BBA-LLB (HONS)/DIV- F

SEMESTER-II

NAME: SAMYAK JAIN

ROLL NO: F036 SAP ID: 81022019430

SUBJECT-LAW OF CONTRACT

TITLE: DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION

SUBMITTED TO – PROF.MEENAZ KAZI

 INDEX

SL TOPIC PG
NO
NO.

1 INTRODUCTION 3-4

2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4

3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 5

4 MEANING OF FRUSTRATION 5-8

5 ESSENTIAL OF FRUSTRATION 9-10

6 GROUNDS FOR FRUSTRATION 10-11

7 EFFECTS 12-14

8 FRUSTRATION IN SINGAPORE 14-15

9 CONCLUSION 15-16

10 REFERENCE 17
 DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION

INTRODUCTION
Frustration is a theory of English contract law that allows parties to cancel contracts when an
unforeseen event makes contractual obligations impossible or significantly alters the parties'
primary motivation for entering into the contract. Historically, there has been no method to
cancel an impossible contract after its formation; the frustration theory was not established until
1863, with the Taylor v Caldwell1 decision. Although the concept has gained popularity since its
introduction, it still has a limited scope of applicability; Lord Roskill said that "it should not be
used carelessly to relieve contracting parties of the natural consequences of reckless
agreements”. Early cases, such as Paradine v Jane2, demonstrate the historical line the courts
took toward frustrating the purpose of the contract; in this case, the courts held that when the
land leased to the defendant had been invaded by royalist forces, the defendant was still
obligated to pay rent to the landowner. A theory of frustration was not explicitly recognized until
Taylor v Caldwell, which alleviated the possible severity of earlier rulings. Two parties agreed to
lease a music room in order to hold concerts. The music hall caught fire after hiring but before
hiring dates. Judge Blackburn ruled that the absolute liability set forth in Paradine v Jane would
not apply in the current instance, as there was an implicit requirement that the music room would
exist at the time of the planned concerts. This effectively released the parties from their
obligations under the contract. Lord Loreburn described the implicit term test as follows:

In most cases, it was alleged that there was an implicit condition in the contract that allowed the
parties to avoid complying with it, and I think that was the underlying basis on which the court
decided. The rule of Absolute Contracts was established in the early days, according to which a

1
Taylor v. Caldwell,3 B&S 826: 122 ER 309.

2
Paradine v Jane (1647) Aleyn 26.
man was strictly bound by his contract and, in the absence of a clear restriction of duty from him,
must accept the consequences of not being able to execute his commitment under alteration .
circumstances. Consequently, he did not make any exemptions in favor of the promisor, who,
however, was responsible for the breach of his promise despite an accident or other unforeseen
event that prevented him from carrying it out. Frustration refers to being defeated in a generic
sense, and is a phrase that is frequently used in agreements and contracts between parties. The
phrase frustration is used to describe failed transactions that could not be completed for some
reason. The frustration theory has developed as one of the most frequent difficulties that has
arisen in dealing with failed contracts in contract law. In this paper we will try to learn about
Frustration in contract which is a valid way of discharging a contract.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

 To Study about the principle and meaning of frustration of contract.

 To study and find the grounds where frustration can be claimed.
 To study about the effects of Frustration in contract.
 To study the cases where frustration has not happened yet condition of frustration of
contract is fulfilled.
 To study some instances of frustration of contract in Singapore law.

HYPOTHESIS
When it is alleged that a change of situation or a change of conditions, after the creation of the
contract but before the termination of the contract, has made performance of the contract
impossible, both physically and financially, the concept of frustration applies. The doctrine does
not concern itself with the first impossibility that a contract can declare worthless from the
beginning.

The idea of contractual frustration can be applied to a wide range of contracts. As a result, it is
impossible to provide a complete list of circumstances in which the concept of frustration will be
applied to excuse the performance of a contractual duty.

Meaning of Frustration in Contract Law

The maxim Lex nec cogit ad Impossibilia supports the theory of frustration. It indicates that the
"impossible" is not required by law. A basic assumption in a contract between two parties is that
the fulfillment of the contract depends on the continued existence of a certain person or thing,
and that any subsequent impossibility (due to the death of the person or the object) will excuse
the execution of the contract. In all contracts, this condition is implicit.

Frustration occurs when an external factor beyond the control of the parties makes the contract
impossible to perform. It covers both the impossibility of fulfilling the contractual duty and the
impossibility of achieving the secondary objective for which the contract was signed. In other
words, 'frustration' occurs when performance of a contract becomes impossible, that is, the
intended purpose of the parties is frustrated. If a supervening or unforeseen and unforeseeable
circumstance makes the execution impracticable, the promisor is exempted from the execution.
When it is alleged that a change in circumstances after the formation of the contract has made it
physically or commercially impossible to fulfill the contract, or that the required performance
has become a radically different obligation than that assumed in the contract, it applies the
doctrine of frustration. . The theory does not concern itself with initial impossibility, which could
void a contract ab initio, such as when a contracting party agrees to perform an act that is
physically impossible according to current scientific knowledge and achievements at the time the
contract is signed.

The Doctrine of 'Frustration', which is discussed in this issue, was created by English law. When
performance of a contract becomes impossible, the original intention of the parties is frustrated.
The promisor is released from the contractual obligation if performance becomes impossible due
to supervening or unforeseen and unforeseen events. This condition is implicit in all contracts
and is known as the Doctrine of Frustration. An agreement to perform a specific action.
Impossible is empty in itself. A contract to perform an act that becomes impossible or illegal
after the contract is concluded, due to some event that the promisor could not avoid, is canceled
when the act becomes impossible or illegal, when a person has promised to do something that he
knows, or with reasonable diligence he could have known, and that the promise did not know, is
canceled when the act becomes impossible or illegal, when a person has promised to do
something that he knows, or with reasonable diligence he could have known, and that the
promise did not know , is canceled when Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 establishes
a positive rule of law, and the courts cannot deviate from it. It simplifies the English rule in
general and leaves no room for examination of the many theories proposed in England, nor does
it leave the subject to be decided according to the intentions of the parties. Judge Mukherjee
articulated the foundations of India's concept of frustration in Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneeram
Bangur.3

These proceeds in this way:

The philosophy is based on the concept of impossibility of performance of the contract. In

reality, the terms "impossibility" and "frustration" are frequently interchanged. Because the
parties did not undertake to make the impossibility, the parties are released from further
performance of the contract due to the altered circumstances.

The concept of frustration is essentially an aspect or pact of the contract performance law due to
the impossibility or supervening illegibility of the act that was promised to be performed, which
is why it is included in section 56 of the Indigenous Contracts Law of 1872.As a result, section
56 of the Indian Contracts Act 1872 establishes a positive rule of law, and English authorities

3
Satyabharata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur,AIR (1954) SC 44.
cannot be of direct help, although they may be of persuasive value in demonstrating how English
courts have handled cases in comparable situations or in similar situations.

ESSENTIAL OF Frustration

Frustration occurs when performance of the contract becomes impossible due to external
circumstances beyond the control of the parties. It covers both the impossibility of executing the
contract and the impossibility of fulfilling the secondary objective for which the contract was
entered into.

The frustration theory is applied when it is stated that a change in the situation or a change in the
conditions, after the creation of the contract but before the conclusion of the contract, has made
the performance of the contract impossible, both physically and financially.

The doctrine ignores the first impossibility that can declare the contract worthless from the
beginning. The idea of contractual frustration applies to a wide range of contracts. As a result, it
is impossible to provide a complete list of cases in which the theory of frustration will be used to
excuse the performance of a contractual obligation.

Grounds of Frustration

The notion of contractual frustration, or inability to perform, can be applied to a wide range of
contracts. As a result, it is impossible to provide a complete list of cases where the concept will
be used to justify performance. It is undeniable that the legislation on the matter is evolving.
However, the following sources of annoyance have become established.

(a) Destruction of subject matter:

The frustration theory has its most visible application in cases like Taylor v. Caldwell. In which
the thematic content of the contract was destroyed. In this case, the defendants agreed to allow
the plaintiffs to use a music room for four specific concert nights. The hall was destroyed by fire
shortly after the contract was signed, but before the first night arrived. The defendants were not
liable for damages, according to Blackburn J. of the Court of Queen's Bench, since the theory of
inviolability of contracts only applied to a guarantee that was final and absolute, and not subject
to any stated or implied condition. The learned judge used the concept of implicit condition to
introduce the doctrine of frustration into English law, arguing that the nature of the contract
implied that the parties should have known from the outset that performance of the contract
depended on the continued existence of a contract. specific. person or thing.

He decided that the disputed contract should be interpreted as follows: Subject to an implicit
condition that the parties will be forgiven if, prior to the breach, the performance of the contract
becomes impossible due to the disappearance of the object.

Taylor versus Caldwell further says that destroying only part of the issue can also frustrate a
contract. Although the lease for Surrey Gardens and Music Hall was terminated, only the hall
was demolished, while the gardens continued to be used as an entertainment venue. It is
sufficient if the main objective of the contract is achieved. As a result, the principle developed
here is that, in cases where performance depends on the continued existence of a specific person
or thing, the condition is implied that the impossibility of performance resulting from the death
of that person or thing will excuse the fulfillment of the contract. obligation. In the words of J.
Blackburn, there is an implicit condition that the inability to perform due to the death of the
person or object excuses the execution. However, it should be noted that partial destruction of
the object that does not have this severe impact would not defeat the entire contract; Rather, it
may provide one party with a reason to fully perform or offer the other party the opportunity to
terminate the contract. The approach developed in Taylor v. Caldwell was quickly used in other
cases and was also recognized by the legislature in the context of sales agreements.

(b) Change of circumstances:

A contract will be frustrated if "circumstances arise that make it impossible to perform the
contract in the manner and at the time contemplated". In Pameshwari Das Mehra v. Ram
Chand Om Prakash4 ,Just Kapur of the Punjab and Haryana High Court explained the
principle as follows: "It is clear that if there is a totally unexpected change of circumstances,
the question will have to be examined whether this change of Circumstances have affected

4
Pameshwari Das Mehra v. Ram Chand Om PrakashAIR 1952 34,38.
 the performance of the contract to such an extent that it has made it practically impossible or
extremely difficult. " If such is the case, and the change in circumstances was not caused by
the fault of either party, the courts will not enforce the contract.
(c) Non-occurrence of anticipated events:
Sometimes, the performance of a contract is completely conceivable, but the value of the
performance is destroyed due to the non-occurrence of an event considered by both parties as
the basis of the contract. In Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton 5, the plaintiff was Herne
Bay Steam Boat Co. It developed as a result of the coronation delay. On this occasion, the
Royal Naval Review was suggested. The defendant chartered a two-person steamboat to
transport a group of paying tourists to see the naval review and enjoy a day trip around the
fleet. However, the search was canceled and the defendant was unable to use the boat.
However, he was held liable to pay the remainder of the rent, minus the profits generated by
the plaintiff in the normal course of business.
(d) Death or incapacity of the party: if the performance of a contract depends on the presence
of a certain individual, that person is exempted from complying if that person dies or
becomes too ill to fulfill. When the nature or conditions of a contract require the promisor to
perform it personally, his death or invalidity will terminate the contract. The known authority
is Robinson v. Davison. The plaintiff and the defendant's wife, an accomplished pianist, had
agreed that she would play the piano at a concert given by the plaintiff on a specific day. She
felt bad the morning of the concert and could not attend. The plaintiff lost money because the
show had to be rescheduled. The plaintiff's breach of contract lawsuit was dismissed.
According to the court, not only was she excused from participating, but she was also not at
liberty to participate if she was deemed unfit. The contract was clearly conditioned on her
being able to fulfill: "The entire contract obviously conditioned on the assumptions of
continuation of life and the conditions that prevailed at that time." Both parties make this
assumption; if the foundation fails, the entire contract must fail. Ms. Davison's total and utter
inability to perform the contract was a major deficiency for the foundation. "
(e) An agreement is dissolved when there is participation of the government, the
administration or the legislature directly affects the performance of the contract. Therefore, it
was ruled that a contract had become unenforceable when a land seller could not execute the

5
(1871) LR 6 Exch 269: 40 LJ Ex 172.
 deed of sale because he had ceased to be the owner by application of the law. The effect of a
management intervention must be evaluated in light of the terms of the contract, and the
parties cannot be dismissed if the terms show that they have committed an absolute duty
regardless of the administrative modifications. The Supreme Court ruled this in Naihati Jute
Mills Ltd v. Khyaliram Jagannath.6 The purchase of raw jute from East Pakistan was agreed.
The buyer had until November to present the import license, failing that he had until
December to supply it at a slightly higher price, and if he failed in December, he had to pay
the difference between the contract and the market price. The buyer applied for a license, but
was denied it because he had enough stock in his mill for two months. It was applied one
more time. He was told that the laws had changed and that in order to obtain a license, he
needed to show that he had used the same amount of Indian jute. As a result, the buyer was
sued for failing to deliver the license. He expressed dissatisfaction with the government's
policy change. However, it was determined that he was legally responsible. Section 56 would
have applied if the government had totally banned imports, Shelat said. However, the
government's policy was for the licensing body to review each applicant's case on their own
merits.
(f) Intervention in a war: Intervention in a war or a military situation during the performance
of a contract has often raised problematic issues. The blockade of the Suez Canal during the
Anglo-French war with Egypt, for example, caused the delay of several contracts.
Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v. Noblee Thorl 7is one such case. The appellants agreed to sell 300
tons of peanuts from Sudan c.i.f. Hamburg to respondents. At the time of the deal, the most
common and common route was through the Suez Canal. The shipment was supposed to take
place in November / December 1956, but the canal was blocked to traffic on November 2,
1956 and was not reopened until April of the following year. The items could have been
transported through the Cape of Good Hope, according to the appellants.The appellants
insisted on not shipping goods through the Cape. The question today is whether the contract
was terminated due to discontent over the closure of the Suez route. The appellants argued
that it was an implicit condition of the contract that the cargo should be made via Suez.
However, it was determined that such a word could not be inferred. Due to the closure of the

6
Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Khyaliram JagannathAIR 1968 SC 528; (1968) 1 SCR 821,830.
7
Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v. Noblee Thorl G m b H1962 (AC) 63.
 Suez Canal, the appellants were obliged [by the Sale of Goods Act of 1893, 32 (2)] to ship
the peanuts by a reasonable and practical route, and although the appellants would incur
greater expenses if they shipped the peanuts across the Cape of Good Hope, this did not
make the contract fundamentally or radically different, and there was no breach of contract.
The concept of frustration cannot be applied if the involvement of the war is due to a delay
induced by the carelessness of one of the parties. If there are many methods of executing a
contract and the war just cuts one of them, the party is still obliged to perform the contract in
another way, no matter how inconvenient or costly gram. Lease enforcement: In India, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v Raja Harmohinder Singh 8,
where SHAH J noted that Indian courts have generally held that Article 56 of the Contract
Law It does not apply when the parties Rights and obligations arise from a transfer of
ownership under a lease. It was one of the cases that arose from the division of the country
into India and Pakistan. The lease in question was for a period of one year on farm property.
The tenant was given possession when the rent was paid. Before any crops could be grown in
the area, the partition occurred, leaving the land in Pakistan and the parties migrated to India.
The purpose of the case was to recover the rent that had been paid. However, no such
recovery was allowed.The completed transfers, according to SHAH J, are totally outside the
scope of Section 56. In a case before the Allahabad High Court, the shops of the rented
premises fell due to their decrepit state and frequent rains, which required a new
construction, which was not considered a frustration.

EFFECTS OF FRUSTRATION

a. Frustration should not be self-inflicted: In explaining the concept that frustration should not
be self-inflicted, Lord WRIGHT stated in Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd 9,
that the core of 'frustration' is that it should not be due to act or election of the parties. The
frustration must develop through no fault or fault of either party. You can't rely on self-inflicted
frustration. The following were the facts: The appellants rented the defendants' trawler,
nicknamed "St Cuthberf", to be used solely for fishing purposes. Both parties knew that the
8
Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v Raja Harmohinder Singh1968 AIR 1024, 1968 SCR (3) 339.
9
Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd.AIR 1935 PC 128
trawler could only be operated for that purpose with a license from the Canadian government.
The appellants used five trawlers and applied for five permits. Only three were allowed, and the
Government requested the appellants to name the three trawlers, which they did, naming the
trawlers other than the St Cuthbert. In reaction to the hiring activity of the first responders, they
gave up the letter and wept in discontent. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
determined that the frustration in this case resulted from the appellants 'own decision to exclude
the defendants' boat from the license and, therefore, they were not released from the contract. In
another comparable example, the contract contemplated the shipment of 1,500 tonnes of sugar
beet pulp pellets, with a later option for the same quantity. Sellers paid $ 3,000 for an export
license. They also agreed to provide you 1500 from another client. However, the government
refused to grant more licenses. They sent the entire agreed amount to the first buyer. Therefore,
they were left with an export license for only 1500, but they had two obligations: one to deliver
1500 to the first customer under the option that was granted, and the other under the contract
with the second buyer for the same number. As a face-saving measure, they split the offer
between the two buyers, giving each about half. The second buyer sued for breach of contract.
Suppliers expressed dissatisfaction. They were held responsible. The Court of Appeal found no
legal authority to support the argument that if a seller has a legal commitment to A and a non-
legal commitment to B, and can fulfill the duty to A or B, but not both, it is justified in Partially
fulfilling both commitments. The court noted the concept established in the American Uniform
Commercial Code that in such a scenario, the seller may distribute the supply in any reasonable
and equitable way, but found no basis to translate the concept into English law. However, there
is an English source that says that if the seller had been under legal responsibility, he would have
been justified in making a fair distribution. The court stated that when a supplier has several
contracts to fulfill but only has enough products to fulfill one of them, he can rely on both force
majeure and others if he appropriately appropriates what he has for that one. Therefore, there is
no legal concept that prohibits one party to a contract from using its own actions to undermine
the rights of the other, unless the party is acting in violation of duty. Thus, if the defendant
company, having the right to do so and legitimately exercising that right, sold its subsidiary,
resulting in the expiration of the employee stock options, the defendant was not held liable for
the expiration since it had no liability whatsoever to sell his subsidiary.
B. Frustration acts automatically: frustration acts automatically to fulfill the contract
"regardless of the persons affected, their temperaments and defects, their interests and
circumstances. "The legal consequence of frustration is independent of your purpose, opinions,
or even knowledge of the incident. ”This is especially true in Indian law, as Section 56 of the
Contract Law establishes a rule of positive law and does not allow the matter is resolved by the
intentions of the parties. However, a subsequent case shows that in certain situations, one party
may give up frustration and the other party will be bound by the contract.In H.R. &. S Sainsbury
Ltd v. Street 10, there was a sale of 275 tonnes (5 percent or so) of feed barley to be produced on
the seller's property. The harvest was just 140 tons. The seller transferred him to another,
claiming that he had the right to do so because the contract had expired due to frustration.
However, he was held liable for breach of contract. Only bad harvests caused disappointment.

C.Adjustment of Rights(Restitution)-Section 65 adjusts the parties' rights. Adjustment of

rights (restitution) -Section 65 adjusts the rights of the parties. Obligation of a person who has
benefited from an invalid agreement or a contract that has become void.- When an agreement is
determined to be void, or when a contract is annulled, all those who have benefited from it are
obliged to restore or compensate the person from whom it benefited.

Cases where Frustration does not happen

There have been several cases when the contract has not been frustrated despite meeting the
requirements for the contract to be frustrated.

Those requirements are as follows:

 Difficulty in performance-The House of Lords has concluded that if the parties may
still execute their principal obligation notwithstanding the fact that the subject-matter has
passed out of their control, frustration may not result. There are times when a contract
becomes difficult to execute owing to changes in external conditions, but it is not

10
H.R.&. S Sainsbury Ltd v Street[1970 H. No. 10887].
 impossible to perform. When construction work is halted for three days due to rain, the
contract can still be executed and completed before the deadline by employing extra
personnel or extending the hours of work.
 Failure of a third party-A business deal, or any contract, involves numerous auxiliaries
who operate in the background of those parties who are referred to as third parties. The
main contracting parties' contract is dependent on third parties that typically supply raw
materials to the contracting parties. Sometimes the primary contracting parties fail to
execute the contract due to the fault of those third parties, but this does not declare the
contract null and void because the contracting parties were not at fault.

Frustration in Singapore law

When a contract fails due to events beyond the control of the contracting parties and which
neither party could have reasonably predicted, the contract is said to be "frustrated". In such
cases, statutory rules specify to what extent advance payments made prior to the frustrating event
can be reimbursed and work done in preparation for contract performance prior to the frustrating
event can be reimbursed - see Failed Contracts Act (Cap 115, 1985 Rev Ed) s 2 (2) and s 2 (4),
respectively. Section 2 (3) of the Frustrated Contracts Act also allows Singapore courts to assess
any non-monetary advantage granted by one contractual party to another prior to the frustrating
event and oblige the beneficiary of such benefits to pay the value received. Frustration occurs
when the law recognizes that, in the absence of default by either party, a contractual obligation
has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances under which performance is
required would cause the required performance to be radically different from what was agreed. in
the contract. In essence, a contract is resolved out of frustration because the situation the parties
are currently in exceeds the scope of the contractual duty and the obligations that the parties have
assumed and anticipate each other under the provisions of the contract. The court must interpret
the terms of the contract in light of the nature of the contract and the relevant surrounding
circumstances when applying the 'theory of construction' set out in the judgment of the UK
House of Lords in Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council11, which was

11
Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] 1 AC 696 (House of Lords, United Kingdom).
explicitly adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Lim Kim Som v Sheriffa Taibah bte
Abdul Rahman12, Only when there is a gap in the contractual allocation of profit and loss risks
arising from non-compliance with the contract in light of The condition of the circumstances
after the occurrence of the supervening event in question can terminate a contract due to
frustration.

In Singapore, the courts have made seemingly contradictory pronouncements on whether

predictability should be a barrier to dissatisfaction. The frustration theory, according to Appellate
Judge L P Thean at Glahe International Expo AG v ACS Computer Pte Ltd13, worked at a
fundamentally different level than a force majeure provision. This has been cited as a basis for
the argument that, at least in Singapore, the occurrence of a supervening event does not release
the contract out of frustration if the event was foreseen or reasonably foreseeable as the
probability of it occurring was high enough. However, the case of Lim Kim Som against Sheriffa
Taibah bte Abdul Rahman seems to contradict this. This case has not been mentioned or alluded
to in future Court of Appeal cases, which is noteworthy.

Conclusion

It can be summarised as follows: "Frustration" occurs when the law recognises that, without the
fault of either party, a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because
the circumstances in which the performance is required would cause it to become something
radically different from what the contract originally intended.

According to Frustration of Contract, if the existence of a specific thing is required for the
performance of a contract promise, either by contract terms or in the contemplation of the
parties, the duty to perform the promise is discharged if the thing is no longer in existence at the
time of performance. And the Frustration of Purpose rule excuses a promisor in specific cases
when the contract's aims have been thwarted by circumstances that arise after the agreement's

12
[1994] 1 SLR(R) 233 (Court of Appeal, Singapore)
13
Glahe International Expo AG v ACS Computer Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR(R) 945 (Court of Appeal,
Singapore).
creation, and the performance is excused under this rule even if the actual performance is not
hampered.

As a result, frustration may be defined as the unanticipated and unexpected termination of a

contract due to the occurrence of certain circumstances that render its execution impossible.

In other terms, frustration refers to the termination of a contract owing to the unanticipated
inability of performing a contractual duty.

As a result, the term "frustration" refers to an unanticipated contract termination owing to the
inability to fulfil a contractual duty. The same perspective is shared by both English and Indian
courts. Impossibility, Supervening Impossibility, Discharge by Subsequent Impossibility, and
Discharge by Operation of Law have all been explored by English and Indian scholars under the
heading of Frustration Doctrine.

As a result of the study of the Doctrine of Frustration, it is clear that the difficulty in performing
a contractual duty, or making it more expensive, does not change the character of the contract or
make it a wholly different contract under English law or in the Indian legal system. The
occurrence of unexpected events such as currency depreciation, high raw material prices, and
scarcity of certain goods, which significantly increase the scope of contractual obligations and
limit the contracting parties' ability to obtain the commercial profit anticipated at the time of
contract formation, is insufficient to excuse poor performance and define frustration.

The result is that, while the 'Doctrine of Frustration' is extremely similar to the rule of changed
circumstances or changing conditions, it is not identical. The Frustration Doctrine refers to the
effect of an event or series of events that prevents the contract's performance goal from being
met, whereas the Rule of Alternated Conditions or Change in Circumstances refers to or
discusses a change in a contract's fundamental condition, which is the contract's very foundation.
REFERENCE

 Drachsler, L. M. (1957). Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies

in Cases of Supervening Illegality. NYLF, 3, 50.
 https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-024-
7576?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true
 aylor v. Caldwell,3 B&S 826: 122 ER 309.
 Paradine v Jane (1647) Aleyn 26.
 Satyabharata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur,AIR (1954) SC 44.
 Pameshwari Das Mehra v. Ram Chand Om PrakashAIR 1952 34,38.
 (1871) LR 6 Exch 269: 40 LJ Ex 172.
 Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Khyaliram JagannathAIR 1968 SC 528; (1968) 1 SCR
821,830.
 Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v. Noblee Thorl G m b H1962 (AC) 63.
 Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v Raja Harmohinder Singh1968 AIR 1024, 1968 SCR (3) 339.
 Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd.AIR 1935 PC 128
 H.R.&. S Sainsbury Ltd v Street[1970 H. No. 10887].
 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] 1 AC 696 (House of
Lords, United Kingdom).
 [1994] 1 SLR(R) 233 (Court of Appeal, Singapore)
 Glahe International Expo AG v ACS Computer Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR(R) 945 (Court of
Appeal,Singapore).
 www.Wikipedia.org
 McNair, A. D. (1940). Frustration of Contract by War. LQ Rev., 56, 173.
