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EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism


as External Relations Practice in
EU–Africa Relations
a
Toni Haastrup
a
Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick , UK
Published online: 23 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Toni Haastrup (2013) EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as External
Relations Practice in EU–Africa Relations, Journal of European Integration, 35:7, 785-800, DOI:
10.1080/07036337.2012.744754

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European Integration, 2013
Vol. 35, No. 7, 785–800, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2012.744754

ARTICLE

EU as Mentor? Promoting
Regionalism as External Relations
Practice in EU–Africa Relations
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TONI HAASTRUP
Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK

ABSTRACT This article examines regionalism in the context of the EU inter-regional


relations with Africa. It especially focuses on the EU–African Union (AU) relation-
ship. It evaluates this relationship using a typology based on the policy diffusion lit-
erature and challenges the notion that the AU is a model of the EU. It addresses the
institutionalisation of Africa’s own regional integration process in the context of the
EU’s broader external relations practice, which prioritises support for local processes.
Rather than a model, the article argues that the EU is best placed to serve as mentor
to the AU as the latter seeks to foster regional integration in Africa. By mentoring,
the EU is able to fulfil its overarching external relations commitments to local
ownership, and realise deepened further integration in Africa.

KEY WORDS: Diffusion, EU–Africa relations, local ownership, mentor, regionalism,


external relations

‘Our European Model of Integration is the most developed in the


world. Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a conti-
nental scale… I believe we can make a convincing case that it would
also work globally’ (Prodi 2000, p. 7).

Introduction
One scholar of regionalism1 recently asked why regional organisations
share key institutions and policies (Jetschke 2010). Despite the divergences
in their histories, this scholar like others assumes that the EU is a model
for Africa’s new regional organisation, the African Union (AU). The rela-

Correspondence Address: Toni Haastrup, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and
Regionalisation, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4
7AL, UK. Email: toni.haastrup@warwick.ac.uk

Ó 2013 Taylor & Francis


786 Toni Haastrup

tionship between the EU and the AU is especially important for appraising


EU external relations roles especially since many of its bilateral partner-
ships suggest a preference for region-to-region cooperation.2
Most assessments of the EU’s relationship with other regions suggest
that its promotion of regionalism is motivated by its desire for self-replica-
tion (Avery 1973; Smith 2008). Essentially, they often conclude that the
EU seeks to create replicate its ‘model’ to the rest of the world (European
Commission 1995, 2008; Smith 2008). On a related note, there is also the
suggestion that the EU’s relationship with other regions is driven by its
need to legitimise its own international role to its member states, and
other actors in the international system (Manners 2002; Schmidt 2004;
Barbé et al. 2009). While this provides an alternative motivation, this
method too seeks a modelling of the EU externally.
This article examines the processes through which the EU promotes its
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own ideas and practices about regionalism using the recent diffusion litera-
ture. It argues that while the EU seeks to share its experiences of regional-
ism by mentoring the AU, the EU literature has interpreted regional
integration promotion as the EU’s attempt to model itself externally. In
this article, I highlight the tension between the opportunities to promote
the EU’s version of regionalism within an inter-regional framework of the
EU’s broader external relations commitments, and the narrative of the ‘EU
as Model’ literature. Thus, while acknowledging the dominance of the EU
perspective in regional integration studies, the article attempts to challenge
the dominant discourse that suggests that the EU model of integration is
the priority for engagement with other regions. By examining the process
of regionalism in Africa, the article offers a critique of the policy diffusion
typology of regional integration processes.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it addresses a brief history of
regionalism in Africa, leading to the creation of the AU. Second, it traces
the similarities between the EU and the AU, focusing on the bureaucratic
organisational and policy frameworks, while highlighting some of the
divergence. In the third section, the article critically examines the extent to
which the typology that applies policy diffusion literature to EU integra-
tion is useful in determining whether the EU model is replicated exter-
nally. The fourth section explores the limits to the diffusion literature and
finally concludes that while promoting regionalism is a useful EU external
relations strategy, it must be understood in the context of broader external
relations processes, and Africa’s own regional imperatives.

The Emergence of a Regional Interlocutor: The African Union


In 1999 the negotiations to create a new regional organisation to replace
the now defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) were concluded in
Sirte, Libya. The leaders of Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa espe-
cially pushed for the creation of the new AU. Following negotiations, the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the AU’s founding charter was
adopted on 11 July 2000 (OAU 2000). On 9 July 2002, in Durban South
EU as Mentor 787

Africa, 53 African heads of states held their last meeting of the OAU and
ushered in a new regional organisation, the AU.
The Constitutive Act defines the objectives of the AU. Inter alia, they
include the promotion of ‘democratic principles and institutions, popular
participation and good governance’ (AU 2000, article 3, pp. 4-5). Further,
the central aims of the AU also include the acceleration of African states’
political and socio-economic integration. In addition to accelerating inte-
gration, the AU is tasked with addressing the holistic experiences of the
continent since the first wave of independence in 1960. Consequently, this
new member of the international community must combat poverty dis-
eases like HIV/AIDs, attain universal education for young Africans, espe-
cially girls, and tackle state fragility and insecurity, to name a few
challenges (see Murithi 2005; Akokpari et al. 2007; Engel and Gomes
Porto 2010). It is clear in the case of the AU that the regionalisation pro-
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cess towards deeper integration favours an initial political trajectory con-


currently or prior to an economic one.
From the African perspective, the creation of the AU has been
prompted primarily by the failures of the OAU. Founded on 25 May
1963, the OAU was created as a reaction to colonial rule and apartheid.
Consequently, the OAU was a political rather than an economic institu-
tion, unlike the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic Community
(ECC). However, as the pressing concerns of colonialism and apartheid
evolved into widespread insecurity and continued poverty in Africa, espe-
cially in the aftermath of the Cold War, the OAU could not address these
new challenges. In 1991 the Abuja Treaty, which proposed an economic
and monetary union in Africa, added an economic dimension to the
OAU. Its aim was to provide a better life for Africans; yet, as of 2006,
63 per cent of the poorest countries in the world were in Africa (World
Bank 2006). Additionally, there is lack of transparency in the governance
structures within Africa. The incapacity to deal with the challenges of
development (as identified in the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs)) further increased poverty and insecurity on the continent.
During the 1990s, the OAU was heavily criticised for not engaging in
Africa’s worst humanitarian crises like the Rwandan genocide, the state
failure in Somalia and the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
These events created the impetus for the shift from the old OAU agenda
to the establishment of newer instruments such as the 2001 New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the AU. In adopting these
new imperatives, the AU, for example, ‘explicitly recognises the right to
intervene in a member on humanitarian and human rights grounds’
(Cohen and O’Neill, cited in Hanson 2008) based on its commitments to
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. This suggests the AU’s aspirations
to represent Africa within the international community by adopting
accepted global norms. Based on the imperatives to the AU’s formation
we expect a marked difference from other contemporary regional group-
ings, especially the EU where economics came before politics. Neverthe-
less, at first glance, there are many similarities between the AU and EU’s
regionalisms.
788 Toni Haastrup

So why does the AU resemble the EU organisationally given the various


attempts and experiences of regionalism within a unique African context?
Let us consider the various factors that contribute to explaining why the
new drive for regionalism in Africa resembles some European processes.
It has been argued from the European perspective that the EU actively
promotes regionalism as a policy objective. Thus, by having a specific
foreign policy of regionalism, the most probable outcome of the EU’s
external relations process is the replication of itself. Taking this approach,
Africa is not the only region where the EU seeks to duplicate its own
process. Indeed, the EU promotes regionalism in Asia (through the Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)) and Latin America (through
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR; Southern Common Market)).
In examining regionalism broadly, however, another explanation for the
increase in regional organisations is that this is the new way through
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which international cooperation is being organised to deal with challenges


of the international system. Essentially, then, regionalisation is the out-
come of international (re)ordering further facilitated by globalisation
(Spindler 2002).3 As such, regionalism in Africa simply forms a part of the
general trend within the global political system. Indeed, specialists in Afri-
can studies have often explained the formation of the AU as a way for
Africa to deal with its problems within a global context. Therefore, since
the EU is the most integrated regional institutional entity, it inspires others
to be just like it.
In both contexts, the EU takes centre stage in the study of regional-
ism. The EU’s approach to regionalism in Africa is especially important
given the historical relationship between Europe and Africa, the ongo-
ing EU–Africa relations and the attempt by African countries to engen-
der further integration through the AU. Further, given that the EU
external relations activities favour region-to-region cooperation, it is
analytically timely to examine how regionalism is pursued in EU–Africa
relations.

Tracing Institutional Similarities in the EU and the AU


In linking the motivation for regionalism in Africa through the AU and
explaining how it is perceived as modelled on the EU, we observe the spe-
cific organisational similarities. Despite the increased volume of literature
on the AU (e.g. see Murithi 2005; Francis 2006; Adejumobi and Olukoshi
2008; Akokpari et al. 2007; Engel and Gomes Porto 2010; Mangala
2010a, 2010b; Murithi 2010) it is still an under-researched organisation.
Thus, the nature of the discourse on the AU is still limited compared to
other similar organisations. Consequently, it has been conceptually chal-
lenging to study the AU in a comparative perspective. Indeed, some schol-
ars from the Global North who have shown an interest in the continental
integration process have also questioned the legitimacy of the AU to speak
for the whole of Africa (Clapham 1999; Söderbaum 2010). Certainly, the
AU is plagued by difficulty in maintaining consensus especially given its
intergovernmental governance structure (Murithi 2010). Additionally, state
EU as Mentor 789

fragility or weakness means that it is difficult for African states to promote


regionalism within their communities.
Yet, those studying the AU in the context of global governance regimes
acknowledge that regional organisations are an ‘important intermediary
between the global and the local’ (Crossley 2011). Regional organisations
understand the local situation, are often more accepted than outsiders and
more committed to engage for the medium to long term. For this reason,
the AU deserves broader examination. This article then presents another
opportunity to explore the organisational structure of Africa’s core
interlocutor with the aim of highlighting its similarities to its European
counterpart.
The Constitutive Act sets out nine institutions and these make up the
AU. They include the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, the
Executive Council, Specialized Technical Committees, the Pan-African Par-
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liament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representa-


tives Committee, and the Economic and Cultural Council. Of these, the
roles of the Assembly, the Commission and the Parliament are worth
noting.
The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments is the decision-mak-
ing organ of the AU. As the central organ of the AU, the Assembly has
the final decision-making power on legislations and actions on issues, for
example, related to conflict resolution. Presently, the Assembly meets twice
annually. The head of the Assembly is a head of state or government who
holds a year’s term. This accession to the head of the Assembly is attained
on a rotational basis among all member states. While it is the main deci-
sion-making organ, the Assembly leaves the implementation of policies
and various programmes to the AU Commission. The Assembly resembles
the Council of the EU.
The AU Commission, like its EU counterpart, is the bureaucratic epicen-
tre of the regional organisation. The AU Commission is managed by com-
missioners who are in turn led by the chairman of the Commission, the
main spokesperson for the AU. The Commission consists of eight director-
ates, which consist of various departments. These directorates deal with
the daily work of the AU. Of these the most developed is arguably the
Peace and Security Directorate, which receives the most from the AU’s
budget.
The Pan-African Parliament, formed in 2004, is based in Midrand,
South Africa. The Parliament is organised around 10 permanent policy
committees and its members are not universally elected, unlike in the EU.
Rather, national legislatures elect representatives to the continental Parlia-
ment. Although a legislative body, it lacks teeth and must defer to the
Assembly of the AU before adopting any laws. Arguably, it resembles the
EU Parliament pre-1979 when the first direct elections occurred. Although
there have been calls to give the Parliament more power, thus far, there
has been no indication to increase the powers or accessibility of the Pan-
African Parliament.
The AU clearly follows an organisational design that is very similar to
the EU called organisational mirroring. In addition to organisational
790 Toni Haastrup

mirroring, the AU has also borrowed policy frameworks from the EU. For
example, similar to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the
AU has its Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). How-
ever, while the EU’s CSDP constitutes an institutional framework and not
a single policy, the CADSP outlines the continental strategy to integrate
security forces including the police and armies of African countries, and
resolve conflicts on the continent. Unlike the CSDP, which includes some
activities undertaken supranationally, the CADSP remains very
aspirational with intergovernmentality dominating all AU foreign policy
activities.
Evidently, there are parallels between the EU and the AU. However, not
all similarities are definitive proof of organisational mirroring. One exam-
ple of this is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU and EU’s
Political and Security Committee. Despite shared abbreviations and the
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similarities in interests, they are nevertheless different. Unlike the EU’s per-
manent committee, which consist of Brussels-based ambassadors from all
member states, it is widely accepted that the AU’s PSC was inspired by
the United Nations’ Security Council. It includes representatives from each
African sub-region with rotational representation of 15 member states for
two- and three-year limits.
Similarly there is the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the
African Union (ECOSOCC). Superficially, it bears resemblance to EU’s
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). Both are forums for
including ‘civil society’ in the governance process of the regional organisa-
tions. However, while the EU’s EESC is mainly a consultative space for
special interests groups, particularly trade unions and employers organisa-
tions, the ECOSOCC is the voice for civil society within the AU from
diverse sectors in Africa and the African diaspora. It thus takes its design
inspiration from the UN’s Economic and Social Council.
A challenge, then, for comparative regionalism scholars is to broaden
analyses that considers how interests that are specific to the history,
culture and traditions of a particular region are embedded within organi-
sations.4 For instance, the main influence in the African path to further
regional integration is the ideology of pan-Africanism. An ideology borne
out of colonialism, it has influenced the African discourse on decolonisa-
tion and post-colonial state-formation process and region building. Pan-
Africanism seeks ‘the unification of African forces against imperialism and
colonial domination’ (Asante 1997, 32). Pan-Africanism, in part at least,
explains the distinctiveness of Africa’s regionalism in that it attaches an
empancipatory discourse to the concept. As Gandois (2005, 14, emphasis
added) notes, ‘the early link between regionalism and pan-Africanism has
left an unending imprint that shaped – and continues to shape – the dis-
course on African regionalism.’ We see then that Africa’s colonial legacy
motivates its regional processes and is a key component of regionalism is
the harmonisation of francophone, anglophone and lusophone Africa.
Indeed, this underlying ideology of pan-Africanism and the colonial expe-
rience provides a shared narrative of being African, which is not as appar-
ent in Europe.
EU as Mentor 791

For its part, EU emerged from post-Second World War Europe, and the
desire for merging European economies in the belief that greater interde-
pendence prevents conflict. Moreover, decision-making within the EU is a
shared process between member states and the European Commission and
thus the EU functions on a mix of supranationality and intergovernmental-
ism (Bach 2006). The AU Commission however, has no decision-making
powers and has to defer to the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment, thus making the AU Commission fully intergovernmental. This,
however, is not surprising since the majority of the issues that the AU han-
dles are in the sensitive area of peace and security, which is still mainly
within the remit of nation states. While the EU’s organisational structures
are further developed than the AU’s, the idea of a Union in Africa is more
potent than in Europe, especially when considering Euro-sceptism, in
member states like Britain, is accepted (White 2012).
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Bach (2006) has also noted that the lack of sovereign abilities within
the AU should not be automatically viewed as a flaw, but rather its
strengths should be gauged by the ability of the member states to adhere
to the decisions taken. He, however, admits that an institution that lacks
substantive funding or commitment and ownership by member states
could lead to stagnation (Bach 2006). Stagnation for Africa translates to
the inability to embed the shared narrative of pan-Africanism, thus stalling
further regional integration. In an effort to mitigate stagnation by embed-
ding institutional development as part of the regionalisation process in
Africa, the EU is committed to sharing its own experiences of regionalism
with the new institution, the AU.

Diffusing Regional Integration to Africa? A European Approach


The EU’s opportunity to diffuse its regional integration practices comes
through its region-to-region cooperation; I argue that presently the AU
requires the EU’s support to develop the AU as a regional actor. This sup-
port is given through a specific inter-regional arrangement achieved
through constant dialogue and joint projects. This arrangement is charac-
terised by institutional and policy cooperation between the two regional
actors and is grounded on the principles of equality, partnership and local
ownership. While this approach to regionalism welcomes a European
input, it emphasises support for Africa’s local imperatives and process.
To analyse the potential of this relationship between the EU and regio-
nal organisations like the AU, scholars have turned to the public policy
concept of diffusion. This approach assumes that the EU’s activities to
promote regionalism elsewhere are motivated by self-replication with the
potential to increase the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor (self-jus-
tification). In this context, diffusion could be conceptualised as a process
where EU ideas, norms and practices spread through inter-regional policy
frameworks (see Strang and Meyer 1993; Börzel and Risse 2009a, b).
Börzel and Risse (2009b) have established a typology of five mecha-
nisms to illustrate how regional organisations emulate each other (Table 1).
Using this typology, the article evaluates the extent to which the recent
‘EU as a Model’ literature captures the nature of organisational similarities
792 Toni Haastrup

Table 1. Mechanisms of diffusion

Social mechanism and underlying


theory of social action Promoter of ideas (sender)
Coercion (legal and physical Coercive authority; legal or physical force
imposition)
Manipulation of utility calculations Positive and negative incentives
(instrumental rationality)
Socialisation (normative Promote ideas through providing an
rationality) authoritative model (normative pressure)
Persuasion (communicative Promote ideas as legitimate or true through
rationality) reason giving
Emulation (indirect influence) Promoting comparison and competition –
strictly speaking this mechanism does not
(a) Lesson drawing (instrumental require the active promotion of ideas
rationality)
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(b) Mimicry (normative


rationality)

Source: Börzel and Risse (2009b).

between the EU and its regional partners and addresses the implications of
this approach.
Börzel and Risse (2009b) note that coercion is the most overlooked
mechanism in the diffusion process since there is the assumption that the
diffusion of ideas is voluntary. While Borzel and Risse are right that coer-
cion is often overlooked as a strategy of EU external relations engagement,
they assume incorrectly that the EU has not used coercion in its external
relations attributing this to its identity as a civilian power. However, the
EU is more than a civilian power, as the term assumes a benign policy
(Haastrup 2010). Further, it does not accurately reflect the range of EU
activities in international affairs.
Looking back at the EU’s history with Africa, there is evidence of the
coercion. In the post-independence era, the EU governed its foreign aid
policies within a regime that brought together the EU on the one hand
and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on the other. With the
exception of their colonial history, these three distinct geographical
regions lacked substantive commonality. Indeed, even within Africa there
was substantive divergences between the anglophone, francophone and
lusophone countries (for further discussion, see Gandois 2005). So
although relatively cohesive today, the ACP was an alliance primary
formed to engage with the EU, which was more interested in dealing with
groupings rather than individual countries (Frisch 2008). The series of
agreements between the EU and ACP in which the EU clearly benefitted
more than the ACP countries is evidence of the EU’s coercive legal abilities
(see Dunlop, Van Hove and Szepesi 2004). Concerning the EU–ACP
Cotonou agreement, for example, Hurt (2003) argues that the EU
exercised hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism with the African ACP
countries, capitalising on the weaknesses of the ACP grouping when
preparing for trade negotiations. Thus, while the EU may be unable to
marshal a coercive military force, it can still be coercive.
EU as Mentor 793

The transmission of norms or practices about regionalism does not


occur in a vacuum of abstractness but requires specific actions. The
diffusion typology thus sees the coercive mechanism used concurrently
with others. To convince actors to take a certain course of action then,
the manipulation of utility calculations is useful. The EU as a dominant
regional entity can provide ‘negative and positive incentives’ to ensure
adaptation to its model (Börzel and Risse 2009b). In Africa, the positive
incentive was the promise of access to European markets through prefer-
ential trade. In addition, the EU provided capacity-building programmes
for socio-economic development and substantive monetary aid to mostly
unaccountable African governments.
This positive incentive made the ACP group desirable to join. Yet, the
EU also negatively used incentives to induce the ACP countries to accept
its preferences or normative values, using conditionalities. Conditionalities
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are the requirements put on how aid money is spent. For example, in the
post-Cold War years, the EU’s conditionalities to ACP countries included
better human rights records, more transparency and the move towards
democratic governance. Although universal, these norms have also been
identified as intrinsic to the EU’s own integration model (Manners 2002).
While the EU–ACP relationship still exists, both EU and AU states have
re-committed to an inter-regional relationship. Thus, the exchange of ideas
on regionalism takes place in the context of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy
(JAES), especially through ministerial meetings or troikas. The JAES is a
partnership that prioritises the relations between EU and the AU in the
overall context of existing EU–Africa relations. It is based in part on the
institutionalisation of existing EU–Africa relations, but has also been dri-
ven by the changing international system, which has encouraged more
cooperation among states. This framework came into force in December
2007 during the Portuguese presidency of the EU. The JAES provides the
EU with the opportunity to mentor Africa into deepened integration as it
calls for constant dialogue and engagement. Unlike previous arrangements,
the JAES emphasises equality, partnership and local ownership as the basis
of new EU–Africa relations. Potentially it challenges the prioritisation of
the EU as a model of self-replication and/or self-justification. To what
extent then are the remaining mechanisms of diffusion – socialisation, per-
suasion and emulation – relevant for understanding the regionalism in
Africa as an aim of EU–Africa relations?
Socialisation describes the internalisation of international norms by
actors so that they are acceptable to other members of international soci-
ety (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This process is not instrumental but
rather follows ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989, 1998).
Essentially, actors seek to be normatively ‘good’. Ostensibly, in internalis-
ing new norms and rules, these actors have to redefine their interests, so
that it converges with those of other actors. In assessing regionalism in
Africa, the AU arguably reflects that there are elements of normative
alignment resulting from socialisation of international norms.
Although Manners (2002) identifies nine norms (five major, four minor)
that the EU seeks to promote and suggests that through these norms, the
794 Toni Haastrup

EU shapes what is ‘normal’ in the international system, the evidence that


this is the result of EU diffusion is lacking. While the Constitutive Act
commits to ‘promote sustainable development’, ‘ unity, solidarity, cohe-
sion and cooperation’, ‘respect for democratic principles, human rights,
the rule of law and good governance’ AU 2000, Article 3, p. 4, which
reflects many of the EU’s own norms, Manners (2002) too admits that
these norms as not ‘European’ norms per se, but universal.5 Consequently,
where these norms have emerged from is contested. Nevertheless, the EU
strives to embed them in the context of its inter-regional engagement and
support for African regional integration implemented by the AU. For
example, when in 2009 the AU PSC issued sanctions against the military
regime in Mauritania, it asked the EU to help impose the sanctions, which
the EU supported (European Commission 2009). By explicitly supporting
the AU, the EU resorted to its own external relations tool for democracy
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promotion in third countries (Kelly 2004; Vachudova 2005; Youngs et al.


2006). Although this provided a learning opportunity for the AU to embed
norms of democracy, the main motivation for EU action is its broader
commitments to support the AU rather than teach a lesson in regionalism.
Persuasion is the fourth mechanism in the typology wherein an actor
aims to convince another that their position is valid. Validity is defended
by establishing the legitimacy of the normative position through constant
dialogue. According to Börzel and Risse (2009a), socialisation and persua-
sion have internal and external dimensions. What concerns us here is the
external dimension, which the EU attempts to achieve through the Joint
Africa–EU Strategy. Indeed, the achievement of the JAES itself could speak
to the ability of the EU to convince its African partners of the veracity of
its own regional approaches. Policy documents like the EU Strategy for
Africa, and the subsequent negotiations between 2005 and 2007 leading
to the JAES, suggest that the EU was able to persuade the newly formed
AU to establish another form of region-to-region cooperation outside of
the ACP grouping. Yet, the EU has been unable to persuade AU member
states to sign the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). It has been
argued that the EPAs are founded on a neoliberal macroeconomic model
that ultimately undermines continental regionalism in Africa (Hurt 2003;
Byron 2007; Chulu 2012). What this suggests is that the EU’s ability to
persuade the AU to adopt the European model is dependent on whether
the proposed action aligns with the AU’s own broader aims of deeper
integration.
According to Börzel and Risse’s (2009b) typology, the EU has limited
control over the emulation process (see also DiMaggio and Powell 1983,
1991). In this process of emulation, the central role of external actors in a
given organisation is to encourage comparison and competition. Essen-
tially, to promote its own model of regionalism in Africa, the EU encour-
ages competition among the regions in which its engages. Taking this
view, the progress of Africa’s regionalism is measurable through peer
review benchmarks placed within the JAES. As it attempts to fulfil its obli-
gations in this inter-regional context, then the AU inevitably borrows from
the EU as an example of good practice because of the inter-regional
EU as Mentor 795

arrangement, which enables a close working relationship. Proponents of


norm contagion, the intentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other
political actors (Whitehead 1996), further contend that emulation occurs
when there is dissatisfaction with the status quo, and a method has
worked elsewhere for similar purposes (see Strang and Tuma 1993;
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Acharya 2004). This perspective also notes
that external pressure is unnecessary for emulation to occur.
Viewed in this way, emulation is evident in the Africa’s adoption of
similar organisational structures without coercion. It is however not evi-
dent that the EU’s organisational type has been selected to adopt the Euro-
pean model in Africa. An alternative explanation is that the similarities
between the EU and the AU are a result of policy transfers that co-opt
frameworks and practices that have been successful elsewhere for similar
circumstances. Thus, the recent interpretation of the EU’s external promo-
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tion of regionalism as found in the policy diffusion literature, does not


supply a convincing motive for institutional emulation in Africa as the
modelling the EU.
Evidently, there are inherent limitations to the assumptions of the domi-
nant policy diffusion narrative that attempts to explain organisational sim-
ilarities as evidence of the diffusion of an EU model of regional
integration. The approach taken by the policy diffusion approach is at
odds with the practice of EU’s engagement in Africa. While the diffusion
literature seemingly echoes the European motivation for promoting region-
alism (see Prodi 2000), in practice this attitude is inconsistent with the
EU’s broader external relations strategy. So how can the EU elites and EU
integration studies align themselves with a broader external relations
agenda? The subsequent section highlights some of the criticisms levied
against assumptions found in the policy diffusion literature, as well as the
empirical challenges, that prevent the adoption of the EU as a model in
Africa.

Challenging the Diffusion Model: Mentoring as External Relations


Priority
A conceptual critique to the diffusion literature’s articulation of the simi-
larities between regional organisations is that it assumes that there is
always an origin and a completion within the diffusion process. It thus
categorises regional actors into two camps: leaders and followers (Beeson
and Stone 2012). In this context then the EU is the leader and the AU the
follower. This is problematic. Granted, a southern literature on regional
diffusion is non-existent; invariably the analysis of regional diffusion is
consistent with northern subjectivities. So, while the normative ideals
being promoted by the EU might themselves be unproblematic, viewed
through the lenses of diffusion the EU faces the potential criticism of being
neocolonial and arrogant, which confounds the idea of legitimately pro-
moting regionalism. The narrative presented in the recent diffusion litera-
ture thus contains an implicit Eurocentrism even as it attempts to
eliminate this in EU external relations practice. Hence, while it may be
796 Toni Haastrup

unavoidable as the EU still stands as the most integrated regional entity,


the lack of self-reflexivity among diffusion adherents constitutes an
analytical shortcoming.
Stone (2011, 3) further argues that the prevailing sense within the ‘diffu-
sion’ literature is that norms are absorbed by ‘osmosis’ and suggests an
inevitability to the absorption of the norms. Yet, the empirical observation
of EU–AU relations suggests that the AU often adopts only best practices,
in the context of its own integration needs, rather than a wholesale
absorption of the EU regional processes. Stone (2011) suggests that in
focusing on the patterns of absorption, the diffusion literature, codified in
the Börzel and Risse (2009b) typology, ignores the political dynamics of
interest. In deferring to the transfer literature, diffusion (and absorption) is
determined by the local political dynamics as much as the external pres-
sures (see Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007). In other words, the AU
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regional imperatives are just as important as the EU’s foreign policy goals.
The idea of the EU as a model to be absorbed is therefore subjective to
northern practices (Stone 2011; Beeson and Stone 2012).
Additionally and in practical terms, pushing the EU as a model is prob-
lematic. As Babarinde (2007) notes, the AU has yet to achieve the sophisti-
cation in its own integration processes that is needed to absorb the EU
model as it is. One of the main challenges to the AU’s ability to foster
regionalism in Africa is its bureaucratic development due to under-staffing
and financial constraints. In recognition of this, the EU, for example,
funds AU liaison offices in post-conflict African countries. These offices
help the AU to fulfil its mandate to prevent, manage and resolve conflict
by monitoring potential challenges to continental peace and security
(European Commission 2012). Effectively, the EU’s support for
regionalism in Africa is most useful when it enables the local ownership of
integration processes.
On the AU’s financial constraints, Murithi (2010, 203) notes that
although Africa has the resources to fund and implement its regional strat-
egies, access to these resources is ‘distorted by the forces of globalization’.
Additionally, on a continent of 55 countries, some are not wholly com-
mited to the function of the AU. Thus, they do not pay the relevant dues
for the financial sustenance of the organisation. They also fail to imple-
ment the norms embodied by the new AU. These undermine African
regionalism and indeed the ability to absorb external norms.
Further, the EU faces challenges to its claims as a regional model. The
recent economic crisis and internal divisions within the EU challenges the
validity of the EU as a model. Although Cameron (2010) rightly contends
that the EU will rebound, and that Europe’s crisis has not stalled regional
integration elsewhere, the use of the EU as a model will, at the least, be
cautiously applied elsewhere. Any real influence the EU hopes to exert in
the external promotion of regional integration must therefore come from a
commitment to mentoring.
Regional integration scholars further suggest that adopting an EU model
for its own sake can create problems for regionalism in Africa (see
Gandois 2005; Söderbaum 2010). Regime-boosting regionalism seeks to
EU as Mentor 797

bolster the position of ruling elites at international and domestic levels.


Söderbaum (2010, 59) claims that African leaders praise regionalism and
the formation of regional organisations as part of ‘summitry regionalism’,
but lack a commitment to the process. This approach to regionalism is
problematic in that it simply helps state leaders to consolidate their posi-
tion rather than help citizens to benefit from a continental community.
This superficial commitment would be further exacerbated if one of the
AU’s main partners, the EU, focuses on creating a model of itself rather
than a truly integrated entity in Africa.
Regime-boosting regionalism correctly presents the motivations of some
African leaders and indeed the implications of modelling the EU. In partic-
ular, a recurrent criticism of Africa’s continental organisation is that it
takes a top-down approach to integration. However, Söderbaum’s (2010)
analysis of regionalism in Africa is at best incomplete. To use one exam-
Downloaded by [Universitaet St Gallen] at 13:39 07 January 2014

ple, Söderbaum contends that regionalism in Africa rides on the principle


of non-interference, which has supported unscrupulous African leaders.
He does not acknowledge the change in that principle resulting from the
creation of the AU, nor acknowledge AU actions6 that have proven the
contrary to this principle. To leave unacknowledged developments in
Africa within the formal regionalisation process that are driven by African
imperatives misses the holistic context of recent regional processes in
Africa while prioritising regionalism in Europe. It is thus evident from the
foregoing that there are both empirical and conceptual challenges to
understanding regionalism in Africa when viewed from a European
perspective.

Conclusion
The formation of the AU has in part relied on the sharing and using of
universal norms and the organisational templates from the EU. However,
these have occurred in the context of Africa’s regional imperatives buoyed
by the narrative of pan-Africanism. Consequently, the AU does not consti-
tute a model of the EU in the sense understood by EU integration scholars.
Indeed, the local dynamics within Africa, with its many challenges and the
previous regional integration trajectory, prevent the adoption of the EU
model.
This article has not set out to discount the notion that norms, ideas and
formal structures are diffused between organisations for various reasons.
However, it challenges the suggestion that this diffusion constitutes a
model motivated by replication or the EU’s own priorities. The application
of the diffusion literature to the ‘EU as a Model’ narrative erroneously
prioritises the EU quest for self-replication, and potentially its attempts of
self-justification as the explanation for the similarities between the EU and
other regional organisations like the AU. Although the argument from
self-justification cannot be disproved, the diffusion literature removes the
broader context of the EU’s external relations commitments in Africa from
its analyses. Further, it overlooks Africa’s motives for regional integration
and consequently the role of the EU in Africa’s integration process.
798 Toni Haastrup

To understand the role of the EU in promoting regionalism externally,


it is necessary to look beyond the EU integration perspective. A consider-
ation for the empirical dimension of the EU’s external relations helps to
mitigate the Eurocentrism in the ‘EU as a Model’ literature. Rather, we
need analyses that pays attention to the international environment, priori-
tises knowledge of the local environment, and supports local ownership as
the cornerstone of the EU’s Africa policies. Observed within an inter-
regional framework, the EU’s approach to regionalism sees the EU as a
mentor to Africa. It is in implementing mentorship that the EU can serve
as a model for regionalism outside Europe.

Notes
1. Regionalism is defined here as ‘a conscious policy of nation states for the management of regionali-
Downloaded by [Universitaet St Gallen] at 13:39 07 January 2014

zation and a broad array of security and economic challenges…’ (Hänggi et al. 2006, 4).
2. European Union External Action – Regions of the world (http://eeas.europa.eu/regions/index_en.
htm). While the EU favours region-to-region cooperation, it does not have a systematic way of
making such groupings. As such a region could be an arbitrary entity for its own purposes, as was
the case when the EU’s development policies were conducted vis-à-vis the ACP group.
3. The Regional Integration System compiled by the United Nations University – Institute for Com-
parative Regional Integration Studies, Bruges, illustrates that of the 191 member nations of the
United Nations, only nine do not belong to some form of regional organisation (http://www.cris.
unu.edu/riks/web).
4. While the EU and the AU have many mutual interests as we will address, the impetus for their
existence are different and are reflective in the ongoing regional integration process that affects the
levels of diffusion and absorption of the EU model of regional integration.
5. While norms are presented as universal, the EU does not shy away from making it known that it
plays a role in shaping this universality. It is an important part of its international status.
6. The AU has intervened in Somalia (African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) and the Sudan
(African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)), has instituted sanctions against Mauritania to the sur-
prise of the military junta, and has sent election observers to Comoros (Mission d’Assistance
Electorale aux Comores (MAES)).

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