Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Arealism, Thin Realism, and The Problem

of Extrinsic Evidence

Jeffrey Schatz

17.06.2021

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

1 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence

2 The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence

3 Three Recent Responses

4 Methodological Arealism

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Mathematical Method in Set Theory

Typical Method in Core Math: proof from accepted

axioms.
Contrast: axiom selection in set theory.
Remains live concern even today: extending ZFC + LCs.
Possible solutions to the question of CH?
Interest for philosophers of mathematics:
1 Epistemology: How can axioms be justified? (no proof,
no empirical evidence)
2 Metaphysics: What must the subject matter of set
theory be like?

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

The Question of Axiom Selection

How do set-theorists defend axiom candidates?
Wide range of argumentative strategies!
Maddy’s 1988 “Believing the Axioms”
Roughly, two sorts of arguments:
1 Intrinsic Justification: axiom follows directly from the
concepts/meanings of ‘set’ and ‘membership’.
2 Extrinsic Justification: axiom should be accepted on the
basis of its desirability or utility.
Is there a distinction here?
Not at the level of axioms!
But distinction is made by set-theorists between
particular arguments (Zermelo, Gödel, EFI Project)
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Intrinsic Evidence in Set Theory

Intrinsic evidence purports to show that an axiom follows
immediately from the nature of set theory.
Connection might not be obvious (Gödel’s concerns)
Reveals an internal property of the axiom candidate.
Example: Replacement and Limitation of size
Replacement: any class bijectable with a set is also a set.
Limitation of Size: Any class that is not “too big” forms
a set.
Intrinsic Justification: a bijection shows that a class is
the same size as a “not big” thing, so is also “not big”
Other common intrinsic justifications: iterative
conception, uniformity, reflection, etc.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Extrinsic Evidence

Extrinsic evidence purports to show that an axiom leads

to a better theory of sets as a whole.
Often makes reference to effect of axiom when combined
with background axioms.
Example: Zermelo’s defense of choice.
AC : every family of non-empty sets has a choice set.
Extrinsic justification: Choice sets required for a wildly
disparate collection of theorems in core math.
These theorems had already been accepted by
mathematical community before choice was articulated.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Another Example of Extinsic Justification

Zermelo’s defense of choice makes reference to past
mathematics.
Form: math as practiced already requires this axiom.
Not all extrinsic justifications take this form.
Example: choice is required for a linear ordering of
cardinalities.
Justification: such an ordering is a prerequisite for a
“nice” theory of the higher infinite.
AC should therefore be accepted, since it will lead to
more “good mathematics”.
Unlike our former example, no reference made to existing
body of theorems.
This body of literature was enabled by the introduction
of AC !
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Forwards and Backwards Looking Justifications

Important contrast:
1 Backwards-Looking EJ: an axiom is required for previous
results, provides better proofs of old theorems, or
connects disparate facts.
2 Forward-Looking EJ: an axiom is desirable due to its
ability to open up new fields of research.
Both sorts of EJ have played important roles in axiom
selection debates, historically and today.
Despite this, signficant focus in philosophy on the
former.
Most examples found in lit are of this sort.
Proposal: Consider examples of forward-looking EJ when
evaluating accounts of extrinsic justification.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

The Problem, Informally

Problem: How can the desirability of some mathematical
claim suffice for its acceptance?
Is extrinsic evidence just wishful thinking?
Shouldn’t it be possible that mathematical reality is not
conducive to human aims?
Extrinsic-style evidence not sufficient for rational
acceptance of a theory in other fields.
Boyle’s corpuscular mechanism was justified by every
imaginable sort of utility consideration.
Nonetheless, theory was rejected in favor of less
tractable theories (Newton/QM).World was not
conducive to our desires.
How can we explain this asymmetry between math and
empirical science?
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

The Problem, more Precisely

Explaining this asymmetry important for philosophers

with disparate metaphysical views.
In particular, problem remains whether or not one is a
realist about sets.
Problem should therefore be formulated in a
metaphysically neutral way.
Problem of Extrinsic Evidence:
1 What is the general structure of an extrinsic
justification?
2 What must sets be like such that extrinsic justifications
suffice to motivate acceptance of an axiom candidate?

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Metaphysics and Epistemlogy

A full solution to the problem requires both a

metaphysical and an epistemological component.
Epistemological component should permit evaluation of
proposed extrinsic arguments.
Metaphysical component should explain the stark
difference in methodology between mathematical axiom
selection and empirical theory choice.
Response should explain what the subject matter of set
theory is, and justify the fit of set-theoretic methodology
for this subject.
Let us consider three recent proposed solutions in turn...

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Response 1: The Abductive Response

The first response is due to Barton, Ternullo, and Venturi.

Claim: all set-theoretic justification takes a single form,
inference to the best explanation.
“justification of axioms in set theory consists of finding
the best explanations for relevant mathematical data”,
where the data is “the body of axioms and theorems
accepted by that community at that time” (BTV, pp.
14-15)
Extrinsic evidence in set theory is therefore rational in just
the same way as abductive evidence in empirical science.
We call this the abductive response.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Abductive Response in Practice

Recall Zermelo’s defense of AC .

Data: wide body of theorems that assume (weak versions
of) AC .
Two options: the truth of the theorems, or the
acceptance of the theorems by working mathematicians.
We suggest it must be the former; otherwise, causal link
between theorems and mathematical activity.
Explanans: The full axiom of choice obtains.
AC is rationally accepted as the best available explanation
of various choice-like phenomena in core math.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Forward Looking Justifications Redux

BTV consider a few further examples of ej.
Unfortunately, these examples are all backwards looking
justifications.
Unclear how to apply abductive response to forward
looking arguments.
Such justifications must precede the “data”.
Instead of explaining prior mathematics, these
justifications motivate new research programs.
Implausible to explain forward looking justifications as
opaque ibe arguments.
So abductive response must either reject all such
justifications, or be supplemented with a further
epistemological response.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Response 2: The Analyticity Response

The second response is due to Soysal.
Metasemantic descriptivism: the meaning of a term
includes all properties that (most) competent language
users would assent to it having.
Competent set theoretic language users: set theorists.
These meanings may be opaque, and only revealed
through actions of community over time.
Claim: all set theoretic justification shows an axiom
follows from meanings of ‘set’ and ‘membership’.
Intrinsic: shows how an axiom follows.
Extrinsic: shows only that an axiom follows.
We call this the analyticity response.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Analyticity Response in Practice

Recall again Zermelo’s defense of AC .
The widespread use of choice by set theorists and core
mathematicians is evidence that AC is true.
Mathematicians proof behavior takes precedence over
direct judgements on the axiom.
“All families of non-empty sets have choice sets” is
therefore (partially) constitutive of the meaning of ‘set’.
Perhaps further conceptual analysis will uncover how AC
connects to the meanings.
A complete understanding of the concepts of set theory
would replace all extrinsic evidence with intrinsic.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Is this Response Epistemologically Inert?

Analyticity response provides little guidance in evaluating
extrinsic justifications.
Nothing more can be said than whether the axiom was
accepted by (enough of) the set-theoretic community.
Is there any rational standard underlying the
meaning-ascription behavior of set theorists?
If so, the analyticity response must be supplemented to
explain the rational basis for this behavior.
If not, set theory appears unduly subjective.
Would accepting ZFC + V = L instead of large cardinals
have been a mistake?
To avoid such subjectivity, more must be said by the
analyticity response.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Response 3: The Practical Response

The final response is due to Maddy.
Set theory as a human activity, serving concrete
mathematical aims.
Eg providing a generous arena, a shared standard for
mathematical proof, and a measure of risk assessment
for theories.
Mathematical goals separate from foundational
epistemology.
Axiom selection is a search for the correct theory for
accomplishing these goals.
EJ as means-ends reasoning: argues an axiom is the best
means for achieving some goal(s).
We call this the practical response
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Practical Response in Practice

Consider again Zermelo’s defense of AC .
One desideratum for an axiomatization is that it is strong
enough to prove all theorems of core math (shared
standard).
Thus AC is required for a shared standard.
Consider instead the desirability of the theory of the
cardinals under choice.
Another desiderata is that our theory provides a useful
measure of the consistency strength of a theory (risk
assessment).
AC , and the nice theory of cardinalities it enables, is
necessary for such a measurement tool.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Rejecting Robust Realism

Unlike the prior responses, Maddy explicitly considers the
metaphysical component of the problem.
What must set theory’s subject metter be like such that
extrinsic evidence is rationally compelling?
Maddy notes that one popular response cannot be
correct.
Robust Realism: a family of theories which holds sets
exist as abstract objects in a distant objective reality,
wholly independent of set-theoretic methods.
Eg Gödelian realism.
If true, extrinsic evidence would not be sufficent; some
further supplement would be required (eg intuition).
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Conceptual Unpreparedness
For Maddy’s positive account, first a detour.
Our concepts and words designed for specific purposes
and domains.
They do not necessarily have clear criteria of application
outside their domains.
Common mistake to assume our language definitively
applies in strange, unpredicted situations.
Example 1: Austin’s “Cat”
Example 2: Amorphous “ice”
Previous language usage does not determine how we
should speak in these new situations.
Our concepts are unprepared for many possible
situations.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Conceptual Unpreparedness in Set Theory

Maddy claims that set-theoretic truth represents such
conceptual unpreparedness.
Are our best justified claims in set theory true?
Yes: supported by rational argument, seemingly
objective, lack of faultless disagreement...
No: about abstract (acausal, non-spatiotemporal)
objects, unique reliance on extrinsic considerations...
Given analogies and disanalogies, no fact of the matter on
whether set-theoretic claims should be called ‘true’.
Instead, we face linguistic choice on whether to extend
truth ascriptions to set theory.
Two options for metaphysics...
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Thin Realism

Thin Realism: Well justified set-theoretic claims are true,

revealing set have a “thin” sort of existence.
“the Thin Realist holds the set-theoretic methods are
the reliable avenue to the facts about sets, that no
external guarantee is necessary or possible... for the
Thin Realist, set theory itself gives the whole story; the
reliability of its methods is a plain fact about what sets
are.” (Maddy 2011, p. 63)
In contrast to robust realism, thin realism trivializes the
epistemology of sets; no room for a “gap” between
set-theoretic method and set-theoretic truth.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

What is Arealism?
Arealism: Truth does not apply in the realm of
mathematics, so set-theoretic claims are not true.
If set theory is not the discovery of mathematical truths,
then what is it?
““Set theory is the activity of developing a theory of sets
that will effectively serve a concrete and ever-evolving
range of mathematical purposes” (Maddy 11, p. 89)
Arealism is not fictionalism.
Not in the business of stating truth-apt claims.
Arealism is not brute formalism.
Symbols gain meaning from their connections to
concrete mathematical activities.
Furthermore, much more than proof to mathematics.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Thin Realism vs Arealism

Maddy argues that there is no substantive difference

between these views.
Each describes the same set-theoretic methods, and
explains extrinsic evidence in the same way.
The only difference is whether to call the resulting
theories true or not.
Maddy: no good reason to prefer thin realism or arealism.

Arbitrary choice given conceptual unpreparedness.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Comparing the Responses

How to decide between the three responses?
1 Only Soysal and Maddy’s epistemic accounts apply to all
extrinsic arguments.
2 Only BTV and Maddy’s epistemic accounts provide
criteria for evaluating extrinsic arguments.
3 Maddy alone provides a metaphysical account of what
sets could be like to support the epistemic story.
We therefore find reason to prefer the practical response.
It alone is sufficiently general and complete.
Nonetheless, we disagree with Maddy’s claim that the
choice between thin realism and arealism is wholly
arbitrary.
In remainder of talk, we propose a variation of her
metaphysical response.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Choice Between Thin Realism and Arealism

Thin realism and arealism as dialects of set-theoretic

language.
Significant overlap between languages.
Difference: non-mathematical descriptions of set theory.
Different uses of ‘true’, ‘exists’, ‘object’, etc.
Question: which language should we use to describe set
theory?
Agreement with Maddy: No theoretical or metaphysical
basis for a principled decision.
But we argue that there are pragmatic reasons to prefer
arealism.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

The Perils of Speaking Like a Thin Realist

Historically, philosophers of mathematics overstate
similarities between mathematics and empirical science.
Overreliance on analogies in phil math.
Unfortunate tendency to ignore differences between
mathematics and other areas.
Wittgenstein: “misunderstandings... arise from a
tendency to assimilate to each other expressions which
have very different functions in language... Hence I will
have to stress the differences between things, where
ordinarily the similarities are stressed” (LFM, p. 15)
Manifests as a tendency for thin realism to drift into
robust realism.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Proposal: Methodological Arealism

Proposal: As guard against such implicit assumptions,
theorizing about set theory should be done in language
which makes uniqueness of mathematics immediately
apparent.
Restricting concepts or ordinary empirical inquiry, math
must be dealt with in its own terms.
More difficult to smuggle illict assumptions into inquiry.
Forces our descriptions of mathematics to reveal the
novelty of mathematical domains “on the surface”
Here arealism is a useful methodological tool, moreso
than a metaphysical revelation.
For this reason, we will call this proposal methodological
arealism.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Arealism and the Problem of Extrinsic Evidence

Methodological arealism makes the solution to the
metaphysical component of problem clear.
No theory of sets is metaphysically privileged.
Any (consistent) theory could be used for set theory.
The only question that remains is which is best suited to
the purposes at hand.
Extrinsic evidence argues that some axiomatization has
such practical merits.
To a certain extent, methodological arealism dissolves the
problem of extrinsic evidence.
Extrinsic evidence is not evidence of some further,
additional property.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

But what about set-theoretic truth!?

Objection: Set theorists commonly speak of the truth of
mathematical claims. Is arealism unduly revisionary?
Contrary to a naturalistic attitude?
We argue not. Arealism requires no revision of
mathematical practice.
No need to hand out flyers at math conferences!
Use of “true” in mathematics merely a linguistic
shorthand.
A bit of Wittgensteinian prose about math.
Only becomes problematic when this truth-talk is reified.
We conclude by noting one way methodological arealism
could benefit current philosophy of set theory.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Realism and the Multiverse

Open debate over multiversism:(commonly) whether

there is more than one universe of sets.
How to adjudicate this debate? Unclear.
Frequently turns to conflicting intuitions regarding the
phenomenology of forcing.
Question whether “working in” forcing extensions entails
a shift in background universe.
On what basis can one decide between these conflicting
intuitions?
In this form, seemingly difficult to find an access-point
for settling the debate.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Methodological Arealism and the Multiverse

Debate has a different character when described from
arealist perspective.
No metaphysical difference between different
characterizations of set-theoretic universe(s).
Instead, question of which sort of theory best serves the
mathematical goals of set theory.
Three options for our theory use:
1 Theory universism: there is one best theory of sets for
our purposes, single-sorted (Kennedy).
2 Theory multiversism: there is one best theory of sets for
our purposes, two-sorted (Steel).
3 Theory pluralism: there is no best theory of sets for our
purposes, instead many single-sorted theories (Hamkins).

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Realism and Potentialism

Open debate over actualism/potentialism: (commonly)

whether the cumulative hierarchy of sets is exhausted by
a single universe.
Again, how to adjudicate this debate?
Frequently turns to question of explaining the apparently
iterative structure of cumulative hierarchy.
Can an actualist make sense of why the set-theoretic
universe has such a structure?
Turns on difficult questions of explaining features of
abstract universe.
Again, difficult to see how to conclusively settle this
debate.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Methodological Arealism and Potentialism

Debate shifts given arealism.

No metaphysical feature to explain for arealist.
Question becomes whether the goals of set theory are
better served by actualist theory or potentialist theory
(in a modal, plural language).
Are any goals better served by the potentialist theory?
Possibly due to language’s increased expressive power?
Debate shifts to methodological questions about what the
best tool for set theory is.
Again, a potentially untractable metaphysical problem is
presented as a question of mathematical theory choice.

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

In Conclusion
In this talk, we introduced the problem of extrinsic
evidence: why does the desirability of a mathematical
axiom suffice for its acceptance?
We then surveyed three recent responses, finding that
only Maddy’s practical response was complete and fully
general.
We then presented a novel argument for accepting
arealism about set theory, based on the benefits of this
language for reasoning about mathematics.
We concluded by considering how methodological
arealism might clarify current debates in phil set theory.
Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence Three Recent Responses Methodological Arealism

Thanks for Listening!

Jeffrey Schatz
The Problem of Extrinsic Evidence