Rethinking Thought

Experiments
Alisa Bokulich
Boston University

An examination of two thought experiments in contemporary physics reveals

that the same thought experiment can be reanalyzed from the perspectiv e of
different and incompatible theories. This fact undermines those accounts of
thought experiments that claim their justiŽcatory power comes from their
ability to reveal the laws of nature. While thought experiments do play a
genuine evaluative role in science, they do so by testing the nonempirical vir-
tues of a theory, such as consistency and explanatory power. I conclude that,
while their interpretation presupposes a whole set of background theories and
putative laws, thought experiments nonetheless can evolve and be retooled for
different theories and ends.

1. Introduction
A thought experiment can be understood as a hypothetical or
counterfactua l scenario from which inferences are drawn.1 Historically,
thought experiments have played a central role in the articulation and
evaluation of scientiŽc theories. One of the earliest discussions of the use

I would like to thank Harvey Brown for stimulating discussions about special relativity
and ether theories. I am also grateful to Jim Cushing, Don Howard, and anonymous refer-
ees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. A portion of the research for this
paper was made possible by the generous support of the National Science Foundation.
1. There is some controversy over how thought experiments should be deŽned. John
Norton (1996) argues that thought experiments are essentially nothing but arguments from
hypothetical states of affairs. The shortcomings of this approach have been adequately ad-
dressed by Michael Bishop (1999) and Tamar Szabó Gendler (1998) and will not be dis-
cussed here. Nancy Nersessian (1993), by contrast, has argued that thought experiments
should be understood as narratives. My aim here is not to enter this debate concerning the
deŽnition of thought experiments, but rather to clarify some misunderstandings about
their function.

Perspectives on Science 2001, vol. 9, no. 3

©2002 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

285
286 Rethinking Thought Experiments

of thought experiments, or Gedankenexperimente, in physics is due to Ernst

Mach (1897). In his book Knowledge and Error, he writes, “besides physical
experiments there are others that are extensively used at a higher intellec-
tual level, namely thought experiments. . . . Our ideas are more readily to
hand than physical facts: thought experiments cost less, as it were. It is
thus small wonder that thought experiment often precedes and prepares
physical experiments” (Mach [1926] 1976, p. 136). For Mach, there is a
continuum between thought experiments and ordinary experiments—
both in the sense that they use a similar methodology2 and in the sense
that many thought experiments Žnd a future realization in the laboratory.3
While a discussion of Mach’s views on the continuity between thought ex-
periments and physical experiments is outside the scope of this paper, the
challenge for any adequate account of thought experiments is to deter-
mine in which respects this continuity view can be maintained, and in
which respects it breaks down. I argue below that, on one hand, there are
certain respects in which thought experiments are more like ordinary ex-
periments than has been previously admitted, while on the other hand,
when it comes to the function of thought experiments, there is an impor-
tant respect in which this continuity view breaks down. The assumption
that thought experiments have the same function in the evaluation of the-
ories as ordinary experiments do has led to difŽculties in several current
accounts of thought experiments.
In what follows, I examine two thought experiments in physics and
show how, in both cases, the same thought experiment can be “rethought”
from the perspective of different—and even incompatible—theories.
While there are no necessary conditions for what is to count as “the same
thought experiment,” one can argue for a lenient construal of the identity
of two thought experiments by appealing to features such as a resemblance
of the central narratives and a continuity through historical connection.4
While my discussion is focused speciŽcally on the role of thought experi-
ments in contemporary physics, the conclusions drawn here do have im-
plications for understandin g the function of thought experiments in sci-
ence more generally.

2. Mach ([1926] 1976, p. 139).

3. A famous contemporary example of this is Alain Aspect et al.’s 1982 realization of
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment. The EPR thought experiment will be
discussed in Section 4.
4. Sorenesen has similarly argued for a leniency in the standards for what is to count
as an instance of the same thought experiment (Sorensen 1992a, p. 163). It should
be noted that this is not a difŽculty unique to thought experiments; similar problems
plague attempts to characterize what is to count as two instances of the same physical ex-
periment.
 Perspectives on Science 287

As I shall argue, the fact that the same thought experiment can be
reanalyzed from the perspective of two incompatible theories has a num-
ber of important implications for understandin g the nature and function
of thought experiments. First, just as Duhem showed in the case of ordi-
nary physical experiments, the interpretation of a thought experiment
presupposes a whole set of background theories and laws. For this reason,
crucial experiments are no more possible in thought experiments than
they are in physical experiments.
Second, the ability to rethink a thought experiment from the perspec-
tive of two incompatible theories challenge s two recent accounts of how
thought experiments function. More speciŽcally, both James Robert
Brown (1991) and Roy Sorensen (1992b) argue that the knowledge we
gain through some thought experiments is knowledge about the laws of
nature, which can then be used in testing the empirical adequacy of our
theories. The difŽculties in explaining where this knowledge comes from
lead Brown, on the one hand, to give an a priori platonic account of our ac-
cess to the laws of nature,5 while, on the other hand, they lead Sorensen to
claim that our access to the laws of nature can be given a biological expla-
nation in terms of natural selection.6 Both of these accounts share a mis-
conception about the function of thought experiments in physics and fail
to give an adequate account of the knowledge we gain from them.
Third, the following analysis suggests an important respect in which
the function of thought experiments differs from that of ordinary physical
experiments: the evaluative function of thought experiments is not to
test the empirical adequacy of our theories, but rather to test their non-
empirical virtues—such as consistency and explanatory power. Finally, I
shall argue that a more careful look at the history and development of two
thought experiments in physics reveals that, contrary to Ian Hacking’s
claim, thought experiments can have a life of their own (Hacking 1993,
p. 307).

2. Duhem, Crucial Experiments, and Exp riences Fictives

Thought experiments are often presented in the form of reductio ad absur-
dum arguments. The strategy is to create a scenario in which the theory
one is arguing against is shown to imply a contradiction or absurdity. A
famous example of this is Galileo’s thought experiment on falling bodies
used to undermine the Aristotelian theory of motion.7 On the Žrst day of
5. Brown (1991, p. 155).
6. Sorensen (1992b, p. 15).
7. Tamar Gendler (1998) has provided a detailed examination of this particular thought
experiment and used it to argue against the view that thought experiments can be reduced
to, or eliminated in favor of, pure arguments.
288 Rethinking Thought Experiments

Galileo’s Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, the character Salviati says,
“But, even without further experiment, it is possible to prove clearly, by
means of a short and conclusive argument, that a heavier body does not
move more rapidly than a lighter one . . . as those mentioned by Aristotle”
(Galilei [1638] 1991, p. 62). The thought experiment consists of tying a
heavy cannon ball to a lighter musket ball and then comparing the speed
of this composite system’s fall to that of a cannon ball falling alone.
Salviati uses this thought experiment to argue that Aristotle’s theory im-
plies a contradiction: on the one hand, this composite system must fall
slower than a cannon ball (since the musket ball is retarding the compos-
ite system), while on the other hand, this composite system must fall
faster (since the composite system is heavier than the cannon ball alone).
Like Salviati, the proponent of a thought experiment often presents it as a
crucial experiment, deciding unambiguously —and unavoidably —in favor
of one theory and against another.8
Philosophers of science have long been wary of claims of crucial experi-
ments. Pierre Duhem, who is well known for his critique of crucial experi-
ments, writes,
Those who assimilate experimental contradiction to reduction
to absurdity imagine that in physics we may use a line of argu-
ment similar to the one Euclid employed so frequently in geome-
try. . . . Unlike the reduction to absurdity employed by geometers,
experimental contradiction does not have the power to transform a
physical hypothesis into an indisputabl e truth; in order to confer
this power on it, it would be necessary to enumerate completely
the various hypotheses which may cover a determinate group of
phenomena; but the physicist is never sure that he has exhausted
all the imaginable assumptions (Duhem [1914] 1954,
pp. 188–190).
Duhem’s critique of crucial experiments became the cornerstone of what
would later, in retrospect, be called the Quine-Duhem thesis. Although
there are stronger and weaker versions of this thesis, its basic claim is that
experimental evidence alone cannot compel a scientist to accept or reject a
theory. The reason that experimental evidence underdetermines theory

8. Gendler (1998), in her section “Four Ways Out,” argues that this thought experi-
ment need not have been taken as decisive against the Aristotelian theory. She does not,
however, connect this insight to Duhem’s work and his concerns about thought experi-
ments. In the examples I discuss below, the challenge to “crucial thought experiments”
does not simply come from the ability to modify a given theory in the face of discon-
Žrming evidence, but rather, from an underdetermination between two genuine rival theo-
ries.
 Perspectives on Science 289

choice, according to Duhem, is that it is never an isolated hypothesis that

faces an experiment, rather it is a whole group of interlocking hypotheses.
A natural question, then, is whether these insights about crucial physical
experiments apply to thought experiments as well.
Duhem, like Mach, is among the earliest philosophers to discuss the
methodological role that thought experiments play in physics. Unlike
Mach, however, Duhem’s assessment of thought experiments is not favor-
able. Duhem refers to thought experiments as “Žctitious experiments”
(expériences Žctives) and sees their use in physics as illegitimate . I would ar-
gue that Duhem’s distrust of thought experiments can be understood as
connected to his critique of crucial experiments. For Duhem, “the inter-
pretation of the slightest experiment in physics presupposes the use of a
whole set of theories, and . . . the very description of this experiment re-
quires a great many abstract symbolic expressions whose meaning and cor-
respondence with the facts are indicated only by theories” (Duhem [1914]
1954, p. 204). Although he does not explicitly draw the connection be-
tween crucial experiments and thought experiments, it is arguably this
holistic aspect to ordinary experiments that Duhem believed to be miss-
ing from thought experiments. This interpretation of Duhem gains sup-
port when one notes that his critique of thought experiments occurs in the
middle of the chapter in which he argues that crucial experiments are
not possible. It is also the case that in the paragraph which immediately
precedes his discussion of thought experiments, Duhem reiterates the
fundamental difference that he sees between the methods of physics and
geometry.
Apart from concerns about whether thought experiments exhibit ho-
lism, Duhem presents an even more difŽcult challenge to the legitimacy
of the use of thought experiments in science. He writes,
To invoke such a Žctitious experiment is to offer an experiment to
be done for an experiment done; this is justifying a principle not by
means of facts observed but by means of facts whose existence is
predicted, and this prediction has no other foundation than the be-
lief in the principle supported by the alleged experiment. Such a
method of demonstration implicates him who trusts it in a vicious
circle (Duhem [1914] 1954, p. 202).
While Duhem is right to point out that thought experiments cannot pro-
vide any new empirical foundation for a theory or principle, he is wrong in
concluding that they have no legitimate role to play in the evaluation and
justiŽcation of scientiŽc theories. As the following two examples show,
thought experiments do play a legitimate role in evaluating the non-
empirical virtues of a theory.
290 Rethinking Thought Experiments

3. Th e Rocket s and Thread Thought Experiment: Einstein vs. Lorentz

The following thought experiment appeared in a 1959 American Journal of
Physics article (Dewan and Beran 1959, pp. 517–518). Imagine two iden-
tically constructed rockets, B and C, both initially at rest in an inertial
frame, S. The two rockets are arranged one behind the other, 100 meters
apart in S and are connected by a thin piece of thread just long enough to
connect the two rockets (as in Figure 1). Now imagine that both rockets
Žre up their engines simultaneously in this frame and gently accelerate to
relativistic velocities. Once they reach four-Žfths the speed of light rela-
tive to S, they simultaneously stop accelerating , and are now moving with
a uniform velocity. According to an observer at rest in S, the two rockets
have been moving in tandem and are still 100 meters apart. The question
now is whether or not the thread will break.
By carefully analyzing the situation in accordance with the special the-
ory of relativity, it can be shown that, according to an observer in S, the
thread must break because it is Lorentz-contracted (to a length of 60 me-
ters) and so can no longer span the full 100 meters between the rockets.
The mistaken belief that Lorentz contraction is simply an artifact of a
mathematical transformation, and not a real effect, might lead one to
worry that the thread breaking will lead to some inconsistency when we
consider the same situation from the point of view of an observer on rocket
A, at rest in the rockets’ Žnal inertial frame S moving with a uniform ve-
locity of four-Žfths the speed of light relative to S. From the point of view
of an observer on rocket A at rest in S , the initial separation of the rock-
ets is only 60 meters. Rather than seeing the rockets Žre their engines si-
multaneously, however, the observer on rocket A will see rocket B acceler-
ate and come to rest in S Žrst, followed by rocket C acceleratin g and
coming to rest at a later time.
Because the two rockets do not accelerat e and come to rest simulta-
neously according to an observer in S , the distance between these rockets
has grown from 60 meters to 166.67 meters. In the S¢ rest frame the
thread is, of course, 100 meters and so must break since it cannot stretch
the 166.67 meters between the rockets.
The intent of E. Dewan and M. Beran in Žrst introducing this thought
experiment was to show that Lorentz contraction can cause measurable
stresses on moving bodies.9 This conclusion is counterintuitiv e because,
according to special relativity, Lorentz contraction is a frame-dependen t

9. There is an interesting pre-history to this thought experiment that involves an ex-

change between Paul Ehrenfest and Einstein on this question of whether Lorentz contrac-
tion can produce stress effects. See Document 44 in Stachel (1989). I thank Don Howard
for bringing this reference to my attention.
 Perspectives on Science 291

Figure 1. The initial situation before rockets B and C Žre, as viewed in the iner-
tial frame S.

phenomenon, and hence, is not thought to lead to any observable effects,

such as a thread breaking.10 Almost twenty years later, John S. Bell re-
tooled this very thought experiment to show that the same conclusion
could be reached by means of a very different sort of analysis. Rather than
using the special theory of relativity to analyze this thought experiment,
Bell uses Lorentz’s ether theory.
Lorentz’s ether theory was, at least in 1905, an observationally equiva-
lent rival theory to special relativity.11 According to Lorentz’s theory, all
motion is relative to a stationary ether frame. The ether was thought to be
the medium through which electromagneti c forces were propagated. Lo-
rentz presents the following argument:
We assume that molecular forces are also transmitted through the
ether, like the electric and magnetic forces. . . . If they are so trans-
mitted, the translation will very probably affect the action between
two molecules or atoms in a manner resembling the attraction or
repulsion between charged particles. Now, since the form and di-
mensions of a solid body are ultimately conditioned by the inten-
sity of molecular actions, there cannot fail to be a change of dimen-
sions as well (Lorentz [1895] 1952, p. 6).
10. The counterintuitiveness of this conclusion is evidenced by John Bell’s account of
how the majority of physicists in the theory division at CERN, when presented with this
thought experiment, initially gave the incorrect answer ([1976] 1993, p. 68).
11. Elie Zahar (1973) has argued that not only was Lorentz’s theory empirically ade-
quate but it was also part of a non-ad hoc research program. Today it remains an open ques-
tion whether or not it is possible to construct a Lorentzian ether theory that is in all re-
spects empirically equivalent to special relativity.
292 Rethinking Thought Experiments

9
9
9

Figure 2. A Minkowski space-time diagram of the relativistic account of the

rockets and thread thought experiment.

From the molecular force hypothesis described above, Lorentz is able to de-
rive the now well-known expression for Lorentz contraction, 1 - v 2 / c 2 ,
where v is the velocity of the object and c is the speed of light (Zahar
1973, pp. 114–115).
Lorentz originally used the above argument as part of an explanation
for how his ether theory could account for the results of the Michelson-
Morley experiment (which many took to be a crucial experiment resulting
in the refutation of the stationary ether theory). As Bell shows, however,
the same argument can also be used to explain the results of the rockets
and thread thought experiment. Bell models the atoms making up the
thread in terms of nuclei with circular electron orbits. He then shows that
as the nuclei begin to move relative to the stationary ether, the initially
circular orbits will deform into ellipses, contracting in the direction of
motion by the usual Lorentz factor (Bell [1976] 1993, p. 70). As the at-
oms and molecules contract, so too will the thread. If the thread is not
strong enough to overcome the inertia of the rockets and draw them closer
together as it contracts, then the thread will break.
The rockets and thread thought experiment can be analyzed not only
from the perspective of Einstein’s special theory of relativity, but also from
the perspective of Lorentz’s ether theory. Although both theories agree on
what happens (i.e., the thread breaks), they differ greatly when it comes to
explaining how and why that event occurs. Bell draws two sorts of lessons
from this thought experiment. The Žrst lesson is a pedagogica l one. In his
discussion of why theoretical physicists often draw the wrong conclusion
 Perspectives on Science 293

(that, according to special relativity, the thread will not break) he notes
that those who are familiar with the work of Lorentz are more likely to see
that the thread will indeed break in this thought experiment. The reason
is that Lorentz’s ether theory, though by no means obvious, is more in ac-
cord with our classical views about space and time.
In addition to noting the pedagogical advantage that teaching Lorentz’s
theory might offer by being more in accord with our classical views, Bell
also draws a stronger epistemological lesson from his Lorentzian analysis
of this thought experiment. In his comparison of Lorentz’s approach to
Einstein’s he writes,
Lorentz, on the other hand, preferred the view that there is indeed a
state of real rest, deŽned by the ‘aether’, even though the laws of
physics conspire to prevent us identifying it experimentally. The
facts of physics do not oblige us to accept one philosophy rather
than the other. . . . [T]he laws of physics in any one reference frame
account for all physical phenomena, including the observations of
moving observers (Bell [1976] 1993, p. 77).
Whether one could consistently develop a Lorentzian space time theory
using a single preferred rest frame is an issue that is still debated, and
not one that I wish to address here. Instead, the important conclusions to
draw from Bell’s analysis are Žrst, that thought experiments are no more
bound to any one particular theory than ordinary physical experiments
are, and second, they can underdetermin e theory choice in the same way
too.

4. Th e EPR Thought Experiment: Copenhag en vs. Bohm

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) Gedankenexperiment is an example of a
thought experiment that has evolved and been modiŽed over time. The
original 1935 thought experiment can be described as follows. Consider
two particles, 1 and 2, that interact and then become spatially separated.
With the help of Schrödinger’s equation one can calculat e the state of the
combined system (1 and 2) at some later time, which will be a superposi-
tion of various possible states for these two particles. If one decides to
measure the position, for example, of particle 1, then the result of this
measurement plus the information about the combined system allows one
to determine a deŽnite value for the position of particle 2 (i.e., without
having to make a measurement on that particle). EPR then invoke the fol-
lowing criterion: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can pre-
dict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a
physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corre-
294 Rethinking Thought Experiments

sponding to this physical quantity” (Einstein et al. [1935] 1983, p. 138).

Thus, EPR conclude that particle 2 must really have a deŽnite position,
since it is assumed that the decision to make a measurement of the posi-
tion of particle 1 in no way could affect the state of particle 2 which is spa-
tially separated from it (this is called the locality or separation principle12).
The paradoxical aspect of this thought experiment arises when EPR point
out that one could just as well have chosen to measure the momentum of
particle 1. In this case, one could use the result of the momentum mea-
surement on 1, plus the information about the state of the combined sys-
tem, to determine a deŽnite value for the momentum of particle 2. From
this EPR conclude that particle 2 must simultaneously have a deŽnite po-
sition and a deŽnite momentum (recall that by the locality assumption
nothing we do to particle 1 can affect particle 2).
The stated intention of EPR is to use this thought experiment to show
that quantum mechanics is incomplete. If quantum mechanics is com-
plete, then a particle cannot simultaneously have a deŽnite position and a
deŽnite momentum; the accuracy to which complementary observables,
such as position and momentum, can be deŽned is limited by Heisen-
berg’s uncertaint y principle. But, according to the EPR thought experi-
ment, a particle can simultaneously have a deŽnite position and a deŽnite
momentum. 13 Thus, they conclude, quantum mechanics is incomplete.
With evidence from Einstein’s letters, Arthur Fine (1986) has shown
that it was likely Podolsky who wrote up the EPR paper and that Einstein
was unhappy with the way the paper came out, feeling that the essential
point he wanted to make was obscured. Fine provides a convincing argu-
ment that Einstein saw this thought experiment, not as showing that
quantum mechanics was incomplete, but rather as showing that one could
not maintain both that quantum mechanics is complete and that states of
spatially separated objects are independen t from each other.14 This illus-
trates the fact that even the coauthors of a thought experiment can dis-

12. Fine (1986, p. 36).

13. Speaking more precisely, it is possible to assign two different wavefunctions to
the same reality and these wavefunctions can be eigenstates of noncommuting operators.
According to the rules of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, if a system
is in an eigenstate of some observable then that observable has a deŽnite value for that
system.
14. Don Howard (1985) has argued for a similar interpretation of Einstein’s views on
the EPR paper. Howard shows that in 1936 Einstein reformulated the EPR Gedan-
kenexperiment in such a way to make the tension between completeness and the “separation
principle” more explicit. SpeciŽcally, Einstein showed that the thought experiment does
not depend crucially on the reality criterion or noncommuting operators, only on the fact
that two different wavefunctions can be ascribed to the same reality. The relevant Einstein
references can be found in Howard (1985).
 Perspectives on Science 295

agree about what it is precisely that the thought experiment is supposed

to show.
In 1951, David Bohm retooled the EPR Gedankenexperiment into the
form in which it is more generally known today. He writes, “we have
modiŽed the experiment somewhat, but the form is conceptually equiva-
lent to that suggested by them, and considerably easier to treat mathemat-
ically” (Bohm 1951, p. 614). Rather than considering position and mo-
mentum measurements, he considers spin measurements on two atoms
that are the result of the disintegration of an initial spin-zero molecule.
These atoms will thus have equal and opposite spin, irrespective of the di-
rection along which the spin is measured (see Figure 3). Since the opera-
tors associated with spins in any two directions not on the same axis do
not commute, we are presented with a situation similar to the original
EPR Gedankenexperiment.
The simpler conceptual and mathematical form of Bohm’s version of
the thought experiment played a critical role in facilitatin g Bell’s con-
struction of his famous inequality. Very briey, this inequalit y is derivable
from (i.e., a logical consequence of) a condition that Bell called ‘locality,’
which is essentially equivalent to Einstein’s separation principle (Bell
[1971] 1993, p. 36).15 This inequality, however, is incompatible with the
predictions of quantum mechanics and with well-establishe d empirical
data. The experimental violation of Bell’s inequality is typically taken to
imply that Bell’s locality condition must be given up. Fine, however,
makes the following point:
Arguments by Bell and others suggest that separation alone may be
incompatible with the quantum theory. . . . Should that be correct,
then the dilemma of EPR could be resolved by abandoning separa-
tion. I do not believe that the Bell arguments are in fact strong
enough to force the issue this way, but even if they are, the question
of completenes s would remain. For it is possible that both separation
and completeness turn out to be false (Fine 1986, pp. 38–39).
The great value of the EPR Gedankenexperiment is that it reveals an incon-
sistency between a certain set of theoretical assumptions. It is by no means
a crucial experiment, however, that forces the resolution of this contradic-
tion one way or the other.

15. More information on Bell’s inequality can be found in the Cushing and McMullin
(1989) anthology. Subsequent work has shown that what is here called locality is in fact the
conjunction of two distinct conditions ( Jarrett 1984). Howard (1985) has argued that
shortly after the 1935 EPR paper, Einstein himself became aware of essentially this dis-
tinction. Unfortunately, a discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this paper and I
must refer the interested reader to the excellent collection of articles referenced above.
296 Rethinking Thought Experiments

Figure 3. Bohm’s version of the EPR Gedankenexperiment.

In 1952 Bohm made a radical reversal, not only of his interpretation of

the EPR thought experiment, but also of his entire interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics. His new resolution of the EPR dilemma is to abandon
both separation and completeness . In the paper in which Bohm develops
the causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, he writes,
In the usual interpretation of quantum theory, there is no . . . con-
ceptual model showing in detail how the second particle, which is
not in any way supposed to interact with the Žrst particle, is never-
theless able to obtain either an uncontrollabl e disturbance of its po-
sition or an uncontrollable disturbance of its momentum depending
on what kind of measurement the observer decided to carry out on
the Žrst particle. . . . In our suggested new interpretation of the
quantum theory, however, we can describe this [EPR] experiment
in terms of a . . . precisely deŽnable conceptual model (Bohm
[1952] 1983, p. 389).
Very briey described, Bohm’s causal interpretation begins with the stan-
dard Schrödinger equation and rewrites it in a form resembling a classical
equation of motion (the Hamilton-Jacobi equation) containing the usual
classical potential plus a new “quantum potential” term.16 This way of
writing the fundamental equations of quantum mechanics suggests a new
way of interpreting this formalism. While the standard interpretation of
the formalism of quantum mechanics takes it to describe a fundamentall y
indeterministic world, in which particles cannot have deŽnite trajectories,
Bohm showed that one could also consistently interpret the formalism of
quantum mechanics as describing a fundamentall y deterministic world
where particles do always follow deŽnite trajectories.
According to Bohm’s causal interpretation, the correlations in the EPR
thought experiment can be explained in terms of a direct disturbance. On

16. For further information about Bohm’s causal interpretation see, for example, Cush-
ing (1994).
 Perspectives on Science 297

this causal view, the wavefunctio n is interpreted as a real Želd that encodes
information about the entire two-particle and two-apparatus system.
When the experimenter changes the settings on the apparatus to measure
a certain observable of particle 1, this immediately produces a change in
the overall wavefunctio n and alters the quantum potential. This change in
the quantum potential can be said to generate a quantum force that
acts instantaneously on the particles. Thus, the measurement made on
particle 1 instantaneously disturbs particle 2 via this nonlocal quantum
potential. 17
As in the rockets and thread thought experiment described in the last
section, the EPR Gedankenexperiment can be reanalyzed from the perspec-
tive of different, and even incompatible , theories. While one might have
thought that the EPR Gedankenexperiment could function as a crucial ex-
periment to decide between standard quantum mechanics and hidden
variable theories, it turns out to be explainabl e equally well by each of
these rivals.
The EPR Gedankenexperiment has been discussed in the literature on
thought experiments before. Allen Janis, for example, has used the EPR
Gedankenexperiment as an example of one of the ways in which thought ex-
periments can fail. With regard to EPR, he writes, “the thought experi-
ment failed to provide a clear basis for concluding that quantum mechan-
ics is incomplete. Since this goal was the motivation for the thought
experiment, however, the thought experiment failed”(Janis 1991, p. 116).
The difŽculty with saying that thought experiments can fail in this way is
that it makes sense only with respect to the intentions of the proponent of
thought experiment. As we have seen, however, different people have put
forward the EPR Gedankenexperiment with the intention of showing differ-
ent things. For example, if Fine’s reading of Einstein is correct, then Janis
should have concluded that the EPR did not fail—it succeeded in show-
ing that one could not maintain both locality and completenes s (i.e., that
one or the other, or both had to be given up).
A more careful reading of the history of this thought experiment re-
veals that many discussions of the EPR Gedankenexperiment are over-
simpliŽed and consequently have led to a mistaken understandin g of
thought experiments. An important lesson to take away from this discus-
sion is that to say that a thought experiment succeeds or fails makes sense
only in reference to the intentions of the proponent of the thought experi-
ment. As we have seen, however, there can be disagreement over what it is
that a thought experiment shows. Moreover, we should not say that only

17. Because these nonlocal disturbances are uncontrollable and cannot be used to send a
signal, there is arguably no conict with the Žrst principle of relativity.
298 Rethinking Thought Experiments

the intentions of the original author(s) of the thought experiment are to

count; thought experiments can be rethought and retooled for new pur-
poses.

5. Th ought Experiments and the La ws of Nature

In thinking through a thought experiment, it is difŽcult not to believe
that one is learning something new. Kuhn, for example, asks “How, then,
relying exclusively upon familiar data, can a thought experiment lead to
new knowledge or to a new understandin g of nature?” (Kuhn [1964]
1977, p. 241). Two sorts of answers to this question have been given re-
cently in the literature on thought experiments. Both Brown (1991) and
Sorensen (1992b) argue that thought experiments function by revealing
the laws of nature. While Brown argues that thought experiments give
us a priori insights into the laws of nature, Sorensen argues that thought
experiments harness physical intuitions shaped by laws through natural
selection. Both accounts, however, misconceive the function of thought
experiments and fail to give a satisfactory account of the knowledge that
we gain from them.
Brown argues for the existence of a special class of thought experiments
which he calls “platonic.” He explains,
A platonic thought experiment is a single thought experiment which
destroys an old or existing theory and simultaneously generates a
new one; it is a priori in that it is not based on new empirical evi-
dence nor is it merely logically derived from old data; and it is an
advance in that the resulting theory is better than the predecessor
theory (Brown 1991, p. 77).
The function of a platonic thought experiment is that of a crucial experi-
ment, designed to decide unambiguously in favor of one theory and
against another. I suspect that it was this sort of interpretation of thought
experiments that led Duhem to be wary of them. Brown’s discussion of
platonic thought experiments assumes that there is a direct path from
such thought experiments to the relevant laws of nature.
Although he sees these thought experiments functioning as crucial ex-
periments revealing the laws of nature, he is not an empiricist. Rather, he
argues that “[platonic] thought experiments give us (fallible ) a priori be-
liefs of how the physical world works. With the mind’s eye, we can see the
laws of nature” (Brown 1991, p. 155). Brown looks for support for this
view in the interpretatio n of laws as necessary relations among independ-
ently existing universals. The difŽculty, however, with deŽning laws of
nature this way is that it divorces this notion from the sort of things that
 Perspectives on Science 299

scientists typically refer to as laws of nature.18 While a full discussion of

this notion of law is outside the scope of this paper, I want to argue that
Brown’s account of laws fails to illuminat e our understanding of how
thought experiments, like the EPR Gedankenexperiment, work.
Brown views the EPR Gedankenexperiment as an example of platonic
thought experiment that “destroyed the Copenhagen interpretation and
established hidden variables” in its place (Brown 1991, p. 77). Brown, of
course, notes that historically this was not the outcome of this thought ex-
periment. Rather than seeing cases like this as posing a problem for his a
priori platonic account, he appends the term “fallibilist ” to his position. To
simply say that the EPR Gedankenexperiment was a failed case of seeing the
laws of nature, still greatly misrepresents this thought experiment.19
Brown furthermore wants to claim that not only are these laws the cause
of the knowledge we gain in the thought experiment, but that they are
also somehow the cause of the correlations involved in the EPR Gedanken-
experiment. Brown writes,
Distant correlations are caused by the laws of nature. . . . A law of
nature is an independentl y existing entity. . . . It is this very same
entity, the abstract law, which plays a role in our knowledge of
what is going on at the distant wing of an EPR-type experiment
(Brown 1991, p. 152).
Unfortunately, Brown does not go on to explain exactly what this particu-
lar law of nature is, nor what are the universals between which it is sup-
posed to be a necessary relation. Further problems arise when one tries to
make sense of what it might mean to attribute causal powers to a law. In
the case of Bohm’s causal interpretatio n of the EPR Gedankenexperiment, for
example, there is no need to postulate a law as the cause of these correla-
tions, since the correlations are said to be caused by a real physical quan-
tum potential, or force.
In the case of the Copenhagen interpretation, the laws at work in this
thought experiment are fundamentall y indeterministic , whereas in the
case of the causal interpretation the laws at work in this same thought ex-
periment are fundamentally deterministic. The fact that the same thought
experiment can be rethought from the perspective of different and incom-
patible theories makes it less plausible that thought experiments work by
allowing us to “see” the laws of nature.
18. Although David Armstrong, who is a proponent of this view of laws, admits this is
the case, he does not view it as a shortcoming (Armstrong 1983, pp. 138–139).
19. I offer an alternative account of the knowledge we gain through thought experi-
ments in Section 6.
300 Rethinking Thought Experiments

Sorensen offers an alternative account of the role that laws play in

thought experiments. He writes,
The laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intu-
itions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought
experimenter s to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those
intuitions. The good news is that natural selection ensures a degree
of reliability for the intuitions. The bad news is that the evolution-
ary account seems to limit the range of reliable thought experiment
to highly practical and concrete contexts (Sorensen 1992b, p. 15).
On this account, thought experiments are said to reveal the laws of nature
by harnessing our physical, or modal, intuitions. In order to explain the
source of these modal intuitions, and why they should generally give us
reliable insight into the laws, Sorensen appeals to evolutionary theory. Al-
though he admits that this “biological guarantee” does not logically entail
reliable belief formation, he nonetheless thinks that it can explain our suc-
cesses in using thought experiments (Sorensen 1992b, p. 35).
A fundamental difŽculty for Sorensen’s account is to explain why one of
the most successful areas in which thought experiments are used is theo-
retical physics. The description of the world given by contemporary phys-
ics is very far removed from our ordinary physical intuitions. In these con-
texts, it is particularly implausible that any appeal to the sort of physical
intuitions that might have evolved evolutionarily would offer us any in-
sight into how such thought experiments function.
Although Sorensen admits that the pessimism his evolutionary account
implies regarding the more theoretical and abstract thought experiments
may not be entirely founded, he gives no clear explanation for how this
fact is to be reconciled with his view. In my view, the reason that thought
experiments can be successfully carried out in physics is that the formal-
ism and mathematical structure of the theory play a central heuristic role
in carrying our reasoning further than our common-sense physical intu-
itions could. This is precisely why we are able to evaluate thought experi-
ments in theories like special relativity even though the relativistic ac-
count of distance and simultaneity is very far removed from our everyday
understandin g of these concepts. It is simply a mistake to describe the sort
of knowledge involved in these thought experiments as intuitions.
Brown and Sorensen share a common misconceptio n that the immedi-
ate function of thought experiments is to reveal the laws of nature. It is
because they see this as the function of thought experiments that they
then must introduce an a priori or evolutionary account to explain how
this might work. Thought experiments, however, are not “pre-theoretical ”
entities that provide a pure empirical or a priori basis from which to dis-
 Perspectives on Science 301

cover laws. In the spirit of Duhem we might put the point the following
way: the interpretatio n of a thought experiment presupposes the use of a
whole set of theories and (for thought experiments in physics) the very de-
scription of a thought experiment requires a great many abstract symbolic
expressions whose meaning and correspondence with the facts are indi-
cated only by theories.20

6. What Do Thought Experiments Teach Us?

If thought experiments do not work by allowing us to see the laws of na-
ture, then the question of what it is that we are learning, when we perform
a thought experiment, remains. The simple answer is that thought experi-
ments work by drawing out the physical implications of our theories. In a
thought experiment we begin with a theory or set of assumed laws and
then use the thought experiment to uncover certain consequence s from
these laws that might otherwise remain hidden. For example, in the rock-
ets and thread thought experiment, one might understand the special the-
ory of relativity, and know the laws that this theory postulates, but still
not be aware that they imply the existence of relativistic stress effects. The
thought experiment makes these consequence s explicit.
While drawing out the implications of our theories is an important
part of science, thought experiments are not limited to this function.
Thought experiments do play a role in evaluating, accepting, and reject-
ing theories. It is a mistake, however, to see the role of thought experi-
ments as testing the empirical adequacy of a theory. On this point, Duhem
was right to charge those who attempt to do so with implicating them-
selves in a vicious circle. The key point to recognize, however, is that
empirical adequacy is not the only criterion used in the evaluation of theo-
ries.
In 1964 Kuhn provided the beginning of an answer to the question of
how thought experiments teach us something new when he pointed out
that thought experiments reveal contradictions between nature and the
scientist’s conceptual apparatus. However, it is only after Kuhn’s 1973 ar-
ticle “Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice” that a fuller
Kuhnian explanatio n of the function of thought experiments in theory
evaluation could be made clear.21 In this article, Kuhn points out that the-
ory choice is not simply a matter of determining whether the theory is
empirically adequate, but that it also depends crucially on other
nonempirical criteria. These criteria can be described as internal consis-
20. Recall the quotation from Duhem (Duhem [1914] 1954, p. 204) given in Section 2
of the present work.
21. Kuhn himself did not, in later writings, return to the question of how thought ex-
periments function.
302 Rethinking Thought Experiments

tency, external coherence with other theories, simplicity, and explanatory

power. Philosophers such as Ernan McMullin (1988) and Paul Churchland
(1985) have argued that these nonempirical criteria can be just as impor-
tant as, and in some cases more important than, empirical criteria in eval-
uating a theory. This realization, that the testing and evaluating of theo-
ries involves not just empirical criteria, suggests a legitimate and
substantial way in which thought experiments can be used in theory eval-
uation.
In addition to bringing out the physical implications of our theories, a
central function of thought experiments is to test and evaluate the internal
consistency, external coherence, simplicity, and explanatory power of our
theories. In special relativity, thought experiments are typically used to
show that apparent contradictions in the theory can in fact be consistently
accounted for. The special relativistic version of the rockets and thread
thought experiment can be understood along similar lines. One might
think that, because Lorentz contraction is a frame dependent phenome-
non, an effect like the thread breaking would lead to an inconsistency
when considered from another frame. If one could not account for the
thread breaking from the perspective of the Žnal rest frame, then this
would suggest an internal inconsistency in the theory. By carefully work-
ing through the thought experiment, however, one can show that there is
no such inconsistency.
The rethinking of the rockets and thread thought experiment from the
perspective of Lorentz’s ether theory illustrates the great explanatory
power that this theory has for accounting for the result. According to Bell,
the ability of this theory to provide a concrete, visualizabl e model for the
Lorentz contraction of the thread gives Lorentz’s theory an explanatory ad-
vantage over special relativity.
In a similar way, the novel insights given by the EPR Gedanken-
experiment can be seen in terms of its function in testing the nonempirical
virtues of quantum theory. Quantum mechanics is one of the most empiri-
cally successful theories in history, and both the standard and causal inter-
pretations share this empirical adequacy. The remarkable result of this
1935 thought experiment was to show that two fundamental assumptions
of standard quantum theory, namely locality (the “separation” principle)
and completeness , are inconsistent. When this thought experiment was
analyzed in accordance with the causal interpretation, however, its pur-
pose was both to demonstrate the explanatory power of this theory and to
address concerns about its external coherence with relativity theory. Once
we see that a central function of thought experiments is to test the non-
empirical virtues of theories, it is not surprising that Bohm makes the fol-
 Perspectives on Science 303

lowing point in the context of the causal interpretation’s account of the

EPR Gedankenexperiment:
The reason why no contradictions with relativity arise in our inter-
pretation despite the instantaneous transmission of momentum be-
tween particles is that no signal can be carried in this way. For such
a transmission of momentum could constitute a signal only if there
were some practical means of determining precisely what the sec-
ond particle would have done if the Žrst particle had not been ob-
served; and as we have seen, this information cannot be obtained
(Bohm [1952] 1983, p. 390).22
Bohm uses the causal interpretation’s description of the EPR Gedanken-
experiment to argue that this interpretatio n involves no conict with the
special theory of relativity. In other words, he is using this thought experi-
ment to highlight the fact that his theory does indeed possess the non-
empirical virtue of external coherence.
While we are not learning anything new about the world through these
thought experiments, they are teaching us something new about the de-
gree of internal consistency, external coherence, simplicity, and explana-
tory power of our theories. In so doing, thought experiments are playing
an important part in the evaluation of a scientiŽc theory even though
physical experiments are still required to test its empirical adequacy. On
this account of the function of thought experiments, there is no longer any
need to explain the knowledge we acquire through thought experiments
as an instance of fallibly seeing the laws of nature.

7. Why Thought Experiments Do Have a Life of Their Own

The function of thought experiments in science is to draw out the physical
implications of our theories and to test their nonempirical virtues. In both
these capacities, the description and interpretatio n of the thought experi-
ment must begin by presupposing a set of background theories and laws.
To say this, however, does not commit one to the view that thought exper-
iments cannot be thought from the perspective of different theories.
Against this view, Ian Hacking has argued that thought experiments do
not have a life of their own. He explains what he means by ‘life of their
own’ as follows,
Over a decade ago I wrote that experiments have a life of their own.
I intended partly to convey the fact that experiments are organic,
22. Whether this account of Bohm’s actually succeeds in establishing the external co-
herence of the causal interpretation with relativity is another matter, which will not be
pursued here.
304 Rethinking Thought Experiments

develop, change, and yet retain a certain long-term development

which makes us talk about repeating and replicating experi-
ments. . . . I think of experiments as having a life: maturing, evolv-
ing, adapting, being not only recycled but also, quite literally be-
ing retooled. But thought experiments are rather Žxed, largely
immutable. . . . what they think is what was once thought
(Hacking 1993, p. 307).
By ‘life of its own’ Hacking does not mean that the interpretation or de-
scription of an experiment can be made independentl y of all theories.23
Rather, he means that experiments have the ability to evolve and be
adapted to different theories and ends.
The closer analyses of the rockets and thread thought experiment in
Section 2 and the EPR Gedankenexperiment in Section 3 reveal that, by the
deŽnition given above, these thought experiments do indeed have a life of
their own. The rockets and thread thought experiment, which was Žrst in-
troduced by Dewan and Beran to show an overlooked consequence of the
special theory of relativity, was readapted by Bell to show that the same
result could be explained much more naturally in terms of Lorentz’s ether
theory. Similarly, the 1935 EPR Gedankenexperiment evolved, at the hands
of Bohm in 1951, into the simpler form it is usually known by today. In
1952, Bohm made an even more radical retooling of this thought experi-
ment by reanalyzing it in terms of the causal interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
Far from being Žxed and immutable, what is being thought at each
stage of these thought experiments is signiŽcantly different from what
had been thought before. In the one case we saw how thoughts about the
classical notions of distance and simultaneity breaking down gave way to
thoughts about molecular forces transmitted by an ether. In the other case,
thoughts about particles that do not possess well deŽned positions and
momenta prior to measurement gave way to thoughts about particles that
do always have well deŽned positions and momenta being guided by a
quantum potential. In short, these examples show that thought experi-
ments can have a life of their own.
The impression that thought experiments do not have a life of their
own can be understood as a result of the oversimpliŽed and ahistorical way
that they are typically presented. Thought experiments are often used as
pedagogica l and rhetorical devices. In these contexts, the complexities and
23. Hacking (1983) presents a much more comprehensive set of arguments for the in-
dependence of physical experiments from theory. Obviously not all of these points can be
carried over to thought experiments. My point here is much more limited—namely, to
show that this particular argument of Hacking’s for a fundamental difference between
physical and thought experiments does not hold.
 Perspectives on Science 305

historical evolution of the thought experiment are omitted. It would be a

mistake, however, to conclude that rhetoric and pedagogy are their only
function; thought experiments have a more substantial role to play in
scientiŽc practice. They are important, not only for drawing out the phys-
ical implications of our theories, but also for testing their internal consis-
tency, external coherence, simplicity, and explanatory power. In this way,
thought experiments, just like ordinary physical experiments, can teach us
something new.

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