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Possible Objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/possible-objects/
from the Summer 2020 Edition of the
Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy
1
Possible Objects
possible objects are not objects, that is, they are nothing. Thus on this
view, the adjective ‘possible’ is equivalent to ‘actual’ when applied to
objects and (ii) is false. This makes the notion of a possible object, or
equivalently the notion of an actual object, uninteresting. The notion of an
object is the basic notion and does all the work. There is another
conservative view on objects, which does not deal in actuality or
possibility directly. It deals in existence instead. It is the view that any
object is an existing object. On this view, the following analog of (ii) is
false: not every object is an existing object, that is, some object is a non-
existing object. This view makes the notion of an existing object
equivalent to that of an object; existence adds nothing to objecthood. If we
combine talk of actuality and talk of existence, we obtain five alternative
conservative views with varying degrees of conservatism:
(2) Any object is an actual object, that is, it is either an actual existing
object or an actual non-existing object;
(1) is a stronger claim than the other four. (2) and (3) are stronger than (5)
and (4), respectively. (1)-(3) give characterizations of all objects, whereas
(4) and (5) are more limited in scope. When the verb ‘exists’ is understood
with the most comprehensive domain of discourse (assuming the
availability of such a domain), (5) is known as actualism. If the domain of
discourse for ‘exists’ is stipulated to consist only of actual objects, (5) is
trivial and compatible with possibilism, the position which says that some
object is outside the domain consisting of all actual objects; cf. (ii). Most
of those who advertise their positions as actualist hold not only (5) with
the most comprehensive domain of discourse in mind but also (1), and
therefore (2)-(4) as well. There are some theorists who hold (5), or at least
do not deny (5), but deny (1). They do so by denying (3), that is, by
maintaining that some object is a non-existing object. Such a view is one
version of Meinongianism. But let us start with actualism and possibilism.
2. Possible Worlds
According to the framework of possible worlds, all alethic modal
statements involving possibility are existential quantifications over
possible worlds and all alethic modal statements involving actuality are
singular statements about a particular possible world, namely, the actual
world (Kripke 1959, 1963a, 1963b). For example, to say that Julius Caesar
was possibly not assassinated is to say that Julius Caesar was not
assassinated at some possible world, and to say that Julius Caesar was
actually assassinated is to say that Julius Caesar was assassinated at the
actual world. Likewise with existence: to say that Julius Caesar possibly
existed is to say that Julius Caesar existed at some possible world, and to
say that Julius Caesar actually existed is to say that Julius Caesar existed
at the actual world. Assuming that the actual world is a possible world, it
follows that if Julius Caesar actually existed, he possibly existed.
In general, any object that actually exists possibly exists. Assuming that
actuality (of an object) is nothing but actual existence and possibility (of
an object) is nothing but possible existence, this grounds the plausible
conceptual connection between actuality and possibility noted earlier: (i)
every actual object is a possible object. The overall philosophical merit of
the possible-worlds framework cannot be judged without close scrutiny of
its metaphysical foundations. Specifically, the two key questions which
need to be asked are: “What are possible worlds in general?” and “What is
the actual world in particular?” Metaphysical theorizing about possible
worlds goes back at least to Leibniz, but the contemporary theorizing is
pursued largely on two distinct fronts; possibilist realism and actualist
representationism.
What distinguishes actuality from all other realms? The leading answer is
due to David Lewis, who is the proponent of the best-known version of
possibilist realism, namely, modal counterpart theory. Lewis’s view on
actuality is known as the indexical theory of actuality (Lewis 1970). The
basic idea is that actuality for us is the realm which includes us, and more
generally, actuality for x is the realm which includes x. But there are many
different realms which include us: this room, this building, this town, this
continent, this planet, this galaxy, this minute, this hour, this day, this
month, this year, this century, etc. So, to fix our actuality as a unique realm
which includes us, Lewis takes the largest spatiotemporal whole which
includes us. More precisely, actuality for us is the maximal
spatiotemporally related whole of which we are (mereological) part. In
general, actuality for x is the maximal spatiotemporally related whole of
which x is part. For anything to exist non-actually-for-x but possibly is for
it to be part of some realm outside actuality for x, that is, to be part of
some maximal spatiotemporally related whole of which x is not part. Note
that this is a reductionist view of existence, both actual and non-actual
possible. Existence is first relativized to a maximal spatiotemporally
related whole, and then existence in such a whole is defined reductively in
terms of (mereological) parthood. Lewis characterizes possible worlds as
maximal spatiotemporally related wholes. Actuality is the actual world,
and all other maximal spatiotemporally related wholes are non-actual
possible worlds.
that every actual object necessarily exists or yields the consequence that
some actual object is not identical to itself (Lewis 1983: 32). There is also
a famous complaint voiced by Saul Kripke (Kripke 1972: 344–45, note
13). It in effect says that whether someone other than you is the leader of a
religious cult at some possible world is irrelevant to whether you could
have been the leader of a religious cult. Lewis’s reply to this is that the de
re character of the possibility is preserved by the stipulation that the
person who is the cult leader is the counterpart of you, rather than the
counterpart of someone else, at an appropriate possible world. For an
attempt to avoid counterparts and still retain a broadly Lewisian realistic
framework, see McDaniel 2004.
latter lacking (a counterpart of) P and the former not lacking it. Thus, even
if B is identical with W and W could not have lacked P, B could have
lacked P, i.e., B without P is a possible object even though W without P is
not. Whereas Lewis invokes similarity, which is relative to contextually
shifting respects, Fara invokes sortal sameness, which is less shifty. Fara’s
counterpart theory also interestingly avoids denying the necessity of
identity.
2.1.2 Modal–Dimensionalism
It is well known that Quine fiercely objects against the ontology of non-
actual possible objects. Referring to an unoccupied doorway, he asks
whether the possible fat man in the doorway and the possible bald man in
the doorway are one possible man or two possible men (Quine, 1948). The
point of this rhetorical question is that there is no serious issue here
because we have no non-trivial criterion of identity for non-actual possible
objects. No respectable ontology should embrace objects for which we
have no non-trivial criterion of identity. Quine encapsulates this in his
famous slogan: “No entity without identity”. Actual ordinary mid-sized
objects have vague boundaries, so the sorites argument may be used to
show that we have no coherent non-trivial criterion of identity for them.
Quine’s slogan then appears to apply to such objects. Some take this to be
good reason against the ontology of actual ordinary mid-sized objects,
whereas others take this to be good reason against Quine’s slogan.
Whatever the ultimate fate of Quine’s slogan may be, there is an objection
against possibilist realism which, while not explicitly invoking Quine’s
slogan, is at least Quinean in spirit. It goes as follows:
all. Vulcan also does not actually have any mass, shape, or chemical
composition. Still it is possible that Vulcan be a unique planet between
Sun and Mercury and have a particular mass m, a particular shape s, and a
particular chemical composition c. Or so it seems. It is also possible, it
seems, that Vulcan be a unique planet between Sun and Mercury and have
a slightly different particular mass mʹ, a slightly different particular shape
sʹ, and a slightly different particular chemical composition cʹ, where the
slight differences in question lie within the range of deviations the original
astronomers would have tolerated. So at some possible world w Vulcan is
a unique planet between Sun and Mercury and has m, s, and c, and at some
possible world wʹ Vulcan is a unique planet between Sun and Mercury and
has mʹ, sʹ, and cʹ. Clearly w and wʹ are different worlds. On Lewis’s theory,
every possible object exists at only one world. So either the planet in
question at w is not Vulcan or the planet at wʹ is not Vulcan. Whichever
planet that is not Vulcan is Vulcan’s counterpart at best. Is either planet
Vulcan? If so, which one? If neither is, where is Vulcan? What possible
world hosts Vulcan? There seems to be no non-arbitrary way to answer
these questions within Lewis’s theory.
distinct worlds. But this difference seems empty. Given that w1 and w2 are
exact qualitative duplicates of each other, on what ground can we say that
the object between Sun and Mercury at w1 and far away at w2 is Vulcan
and the object far away at w1 and between Sun and Mercury at w2 is
Nacluv, rather than the other way around? It is unhelpful to say that
Vulcan and Nacluv are distinguished by the fact that Vulcan possesses
Vulcan’s haecceity and Nacluv does not. An object’s haecceity is the
property of being that very object (Kaplan 1975, Adams 1979, Lewis
1986: 220–48). Since what is at issue is the question of which object is
Vulcan, it does not help to be told that Vulcan is the object possessing the
property of being that very object, unless the property of being that very
object is clarified independently. To say that it is the property of being that
very object which is Vulcan is clearly uninformative. It is not obvious that
there is any way to clarify it independently.
possibility of Julius Caesar having had a sixth right finger which was
never burnt is, as before, easily representable by, say, the sentence, ‘Julius
Caesar had a sixth right finger which was never burnt’. This means that the
pronoun ‘it’ in (a) is unproblematic; it is replaceable by ‘Julius Caesar’s
sixth right finger’. How about the pronoun ‘it’ in (b)? It should designate
the sixth right finger Julius Caesar is said to have had within the scope of
the first possibility operator. It should therefore be bound by the
appropriate existential quantifier, just like the pronoun ‘it’ in (a). But
unlike the pronoun ‘it’ in (a), the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) occurs separated from
the quantifier by the intervening second possibility operator, ‘the
following is possible’. This “quantifying in” from outside the possibility
operator forces the sentence representing the possibility specified in (b) to
retain the pronoun ‘it’: ‘it was burnt’. Thus, unlike the pronoun ‘it’ in (a),
the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) is not eliminable in the representation of the
possibility in question. But no part of the representation that is the possible
world in question, or any other possible world, may serve as the object
which the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) designates, as the pronoun needs to designate
something that is said to be a human finger but no part of any such
representation is said to be a human finger. Notice that Lewis has no
corresponding difficulty here. On his theory, the modal statement in
question is true if and only if at some possible world there is a counterpart
of Julius Caesar who had a sixth right finger f such that f was never burnt
and at some possible world there is a counterpart of f which was burnt.
Julius Caesar, his counterpart, and the counterpart’s sixth finger f are all
real objects, and the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) designates f. (Note that the pronoun
‘it’ in (b) does not designate the counterpart of f any more than ‘it’ in (a)
does.)
One difficulty with this view is the failure to produce a single plausible
example of such an essence. We saw that possibilist realism faces the
problem of specifying non-actual possible objects. Plantinga’s version of
actualist representationism faces its own version of the Quinean challenge,
namely, the problem of specifying the individual essences which are
supposed to replace non-actual possible objects. What individual essence
did Julius Caesar have? What readily comes to mind is the property of
being Julius Caesar. As Ruth Barcan Marcus and Kripke have forcefully
argued (Barcan 1947, Marcus 1961, Kripke 1972), identity is necessary;
that is, if an object x is identical with an object y, it is necessarily the case
that x is identical with y. Given this, it is easy to see that Julius Caesar
necessarily had the property of being Julilus Caesar and everything other
than Julius Caesar necessarily lacks it. However, it is implausible to
suggest that this property is independent of Julius Caesar. Our canonical
Reina Hayaki proposes yet another solution (Hayaki 2003). When we say
that Julius Caesar had an unburnt sixth right finger at some possible world
w1, we take w1 to represent Julius Caesar as having an unburnt sixth right
finger. When we say further that that finger at w1 was burnt at a different
possible world w2, we should likewise take w2 to represent that finger as
having been burnt. According to Hayaki, this requires a hierarchical
arrangement of possible worlds in which the representation of the finger
by w2 is parasitic on the representation by w1.
Other solutions to the nesting problem include the claim that despite
strong appearance to the contrary, there are no modal statements about
objects which do not actually exist; see Adams 1981, Fitch 1996.
Like Plantinga, Fine takes individual essences seriously but he regards the
notion of necessity as prior to the notion of a possible world, and the
notion of an individual essence as prior to the notion of necessity (Fine
1994, 1995a, 1995b, 2000). Fine’s modal theory is based on the broadly
Aristotelian idea that alethic modality stems from natures of things.
Understanding of actual or non-actual possible objects should therefore be
firmly grounded on understanding of natures of things. Fine believes that
‘There is a possible object x’ is reducible to ‘Possibly there is an object x’
(Prior and Fine 1977: 130–9, Fine 1979, 1981, 2003). For a similar
reductive proposal, see Peacocke 1978, 2002. For some difficulties with
such a project, see Hazen 1976.
Jubien builds his modal theory out of properties and their relations (Jubien
1996, 2009). The possibility of Julius Caesar’s having had an entirely new
sixth right finger satisfying (a) and (b) is analyzed roughly as follows: the
property of being a particular sixth finger on Julius Caesar’s right hand is
simultaneously compatible with the properties of existing, being
composed of non-actual stuff, and being never burnt, and also
simultaneously compatible with the properties of existing, being
composed of non-actual stuff, and being burnt. The underlying idea is to
start with the ontology of stuff and use properties and relations, including
modal properties and relations, as the fundamental metaphysical items to
account for all statements about objects, including all modal statements
about possible objects. It specifically avoids talk of non-actual possible
objects. It, however, does not avoid talk of non-actual possible stuff. So it
does embrace the ontology of the non-actual possible in a broad sense.
time, for Meinong, the nature of an object does not depend on its being
actual. This seems to give objects reality that is independent of actuality.
Another interesting feature of Meinong’s theory is that it sanctions the
postulation not only of non-actual possible objects but also of impossible
objects, for it says that ‘The round square is round’ is a true sentence and
therefore its subject term stands for an object. This aspect of Meinong’s
theory has been widely pointed out, but non-trivial treatment of
impossibility is not confined to Meinongianism (Lycan & Shapiro 1986).
For more on Meinong’s theory, see Chisholm 1960, Findlay 1963,
Grossmann 1974, Lambert 1983, Zalta 1988: sec.8. For some pioneering
work in contemporary Meinongianism, see Castañeda 1974, Rapaport
1978, Routley 1980. We shall examine the theories of two leading
Meinongians: Terence Parsons and Edward Zalta. We shall take note of
some other Meinongians later in the section on fictional objects, as their
focus is primarily on fiction. Parsons and Zalta not only propose accounts
of fictional objects but offer comprehensive Meinongian theories of
objects in general.
(P2) For any set of nuclear properties, some object has all the nuclear
properties in the set and no other nuclear properties.
If Julius Caesar’s entirely new right finger satisfying (a) and (b) is to be a
Meinongian object of Parsons’ theory, the best candidate appears to be a
non-existent incomplete object corresponding to the set of properties,
{being a finger, belonging to Julius Caesar’s right hand, being never
burnt}. This set includes neither the property of being constituted by
particles which do not (actually) exist nor the property of being possibly
burnt. Both of these properties are extra-nuclear properties, hence
ineligible to be included in a set to which (P2) applies. So (P2) does not
confer them on the object corresponding to the set. How then does the
object come to have the properties? It is not obvious how this question
should be answered (Parsons 1980: 21, note 4, where Parsons says, “The
present theory is very neutral about de re modalities”), but we should at
least note that on Parsons’s theory, objects are allowed to have properties
not included in their corresponding sets of nuclear properties: e.g., the
round square, whose corresponding set only includes roundness and
squareness, has the property of being non-existent and the property of
being incomplete. Also, Parsons allows nuclear properties which are
“watered-down” versions of extra-nuclear properties. So the set may
include the “watered-down” versions of the two extra-nuclear properties in
question and that may be enough. For more on these and related issues in
Parsons’ theory, see Howell 1983, Fine 1984.
(Z2) For any condition on properties, some object that could never
have a spatial location encodes exactly those properties which satisfy
the condition.
Some object is the round square, for, by (Z2), among objects which could
never have a spatial location is an object which encodes roundness and
squareness. The noun phrase, ‘the round square’, unambiguously denotes
such a necessarily non-spatial object. Other noun phrases of the same kind
include those which denote numbers, sets, Platonic forms, and so on.
There are, however, many noun phrases which are ambiguous. They allow
an interpretation under which they denote an object that is necessarily
non-spatial, and also allow an interpretation under which they denote an
object that is possibly spatial and possibly non-spatial. The phrase, ‘the
golden mountain’, is an example. The golden mountain in one sense is an
object which is necessarily non-spatial and which encodes goldenness and
mountainhood. The golden mountain in the other sense is an object which
actually is non-spatial but could be spatial. When we say that the golden
mountain in the second sense is golden, it means that necessarily if the
golden mountain is spatial, it is golden. Since, by (Z1), such an object
cannot encode properties, all predications in the preceding sentence have
Zalta endorses the claim that some objects are non-actual possible objects,
so he appears to side with possibilists. But he defines a non-actual possible
object as an object which could have a spatial location but does not (Zalta
1988: 67). So the claim means for Zalta that some objects could have a
spatial location but do not. This is compatible with actualism, provided
that all such objects are actual in the sense of actually existing (Linsky &
Zalta 1994, also Williamson 1998, 2002, 2013; it is noteworthy that
Timothy Williamson independently argues for what he calls necessitism,
which says [in a nutshell] that every possible object is a necessary object).
If we understand Zalta’s theory this way, we have the following actualist
picture: all objects are actual and existing, some objects are necessarily
non-spatial, and other objects are possibly spatial and possibly non-spatial.
(For an alternative interpretation of Zalta’s formal theory, according to
which some objects do not exist, see Zalta 1983: 50–52, 1988: 102–04,
Linsky & Zalta 1996: note 8.) Among the latter type of objects are those
which are actually spatial but possibly not, like you and me, and those
which are possibly spatial but actually not, like the golden mountain in the
appropriate sense. The distinction between the golden mountain in this
(exemplification) sense and the golden mountain in the other (encoding)
sense is key to overcoming some objections (Linsky & Zalta 1996). See
Bennett 2006 for the claim that the Linsky-Zalta view is not actualist, and
Nelson & Zalta 2009 for a response. Hayaki 2006 critiques both Linsky-
Zalta and Williamson.
4. Unicorns
If anything is a non-actual possible object, a unicorn is. Or so it appears.
But Kripke vigorously argues against such a view in the 1980 version of
Kripke 1972: 24, 156–58. His argument starts with the assumption that the
unicorn is (intended to be) an animal species if anything. This excludes the
possibility that a horse with a horn artificially attached to its forehead is a
unicorn. Kripke assumes obviously that there are actually no unicorns and
that unicorns are purely mythical creatures. Also assumed is the absence in
the relevant myth of any specification of the genetic structure,
evolutionary history, or other potentially defining essential features of the
unicorn. (Possession of a horn is not a defining essential feature of the
unicorn any more than having tawny stripes is a defining feature of the
tiger.) The myth describes the unicorn only in stereotypical terms: looking
like a horse, having a horn protruding from its forehead, etc. Suppose that
there are objects with all such stereotypical features of the unicorn. This
seems perfectly possible and Kripke accepts such a possibility. But he
rejects its sufficiency for establishing the possibility of unicorns. Suppose
that among the objects with the stereotypical unicorn features, some have
a genetic makeup, an evolutionary history, or some other potentially
defining essential unicorn characteristic which is radically different from
5. Fictional Objects
Let us shift our attention from mythological creatures to fictional objects.
Fictional objects include fictional characters but not all fictional objects
are fictional characters. Sherlock Holmes is a fictional object and a
There are two main problems with the claim that fictional objects are
possible objects. One is the problem of impossible fictional objects. Some
fictional objects are ascribed incompatible properties in their home fiction
by their original author (usually inadvertently). This seems to be sufficient
for them to have those properties according to their home fiction, for what
the author says in the fiction (inadvertently or not) seems to hold the
highest authority on truth in that fiction. On the assumption that a fictional
object has a given property if it has that property according to its home
fiction, those fictional objects are impossible objects, for no possible
object has incompatible properties. The other problem is the failure of
uniqueness. It may be viewed as the problem of meeting the Quinean
demand for clear identity conditions. Holmes is a particular fictional
object. So if we are to identify Holmes with a possible object, we should
identify Holmes with a particular possible object. But there are many
particular possible objects that are equally suited for the identification with
Holmes. One of them has n-many hairs, whereas another has (n+1)-many
hairs. No fictional story about a particular fictional object written or told
by a human being is detailed enough to exclude all possible objects but
one to be identified with that fictional object, unless it is a fiction about an
actual object or a non-actual possible object analogous to Kaplan’s
automobile or Salmon’s Noman.
Strangely enough, there is also a problem with the claim that fictional
objects are non-actual objects. That is, there is some plausible
consideration in support of the claim that fictional objects are actual
objects. We make various assertions about fictional objects outside the
stories in which they occur and some of them are true: for example, that
Though not meant to be a fictional object, Vulcan may be given the same
treatment as explicitly fictional objects. According to Parsons, the word
‘Vulcan’ is ambiguous. In one sense, it is the name of a fictional object
which originates in a false astronomical story. In the other sense, it does
not refer to anything. Zalta does not recognize Parsons’ second sense and
simply regards ‘Vulcan’ as the name of a fictional object.
Gregory Currie denies that fictional names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ are
proper names or even singular terms (Currie 1990). He claims that
sentences of fiction in which ‘Sherlock Holmes’ occurs should be regarded
as jointly forming a long conjunction in which every occurrence of
‘Sherlock Holmes’ is replaced with a variable bound by an initial
existential quantifier in the way suggested by Frank Ramsey (Ramsey
1931).
Kendall Walton urges that we should take seriously the element of make-
believe, or pretense, inherent in the telling of a fictional story by the author
and the listening to it by the audience (Walton 1990, also Evans 1982:
353–68, Kripke 2013). According to this pretense theory, the pretense
involved in the language game of fictional discourse shields the whole
language game from a separate language game aimed at non-fictional
reality, and it is in the latter language game that we seek theories of
objects of various kinds as real objects. If this is right, any search for the
real ontological status of fictional objects appears to be misguided. For the
view that the pretense theory is compatible with a theory of fictional
objects as real objects, see Zalta 2000.
The formal logical sentence with this meaning is known as the Barcan
Formula, after Ruth C. Barcan, who published the first systematic
treatment of quantified modal logic, in which she postulated the formula as
an axiom (Barcan 1946), and who has published under the name ‘Ruth
Barcan Marcus’ since 1950. If we read ‘F’ as meaning “non-identical with
every actual object”, the Barcan Formula says that if it is possible that
something is non-identical with every actual object, then something x is
such that it is possible that x is non-identical with every actual object. The
antecedent is plausibly true, for there could have been more objects than
the actual ones. But if so, the consequent is true as well, assuming the
truth of the Barcan Formula. But no actual object is non-identical with
every actual object, for every actual object is identical with itself, an actual
object. Assuming the necessity of identity, if an object y is identical with
an object z, it is not possible that y is non-identical with z. So, no actual
object is such that it is possible that it is non-identical with every actual
object. Therefore, any object x such that it is possible that x is non-
identical with every actual object must be a non-actual possible object.
The converse of the Barcan Formula is also a theorem along with the
Barcan Formula in classical logic augmented with a possibility or
necessity operator, and is as interesting. The Converse Barcan Formula, as
it is known, says the following:
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