Be It Enacted by The Senate and House of Representatives of The Philippines in Congress Assembled

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Tenth Congress
Republic Act No. 8552 February 25, 1998
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998."
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure that every child remains under
the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and
harmonious development of his/her personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or
adoption within the child's extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in
accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social
and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or
adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned.
(c) It shall also be a State policy to:
(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to relinquish his/her parental authority over
his/her child;
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s);
(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority and custody over his/her adopted
child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or judicially declared so as
to establish the status of the child as "legally available for adoption" and his/her custody transferred to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-
caring agency, which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child;
(iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for adoption;
(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector agencies to handle adoption
inquiries, process domestic adoption applications, and offer adoption-related services including, but not limited to,
parent preparation and post-adoption education and counseling; and
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's identity and culture in his/her native land, and only
when this is not available shall intercountry adoption be considered as a last resort.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as:
(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to
the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental
authority of his/her biological parent(s) or guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption.
(c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly relinquishes parental authority to
the Department.
(d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has been permanently and
judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse;
or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities.
(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose parent(s) has
deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such.
(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker oversees the adjustment and
emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship.
(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department to provide comprehensive
child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective
adoptive parents, and preparing the adoption home study.
(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department that provides twenty four
(24)-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.
(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth records that a certain child
was born to a person who is not his/her biological mother, causing such child to lose his/her true identity and
status.
ARTICLE II
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES
Section 4. Counseling Service. – The Department shall provide the services of licensed social workers to the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) – Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the birth of his/her child.
No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6)
months shall be allowed for the biological parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for
adoption before the decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to
the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all alternatives for the
child's future and the implications of each alternative have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) – Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars, among others, shall be
provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible adoption issues and to prepare him/her for
effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee – Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she understands the nature
and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on adoption in accordance with his/her age and level
of maturity.
Section 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). – It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency
which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall
be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
Section 6. Support Services. – The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program which shall include, among others, the
above mentioned services.
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for
his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between
the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is
the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and
that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority
shall be exercised by the spouses.
Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for
adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by
the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within
six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).
Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to
give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the
latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE
Section 10. Hurried Decisions. – In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that the biological parent(s) has
been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to
sustain that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her own
home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
Section 11. Case Study. – No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social worker of the Department,
the social service office of the local government unit, or any child-placing or child-caring agency has made a case study of the
adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the matter
to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall confirm with the Civil Registry the real
identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the
responsibility of the concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and that the documents to support this
fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the
adoption is in the best interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case studies, that the petition should
be denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be
preserved by the Department.
Section 12. Supervised Trial Custody. – No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the adopter(s) has been given by
the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months within which the parties are expected to adjust
psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental
authority shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the same to be in the best interest of the
adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the period. However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-
month trial custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through a pre-adoption placement
authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled
from the date the adoptee is placed with the prospective adopter(s).
Section 13. Decree of Adoption. – If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, and no opposition
has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody
report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would
redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the
original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of
adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known.
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. – An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry, as required by
the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname.
The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in
its place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any
notation that it is an amended issue.
Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. – All hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and shall
not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department,
or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for purposes connected with or arising out of
the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information to be released,
restricting the purposes for which it may be used.
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Section 16. Parental Authority. – Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
Section 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means
of the family.
Section 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the
law on testamentary succession shall govern.
ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a
minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of
the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite
having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and
failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if
known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth
certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested
rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal Code if
the criminal acts are properly proven.
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
Section 21. Violations and Penalties. – (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or
other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her
biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine
not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office, shall cooperate in the execution of the
abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein prescribed and also the penalty of permanent disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity of records, documents, and
communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1)
year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense under this Article shall be imposed upon
the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by
a syndicate or where it involves two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall
merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as
are herein provided, shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under other
laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and perpetually excluded from
entry to the country.
Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who
shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with
existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said
government official, employee, or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension until the resolution of the case.
Section 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. – A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a
child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that
he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
application for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of
this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this
Act and other requirements as determined by the Department.
ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. – There shall be established an Adoption Resources and Referral Office
under the Department with the following functions: (a) monitor the existence, number, and flow of children legally available for
adoption and prospective adopter(s) so as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information and educational
campaign on domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption proceedings; (d) generate resources to help child-caring and child-
placing agencies and foster homes maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption
Board and other concerned agencies. The office shall be manned by adoption experts from the public and private sectors.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6) months from the promulgation of this Act, the Department,
with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Office of Civil Registry General, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor
General, and two (2) private individuals representing child-placing and child-caring agencies shall formulate the necessary
guidelines to make the provisions of this Act operative.
Section 25. Appropriations. – Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Act shall be
included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative
order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended
accordingly.
Section 27. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected
thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in any newspaper
of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
Approved: February 25, 1998
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SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal
protection before as well as after birth. In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and
1
vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose
Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s
2
parents in Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
3 4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa
5
on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that
6
Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City. 7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham
and that she never lived with Mario at all. 8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child
was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. 9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the
‘bastardization’ of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the …
decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation rights’… between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any
Sunday." She argued that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
10
child." She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name,
11
following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion and made the following
observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something they should never do if they
want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a
father figure to recognize – something that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and
psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8,
PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED. 12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to
Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardo’s surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had
already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father visitation rights over his
illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the "best interest of the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t
bottom, it (was) the child’s welfare and not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting
visitation rights a few hours once a week." 14
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother’s surname motu proprio. The child, represented
by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry.
15
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to
set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for
reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable – established by the evidence in this case – that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario
Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called "marriage" with the
latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately
married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo –
under the law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot
be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by
the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code).
Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose
Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to
be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and
Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an
illegitimate relationship.
16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave
little weight to Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
were married:
We are not unaware of the movant’s argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially
admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family
Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare
declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are
the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. (Emphasis supplied)
17
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
18
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or
19
born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. 20

As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
21
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the
22
recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals : 23
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose
24
Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
25
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
26
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and
27
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To 28
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that
there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
29
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. 31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may
32
take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place
33
through the violation of prison regulations.

34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola
Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove
personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband,
Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who
asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue
of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of marriage that she never lived with
35 36
Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was
binding on her.
Gerardo’s argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with
Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could
have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never
lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth.
Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus,
the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the
husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence,
37 38
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband
and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also
39
promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. 40
Gerardo’s insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does
not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it
would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial
of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy
41
of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was
not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth
43
certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof
44
of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300
days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. 45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even
then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima facie evidence, the
46
statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to
the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima
47
facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the
best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy while claiming that they
both had the child’s interests at heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to
the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of
both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname
48
and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is
only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the
49
eyes of society, a ‘bastard’ is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy
presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons who were passionately
declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should
end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose
Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of
incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his
infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A person’s surname or family name identifies the family to which
50
he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the
51
eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardo’s name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his
paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a
parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each
other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit
Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is
clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount. – In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from
52
every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society
shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue
concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., no part.
Footnotes
1
Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child.
2
Marriage Contract, Annex "A," Rollo, p. 41.
3
Decision, Annex "E," Rollo, pp. 46-48.
4
Certificate of Live Birth, Annex "M," Rollo, p. 127.
5
Petition, Annex "C," Rollo, pp. 38-40.
6
Marriage Certificate, Annex "B-1," Rollo, p. 43.
7
Supra at note 5.
8
Answer, Annex "D," Rollo, pp. 44-45.
Penned by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, CC No. 91-10935, Regional Trial
9
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 107, Quezon City, Annex "E," Rollo, p. 46.
10
Motion for Reconsideration, Annex "F," Rollo, p. 49.
11
Id., p. 61.
12
Order, Annex "G," Rollo, pp. 53-54.
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (a
13
retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Serafin V.C. Guingona. Decision dated September 29, 1994,
CA-G.R. CV No. 40651, Court of Appeals, Third Division; CA Rollo, pp. 55-64.
14
Id.
15
Id.
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo M. Buena and
16
Conchita Carpio Morales (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court). Resolution dated September 14,
1995, CA-G.R. CV No. 40651, Court of Appeals, Former Third Division; Rollo, Annex "A," pp. 29-32.
17
Id.
Resolution dated January 10, 1996, CA-G.R. CV No. 40651, Court of Appeals, Former Third Division; Rollo,
18
Annex "B," pp. 34-37.
19
Article 2035 (1), Civil Code; Baluyut v. Baluyut, G.R. No. 33659, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 506.
Further, under Article 54 of the Family Code, a child who was conceived or born before the judgment of
20
annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity has become final and
executory shall be considered legitimate. It also provides that a child who was born from a subsequent void
marriage as a result of the failure of the contracting parties to comply with the mandatory provisions of Articles 52
and 53 of the Family Code shall likewise be considered legitimate.
Tolentino, Arturo, Civil Code of the Philippines with the Family Code, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, vol. I,
21
1990 edition, p. 528.
22
Bowers v. Bailey, 237 Iowa 295, 21 N.W. 2d 773.
23
G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004.
24
In particular, Article 166 (1)(b) provides:
Article 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible; or
xxxxxxxxx
Article 171 provides for the instances where the heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child. Thus:
25
Article 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49542, 12 September 1980, 100 SCRA 73; Article 170, Family
26
Code.
Liyao, Jr. v. Liyao, 428 Phil. 628 (2002).

27
Supra at note 21 citing People v. Giberson, 197 Phil. 509 (1982).

28
Supra at note 26.

29
Id. citing Tolentino supra.

30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. citing Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442 (1934).

33
Id. citing 1 Manresa 492-500.

34
Supra at note 8.
35
Supra at note 5.
36
Supra at note 26. See also Articles 170 and 171, Family Code.
37
Id.
38
People ex rel. Gonzales v. Monroe, 43 Ill. App 2d 1, 192 N.E. 2d 691.

39
Cf. Article 220 of the Civil Code. It provides:

40
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over the children, and the validity of defense for
any member of family in case of unlawful aggression.
While this provision of the Civil Code may have been omitted in the Family Code, the principles they contain are
valid norms in family relations and in cases involving family members. They are even already embodied in
jurisprudence. (Tolentino, supra, p. 506)
Supra at note 19.

41
Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
42
Tolentino, supra, p. 539; Sempio-Diy, Alicia, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1995 edition, p.
43
275.
Articles 172 and 175, Family Code. Article 172 states:

44
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
On the other hand, Article 175 provides:
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxxxxxxxx
Cf. Article 169, Family Code.

45
Article 410, Civil Code.

46
Dupilas v. Cabacungan, 36 Phil. 254 (1917).

47
Article 174, Family Code provides:

48
Article 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in
conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.
Article 176, Family Code states:

49
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force.
Id.
50
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311 , 31 March 2005.
51
People v. Dolores, G.R. No. 76468, 20 August 1990, 188 SCRA 660.
52
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AUSL Exclusive
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated 15 September
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim).
They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the
children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. 3 Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. 4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used
the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty 5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the
filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months
old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. 7 Michael also gave his
consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an
abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for
Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had
remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In
denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA
8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are
additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a
party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental
authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the
paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions
were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for
his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between
the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is
the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and
that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other
spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority
shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not
the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner.
And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA
8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to
Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having
reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their
moral, mental and physical character and well-being. 13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. 14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. 15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of
age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes
and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the
family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the
law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the
right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights 19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled 20 such
as support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the
joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly,
the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and
education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption
in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition
for adoption. (Emphasis supplied) 1avvphi1 .zw+
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband.
We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to
Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Penned by Judge Antonio C. Lubao. Records of SPL. PROC. Case No. 1258, pp. 161-162 and SPL. PROC.
1
Case No. 1259, pp. 163-164.
2
Three children were actually entrusted to petitioner and Lim. The third, who was named Primo Jude P. Lim, was
still a minor at the time the petition for adoption was filed. The case was docketed as SPL. PROC. No. 1260.
Petitioner opted not to appeal the decision insofar as the minor Primo Jude P. Lim was concerned.
3
Records (SPL. PROC. Case No. 1258), pp. 94-96.
4
5
Section 22 of RA 8552 provides:
SEC. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births.- A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated
the birth of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for
the best interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person
as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth registration
and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed
thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this
Act and other requirements as determined by the Department.
An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
6
Purposes, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998." Approved on 25 February 1998.
7
8
Id. at 147.
9
Id. at 149.
10
Id. at 145.
11
Records (SPL. PROC. Case No. 1259), p. 8.
12
Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, 8 June 1994, 233 SCRA 9.
13
Article 209, Family Code.
14
15
16
Republic Act No. 6809, An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from Twenty-One to Eighteen Years, Amending for
the Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and For Other Purposes.
17
Article 236, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809.
18
Section 33, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
19
20
Section 34, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
21
22
Section 18, Article V, RA 8552.
23
Bobanovic v. Montes, 226 Phil. 404 (1986).
24
336 Phil. 944, 948-949 (1997).
Constitution
Statutes
Executive Issuances
Judicial Issuances
Other Issuances
Jurisprudence
AUSL Exclusive
SECOND DIVISION
October 15, 2014
G.R. No. 188801
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO"
and "JAYROSE M. CASTRO", Petitioners
vs.
JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be
defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock,
the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough
that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied
1 2
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of
the trial court that granted respondents’ decree of adoption.3
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of
Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her
nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled.
They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days.
Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them. 4
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as
husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila
during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. She 5
insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation(.)"
6
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he
7
alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged was
8
his erstwhile housekeeper. 9
At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old. According to the Home Study Report conducted by the Social
10 11
Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former
Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. The report mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the
12
marriage did not produce any children. It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to
13
bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989. Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare
14
officer noted:
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However,
with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and
surname. . . . 15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The children have
16
allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth’s death in July 1995. 17
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, having ruled that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court
18
from any person including the government which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General." A certificate of19
finality was issued on February 9, 2006.

20
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their
21
daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years. She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne
22
while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne’s knowledge and consent. She also alleged that Jose
23
made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry’s wife, Lilibeth, to cover
up for his homosexual relationship with Larry. 24
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her
minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined. He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina
25
because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also
stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because
several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments. He then implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh
26
on the case with "justice and equity." 27
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. 28
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and
Regina’s adoption. 29
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005. They allege that Rosario’s
30
affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K," was fraudulent. They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
31 32
certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue
that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the
father to be Larry, Jose’s driver and alleged lover. It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate
33
children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. On May 26, 2009, the Court
34
of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there
is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the
hearing." 35
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his
illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs" but stated that its hands were bound by the trial court
36
decision that had already attained "finality and immutability." 37
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates required
the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment
of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is
required in an action for annulment of judgment. 38
When Rosario and Joanne’s motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10, 2009, they filed this petition.
39
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to
(1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
judgment. They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the
40
birth certificates presented as evidence before the trial court, they were not given the opportunity to oppose the petition since
41
the entire proceedings were concealed from them. 42
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due
process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable parties. They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the
43
consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent was never
secured from Joanne. 44
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been deprived of their day in court since their
interest was "amply protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public
prosecutor." 45
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings. They
46
argue that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which
is not a ground for annulment of judgment. They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is
47
an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the state. 48
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule

47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."49
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 50
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and
readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by
limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards
any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the
remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a
judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that
rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. (Emphasis supplied)
51
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of:
extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is
barred by estoppel or laches. 52
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction
over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
53
entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured." 54
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption

proceedings vis-à-vis the law on
adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their
consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action." As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the
55 56
proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his
own children born out of wedlock:
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:
....
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other
spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is
stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim: 57
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses. 58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de
facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose,
however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be
considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she
would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8552:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or
withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: . . . .
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis
supplied)
The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also
sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future
legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the
adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby
preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should
1âwphi1
have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough
to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic
fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece: 59
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby
the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant
never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat. (Emphasis supplied)
60
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from discovery. Petitioners alleged that they
61
were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the
rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City,
Ilocos Norte. Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City. Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos
62 63
Norte. Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila. The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the
64 65
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. The trial court gave due course to the petition on Jose’s bare allegation in his
66
petition that he was a resident of Batac, even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in
67
Laoag City. 68
Second, using the process of delayed registration, Jose was able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to
69
be the father and Larry as merely the informant. Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured: one
70
showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, and another wherein the portion for the mother’s
71
name was not filled in at all. The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their
72
father was Larry R. Rentegrado. These certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial
73
court in support of his petition for adoption.

Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for adoption was because he and his wife,
Rosario, were childless, to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by
74
Rosario and alleged to be fraudulent. 75
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario
and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged
instruments or perjured testimonies" presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic
76
when the other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or testimony
was presented in court, thus:
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is
that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication
of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that
kind of fraud through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the modes
of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and
perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not,
therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud. (Emphasis supplied)
77
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the
fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and
Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552:
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall
be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar
acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii)subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s)of a person(s) who is not his/her
biological parents(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayorin its medium period and a fine
not exceeding Fifty thousand peso (P50,000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities. Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to
78
provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the
79
adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having
never experienced the love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even
benefited from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree
from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine and is now working as a doctor in Canada. These accomplishments,
80 81
however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES *
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1844 dated October 14, 2014.
1
Rollo, pp. 3–29.
Id. at 37–62. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando (Chairperson) and
2
concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente of the Special
Former Seventh Division.
3
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38–39 and 48.
4
Id. at 39 and 48.

5
Id. at 49.
6
Id. at 109–110.
7
Id. at 109.
8
Id. at 52.
9
10
Id. at 79.
11
Id. at 79–82.
12
Id. at 80.
13
Id. at 79–80.
14
Id. at 80 and 83–84.
15
Id. at 80.
16
Id. at 81.
17
Id. at 80.
18
Id. at 87–90.
19
Id. at 87.
20
Id. at 91.
21
Id. at 168–173.
22
Id. at 168.
23
Id. at 169–170.
24
Id. at 171.
25
Id. at 174.
26
Id. at 175–176.
27
Id. at 176.
28
Id. at 122.
29
Id. at 38.
30
Id. at 9.
31
Id. at 14.
32
Id. at 40.
33
Id. at 153–158 and 226–227.
34
Id. at 41 and 136.
35
Id. at 59.
36
Id. at 59–60.
37
Id. at 60.
38
Id. at 60–61.
39
Id. at 98–99.
40
Id. at 13.
41
Id. at 14–15.
42
Id. at 18.
43
Id. at 22.
44
Id. at 26–27.
45
Id. at 306.
46
Id. at 307.
47
Id. at 311 and 313.
48
Id. at 313.
49
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 47, sec. 1.
50
G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 580 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
Id. at 586–587, citing People v. Bitanga, 552 Phil. 686, 693 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third
51
Division]; Fraginal v. Heirs of Toribia Belmonte Parañal, 545 Phil. 425, 432 (2007) [Per J. AustriaMartinez, Third
Division]; Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Apo Fruits
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 622 Phil. 215, 231 (2009) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]; Peña v. Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), 533 Phil. 670, 689–690 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division]; Gallardo-
Corro v. Gallardo, 403 Phil. 498, 511 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
52
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 47, sec. 2 and sec. 3.
53
Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 57 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
Bulawan v. Aquende, G.R. No. 182819, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 585, 594 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division],
54
citing Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 507 Phil. 682, 694 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Zenaida Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 363 [Per
55
J. Regalado, Second Division], citing Ramos, et al. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 148-B Phil. 1047, 1066
(1971) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
56
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
57
606 Phil. 82 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
Id. at 89–90, citing Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9, 13 [Per J. Puno, Second
58
Division].
59
G.R. No. 187409, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 323 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
Id. at 327, citing Amihan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Romars International Gases Corporation, G.R. No. 180819, July 5,
60
2010, 623 SCRA 406, 411 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
61
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 47, sec. 3.
62
Rollo, p. 139.
63
Id. at 138.
64
Id. at 88.
65
Id. at 4–5.
66
Id. at 87–90.
67
Id. at 109.
68
Id. at 80.
69
Id. at 155 and 158.
70
Id. at 153 and 156.
71
Id. at 154 and 157.
72
Id. at 153 and 156.
73
Id. at 226–227.
74
Id. at 80.
75
Id. at 14. The allegedly fraudulent affidavit of consent was not attached in the rollo.
76
Id. at 61.
Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank and Trust, G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014
77
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/january2014/159926.pdf> [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division], citing Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643, 656 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third
Division] and Strait Times Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 217, 226 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division].
78
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 89.
79
Article VI of Rep. Act. No. 8552 provides:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. - Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on
the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by
the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of
the Civil Code.
80
Rollo, p. 169.
81
Id. at 5.

Be It Enacted by The Senate and House of Representatives of The Philippines in Congress Assembled

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Be It Enacted by The Senate and House of Representatives of The Philippines in Congress Assembled

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Today is Wednesday, January 20, 2021

Republic Act No. 8552 February 25, 1998

(c) It shall also be a State policy to:

(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.

(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.

Approved: February 25, 1998

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Wednesday, January 20, 2021

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. 20

recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals : 23

through the violation of prison regulations.

Gerardo’s argument is without merit.

Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.

of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.

eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.

Costs against petitioner.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., no part.

Annex "B," pp. 34-37.

1990 edition, p. 528.

Liyao, Jr. v. Liyao, 428 Phil. 628 (2002).

Supra at note 21 citing People v. Giberson, 197 Phil. 509 (1982).

Supra at note 26.

Id. citing Tolentino supra.

Id. citing Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442 (1934).

Id. citing 1 Manresa 492-500.

People ex rel. Gonzales v. Monroe, 43 Ill. App 2d 1, 192 N.E. 2d 691.

Cf. Article 220 of the Civil Code. It provides:

Supra at note 19.

Articles 172 and 175, Family Code. Article 172 states:

On the other hand, Article 175 provides:

Cf. Article 169, Family Code.

Article 410, Civil Code.

Dupilas v. Cabacungan, 36 Phil. 254 (1917).

Article 174, Family Code provides:

Article 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

Article 176, Family Code states:

Today is Wednesday, January 20, 2021

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,

The Ruling of the Trial Court

Hence, the present petition.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Case No. 1259, pp. 163-164.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Wednesday, January 20, 2021