swelled with 2 gowring sense of ies ommi Ibert smpovtancs, and fle enced to greater sy and sway, Sparta rected ‘with insecure, fe, and a dezerminaton to defend the stars qu. ‘Siar dynamicscan be Foundins hoe of oer setings, indeed even 1a families. When a young man's adolescen sarge poses the prospect ‘that he will overshadow his older sibling (reves is father}, what do ‘we expect? Should the allocation of Bedrooms, ot eloset space, oF seat= ing be adjusted vo reflect relive size a wells age? In alpha-dominated species ke grit, 4 potensial succes grows larger and stronger both th pack leader and the wannabe prepare for 3 showdown. In busine, when darupiv technologies allow upstart companies ike ‘Apple. Google, or Uber to break quickly lao new industries, the r= salts offen ice competition tat Force enablshed compe Uke Hlewlest-Packard, Microsoft oc tax operators to adapt their busines model: —or perth. “Thucydides Tap refers othe naar, inevitable dscombebulaton that occurs when 4 tng power ehrestens to place a ruling power. “Thiscan happen in any sphere. Butts ipleations are mos dangeross In international ar, For jus asthe original iseance of Thucydides’ “Tap resale ina war that brought ancient Greece tos knees, this ‘Phenomenon has haunted diplomacy i she mllenna since. Today i nase the world's ewo bigger power oa a path roa ataclysm nobody ‘rants, but which they may prove unable to avoid ARE THE US AND CHINA DESTINED FOR WAR? “The world har never seen saything hike the rapid, tectonic hf inthe flobal balance of power eeatod by the rv of Chins. che US were a corporation, i would have acounted for 50 percent ofthe global eco- ‘nomic maket in the years immediately fee World Wat HI. By 1980, that had declined to 22 percent. Thzee decades of double-digit Chi- ese growth hs redace that US share to 16 potent today If curzent teends continue, che US share of global economic output will decline farther over the net thre decades to jus 1 percent, Over this sare pod, Chin's share of che global economy will have soared from 2 percent in 1980 o 18 petcene in 2016, well ons way co 30 percent in 2000. ‘Chicas economic development ix ansorming i ince 2 formida- ble politcal and miltary competitor. Dring she Cold Wer, 2 he US mounted camry responses to Soviet provocations, ign inthe Pets- poe std: “If we ever fced a el enemy, we would bein deep rouble.” (Chins serious potential enemy "The powiblty tha the United States and China coeld find chem selves at war peat at unikely a would be snore. The centennial tecilng World War I, however, have reminded wt of man's pacity for flly. When we say cat wa i “inconceivable.” hia statement shone what i powuble in the world —or only about what our limited minds can conceive? ‘As fir shesd atthe aye cana, the defining quewtion about glotal onde s whether China andthe US can exape Thucydides’ Trp, Most ‘oncets tha fi hie pattern have ended buy. Over the past ive bo ied yess ia seteen cater 2 major ssing power bas dreatened eo dis- place a ruling power. In emelve of thot, the rele wat war. The four ‘oes cht avoided tht ouscome did zo only because of huge, painfl djstments in arcade and actions onthe pst of challenge and cal- Teoged ae. "The United States and China can lkewite avoid war, butonly they can ioteraaize two dilficuleuths. Past, onthe current actor, ws Between the US and China nthe decades aad i not jut pile, bu mach mri than carey resend Indeed, 0 the iri ecord, war ‘moc likely than not. By wnderertimazing che danger, moreover, we Md othe risk, IFleader in Beijing and Washington keep doing what they hive done for the pts decade, the US and China wil almost cer tainly wind up st war. Second, arent neal, History shows chat smsjor ruling powers an manage rons with vals even thote ct Shresten to overtake chem, without triggering 2 wit. The reat of| hore acces, a wll ar the filare, or many esos for statesmen sedey. As George Sentayana noted nly those who il to study history ae condemned to repeata Inaction “The chapters tha fllow describe the origins of Thucydides Tp, ‘explote ic dynamic, and explain ts mplicasons forthe pretest com text berwen the US and Chin, Part Oe provides succinct summary ‘ofthe ite of Chins, Everyone knows about China's groweh but few have realized se magnine or consequences. To paraphrase former (Czech president Vilw Havel, tas happened so quickly that we have not yet had dine wo be astonished. Par Two loctesrecne developments ia US-China elation onthe broader canes of istory. This not only helps ws underwand curent vents, bo ls provider cues abou where events ae trending. Our review stretches ack 2500 yar, to the ie when the rapid growth of Athens shocked s dominant maria Sparta ad led to the Plopoa- ‘nesan War. Key example fom the pat $00 year lio provide tsights tnxo the ways in which the tension between ring and ruling powers can ee the chessboard toward war. The covet analogue to de current seandof— Germanys challenge to Betas rling global empire be- fore Word War —shoald give wll pause ‘Pare Thre asks whether we should se carrer trends in America's relations with China sa gathering storm of similar proportions. Dally media report of Chin's “aggrenive” behavior and unwilingnee 0 accept the “international rles-bued order” established by the US af ter World War Il describe incident and sccdentreminicent of 1914 A the same tie, 2 dove of self-awareness is due. IF China were "Jost |Wke ue" when the US ban nto che wench century brimming wich ‘confidence thatthe hundeed yearsabead woold bean Amesean ea the rivalry would be even more severe and war even arder to void If acwaly followed in Americ’ footsteps, we should expect sce Chi- nee eroops enforcing Beings wl om Mongols to Aust, jst “Theodore Rootevl molded “our hemisphere” co his king, ‘China following diferent eraectry than did the United States dang ts own surge to primacy. Buti many apets of China'rte, we ‘anhesr echoes. What does President X:Jnping's China want? In one tine: to make China great again The deepest aepetion of ver abilion ‘Chine cizens ito make thelr mation not only eich, but ako pow Iriredtion ate fa. Indeed, thee goal i China 20 sch and so powerfil tht other ations wl have ne choie but to recognize is intrest and give ithe respect that deserves The sheer sae and ambition of this "China Dream” should diabuse wi of any notion thatthe contre between (China and the United States will naturally subside a Chins becomes 2 "rexpousble tabolder.” This especially so given wha my former colleague Senn Huntington famously called a “elth of cilizationy 1 bisrseldijoncton in which fundamentally different Chinete and ‘American values and radiions make rapprochement berween there ‘powers even more elusive. ‘While resolution ofthe presen evaley muy seem dial to freee, sual armed confict appears distant. Buti 1? Ta teuth the paths to wa ae more varied and plauble (nd even mundane) than we want to believe. From current confonttions in the Soath China Sea, the ast China Sea and eyberspace, co a trade cont chat spirals out of| contol si fighteninglyeaty to develop senarioe in which Amer- ‘anand Chinese solders ae killing each oter. Though none of these ‘eenarioe rem Mlly, when we recall he unintended contequences of {he aasnation ofthe Hapsburg archdske or of Khrushchev’ maceat sdventure in Cuba, we are reminded of jut ow marow the papi be- teen “unlikely” and “imposible.” ‘Pare Four explaioe why wat it mi inevitable, Most of the policy -commenity and gencrl public ate alvely complacent aboot the pos Dlity of war. Fatale, meanwhile, sean ire force epilyap- proaching an immovable object. Neither de hai right. I lade in ‘oth sees wil eudy the sucese and furs ofthe pat, they wil finda Hic source of clus from which to fshion 2 strategy that can meet each nation’ eee ners without wa. ‘The rerum to prominence ofa 5,000-yea-oldcizaion with 1.4 bilion people tot problem tobe fixed. Ie sendin —a chronic condition tht will ave co be managed over a generation, Sacre will requlee not just anew slogan, more frequent presidental summits, oF dicional meetings of departmental working groups. Managing this relaionship without war will demand sotinedatenton, week by= Inerebsion week, at she highest levels in both governments. Ie will requie a depth Df mevaal understanding nt seen since the Henry Kisinger-Zhou En~ lat conversations thar reestablished US-China zlasons inthe 1970 Most significant, wll mean sure radical changes in atcitudes and 2c- tions by lenders and the public alike than anyone has yer undertaken, To scape Thucydides’ Trop, we must be willing to hinkthe unthinkable wrth imagine the unimaginable, Avoing Tacyies's Trap n this case wil require nothing les than bending the arc of history