Essais Science 04 Max Weber EN

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Max WEBER (1864-1920)
Theory tests
science
Fourth test:
“Essay on the meaning of“ axiological neutrality ”
in sociological and economic sciences ”(1917)
Translation from German and introduced

by Julien Freund
A document produced in digital version by Gemma Paquet, volunteer,

Retired professor from Cégep de Chicoutimi
E-mail: mgpaquet@videotron.ca
As part of the collection: "The Classics of Social Sciences"

Website: http://classiques.uqac.ca/
A library founded and managed by Jean-Marie Tremblay, sociologist
A collection developed in collaboration with the Library

Paul-Émile-Boulet from the University of Quebec in Chicoutimi
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Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 2
This electronic edition was produced by Gemma Paquet, volunteer, professor at

retirement from Cégep de Chicoutimi from:
Max WEBER
Essays on the theory of science

[A collection of articles published between 1904 and 1917]
Fourth test:
in sociological and economic sciences ”(1917)
A digital edition based on the book Essays on the theory of

science . Translated from German and introduced by Julien Freund. Paris: Bookstore
Plon, 1965, 539 pages. Collection: Research in human sciences.
A collection of essays published between 1904 and 1917.
Fonts used:
For the text: Times, 12 points.

For quotes: Times 10 points.
For footnotes: Times, 10 points.
Electronic edition carried out with the word processor Microsoft Word
2004 for Macintosh.
Layout on paper format: LETTER (US letter), 8.5 '' x 11 '')
Edition completed on August 2, 2006 in Chicoutimi, Ville de Saguenay, Quebec.
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Contents
Translator's Note
Introducing the translator
First try : “The objectivity of knowledge in science and politics

social tick ”(1904)
I.
II.
Second essay: “Critical studies to serve the logic of science

culture ”(1906)
1. Elements for a discussion of the ideas of Édouard Meyer

2. Objective possibility and adequate causality in history
Third essay: “Essay on some categories of sociology comprehen-

sive ”(1913)
1. Meaning of a "comprehensive" sociology.

2. Relationship between comprehensive sociology and psychology.
3. Relationship between comprehensive sociology and legal dogmatic
than
4. Community activity
5. Socialization and corporate activity
6. The agreement
7. Institution and group
Fourth try : “Essay on the meaning of“ axiological neutrality ”in the
sociological and economic sciences ”(1917)
Translator's notes for the fourth essay.
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MAX WEBER
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SCIENCE
TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN AND INTRODUCED BY JULIEN FREUND

Paris, Librairie Plon, 1965, 539 pp. Collection: Research in human sciences
maines, no 19.
The essays published here are taken from

Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre
2. Aufl. (Tübingen, Mohr, 1951).
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Fourth try 1
Essay on the meaning of "axio-neutrality

logic ”in the sociological sciences.
c and economic 2
By Max Weber
[1917]
Return to the table of contents
1 The notes with lowercase letters (a, b, c…) are those of Max Weber, the
others, in Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3), are those of the translator. JMT.
2 This essay is a reworking of an account, printed from a manuscript (127) was
intended for internal discussion within the Committee of the Social Policy Association
(1913) ( 128 ). I removed as much as possible the considerations which could not interest
than the members of this association and I developed at greater length those concerning
the general methodology. Other reports presented during this discussion included
that of Professor Spranger, which was published in the Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung,
Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft ( 129). I admit that I got this work from a philosopher, that
I personally consider it extremely low, because it does not contribute to the clarity
of the problem. However, I will avoid any controversy with him, if only for a reason
space, and will only present my own position ( 130 ).
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[475] Unless otherwise indicated and unless the meaning is clear

of itself, we mean by "evaluation" [Wertung], appreciation [ Be-
wertung ] practice of a phenomenon on which our activity can exert an influence.
fluency by adopting an attitude of approval or disapproval towards it.
The question of the "neutrality" of a given science with regard to evaluations
of this kind (therefore a problem which relates to the validity and the meaning of a principle
logic) is in no way identical to this other, totally different, that we treat
terons first: to ilo-on or not, during a university lesson, "pro-
conduct ” practical evaluations based on an ethical conception, on
cultural ideals or, in general, a conception of the world? This question does
cannot be discussed scientifically. Indeed, it depends itself, sum
all, practical evaluations and, therefore, it cannot be definitively resolved.
is lying. To cite only the extreme opinions, it is argued:
a) the point of view according to which the distinction between the facts which can be
to show in a purely logical way or to establish in a purely empirical way,
on the one hand, and practical and ethical evaluations or even those which are
conceptions of the world, on the other hand, is justified, but that nonetheless (or
maybe even for this reason) these two categories of problems have their place
in a university lesson;
b) the view that advocates that even if [476] This distinction is resistant to
rigorous logical elaboration, it is however recommended to discard as much
as possible in one lesson all practical matters of values.
Point of view (b) seems unacceptable to me. In particular, the distinction that
we frequently do in our disciplines between practical evaluations of gold
of partyunachievable.
lument policy and those
It iswhich have a different
only suitable character
to hide the seemthe
reach from to listeners.
me to be
practice of the position that one suggests. Moreover, the idea according to the-
what it would be advisable to "silence all passion" in a university chair
and that consequently it would be necessary to eliminate any subject which might give rise to
"Ardent discussions" could not be, in case one allowed oneself once
to express from the pulpit an evaluation, a bureaucrat's opinion that any
independent spanker should push back. Among the professors who believed they did not
be able to dispense with practical evaluations during empirical discussions,
the most bearable were precisely the most passionate - for example Treits-
chke or also, of its kind, Mommsen (131 ). Indeed, it is precisely the
strength of the passionate accent which at the very least gives the listener the opportunity to
measure, for its part, to what extent the subjectivity of the professor's evaluation
contributed to confuse his findings and to do for himself what the weather
rament forbade the professor. We would thus safeguard the action of the pathos
thentique on the soul of young people that, I suppose, the supporters of the evaluations
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practices would like to ensure, without however distorting the minds of listeners
by a confusion of the different spheres, as it necessarily happens when
one drowns in the same and cold absence of temperament the observation of facts
empirical evidence and the invitation to take a practical stand in the face of major
problems of life.
The point of view (a) does not seem acceptable to me, even from the own point of view
subjective of its possible supporters, only on the sole condition that the pro
spanking is done in each particular case, at the risk of reducing the attractiveness of his
course, an unconditional duty to raise awareness clearly and without
weakness to his audience, and capital thing to take especially himself con-
knowledge of what in his presentation results from purely logical reasoning or
a purely empirical observation of the facts and of what comes under an evaluation
practical tion. It seems to me that this easement [477] directly constitutes a
duty of intellectual integrity, if we admit the heterogeneity of the two spheres; in
in this case, it is the absolute minimum to be required.
Should we or should not in general (subject to the indicated reservations)

practices in an amphitheater? This question arises from its side in politics.
practice of higher education and for this reason we cannot ultimately
resolve that according to the tasks that the individual thinks he should assign to the
versities based on their own practical assessments. The one who claims that
university, as well as himself, by virtue of his own professional qualification
sional, must still play the universal role of marking
men of a certain imprint and to propagate certain political doctrines,
ethical, cultural or otherwise, will adopt a different attitude from one who believes
having to affirm (drawing the consequences) that in the classrooms one cannot
can exert a real and valuable influence that by giving students a
specialist training (132 ), thanks to qualified teachers in their field,
so that the 4 intellectual probity ”would be the only specific virtue that is needed
instill in students. The final reasons that can be invoked in favor of
the first thesis are as numerous and varied as those in favor of the second
conde, We can in particular justify the last one (which I share personally)
by attaching extreme importance to "specialization" or, conversely, by
assigning it only a very modest value. Not that it would be
example of making, as far as possible, all men pure "specialists"
in the deepest sense of the term, but because we want to avoid, on the contrary,
put in the same bag the ultimate, eminently personal decisions that a
manwhich
lift must is
become aware,
attributed to itand
notspecialization - regardless
only in the general of the
education of im-
reflection, but also, indirectly, in personal discipline and attitude
morality of the young man - and finally because we want the listener to seek his
solution in a personal examination of conscience and not by accepting a suggestion
management proposed in the chair.
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The favorable prejudice of Professor von Schmoller ( 133) for evaluations

in university lessons is personally understandable to me
as the echo of a great era that he helped to create together
with his friends. I think, however, that it can only escape him [478] on a
essential point the actual conditions have nowadays changed considerably.
fiées for the younger generation. Forty years ago, there was widespread
due in the world of specialists in our discipline the belief that, among
various possible positions in the field of practical evaluations
tick and policy, there was ultimately only one that had to be fair, namely
the ethical position (it must be recognized that von Schmoller was never more than
a very cautious supporter of this point of view.)
However, this opinion is no longer valid among the supporters of evaluations.
in a college lesson. We no longer justify the legitimacy of these in the name
an ethical requirement including, moreover, the postulates of justice (relatively)
simple did not or seemed to have, as well as to the nature of
their ultimate foundations than their consequences, that a (relative-
elementary and above all (relatively) impersonal, because they were
unequivocally specifically suprapersonal. They are founded (by virtue of a de-
inevitable development) on a multicolored bouquet of "cultural evaluations",
and in truth on a set of subjective claims with regard to culture and
to say everything about the so-called "right to personality" of the scientist. Of all the
kinds of prophecies, the professorial prophecy thus tinged with "personality" is
the only one that is really unbearable. We can be indignant at this point of
view, but, because it in turn "involves" a practical evaluation, one cannot
would refute it.
It is still an unprecedented situation, to see many prophecies

are accredited by the State, which, instead of preaching their doctrine in the street, in
churches and other public places or, in private, in conventicles of
believers who are personally chosen and who recognize themselves as such, arrogate to themselves the
right to deliver from the top of a pulpit, in the "name of science", verdicts decided
sive on questions affecting the conception of the world, taking advantage of what,
by a privilege of the State, the classroom guarantees them a so-called ob-
jective, uncontrollable, which carefully shelters them from discussion and
continuation of the contradiction. There is an old principle, which Schmoller once made
the ardent advocate, who demands that what happens in a classroom must be
escape public discussion. Although it is possible that this way of seeing
is incidentally accompanied by certain drawbacks, it is apparently admitted, and
personally I share this opinion, that the "course" [479] should be something else
that a "speech" and that the impartial severity, objectivity and lucidity of a
teaching lesson could only suffer, from a pedagogical point of view, from the in-
tervention of advertising, of the journalistic genre for example. It seems in all
case that the privilege of the absence of control can only be appropriate in the
field of the professor's pure qualification as a specialist. However, there is
point of qualification of specialist in personal prophecies, consequently this
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In this case, privilege loses its raison d'être. But, above all, the lack of control does not
must not be used to exploit the condition of the student who, because of his future, is
forced to attend certain schools and follow the lessons of
professors who teach there, to try to instill in him, sheltered from any
contradiction, in addition to the elements he needs for his career (awakening and
of his gifts of intelligence and his thought, and also the acquisition of knowledge.
sances), a so-called "conception of the world" personal to the teacher, which
is certainly sometimes very interesting (but often also completely indifferent).
Like anyone else, the teacher has other means to propagate

his practical ideals, and if he does not have them, he can easily obtain them,
in the appropriate forms, if he wants to faithfully go to the trouble, as well as
experience proves it. But the teacher as a teacher should not
have the pretension of wanting to carry in his pouch the marshal's staff of
statesman (or cultural reformer), as it happens when he takes advantage
from his pulpit, sheltered from all turmoil, to express his feelings as a man
political (or cultural policy). He can (and must) do what his God or
demon orders him, through the press, public meetings, as-
sociations or literary essay, in short in a form that is also accessible
to any other citizen. A student should learn nowadays, before
everything, from its teachers, the ability
1) to perform a given task with ease,
2) to recognize first the facts, even and precisely those which seem to him
personally unpleasant, and know how to distinguish between the finding
facts and positive stance,
3) to withdraw his own person to serve a cause and consequently to repress

above all, the need to inappropriately display one's own tastes and
other personal impressions. It seems to me that today all this has a ca-
is incomparably more urgent than it was forty years ago when, deep down, the
The problem did not arise at all from this [480] angle.
It is not true - although it has been asserted to the contrary - that the "personality"
would or should constitute a "unit" in the sense that it could
say run the risk of getting lost if we do not highlight it on all occasions
( 134). Whatever the professional task , the cause [ Know ] that one serves re-
sells its own right and demands that it be accomplished in accordance with its laws.
Whatever the professional task, the one to whom it is asked is obliged to
limit and exclude anything foreign to the cause, mostly hate
and personal love. And it is also not true that the strength of a personality
gets richer only if on every occasion she is worried, in the first place, about the "note
personal ”which is unique to her. On the contrary, it is to be hoped that just-
the new generation is getting used again above all to the idea that
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"Being a personality" is something that one cannot want in delicacy.
beré and that there is only one way to (perhaps!) become it: devotion without
reserves to a "cause", whatever, in the particular case, its figure and the
"Daily demands" that flow from it. It's a mistake of taste
that to confuse the positive analyzes of his specialty with questions of order
staff. We only strip the notion of "vocation" of the unique meaning
important which remains to him today, if we do not personally operate the limita-
tion [Selbstbegrenzung] that it requires. Even though the cult of the personality
fashionable tee tries to make a living on the throne (135 ), in offices or in
university chairs - it probably outwardly almost always produces a
great effect, but internally it is never more than a sign of littleness and everywhere
it only harms the cause. Having said that, I hope that it is not necessary to specify
especially that the adversaries with whom this account is concerned have no doubt
nothing in common with this sort of personality cult for the personality.
Sometimes they see the duties of a university professor in a different light, sometimes
they propose other educational goals that I respect, but that I do not share
point. However, one must consider not only their intentions, but also the
way in which the attitude which they legitimize of their authority necessarily acts on a
generation, thanks to the strongly developed predisposition and
inevitable to overestimate their own importance.
Finally, it is hardly necessary to insist specially on the fact that among

the alleged opponents of the freedom to make evaluations in the pulpit (political
ques) some are less able than any other to invoke the principle of
the exclusion of "value judgments", which in addition they often hear loudly
evil, in order to discredit discussions of policy issues
cultural and social events that take place publicly, outside [481] the halls of
Classes. Due to the indisputable existence of biased and pseudo-elements
independent with regard to the values which are furthermore encouraged in our
plines by powerful, tenacious and purposeful interest groups, we
understands without a doubt that a certain number of scientists, perfectly
pendants of character, persist nowadays to make evaluations in their
lessons, because they are too proud to participate in this apparently
"Axiological neutrality". Despite this, I personally believe that it would be necessary
do what (in my opinion) is right and that the practical evaluations of an au-
would carry more weight if he was content to support them on the appropriate occasions.
quates, outside of classrooms, especially if we know that he sticks rigorously to
Sure to speak in his lessons only of what corresponds to his function. He is
true that all these considerations are in turn practical evaluations and
for this reason we cannot give them a definitive solution.
Anyway, it is, in my opinion, only a consistent way of claiming

in principle the right to carry out evaluations in the chair: at the same time granting
all partisan opinions the opportunity to show off in a meeting room
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course 3 . Unfortunately when we insist here on the professor's right to

to carry out evaluations in the pulpit, we usually hear the justly opposite principle
to that of the equal representation of all trends (including the most "ex-
very possible). Obviously Schmoller remained, for example, from his point of
personal view, consistent with himself, when he declared that the "Marxists
and the Manchester group ”were not qualified to hold a uni-
versitary, although he personally never committed the injustice of ignoring the
scientific work that these circles have [482] accomplished. In truth, we all-
here at the points about which I have never been able, personally, to follow
our revered master. It is, in fact, obvious that we do not have the right to claim
with one breath the freedom to make evaluations in the pulpit and, on the other hand - to the
moment to draw the consequences - to suggest that the university
is a state institution intended to train civil servants led by the
"Loyalty to the state". In this way we would make the university no
more an "institution for specialists" (which seems to be so degrading
in the eyes of many teachers), but a sort of seminary for priests -
without however being able to attribute religious dignity to it. We finally also have
sought to infer by a purely "logical" way the existence of certain limits to the
freedom to make evaluations. One of our most eminent jurists declared a
day, while protesting against the exclusion of socialists from university chairs
res, that it was however impossible for him to accept that an "anarchist" should occupy a
chair of a law faculty, given that the latter generally denies the validity of the
right as such - and this eminent jurist clearly considered this argument
as decisive ( 136). I personally take the exact opposite view. In
indeed, there is no doubt that an anarchist can be a good expert on the law.
And if it is, the Archimedean point, so to speak, where it is placed by virtue of
its objective conviction - provided it is authentic - and situated outside the
conventions and presuppositions which seem so obvious to us, can
give him the opportunity to discover in the fundamental intuitions of the theory
current law a problem that escapes all those for whom they
are all too obvious. Indeed, the most radical doubt is the father of the know-
session.
It is just as little incumbent on the lawyer to "prove" the value of cultural property.
whose existence is linked to the permanence of a "right" that the doctor of demon-
be sure that it is worthwhile to seek to prolong human life in all circumstances.
3 It is by no means possible to consider as satisfactory the principle which in Holland unbinds

to professors of theological faculties of the obligation of a profession of faith confess-
sional and which guarantees total freedom to found a university, provided that the
following conditions: financial guarantee, compliance with the requirements concerning the qualification
cation of those who apply for a chair, and the right for any man deprived to found a chair
and present its candidate. Indeed, this system gives a bonus to those who have a
fortune and in addition to the authoritarian organizations which are in power. However
as far as I know, only clerical circles have, until now, made use of these privileges.
light.
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Maine. Neither one nor the other is moreover in a position to provide proof with the
means of their own. If we wanted to make the university chair a place
for practical discussions on values, it is obvious that one would be obliged to
to tolerate unhindered free discussion of fundamental questions of principle,
from any point of view. Is it possible to grant this? Nature
political reports nowadays exclude university chairs
German discussion of practical or political value issues
which are precisely the most determining and the most important. The one who places
unreservedly the interests of the nation above all institutions, [483]
will come up against, for example, the following central and essential question: the design
which currently prevails in Germany concerning the position of the emperor is-
it is reconcilable with the nation's global interests and the means of war
and diplomacy which allows them to be safeguarded? It is not always the
worse patriots nor only the opponents of the monarchy who
are currently inclined to answer this question in the negative and who believe that
sustainable results cannot be achieved in these two areas as long as
will not have carried out very profound reforms ( 137). Now, no one is unaware
that it is not possible in German universities to discuss freely
of these vital questions for the nation 4 . Faced with this situation which permanently banishes
lack of chairs the freedom to discuss decisive questions concerning
practical and political evaluations, it seems to me that there is only one attitude which
befits the dignity of one. representative of science: keep the si-
lence on value issues that one authorizes with great benevolence
treat.
One cannot in any way confuse the question (which cannot be resolved
definitely because it is conditioned by evaluations): can we, should
he or should we advocate practical assessments in a lesson? and the discus-
purely logical comment on the role that evaluations play in the disciplines
empiricals such as sociology and political economy. This confusion does not
could only prejudice objectivity in the discussion of the true pro-
logical problem whose solution does not in itself provide any indication to solve
the question posed above, except as regards the purely logical aspect which
demands clarity from teachers and the need to make an explicit distinction
between these two heterogeneous spheres of problems.
In addition, I would not like to open a discussion on the "difficulty" either.

to separate empirical observation and practical evaluation. It is difficult thing.
All of us, the signatory of these lines who advocate this requirement too
although others, we run into them over and over again. At the very least, supporters of
the so-called ethical political economy should know that the moral law is,
4 This is not a peculiarity unique to Germany. There is also, under a

avowed or camouflaged form, a de facto limitation in almost all countries. The difference
deals only with the kind of axiological problems that are excluded.
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it too, impracticable and yet it passes for "obligatory". A review of

conscience could perhaps show that it is particularly difficult to
fulfill this postulate because we [484] never give up except against
heart to enter the game so interesting evaluations, especially since we
give the opportunity to add our "personal note" so exciting. All
teacher will see that students' faces light up and their
traits are stretched as soon as he begins to "make profession" of his personal doctrine.
or even that the number of listeners in its course grows extremely
advantageous when students expect him to talk about the
so. In addition, any teacher knows that competition in attendance at,
course makes that the university often gives preference to a prophet, however small-
he, who fills the amphitheatres and pushes aside the scientist, however great he may be, who sticks to
its subject matter - unless the prophecy strayed too far from evaluations that
each time pass for normal from the point of view of conventions or politics.
tick. Only the pseudo-independent prophet with regard to values, supported by
powerful material interests, has. higher chances, because of the in-
influence of these interests on public authorities. I consider all of this to be very
unfortunate and, for this reason, I cannot declare myself in agreement with those who assert
ment that by excluding practical evaluations, we are showing
took ”and all that ended up being to make the lessons“ boring ”. I don't want to abor-
der the question of whether the courses which relate to the subject of a specialization
rique must seek to be above all "interesting", although for my part I
fears that the favor of the students, acquired at the cost of too much personal
interesting, does not cause them in the long run to lose their taste for modest but positive work.
tif.
I would also like to recognize without entering into the discussion that the diagram
known to "let the facts speak" can precisely, under the pretext of eliminating the
practical evaluations, arouse them in a particularly suggestive way. The
best representatives of our parliamentary and electoral eloquence operate in
using that formula - in a perfectly legitimate way given their goals.
But I don't want to waste my time explaining that at a university she
would constitute precisely, from the point of view of the need to distinguish the two
spheres of problems, the most deplorable of all abuses. The fact that a sham
unfair in the performance of duty is given for reality is not yet
a critique of this duty itself. All this tends to invite the prof-
sor who believes that he cannot give up carrying out practical evaluations,
present clearly as such to his students and especially to himself.
[485] Finally, there is a last conception which must be combated in the

fiercer, although we meet her quite frequently, she is the one who considers
that the method which leads to scientific "objectivity" would consist of a
free between the different antagonistic evaluations, in the form of a kind of
political compromise. Not only the "middle line" is just as little de-
scientifically demonstrable with the means specific to empirical disciplines
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than that of the most "extreme" evaluations, but in the sphere of the evaluation
tion it is normally the least unequivocal ( 138). This process has no place
in a university chair, but in political programs, in
administration or Parliament. The sciences, whether they are normative
ves or empirical, cannot render to politicians or parties
competitors that only one service, it is true invaluable: indicate to them
1) that faced with such a practical problem, it is only possible to conceive of such or
such different "ultimate" positions, and
2) that the situation to be taken into account when choosing between these
sitions presents itself in such and such a way. Having said that, we can address our
"Real" problem.
The concept of "value judgment" has given rise to an immense misunderstanding

and above all it gave rise to a terminological controversy, therefore perfectly sterile,
which obviously contributes nothing to the solution of the problem,
indicated at the beginning of this article, it is indisputable that when our discussions
plines dispute value judgments, they deal with practical evaluations
ques and social facts that are considered practically as desirable or
undesirable for ethical, cultural and other reasons. Unhappy-
when I wrote in previous works that science proposes to
dye:
1) "appreciable" results [ wertvolk ] , which means logically correct

and objectively assessed, and
2) "appreciable" results, which means, this time, important to the

sense of scientific interest, and that in addition the choice of the subject already implies in itself
even an evaluation - these statements gave rise very seriously, despite
my explanations, to "objections" 5 . Likewise, misunderstanding has constantly arisen.
of the powerful and almost inconceivable which grieves me for having affirmed [486] that the
empirical science cannot deal with the 'subjective' evaluations of human beings.
hands as the object of his research (while sociology in general and
theory of marginalism in political economy are based precisely on the
reverse position). In reality, this is exclusively the extremely demanding requirement.
5 I must refer here to what I have said in previous articles, mainly in the studies.
of the titles Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, pp.
146 et seq., Kritische Studien, pp. 215 and following. and R. Stamnder's Oberwindung der materialis-
tischen Geschichtsauffassung pp. 291 and following. (It is obviously possible that such and such
formulas that I adopted there sometimes fail by inadequacy of rigor, but this should not
not modify the essential elements of the question.) Regarding the impossibility of
give a definitive solution to some ultimate evaluations in an important area, i
recommends among others the work of G. Radbruch, Eintführung in die Rechtswissenschaft
(20th ed. 1913). I do not always agree with this author on all points, but this
discrepancy is irrelevant to the problem at hand.
Page 15
trivial which requires the scientist or the professor to make absolutely the distinction,
since these are two series of quite simply heterogeneous problems, between the
finding empirical facts (including 'evaluative' behavior [wer-
tend] subjective human beings that we study) and his own eva-
luative of a scholar who makes a judgment [ beurteilen ] on facts (including
possible "evaluations" of the empirical beings that become the object of his
study), in so far as he considers them desirable or unpleasant and adopts in
in this sense an “appreciative” attitude [bewertende] .
In an otherwise valuable study, a writer exposes the idea that a scholar

might also take their own assessments as 'facts' and
draw the consequences. While this author's idea is undoubtedly correct,
the expression chosen gives rise to misinterpretations. It is obvious that before a debate,
participants can agree beforehand to consider as
"Presupposition" of their discussions a specific practical measure (for
example the need to make only the propertied classes bear the
costs entailed by the increase in the strength of an army), to deliberate only
the means may give the measure its effect. This is often very
convenient. However, we do not qualify as "fact" this kind of practical intention.
presupposed in common; it is only an "end posed a priori". To enter that
we are in the presence of two effectively different things, it suffices to or-
turn the debate on the "means", unless the "goal that one presupposes"
as indisputable is as concrete as that of igniting, at the very moment, a
cigar. In the latter case, it is very rare that we even have to discuss
means. But in almost all cases where the project is formulated in a general way
rale, in the sense of the example we have chosen, we will note by experience
that when deliberating on the means, not only the various participants
will each have understood something completely different under this apparently univocal one,
but above all it can happen that everyone wants exactly the same end for
extremely diverse reasons and that this divergence influences the dis-
cost of means. But let's leave that aside. Indeed, it is undoubtedly not
nobody has come up with the idea of contesting that one can start from a specific end.
born, wanted [487] in common, to deliberate only on the most common means.
modes to achieve it and that this debate can then give rise to a discussion
which must be resolved by purely empirical means. Indeed, what is found
here in debate, it is the choice of ends (and not that of the means when the end is
blie), therefore not in what sense the assessment that an individual takes
as the basis of its action can be considered as a "fact", but in what
meaning it can become the object of scientific criticism. If we refuse to stick
at that, any discussion becomes useless.
To tell the truth, there is no question here of discussing to what extent

practical evaluations, in particular those of an ethical nature, may claim to
normative dignity , that is to say take on a character other than the question posed by
Seed by the following example: should we prefer brunettes or blondes? or by other
Page 16
very similar subjective judgments of taste ( 139). These problems belong to

the philosophy of values, not the methodology of empirical disciplines. This
which only matters in the latter case is that on the one hand the validity of an imperative
practice understood as a norm and on the other hand the validity of truth of a
empirical theory of a fact are two things that are absolutely heterogeneous at the level of
problematic, so that it is detrimental to the rank of one and the other of
these two spheres if we ignore their distinction and if we try to confuse them.
In my opinion, this error has been made frequently, especially by the profes-
Sister Schmoller 6 . The veneration I have for this eminent master forbids me to
to pass over in silence the points on which I do not think I can be agreed.
cord with him.
First of all I would like to speak out against the claim of the partisans of the
axiological trality who see in the simple fact historical and sin-
standard, in terms of the positive positions taken each time in force, a
proof in favor of the inevitably "subjective" character of morality. Even the
empirical determination of facts is the subject of dispute, and it often happens
that we generally agree more easily on the need to look at an individual
like a scoundrel than on the interpretation to be given of a mutilated inscription (and
this precisely among specialists). Schmoller's hypothesis ( 140) according to
which there would be a growing conventional unanimity [488] in all
confessions and among all men on the main points of the evaluations
practicalities is in radical opposition to my personal impression. All
However, this does not seem to me to be of importance for the subject in question. The
concept to fight in all cases is that which considers that, from the point of
scientific view, one could be satisfied with the effective evidence, consecrated by
a convention, certain practical positions, however widespread
they. Science seems to me to fulfill a specifically opposite function: it
makes what is conventionally obvious a problem . This is what
Schmoller and his friends had done it themselves in their day. In addition, research
ches on the influence that certain ethical or religious convictions given e f-
actually have causally exerted on economic life, even if, the case
appropriate, we attach a lot of importance to them, we cannot
get them to adopt these beliefs simply because they may have had
a very great causal influence, or even force us to give them a high
" value ". Conversely, by recognizing a great value in a reli-
gious or ethical, it is still not at all argued that the uninvited consequences
things that its actualization has caused or could result in deserve to be created.
of the same attribute of positive value .. It is not possible to solve
such questions with the sole observation of the facts, but each individual de-
to judge otherwise according to his own practical, religious and
others. All this remains unrelated to the question in dispute.
6 In his article on Volkswirtschalftslehre du Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften ( 3rd

edict, t VIII pp. 426-500.
Page 17
On the other hand, I vigorously dispute that a "realistic" science of morality

(i.e. the exposition of the effective influences that the ethical convictions which
predominate each time in a specific group of men have suffered from the fact
other living conditions and that in return they exerted on them)
be able to form a "morality" capable of asserting anything on this
which must be worth (141 ). No more than a "realistic" exposition of astro-
nomic of the Chinese, for example (by that I mean an analysis that would show
for what practical reasons the Chinese made astronomy, how they
conceived, what were their results and why) could ever be
to establish the accuracy of this astronomy. No more, finally, than the observation that
Roman surveyors and Florentine bankers (even when the latter
[ 489 ] proceeded to the division of immense fortunes between heirs) used
methods which are very often incompatible with trigonometry and arithmetry.
that, cannot call into question the validity of these last two sciences. A
empirical research, psychological or historical, bearing on a point of
evaluative view [ Wertungsstandpunkt ] determined to analyze the conditions
particular, social or historical, can lead to nothing other than to explain
comprehensively [ verstehend zu erklären ] this point of view (142 ). Now, such
result is by no means negligible. This understanding is not only
desirable because of the secondary consequence of a personal nature (but not
scientific), namely - to enable us personally to "do justice" more
easily to an individual who, in fact or in appearance, thinks differently from us.
But it also results in an extremely important scientific advantage
1) for the purposes of an empirical causal study of human activity, in order to

to grasp the true ultimate motives , and
2) to clarify, during a discussion with an individual whose evaluations

tions move away (in reality or in appearance) from ours, which are
ment the two evaluative points of view really present. A discussion
dealing with value has basically no other meaning than to help grasp this
that the interlocutor (or even ourselves) is really aiming, that is to say understanding
dre the value which is really and not apparently at stake between the two parties
and thus make it generally possible to take a position with regard to this value.
So far from the point of view of the requirement of, "axiological neutrality
that "empirical discussions based on valuation controversies are
sterile or devoid of any meaning, knowledge of their meaning is at
contrary to the presupposition of all useful discussions of this kind. They pre-
simply assume an understanding of the possibility of ultimate evaluations
which are in principle irreducibly divergent. Not only "all
to understand ”does not mean“ to forgive everything ”, but in general the simple understanding
grasping the position of the other does not of itself lead us to approve
worm. On the contrary, it brings us at least just as well, and often with
Page 18
much more likely, to recognize that we cannot agree

with him, why and on what point we cannot. This knowledge is just-
knowledge of the truth and it is to establish it that the "contro-
verses on evaluations ”. On the contrary, one thing is certain: it is absolutely
excluded
one that by
can arrive at this
any route - since
normative it goes
ethics, or precisely
found theincharacter
the opposite direction -
obligatory of any "imperative". Everyone knows on the contrary that this
kind of discussions, because they give us [4901, at least in appearance,
the impression of a certain "relativism", are rather an obstacle to this objective. It
Obviously, we should not conclude from this that we should for this obvious reason
ter that kind of controversy. Quite the contrary! Indeed, a “mo-
rale ”which allows itself to be shaken by the psychological“ understanding ”of evaluations
divergent has no more value than religious beliefs which are
destroy, as it also happens, by scientific knowledge. Finally
account, since Schmoller admits that the advocates of "axiological neutrality
that "in the empirical sciences can only recognize moral truths
the "formal" (he obviously thinks of the type of propositions of the Critique
of practical reason), I would like to briefly discuss its design - although
this problem is not directly within the scope of this essay (143 ).
First of all, we must reject the identification included in the design of

Schmoller between ethical imperatives and "cultural values", so sublime
be they. Indeed, one can very well conceive a point of view according to which
cultural values would remain “obligatory”, even when they entered into
vitally and irreducibly in conflict with any morality. In-
verse, it is also possible to conceive without internal contradiction a
rale which would repudiate all cultural values. Anyway, these two
spheres of values are not identical. Likewise, it is a serious misunderstanding
(moreover quite frequent) to imagine that the "formal" proposals,
the kind of Kantian ethics, provide no indication of the contained
naked. This is certainly not to question the possibility of a normal ethics.
tive to consider that it cannot by itself provide uni-
voices capable of solving certain practical problems (among which
it is necessary, in my opinion, to classify in a quite specific way certain
institutions, and precisely the problems of " social policy "), or of
recognize that ethics are not the one and only thing that "matters" to the
world and that there exist alongside it other axiological spheres of which we cannot
actualize values only by assuming, where appropriate, an ethical “guilt”.
To this last kind belongs especially the sphere of political activity.
In my opinion, we would show timidity if we started to deny the tensions
between politics and morality. Moreover, this situation is not peculiar to the
political, despite what the usual distinction between "moral
private ”and“ public morality ”. Let us try to examine some of the "limitations
your ”of ethics that we have just pointed out.
Page 19
[491] Among the problems that no ethics can solve badly

decisive and unequivocal nexus belong to the consequences of the postulate of
tice ”. We cannot, for example, based on the premises of ethics,
give a definitive solution to the question - which is probably the closest
views that Schmoller once expressed: Does he who does the most deserve
the most or, on the contrary, should a lot be required of those who are capable of
do ? In other words, is it necessary in the name of justice (all other points of view,
as that of the necessary "stimulation", being discarded) to give to the great talent
equally great chances or, on the contrary (as Babeuf demanded), are
say to equalize the injustice of the unequal distribution of intellectual gifts in the first
taking severe precautions to prevent talent, including the mere possession
already constitutes in itself an enviable feeling of prestige, cannot exploit
for himself the superior chances which are offered to him in the world? Gold,
this is policy
social the typeissues.
of question that corresponds to the ethical issue of most
In the field of personal activity there are also problems

quite specific fundamental ethics that morality cannot regulate
start from its own presuppositions. In particular, this is the case with the question
essential: the intrinsic value of an ethical activity - or, as we
usually says, "pure will" or "conviction" - is it sufficient for its own
justification, according to the maxim formulated by certain Christian moralists:
Christian must act with rectitude and for the success of his action to rely on
God " ? Or, on the contrary, should the res-
responsibility for the foreseeable, possible or probable consequences of ac-
activity, as its insertion in an ethically irrational world wants?
In the social field, any radically revolutionary political attitude, particularly
all that of what is called "unionism", invokes the first postulate, and
any "realistic" policy the second. One and the other of these two attitudes is re-
therefore claim ethical maxims. But these are opposed in an antagonism
eternal which it is absolutely impossible to overcome with the means of a
rale which is based purely on itself ( 144)
However, both of these two maxims have a rigorously

"Formal", and in this they are analogous to the known axioms of the Critique of
the practical reason. Because of this character it is often believed that they do not provide-
generally feels, as to the content, no indication specific to an appreciation of
the activity. As we have already said, this is incorrect. Let us take a
[492] example as far removed as possible from any "policy" which allows us to
perhaps it will be clear to understand what is basically the meaning of the
“purely formal” character of Kantian ethics which is so often debated. Sup-
let us assume that about their erotic relationships a man does this kind of
confided to a woman: “At the beginning our relationships were only passion, now
however they constitute a value. »In accordance with the temperate spirit and without cha-
of Kantian ethics, we could express the first half of this
Page 20
sentence in the following form: "At the beginning we were only one for the other
medium ”- and in this way we could consider the whole sentence
as a particular case of the famous categorical imperative that we have been curious about
much better to present as a purely historical expression of
individualism " [145 ], while in reality it is a quite general formulation.
nial to characterize an infinite multitude of ethical situations that must be
can understand correctly. Considered in its negative tenor and
disregarding any comment on what could be the opposite positive
from the refusal to treat others morally "only as a means", we find
will clearly mark that this imperative contains:
1) the recognition of spheres of independent values of extra- order

ethics,
2) a delimitation of the ethical sphere in relation to these other spheres, and in-
end
3) the observation that, and in what sense, an activity which is at the service of
their extraethics may be affected, however, by differences in the di-
ethical gnity. It is certain that the spheres of values which allow or prescribe
wind that we treat others "only as a means" are heterogeneous by
relation to ethics. We cannot, however, dwell on this question;
nevertheless
eminently we seedoes
abstract that not
even the "formal"
remain character
indifferent to the of this ethical
content of the imperative
activity.
The problem is much more complex. Even the negative predicate

contained in the words "were only passion" can, from a certain point of view,
pass for an insult to what is internally the most authentic and
most characteristic of life, that is to say with regard to the one way or at least
of the royal road which frees us from the "mechanisms" of values [ Wert-
Mekanismen ] i mpersonal and supra-personal and such. hostile to life, or
still which frees us from the ties that bind us to the lifeless rockery of the road.
daily life and pretensions of "obligatory" unrealities. It is in any case
possible to imagine a conception of this interpretation which - although it re
would push with disdain the term "value" to designate what she considers
as the most concrete element of lived experience - [493] would constitute this-
during a sphere which, while affirming itself as indifferent or hostile to any
holiness or goodness, to any moral or aesthetic law, to any cultural significance
and to any personality assessment, could nevertheless claim, and just-
for this reason, to a dignity proper and "immanent" in the most
wide of the term. Whatever our position on such a claim may be
tion, it is in any case impossible to prove or refute it with the means
of no science.
Page 21
Any empirical meditation on these situations would lead us, according to the right
remark of old Mill, in recognizing that absolute polytheism is the only
taphysics that suit them. A non-empirical analysis but oriented towards
interpretation of meanings, in short an authentic philosophy of values which
going beyond this point of view should recognize that no conceptual system of
"Values", however ordered (146 ), is not of size to take the measurement of the point
decisive of this state of affairs. It is ultimately, everywhere and always, to pro-
pos of the opposition between values, not only of alternatives, but also of a
a deadly and insurmountable struggle, comparable to that between "God" and the
" Devil ". These two extremes reject any relativization and any compromise.
Of course, they refuse them as to their meaning, because, as anyone can
to experience it during his life, there is always in reality and according to all
appearance of compromises: we even meet them at every step. Indeed, in
almost all the important positions taken by concrete men the spheres
of values intertwine and become entangled. What we literally call
the flatness of "daily" life consists precisely in that the man who
is immersed in it is not conscious, and above all does not want to become aware,
for psychological or pragmatic reasons, of this tangle of va-
their fundamentally hostile to each other. On the contrary, he simply refuses
to choose between “God” and the “devil” and to make the fundamental decision.
personal mental health in order to determine which of these antagonistic values are
list those which are under the empire of the first and those which are under that of the second
cond. The fruit of the tree of knowledge, so bitter for our human convenience
but inescapable, consists of nothing other than the need to take
awareness of these antagonisms and understand that each individual action
and, in the final analysis, life in its entirety, provided that it does not move
like a phenomenon of nature but that it is carried out perfectly
conscious, signifies nothing other than a chain of ultimate decisions [494] thanks to
to which the soul chooses, as in Plato, its destiny - which means the meaning
of his actions and his being. The grossest misunderstanding that one overwhelms without
ends here and there the intentions of the partisans of the antagonism of values consists in
interpret
tion their
of life point
which is of viewprecisely
based as a "relativism"
on a view- of
in things
short asthat
a concept
is found- in
radical opposition to the relationship that values maintain between them and which
(logically) can only be developed meaningfully by taking as a basis a
metaphysics of a very particular character (of the "organicist" type).
But let's come back to our particular case. It seems beyond dispute that,
with regard to guidelines for valid action which can be inferred
practical and political evaluations (especially in terms of environmental policy
nomic and social), an empirical discipline is never able to provide
by its own means other information than the following:
1) what are the inevitable means in the circumstances,

2) what are the inevitable subsidiary consequences,
Page 22
3) what are the practical consequences of competition between the various

its possible evaluations which condition the two preceding points.
The philosophical disciplines can in addition, with the intellectual means

available to them, to discern the "meaning" of these evaluations, that is to say their
last significant structure and their significant consequences , in short their assi-
to gain a "place" in the set of all the ultimate "values" generally
possible and delimit their significant sphere of validity. Ultimately pro
problems as simple as these: to what extent must the end justify the
means ? or again: to what extent should we assume responsibility for
unintended subsidiary consequences? or finally: how should we untie the
conflict between several desired or imposed ends that confront each other in concreto? -
are entirely a matter of choice or compromise. There is no kind of
scientific process, whatever it may be (empirical or rational), which would be capable of
make the decision in these cases. Less than any other, our own rigorous discipline
rously empirical cannot spare the individual this choice; also should not
nor did she arouse the illusion that she would be able to cut him off.
Finally, I would like to expressly insist on another point the recognition of

this state of affairs is, for our disciplines, entirely independent of the posi-
tion that we take with regard to the theory of values that we have just sketched
as [495] briefly as possible. In fact, there is generally no point of
logically sustainable view making it possible to challenge this state of affairs, except that
which is based on a hierarchy of values unambiguously prescribed by the
dogmas of a Church. I just have to wait to find out if there are any-
those who dare to assert that there is no fundamental difference in meaning
between this first series of questions: Does a given situation arise
lop in one direction or another? Why did this concrete situation arise
produced in such a way and not in another? Does following a rule of de-
come real we could not have expected that another situation could have succeeded
der to that which was given and, in this case, with what degree of probability?
- and this other series: What should we practically do in a concrete situation?
From what points of view could this situation appear to be happy
or unhappy? Could there possibly be propositions (or axioms) of
general character - whatever their nature - to which we could reduce these
perspectives ? - Likewise, I am waiting for someone to prove to me that there is no
rence between the question: In what direction will a situation probably develop?
effective, given concretely (or more generally a situation of a certain
a type sufficiently determined in one way or another), and with what de-
likelihood will evolve in this direction (or respectively does it evolve
usually in this
determined typicaltosense)?
situation help it-develop
and thisinother: Should we
a determined intervene in a
direction,
whether in the probable direction or in the opposite direction or in any
other ? Finally I would like to know if we can confuse the question: What opinion
certain determined people or an indeterminate multitude, struggling
Page 23
with the same concrete situation, will they probably form (or even some
tainement) faced with any problem? and this other: This opinion that they
will probably or will it certainly be the right one? i ask
So if these pairs of opposing questions have anything in common regarding
in their opinion. Is it true, as we keep saying, that they really are
"Inseparable"? In the affirmative case, do we not put ourselves in contradiction with
the demands of scientific thought? As for knowing, once one has admitted
the absolute heterogeneity of these kinds of questions, if we do better to present
separately the one and the other series of these heterogeneous problems by divisions to
within the same book [496] or within the same page or even within
the syntactic unity of the same sentence, thanks to the play of the main clauses and
subordinates - it depends on the pleasure of each author. There is only one thing
that it is absolutely necessary to demand of him, it is that he does not deceive involuntarily (or
voluntarily to be brilliant) his readers on the absolute heterogeneity of these
problems. Personally I am of the opinion that no way in the world is too much
pedantic which avoids this kind of confusion.
Therefore, discussions of practical assessments ( including

taken from those of the people who take part) cannot have any other meaning
than the following:
a) First of all, in their internal "coherence", the axioms of ul-

times from which the opposing opinions derive. We don't just kid ourselves on
the axioms of his adversaries, but very often also his own.
This way of proceeding consists, in essence, of an operation which starts from an evacuation.
singular luation and its significant analysis to rise ever higher
towards increasingly fundamental evaluative positions. She does not operate
however never with the means of an empirical discipline and never gives birth
but with knowledge of facts. It 'is valid' in the same way as the logic
than.
b) Deduce the “consequences” of the evaluative stance that results from

would have certain axioms of ultimate value if we took them, and just them,
as a basis for the practical appreciation of actual situations. This deduction
on the other hand is, relatively to the argumentation, significantly: linked to observations
empirical statements with regard to the most complete possible casuistry of
empirical situations which, in general, can be taken into account in a
practical appreciation.
c) Determine the effective consequences which would necessarily result from the realization
practice of taking a practically evaluative position in the face of a
problem, taking into account that 1) this achievement is linked to certain means
inevitable, and that 2) it is impossible to avoid certain subsidiary consequences
not directly wanted. This purely empirical determination can, between
others, result in:
Page 24
1) the absolute impossibility of realizing, even in the least approximate way.

tive possible, the postulate of value envisaged, because there is no way of
realize it, or
2) the greater or lesser improbability of being able to achieve it in full or

only partially 14971, either for the same reason as above, or
because we will come up against the probable intervention of subsidiary consequences not
wanted which risk rendering its realization illusory, or finally
3) the need to take charge of the means and consequences

diaries that the proponent of the practical postulate in question had not taken into
ration, so that the axiological decision between end, means and consequences
becomes for him a new problem and thus loses its binding force on
others.
d) Finally, it may happen that we are working in favor of new axioms of va-
their and resulting postulates that the supporter of a practical postulate had not
not taken into consideration and in respect of which he had not taken a position, although
the realization of its own postulate either in conflict with these other axioms, or 1)
in terms of principles, or 2) in terms of practical consequences, that is to say
whether he is opposed to them significantly or practically. In the case (1) we
we are dealing with a broader discussion of type (a) and in case 2 with that of
type (c).
Thus, far from being "devoid of any meaning", the discussions

evaluative sions of this type have, provided that one correctly understands their
utility, a very important meaning and, in my opinion, they really only have
in this case.
The usefulness of a discussion of practical assessments, provided that

doing it in the right place and giving it the correct meaning, is far from
exhausted with these direct results that she can ripen. Indeed, when it is
conducted correctly, it continuously enriches empirical research as
that it gives rise to problems during work.
It is undoubtedly necessary to give to the problems specific to empirical disciplines

ques a response that respects "axiological neutrality". Indeed, they are not
point of "value problems" [ Wertproblemen ] . Nevertheless, within the framework of
our disciplines, they remain under the influence of the relation of realities "to" values.
their. Regarding the expression of "relation to values" [ Wertbezie-
hung ], the reader should be referred to the explanations I have given in studies
earlier and especially also to the known works of Rickert. It is not
not possible to come back to this point again. I will only settle for
recall that the notion of "relation to values" simply designates the interpretation
Page 25
philosophy of the specifically scientific "interest" which governs the

selection and formation of the object of empirical research.
[498] These problems of pure logic cannot legitimize in the research

empirical no kind of "practical evaluations". Nevertheless, they put in
evidence, in keeping with historical experience, that cultural interests,
which means axiological interests [ Wertinteressen ] , indicate the direction
purely empirical and scientific work. It is clear that the discussions on
value can be the occasion for the development of these axiological interests in
a casuistry of their own. They can also considerably reduce
or at least facilitate the work of the scientist and especially the historian, particularly
that of axiological interpretation [ Wertinterpretation ] which constitutes one of the
most important preparatory tasks for empirical work proper.
Since it often happens that we neglect to distinguish not only
between evaluation and relation to values, but also between evaluation and interpretation
axiological tion (the latter consisting in the development of the different
significant position possible in the face of a given phenomenon) and that this results in
obscurities, especially with regard to the appreciation of the logical essence
of the story, I refer the reader to what I said on this point on page [245] and
following of my article entitled Critical studies to serve the logic of scientists
those of Culture 7 where, of course, I do not claim to have settled definitively
the problem.
Instead of discussing once again these fundamental problems of the

theory, I would rather examine in more detail some notions by-
which are in practice very important for our disciplines.
We still very frequently encounter the opinion that we should or

although it would be necessary or at least that one could deduce indications on the
practical assessments based on "development trends" [ Entwicklung-
stendenzen ] (147 ). However, from development trends, if univo-
whatever they are, we will never succeed in identifying unambiguous imperatives of
activity relating to the means which are in all likelihood most appropriate
in the event that the positions are given, but not the requirements relating to
these positions themselves. It is true, we then take the concept of
“Medium” in its widest extension. In the event that an individual considers that
political interests constitute an ultimate end, he will have to consider, according to the
case, the absolutist constitution as a (relatively) equally appropriate means
prayed that a radically democratic constitution, and it would be perfectly ridiculous
cule to look at a possible modification in the appreciation of the
tick available, which is only a means, as a modification of the
"ultimate" position. Moreover, it goes without saying, as we have already said, that this
7 This article first appeared in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpoli-
tik, t. XXII, p. 168.
Page 26
individual will come up against a constantly recurring problem [499]: will he or she need
no give up the hope of carrying out its practical evaluations, given the
knowledge that he has of the existence of an unequivocal tendency of development which
makes the execution of his project dependent, either on the need to use
new ones that seem to him possibly reprehensible for moral reasons.
them or others, or the obligation to take charge of the subsequent consequences.
diaries whom he personally detests, or others who make the execution
so improbable that the effort, measured by the chances of success, would appear
like a sterile "quixotic"?
The observation of this sort of "development trends" which
feels to modify more or less with difficulty is however far from being something
extraordinary. Indeed, any new situation can just as easily
force us to make a new readjustment between the end and the inevitable means.
bles, between the conscious goal and the inevitable subsidiary consequence. Nevertheless,
not only no empirical discipline, but also no science in general.
ral, whatever it may be, are not in a position, as we have already said, of us
tell if things should happen like this or tell us what the
final practical consequences. We can, for example, show so per-
suasive as possible to a trade unionist convinced that his action is not only
"Useless" from the social point of view, that is to say that it does not allow any hope of
modification of the external condition of the proletarian class, and even that
will ultimately only deteriorate it by creating a "reactionary" current, we
will lose his sentence if he truly recognizes himself in solidarity with the extreme consequences
of his opinion. Not because he would be a fool, but because he can have
"Reason" from his point of view - as we will see even later. Sum
all, men who have a rather strong tendency to bow inwardly in front of
success or in front of the man who promises it every time, and they do it - thing
completely natural - not only in terms of means or to the extent that
each time they try to realize their ultimate ideals, but still sacrifice them
trusting the very ideals. In Germany, we believe we are doing the right thing by countering this behavior.
ment of the name of "realistic policy". I really don't see why the repre-
feeling of an empirical discipline should indeed feel the need
to provide further support by applauding each time the "development trend.
development ”and seeking to“ adapt ”to this trend, which is
in fact that a problem of ultimate evaluation [500], that is to say a problem that
each one must resolve personally in conscience according to the particular situations
lières, a principle supposedly covered by the authority of a "science".
On condition of hearing it properly, it is quite relevant to define the

effective politics as the “art of the possible”. But it is no less fair that
very often we have only been able to achieve the possible because we have tried each time
to go beyond to achieve the impossible (148 ). All the specific qualities of
our civilization that, to all appearance and despite other differences, we
we all (subjectively) assess as constituting a more or less positive
Page 27
tif, are not after all the work of true morality alone.
from the point of view of 'adaptation' to the possible, namely the ethi-
bureaucratic of Confucianism ( 149). As a follow-up to what I said more
high, I will regret that we systematically get used to it, precisely in the name of
science, the German nation to forget that next to the "value of success" [ Erfolg-
swert ] of an action there is also the “conviction value” [ Gesinnungswert ].
In any case, ignorance of this state of affairs is an obstacle
to the intelligence of realities. Let us take the example of the trade unionist mentioned above.
It would be logically absurd to confront for the needs of "criticism"
with the "value of success" a behavior which, by virtue of its internal consistency
dull, could not adopt any other common thread than the "value of conviction"
indeed, the trade unionist who is really consistent with himself simply seeks to
keep in one's soul and, if possible awaken in others, a determined conviction
which seems worthy and sacred to him. Its external actions, in particular those which
are condemned in advance to the most total inefficiency, do not serve at the end of
expects to assure him before his conscience that his conviction is authentic,
that is to say, it possesses the strength to "confirm itself" in acts and that it
is not pure ranting. In this case, there is (maybe) in fact no other
medium for this kind of actions. Moreover, when a trade unionist is considered
quent with himself, his kingdom, like that of all ethics of conviction,
is not of this world.
From the "scientific" point of view one can only establish that this way
to conceive of its ideals is the only one which is logically coherent and which it cannot
can be refuted by external "facts". I would like to believe that by saying this I
serve both supporters of trade unionism and its opponents, and
precisely the one they rightly expect from science. It seems to me that in this
which concerns its meaning, no science whatsoever has anything to gain with
the method which operates with the formula "on the one hand ... on the other hand", that is to say
with the process which consists in invoking seven reasons "for" a de-
finished and six reasons “against” (for example [501] for or against the general strike.
rale) and then weigh these reasons against each other in the manner of the an-
cameralistic or certain administrative memories of modern China
derne. Axiologically neutral science has definitely fulfilled its function a
time that it has reduced the point of view of the trade unionist to its form, logically the
more coherent and rational possible and that it has determined the conditions
empirical knowledge of its training, its chances and the practical consequences
flow from experience. We could never prove to someone
whether or not he should become a trade unionist, without bringing into play any misconceptions
taphysics determined that in this case no science whatsoever
can demonstrate. The fact that an officer prefers to jump into his redoubt rather than
surrender may very well, in the particular case, be only an absolutely serious act.
tuitable from all points of view, if we measure it by the criterion of success. He wouldn't know what-
while we are indifferent whether or not there is in general such a convict-
tion, capable of inspiring acts that ignore all usefulness. Such a
Page 28
conviction is as meaningless as that of the trade unionist

consequent with itself. If ever a professor were to recommend
high from the comfortable position of his pulpit such a "catonism", this attitude does not
would not be particularly a manifestation of good taste. As a result, it does
nor should he glorify the contrary position and make it a duty to
the adaptation of the ideals to the chances which always result from the tendencies of the
development and given situations.
We have just used the term "adaptation" on several occasions [ Anpas-

sung ], the meaning of which is in this case sufficiently clear in the
previous context so as not to give rise to misunderstandings. We can however
show that this notion has a double meaning. It can mean: adaptation of
means of taking an ultimate position in given situations (“re-
aliste ”in the proper sense) or else: adaptation to ephemeral chances of success,
real or imaginary, in the choice of one of the many positions taken
possible times in general (we are then dealing with this famous
realistic ”thanks to which our policy for twenty-seven years has obtained results.
so remarkable!). These indications are far from exhausting all the signi-
possible fications of the concept. That's why it would be better, in my opinion,
radically outlaw [502] this word so discredited from the discussion of our
problems, both about evaluation questions and others. In
indeed, it never gives rise to anything but misunderstandings insofar as it is the expression of a
scientific argument , a value that one continues to attribute to it as well
in the order of the "explanation" (for example that of the empirical existence of
certain moral conceptions in human groups determined at different times
determined) than in the order of the "appreciation" (for example that of
certain existing moral conceptions to find that they "suit"
objectively and that they are therefore objectively "just" and "valid"
bles'). In fact, this term does no service from these angles, since it is always
days necessary to interpret it beforehand in turn. Biology is his de-
die. Taken in its strictly biological sense, insofar as it indicates for example
ple the relatively determinable chance, given under certain conditions to a
human group to maintain its psychological heritage through reproduction
profuse demographic, it would follow that the social strata which are
only the most prosperous and leading the most rational life would form, if
we rely on known statistics on the number of births, social class
"Least suitable". From a biological point of view - as also from those of
multiple - other purely empirical meanings actually conceivable
the few Indians who lived in the Salt Lake region before the arrival of the
Mormons were just as well or just as ill-suited to the conditions of this
region than the much larger Mormon community that came to
settle there. This concept is therefore of no benefit to us for the knowledge em-
pirical facts, but we readily imagine that it is.
Page 29
Let us now make an observation: it is only in the case where

two organizations are absolutely identical in all respects except one, which
it is permissible to say that this concrete and singular divergent condition can
tituer empirically situation "more favorable" for conservation
one of them, so that it is in this sense better "adapted" to the given conditions
that the other. On the other hand, when we look at the level of appreciation, we will be able to
advocate on behalf of Mormons by glorifying the repopulation of the
as well as the material or other results and characteristics that they contributed to it or
developed and consider this as proof of their superiority over the In-
diens; but we could just as well, if we absolutely abhor the means
and the consequences of Mormon morality which has been at least in part
responsible for the work they have accomplished, to prefer the steppe, even uninhabited
by Indians and finally the romantic existence that the latter led there.
No science in the world, whatever it may be, can claim to convert to
first point of view that which is in favor of the second. Because we are here in
presence [503] of a compromise between means, end and consequences which one cannot
can give definitive solution.
We cannot speak of really empirically soluble problems that

in the only cases where one wonders about the appropriate means for a given end
absolutely unambiguously (150 ). The proposition: the measure x is the only one
means which suits the end y is in reality only the simple inversion of the proposition.
sition: x is followed by y. The concept of "adaptability" [ Angepasstheit ], like all
others of the same kind, never provides - and this is essential - the slightest
information about the evaluations that are ultimately used to
foundation, but rather it risks masking them, - just like, in my opinion, this
another archiconfused concept of "human economy" [ Menschenökonomie ] for
which has been showing a certain predilection for some time. According to the ma-
the notion of which we understand, we can say that in the domain of "civilization
tion ”everything is“ suitable ”and nothing is. In fact, it is not possible to eliminate
the notion of struggle in cultural life . We can modify the means of the struggle,
its object or even its orientation and the adversaries present; we would not know
delete itself. Instead of an external rivalry between enemies fighting for
external goods, it can be only an intimate rivalry between individuals who
love each other and who fight for interior goods; therefore, instead of being a
external constraint it can be only a manifestation of internal violence (precise
also in the form of an erotic and charitable abandonment) or finally a fight
which takes place in the soul of an individual who fights against himself: we encounter the
struggle everywhere, and often it asserts itself with all the more success when it is disputed.
encircles less or that it adopts during its development the form of the laissez-faire
go weak and convenient or that of a deceptive illusion on oneself or finally
when it is exercised under the guise of "selection". "Peace" is only a displacement
cement [ Verschiebung ] of the forms, adversaries or object of the struggle or
finally, chances of selection: it is nothing else. As to whether and when
these kinds of trips stand the test of ethical judgment or any
Page 30
another value judgment, it is obvious that on this subject there is absolutely nothing
say general. One thing is in any case unmistakable: when we propose to
need to regulate labor relations, whatever their nature, it
must always and without exception be examined from the following angle: to what type
of men offer the best chances of domination by the factor game
subjective and objective selection? Because for the rest not only an ana-
empirical lysis is never complete, but still it generally lacks the
positive basis essential for an assessment [5041 claiming to be valid
consciously subjective or objective. And I would at least like to recall this state
many things to those many colleagues who believe that we could operate without
suitable in the analysis of social developments with the univocal concept
of progress [Fortschritt]. This leads me to a more in-depth study of this
important notion.
We can obviously use in an axiologically neutral way the

concept of "progress" when identified with "progression" [ Fortschreiten ]
of any concrete process of development, studied in isolation. Corn
in most cases the question is infinitely more complex. Take what-
what examples in very different fields where confusion with
value issues is the most intimate.
In the field of irrational, sensitive and affective contents of our community

psychic behavior we can characterize, while respecting axiological neutrality
increase, the quantitative increase and - what is often associated with it - the diversification
qualitative statement of the different possible ways of behaving as a
progress of psychic "differentiation". However, it is immediately grafted to
axiological concept of increasing the "reach" or "capacity" of a
concrete soul or of an "epoch" - the latter term already putting us in advance.
sence of a construction which. is no longer unambiguous (as we see in the ou-
book that Simmel devoted to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) ( 151).
There can be no question of questioning the existence of a "progression"

effective in "differentiation", with this reservation, however, that it does not
It does not always appear in reality where you think you see it. In fact, we are
wind the victims of the illusion of seeing a growing differentiation
in the modern phenomenon which pushes certain individuals to grant more and
more attention to the nuances of their emotional life, as it presents itself at the time
as a consequence of increasing rationalization and intellectualization
in all areas of life and as a result of the growing importance
that each individual accords to his subjective expressions (which often remain
perfectly indifferent to others). These manifestations can signify a
progression in differentiation and even promote it. However we
let us often be deceived by appearance and I admit that, personally, I am
willingly inclined to believe that too much is given to this illusion. But the
things are what they are. If others prefer to call this kind of
Page 31
progressive differentiation, this is only a question of terminological expediency.

than. On the other hand, if it is a question of appreciating it in the sense of a progress understood as
"Inner enrichment", no empirical discipline [505] is able
to decide. The question of knowing whether to recognize as "values"
new affective possibilities that arise or that we take new
awareness, even if, where appropriate, they give rise to new
sions ”and“ problems ”, does not concern these disciplines. Whoever desires
take an appreciative position with regard to the phenomenon of differentiation
as such - which certainly no empirical discipline could inter-
to say - and who seeks for this purpose the suitable point of view, will come up against normal-
ment to the question raised by many contemporary events:
what price do we "pay" for this kind of process, as far as it is concerned -
more than a simple intellectualist illusion? He will need by
example not to lose sight of the fact that the hunt for “lived experience” - which constitutes
fundamentally kills the value currently fashionable in Germany - perhaps, in a
important measure, a product of the decline in the ability to be self-evident.
up to his "daily task", as well as the need that
feels giving more and more publicity to his "experience" could perhaps
also be appreciated as a growing loss of the sense of distance,
and consequently of taste and dignity. Still, at the level of evaluations
tions of subjective experience there is no identity between "progress in differentiation"
and the increase of "value" only in the only intellectualist sense of the pro-
pagation of the growing awareness of the experience or of a growing improvement
healthy possibilities of expression and communication.
The problem is somewhat more complex about the possibility of using

ser the concept of "progress" (in the sense of appreciation) in the field of art
( 152). It happens that this possibility is violently contested, rightly or wrongly,
depending on the direction we are aiming for. There has never been a theory evalua tive of art that has
was able to get out of the situation with the exclusive opposition between "art" and "non-art" [ Un-
kunst ] , without also making the distinction between project and execution or in-
core without establishing a difference in value among the completed works or finally
between a completed work and a missed work, it does not matter if it is
defective in one or more or even important points, for-
since it is not devoid of all value. This is not only true
a concrete desire for creation, but also artistic impetus
of entire eras. Applied to these kinds of questions, the concept of "progress"
takes on a trivial meaning, because of the use made of it elsewhere at the level
purely technical problems. Nevertheless it is not in itself
meaningless. [506] The problem takes on another aspect again
in the case of the pure empirical disciplines of art history and sociology
empirical theory of art. From the point of view of the first there is naturally no
of "progress" in art in the sense of the aesthetic evaluation of works of art as
significant achievements; indeed, it is not possible to make these evaluations
with the means of empirical research: they therefore go beyond its task. By
Page 32

against it is able to take advantage of the concept of "progress" understood in
a purely technical, rational and unambiguous sense of which we will speak further
in a moment. The possibility of using it in the latter sense in a
empirical history of art is justified by the fact that it is strictly limited to determining
the technical means which an artistic will uses in an
determined and well-established attention. We readily underestimate the significance for history.
to the art of this singularly modest kind of research, or we
misinterprets it in the sense that it relates to a pure question of fashion, perfect-
secondary and specious, due to so-called "connoisseurs" who claim
"To have understood" an artist quite simply because they have raised the curtain of his
workshop and that they learned about its external means of production and its
" manner ". However, the concept of "technical progress", correctly understood,
truly constitutes the domain of art history, because this concept, as well as
its influence on artistic creation, include precisely the only thing
empirically observable in the development of art, which means that
which remains foreign to an aesthetic evaluation. Let us take a few examples which
will highlight the positive meanings of the "technical" element in the sense
true of the term in an art history ( 153).
The birth of Gothic art was first and foremost the result of a solution
technically happy with a pure technical architectural problem concerning the
arching of spaces of a certain type, in this case that of the technical optimum
in the construction of buttresses intended to distribute the thrust of the vault
ridge, although this invention has also been linked to a few other particulars.
rities that we will not discuss here. In this way we solved pure concrete problems
of construction. This knowledge which thus made it possible to arch a certain
manner of non-quadratic spaces aroused a passionate enthusiasm in
the soul of the architects of which we do not know for the moment and probably for all
days the names, although it is necessary to attribute to them the development of this new
style. Their technical rationalism experienced all the consequences of the new
principle. Their creative will [507] exploited it as a possibility of realizing
artistic tasks hitherto unsuspected, and this is how she brought about the
sculpture in a new way by arousing a new and original "sense of the body"
ginal, awakened by new architectural ways of treating spaces and
surfaces. Finally, this revolution, originally conditioned by technology, is
did in concert with certain feelings aroused to a great extent by
sociological and religious reasons and thus offered the essential elements
problems which dealt with artistic research in the Gothic era. During-
that the history and sociology of art have exposed the material, technical
ques, social and psychological of this new style they have exhausted their task
empirical. They do not have to "evaluate" the Gothic style against the Roman style.
man nor in relation to the "Renaissance" style which, for its part, was essentially oriented
mainly towards the technical problem of the dome and in addition towards modifications
tions of the architectural enterprise, conditioned in part by sociological reasons.
gics; nor do they have to aesthetically "evaluate" an archi-
Page 33
tectural in its singularity, as long as they remain purely empirical disciplines.

ques. On the contrary, the purely aesthetic interest that we have in works of art
and to the various aesthetically important peculiarities is heteronomous to them: this
is not their object. I mean the item is given to them in Priori as
the work is already affected by an aesthetic value that they cannot
not, as empirical disciplines, establish on their own.
It is the same in the field of the history of music (154). The pro-
Haggard center of this discipline lies undoubtedly the point of view of the
curiosity of the modern European (here is the "relation to values"!), in the question
next question: why harmonic music, almost everywhere stemming from poly-
popular speech, has it developed only in Europe and that for a long time?
period of time, whereas everywhere else the rationalism of the
sique has embarked on another path, often even directly opposed, to his
see that of a non-perfect division of intervals (most of the time a divi-
Zion of the fourth) instead of the harmonic division (of the fifth)? In the center of
debate we find the problem of the discovery of the third and its interpretation si-
harmonic gnificative as an element of the perfect chord, then the discovery
harmonic chromatic and finally that of modern rhythm (good
and wrong measurements) - instead of a purely metronomic measurement - because, without
this rhythmic, modern instrumental music would be inconceivable. There too
it was originally only a question of pure problems relating to a "progress
“Technical [508] and rational. We know that, long before the discovery of
harmonic music, chromaticism was the means of expressing the "pas-
sion ”, as antiquity shows us, which used chromatic music
(sometimes even homophone) to accompany passionate dochmies, to
the example of the fragment of Euripides which we have just discovered recently. It's not
therefore not in the artistic will of the expression, but only in the
technical means of this expression that we must look for the difference between the
ancient music and chromaticity that the great musical experimenters of
the Renaissance era created with the rational enthusiasm of the effort of the
discovery, in order to give in their turn a musical form to the "passion". The the-
technically new development, however, consisted in the adoption for this
new chromatic of harmonic intervals instead of melodic intervals
half and quarter tones of Greek music. This discovery
technique was itself only possible because previously we had solved
other technical and rational problems, in particular the discovery of writing
rational musical note-based (without which no modern composition
would not have been conceivable) and, previously, the construction of certain
instruments which must necessarily lead to a harmonic interpretation
musical intervals, and last but not least the birth of polyphonic song ra-
tional. The essential part in all these discoveries, however, belongs to the
missionary monks from the early Middle Ages who exercised their apostolate in the
northern regions of the West. Indeed, it is they who, without suspecting
later scope of their work, rationalized for their own purposes the po-
Page 34
popular lyphony, instead of seeking their sources in the classical melody

Greek, as did the Byzantine monks. So these were peculiarities
very concrete of the internal and external state of the Western Christian Church, condi-
sociologically and historically by religion, which allowed this
new musical problem of seeing the light of day under the impetus of rationalism
which was peculiar only to Western monks. We see that, in essence, it
these were only purely "technical" problems. On another side,
the adoption and rationalization of the measure of the dance step, which is at the origin of
musical forms, the culmination of which was the sonata, were conditioned by
certain forms of life in society during the Renaissance. Finally, the development
development. piano, one of the most important technical instruments in the
development of modern music, and the wide reception it received from the bourgeoisie
sie, have their root in the specific continental character of culture in the EU
northern rope. This is "progress" in the technical means of [5091 la
music which largely determined its history. Now, an empirical story
of musicseeking
without can andfor
should expose
its part these factors
to aesthetically in the development
appreciate the musicalofworks
music,
even
my. It has even often happened that "technical" progress has manifested itself.
first in works which, from the point of view of aesthetic value, are clear-
mentally imperfect. The orientation of curiosity specific to the history of music is
heteronomous to the object it has the task of explaining historically, the latter being
given because of its prior aesthetic significance.
Regarding the development of painting, I recommend the book

de Wöfflin, Die klassische Kunst, Distinguished Modesty in the Way He
pose the problems is an outstanding example of what can be done
in the context of empirical research ( 155).
The radical separation between the sphere of values and that of the empirical is
manifested characteristically in that the use of a technical de-
completed, however advanced it may be, does not provide the slightest indication of the value
aesthetics of the work of art. The works performed, even with the most
more "primitive", for example paintings which knew nothing of perspective
- may have an aesthetic value exactly equivalent to those of the works
the most perfect, created with the means of a rational technique, on condition
that the artistic will be limited to the only forms which are adequate to
this "primitive" technique ( 156). The invention of new technical means
therefore has in the first place only the significance of an increasing differentiation and
it only offers a possibility of "enriching" art more than in the sense of intensifying
tion of value. It is not uncommon to find that in reality it also led to
the opposite result, to the "impoverishment b of the sense of form." From the point of view of
empirical and causal study, however, the technical modification (in the
highest sense of the term) is precisely the most important element that it is
generally able to establish in the development of art.
Page 35
However, not only art historians, but also historians in general,

in the broadest sense of the word, usually object that not only do they
will not allow the right to make political and cultural assessments to be taken away
real, ethical or aesthetic, but still that they would no longer be able to do
research if they were required to give up these assessments. Of course,
the methodology has neither the power nor even the intention to prescribe to anyone what
that he must propose to exhibit in a literary work. On the other hand, it claims
that the right to show that there is a heterogeneity of meaning between certain problems
mes, that their confusion causes [510] the discussions to turn into a dialogue of
deaf and that, while it makes sense to open a discussion on certain issues
with the help of empirical science or logic, we cannot
very. Perhaps it is appropriate to add the general remark that for the mo-
ment we will not justify: an in-depth examination of historical works
very easily provides proof that the continuity of the causal chain,
pirical and historical, pursued radically to the extreme limit, is ordinarily
broke almost without exception to the detriment of scientific results, as soon as
the historian begins to "evaluate". He exposes himself to "explain" for example as
being the consequence of an "error" or a "degeneration" which was not
perhaps on the part of the agents that the effect of ideals which are different from his own and
thus he fails in his elementary duty: that of "understanding". The misunderstanding
There are two kinds of reasons for the resulting du. In order not to leave the do-
maine of art, we will say that the first. comes from the fact that we forget that, in addition
of the two ways mentioned above to approach the study of artistic reality, to its
see on the one hand the contemplation which evaluates in a purely aesthetic way an
vre and
and on the
causal, other
there hand
is still the analysis
a third method,which
that ofseeks to establishinterpretation.
the axiological a purely empirical imputation
geology, the nature of which we have defined (above, p. 498), so that it is no longer
need to come back to it. In any case, there is absolutely no doubt that the latter
method has its own value and is essential for any historian. It
nor is there any doubt that the ordinary reader of works on the history of art
also and even quite particularly expects to find it there. In any state of
cause, considered in its logical structure, it goes without saying that it is not identical
to empirical analysis.
The second reason is that whoever wants to deal with the history of
art, even in the purely empirical sense, must possess the faculty of "understanding
take ”artistic production, and it goes without saying that this faculty is inconceivable
without the power to make an aesthetic judgment, that is to say without the faculty of
preciation. This obviously also applies to other areas of history,
that of political history like those of the history of literature, of religion
gion or philosophy. However, it is clear that all this does not provide us
no indication of the logical essence of historical work.
We will come back to this question later. For the moment we limit ourselves to
we will discuss the following problem; in what sense can we speak of a "pro-
Page 36
sandstone ”in the history of art, apart from any aesthetic appreciation? We
we have seen that in this case, the notion of progress, when it takes on a technical meaning
that and rational [511] which aims at the means appropriate to an artistic intention,
can actually become important for the empirical history of art. It's time
finally to pursue this concept of "rational" progress in its most important domain.
proper and to reflect on its empirical or non-empirical character. Indeed, the
The foregoing considerations are only a particular case of a very
general.
The way Windelband delimits in his work, Lehrbuch der Ges-

chichte der Philosophie (§ 2, 4th edition, p. 8), the theme of his "history of
philosophy ”(namely“ the process by which European culture has translated its
conception of the world [...] in scientific concepts ") means for its
pragmatic, in my opinion remarkable, a use of the specific concept of 'pro-
sandstone ”which, however, is only valid for its relation to the values of culture (including
the author draws the conclusions on pages 15 and 16 of his work). It is that of a
apart from this concept is not obvious for any "history of philosophy
phy ”and on the other hand, if we take as a basis this same relationship to cultural values
realities, it is not only valid for a history of philosophy or
any other science but still for any history in general
ral (in a sense other than Windelband, ibid. p. 7, no 1, sect. 2). In the
on the following pages, however, we will limit ourselves to the concepts of "progress"
rationality that play a role in sociological and economic disciplines.
Our European-American social and economic life is "rationalized" by a
specific way and in a specific sense. This is why the explanation of
this rationalization and the construction of corresponding concepts for the
take is one of the main tasks of our disciplines. However, in
in addressing these questions, we again come up against the problem that we
have already met about the history of art without having solved it, namely:
what do we mean when we consider that a phenomenon constitutes a
"Rational progress"?
Here again we encounter the entanglement of the different senses of the no-
tion of "progress" insofar as it signifies
1) a simple "progression" by differentiation, or else
2) a progressive technical rationality of the means, or finally
3) an increasing intensification of the value.
First of all, a subjectively "rational" behavior is not identical.

than to a "rationally fair" activity, that is to say an activity using the
means objectively correct according to the data of scientific information. In
indeed, such behavior simply means that the subjective intention [512]
tends towards a methodical orientation of means, considered fair, relative to
tively to a given end. A progressive subjective rationalization of the activity
Page 37
therefore does not necessarily constitute, from an objective point of view, "progress" in the
sense of a rationally "right" activity. The magic for example has been "ratio-
nalized ”as systematically as physics. Thus, the first therapy
canique pretension "rational" meant almost everywhere the refusal to treat
empiric symptoms with the help of herbs and potions experienced
rically, to try to expel by exorcism the (presumed) "real causes
its ”(magical or demonic) disease. From a formal point of view, the magic
therefore had the same rational structure as many advances, even the most
clothes rails, modern therapy. However, we cannot evaluate these
magic therapies of priests as a "progress" in the sense of an activity.
vity "just" as opposed to old empirical methods. On another side,
any "progress" in the direction of the use of "just" means is not
not necessarily obtained by a "progression" of the activity in the sense of the ratio-
subjective nality. The fact that an activity progresses with the greatest rationality
subjective towards an activity objectively "more in conformity" with its end, does not constitute
that one of the multiple possibilities of the activity and consequently a process in which we
can be expected with (more or less) probability. On the other hand, if in the case by-
In particular, the following formula turns out to be correct: the measure x is the mean (let us admit:
unique) to achieve in result y what constitutes an empirical question and
all in all, the inversion of the causal relation: after x succeeds y - and if individuals
consciously use it during the orientation of their activity to achieve the
result y - something which in turn can be observed empirically - their activity
is then oriented in a “technically correct” sense . If at any point
human behavior, whatever it may be, is oriented in the direction of
“Greater technical accuracy” than previously, we will say that we
we are in the presence of " technical progress". It's up to empirical disciplines
that it is incumbent to determine, thanks to the means of scientific experiment, therefore
empirically, if we are really in the presence of a case of this kind
(it being understood, of course, that one always presupposes the absolute univocity of
given end).
In this sense then, that is to say in the case where an end is given univo-
that we meet at the level of means the concepts of "technical" accuracy and
of "technical" progress [513] that can be unambiguously established (we pre-
here is the term "technique" in the broadest sense, insofar as it signifies everything
rational behavior in general, and this in all areas, including
that of the handling and domination of men by politics, by
social means, through education or through propaganda). In particular (for ne
mention only aspects that are easy to conceive), it is allowed to speak
in an approximately unequivocal way of "progress" in the specific field.
of technology in the ordinary sense of the word, but also in the fields of
commercial technique or legal technique, provided that you take
as a starting
concrete. point
I say: an unambiguously
approximately, determined
because state man
any informed of a knows
structure
that the
various technically rational principles manage to fight each other, so that if
Page 38
we manage to establish a compromise between them each time from the point of view of
concrete people who are interested in it, it is never "objective". Yes
we now assume that certain needs are given, if we further assume
that these needs as such as well as the subjective estimation of their hierarchical order
chique could not be subjected to criticism and finally if one supposes given a
stable form of economic organization - of course on the condition that
which concerns their duration, their safety or their profusion in the satisfaction of
needs, these interests can and do fight each other - it is
also possible to speak of an "economic" progress towards a relative optimum
in the satisfaction of these needs, in case the possibilities are given to
provide the means. However, the use of this concept is not justified from the point of view of
economic view only under these presuppositions and within these limits.
It was believed that it was possible to deduce unambiguous evaluations, in particular

purely economic order . A typical example is provided to us
by the theory developed in his time by Professor Liefinann (157 ), from
the school example of the deliberate destruction of consumer goods which
have fallen below cost price, in order to safeguard the
tability of producers. In his opinion one could estimate this destruction as
objectively fair "from an economic point of view". This design together with -
this is what matters - other analogues consider as obvious a series
presuppositions that are not at all. In the first place they admit that
the interest of an individual would not only in fact extend beyond his death,
but still that it should [ solle ] be valid once and for all as extending
so. Now, without this transposition of "being" [ Sein ] into "having to be" [ Sollen ] he
it is not possible to unambiguously carry out this so-called pure evaluation.
economically. Indeed, how could we otherwise designate for example
the interests of [514] "producers" and "consumers" such as those of
people endowed with sustainability? The fact that an individual takes into account the interests
of his heirs is no longer purely economic data. Indeed, we
rather substitutes for living men pure entities interested only in
to grow [verwerten] their "capital" in "companies" and not existing
than for these companies. Certainly, such a design is useful fiction for
theoretical research. But, even as a fiction, it does not apply to the
situation of workers, especially those who do not have children. Secondly
place it ignores the existence of "social classes" whose situation can (I do not say
not - must) deteriorate absolutely under the free market regime, because the
purchasing power of certain layers of consumers may decrease not only
LEMENT despite the "optimal" allocation - whenever possible when the ap-
from the point of view of profitability - between capital and labor in the different
rents branches of production, but also precisely because of it. Indeed, the
“optimal” distribution of profitability which conditions the constancy of investments.
movements of capital depend in turn on the constellations of force between
various classes and the consequences of this phenomenon can (I am not saying:
must) weaken in a concrete situation the position of these social strata
Page 39
in the price battle. Third, this conception ignores the possibility

persistent and irreducible oppositions, interests between members of the various
political units and therefore it takes a Priori party in favor of the principle
of "free trade". However, this principle, which is an excellent heuristic instrument
immediately turns into an "assessment" that is no longer obvious
as soon as it serves to establish postulates concerning what should be. And if, in order
avoid conflict, this conception presupposes the political unity of the global economy.
diale - hypothesis perfectly plausible from the theoretical point of view - the possibility
inevitable criticism, provoked by this destruction of consumer goods
tion in the interest (we suppose) of the optimum profitability (of the
providers as well as consumers) given permanently under the condi-
data, moves and takes its full range. Because then the criticism attacks
as a whole to the Principle of the market economy as such, on the basis of the
ves provided by the optimum profitability, expressed in currency, of the various units
economic participants in the exchange. An organization of the supply of
goods other than that of free trade would have no reason to take into account
deration the constellations of interests of the various economic units given in
virtue of the principle of free trade [515j and consequently it would not be obligatory.
ability to withdraw existing consumer goods from circulation.
Professor Liefinann's views are not correct even on the theoretical level
and then, of course, correct, that if one supposes that certain conditions are
formally given, i.e. if we give ourselves
1) exclusively for guiding purpose the permanent profitability interests of

people who are meant to stay the same, with needs that are also
supposed to stay the same,
2) the exclusive regime of the economy of private capital to cover the needs
through the game of total freedom in competition and
3) a state power which lacks interest in the economy to be only the pro
tector of law. In this case, the evaluation relates only to the rational means
with a view to the optimal solution of a particular technical problem of the distribution
tion of goods. These fictions of pure economics, useful in the context of research
theoretical, cannot become the basis for practical evaluations of situations
real. There is no getting out of this, an economic theory can never indicate
that this: to achieve the given technical end x , the measure y constitutes the only
means or one of the appropriate means together with the measures y 1 and y 2 ;
in the latter case, there exists between y, y 1 , and y 2 , such and such a difference in the ef-
fets and, possibly, in rationality; finally the application of these measures and the
achievement of the end x require taking charge of the “subsidiary consequences
res » z , z 1 , and z 2 . All these propositions are only inversions of relations
causal and, in so far as 'evaluations' are attached to them, these do not
only the degree of rationality of the action envisaged. The evaluations
Page 40
tions are unambiguous only on the condition, and on the sole condition, that the eco-goal
nomic and the conditions of the social structure are formally given,
that there is only to choose between several economic means and finally that these
are only differentiated from each other in relation to their safety, their
frequency and their quantitative profusion, but on the other hand remain absolutely identical.
ticks with regard to other points that could possibly have
importance to human interests. It is only on this condition that one can
unconditionally evaluate a means as being "technically the most
fair ”and that this assessment is unequivocal. In all other cases, i.e.
in all those which are not purely technical, evaluation ceases to be
unequivocal, because other evaluations occur that it is no longer possible to determine
to mine purely economically.
However, once one has established the univocity of a technical evaluation [516]
in the sphere of pure economics, we should not believe that we are already
came to establish a univocity at the level of the final evaluation. Indeed, it is
rather beyond these discussions that the entanglement due to the diversity begins.
infinite number of possible evaluations which can only be mastered by referring to
rant to ultimate axioms. I'll just mention one point: der-
In all "action" there is always the man. Now, when the increase in the ra-
subjective tionality and the objective and technical "correctness" of the activity as
such exceed a certain limit, man may consider that there is a danger to
certain important goods (of an ethical or religious nature) and, from the point of view of certain
In some conceptions, this danger even generally exists. It seems difficult to
us to make our own the (maximalist) ethics of Buddhism which condemns
any action directed towards an end [ Zweckhandlung ], quite simply because it
is an action oriented in this direction and that it diverts the human being from the deli-
vrance. Nevertheless, it is absolutely impossible to "refute" it in the manner
of which it is shown that a calculation operation is false or that a medical diagnosis
is wrong. Without choosing such extreme examples, it is easy to understand that
economic rationalizations, however indisputably "fair" they may be
"technical" point of view, are in no way justified by virtue of this sole
quality in front of the appreciation forum . This applies without exception to all
rationalizations, including seemingly purely technical areas
than the banking system for example. Those who speak out against these kinds of ra-
nationalizations are not necessarily foolish. On the contrary, whenever
we are trying to make an evaluation it is essential to take into account the
influence that technical rationalizations have on changes in the environment.
seems internal and external living conditions. The legitimate use of the concept of
progress in our disciplines is therefore everywhere and without exception linked to "technical
that ”, that is to say as we have explained, to the notion of appropriate“ means ”.
prayed to an unambiguously given end . it never rises to the sphere of evaluations.
ultimate tions .
Page 41
All these considerations oblige me to hold the use of the concept of "pro-
sandstone ”for extremely inopportune, even in the limited field where its application
empirical cation does not raise any difficulty. But we have never been able to forbid
nobody uses certain terms and I believe that in the end we can avoid
possible misunderstandings.
Before concluding, I have one last set of issues to discuss

concerning the place of the rational within empirical disciplines.
[517] When a normatively valid thing becomes the object of a search

empirical, it loses, by becoming such an object, its character as a norm: it is treated
then as "being" [ seiend ] and not as "valid" [ gültig ] Let us take
an example. If we propose to establish a statistic of the number of
calculation ”committed by a specific category of professional accountants -
experiment which may not be devoid of all scientific significance -
the fundamental principles of arithmetic "are valid" then in two total senses.
slightly different. In the first case, their normative validity obviously constitutes
the absolute presupposition of the calculation in itself. In the second case, where
the examination of the degree of the "fair" application of operations intervenes as an object
research, we are in the presence of something absolutely different
rent from a logical point of view. Indeed, the application of the rules of calculation by the
persons whose accounts are statistically examined is then treated as
an effective maxim of the behavior they have acquired through education and of which
the frequency is determined in the concrete application, just like certain phenomena
names of dementia may become the subject of statistical determinations. From
the instant when the application of arithmetic operations becomes the object of a re-
seeks, the fact that they "are valid" normatively or that they are "correct"
does not enter into account in the discussion and it remains even perfect-
logically indifferent. Obviously the statistician is obliged to
also submit to the convention, that is to say to the principles of operations
arithmetic, when it statistically examines the accounts of people under
put to the test. But he would just as well have to apply a
calculation method which would be normatively "false" if by chance it had
passed for "correct" in the eyes of a determined group of men, and in case he
would propose to statistically examine the frequency of the use of these procedures
rations considered "correct" by this group of men in question. The
where arithmetic operations become the object of research, they are not
never from the point of view of empirical, historical or sociological study, that a
maxim having conventional validity within a group of determined men.
mined, who adopt them more or less approximately in their behavior
practical, and they are nothing else. Any exposition of the musical theory of Py-
thagoricians is obliged to first accept the "false" calculation - according to our
know - that 12 fifths = 7 octaves. Likewise any history of logistics
that is obliged to admit the historical existence of logical constructions [518]
which (in our eyes) are contradictory. It is, however, humanly understandable.
Page 42
ble, although this remains foreign to scientific work, which an author accompanies
the observation of such "absurdities" of an explosion of anger, as it is
happened to an eminent historian of the logic of the Middle Ages ( 158).
The metamorphosis of truths possessing validity. normative in opinions

simply having a conventional validity which serves as a basis for all structures
intellectual tures, including logical or mathematical thoughts, do not prevent
absolutely not that when the latter become the object of a study which
proposes to analyze their empirical [breast] being . and not their meaning [Breast] correct
(from a normative point of view), the normative validity of logical and mathematical truths
However, it is the a Priori of all empirical sciences and of all
any of them. However, the problem of their logical structure is less simple.
when we examine a function of which we have already spoken above and which inter-
comes as soon as we do empirical research on intellectual relations;
this function must be carefully distinguished from the other two, from that which
validity of those subject to empirical research and that makes them a
priori. Any science which deals with psychic or social relations is a
science of human behavior (this concept embracing as well any act of
reflective thought than any psychic habit ). She seeks to "understand" the
behavior and, through this, "interpretively interpret" [ erklärend
deuten ] its development. This is not the place to deal with the difficult concept
of "understanding". Only one of its particular shapes will hold our attention,
that of "rational interpretation" [ratio "e Deutung]. We" understand "
manifestly without more comment than a thinker solves a de-
finished in a way that we ourselves consider to be (i normative-
just lie ”, just as we understand that a man makes a prediction
"Correct" when it applies the means which - in our own judgment - are
"Righteous" in consideration of the desired end. Our understanding of these phenomena
leads then has such a particularly obvious character, because it is a question of
in these cases the achievement of something objectively "valid". It's necessary
despite everything, beware of believing that in these cases the notion of "normatively
"Just" would have, from the point of view of logic, a structure similar to that which
characterizes it when it plays the a priori general role of all scientific research.
fique. The function it fulfills as an instrument of "understanding"
seems rather the same as that played by pure "intropathy" [ Einfühlen ] psy-
ecological, intended [519] to make known comprehensively, relations
affective and sentimental, logically irrational. The means of explanation
Comprehensive here does not consist in normative correctness , but on the one hand
in the conventional habits of the scientist and the professor of thinking in such
way and not in another [so und nicht anders zu denken ] and on the other hand, when
this turns out to be necessary, in the capacity to understand by intropathy a thought
which is foreign to their own habits and which, in relation to them,
seems to them normatively "false". The fact that a wrong thought or an "er-
ror ”can in principle be understood just as well as a“ correct ”thought.
sufficiently proves that the notion of the valid, understood as what is "nor-
Page 43
matively fair ”, does not come into play here as such , but only
only in so far as it constitutes a conventional type which is particularly easy to
understand. This brings us to a final remark on the role that the “norma-
tifjustly ”plays a role in sociological research.
To "understand" an "inaccurate" calculation or an "incorrect" logical proposition

recte ”and to determine or explain their influence on the actual consequences
ves that result, it goes without saying that it is not enough to control them by
in turn redoing the "correct" calculation or, as the case may be, logically rethinking the
proposal, but that must also be indicated with the means of exact calculation
or respectively of correct logic the precise point where the calculation and the proposition
logical tion which are the object of the research deviate from the rules that the author who
The exposes itself considers them to be normatively correct. It is not necessary
not only for the reasons of practical pedagogy that Windelband puts in
before in The Introduction to his Geschichte der Philosophie, when he speaks of
"Signs" intended to indicate "trails reserved for the transport of timber"
[Holzwege], because this result is only a desirable subsidiary consequence.
ble of historical work. Nor either because of all necessity the "value of
truth ”which we recognize as“ valid ”- and therefore also the
"Progress" in the direction of this truth - could in itself constitute the uni-
as possible relation to the ultimate values which would be decisive for the selection of
facts in any historical problematic, this one being able to have for object
what logical or mathematical knowledge or any other kind of
scientific knowledge. (Besides, even if it was really so, it was necessary to-
should nevertheless take into account the state of affairs so often pointed out by Windel-
band (159 ) which tells us that "progress" thus understood, instead of the direct path,
very frequently - economically speaking - takes the more profitable detour which
goes through the "errors", that is to say [520] the confusions of problems). That
is imposed on the contrary because (and therefore only insofar as) the
rights, where the scholarly picture of thought that is the subject of research deviates
of that which the scientist must regard himself as "just", belong generally
generally to the aspects which seem to him to be specifically "characteristic", that is,
that is, the aspects which, from his scholar's point of view, are directly important
In relation to values or causally from the angle of other facts equal-
ment related to values. This will normally be the case all the more often
that the truth value of thoughts constitutes more the guiding value of a
historical account, in particular in a history of a determined "science" (for
example philosophy or theoretical political economy).
This is not necessarily so in these cases alone. Indeed, things are

pass in at least an analogous way wherever a rational activity-
subjective by its intention, generally forms the object of a presentation, in short where
errors of "reasoning" and "calculation" may be the causal elements.
satisfied with the development of the activity. To "understand" for example the way
which a war has been waged, it is essential to re-imagine - maybe not
Page 44
necessarily in an explicit and detailed form - on both sides a command

ideal chief executive who would have had complete information and would always have had
keeping in mind the totality of the situation, the dislocation of the military forces in
presence as well as all the subsequent possibilities likely to be
ser the goal, univocal, in concreto, namely the destruction of military power
opponent, and who, on the basis of this information, would then have acted without committing
be of error nor of logical fault. Indeed, it is only in this way that it is possible to
determine unambiguously what was the causal influence exerted on
the course of events the actual commanders-in-chief who neither possessed nor
this knowledge and this discernment devoid of error and which were not
more generally simple rational thinking machines (160 ). Construction
rational here therefore takes on the value of a means allowing the "imputation
causal ”correct. Utopian constructions of a strictly rational activity
and devoid of error that "pure" economic theory imagines have
the same meaning.
To make the causal imputation of empirical phenomena we just-

ment need rational constructions which, as the case may be, - have a character
empirico- [521] technical or logical and which answer the question:
How can a state of affairs which can also consist of an external relation
activity than in a thought table (for example a philosophical system)
would he or would he present himself if he obeyed a "correctness" and a
Absolutely rational "absence of contradiction" of an empirical or logical order.
than ? Considered from a logical point of view, the construction of this kind of utopias
rationally correct is only one of the various possible figures of the "ideal-
type ”- because that is the name I gave to this kind of construct of concepts
(which I am moreover ready to exchange for a better denomination). Now, no
only we can conceive of cases, as we have already said, where an inference
characteristically false or typically contradictory behavior
with its end render precisely the best services in the form of the idealype,
but above all there are entire spheres of behavior (that of
the "irrational") where the univocity obtained by an abstraction by isolation makes it
more than the maximum of logical rationality (161 ).
In fact, the scientist very frequently uses "idealtypes" constructed according to

normative “correctness”; logically, however, the "normative correctness" of these
types is not the most essential. In fact, when a scientist proposes himself, for example,
to characterize a specific form of beliefs typical of an era, it
may as well build a type of convictions in accordance with its ethical standards
personal, and in this sense objectively "fair", that a type absolutely
contrary to its own norms, in order to then compare the behavior of the
dividus which it proposes to examine; finally he can even build a type of
convictions to which he personally attributes no positive or negative predicates.
In this respect, what is normatively "right" has no kind of mo-
nopole. Indeed, whatever the content of the rational idealype, which it represents
Page 45
a standard of legal dogma, ethical, aesthetic or religious belief

or a technical, economic or even a political maxim
legal, social or cultural or finally any kind of "evaluation"
elaborated in the most rational way possible, its construction does not
empirical research than the only following goal: "to compare" with him the empirical reality.
that and determine in what way it diverges from it, deviates from it or approaches it relative-
ment, in order to [522] be able to describe it with concepts as understandable and
as unambiguous as possible, understand and explain it through imputation
causal. The rational construction of concepts in legal dogmatics
for example fulfills these functions for the use of the empirical discipline of history
of law 8 and rational accounting theory for use in the analysis of
real behavior of economic units within a profit economy. The
two dogmatic disciplines that we have just cited obviously have in addition,
because they are also "technical arts", practical and normative purposes.
eminently important tifs. By virtue of their peculiarity of dogmatical sciences
that they are just as little empirical disciplines, in the sense discussed here, as
for example mathematics, logic, normative ethics or aesthetics,
although for other reasons they differ completely in the same way
that these differ from each other.
In the end, economic theory is obviously a dogmatic in one

logically very different meaning from that of legal dogmatics. Its concepts
relate to economic reality in a specific way other than
concepts of legal dogmatics to the reality of the object of history and the
empirical sociology of law. However, just as we can and should use
in these latter disciplines the concepts of legal dogmatics as
of "idealtypes", the exclusive meaning of pure economic theory is to serve the
knowledge of past and present social reality. Indeed, it establishes a certain
a number of presuppositions which are almost never fulfilled in the
reality, although they meet it in a more or less approximate way, and it
asks how human social activity would have been constituted in the
What about these presuppositions if its development had been strictly rational?
It therefore does not presuppose in particular that the sole reign of pure economic interests.
nomic and excludes the influence of political factors as well as of other
extra-economic factors on the orientation of the activity.
Unfortunately, economic theory has also been the victim of the phenomenon.
typical leads to the "confusion of problems" [ Problemverschlingung ] (162 ).
In fact, purely economic theory in its 'individualist', political
morally and morally 'neutral', which was an essential methodological
sand and doubtless always will remain so, was conceived by the radical school of
lism as the integral reflection of reality. "Natural", that is to say from reality
8 See on this subject my study on R. Stammler's Überwindung der materialistiche Geschichtsauf-

fassung (apud Gesaammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehr pp. 337 et seq.).
Page 46
unaltered by human foolishness, and for this reason as having the character
[523] of a "must-be"; in other words, it has been attributed the validity of an ideal
in the sphere of values instead of an ideal type to - use during research -
empirical che dealing with "being". When as a result of developments in the poli-
economic and social tic there was a turnaround in the appreciation of the State, the
The reaction that followed in the sphere of evaluations also had a very
quickly into that of being and pure economic theory was rejected not only
sense of an ideal - validity to which it should never have been entitled - but also to
that of methodological process useful in the study of reality. Considerations
"Philosophical" of all kinds have taken the place of the pragmatic ration-
nelle, so that by identifying the psychological "being" and the "frontier"
ethics, it was impossible to establish a clear distinction between
sphere of evaluations and that of empirical work. The extraordinary results
that the representatives of this scientific development have obtained in terms of
historical and sociological as well as that of social policy are
as undeniable as the need for an impartial observer to observe that
this development has caused for a number of decades a degradation of
constant tion of theoretical and strictly scientific work in general: this is
a normal consequence of confusing issues.
The first of the two main theses invoked by the opponents of the
pure theory consists in looking at rational constructions as "pure
fictions ”which do not tell us anything about empirical reality. Heard as he
This assertion can be justified. Indeed, the theoretical constructions are
solely in the service of knowledge which is in no way provided to them by
realities, especially since, as a result of the intervention of other series of factors and
reasons that are not included in the presuppositions of the theoretical construction
that, even in the best cases, these are never more than approximations
tions of theoretically constructed development. Also as we show
the preceding explanations, this does not bring the slightest objection against the use
ty and the need for pure theory. The second thesis maintains that it cannot ab-
there can be no axiologically neutral theory of economic policy.
that understood as science. It is obvious that it is fundamentally false and
even all the more false as the "axiological neutrality" - understood at the ma-
that we have defined above - is precisely the presupposition of any
purely scientific research focusing on policy and mainly on the
social and economic policy. I think it is not necessary to repeat a
again that it is naturally possible and even scientifically useful and
necessary to develop proposals of the following type: if we want to achieve the goal
(of the order of economic policy) x , measurement y is the only appropriate means
or, [524] given the conditions b, b 1 , and b 2 , the measurements y 1 , y 2 , and y 3 ,
are the only or most effective means. I would only like to recall here in y
insisting that the problem remains even where it is possible to define in a fa-
The end is absolutely unambiguous . If we are in the presence of such univocity
we are dealing with a simple inversion of a causal relation, and consequently
Page 47

quent to a pure "technical" problem. Therefore, in all these cases, there is no
nothing that could prevent science from dealing with these technical relations of a premature order.
leological as simple causal relations and to conceive them according to the
formula: to y constantly succeeds the result x or respectively, given
the conditions b 1 , b 2 and b 3 , at y 1 , y 2 and y 3 succeeds the effect X. All this means at
the same thing, and the "man of action" can draw from it without difficulty
these ”.
However, in addition to its role which consists on the one hand in the development of
purely idealtypical formulations and on the other hand in establishing
singular causal relationships of an economic order - because it is only and without
exception of relations of this kind when x must be sufficiently unambiguous and
that the attribution of an effect to its cause and consequently the relation of means to end
must be sufficiently rigorous - it is still up to scientific theory
saving other tasks. She still has to study all the phenomena
social to determine the extent to which they are co-conditioned by causes
its economics: it is the work of the economic interpretation of history and
sociology. On the other hand it also has to study how events and
economic structures are in turn conditioned by social phenomena
taking into account the diversity of nature and stage of development of these
phenomena: this is the work of the history and sociology of economics. TO
this last kind of phenomena obviously and even in the first
take place political acts and structures and above all the State as well as the right
guaranteed by the state. It is no less obvious that political phenomena are not
not alone involved. On the contrary, it is necessary to take into account all the structures that
influence the economy - to a sufficiently large extent in relation to
scientific interest. The accepted expression of: theory of economic policy
that, of course only imperfectly to designate all of these
problems. If we continue to use it despite everything, this can be explained externally.
by the fact that universities are the place where we train future civil servants of
the State, internally by the fact that the State has the means of partial power
particularly effective in influencing the economy very strongly, [525] and therefore
by- the practical importance that the reflection on the state phenomenon has assumed. It
need not repeat once again that in all this research it is
possible to reverse the "cause and effect" relationships into those of "medium to end"
whenever the result in question is indicated in a sufficiently univocal way.
than. Obviously, neither does all of this change the logical relationship between
the sphere of evaluation and that of empirical knowledge. As a follow-up to
all this, - we will say again, by way of conclusion, a few words on a point
particular.
The development of recent decades as well as unprecedented events

what we are now witnessing has increased tremendously
the prestige of the state. Among all the social communities it is the only one
which today is granted "legitimate" power over life, death and
Page 48
freedom ; its organs make use of it in times of war against the external enemy.
laughter and in times of peace and war against internal resistance. In p-
period of peace he is the most important economic entrepreneur and the master
more powerful to impose tributes on citizens; in times of war he dis-
poses without any limit of all the economic goods which are accessible to him.
In its modern, streamlined form of business it was possible to proceed,
in multiple fields of activity, to achievements which, indisputably, do not
could be performed, even roughly, by any other species of
social cooperation. It was almost inevitable that one should draw the consequence that he
should be seen as the ultimate "value" - mainly in terms of
concerns on-the-ground evaluations of 'policy' - and that any activity
social should ultimately be measured against the interests that are decisive
for its existence. All in all, this too is an absolute transformation.
inadmissible in the interpretation that distorts the facts of the sphere of being
to make them standards in the sphere of evaluation, not to mention that we
sounds abstraction of the lack of univocity in the consequences that result from
these evaluations as soon as we approach the discussion of the means (intended to
"Maintain" or "promote" the state).
Against this prestige of the State, it is necessary, by remaining precisely at the level
simple facts, make the following remark - the State is incapable of making a certain
a number of things. This is true even in the fields which pass for
be his, chosen ground, for example the military domain, It suffices to observe
certain manifestations that the current war allows us to observe within
the armies of certain states with a multinational character (163 ). They teach us
annoy that [526] the free devotion, which cannot be ordered, of individuals to
cause of the State of which they are members is by no means indifferent, even for the
successful military operations. In terms of the economy, we will point out sim-
as an indication that the conversion of the forms and principles of the economy
war in permanent institutions of the peace economy could lead to
very quickly to consequences that would have a pernicious effect on the plans
ideals of the representatives of the expansionist conception of the state. But there is
there is no need to discuss this kind of question at length here. When we rise to
the sphere of evaluations we can very reasonably be the advocate of the point
of view which wishes on the one hand to strengthen as considerably as possible the,
coercive power of the state to make it a means of breaking resistance
and on the other hand deny it any intrinsic value by reducing it to the role of a
technical instrument intended to achieve totally different values,
which he holds his dignity and which he can only safeguard on the condition of not
deny its vocation as a simple maneuver.
However, we have no intention of developing this theme here nor

nor to plead for himself or for any other evaluative point of view in
general. One thing should be remembered: if there is a virtue that one can demand from an "
such professional intellectual “[ berufsmäßigen Denker ] , it is the obligation, to him recom-
Page 49
urge, moreover, to always keep a cool head, in the sense of

personal authority, in the face of all ideals, even the most majestic that reign
hinder at a specific time and, if necessary, to "swim against the current". " The
German ideas of 1914 ”were a pure product of literati ( 164). The expres-
of "socialism of the future" is a rhetorical way of designating the rationalization.
sation of the economy through a combination of bureaucratization
more advanced and utilitarian management of affairs by those concerned. And when, at
place to objectively discuss the purely technical desirability of measures
which, to a large extent, are conditioned by the possibilities
financial, the fanaticism of the proselytes of the economy implores the blessing not
only German philosophy, but also religion - too much
frequent these days - I cannot see anything other than an aberration of the taste of
literati who give themselves importance. No one can predict right now
knowing with certainty what can or should be the real "ideas al-
the demands of 1918 ”, because the soldiers who will return from the front will have their say in
to say. And the future will undoubtedly depend on these ideas.
Page 50
Notes from the translator, Julien Freund,

for the fourth test:

in sociological and economic sciences ” (1917)
Return to the table of contents
( 127 ) This essay first appeared in Logos, t. VII, 1917. The theme
that Weber deals with here in some depth is in the background of all his
methodological work. You can also consult the article he published in the
number of September 20, 1908 in the Frankfurter Zeitung under the title: Die so-
genannte " Lehrfreiheit" an den deutschen Universitäten and the Wis-
senschaft ais Beruf which sums up the essentials. The manuscript to which Weber refers
sion here has just been published recently under the title Gutachten zur Werturteilsdis-
kus sion by E. BAUMGARTEN in Max Weber, Werk und Person, pp. 102-139.
How much this problem was dear to Weber's heart, as can be seen from the efforts he made
taken to create the German Sociological Society in 1909. On the difficulties
encountered, see Marianne WEBER, Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild, pp. 427-430. It
demanded that the company's articles of association recognize the principle of axiomatic neutrality
logical (see on this subject the Schriften der deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie,
Verhandlungen, t. I, p. V and the explanations of WEBER, ibid. pp. 39 et seq.). It
believed he had won his case when he collided during the 2nd congress of
this company in Berlin in 1912 to such hostility that he resigned from
member of the Steering Committee.
( 128 ) This association, Verein für Sozialpolitik, was founded in 1872 by G.

Schmoller and grouped together economists, historians and philosophers (in particular
those who were then called the Kathedersozialisten) who proposed a reform
in the direction of social progress, but without recourse to violent and
holders. Weber embraced it as he embarked on the academic career. This is
on behalf of this organization, he conducted the socio-economic survey, the es-
sentiel is found in the study known as: Die Verhältnisse der Landar-
beiter im ostelbischen Deutschland, 1892.
Page 51
( 129 ) This study by B. SPRANGER appeared in the Schmollers Jahrbuch, t.

XXXVIII (1914), under the title: Die Stellung der Werturteile in der Nationalöko-
nomie.
( 130 ) It is hard to imagine the turmoil that may have caused in the circles
German academics Weber's position, although the immediate result
was to practically isolate it. To understand this complex matter, it is necessary
to resume the succession of facts. The survey cited above (note 128) had
enshrined the authority of Weber. He opposed Schmoller's views fairly quickly.
for reasons of simple intellectual integrity. The conflict took a sharp turn when
of the Congress of the Association for Social Policy in 1909 in Vienna. The theme
treated was nevertheless very technical: the problem of the initiative of the communes in
economic matter. Schmoller, who was as founder the main fi
of this society, and Weber clashed over the question of the patronage of
The State. The former championed it, while Weber defended the idea of a
autonomy of the working class and the lower classes, at the same time
posed the problem of the relationship between ethics and politics in the form of
validity of value judgments in science. We even spoke at that moment
of a division of the assembly into a right and a minority left, Weber pas-
health for the leader of the latter - which thwarted his own views. (The
Weber's main intervention is reproduced in his Gesammelte Aufsätze zur
Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, pp. 412-416). It was decided in Vienna to donate for
theme at the congress following a debate on value judgments and the
principle of drafting written contributions to be sent to participants when
ques months before the meeting of the preparatory assembly of the congress. Thus
Weber wrote the manuscript just mentioned in 1913: others wrote
likewise, such Eulenburg; Hartmann, Oncken, Schumpeter, Spann, Spranger, von
Wiese, Wilbrandt, etc. In the meantime, however, Schmoller took Weber to task in
opening a controversy on the remarks made by Weber at the Congress of Vienna.
(See on this subject the last section of the SCHMOLLER article: Volkswirt-
schaft, Volkswirtchaftslekre und-method in the 30th ed. (Jena 1911) from Hand-
wörterbuck der Staatswissenschaften, t. VIII, in particular pp. 493-501. More
far, we will have the opportunity to come back to this study on several occasions.)
of the preparatory assembly of January 5, 1914, the discussion quickly turned to
sour. At Schmoller's proposal, we gave up including the discussions.
in the minutes
sociation of the meeting
the contributions andabove,
cited to be published in the collection
while authorizing of writings
each author of the
to publish
his own as an individual. With the exception of Sombart, all the other participants
pants (they were more than fifty) opposed with more or less enthusiasm.
gue to Weber, so that the latter finally left the sitting room. One can
consult on all these points F. BOESE, Geschichte des Vereins für Sozialpolitik
1872 bis 1932, published in 1939 as volume 188 of the collection of this
association. You have to keep in mind all this controversy to understand
the essay on Axiological Neutrality, although Weber gave up, out of discretion
or out of deference, to make personal attacks. We can still see
Page 52
how much this problem has shaken German intellectual circles today,
that he always continues to divide them.
( 131 ) Weber had followed the courses of these two historians during the year 1884-1885.
The work of Th. MOMMSEN (1817-1903) is well known. Just indicate
in passing that the family of Th. Mommsen and that of Weber were allies. the
son of the first had married Clara, the sister of Max Weber. H.TREITSCHKE
( 1834-1896 ) was one of the most brilliant advocates of Bismarck's politics and the
theorist of what is called the politics of power (Machtpolitik). See his
Vorlesungen über Politik, edited by Comicelius, 2 vols., 1897-1898.
( 132 ) The awareness of the growing importance of specialization, corre-

which, moreover, is one of the themes of increasing rationalization.
graduates of Weber's methodology. Cf. for example, The scientist and the politician
as, pp. 61-84 and 129-131.
( 133 ) G. SCHMOLLER (I838-1917), which has often been mentioned in the

cédentes notes, was one of the main representatives of the history of the economy
politics in Germany. As we have already said he was the leader of the second
German historical school of political economy and founder of the Association
for a social policy. He also fought well. 'influence of the classical theory
as English as marginalism, the conceptions of Treitschke as those of
Sombart and Weber. He is the author of Über einige Grundfragen der Sozialpolitik
und Volkswirtschaftslehre (1898) from a Grundriß der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaft-
slehre, 2 vol. (1890-1904) and Die soziale Frage (1918). We can read of him through-
French duction: Social Policy and Political Economy (Paris 1902) and Princi-
political economy (Paris 1905).
( 134 ) Cf. The Scientist and the Politician, pp. 74-75.
( 135 ) Allusion to the behavior of Emperor William IL Weber did not have
waited for the setbacks of the First World War to criticize this monarch.
In the letters to F. Naumann of 14-XII- 1906, 12-Xl and 18-XI- 1908 he
qualifies the policy of the emperor of "dilettantism", of "corporalized power",
of "swagger" and the ruler himself of Schattenkaiser. See the first
edition (1921) of Gesammelte politische Schriften. These letters have been deleted
in the second edition.
( 136 ) In the Gutachten zur Wertdiskussion, published by BAUMGARTEN, op. cit.

p. 110 it is specified that this declaration was made during an assembly of the
spankers of the Technical High Schools. It appears to be the 4th
an assembly of this kind held in Dresden in 1911 which Weber attended.
The position taken by the latter provoked new controversies even in the
hurry. It is well known that Weber has never ceased to protest against discrimination.
at the university level either to the detriment of the Jews (despite the friendship he had for Win-
Page 53
delband and Rickert, he did not forgive them for having hindered the university career
sitaire de Simmel) or to the detriment of the Socialists (the article in the Frankfurter Zei-
tung) of September 20, 1908 on Die sogenannte Lehrfreiheit contained a pro-
energetic test against the refusal of certain German faculties to authorize
socialists).
( 137 ) At the time of writing this essay (1917) Weber's hostility to the
The Kaiser's ringing was such that he isolated himself completely and even fell out with his
best friends. See letter from B. Troeltsch. to P. Honigsheim from I2-VI-1917,
in BAUMGARTEN, Op. M. p. 489. As early as 1916 Weber had advocated a peace
compromise and he even proposed to be guilty, by a gesture which
conch, lèse-majesté in order to be able to expose in court the faults
committed by the emperor against the German nation. He was also one of the
first to demand the abdication of William II for pure political reasons. In
Indeed, Weber's opposition to the emperor did not arise from feelings
antimonarchists, as shown by the letters of 11-X-1918 to Schultze - Gä-
vernitz, from 12 -X and 17-X-1918 to F. Naumann, in the first-edition of Ge-
sammelte politische Schriften, pp. 476-478.
( 138 ) Weber has repeatedly denounced this kind of pseudo-objectivity, in

particularly in the study on the Objectivity of knowledge, p. 154 and in Ge-
sammelte Aufsälze on Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, P. 431. However, the argument
tation takes on a particular flavor here from the fact that in the article already cited in the Han-
diwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften Schmoller rightly claimed the opi-
average nion of German philosophers to fight Weber.
( 139 ) Allusion to a sentence pronounced by W. Sombart about the discussion

on value judgments at the meeting of the Association for Politics
social in Vienna in 1909: “We cannot discuss these kinds of judge-
as long as it has not been scientifically proven which blondes or brunettes
are the most charming. "
( 140 ) In the article in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften Schmoller

considers as subjective the partisan judgments of political parties and
clerical, while in contrast we would witness in the sciences the growing triumph
objective judgments even in the order of ethics. Indeed, this would tend to
become an experimental science and for this reason there is no need to revolt
ter against the intrusion of morality into political economy.
( 141 ) Allusion to a sentence by Schmoller in the same article: “I believe that

ethics is a realistic science in the same way as political economy ”(p,
four hundred ninety seven). It would undoubtedly be interesting to compare this passage on the one hand with Morale
et science des mœurs de Lévy-Bruhl and on the other hand with the article that -Durkheim
published at the same time in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale in 1911,
Page 54
precisely on judgment of value and judgment of reality (republished in DURK-

HEIM, Sociology and Philosophy, Paris1951.)
( 142 ) Once again Weber associates in the same movement of the median analysis
thodic "explanation" and "comprehension".
( 143 ) Weber responds here to Schmoller who accused him of being a "puritan of ethi-
that "from the fact that he only accepted the validity of pure formal imperatives in the
contrary to moral science which, while bringing Catholics and Protestants together,
realistic and idealistic, would be able to generate unanimity between religions
as well as between scholars and peoples on the content of cultural values
as simple as they are indisputable. In short, morality would become in Schmoller's eyes
a science of being and not of having to be and as such it could define
rities valid for politics, law and economics.
( 144 ) The theme of the tension between politics and morality or religion has been
repeatedly dealt with by Weber, in particular in the Zwi schenbetrachtung
des Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, t. 1, pp. 545-554 and in Le
scholar and politician , pp. 181-201. To our knowledge, this passage is with a
other of the Zwischenbetrachtung, pp. 552-553 one of the first where Weber opposes
clearly the terms of conviction and responsibility. It was only later that he
will forge the concepts of “ethics of conviction” and “ethics of responsibility
té ”, that of“ ethics of conviction ”having been formed the first. Indeed the fac-
similé no 16, published by Baumgarten ( op. cit. ) still shows a hesitation of
Weber when writing the notes for his lecture Politik als Beruf. the
manuscript indicates Machtethik, but Weber crossed out Macht to replace this
term by Verantwortung.
( 145 ) In all likelihood this is an allusion to the thesis supported by

Simmel in his work on Kant, Leipzig 1904.
( 146 ) Weber here opposes the views expressed by Rickert in his article "Vom
System der Werte ”, Logos, t. IV. See also the study on the Objectivity of
knowledge, pp. 15o-156 and The Scientist and the Politician , pp. 93-94.
( 147 ) The question of development trends was one of the most important
were to be discussed correlatively to that of the value judgment during the
seemingly preparatory for which the present writing was originally intended. Weber
immediately expands the problem by including the other points which depend on it,
those of adaptation and progress. On the notion of development trend
see also Critical Studies, pp. 289-290 and Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie
in Rußland , in Gesammelte Politischt Schriften (26th ed. 1958), p. 61. There is
however, it should be noted that Weber is the author of a study entitled Entwicklung-
stendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter, reproduced in his Ge-
Page 55
sammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. See also the study
on the notion of adaptation, ibid . pp. 57 and 66.
( 148 ) Cf. The Scientist and the Politician , pp. 200-201.

( 149 ) See Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie , t. I, pp. 514-536.
( 150 ) Cf. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial und Sozialpolitik, pp. 401-402.
( 151 ) This is the work by G. SIMMEL, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche, Ein

Vortragzyklus (Leipzig 1907).
( 152 ) According to Marianne Weber ( op. Cit. P. 349) Max Weber intended to write
a sociology of art which would have been the counterpart of its sociology of religion, in order to
to highlight the originality of the rationalization of Western civilization
tale. See also the foreword (pp. 12-13) to The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of
capitalism.
( 153 ) Weber gave some indication of his conception of the technique in

during his speech after W. Sombart's presentation on Technique and culture,
at the first congress of the German sociological society in Frankfurt in 1911.
Sombart's presentation was published in the Archiv, für Sozialwissenschaft und So-
zialpolitik, t. XXXIII (1911). Weber's intervention is reproduced in his Ge-
sammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial und Sozialpolitik, pp. 449-456
( 154 ) See the work already cited by WEBER, Die rationalen und soziologischen
Grundlagen der Musik.
( 155 ) H. WÔLFFLIN (1864-1945). The exact title of the work is: Die klassische
Kunst. Fine Einführung in die Italienische Renaissance (München 1899). The or-
vrage was translated into French for the 40 edition under the title: Classic Art. Intro
duction to the genius of the Italian Renaissance (Paris 1911). Other works from
same author : Renaissance und Barok (1888), Gedanken zur Kunstgeschichte
(1941), and above all Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe (1915), which was also
translated into French under the title: Fundamental Principles of Art History (Pa-
laugh 1952).
( 156 ) Cf. The Scientist and the Politician , pp. 75-76.
( 157 ) R. LIEFMANN (1874-1941), German economist with a psychological tendency

gist. Weber alludes here to the statements of this scholar during the debate on the
productivity during the meeting of the Association For Social Policy at
Vienna in 1911 and possibly also in the book, Die Unternehmungsformen, 1912.
Page 56
( 158 ) The publisher of the 2nd edition of the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre
believes Weber is referring to K. PRANTL, the author of the Geschichte der Logik
im Abendland , 4 vol. (Leipzig 1855-1870). We were unable to locate the
passage to which Weber alludes, except that Prantl states in the introduction to the
fourth volume that medieval logic is particularly abstruse and that
nine tenths of the writings of this period are worthless.
( 159 ) WINDERLAND, Geschichte der Philosophie , 4th ed., § 2, p, 11.
( 160 ) This example is, so to speak, typical from the point of view of the meaning
of the ideal type.
( 161 ) Cf. Essay on some categories of comprehensive sociology , pp. 429,

432-433, 438
( 162 ) This conclusion is much less harsh than that of the Gutachten zur Wer-
turteilsdiskussion (BAUMGARTEN, op.cit. p. 139) where Weber declares that he reigns
a real "methodological pestilence" in political economy, because
each scientist feels the need to make himself interesting by adding his grain of
salt of an epistemological and evaluative character to purely empirical research.
It is true, Weber had been even more aggressive during the Association meeting.
for social policy in Vienna in 1911, during which he reportedly declared
according to Schmoller (article cited in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften , P.
493) that the “intrusion of must-being into scientific questions is the result of
devil ”- Das Hineinmengen eines Solleens in tvissenschaftlichen Fragen ist eine
Know Teufels.
( 163 ) Allusion to the political and military situation in Austria-Hungary during the
first World War.
( 164 ) This is the nationalist and socialist movement led by the sociologist
German J. PLENGE (1874-1963) and Swedish historian R. KJELLEN (1864-
1922), one of the masters of geopolitics ( Der Staat als Lebensform , 1917 and
Grundriß zu einem System der Politik, 1920) which, through Hausho-
iron and other students, initially influenced the National Socialist movement. the
manifesto of the movement of which Weber speaks appeared in 1916 under the title: 1789 und
-1914, Die symbolische Jahre in der Geschichte des politischen Geistes. So
same theme, see Weber, Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deuts-
chland in the Gesammelte politische Schriften, pp. 315 and 384.

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Page 1

Max WEBER (1864-1920)

Translation from German and introduced

A document produced in digital version by Gemma Paquet, volunteer,

As part of the collection: "The Classics of Social Sciences"

A collection developed in collaboration with the Library

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 2

This electronic edition was produced by Gemma Paquet, volunteer, professor at

Essays on the theory of science

A digital edition based on the book Essays on the theory of

A collection of essays published between 1904 and 1917.

For the text: Times, 12 points.

Layout on paper format: LETTER (US letter), 8.5 '' x 11 '')

Edition completed on August 2, 2006 in Chicoutimi, Ville de Saguenay, Quebec.

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 3

First try : “The objectivity of knowledge in science and politics

Second essay: “Critical studies to serve the logic of science

1. Elements for a discussion of the ideas of Édouard Meyer

Third essay: “Essay on some categories of sociology comprehen-

1. Meaning of a "comprehensive" sociology.

Translator's notes for the fourth essay.

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 4

ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SCIENCE

TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN AND INTRODUCED BY JULIEN FREUND

The essays published here are taken from

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 5

Essay on the meaning of "axio-neutrality

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 6

[475] Unless otherwise indicated and unless the meaning is clear

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 7

Should we or should not in general (subject to the indicated reservations)

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 8

The favorable prejudice of Professor von Schmoller ( 133) for evaluations

It is still an unprecedented situation, to see many prophecies

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 9

Like anyone else, the teacher has other means to propagate

1) to perform a given task with ease,

3) to withdraw his own person to serve a cause and consequently to repress

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 10

Finally, it is hardly necessary to insist specially on the fact that among

Anyway, it is, in my opinion, only a consistent way of claiming

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 11

course 3 . Unfortunately when we insist here on the professor's right to

3 It is by no means possible to consider as satisfactory the principle which in Holland unbinds

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 12

In addition, I would not like to open a discussion on the "difficulty" either.

4 This is not a peculiarity unique to Germany. There is also, under a

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 13

it too, impracticable and yet it passes for "obligatory". A review of

[485] Finally, there is a last conception which must be combated in the

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 14

The concept of "value judgment" has given rise to an immense misunderstanding

1) "appreciable" results [ wertvolk ] , which means logically correct

2) "appreciable" results, which means, this time, important to the

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 15

In an otherwise valuable study, a writer exposes the idea that a scholar

To tell the truth, there is no question here of discussing to what extent

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. Fourth attempt (1917) 16

very similar subjective judgments of taste ( 139). These problems belong to

6 In his article on Volkswirtschalftslehre du Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften ( 3rd

On the other hand, I vigorously dispute that a "realistic" science of morality

1) for the purposes of an empirical causal study of human activity, in order to

2) to clarify, during a discussion with an individual whose evaluations

1) the recognition of spheres of independent values of extra- order