M. en Canadá

International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 663–675
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International Journal of Intercultural Relations

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijintrel
Research on multiculturalism in Canada

John W. Berry a,b
a
Queen’s University, Canada K7L 3N6
b
Sociocultural Psychology, Higher School of Economics, Russian National Research University, Moscow, Russia
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: Canada announced a policy of multiculturalism in 1971. The goal of the policy was to
improve the quality of intercultural relations. Two main elements of the policy were pro-
This article is dedicated to the memory of
posed as steps towards achieving this goal: support for the maintenance and development
my friend and colleague Rudy Kalin
(1938–2011).
of cultural communities (the cultural component); and promotion of intercultural contact
along with the reduction of barriers to such participation (the intercultural component).
Keywords: Research on these issues can provide a basis for the development and implementation of
Acculturation multiculturalism policies and programmes. A review of psychological research on mul-
Contact ticulturalism over the past 40 years is summarised. Topics include: knowledge about
Cultural maintenance the multiculturalism policy; acceptance of multiculturalism; acceptance of ethnocultural
Ethnocultural groups groups; acceptance of immigrants; discrimination and exclusion; and attachment and iden-
Immigrants tity. Research assessing three hypotheses derived from the policy is also briefly reviewed.
Intercultural relations Current evidence is that there is widespread support for these features of the multicultural
Public attitudes
way of living in Canada. Of particular importance for the success of multiculturalism is the
Public policy
issue of social cohesion: is the first component (the promotion of cultural diversity) com-
Social cohesion
patible with the second component (the full and equitable participation and inclusion of
all ethnocultural groups in civic society)? If they are compatible, together do they lead to
the attainment of the fundamental goal of attaining positive intercultural relations? Cur-
rent psychological evidence suggests that these two components are indeed compatible,
and that when present, they are associated with mutual acceptance among ethnocultural
groups in Canada. I conclude that research in Canada supports the continuation of the mul-
ticulturalism policy and programmes that are intended to improve intercultural relations.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Diversity has always been a hallmark of the population and society of Canada (Lower, 1964). Canada was a culturally
diverse region prior to the arrival of European settlers, with 50 distinct Aboriginal cultures and more than a dozen distinct
language groups in the Aboriginal population (Burnet, 1981; see note 1 ). With respect to immigration, Canada ranks fifth in
the world in terms of the largest foreign born population (World Migration Report, 2010). At present, there are 6.2 million
E-mail address: berryj@kos.net

1
While Aboriginal Peoples in Canada constitute an important element of our historical and contemporary cultural diversity, they are generally not
enamoured of multiculturalism policy and its programmes, and remain largely outside of its focus (Fleras & Elliot, 1992). In part, this is because Aboriginal
Peoples perceive the policy to be relevant to ‘settlers’ rather than to themselves as indigenous peoples. In terms of Jenson’s (1998) conception of social
cohesion (which includes the components of belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition, and legitimacy), Lambertus (2002) has argued that Aboriginal
Peoples have experienced “isolation, exclusion, non-involvement, rejection, and illegitimacy”. Because of this situation, the present paper does not seek to
incorporate Aboriginal Peoples further into the general discussion of multiculturalism in Canada.
0147-1767/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2013.09.005
664 J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 663–675
foreign-born people in Canada (representing 20% of the population) who have come from over 200 countries, and who
speak 94 different languages (Statistics Canada, 2006). In recent years, the majority of immigrants (over 65%) have come
from East and Southeast Asia, adding to the extant diversity. Along with this cultural diversity, the existence of geographic,
historical, linguistic and social diversity has meant that there has probably never been a realistic option to forge a uniform
people or society in Canada. In recognition of this, over the past half century, Federal Governments of Canada have declared
their intention to pursue a multicultural vision for Canadian society. This course was made concrete by the announcement
of a policy of multiculturalism in 1971, and its formalisation as the Multiculturalism Act in 1988. Most recently, Canada
was the first to ratify (in 2005) the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions.
The concept of multiculturalism has acquired many meanings in the past 40 years. In the 1970s, Berry, Kalin and Taylor
(1977) made the distinction among three different meanings: multiculturalism as demographic fact (the presence of cul-
tural diversity in the Canadian population); multiculturalism as an ideology (the general desirability among Canadians for
maintaining and sharing this diversity); and as a public policy (governmental orientation and action towards this fact). Of
course, these three features are closely related: without the first, there is no need to be concerned with what Canadians
might think about it; and there would be no need for governmental policy or action to deal with it. At the psychological core
of the meaning of multiculturalism lies the notion of individuals having and sharing a collective identity as Canadians, and
who also have particular identities as members of various ethnocultural communities (Cameron & Berry, 2008).
In the past 40 years, Canada came to recognise, celebrate and seek to manage this diversity. According to Yalden (2009, p.
33), the first use of the concept in public policy anywhere was in the Canadian “Policy of Multiculturalism within a Bilingual
Framework” (see note 2 ). The multiculturalism policy was advanced by the Government of Canada in 1971, stating that:
“A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. . . (is) the most suitable means of assuring the cultural
freedom of all Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies.
National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one’s own
individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others, and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and
assumptions. . .. The Government will support and encourage the various cultural and ethnic groups that give structure
and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians
and so contribute to a richer life for all” (Government of Canada, 1971).
In essence, this policy advocated support for: (i) the maintenance and development of heritage cultures; (ii) intercultural
sharing, and the reduction of barriers to full and equitable participation of all Canadians in the life of the larger society; and
(iii) the learning of official languages as a basis for such participation.
However, the basic notion that cultural communities living in plural societies need not ‘assimilate’ into some kind of
‘mainstream’ had an earlier history in Canadian discourse. For example, at the UNESCO conference in 1956 in Havana on
“The Cultural Integration of Immigrants” (Borrie, 1959), there was a beginning shift away from assimilation. The presentation
to the conference by the Canadian Government (Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 1956, p. 1) argued that their
policy towards immigrants should reflect the political and cultural patterns of Canadian society. This pattern includes “. . .a
society built on the ideas of individual worth and cultural differences. . . The pressure of one dominant group to assimilate,
that is to absorb others, is therefore impracticable as a general theory.” (quoted in Borrie, 1959, p. 51).
The Multiculturalism Act (1988) gave formal and concrete meaning to these general ideas. The Act declared that the policy
of the Government of Canada is to “recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and
racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance
and share their cultural heritage”. It also recognised that “multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian
heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada’s future”. At the same time, the
Act sought “to promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing
evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation”,
and to “ensure that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing
their diversity”. The then Director of Multiculturalism (Gauld, 1992), reiterated three points: (i) Multiculturalism is here to
stay, both as social fact and as public policy and programmes; (ii) it is more than a cultural policy; it is also an equity policy,
designed not only “to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians”. . . but also “working to achieve the
equality of all Canadians in the economic, cultural, social and political life of Canada”; and (iii) he noted that the policy “is
addressed to all Canadians, not just to ethnocultural minority communities”. This necessary conjunction of the diversity and
equity features of the policy has been repeatedly emphasised, and has been at the forefront of debate about multiculturalism
for many years. For example, Kymlicka, opined that “. . .accommodating diversity is in fact central to achieving true equality”
(2004, p. 167).
2
The notion of bilingualism in Canada refers to the presence and widespread use of two ‘Official languages” (English and French). It may appear as
anomalous to have multiculturalism, but not also multilingualism. However, the country was founded by these two distinct linguistic communities, and
their languages have been given official support (for example in laws, parliaments and federal government services). Other ‘heritage languages’ are also
recognised, and are supported to some extent, but do not have the same status.
J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 663–675 665
One difficulty in discussions of the meaning of multiculturalism, both in Canada and internationally, has been the simple
equating of multiculturalism with cultural diversity. As noted above, the Canadian policy has always been more than just the
recognition, promotion and celebration of cultural diversity; intercultural sharing, equity and inclusion have been seen as
being essential elements in the policy. Critics of multiculturalism, such as Bissoondath (1994) in Canada and Glazer (1997)
and Moghaddam (2008) in the USA have diminished the richness and complexity of the concept by focusing only on the
diversity aspect. As a result, they typically see it as leading to social divisiveness, and even to separation. Many European
societies, such as the UK, also hold to this narrow meaning. For example, “The term ‘multicultural’ is generally used to refer
to societies characterised by diversity, irrespective of whether or not the diversity is exclusively cultural in nature. This is
how I use it” (Parekh, 2009, p. 33).
This view that multiculturalism means only the presence of many independent cultural communities in a society (that is,
only cultural pluralism), without the presence of intercultural interaction and equitable participation in the larger society
seems to have been the basis of recent assertions in some European societies (e.g., in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK)
that “multiculturalism has failed”. For example, the British Prime Minister (Number 10, 2011) argued that state multicul-
turalism in “Britain had encouraged different cultures to live separate lives” . . .and that, “the UK needed a stronger national
identity to prevent people turning to all kinds of extremism”. From the perspective outlined here, multiculturalism has not
failed because it was not really attempted in these societies. If multiculturalism is viewed and accepted only as the tolerated
presence of different cultures in a society, without the simultaneous promotion of inclusion through programmes to reduce
barriers to equitable participation, then a form of segregation is the correct name for such policies and practices. This seems
to have been the view of Cameron. However, his proposed solution to the problem of segregation is more homogeneity (pos-
sibly assimilation), rather than the pursuit of the two main goals of multiculturalism that are the basis of the multicultural
vision.
These two features of multiculturalism (diversity and equity) have remained central to the Canadian policy since its
inception. However, there have been shifts in emphases over the past 40 years. At the beginning there was a focus on support
for the maintenance of cultural diversity; this appears to have been an effort to halt (or reduce) the assimilationist features
of earlier policies. Later, the other core concern in the policy (for sharing, equity and social inclusion) came to be emphasised
more. And most recently the incorporation of everyone into a Canadian civic society has come to the fore with an emphasis
on a common citizenship for all. Fleras (2009) has referred to this shift as moving from ethnicity multiculturalism (with a
focus on cultural diversity), to equity multiculturalism (focus on equitable participation), to civic multiculturalism (focus
on society building and inclusiveness) and finally to integrative multiculturalism (focus on identification with Canada, and
full incorporation into the larger Canadian society). This shift is still in progress, with earlier forms of multiculturalism very
much in evidence. For example, expressions of heritage/ethnic cultures are part of annual festivals in many communities;
anti-discrimination efforts are seriously advocated to reduce barriers to full participation; and the civic integration of all
peoples is promoted through public education and political advocacy (Biles & Tolley, 2005).
2. Canadian multiculturalism in international perspective
A project to evaluate the multicultural policies and practices in many contemporary democratic societies has been
developed by Banting and Kymlicka (2006). This index includes a set of criteria to assess the degree of promotion of multicul-
turalism (by policy and practice) in plural societies. They proposed nine criteria with which to place societies on a dimension
of acceptance of multiculturalism, including: a government policy promoting multiculturalism, a multicultural ministry or
secretariat, adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum, ethnic representation in the media, exemptions of cul-
tural groups from codes that are rooted in the dominant society (e.g., Sunday closing), allowing dual citizenship, funding of
cultural organisations, and funding of bilingual or heritage language instruction.
Many societies are now considering multiculturalism as a vehicle to achieve the incorporation of immigrants and cultural
communities into the larger society. Three international overviews of immigration and incorporation have been published
recently (Bloemraad, 2011; MIPEX, 2012; Vigdor, 2011). These surveys reveal a number of commonalities across soci-
eties (Australia, Canada, the European Countries and the USA), despite their focus on different aspects of multiculturalism,
immigration and settlement.
Bloemraad (2011) examines the policies and practices of multiculturalism in various countries and tracks changes over
the years from 1980 to 2010. Using the “Multiculturalism Policy Index” (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006), she found rankings
that put Canada and Australia in first place, followed by Sweden, New Zealand, Belgium, and the UK. Towards the middle are
Spain, Portugal and the USA. Lowest placed are France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark. Of particular interest is
the Netherlands, which was rather high in 2000, but dropped to a low score in 2010. This may reflect the recent assertions
in the Netherlands that multiculturalism has failed there (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010).
The second survey is the “Migrant Integration Policy Index” (MIPEX, 2012). This survey includes indicators of migrant
integration in a number of domains: labour mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence,
access to nationality and anti-discrimination laws; it also presents an overall score. The overall rankings place Sweden first
place, followed by Portugal, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Spain, the USA, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany,
the UK, Denmark and France.
The third survey (Vigdor, 2011) is concerned with “Immigrant Assimilation in North America and Europe”. The use of the
term ‘assimilation’ in title is rather misleading, since it does not assess the giving up (or loss) of heritage culture, which is
part of the usual conception of assimilation; it assesses only immigrant involvement in civic, cultural and economic domains
of the larger society (and also provides a composite index). The comparison of immigration countries on overall immigrant
incorporation provides the following ranking: Canada, Portugal, the USA, Greece, Austria, France, Spain, Switzerland, and
Italy. With respect to naturalisation rates, the ranking is Canada, Portugal, the Netherlands, the USA, Greece, Austria, France,
Spain, Switzerland and Italy. The ranking of Canada on these various indices is rather consistent, and is based on numerous
objective criteria. Hence, we can have some confidence that Canada is a world leader in the domains of multiculturalism
and immigrant settlement and incorporation. This conclusion corresponds to that of Adams (2007), who used many years
of data from the polling of public attitudes to document the “triumph of pluralism in Canada”.
Curiously, these low scores in some European societies fly in the face of an EU (2005) directive that identifies the inte-
gration of migrants and their cultural communities as “. . .a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all
immigrants and residents of Member States. Integration is a dynamic, long-term, and continuous two-way process of mutual
accommodation. . .. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident.” (p. 1).
3. Specifying the meaning of multiculturalism
In this paper, the term multiculturalism is used to mean the joint value placed on cultural maintenance (the cultural
diversity element) and equitable participation (the intercultural element). To help clarify this use of the concept, other
terms (such as assimilation, integration, melting pot, and segregation) can be visualised within a framework developed by
Berry (1974, 1980; see Berry, 2005, Fig. 3). These issues are based on the distinction between orientations towards one’s
own cultural group, and those towards other groups. This framework considers the relative preference for (i) maintaining
heritage culture and identity and (ii) a relative preference for having contact with and participating in the larger society
along with other cultural groups. These two issues can be responded to as attitudinal dimensions, ranging from generally
positive or negative orientations to these issues. Different terms may be used to refer to the orientations of non-dominant
ethnocultural groups and the larger society.
Among non-dominant ethnocultural groups, when they do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily
interaction with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place a value on holding
on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the Separation alternative is
defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining ones original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups,
Integration is the option. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking,
as a member of a cultural group, to participate as an integral part of the larger social network. Finally, when there is little
possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination) then Marginalisation is
defined.
As proposed by Berry (1974), the views and expectations of members of the larger society are also important to examine.
From the point of view of the larger society, Assimilation when sought by the dominant group is termed the Melting Pot. When
Separation is forced by the dominant group it is called Segregation. Marginalisation, when imposed by the dominant group
is termed Exclusion. Finally, when diversity maintenance and equitable participation are widely-accepted features of the
society as a whole, integration is called Multiculturalism. This long-established linking of integration with multiculturalism
has been emphasised by Garcea (2003, p. 59), who notes that in both concepts, there is a joint effort to promote diversity and
equity. This linkage has been further emphasised by Duncan (2005, p. 12) who argues that “. . .it is important to recognize
explicitly that multiculturalism is an instrument for integration”. That is, the concept of “. . .multiculturalism incorporates the
fundamental element of interculturalism which is the emphasis on interaction between cultures . . .that have been described
as community bridging and bonding” (Jedwab, 2005, pp. 98–99)”. Rather than seeing them as opposites (as implied in some
declarations from Europe), I have advocated the view that they are very similar. Together, and in balance with each other, it
should be possible to achieve the multicultural vision. This is the meaning of multiculturalism that is used in this paper: the
joint value placed on cultural maintenance (the diversity element) and equitable participation (the intercultural element).
In my view, this reflects the original (and continuing) meaning in the 1971 Canadian policy statement.
4. Framework for examining research on multiculturalism
There have been numerous examinations and evaluations of research on Canadian multiculturalism policy (see e.g.,
Berry & Laponce, 1994). In addition, others have presented critical evaluations of the policy and its programmes (Bibby,
1990; Bissoondath, 1994; Ryan, 2010). A framework for examining the Canadian multiculturalism policy was proposed by
Berry (1984; see Berry, 2006, Fig. 1). As noted above, the fundamental goal is to enhance mutual acceptance and to improve
the quality of intercultural relations among all cultural groups. This goal is to be approached through three main programme
components: the cultural diversity component; the intercultural component; and the official language learning component.
In addition to these components, there are three links among them that give rise to three hypotheses. The first, termed the
multiculturalism hypothesis is expressed in the policy statement as the belief that confidence in one’s identity will lead to
sharing, respect for others, and to the reduction of discriminatory attitudes. Our initial findings from national surveys (Berry
& Kalin, 1995; Berry et al., 1977) lend support to this link between confidence in one’s identity and mutual acceptance.
In those studies, measures of cultural security and economic security were created with respect to extant diversity, and
the continuing flow of immigration. These two security scores were correlated positively with each other and with various
intercultural attitudes: cultural security was negatively correlated with ethnocentrism, and positively with multicultural
ideology and with perceived consequences of multiculturalism. Economic security had a similar pattern of correlations with
these variables.
In New Zealand, using a structural model, Ward and Masgoret (2008) found that security was positively related to
multicultural ideology and with attitudes towards immigrants. In Russia, Lebedeva and Tatarko (2012) studied migrants
from the Caucasus to Moscow and Muscovites. They found that cultural security predicted tolerance, and a preference for
integration and social equality in both groups, but to a lesser extent among Muscovites. In Estonia, a representative sample of
Russian speakers was asked about their intercultural strategies, their ethnic self-esteem, their experience of discrimination,
and their level of cultural threat, civic engagement and economic and political satisfaction (Kruusvall, Vetik, & Berry, 2009).
The four usual intercultural strategies were found. Groups following the separation and marginalisation strategies reported
the highest levels of threat and lowest levels of self-esteem and civic engagement. In contrast, the integration and assimilation
groups had lowest threat and discrimination, and highest civic engagement and satisfaction. From this sampling of empirical
studies, it is possible to conclude that security in one’s own identity underlies the possibility of accepting “others”. This
acceptance includes being tolerant, accepting cultural diversity in society, and accepting immigrants to, and ethnocultural
groups in, that society. In contrast, threatening an individual’s or group’s identity and place in a plural society is likely to
lead to hostility.
A second link is the integration hypothesis: when individuals and groups seek integration, by being ‘doubly engaged’ (in
both their heritage cultures and in the larger society) they will be more successful in achieving a higher level of wellbeing,
in both psychological and social domains, than if they engage only one or the other of the cultural groups. The integra-
tion strategy has often been found to be associated with better adaptation than other strategies (Berry, 1997). A possible
explanation is that those who are doubly engaged with both cultures receive support and resources from both, and are com-
petent in dealing with both cultures. The social capital afforded by these multiple social and cultural engagements may well
offer the route to success in plural societies. The evidence for integration being associated with better adaptation has been
reviewed (Berry, 2011). More recently, Nguyen and Benet-Martinez (2013) carried out a meta-analysis across 83 studies
and over 20,000 participants. They found that integration (‘biculturalism’ in their terms) was found to have a significant and
positive relationship with both psychological adaptation (e.g., life satisfaction, positive affect, self-esteem) and sociocultural
adaptation (e.g., academic achievement, career success, social skills, lack of behavioural problems).
A third link is the contact hypothesis, by which contact and sharing is considered to promote mutual acceptance under cer-
tain conditions, especially that of equality. The contact hypothesis asserts that “Prejudice. . .may be reduced by equal status
contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals.” (Allport, 1954). However, Allport proposed
that the hypothesis is more likely to be supported when certain conditions are present in the intercultural encounter. The
effect of contact is predicted to be stronger when: there is contact between groups of roughly equal social and economic
status; when the contact is voluntary (sought by both groups, rather than imposed); and when supported by society, through
norms and laws promoting contact and prohibiting discrimination. A good deal of research has been carried out to test this
hypothesis. In a massive comparative examination, Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of hundreds of
studies of the contact hypothesis, which came from many countries and many diverse settings (schools, work, experiments).
Their findings provide general support for the contact hypothesis: intergroup contact does generally relate negatively to
prejudice in both dominant and non-dominant samples: Overall, the results from the meta-analysis reveal that greater lev-
els of intergroup contact are typically associated with lower level of prejudice. This effect was stronger where there were
structured programmes that incorporated the conditions outlined by Allport than when these conditions were not present.
One remaining issue is whether intercultural contact leads to more positive attitudes, or conversely, whether those indi-
viduals with positive attitudes seek more intercultural contact. In the national surveys in Canada, we found support for the
first alternative, especially when status is controlled. For example, Kalin and Berry (1982) using data from a national survey
in Canada, examined the ethnic attitudes of members of particular ethnocultural groups towards members of other ethno-
cultural groups. Their attitude data were aggregated by census tracts (essentially neighbourhoods), in which the proportion
of particular ethnocultural groups was also known from the Census. They found that the higher the proportion of mem-
bers of a particular group in a neighbourhood, the more positive were the attitudes of non-members towards that group.
This kind of ecological analysis permits the suggestion that contact actually leads to more positive intercultural attitudes.
However, it is still possible that individuals actually move to particular neighbourhoods where already-liked ethnocul-
tural groups are residing. More such research of needed, and in other intercultural settings, before firm conclusions can be
drawn.
A key element in the contact hypothesis is the set of conditions that may be necessary in order for contact to lead to
more positive intercultural relations. The three hypotheses are linked because the first two hypotheses speak to some of
these conditions under which contact can have positive outcomes. First, for the multiculturalism hypothesis, we saw that
when the cultural identities of individuals and groups are threatened, and their place in the plural society is questioned,
more negative attitudes are likely to characterise their relationships. This consequence applies to all ethnocultural groups,
both dominant and non-dominant. For example, when members of the larger society feel threatened by immigration, and
when members of particular groups have their rights to maintain their heritage cultures and/or to participate in the larger
society are questioned or denied, a mutual hostility is likely to ensue. Under these conditions, increase contact is not likely
to lead to more positive intercultural attitudes. For the integration hypothesis, we saw that ‘double engagement’ (that is,
maintaining contact with, and participating in both the heritage culture and the larger society) is associated with better
wellbeing, including greater self-esteem and life satisfaction. When psychological and social wellbeing are low (that is,
when confidence in one’s identity is low) there can be little basis for engaging in intercultural contact. And when contact
does occur, as we saw for the multiculturalism hypothesis, it is likely to lead to more hostile mutual attitudes.
The evidence is now widespread across cultures that greater intercultural contact is associated with more positive inter-
cultural attitudes, and lower levels of prejudice. This generalisation has to be qualified by two cautions. First, the appropriate
conditions need to be present in order for contact to lead to positive intercultural attitudes. And second, there exists many
examples of the opposite effect, where increased contact is associated with greater conflict. The conditions (cultural, political,
and economic) under which these opposite outcomes arise are in urgent need of examination.
5. Knowledge and beliefs about multiculturalism
This section reviews the extent to which Canadians know about multiculturalism. The first national survey (Berry et al.,
1977) consisted of random households across Canada, with 1849 completed interviews. In order for all Canadians to be
included in the sample frame, interviews were conducted with those of Angloceltic, French and other cultural heritages.
This allowed for comparisons across these groups. A modified version of the survey was carried out in 1991 (Berry & Kalin,
1995), with a sample of 3325 individuals, allowing for some comparisons over time. In the first survey, respondents were
interviewed in their homes; in the second, the interviews took place on the telephone. Since then some items from these
surveys have been included in omnibus national surveys in Canada. In addition, other national surveys of these issues have
been carried out by various polling firms. Many of these more recent studies have been compiled by Canadian Heritage
Public Opinion Research (CHPOR, 2006).
Berry et al. (1977) developed a number of items and scales to assess these knowledge issues. First were the knowledge
questions; results indicated a low level of actual knowledge (20%). The perception of what the policy contained was assessed
by three items: “Some countries encourage immigrants to give up their. . . ways of life, and take on the customs of their
new countries”; “Other countries allow immigrants to maintain their customs. . .when they come to a new country”; and
“Still other countries encourage immigrants to maintain their customs. . .when they come to a new country”. The responses
suggested that Canadians did not perceive the policy to be that of assimilation (only 13% chose the first way). Instead,
some form of cultural maintenance was recognised: 60% perceived the policy to allow, while 27% perceived it to encourage
maintaining their customs. Thus, even early on in the life of the policy there was a fairly accurate perception that it was not
one of assimilation, but one that accepted some form of cultural diversity.
The belief that multiculturalism is a core characteristic of Canadian society has been assessed in various surveys. For
example, the overview of national surveys (CHPOR, 2006) reveals a pattern of fairly accurate beliefs about multiculturalism
in Canada. For example, 85% of Canadians: say that “the word ‘multicultural’ describes Canada very well”; 74% agree that
“our multicultural society is a cornerstone of Canadian culture”; 82% agree that “our multicultural society is a source of
pride for Canadians”. Jedwab (2005) has extracted responses from various Environics Focus Canada surveys, in which 74%
of respondents agreed that “The preservation of the multicultural heritage of Canadians promotes the sharing of common
values”.
6. Acceptance of multiculturalism policy and programmes
The acceptance of multiculturalism has been examined using various constructs and scales such as the Perceived Con-
sequences of Multiculturalism. Some more general indicators have also been used, including the concept of Multicultural
ideology. This concept refers to a broad construct that includes the acceptance of both cultural diversity and equity, a pref-
erence for integration, and a rejection of assimilation and segregation, as ways of managing intercultural relations. It also
includes the belief that all groups need to engage in change through mutual accommodation to each other.
In the first national survey (Berry et al., 1977) a scale developed to assess the Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism
asked respondents for their views about what they thought would be the consequences for themselves and for Canadian
society if a policy of multiculturalism were pursued. Results showed an overall level of agreement that there would be
positive consequences of multiculturalism; 61% agreed in the first survey and 79% agreed in the second survey. There is
clearly a positive view about pursuing multiculturalism, and the level of support rose between the two surveys.
As noted above, the construct of Multicultural Ideology assesses support for the multicultural way of living in the larger
society, and for ethnocultural and immigrant groups to relate to each other. In the first national survey (Berry et al., 1977),
63.9% of respondents were on the positive side of the scale, and this rose to 69.3% in the second survey. The analyses
examined variations in levels of support for multiculturalism using the demographic distinctions of (i) living inside or
outside Quebec, (ii) by Angloceltic, French and other cultural backgrounds, and (iii) by socioeconomic status. Variations
in support for Multicultural Ideology differ according to these demographic characteristics: respondents of French origin
who live in Quebec, those with lower levels of education and income have lower acceptance than other groups. However,
those of French origin living outside Quebec had a higher (in fact the highest) level of support. This pattern may be due
to the different perceptions of multiculturalism among French-origin Canadians living outside and inside Quebec: outside
Quebec, multicultural policies and programmes that promote cultural maintenance and equity are seen as a support for the
continuity of French culture and identity, whereas inside Quebec, they are seen as a threat, and as supporting the cultural
continuity of other groups, and possibly undermining the majority position of French Canadians in “their own” province.
This pattern of results supports the multiculturalism hypothesis outlined above.
Since these initial national surveys, there have been a large number of national surveys that examine the acceptability of
multiculturalism and various multicultural programmes among Canadians. Many of the items in these surveys are derived
from the earlier (1974 and 1991) national surveys. The compilation of results from various surveys from the period 2001 to
2005 (prepared by CHPOR, 2006) reveals a pattern of positive orientations towards multiculturalism in Canada: 82% agree
that “our multicultural society is a source of pride for Canadians”; 83% feel that “people from different racial and cultural
groups are enriching the cultural life of Canada”; 96% agree that “young Canadians are fortunate to grow up surrounded by
friends from different races and religions”; and finally, 74% approve of the Federal policy of multiculturalism” (with only
15% disapproval). This last statistic compares well with the findings from the 1974 and 1991 surveys, indicating that public
support has remained very high.
There have been some recent integrative examinations of multiculturalism by Adams (2007) and Kymlicka (2010, 2012).
For example, when asked “What is it about Canada that gives you the greatest sense of pride?” (Adams, 2007) multiculturalism
has been in the top 10 responses for the past decade (4th place after democracy, quality of life, and humanitarianism, but
ahead of the Canadian health care system). And Kymlicka (2012) concluded that support for multiculturalism remains high
in Canada. Overall, we can say that at the very beginning of the policy, by and large Canadians supported this way of engaging
in intercultural relations, and over time, they do so by a growing, margin.
7. Acceptance of ethnocultural groups
One aspect of the acceptance of multiculturalism is the pattern of attitudes towards particular ethnocultural groups
within the larger Canadian society. While there is high acceptance of multiculturalism in general, there was also evidence of
variations in attitudes towards specific components. In the national surveys (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry et al., 1977) attitudes
towards members of various specific ethnocultural communities were assessed, and analysed for the mutual attitudes among
groups. A number of attitudinal phenomena were apparent. First, these attitudes revealed an ethnic hierarchy, with some
groups being evaluated more positively than others. In Canada, those of West and North European backgrounds are usually
viewed more positively than those of other origins: East and South Europeans are lower in the hierarchy, followed by
those not of European background. These attitudes have been studied with respect to both immigrants and to ethnocultural
groups, with immigrants usually viewed less positively than those who were born and raised in Canada of the same cultural
origin (see section below on immigrants). Jedwab (2005) has found that such a hierarchy continues to remain present in the
attitudes of Canadians. Similar hierarchies have been found in Europe (e.g., Hagendoorn, 1996; Van Oudenhoven, J.P., Prins,
K., & Buunk, B., 1998) and in New Zealand (Ward & Masgoret, 2006).
Second, in both the 1974 and 1991 surveys, there is clear evidence of ethnocentrism: each group evaluates their own group
more positively than all other groups. Within this general pattern of ethnocentrism, there was evidence for group differences
in the degree of ingroup preference: in both surveys, respondents of French-Canadian background showed relatively more
ingroup favouritism than other groups; Ukrainian-origin respondents were second highest in ingroup preference, while
German-origin respondents were lowest. On the basis of these findings, we can say that ethnocentrism is widespread, but
also that some groups appear to be more ethnocentric than other groups.
Third, there is also a consensual hierarchy evident (after own-group preferences are taken into account). There is general
agreement on the hierarchy (reported above), one that is shared by most other groups of respondents (Berry & Kalin, 1979;
Kalin & Berry, 1995). That is, there is an implicit agreement among all groups about which groups are highly valued in
Canadian society and which are not.
8. Acceptance of immigration and immigrants
Attitudes towards immigration and towards specific groups of immigrants, can provide an indication of Canadians’ atti-
tudes towards the cultural diversity component of multiculturalism, and to some extent the general level of ethnic prejudice
in the Canadian population. With respect to the acceptance of immigration and immigrants, scales were developed in the
two national surveys (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry et al., 1977) to assess two aspects: the perceived consequences of immigra-
tion; and attitudes towards various kinds of immigrants. Some items from these measures have also been included in later
national surveys.
The scale to assess the Perceived Consequences of Immigration included 10 items referring to both negative and positive
consequences. High scores indicate a positive attitude to immigration. Overall, attitudes were on the positive side of the
mid-point (mean scale score of 4.36 on a 7-point scale), but varied by the region of residence, ethnic origin, and level of
education of respondents: the least positive attitudes were among respondents in the province of Quebec, among those
of French origin, and by those with only primary schooling. This pattern supports the multiculturalism hypothesis where
immigrants may be seen as undermining the place of French language and culture in society, and the economic security of
those with few resources. The most positive attitudes were held by respondents in the province of Ontario, by those of ‘other
ethnic’ (not of French or British) origin, and by those with a university education.
The acceptability of different kinds of immigrants was assessed in two ways: by various attributes (such as their educa-
tional and language characteristics); and by country of origin. The first scale consisted of 10 items referring to attributes such
as educational level, knowledge of English and/or French, those who have relatives in the country, and those ‘who could be
useful’ to the country. Overall, the acceptability of immigrants was positive (4.99 on a 7-point scale), but also varied by the
respondents’ region, ethnic origin and education, in much the same way as for the perceived consequences of immigration.
Attitudes towards immigrants coming from various countries were assessed at the same time as attitudes towards the
ethnocultural groups descended from them (see above). The same hierarchy of acceptability that was found for members of
ethnocultural groups was also found for immigrants. Holding the origin of their group constant, immigrants received scores
that were lower than those for ethnocultural group members, indicating relatively less willingness to accept immigrants
compared to those of the same origin who were already settled in Canada. There is variation in the difference between
accepting members of ethnocultural groups and immigrants of the same national origin across the specific group being
evaluated: the lower the group in the overall hierarchy, the greater is the difference between accepting them as a member
of a group already resident in Canada, and accepting them as an immigrant.
Over the years since these early surveys, there have been numerous surveys that have asked specific questions, rather
than using scales. In the compilation by CHPOR (2006), a number of questions about immigration were included: 55% agreed
that “accepting immigrants from many countries makes our country stronger”. While not a large majority, the balance of
opinion remains on the positive side.
A related question concerns the level of immigration. Over the past decades, Canadians have been asked questions about
whether the level is too high, about right or too low. The pattern of responses has remained fairly stable: around 40–50% say
the level is about right; around 30–35% say it is too high and around 10–20% say it is too low (CHPOR, 2006). EKOS (2010)
has recently reported that in surveys between 2004 and 2010, around 50–60% of Canadians say that immigration levels are
about right, 20–30% say they are too high and 15–20% say too low. Recently, Nanos (2010) examined Canadian attitudes
towards immigration and immigrants. Nanos asked for responses to the statement: “Immigration is a key positive feature
of Canada as a country”, and found that overall 81.4% agreed (completely or somewhat) while only 16% disagreed. When
asked the question about the economic impact of immigration, Nanos found that 70% agreed that “Immigration is one of the
key tools Canada can use to strengthen the economy”; only 25% disagreed. With respect to numbers of immigrants, Nanos
found that overall 39% of Canadians opted for the “same number”, 21% opted for an increase, and 32% for a decrease.
Most recently, Reitz (2011) further analysed responses from a 2010 Environics survey to discover why Canadians have
such high and sustained positive attitudes towards immigration. He reported that “Majority Canadian support for high levels
of immigration has been remarkably stable over time and relatively unaffected by recessions, the threat of terrorism and
negative reports on specific immigrant groups” (p. 1). Reitz proposed that: “Two important sources of pro-immigration
sentiment are belief in immigration as an economic benefit and pride in Canadian multiculturalism. These perceptions
reinforce each other, and both have broader roots. The perception of economic benefit – prevalent in all regions, including
Quebec – reflects general economic optimism and personal economic success. Those who feel that multiculturalism is
important to Canadian identity are significantly more likely to support current immigration levels” (p. 1). These Environics
findings reveal a positive change in these attitudes between 1977 and 2010. In response to the same question: “Overall, there
is too much immigration to Canada” those agreeing were around 60% in 1977, dropping to under 40% in 2010; the largest
drop occurred between the years 1995 and 2005. Conversely, those disagreeing with this statement went from just under
40% in 1977 to around 60% in 2010. While not a large majority, the balance of opinion remains in support of continuing
immigration.
Comparative analyses of international studies also highlight the views of Canadians. When asked if “Immigrants are
having a good or bad influence on the way things are going in your country” (CHPOR, 2006), 73% of Canadians said it is
a good influence (compared to 43% in the USA and 37% in Europe). In another international study, samples from Canada,
Germany, the Netherlands, France, the USA, Spain, Italy and the UK indicated if they thought that “there were too many
immigrants in their country”. Results varied greatly across countries. The percentages agreeing were lowest for Canada
(under 20%), intermediate for Germany, the Netherlands, France, the USA and Spain (between 20% and 40%), and highest for
Italy and the UK (between 40% and nearly 60%). These international findings on attitudes towards immigration parallel the
findings of the three international surveys on multiculturalism and settlement reported earlier in the section on international
perspectives on multiculturalism
9. Discrimination and exclusion
The shifting emphasis in multiculturalism programmes towards equity and inclusion has been partly in response to
the evidence that not all peoples in culturally-diverse societies are treated equally. There is now widespread evidence of
differential outcomes for members of various ethnocultural groups, such as in educational attainment (Boyd, 2002) and in
employment (Statistics Canada, 2011). Some of these outcomes may be due to prejudice and discrimination.
In the overview of various surveys (CHPOR, 2006), there is substantial evidence for the perception of discrimination,
and for variations in this perception across ethnocultural groups. In some ways these variations parallel the findings about
an ethnic hierarchy noted above. For example, in response to the question: “Discrimination may happen when people are
treated unfairly because they are seen as being different from others. In the past five years, do you feel that you have
experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly because of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language accent
or religion?” Black (African-origin) respondents report highest levels of discrimination (52%), followed by Chinese (45%),
Hispanics (38%), South Asians (37%), West Asian/Arab (36%), and Italian (22%). These appear to be rather high, but the time
span (five years) is long; hence neither the frequency nor the severity of discrimination can be judged.
The reduction of such unequal treatment has become a major concern in Canadian public life, with emphases in pro-
grammes increasingly being placed on the promotion of equitable participation. Reitz and Banerjee (2007) assembled
evidence from the Ethnic Diversity Survey conducted by Statistics Canada in 2002. The survey was designed to “better
understand how peoples’ backgrounds affect their participation in Canada’s social, economic and cultural life” (Statistics
Canada, 2002, p. 2). There are two ways to assess discrimination: self-report, and objective indicators. With respect to the
self-reported experience of discrimination, ‘visible minorities’ claimed that they had experienced discrimination as recent
immigrants (33.6%), as earlier immigrants (35.5%), and as second generation (42.2%). This level of discrimination varied
somewhat across various origin categories (higher for Blacks; somewhat lower for Chinese and South Asians), but overall at
higher levels than claimed by ‘Whites’ (19.2% for recent immigrants, 10.2% for earlier immigrants). They argued that these
experiences of discrimination had consequences for the integration of immigrants into Canadian society. Reitz and Banerjee
(2007) concluded that “Whites with greater experience in Canada are better integrated into society than are visible minori-
ties. (p. 33)”. It is clear that there are substantial differences in the experiences of discrimination and on life outcomes across
ethnocultural groups in Canada. It is also noteworthy that reports of discrimination increase over generations; this is a trend
that requires further research to understand the underlying reasons, and action to combat it.
Using more objective indicators (and index of income, and percentage poverty rate, both derived from the Ethnic Diversity
Survey), Reitz and Banerjee (2007) compared these rates between two groupings (based on ancestry): ‘visible minorities’
(e.g., Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Japanese, Latin American, South East Asian, etc.) and non-visible minorities (French,
British, Northern/Western European, Eastern European, Southern European, Jewish, etc.). They found that there were large
differences between the two general categories. Income was somewhat higher for non-visible minorities compared to visible
minorities. For poverty rate, there was also a lower rate for non-visible minorities compared to the rate for visible minorities.
There was also a large variation among origin groups within these two broad categories. Among non-visible groups,
income ranged from highest in the Jewish and British groups to lowest among the Latin American and Southern European
groups. Among the visible minority origin groups, highest levels were found for the Japanese, Filipino and Chinese origin
groups, and lowest levels were found for the Korean, West Asian and Black origin groups. For poverty rate, among the non-
visible minority origin groups, it was lowest among the British, North Western European and Jewish groups, and highest in
the Latin American origin group. Among the visible minority origin groups, the poverty rate was highest for the Korean and
West Asian groups, and lowest among the South and Southeast Asian groups.
It is clear that the subjective self-report of the experience of discrimination, and the more objective indicators of inequality
parallel each other to a very large extent. This is the case both for the comparison between the two main categories (visible
and non-visible groups) and for the comparison across origin groups within categories. For both measures, it is also clear
that the levels of discrimination are higher than those desired by the multicultural policy goal of equitable participation.
10. Attachment, identity and social cohesion
One challenge facing all culturally-diverse societies is how to encourage individuals and groups to develop a sense of
attachment to, and identification with, the larger national society as a basis for their integration. Concerns about such
attachments have a long history in Canada, and have been linked to the perennial quest for ‘national unity’ (Angus, 1997;
Frye, 1971). This challenge is possibly more difficult when the national policy is also to support attachment to one’s heritage
ethnocultural community. The core question is whether there is any necessary incompatibility between attachment to one’s
heritage group and to the national society. In keeping with the concept of integration outlined in this report, both are
considered to be desirable in a multicultural society. As we shall see below, there is evidence that these two attachments
can indeed be held simultaneously, supporting the claim that integration is possible. This issue is currently being phrased in
terms of concerns about social cohesion, including the inclusion of ethnocultural groups and their attachment to the larger
society (e.g., Jedwab, 2005).
There is a debate about whether such cohesion requires shared values or shared identities. Kymlicka (1998, p. 17) has
argued that the basis for social unity “is not shared values but a shared identity . . . People decide whom they want to
share a country with by asking whom they identify with, whom they feel solidarity with”. This view is shared by Harles
(1997, p. 717) who considers that “the most profound mark of a well-integrated polity is the strong sense of belonging
felt by its members”. Garcea (2008, p. 141), has considered the possible ‘fragmentary effects’ of multiculturalism policy in
Canada. In addressing these possible effects, he organised ten postulates into four categories: “multiculturalism segregates
the population in Canada; multiculturalism is problematical for the Canadian, Quebecois, and Aboriginal culture, identity,
and nationalism projects; multiculturalism perpetuates conflicts between and within groups; and multiculturalism hinders
equity and equality in society and the economy”. He assessed the evidence for these postulates, and concluded that: “The
postulations regarding the fragmentary effects of multiculturalism should not be dismissed as insignificant (p. 155)”, but
that “The postulations should be assessed to determine which of them point to real problems and which of them point to
perceived problems both in relation to the multiculturalism philosophy and the multiculturalism policy” (p. 156). Evidence
reviewed above supports some of the Garcea’s contentions. In particular, the situation of Francophones in Quebec raises
concerns. For example, the lower acceptance of the multicultural vision among Francophones in Quebec is related to a
perception of threat to their cultural and linguistic identity; this has been interpreted as supporting the multiculturalism
hypothesis (Berry & Kalin, 1995). And continuing concerns about the place of Aboriginal Peoples in a multicultural Canada
reinforce the view that not all Canadians have achieved an equitable place in the larger plural society (Adams, 2011).
Kesler and Bloemraad (2010) examined the concept of collective-mindedness, which includes the phenomena of social
trust, civic engagement and political participation. They note that social scientists have “sounded the alarm about the
negative repercussions of ethno-racial diversity for social capital (p. 320)”. In their analysis of findings from the World
Values Survey, they found that there is no general or overall relationship between diversity and cohesion. Thus, with respect
to any straightforward relationship between cultural diversity (and policies promoting it) and cohesion, there is no general
evidence that diversity either undermines or promotes cohesion. Considerably more conceptual and empirical examination
of this possible relationship is very much needed.
Studies of national and ethnic identification have a long history (e.g., Ipsos Reid, 2007a, 2007b; Kalin & Berry, 1995). In
the two national surveys (Berry et al., 1977; Kalin & Berry, 1995), respondents were given options to identify with various
entities: Canada; a province; British-Canadian; French-Canadian; other-ethnic Canadian; and another national origin. The
majority of respondents identified as ‘Canadian’ (59% in 1977; 64% in 1995) but there were substantial variations across
the ethnic origins of respondents. Among those of British origin, the percentages identifying as ‘Canadian’ was 80% in both
surveys, while it was 26% and 32% for those of French origin, and 59% and 65% for those of other origins. Identification as
‘French-Canadian’ was 47% in 1977 but dropped to 16% in 1995, being largely replaced by a provincial (Quebecois) identity,
which increased from 22% to 47%. For those of other-ethnic origin, identification with their own origin group dropped from
28% to 20% between the two surveys. Overall, the sense of attachment to Canada remained high for most respondents, but
was lower for those of French origin.
In the Ipsos Reid survey (2007a, 2007b), when asked to indicate how strong their sense of belonging to Canada was,
79% of the general sample indicated that this sense was either very or somewhat important; this was lower (71%) among
first generation immigrants, but rose to 88% among second generation immigrants. When asked to rate the importance of
their ethnic identity, 53% of the general population said that it was very or somewhat important; this was higher (64%) in
the first generation, but dropped to 57% in the second generation. From these findings, we may conclude that a ‘Canadian’
identity is important to most Canadians; however, this does not seem to undermine a sense of attachment to their heritage
ethnocultural community. This supports the conclusion that the goals of diversity and social cohesion need not be seen as
opposing one another.
The Association of Canadian Studies survey (2011) asked about attachment to Canada and to a heritage group. They
found that attachment to Canada is high (at 75%), but this varied across language groups: 77% for Anglophones; 62% for
Francophones; and 83% for Allophones (see note 3 ). Attachment to one’s heritage ethnic group varied somewhat across
groups (67% for Anglophones; 60% for Francophones; and 71% for Allophones). With respect to attachment to one’s language
group, again there was variation: 76% for Anglophones; 87% for Francophones; and 72% for Allophones. Again, a Canadian
identity remains high, but is attenuated among Francophones, being replaced to some extent by identification with the
French language.
In an examination of the collective identity of immigrants to Canada, Gilkinson and Sauvé (2010) analysed data from the
World Values Survey. They defined collective identity as “the degree to which immigrants associate with their community,
province, or country” (p. 2). They focused on three population groups: recent immigrants, earlier immigrants, and Canadian-
born. All three groups collectively expressed high levels of positive identification as a citizen of Canada, as a citizen of
their province/region and as a member of their community. Similarly, all three groups express very high levels of pride in
Canada. Of particular relevance to the question of any relationship between attachment to one’s local community and to
the national society is their finding that “the earlier immigrant and recent immigrant respondents who strongly identify
with their community are significantly more likely to identify as citizens of Canada” (p. 1). They also found that “there is no
contradiction between identifying as a citizen of the world and identifying as a citizen of Canada” (p. 1). These two findings
show that individuals can have multiple and mutually compatible collective identities, and supports the conclusion that the
goals of diversity and social cohesion need not be seen as opposing one another.
This compatibility corresponds to findings from an international study of immigrant youth (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder,
2006). That study found that young people’s national identity and their ethnic identity were positively correlated in ‘settler
societies’ (such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA). In contrast, immigrant youth in societies experiencing more
recent immigration flows (such as France, Germany, Norway, Portugal and Sweden) the correlations were all negative. That
is, young immigrants in settler societies have come to feel that they can be ‘both’, whereas in some other societies, they
feel that they have to choose between possible identities. It also corresponds to the findings of Kesler and Bloemraad (2010,
noted above) that there is no general relationship between the presence of diversity in a society and social cohesion: it
depends on whether cultural communities are recognised and accommodated in the society. However, it remains an open
question whether this generalisation would hold for recent immigrants, especially in the face of discrimination.
Much of these findings correspond to the interpretation regarding the content of Canadian identity (Cameron & Berry,
2008). Although Canadians seem somewhat shy to reveal their patriotism, they do show national pride in Canadian insti-
tutions and values (e.g., the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada’s health care system), and in Canadian participation
3
The term Allophones refers to those whose mother tongues are neither English nor French.
on the world stage. In essence, the study showed that Canadian identity can be captured by their acceptance of diversity
and the value they place on tolerance. In short, we may characterise the core of Canadian identity as being proud of our
diversity and of our pursuit of an equitable larger society. We may even say that Canadian identity is multicultural identity;
the acceptance and celebration of pluralism is an integral part of who we believe are (cf., Adams, 2007).
From this examination of the link between identity and social cohesion, we conclude that there is no general relationship
between individuals having dual identities (that is with one’s heritage group and the national society) and social cohesion.
The relationship depends on the way a society deals with cultural diversity. In societies that promote multiculturalism,
these dual identities are secure and compatible, and do not undermine social cohesion. In contrast, in societies that are
either new to dealing with cultural diversity, or where such diversity is not recognised or accommodated, there is a negative
relationship. This conclusion supports the claim in this report that integration is possible, but it is likely to be attainable only
in multicultural societies.
11. The future of multiculturalism in Canada
Research on multiculturalism in Canada has provided a basis for addressing the question of how best to move forward:
are we on the right path; are we heading in the right direction; have we progressed towards the goals of achieving diversity
and equity; and can we have both cultural pluralism and social cohesion in Canada?
A first answer lies in the high level of support generally found for the multicultural way of living together in the Canadian
plural society. Both the domestic findings, and the placement of Canada on international studies, show that Canada is (and
is widely recognised as) a leader in advocating and achieving the multicultural vision. However, this support is variable;
as we have seen, Francophones living in the Province of Quebec are less supportive of the multicultural vision. Over the
years, an alternative policy has been advocated by the Government of Quebec, termed interculturalism. This policy places
more emphasis on the acceptance of the French character of the culture and institutions of the province (Helly, 1994). As
noted by Dewing (2009): “It is mainly concerned with the acceptance of, and communication and interaction between,
culturally diverse groups (‘cultural communities’) without, however, implying any intrinsic equality among them. Diversity
is tolerated and encouraged, but only within a framework that establishes the unquestioned supremacy of French in the
language and culture of Québec”. This policy of interculturalism is an attempt to guarantee the place of French language
and culture in Quebec, thereby enhancing the cultural security of Francophones. Although enhancing cultural security is one
of the basic goals of multiculturalism policy in Canada as a whole, the privileging of French in Quebec may undermine the
sense of security of other groups in that Province. This possibility parallels the findings from Estonia (Kruusvall et al., 2009)
where attempts to advance the interests of Estonian language speakers are associated with lower levels of security and civic
engagement among the Russian-speaking population.
A second answer is based on the pattern of attitudes towards immigration over time. As noted in the section on immigra-
tion attitudes, various surveys have revealed a positive change in these attitudes between 1977 and 2010. There is a clear
pattern of improvement in attitudes towards ‘others’ in Canadian society. With the consistently high ranking on interna-
tional surveys in the acceptance of immigrants, and the promotion of and actual success in the incorporation of immigrants
noted above, we are clearly doing something right. However, the evidence of discrimination and exclusion noted above,
presents us with a challenge: moving towards the acceptance of immigrants from all origins, and the full civic and economic
integration of all Canadians has clearly not been accomplished.
A third answer is based upon the evidence reviewed in the section on identity and social cohesion. Canadian society has
been successful in promoting the incorporation of newcomers, as indicated by the degree to which they identify with the
larger national society, and the frequency with which they take up Canadian citizenship. Moreover, it appears that retaining
links with one’s heritage community poses no general difficulty for achieving social cohesion, at least in those societies,
such as Canada, where policies and practices promote multiculturalism. However, a high level of social cohesion will only
be attained when the transition to civic incorporation (Fleras, 2009) is achieved. It is clear the goal of achieving a socially
cohesive society, where there is mutual respect and acceptance among all groups and individuals, is essential and attainable
by the joint promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural engagement.
Finally, we have seen evidence that the three hypotheses derived from the Multiculturalism policy (the multiculturalism
hypothesis, the integration hypothesis and the contact hypothesis) are generally supported by empirical evidence in Canada
and internationally, especially when certain conditions are met. We have also seen that these conditions are generally met in
Canada. Multiculturalism policy and practice promote: a sense of security in one’s place in Canadian society (by supporting
heritage cultural community and identity); the legitimacy and value of being doubly engaged (by way of adopting the
integration strategy); intercultural contact (by supporting participation in the larger society, the reduction of barriers to
such participation, and the acquisition of an official language).
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International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 663–675

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Intercultural Relations

Research on multiculturalism in Canada

© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

E-mail address: berryj@kos.net

2. Canadian multiculturalism in international perspective

3. Specifying the meaning of multiculturalism

4. Framework for examining research on multiculturalism

5. Knowledge and beliefs about multiculturalism

6. Acceptance of multiculturalism policy and programmes

7. Acceptance of ethnocultural groups

8. Acceptance of immigration and immigrants

9. Discrimination and exclusion

10. Attachment, identity and social cohesion

11. The future of multiculturalism in Canada

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