Russia has historically been rife with political turmoil as it pertains to constitutionalism.

Traditionally, Russia's governments have always stood above the law. Constitutional ideas,

which were promulgated sporadically throughout Russian history, lasted only as long as they
were convenient. Considering the historical role of the relationship between Russia's leaders

and her people, the greatest test of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (hereinafter,

1993 Constitution), passed on December 12, 1993, will be withstanding challenges by future
leaders to dissolve it when they find it inconvienient.

A constitution is "a system of basic laws and principles by which a nation ... is governed." A
constitution should be independent from the will of the leader and the will of the government,
it should stand alone as a protection of rights and freedoms.

Powers of the Russian President

The choice between presidentialism and parliamentarism has widespread implications for the
power and prestige of many political actors. Therefore, presidential power is often the subject
of intense negotiation, and it can be tailored to fit an individual. For example, constitutional
drafters in Poland during the interwar period created a weak presidency for fear that Marshall
Pilsudski, who was widely expected to become the first president, would rule the country
autocratically.

Tussle between Yeltsin and CPD

The President of Russia is granted numerous and extensive powers by the Constitution of the
Russian Federation.

The constitution defines the president as the head of state, the guarantor of the Constitution
and of human and civil rights and freedoms, the definer of domestic and foreign policy, and
the commander-in- chief of the armed forces. He also has the power to appoint the new
chairman of the government, decide on the resignation of the government, introduce the
candidate to the office of Chair of the Central Savings bank, appoint and dismiss deputy
chairs of the government, submit candidates for all Russian Federation courts, dissolve and
call elections for the State Duma - one of two bodies in a bicameral legislature - call for
referenda, introduce draft legislation, sign federal laws, impose a state of emergency, and
issue decrees that are binding throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. Further, the
president has the right to use dispute-settlement procedures to resolve differences between
other organs of state power.

The president also has the power to override the decisions of the two-chamber Parliament,
issue decrees and be impeached only after a lengthy process. Impeachment requires the Duma
to put forth a charge against the President of high treason or some other grave crime. This
constitution establishes the president as the supreme authority. The provisions in the
Constitution relating to the authority of the president limit the legislature and permit scant
judicial review. The only limitation on executive power is the recitation in the Constitution
that decrees should be constitutional.

Without constraints, there is little to prevent the president from acting above the law. This

power does not necessarily have to be problematic. If the particular president in power
possesses integrity and a desire to put an end to political instability and advance
constitutionalism, then the power vested in the president will not be abused. It is the fear of
the possible abuse of the privileges by presidents which brings harsh reviews of this
constitution.

The checks and balances in a state should work between structural elements of power so as
not to allow one branch to seize the power of another. In theory there should be sufficient
checks on the president in order to establish a law-based state, however, In real life, neither
abstract theories and principles, nor ideals act; rather, living people act in agreement with
their own notions instilled in them earlier, acting on a level of their own legal conscience.

Proclaiming at the level of the Constitution - the fundamental law of the state - the principle
of separation of powers and describing the given state as a 'rule of law' state has not yet
indicated that the state will develop from now on as a 'rule of law' state, or that the
legislative and executive branches will act in a law-abiding manner and follow the dictates of
the Constitution.

Since the president was only limited in the constitution by the statement to act
constitutionally, there is nothing but his conscience to prevent an abuse of discretion.
There are provisions in the constitution which suggest that the President may be justified in
overriding specific rights in order to further overarching purposes. Specifically, Article 113
prohibits the establishment of public associations aimed at undermining the security of the
state. It is conceivable that these types of provisions will provide excuses for Presidents to
revert to an aristocracy under the guise of constitutionality. If this authority is used for that
end, a state of political flux cannot and will not end.

Though the power of the president may appear boundless, it should be kept in mind that there
is a heavy reliance in this con- stitution on international law. It is possible that international
legal principles might work as a constraint on the President's ability to exercise the power
conferred on the position by the 1993 Constitution.

The Russian Constitution is most often compared to the French Constitution because the
nonlegislative authority of the president is similar in both constitutions. However, the
differences are perhaps less substantial than indicated. The major difference in the two
constitutions lies in the legislative authority of the president. The Russian president has
substantially more legislative authority than the French president. Russian president can veto
legislation and propose referenda (the French president cannot) and has greater decree
authority. In this regard, the Russian Constitution is more like Latin American presidential
regimes, such as Chile (1891 and 1925), Columbia (pre-1991), and Brazil.

PUTIN’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS CONSOLIDATE POWER AROUND THE

PRESIDENCY

On Jan. 15, 2020, President Vladimir Putin announced a number of constitutional

amendments in his Federal Assembly annual address to alter the balance of power of the
government after his presidency ends in 2024. Putin’s proposed amendments would create
new opportunities for him to rule Russia for the rest of his life. A series of startling events
followed Putin’s speech: the forced resignation of the prime minister and the cabinet
members, an unexpected appointment to the new prime minister position, and the creation of
cryptic legislation. News of Putin’s speech and the forced resignation of the government
members spread globally. As a result, social media, political commentators, and news outlets
began to develop a variety of theories regarding Putin’s intentions. On Mar. 10 Russia’s
lower house of the parliament approved a constitutional amendment that would extend
President Putin’s rule until 2036, allowing him two more terms as the president. The heart of
the debate is what will happen to Putin at the end of his term in 2036. Although Putin’s plan
for the end of his presidency remains unknown, his constitutional reforms will strengthen the
centralization of power in the Russian presidency.

The presidency is already the strongest institution in Russian government. Putin’s reforms
grant the presidency new powers in the judicial and legislative selection process. In
particular, the president can demand that the Federation Council (the upper house of the
parliament) dismiss justices in the Supreme and Constitutional courts. The judiciary is made
up of three courts: the Constitutional courts, the regular courts (the highest of which is the
Supreme Court), and the appellate courts (High Court of Arbitration is the highest).
Originally, the judiciary was intended to be an independent branch, but the reform will lessen
their independence by allowing for political influence. The president can arbitrarily replace
judges, which will undermine the legitimacy of any decision by the courts. Furthermore,
judges will obey the wishes of the president, or otherwise be removed.

Another one of Putin’s reforms will increase the president’s veto power. Currently, when a
president vetoes a law the legislature can override the veto. After the constitutional reform,
the president will have the power to appeal the legislature’s override in the Constitutional
Court. This new process will give the president another chance to veto the law. The
president’s new opportunity to override a veto in court, combined with the president’s ability
to dismiss justices from the judiciary, gives the president a stronger role in the law-making
process.

Putin also proposed requirements that would restrict the presidential candidacy, such as a 25
years of residency, and a limit of two terms. The reforms will include the removal of the
word “consecutive” from the constitution to prevent future presidents from running again,
which was used by Putin to run for President twice. Although the presidential requirements
may appear as an impediment for Putin’s acquisition of power, the requirements will not
hinder the centralization of power, which is his primary intent. By imposing candidacy
requirements, he can narrow the number of candidates and guarantee the election of the
successor that is most loyal to him. Furthermore, limiting presidents to two terms will rest
Putin’s presidential terms to zero and enable him to run for president again. Putin’s goal is
not to dominate the system, but to find a method to exert influence without risking a
dangerous consequence for the state.

Constitutional Reform: Weakening Parliament

To combat criticism of the reforms, Putin attempted to create an impression that his
constitutional reform will also increase the role of Parliament. However, Tatiana Stanovaya,
founder and head of the Russian think tank R.Politik, claims that the Parliament will not have
a bigger role in policymaking. Instead, the reforms will cause only minor changes in the
procedure for appointing prime ministers. Under the current Constitution, the State Duma –
the lower chamber of the parliament – has the power to approve both the prime minister and
executive cabinet members proposed by the president. If the president’s candidate is rejected
three times, the entire State Duma is dismissed and there is a new election. In other words,
members of the lower chamber are faced with two options: vote for the appointment or be
removed from the parliament. Furthermore, the majority of the seats within the State Duma
are members of the United Russia party, which is loyal to Putin. Thus, opposition to the
president’s appointment seems unlikely. The reforms will only change the semantics of the
appointing procedure from “approve” to “confirm,” – the procedure will not change.

The most drastic reforms will be applied to the Federation Council, which is the upper
chamber of the parliament. The original Constitution requires the Federation Council to
approve the president’s appointment of a foreign minister. However, under the new reforms,
the president will no longer need the Federation Council’s approval, just their consultation.
The upper chamber will lose their right to deny a presidential appointment. Ultimately, the
purpose of the parliamentary reforms is to remove potential opposition against the president’s
ruling establishment.

Constitutional Reform: Establishment of the State Council

Another notable amendment in Putin’s constitutional reforms is the codification of an

advisory body to the president, known as the State Council. Created in 2000, the advisory
body was designed to compensate regional governors for being ousted from the Federation
Council. Although the State Council has proved to be ineffective for 18 years, it has allowed
governors to directly communicate with the president. Then in 2018, the advisory body
became an assembly of elite members to coordinate national projects. Putin can gather
ministers, presidential administrative staff, experts and CEOs to discuss policymaking
initiatives. Despite the elite gathering, the State Council does not have the power to
implement its decisions. However, after the reform, the advisory body will be formed by the
President and will “facilitate coordination between state bodies to determine key areas of
domestic and foreign policy.” In other words, the State Council will directly advise and serve
the President and set the direction of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy. The powers of the
State Council are vague and broad, which leaves room for interpretation of powers. It is
certainly a possibility that Putin will head the State Council after the expiration of his
presidential term in 2036 and continue to advise future presidents.

Conclusion

President Putin’s recent constitutional reforms dramatically increased the power of the
presidency. Given that the reforms will enable the president to override Parliament’s vetoes,
dismiss the Supreme court and Constitutional Court Judges, remove the Federation Council’s
approval of a prime minister appointment, and maintain influence in foreign policy through a
State Council, it can be concluded that opposition against the president will be unlikely. In
light of his presidential term extension until 2036, the reforms indicate that Putin will
continue to develop the government around the presidency. He has already created avenues to
retain the highest power. The centralization of power supports the argument that Putin will
remain in power through the position as the head of the State Council, after the end of his
presidency. Along with the State Duma’s approval of his constitutional amendments, the
Russian voters have also decided to support Putin’s reforms. Over three-fourths of the voters
have backed a referendum on constitutional changes. Thus, he will have another opportunity
to run for president after his tenure. Furthermore, the referendum has also strengthened the
State Council, which will provide another opportunity for Putin’s rule. By becoming the head
of a broadly defined governing body, he could potentially hold a supervisory role over the
entire political system as long as the president remains loyal to him. Even after his death,
these constitutional amendments will preserve the idea of a centralized authority figure
instead of a democratic society. The Constitutional overhaul will ingrain Putin’s legacy in
Russian politics.
 American versus Russian Presidency

The Russian presidency is a far more recent incarnation than its American counterpart, which
came into existence shortly after independence from Great Britain was gained. From its
earliest days the American presidency had limits placed on its functions and powers. There
are various notable factors that explain the differences that are contrasted sometimes sharply
when the Russian and American presidencies are compared to each other in depth. Americans
frequently contend that they have a long standing tradition of liberal democracy instead of
autocracy, which is an obvious area for finding stark contrasts with the Russian Federation
and the authoritarian tendencies passed down from the Romanov dynasty and also the Soviet
Union. Personalities as much as constitutions can decrease or increase the differences (and
sometimes the similarities) between both presidencies.
In contrast to the Russian presidency that was not introduced until 1991 shortly before the
sudden death of the Soviet Union, the American presidency is over two centuries old and an
integral part of the United States constitution. The presidency in conjunction with Congress
as well as the Supreme Court forms the centre of the federal system (Palmowski, 2008, p.
701). Thus there is a major age gap between the Russian and American presidencies,
although differences go deeper than that, it is a useful starting point. The Americans have had
time to make sure that their constitution and their federal institutions are fully functional, and
not subject to bouts of autocratic presidential rule (Woodruff, 2005, p.75

Unlike the Russian presidency, which is within a polity subject to higher risks of instability
and dictatorship, the American presidency is part of a stable constitutional system that
protects the human rights and safety of its own people. The Russians had the unenviable task
of trying to nurture liberal democracy from unpromising foundations, which have had an
impact on how the Russian presidency has turned out so far (Palmowski, 2008, p. 589).
Culturally the Russians seem to regard themselves as being vulnerable if they do not have a
strong leader or single party rule, they would prefer order ahead of liberal democracy.
Besides the early to mid 1990s brought a great deal of social and economic suffering for the
bulk of the Russian population and the country's constitution and the presidency of Boris
Yeltsin did little to reduce their burdens (James, 2003, p. 395).
Therefore United States presidents irrespective of whether or not they wish to have operate
inside the political framework put into place by the federal constitution, by and large they
indeed do so (Palmowski, 2008, p. 700). The American founding fathers purposely designed
that constitution to have a complex system of checks and balances in order to prevent any of
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the national government dominating the
other two branches (Eatwell & Wright, 2003, p. 70). Unlike the Russian presidents, arguably
American presidents have not been able to subvert or simply ignore their respective
constitutions, not even Richard Nixon (Grant & Ashbee, 2002, p. 110). It is constitutionally
possible for the president to be removed from the Oval Office, should two – thirds of
Congress vote in favour of impeachment. No president has been impeached although Nixon
resigned before it happened to him (Ward, 2003, p. 320). That bears testimony to the staying
power of the system brought in during the 1780s (Spiller et al, 2005, p. 10).

The American presidency in other words has carefully defined boundaries to its powers and
prerogatives that Congress and the Supreme Court are meant to ensure are not in any
circumstances exceeded, or totally disregarded. There is little scope for any president to
abuse their position, although some of the clandestine activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency have offered opportunities to bypass Congressional restrictions in foreign policy
areas (Duncan & Goddard, 2005, p. 257). Take for example the botched Bay of Pigs invasion
of Cuba, the Tonkin Bay incident, and the Iran – Contra affair (Spiller et al, 2005, p. 280).

The American president as Commander in Chief of the United States armed forces has the
ability to deploy military units anywhere across the globe yet they have to take into account
that Congress controls military spending and has to approve declarations of war. It is not
surprising then that presidents have resorted to covert military operations Grant 7 (Ashbee,
2002, p. 15). Russian presidents have fewer problems in the deployment and the use of
combat units at home or abroad. Russian presidents are not overly concerned as to whether or
not their forces kill civilians or abuse human rights, when the Americans would claim that
they always try to limit collateral damage as they term it (Palmowski, 2008, p. 590).

 In Russia particularly during the presidency of Vladimir Putin the Duma was usually under
the firm control of the government. When members of the opposition went too far in
opposing him they faced repressive measures, and his policies were fully implemented in any
case (Palmowski, 2008, p. 590).
US Presidents nominate candidates to become Supreme Court judges yet these nominations
have to be approved by Congress. Generally new judges are only nominated when existing
members either die or retire. It has become usual practice for members of the Supreme Court
to be divided between those with Democratic, Republican, or independent perspectives to
prevent the body become biased either in favour or against the White House and Congress.
The perceived political autonomy and neutrality of the Supreme Court can be useful if it has
to declare any new legislation from Congress or policy introduced by the president. Such
action has been taken when the judges considered it to be required (Grant & Ashbee, 2002, p.
10). During the 1930s it even went as far as blocking large segments of the New Deal
legislation, when its members deemed that the president should not intervene so widely in
economic matters. Conversely favourable Supreme Court decisions contributed to the
achievement of full civil rights for African Americans to ensure that the legislation drawn by
president and Congress were enforced across the country (Ward, 2003, p. 280).

However Russian courts lack the status or the autonomy of the American Supreme Court,
which critics of the Russian constitution claim strengthens the presidency at the expense of
liberal democracy. The lack of a suitably neutral and independent Supreme Court could be
arguably considered to be a feature inherited from the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union
when the executive dominated government as an essential strand of maintaining a tight
dictatorial grip on power (Jack, 2004, p.3). Courts and judges in Russia are not used to ruling
against the actions and the policies of their government, and will not assume that they are
safe if they did so. There is therefore little if no legal protection for Russian citizens that are
opposed to their government (Service, 2003, p. 530).

Similarities :
An area in, which the Russian and American presidencies would apparently have much in
common is that there are democratic presidential elections, although there are doubts about
the legality of results in the case of Russia. In the Russian Federation the candidate with the
highest over all number of popular votes is elected president (James, 2003, p. 397). Therefore
the Russian voters should always end up with the most popular choice as president in office.
On the other hand the American constitution sets out that the president is actually chosen via
an electoral college instead of by a simple majority of the popular votes cast (Ward, 2003, p.
345). Generally the candidate voted into the White House by the electoral college is the same
as the one with the most votes (Dean, 2004, p. 3). However that was not always the case as
Al Gore gained more votes than George W Bush in 2000 but the latter was put into office
after the Supreme Court decided that Bush had won the electoral college votes of Florida
(Palmowski, 2008, p. 704).

Over all the 2000 contest was the closest fought presidential election ever, and thus far the
only one in, which the result was decided through a decision made by the Supreme Court. It
could be argued that the Russian presidential election process is (theoretically at least) more
democratic than the American presidential process as only the most popular candidate can
win the presidency. That is only theoretically as there is evidence from some Russian
elections that parliamentary and presidential elections have been subject to high levels of
fraud (White et al, 2009, p. 20). Furthermore it is fraud masterminded by sections of the
Russian government itself. Doubts about open and fair elections are not the only indicators
that democracy is in a poor state in Russia (Jack, 2004, p. 272).

Besides both the Russian and American presidencies been democratically elected in both
countries successful candidates can only serve two consecutive presidential terms in office. In
the United States this restriction was only introduced after Franklin Roosevelt won four
consecutive elections to the White House yet died shortly commencing the last one of them
(Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 228). The Russians put a limit on consecutive terms in order to prevent
any president becoming a dictator, all be it an elected one (Freeland, 2000, p.15).

Use of borrowed presidential powers

By the early 1990s limiting the number of presidential terms to two consecutive ones was a
fairly common one in the majority of states with republican constitutions. In Russia both
Boris Yeltsin and his successor Vladimir Putin managed to win two consecutive presidential
elections, whilst the latter became Prime Minister once again after his second term finished
(Palmowski, 2008, p. 590). It is often argued that Putin still dominates the government of the
Russian Federation even if Dmitry Medvedev is the actual president. The constitution has not
formally been amended yet the Prime Minister is in full control because he makes use of
borrowed presidential powers (White et al, 2009, p. 301).
Arguably neither liberalism nor democracy have had long – term existences within the
Russian Federation, consequences of the country's former imperial and communist regimes.
Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin themselves were products of the Soviet Communist party.
This notable lack of liberal democracy in many respects makes a significant contribution to
the differences between the Russian and American presidencies (Jack, 2004, p. 4). Whilst the
Russian Empire (briefly, for its last twelve years) and also the Soviet Union had constitutions
in both cases the executive completely dominated the legislature as well as the judiciary. The
imperial and communist regimes were not interested in promoting the political forms of
liberalism, just reducing opposition to insignificant levels via censorship, imprisonment, and
ultimately executions (Service, 2003, p. 531). When Boris Yeltsin was the Russian president
the law courts and the Duma exercised more autonomy than they had ever done before yet it
came nowhere near matching the checks and the balances featured for so long within the
American constitution. Yeltsin was convinced that the law courts and the Duma were more
independent from the presidency than was necessary (Meir, 2004, p. 12).

Without a doubt Yeltsin did not intend for the Russian presidency to loose power to the
Duma and to the judiciary but did so due to his own ill health (hindered by heavy drinking),
and the even poorer state of the Russian economy as it adjusted to the end of wholesale state
ownership (Freeland, 2000, p. 14). The Russian government acting on Western advice was
convinced that it had to implement severe reforms to move away from the collapsed Soviet
centrally planned economy, and the other social and economic consequences of the Soviet
Union's disintegration. These reforms were also intended to break any surviving aspects of
the communist economic system, and strengthen moves towards liberal democracy (Meir,
2004, p. 35). Ordinary Russians disliked the reforms further as they suffered whilst those
close to Yeltsin grew rich due to corrupt practices and bribery. Hand in hand with corrupt
government officials and the newly enriched went widespread ineptness within the constantly
changing administrations (Politkovskaya, 2001, p. 5).

Domestically and especially abroad Yeltsin at first had a reputation for promoting liberal
democracy in Russia particularly after he defied the hardline Soviet military coup of August
1991 that signified that the days of the Soviet Union were numbered (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.
490). However when in office Yeltsin did not promote democracy as much as he sought to
promote capitalism. The social consequences of economic reforms were dire leading to
realistic fears that the communists and the ultra – nationalists would gain power (Woodruff,
2005, p. 371).

The more liberal minded Russians backed Yeltsin's re – election in 1996 because the other
candidates were less likely to bring about liberal democracy. Added to the dire state of the
Russian economy Yeltsin was faced with the prospect of Chechnya fighting for its
independence. President Yeltsin was not reluctant to use force if or when his position was
threatened, and did so against the Chechen fighters (Klein, 2007, p. 350). In the last year of
the Yeltsin era the former head of the Russian secret service, the younger Vladimir Putin
started to restore the government's authority. Unlike previous Prime Ministers Putin was not
sacked and Yeltsin even resigned the presidency early to enhance Putin's chances of winning
the subsequent presidential election (Jack, 2004, p.4).

The incoming Putin was determined to restore full presidential authority, and did so to such
an extent that critics condemned his autocratic grip upon power. Under Putin the human
rights situation within Russia worsened considerably with repression been justified by the
need to crush the Chechen rising, as well as controlling other nationalities seeking their
independence (Palmowski, 2008, p. 590). Although popular amongst many Russians the
renewed war in Chechnya did arouse opposition in the Duma, and the more liberal sections of
the media. Putin reacted by increasing levels of censorship, imprisoning opponents, and
failed to find those responsible for a spate of the best known government critics being
murdered, or dying in dubious accidents (Klein, 2007, p. 346). The Russian government was
able to reduce American criticism of its human rights record by supporting United States
efforts to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Jack, 2004, p. 273).

Now the state controlled media does not dare broadcast or print information that the Russian
government does not approve of. Heavy censorship levels, and the careful manipulation of
the media are a return to the days when the Communist party misled, or aimed to mislead the
entire population of the Soviet Union. Internal opposition and international non –
governmental organisations regularly argue that personal freedoms , and human rights in
contemporary Russia have been reduced to almost non – existent levels. The prolific use of
propaganda and the fact that democratic elections are prone to state sponsored fraud makes a
mockery of claims that Russia is a liberal democracy (Klein, 2007, p. 348).
No American president could hope to match the repressive measures frequently employed by
the Russian government especially under Putin and Medvedev even if they seriously
considered doing so. Furthermore, the American presidency could not achieve such wide
ranging control of the media although the White House does attempt to present presidential
achievements, or decisions in the best possible light (Klein, 2007, p. 352). The American
media unlike its Russian counterpart can feel safe if it criticises the president or the
government. Americans did accept some potential limits of their freedoms due to the greater
threat of terrorism in their own country. Increased security measures were put into place after
the 9/11 attacks yet the worst alleged abuses of human rights have been out on non –
American citizens (Grant & Ashbee, 2002, p. 120). Abuses even torture has been used in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the infamous detention camp in Guantanamo Bay (Duncan &
Goddard, 2005, p. 260).

Conclusion:

Therefore in conclusion it has to be argued that there a greater number of differences than
there similarities when the Russian and the American presidencies are compared to each
other. If these two presidencies are examined together at a superficial level then they would
apparently have more in common with each other than if the comparison is undertaken upon
a wider basis. Theoretically at least the differences between the Russian and American
presidencies are less pronounced than they are at the practical level, mainly due to Russia
been less democratic in reality than it is constitutionally, especially as presidential powers
have been used to repress opposition within the Russian Federation.

The American presidency has been around for more than two hundred years prior to that of
its Russian counterpart, and therefore its holders have had less opportunities to alter the
constitution or increase the amount of political power, which they command. In many ways it
has been the American constitution's emphasis upon the maintaining of checks and balances
that has prevented any president from raising their powers illegally, or successfully
subverting the federal system of government for their own benefit and the detriment of all
American citizens. The formal separation of constitutional powers with checks and balances
have undoubtedly played their part in maintaining the stability of the United States, perhaps
at the expense of slowing down the decision – making process. The American presidency not
only works due to the boundaries set in the constitution, it also functions well because the
United States has a long history of been a liberal democracy.

In a bleaker contrast, Russia and its presidency have only led an independent existence since
the end of the Soviet Union some twenty years ago. Human rights, liberalism, and democratic
values are all relatively new to Russian soil, with illiberal tendencies generally having much
stronger foundations inside Russia. Russian and Soviet leaders have been almost
overwhelmingly been autocratic, if not down right authoritarian. To a large extent then the
constitution reflects the Russian quest for strong leadership, as opposed to the establishment
of meaningful liberal democracy instead of an autocratic presidency. Russia was arguably a
more open country under Yeltsin than it is now yet that was due to his bouts of illness,
corrupt practices, inept policies, and economic crisis. As president Putin reversed all the
moves towards political liberalism whilst concentrating considerable powers in the
presidency itself.

Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of 1993

The 1993 Constitution provides for a number of rights, commonly recognized by

international law as basic human rights, which cannot be contravened by private individuals
or the government. These rights include: the right to equality under the law without regard to
sex, race, nationality, property or employment status, freedom of membership in public
associations, privacy, movement and emigration, freedom of conscience and religion,
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to free association and assembly, and the
right to own property. Further, the Constitution contains several direct references to
international human rights law and international institutions concerned with human rights.
Article 17 of the constitution, which enumerates human rights, includes a reference to
international legal principles and norms suggesting the enumerated list of human rights might
not be complete. In addition, there is a special clause in Article 55 which states, "there may
be other generally recognized rights and freedoms."

The granting of human rights appears to be the most applauded part of the constitution by the
international community. It should be kept in mind that there was no requirement for the
inclusion of these rights by the international community. Considering the actions past
Russian leaders have taken to strip away human rights, relinquishing the power to interfere
with basic human rights is a building block toward joining the international community, and
that by implication implies becoming a "law-based state."

The reform of Russia's laws, regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, may require
a number of years to eliminate inconsistencies between them and international norms. During
this time however, international law may serve as a basis for human rights and democracy
that may have a stabilizing influence on Russia.

With respect to the civil rights, the Constitution provides the right to "challenge in court the
actions of governmental organs and government officials. There is also a right to trial by jury
in certain classes of cases. The classes of cases are expected to be defined by federal law.
There is also a right to counsel that attaches at the moment of detention, a presumption of
innocence, a prohibition against double jeopardy, and a prohibition against compulsory self-
incrimination.

That this system relates to the right to challenge governmental organs and officials,
establishes another building block toward a "law-based state" by allowing the citizenry to
check governmental power. This check is not as immediate as a balance of power between
separate branches of government would allow, however it does provide a check on power if
there are violations of enumerated articles of the Constitution by the government. The power
of citizens to challenge governmental organs and officials will assist in eliminating
inconsistencies between Russian law and international law. Eliminating inconsistencies is
necessary to ensure that Russian citizens know how to exercise the rights granted to them in
the constitution.

The 1993 Constitution also provides for a number of affirmative rights. These rights include:
the right to rest and leisure, to strike, to social security, to a home, to health care and medical
assistance, to a healthy environment, and to an education. Considering the economic
conditions confronting Russia at the time the constitution was promulgated questions were
asked as to the financial feasibility of providing for affirmative rights. If these rights fail the
constitution will lose credibility. There has not been a clear articulation of how the
government intends to snsure these rights, but it is clear that governmental programs are
necessary. Where funds will come from for any government program has not been firmly
established. Whether Russia can pay for these entitlements or not, that these rights were
provided for the citizens of the country shows an interest by the government in furthering
human rights, which is a positive step.