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Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
FACTS:  of eminent domain, which requires the payment of just
These are consolidated cases involving common legal
questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of several measures like E.O. No. 228, P.D. No. 27,
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229 and R.A. No.
6657 – Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
specifically the provision on granting modes of payment other
money as just compensation for lands that are taken by the
government.
In G.R. No. 7977
The petitioners in the said case are questioning P.D. No. 27
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds of separation of
powers, equal protection, due process and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as provided in the
Constitution is lodged in the Congress and not to the
President. The petitioners also seek to prohibit the
implementation of Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners contend that the taking of the property must be
simultaneous with the payment of just compensation which
Sec. 5 of E.O. No. 229 does not provide.
In G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said E.O.s
violate the constitutional provision that no private property
shall be taken without due process or just compensation which
was denied to the petitioner.
In G.R. No. 78742
Petitioner claims that they are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because they cannot eject their tenants due to the fact
that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not issued
the implementing rules required under the said decree. The
petitioners are therefore asking the Honorable Court for a writ
of mandamus to compel the DAR to issue the said rules
ISSUE: WON the laws questioned are valid exercise of power
of eminent domain.
RULING: YES. There are traditional distinctions between the
power of eminent domain and police power which logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time
involving the same subject. The property condemned under
police power is harmful or intended for harmful purposes, like
a building on the verge of collapse, which needs to be
University of the East
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demolished for public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. Under
police power, the confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking done in the exercise of power
compensation to the owner.
The petitions before the Court present no knotty complication
insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned.
There is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution with
regards to the extent that the laws in question merely prescribe
the retention limits for the landowners. However, there is
definitely a taking under power of eminent domain which
payment of just compensation is imperative when in order to
carry out the regulation, it is necessary to deprive such land
now
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the
exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right
theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the
State of rights in property without making compensation. But
restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or
morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction
here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.
The property so restricted remains in the possession of its
owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it.
The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the
use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of
further changes in local or social conditions — the restriction
will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to
enjoy his property as heretofore.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is
compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1)
the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must
be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary
for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the
condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge,
the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all
the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount." Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law
provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
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name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.
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particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be
paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the
just compensation, with other things of value.

DOCTRINE: All petitions were dismissed.

It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the

payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past
solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is
not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property
of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State
from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of

expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural

lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are
in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit
not only of a particular community or of a small segment of
the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels
of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-
glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole
territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the
foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the
vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we
are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer
and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow
through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has
ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just
distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore
been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at
least to their deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The

cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land
subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate
that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more
indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated,
which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of

this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top
priority project of the government. It is a part of this
assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that
would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way
but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be
no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of
the government and had no illusions that there would be
enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they
wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore
assume that their intention was to allow such manner of
payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
Magallona vs Executive Secretary
Facts:
Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines
of the Philippines as archipelagic state following the framing
of the Convention on the territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone codifying among others, the sovereign right of States
parties over their territorial sea. In March 2009 RA 9522
amended RA 3046 for compliance to UNCLOS III. It
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some base
points around the Philippine archipelago and classified
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez
adjacent territories, namely the KIG and Scarborough shoal as
regimes of islands whose island generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
Petitioners argue that the law reduces Philippine maritime
territory and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power in violation of Article 1 of the Constitution

Issue:

Whether or not RA 9522 adjusting the country’s archipelagic

baseline and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories is constitutional

The Petitioner argues that the law dismembers a large portion

of the national territory because it discards the previous
demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris
and related treaties and as defined in the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.

Ruling:

RA 9522 is constitutional. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with

the acquisition of territory. It is a treaty that regulates sea-sue
rights over maritime zones, while baselines law such as RA
9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States to mark-out specific
base points along their coasts from which baselines are drawn,
either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. These are mere statutory mechanism of
UNCLOS III to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves.
Verbatim decision: Petitioners hold the view that, based on
the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound
to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the relevant provision of
UNCLOS III and we find petitioners’ reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs
to Congress, not to his Court. Moreover, the luxury of
choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent and
UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic
maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is
recipe for two-fronted disaster: First, it sends an open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit
the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et.al. vs. LTFRB
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These
are consequences Congress wisely avoided. FACTS:

Doctrine: Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baseline law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522 allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental
shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with
the Constitution and our national interest.
mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in
sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various
engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of
life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel
emissions from engine combustion when these react to other
pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons,
oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it
creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other
compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates.
Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in
plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon
Law on Natural Resources and Environment
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monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into
the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary
oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the
nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.
Petitioners add that although much of the new power
generated in the country will use natural gas while a number
of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still
with the projected doubling of power generation over the next
10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor
vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain
the major sources of harmful emissions.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the
bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the
LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie
in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling
in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic Act
No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted
petitioners' motion to implead the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional
respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the
Solicitor General, notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by
owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor
General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the
existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this
law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs,
the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as
alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is
tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB
nor the DOTC. However, the petitioners insist that the
respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers
to implement measures in accordance with the policies and
principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent is the agency
responsible to implement the suggested alternative of
requiring public utility vehicles to use compressed
natural gas (CNG);
2. Whether or not the respondent can be compelled to
require public utility vehicles to use compressed
natural gas through a writ of mandamus.
HELD:
1. No. The Court held that the respondent is not the
agency responsible to implement the suggested
alternative of requiring public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas (CNG).
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
Further, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked
to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of
developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are
concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency
whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an
action plan and implement the emission standards for motor
vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
2. No. The Court held that the respondent cannot be
compelled to require public utility vehicles to use
compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB
has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to
grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based
on the results of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of
government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in
both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted
by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for
is procedurally infirm.
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to
reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as
the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels
deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these
pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently
requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that
petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an
indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant
of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for
public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to
the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
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Oposa v Factoran

Facts:

The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal

petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]
complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests.
The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn.
They pray that judgement be rendered ordering his
agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing timber licenses
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2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new
timber licenses agreements
They specifically allege that:
1. predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations
to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
2. the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier
3. The continued allowance by defendant of
TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
4. . Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal
to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of
the State to:
a. conserve and promote the nation's
cultural heritage and resources
(Section 14, Article XIV)
b. protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature. (Section 16,
Article II)
The Lower court ruled in favor of the respondent for
want of cause of action, Plaintiffs thus filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion.
Issues:
I. Locus standi
II. Whether or not the complaint fails to allege
a legal right involved or a legal wrong
committed.
III. Whether or not the TLAs are protected by
the non-impairment clause and that it cant
be rescinded
Held:
Anent the first issue, the court ruled that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
University of the East
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Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Anent the second issue, the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to
be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment
Anent the third issue, A license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order
of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil
Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
Doctrine:
The case herein provides for the Doctrine of
Intergenerational responsibility, giving due course to a
personality, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generations
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez

Cariño v. Insular Government

The Case:

• This case is about the application for land registration to the

Philippine Court of Land Registration, which the court granted
March 4, 1904.

•The Philippines and US Government, those governments

having taken possession of the property for public and military
purposes, appealed the decision to CFI of Province of
Benguet, which dismissed the application of the plaintiff and
affirmed by the SC.

• The Plaintiff brought to US Supreme Court by of virtue of

error and not by appeal.

Facts:

Mateo Cariño is an Igorot of the province of Benguet. For

more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899,
he and his grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained
fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His father had
cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he
had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been
recognized as owners by the Igorot and he had inherited or
received the land from his father, in accordance with Igorot
custom. He applied for the registration of a certain land. There
was no document of title issued for the land when he applied
for registration. The government contends that the land in
question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all
lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit
private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the
Crown.
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In 1893 -1894 and 1896 -1897; he made an application but
with no avail. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging
ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were
registered to him, that process, however, establishing only
possessory title. Even if the applicant have title, he cannot
have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act
No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among
others from its operation. The government argued that the
Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the
Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to
be acquired (Regalian Doctrine). Such title was acquired by
the US by virtue of the Treaty of Paris signed on April 11,
1899.
Issues:
a.) Whether or not the Regalian Doctrine applies to lands
previously occupied by tribes such as the Igorots,
who acquired native title thereof
b.) Whether or not Carino owns the land
Ruling:
a.) No. The Regalian Doctrine does not apply to lands
previously occupied by tribes that already acquired
native title thereof, such as the Igorots. By Section 12
of the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property
and rights acquired there by the United States are to
be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof.” The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and,
like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
It provides that "no law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from
Section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was
ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not
embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by
"property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of
which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had
heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association -- one of the
profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
Every presumption is and ought to be against the government
in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and
sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way (private ownership) before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land. (Principle of
Native Title) There is an existence of native title to land, or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a
claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of
any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the
theory of (jura regalia) Regalian Doctrine.
b.) YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and
should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of
those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. The
grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of
Prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states:
“where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.
Moreover, the decree of june 25, 1880 states that possessors
for certain times shall be deemed owners; if a cultivated land
20 years, if uncultivated 30 years.
Here the plaintiff’s father was the owner of the land by the
very terms of this decree – by Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all
the property and rights acquired there by the US are to be
administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to
this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to
equity in the main. Every presumption is and ought to be
against the government in a case like present. The court said
that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different
(compared to the occupation of white race against Native
Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of
the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their
country for private gain.The effect of proof was not to confer
title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law.
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez

Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, and Cesar

Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights
Act. Thus is on the ground that the law amounts to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The
IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. The assailed provisions of the said law are:

(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of

ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;

(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that

ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;

(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines

the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of

the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of

the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the

indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within
the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right
to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and

(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the

responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.
Law on Natural Resources and Environment
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Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within
said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners. They also question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground
that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. These provisions are:
(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of
the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions
and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in
favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples;
and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."
Issue:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
NO. The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation
they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and
the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote,
Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained.
University of the East
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Discussion from the Separate Opinion of Justice Puno:
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
The IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral land but more
importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our
indigenous people.
The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution.
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was
an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine.
State ownership of natural resources was seen as a
necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's
power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of
State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced
by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it
was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all
doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.
THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize,
Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing
Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct
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sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;
- the right to ancestral lands which include the right to transfer
land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,
subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned; and the right to redemption for a period not
exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a
non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent
of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable
consideration.
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the
ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and
empowerment, social justice and human rights, the right to
preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and
community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their
own sciences and technologies.
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The
NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the
President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners
belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas-
Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon;
Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay
and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao;
Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. The
NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino
which were merged under a revitalized structure.
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under
customary laws and practices. When still unresolved, the
matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-
judicial powers. The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
A. Indigenous Peoples
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The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people,
i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the
Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987
Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary
international language in the International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous
Peoples- refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who
have continuously lived as organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory, and who have,
under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied,
possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds
of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural
traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority
of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country, at the time of
conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of
present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who
may have been displaced from their traditional domains or
who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples
refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who
have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups
of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial.
They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions
and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance
to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also
include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at
the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions
but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains.
Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them
apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians.
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They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas.
They have a system of self-government not dependent upon
the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are
perceived as different from those of the rest of the population.
The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal
with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making
it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their
customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had
become peripheral to colonial administration, represented,
from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic
culture. The political systems were still structured on the
patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and
authority. The economic activities were governed by the
concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The
social structure which emphasized division of labor and
distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The
cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of
social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept
constantly vibrant.
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples'
existence. There is no traditional concept of permanent,
individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of
land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land
or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners
or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases
to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts
to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary
owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to
possess the land does not only belong to the present generation
but the future ones as well.
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no
one owns the land except the gods and spirits, and that those
who work the land are its mere stewards. Customary law has
a strong preference for communal ownership, which could
either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who
are related by blood or by marriage, or ownership by residents
of the same locality who may not be related by blood or
marriage. The system of communal ownership under
customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and
highly collectivized mode of economic production. The
Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation
like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden
farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms,
orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-
owned. For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a
common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations
to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary
law on land also sanctions individual ownership. The
residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by
a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited
because while the individual owner has the right to use and
dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an
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exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.
Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-
owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and
succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to
sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops. Moreover, and
to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before
any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land
be sold to a non-member of the ili.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to
automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has
several options and it is within its discretion to choose
which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law
that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-
scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour
always under State supervision or control. This indicates that
the State does not lose control and ownership over the
resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of
the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual
occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have
traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and
survival.
The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7
(b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2
of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remains with the State and
the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right
to manage them.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are
merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them
for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits
from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the
terms and conditions for their exploration" for the
purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental
protection and conservation measures." It must be noted
that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration which must be
for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental
protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral
domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural
resources take the form of management or stewardship.
For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the
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profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their
exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must
ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral
domains are conserved for future generations and that the
"utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and
environment pursuant to national and customary laws.
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7
(b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of
natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-
scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in
the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers,
gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated
who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance
and survival."
The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In
Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1
and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of natural resources within
ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights'
therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is
utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or
other extensive use that require technology other than manual
labor. The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and
utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such
participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a
formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member
and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right
to "manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead,
the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving
preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The
grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior
entity that owns these resources and this entity has the
power to grant preferential rights over the resources to
whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine.
Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural
resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the
State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine,
hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural
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resources, may directly undertake the development and
exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the
alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs
as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found
by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter
into any of said agreements with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member
to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources
within the ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these
resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself,
directly undertake the development and exploitation of the
natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such
development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an
agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such
non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to
automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has
several options and it is within its discretion to choose
which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law
that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-
scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour
always under State supervision or control. This indicates that
the State does not lose control and ownership over the
resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of
the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual
occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have
traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and
survival.
THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS
INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the
existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy the
promotion of their rights within the framework of national
unity and development. The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine
category of ICCs with the international category of IPs, and is
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heavily influenced by both the International Labor viable and practicable option. A resolution by the City ratified
Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations the MOU. Respondent Atienza now asserts that the MOU
(UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. superseded the MOA

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Issue:

Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries" and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination. ILO Convention No. 169 revised the
"Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26,
1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate
to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples
"with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of the
earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of
life and economic development."
Whether or not the MOU superseded the resolution
Ruling:
No need to resolve the petitions since the MOU and resolution
is only binding until April 30, 2003 (the decision was in
2007). However the court reminded that the Local
Government code imposes upon respondent the duty as city
mayor to enfore all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city. One of these is Ordiance No. 8027. As
the Chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
ordinance as long as it has not been repealead or annulled by
the courts. He has no other choice, it is his ministerial duty to
do so.
Doctrine:

CONCLUSION Local government officers cannot refuse to perform their duty

on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had the duty. The reason is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These transaction of public business if these officers were to be
differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
government through the imposition of a national legal order statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which
that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. Largely have not judicially been declared unconsitutitonal. Officers of
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the the government from the highest to the lowers are creatures of
alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the the law and are bound to obey it.
indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes
are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital
to the understanding of contemporary problems. It is through
the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to
understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases
but through common experiences in the course of history. The
Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the
Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed
democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to
participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is
this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous
and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-
existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

SJS vs. Atienza

Facts:

The Social Justice Society files for mandamus to compel

Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which
reclassified lands from industrial II to Commercial I. This
entailes the businesses within 6 months from the date of
effectivity to cease and desist from operation, some business
are the Pandancan terminals of the Oil Companies. The DOE
and City of Manila, together with the oil companies agreed
that the scaling down of the Pandacan terminals was the most
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CHAVEZ v. PEA and AMARI
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay.
The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II
of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
President Marcos issued PD No.1084 creating PEA. It tasked
PEA to reclaim land, including foreshre and submerged areas
and to develop, improve, acqure, lease abd sell any and all
kinds of lands. In addition, PD No. 1085 was also promulgated
in order to transfer to PEA the reclaimed lands in the foreshore
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and offshore of the Manila Bay ubder the Manila – Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 351, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels
of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP." Subsequently, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque, in the
name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.
On1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-
MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding.
In 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate
Committees reported the results of their investigation among
the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands
PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands;
(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are
thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
In 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. Thereafter, the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that
there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI
under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.
Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to
nullify the JVA but such petition was dismissed.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer,
filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands
to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose
the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
Petitioner also assails that the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands
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of the public domain to private corporations. Finally,
petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of
pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi to bring
this suit;
2. Whether or not the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement;
3. Whether or not the stipulations in the amended joint
venture agreement for the transfer to Amari of certain
lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the
1987 Constitution.
Held:
1. Yes. The Court held that the petitioner has locus
standi to bring this suit. The rule that since the
instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information
and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources -
matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
2. Yes. The Court held that the constitutional right
to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final agreement.
The reiterate the provisions stated in Section 7, Article III of
the Constitution explains the people's right to information on
matters of public concern. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the government and should
not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order. Congress has also
prescribed other limitations on the right to information in
several legislations.
Whether or not the stipulations in the amended joint venture
agreement for the transfer to Amari of certain lands, reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.
3. Yes. The Court held that the stipulations in the
amended joint venture agreement for the transfer
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to Amari of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed, violates the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted our legal system.
The court has summarized in their conclusions as follows:
a. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations
but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to
the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
b. The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The
government can make such
classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
c. Since the Amended JVA seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
d. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged
areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands
of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for Issues:
public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of I. Whether or not the ordinances and resolutions
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits assailed by the petitioners are unconstitutional
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates
Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation
are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementingn the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared
NULL and VOID ab initio.
No. Article XII Section 2 bestow no right to subsistence
fisherman, thus it cannot be invoked. Additionally, petitioners
herein are not subsistence fisherman contemplated in the
provisions of the constitution but merchants and associations.
Furthermore, The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence
or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at
all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration,
development and utilization...shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.

Doctrine:

Regalian Doctrine triumphs over the right to enjoy marine

wealth enshrined in Article 12 sec 2

Tano v Socratez
[GR NO 110249]

Facts:

On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng

Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took
effect on January 1, 1993 titled: An ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto princesa
city from Jan 1, 1993 to 1998 and providing exemptions and
penalties

On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,

Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33
entitled: A resolution prohibiting thee catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years.
Petitioners herein are those criminally charged under the
ordinances, merchants and Associations. Petitioners filed a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that
the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as
unconstitutional

Petitioners argue that the ordinances deprive fishermen of the

whole province of Palawan and Puerto princesa of their means
of livelihood, and performing trade. Citing Article XII Section
2 and Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution
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Miners Asso. vs. Factoran
Facts:
Then President Cory Aquino promugated Executive Order No.
211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and
approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals to ensure continuity of mining
operations and to hasten the development of mineral
resources. She also promulgated Executive Order No. 279
authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude
joint venture, co-production, or productionsharing agreements
for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements
and those agreements involving technical or financial
assistance by foreign-owned corporations for largescale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. DENR
issued two administrative orders, No. 57 series 1989 and No.
82 series of 1990 to implement these Executive Orders of the
President. DENR Admin order No. 57 states that all existing
mining leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution except small scale mining
leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less,
shall be converted into production-sharing agreements.
DENR Admin order No. 82 discussed the “Procedural
Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation.” It enumerated the
persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs)
and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within
two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative
Order No. 57 or until July 17, 199. Failure to do so within the
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Atty. Rondez
prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining,
quarry and sand and gravel claims.
Petitioners, Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc assailed
the validity and constitutionality of these two DENR
administrative orders for being violative of the nonimpairment
of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57
unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining
agreements and -automatically converts them into production-
sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity
date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares
that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-
Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the “date of
effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the
abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
The Court sided with the petitioner and granted a Temporary
Restraining Order stopping the implementation of the
admininstrative orders.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the DENR Secretary committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the two administrative orders that
contained provisions not covered by the law (EOs issued by P.
Cory Aquino)
2. Whether or not DENR Administrative Orders No. 57 series
1989 and No. 82 series of 1990 violates the nonimpairment of
contract provision of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the case and lifted the TRO.
1. NO. The Supreme Court reiterated that the principle
that the power of administrative to promulgate rules
and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what
is provided in the legislative enactment. Executive
279 and not PD No. 463 is the law to be followed and
there is no showing that these Administrative Orders
went beyond the scope of EO No. 279.
2. No. The well-settled is the rule regardless of the
reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant
to Executive Order No. 211 referred to in this
petition, are subject to alterations through a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Police power of the State is superior over the sanctity
of the contract. Constitutional provisions against
impairing the obligation of contracts is not absolute,
Court ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to
a proper exercise of the police power when such
power is exercised to preserve the security of the
State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted
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to the accomplishment of that end and are, therefore,
not arbitrary or oppressive.
Doctrine: The exploration, development and utilization of the
country’s natural resources are matters vital to the public
interest and the general welfare of the people. Being vital to
public welfare, the nonimpairment clause must yield to the
State’s Police Power.
Alvarez vs. PICOP
FACTS:
The facts, culled from the records of the three consolidated
petitions, are as follows:
On 24 May 1952, PICOP’s predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber
Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber License Agreement
(TLA) No. 43 which covers an area of 75,545 hectares in
Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and
Davao Oriental. Allegedly sometime in 1969, the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued a presidential warranty
to BBLCI, confirming that TLA No. 43 "definitely establishes
the boundary lines of [BBLCI’s] concession area.” TLA No.
43 expired on 26 April 1977. It was renewed on 7 October
1977 for another 25 years to "terminate on April 25, 2002."
On 23 December 1999, then DENR Secretary Antonio H.
Cerilles promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
99-53 which had for its subject, the "Regulations Governing
the Integrated Forest Management Program (IFMP)." In a 28
August 2000 letter to the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), DENR-Region XIII-D4,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, PICOP signified its intention to
convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) invoking the provisions of Section 9,
Chapter III of DAO No. 99-53.
PICOP requested for a favorable indorsement of their letter of
intent to the DENR Secretary.
The Officer-In-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director
Constantino A. Paye, Jr., in a 6 March 2001 Memorandum,
forwarded PICOP’s letter of intent dated 28 August 2000 to
the DENR Secretary informing the latter that the DENR
Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City, had created a
team tasked to conduct a performance evaluation on PICOP on
the said TLA pursuant to DAO No. 99-53.
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Atty. Rondez
The performance evaluation memorandum indicated violations
by PICOP of existing DENR Rules and Regulations governing
TLA No. 43, such as the non-submission of its five-year forest
protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as required
by the DENR rules and regulations and alleged unpaid and
overdue forest charges of respondent on TLA No. 43. Further
evaluation indicated purported unpaid and overdue forest
charges by PICOP on its TLA No. 43.
Thus, it was recommended that the conversion of the TLA into
IFMA is primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials for
the continuous operation of the integrated wood processing
plant of the company. However, the very complex issues
presented cannot just be ignored and have to be fully
addressed to before further appropriate action is taken on the
application for conversion. In the absence of categorical
comments and recommendation of the regional office to
resolve the issue, it is recommended that a transition team.
It was the position of the DENR members of the TWC that
PICOP’s application for the IFMA conversion should undergo
the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP
representative Atty. Caingat, however, claimed that "the TLA
has been converted" and suggested the suspension of the
meeting as they would submit a written position on the matter
the following day.
On 22 April 2002, the TWC members of the DENR received a
letter from PICOP dated 18 April 2002 insisting that "the
conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been
completed" and indicated that they had "no choice except to
decline participation in the ongoing meeting and bring our
issues to the proper public and legal forum."
On 12 August 2002, a meeting was held at the Office of the
President of the Philippines. PICOP’s representatives
committed to submit the following, to wit:
1. Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of
Incorporation issued on 12 August 2002 that
extended PICOP’s corporate term for another fifty
(50) years;
2. Proof of Payment of forest charges;
3. Proof of Payment of Reforestation Deposit;
4. Response to social issues, particularly clearance
from the NCIP; and
5. Map showing reforestation activities on an annual
basis.
PICOP failed to respond completely to all the social issues
raised. Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims that
further processing of PICOP’s application for the conversion
of TLA No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the
requirements. Insisting that the conversion of its TLA No. 43
had been completed, PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez before the
RTC of Quezon City. On 11 October 2002, the RTC rendered
a Decision granting PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus The
DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
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PICOP filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction.
On 25 November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 297, "EXCLUDING A CERTAIN
AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION
NO. 369 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1931, AND DECLARING
THE SAME AS MINERAL RESERVATION AND AS
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA." The excluded
area consists of 8,100 hectares, more or less, which formed
part of PICOP’s expired TLA No. 43, subject of its application
for IFMA conversion.
On 21 January 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of the aforesaid presidential
proclamation as well as its implementing DENR
Administrative Order No. 2002-35 (DAO No. 2002-35).
In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondents therein from
implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary
and her co-respondents in said case filed on 6 February 2003
an Omnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve the Temporary
Restraining Order dated 3 February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss
(With Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction).
The trial court issued a Resolution dated 19 February 2003
granting the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Petition
does not state a cause of action. PICOP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration as well as a Motion to Inhibit.
On 28 February 2003, the DENR Secretary filed before the
Court of Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari With a Most Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction insofar as the trial court
ordered the execution of its 11 October 2002 Decision pending
appeal. The petition (hereinafter referred to as the
INJUNCTION CASE).
On 11 March 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a 60-day TRO
enjoining the enforcement of the 11 October 2002 Decision
and the 10 February 2003 Order of the RTC. On 30 April
2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. On 30 October 2003, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision in the INJUNCTION CASE granting the
Petition and annulling the Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of
Mandatory Injunction issued by the trial court. PICOP filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. On 19 February 2004, the
Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
on the MANDAMUS CASE, affirming the Decision of the
RTC.
Meanwhile, in a 22 March 2004 Resolution, the Special
Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held in abeyance
the ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration of the
INJUNCTION CASE pending the Seventh Division’s
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the 19
February 2004 Decision in the MANDAMUS CASE. The
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Atty. Rondez
DENR Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate
Petitions for Review on the 19 February 2004 Court of
Appeals Decision in the MANDAMUS CASE.
On 16 December 2004, the Special Thirteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision on the
INJUNCTION CASE lifting the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction it had previously issued. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated 30 April 2003 is hereby lifted and dissolved
and the Order dated 10 February 2003 allowing execution
pending appeal and authorizing the issuance of the writ of
mandamus and/or writ of mandatory injunction is hereby
affirmed. The Petition dated February 27, 2003 is herewith
dismissed.
Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration in a 9 March
2006 Resolution, the DENR Secretary filed with this Court, a
Petition for Review of the INJUNCTION CASE.
ISSUE:
Whether the presidential warranty is a contract which
constitutes a legal bar to the exercise by the state of its full
control and supervision regarding the exploration development
and utilization of its natural resources?
Whether or not PICOP had acquired a vested right over its
forest concession area by virtue of the aforesaid presidential
warranty?
RULING:
NO. PICOP’s ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
is the supposed contract entered into by the government in the
form of a Presidential Warranty issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refutes
this claim, and alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring the Presidential Warranty a valid and
subsisting contract under the Constitution’s Non-Impairment
Clause.
We are constrained to disagree. In unequivocal terms, we have
consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting
of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered
contracts that would bind the Government regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare.
Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr., where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides:
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"x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein x x x."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the constitution. In
Tan vs. Director of Forestry, [125 SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this
Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it
is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.,
Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary [190 SCRA 673, 684
(1990)]:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing, the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.
PICOP, however, argues that these rulings laid down in Tan v.
Director of Forestry, Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy
Executive Secretary and Oposa do not find application in the
present case allegedly because the issue here is the unlawful
refusal of then DENR Secretary Alvarez to issue an IFMA to
PICOP and not the matter of a timber license being merely a
license or privilege.
We are not persuaded. PICOP filed the MANDAMUS CASE
against then DENR Secretary Alvarez on the ground that
Secretary Alvarez’s refusal to issue an IFMA in its favor
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Atty. Rondez
allegedly violated its vested right over the area covered by its
TLA No. 43 and presidential warranty, and impaired the
obligation of contract under said agreement and warranty.
The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on
the ground that there were mutual considerations taken into
account consisting in investments on PICOP’s part is
preposterous. All licensees put up investments in pursuing
their businesses. To construe these investments as
consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render
ineffective the settled jurisprudence that "a license or a permit
is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or
permittee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as
to which the constitutional proscription against the impairment
of contracts may extend." Neither shall we allow a
circumvention of such doctrine by terming such permit as a
"warranty."
PICOP’s noncompliance with the requirements for the
conversion of their TLA is so glaring, that we almost see a
reluctance to uphold the law in light of PICOP’s sizeable
investments in its business, a fact repeatedly stressed by
PICOP in its pleadings.
In sum, the DENR Secretary has adequately proven that
PICOP has, at this time, failed to comply with the
administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion
of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA. The Petition in G.R. No.
162243 should therefore be granted.
On the other hand, as PICOP is not yet entitled to such
conversion, then Secretary Alvarez had been correct in
withholding the same and thus cannot be held liable for
damages therefor. Thus, the Petition in G.R. No. 164516
should be dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
Licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s
forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the
Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare.
In applying the judicial policy of nurturing prosperity,
consideration should also be given to the long-term effects of
the judicial evaluations involved, particularly to our nation’s
greatest wealth, our vast natural resources.
Our country has been blessed with rich, lush and verdant rain
forests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found. The legislative policy has been to
preserve and nourish these natural resources as they are not
only for our benefit but more so for the countless future
generations to which we are likewise responsible. It has also
been legislative policy to let the citizens of this country reap
their benefits, foremost the citizens in close proximity to such
resources, through the local governments and the NCIP.
In working for the legislative policy of environmental
preservation, the requirements of a five-year forest protection
plan and seven-year reforestation plan had been laid down,
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
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together with the levy of forest charges for the regulation of
forestry activities. In pursuing, on the other hand, the benefit
distribution policy, the Local Government Code requires prior
Sanggunian approval to ensure that local communities partake
in the fruits of their own backyard, while R.A. No. 8371
provides for the rights of the indigenous peoples, who have
been living in, managing, and nourishing these forests since
time immemorial.

PICOP has been fortunate to have been awarded an enormous

concession area and thus, a huge chunk of the benefits of this
country’s natural resources. Attached to this fortune is the
responsibility to comply with the laws and regulations
implementing the stated legislative policies of environmental
preservation and benefit distribution. These laws and
regulations should not be ignored, and the courts should not
condone such blatant disregard by those who believe they are
above the law because of their sizable investments and
significant number of workers employed. PICOP has only
itself to blame for the withholding of the conversion of its
TLA. But while this disposition confers another chance to
comply with the foregoing requirements, the DENR Secretary
can rightfully grow weary if the persistence on noncompliance
will continue. The judicial policy of nurturing prosperity
would be better served by granting such concessions to
someone who will abide by the law.

Secretary of DENR vs. Yap

Right of the present occupatns of Boracay Island to secure

titles over their occupied lands.
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Facts: President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
declaring boracay island as tourist zones and marine reserves.
The repondents claimed the proclamation will preclude them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes..
Claimants argued that Proclamation No 1801 did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man, the OSG maintains
that the island was an unclassified land of the Public Domain
that it forms part of the mass of lands classified as public
forest which was not available for disposition.
The RTC and CA decides in favor of the respondents
declaring that the proclamation posed no legal obstacle to the
petitioners and those similar situated to acquire title to their
lands in boracay.
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and
600 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable),
respondents to this case argued that the proclamation infringed
on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay.
Claimants also contended that there is no need for a
proclmation reclassifying boracay into agricultural land being
classfied as niether mineral nor timber land, the island is
deemed agricultural pursuant to the first Public Land Act.
OSG argued that this is an unclassified public forest land,
hence, inalienable.
Issue:
Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.
Ruling:
The Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
1. 1935 Constitution lands of public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber
2. 1973 Constitution: Agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber
or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as
may be provided by law.
3. 1987: Agricultural, forest or timber and national
parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
Prior the 2006 proclamation Boracay had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions, making boracay an Unclassified land of the Public
Domain. To reclassify a land, a positive act declaring the land
as alienable and disposable is required: an official
proclamation declassifying inalienable public and into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. CA 141
limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which
have been officially delimited and classified.
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
In the present case, no official proclamation was made to
boracay islands. Except for lands already covered by existing
titles, boracay was an unclassfied land of the public domain
prior to proclmation No. 1604, Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD 705. PD 705 by President
Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain
as public forest. The fact that Boracay island was strip of its
forest do not negate its character as public forest. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does nto have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. It was Presidents Arroyo’s Proclamation No. 1604 that
made Boracay’s 620 hectares disposable.
“To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s
survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy
rhetoric for politicians and activitist. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets
prevalent and difficult to control.
RTC and CA reversed
Doctrines:
1. To reclassify a land, a positive act declaring the land
as alienable and disposable is required: an official
proclamation declassifying inalienable public and
into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
2. The fact that Boracay island was strip of its forest do
not negate its character as public forest. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does nto have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like.
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, v. COMMISSION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS (COSLAP)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara was granted
Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 by the DENR.
Under said FLGLA, Alcantara was allowed to lease 923
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hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong,
General Santos City for grazing purposes for a period of 25
years to expire on 31 December 2018.
As early as 1990, however, private respondent Rolando
Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel and Lasid Acop filed a
letter-complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No.
542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares to the B'laan
and Maguindanaoan tribes.
Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP over the case, since the dispute involved a claim for
recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case
should have been filed with the DENR since it is the latter
which has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public
lands, including grazing lands.
Notwithstanding petitioner's objection to the COSLAP's
exercise of jurisdiction over the case, said body continued the
hearings thereon. Petitioner alleged that COSLAP did not
conduct formal hearings on the case, and that he was not
notified nor given the opportunity to be present and participate
in the field interviews and ocular inspections conducted by
COSLAP.
Thereafter, the COSLAP issued a Decision ordering the
cancellation of FLGLA. Petitioner appealed the same to the
Court of Appeals by petition for review on certiorari, but was
dismissed. The petitioners filed a MR but was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in the ruling that wherein it
recognized the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case
regarding ancestral land claims of Indigenous People.
HELD:
No. The Court held that it finds no reason to disturb the
ruling of the CA. The CA did not commit any reversible error
in the assailed decision. Further, the Court agrees with the
appellate court that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP since he participated actively in
the proceedings before said body by filing an Answer, a MR
of the COSLAP's decision and a Supplement to Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court also notes the appellate court's observation that
petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of the COSLAP
only when he realized that his period to appeal the COSLAP's
decision had already lapsed. It has been repeatedly held by this
Court that the active participation of a respondent in the case
pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is
tantamount to a recognition of that court's or body's
recognition and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case and will bar said party from later on impugning the
court's or body's jurisdiction.
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
Moreover, Executive Order No. 561 creating the COSLAP,
the law then prevailing when private respondents filed their
complaint for cancellation of FLGLA No. 542, provides in
Section 3, paragraph 2(a) thereof that said Commission may
assume jurisdiction over land disputes involving occupants of
the land in question and pasture lease agreement holders:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. -- The Commission shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxx
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute
referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission,
may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the
parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension
or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement
holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/ squatters and government
reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude.
The Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as
will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above
cases.
The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the
land area being claimed by private respondents belongs to the
B'laan indigenous cultural community since they have been in
possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the
same since time immemorial, a fact has not been disputed by
petitioner. It was likewise declared by the appellate court that
FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 41013 which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public
domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the
indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these
lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous
cultural group concerned.
Hence, the Court finds no reason to depart from such
finding by the appellate court, it being a settled rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez
conclusive upon the Supreme Court absent any showing
that such findings are not supported by the evidence on
record.

Wherefore, the was petition hereby denied.

Cheesman v IAC [GR NO 74833]

Facts:

Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the

Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT)
over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012)

To pay for his wife's hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the

subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de
Leon. When the contract period expired, he again mortgaged it
to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a
period of four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990)
to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a contract
denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang
Sakahan," which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate
the land during the duration of the mortgage.
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez

Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication

Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner
instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of
possession
Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan"
between them and petitioner allowed the former to take over
the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter
paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly
executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P.

Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the
landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16
and 27

Petitioner argues to the SC that relingquishing possessions of

landholdings are invalid for being violative of the agrarian law
reforms.

Issues:

I. Whether or not the relinquishment of petitioner’s

landholdings are violative of the agrarian law
reforms
II.
Held:

No. Generally sale or transfer of rights over a property

covered by a certificate of land transfer is void, however it is
an exception when the alienation is made in favor of the
government or through hereditary succession.

This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal

system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land,
thus negating the government's program of freeing the tenant
from the bondage of the soil.
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance
System, Committee on privatization and Office of The
Government Counsel

Facts:

The Respondent Government Service Insurance System

(GSIS) in pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the
former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a
manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the
Law on Natural Resources and Environment
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GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s
check.
The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution “Filipino first policy” and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of
the national economy.
Issues:
A. Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self- executing.
B. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony.
C.
Whetherornotthereisgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheresp
ondentsin
refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Held:
A. It is a self-executing provision. Since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract. A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. A
constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy.
B. The Court agree. In its plain and ordinary
meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence
in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel.
In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
C.
There was a grave abuse of discretion. The argument of
respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware
from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners
alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by
the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was
already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the
constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional
safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To
insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is
to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters
for its actions.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose
Corpus v. Sps Gorospe
Facts:
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory
Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel
of unregistered land and the house) in favor of "Criselda P.
Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas
Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road,
Sta. Rita, Olongapo City. Thomas Cheesman, although aware
of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to
his wife.

tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the

name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed
exclusive management and administration of said property,
leasing it to tenants.

On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to

Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of
Thomas Cheesman.5 The deed described Criselda as being" . .
. of legal age, married to an American citizen

Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance

at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita
Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground
that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge
and consent

Issues:

I. Whether or not Cheesman’s citizenship is a bar

to recover the lot and house for the conjugal
partnership

Held:
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez
the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential
land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains
that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife
on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of
the constitutional prohibition.

People vs. Maceren

FACTS:

The accused were charged by a Constabulary investigator in

the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 due to electro fishing
in the waters of Sta. Cruz. The municipal court and CFI of
Laguna nullifies the complaint because electro fishing cannot
be penalized as contemplated in Section 11 of the Fisheries
Law that electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous
substance but a form of energy. The prosecution seeks higher
Court to their appeal.

Petitioner, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,

upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries,
promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters that will
subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred
pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not exceeding six (6)
months or both at the discretion of the Court and in the same
year, they amended section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84,
by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water
fisheries emphasizing the phrase "in any portion of the
Philippine waters” to" in fresh water fisheries in the
Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation
canals and other bodies of fresh water."

The legal sanctions stated for the prohibition against electro

fishing in fresh water fisheries are sourced from (1) the rule-
making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of
the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of
Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and
the regulations promulgated there under and to execute the
rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the
creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development
of fisheries; (3) the declared national policy to encourage,
promote and conserve our fishing resources and (4) section 83
of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation
of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations
promulgated there under "shall subject the offender to a fine of
not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
Law on Natural Resources and Environment
NatRes [DIE]gest
Respondent, the accused, were charged having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 due to electro fishing
in the waters of Sta. Cruz. They appealed that lower court held
that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric
current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as
contemplated in Section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is
not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or
transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that,
since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider it
unlawful. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and
that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission. The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit
electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In
other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. The
accused-appellees contends the crime of electro fishing would
be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior
court thus, the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no
appellate jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not executive officials have a rule-
making function in constituting a criminal
offense?
b) Whether or not electro fishing is punishable?
c) In case of discrepancy, which will prevail
between basic law and rule of regulation?
RULING:
a) The law-making body cannot delegate to an executive
official the power to declare what acts should constitute a
criminal offense. It can only authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in
the law itself. Originally, Administrative Order No. 84
punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against
electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The
amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not
prohibited. It could be tolerated in marine waters. The
administrative order penalizing electro fishing exceeded their
authority.
Generally, what has been delegated cannot be delegated, like
the Congress where legislative power is delegated to them.
One of the exceptions of this is subordinate legislation made
by administrative agencies. Under the theory of
Administrative Law, what is delegated is in fact not “law-
making” power, but “law executing power.” Hence,
administrative agencies have the power to “fill up the details”
of a statute passed by Congress in the course of its
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
implementation. In this case, the act constitutes not only an
excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary
but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not
have, and therefore the said provision "is null and void and
without effect." A penal statute is strictly construed. While an
administrative agency has the right to make rules and
regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that
power should not be confused with the power to enact a
criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the
administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon it.
b) Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing,
a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the
use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in
fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful
taking of marine mollusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5)
failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of
fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished.
Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing,
does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the
category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the
penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the
penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, fixed in Section 76, and is not the same as the
penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed
in Section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
c) In case of conflict between the basic law (Fisheries Law)
and a rule or regulation (Administrative Order) issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law. It has been held that "to declare what shall
constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power
vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be
delegated to any other body or agency". Moreover, Article 7
of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that
"administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution."
In the case, the regulation or the administrative order
penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the
Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because
the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
Thus petitioners’ appeal was dismissed.
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez

Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR

Note: The court did not arrived in a majority opinion

since the vote is 7-7 even after deliberation. Hence, but
the rules, the petition is dismissed.

Facts:

Petitioners assails the constitutionality of IPRA, on the

ground that it is an unlawful deprivation of State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalia doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution. The solicitor general agreed that it is
unconstitutional as it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples.

Issue: Whether or not IPRA is unconstitutional

Using Justice Puno’s Opinion:

No, IPRA introduced radical concepts into the

Philippines legal system that appears to collide with
settled constitutional and jural precepts of state
ownership of land and other natural resources. There is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over natural resources within their ancestral domains.
Their right in the ancestral domains includes ownership
but this ownership is expressly defined and limited in
Section 7 (a) of the same law – it does not cover water,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources.
Ownership over this remains with the state, and the
ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to manage and
conserve them for future generations. It is a form of
management and stewardship.

Doctrine: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all natural

resources belongs to the State, the ICCs/IPs are only
given management and stewardship over the natural
resources inside their Ancestral Domains.
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez

Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural

resources v. Yap

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

At stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the

present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over
their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R.

No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the CA affirming that of the RTC in Kalibo,
Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief
filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al.
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 10645" issued by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and
agricultural land.

FACTS:

In 1976, the DENR approved the National Reservation

Survey of Boracay Island, which identified several lots as
being occupied or claimed by named persons.

In 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under
the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of
PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular

No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land
for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y.
Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Law on Natural Resources and Environment
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Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No.
1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island
was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of
private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as "public forest," which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.
Also, the OSG maintained that respondents – claimants’
reliance on PD 1801 and PTA Circ. No. 3-83 was
misplaced. Since Boracay Island had not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have
their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that
neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-
82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or
could not be the subject of disposition. The Circular itself
recognized private ownership of lands.The trial court
cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as
basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA, however,
it affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
G.R. No. 173775 (Sacay v. Sec. of DENR)
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No.
167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into
400 hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of
the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-
way and which shall form part of the area reserved for
forest land protection purposes.
Petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito,
and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights"
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
In addition, they also contended that there is no need for
a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural
land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land,
the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the
first Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in the
concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-
claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public
forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705.
Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private claimants have a right to secure
titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.
HELD: The was petitions DENIED. The Court
reversed the decision rendered by the appllate
court.
No. The Court held that private claimants has no
right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. Further, the Court stated that except for lands
already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a
mass of lands of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are
ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such
Law on Natural Resources and Environment
NatRes [DIE]gest
classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these,
only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified
under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable
is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such
presumption is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records
are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.
Hence, Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive
act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify
the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both,
he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This
was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
 Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and
De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De
Aldecoa were decided at a time when the
President of the Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts
were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section
6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the
University of the East
Atty. Rondez
exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer
had the authority, whether express or implied,
to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain.
 Each case must be decided upon the proof
in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering
the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that
the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown. Whatever the
land involved in a particular land registration
case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act
and the Constitution classifying lands of the public
domain into “agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks,” do not necessarily refer to large
tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense
growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest
lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,
nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as “forest” is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between “forest” as defined
in a dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a
classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is
tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its
forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
Law on Natural Resources and Environment University of the East
NatRes [DIE]gest Atty. Rondez
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has
not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.

 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands

of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine
has been consistently adopted under the 1935,
1973, and 1987 Constitutions.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly

within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power
as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what
terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding
the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of
what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.