MOYA VS DEL FIERRO 69 PHIL 199 (1939) moot and academic since the 12th congress already adjourned
nce the 12th congress already adjourned and
In this petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the CA
declaring del Fierro as the candidate-elect mayor of Paracale,
Camarines Norte with a majority vote over Moya. He contended
that the CA committed errors in admitting and counting in favor of
del Fierro several ballots.
The SC dismissed the petition because in result even if the ballots
contested are counted in favor of Moya, del Fierro still wins by one
vote.
The SC avers that in republicanism, the citizens have the voice in
the government and whenever called upon to act in justifiable
cases to give it efficacy and not to stifle. This is the fundamental
reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated if not
with utmost, with reasonable liberality.
OCAMPO VS HRET, JUNE 15, 2004
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo.
He alleged that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), herein public respondent, committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing in HRET Case No. 01-024, Pablo Ocampo vs.
Mario "Mark Jimenez" Crespo, the (a) Resolution2 dated March
27, 2003 holding that "protestant" (herein petitioner) cannot be
proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of
Manila since being a second placer, he "cannot be proclaimed the
first among the remaining qualified candidates"; and (b)
Resolution3 dated June 2, 2003 denying his motion for
reconsideration.
In the 2001 election, Jimenez won by 768 votes against Ocampo
but was disqualified after almost 22 months. Ocampo the candidate
who garnered the second most number of votes seeks to be
declared as the winner in the election.
Petitioner contends that the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that "it is unnecessary to rule on the
recount and revision of ballots in the protested and counter-
protested precincts." He maintains that it is the ministerial duty of
the HRET to implement the provisions of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646
specifically providing that "any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted."
In his comment, private respondent counters that what the law
requires is that the disqualification by final judgment takes
place before the election. Here, the HRET Resolutions
disqualifying him as Representative of the 6th District of Manila
were rendered long after the May 14, 2001 elections. He also
claims that the Resolutions are not yet final and executory because
they are the subjects of certiorari proceedings before this Court.
Hence, all his votes shall be counted and none shall be considered
stray.
The SC dismissed the petition stating that being the second placer
does n not automatically make him the duly elected representative
as it would violate the will of the electorate. The case also becomes
1
a new representative was duly elected.
VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN 39 PHIL778 (1919)
In this petition for habeas corpus, the mayor of Manila along with
other respondents was ordered to bring to court the 170 female
inmates whom they forcibly sent to Davao as workers.
The mayor was found in contempt for his failure to comply with
the court’s order.
It is noted in this case that even inmates have rights which are to
protected by the state.
MAQUERRA VS BORRA 15 SCRA 7 (1965)
In this petition, Maquera seek that the RA 4421 requiring all
candidates for national, provincial city and municipal offices to
post a surety bond equivalent to salary or emoluments to which he
is a candidate.
The Court granted the petition as it is inconsistent with the nature
and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution
and the principle of social justice underlying the same for said
political system is premised upon the tent that sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them
and this in turn implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual
concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity
for all, rich and poor alike and that accordingly no person shall by
reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public
office.
LACSON VS POSADAS 72 SCRA 168 (1976)
Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas, of Talisay Negros
Occidental, is charged in a verified complaint by Salvador Lacson,
Jr. with (a) ignorance of the law, (b) partiality, and (c) violation of
the Election Code of 1971 which provides that:
Any person who has been refused registration or whose name has
been stricken out from the permanent list of voters may at any time
except sixty (60) days before a regular election or twenty-five (25)
days before a special election, apply to the proper court for an
order directing the election registration board or the board of
inspectors as the case may be, to include or reinstate his name in
the permanent list of voters, attaching to his application for
inclusion the certificate of the Electron registration board or the
board of inspectors regarding his case and proof of service of a
copy of his application and of the notice of hearing thereof upon a
member of the said board (Emphasis supplied.)
In the light of the statutory purpose, the seriousness of respondent's
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of the
electoral law becomes evident. His good faith or lack of malice is
of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita the
act alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. It
appears, however, that on April 8, 1974, the President of the
Philippines promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433, which grants
general amnesty under certain conditions to public school teachers,
other government officials and employees, members of the armed
forces of the Philippines and other persons for violation of election
laws and other related statutes in connection with the elections of
1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of delegates to the
Constitutional Convention.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby admonished that he should
exercise greater care in the observance of the provisions of existing
laws in the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned that any
subsequent misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
PUNGUTAN VS ABUBAKAR 43 SCRA 1 (1972)
The resolution of respondent Comelec 1 now assailed in this
petition for review, was undoubtedly motivated by the objective of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections in the discharge of its
constitutional function to enforce and administer electoral laws. 2 It
excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone
district of the province of Sulu the returns from 107 precincts of
Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60
precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured and therefore
no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar
Pungutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to the last
remaining seat for delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
there being no question as to the election of the other two
delegates, 3 would lose out to respondent Benjamin Abubakar.
Petitioner would thus dispute the power of respondent Commission
to exclude such returns as a result of oral testimony as well as the
examination of the fingerprints and signatures of those who
allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that no election in fact
did take place. This contention is, however, unavailing, in the light
of our holding last month in Usman v. Comelec. 4 The other
principal question raised is whether the recognition of such
prerogative on the part of respondent Commission would
contravene the constitutional provision that it cannot pass on the
right to vote. The appropriate answer as will be made clear is
likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence, respondent Commission
must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the
Commission on Elections dated May 14, 1971 is affirmed.
ROMUALDEZ VS RTC 226 SCRA 406 (1993)
The petition of Romualdez is granted and reversed the decision of
the CA cancelling his name from the list of qualified voters of
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the
election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." 19 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return.
LIDASAN VS COMELEC 21 SCRA 497 (1967)
2
In this petition, Lidasan seek to nullify RA 4790 creating the
municipality of the Dianaton, Lanao del Sur. The official were
elected in 1967. However 12 barrios were in Cotabato and no in
Lanao del Sur. Comelec adopted a resolution that Dianaton shall
be composed of the areas enumerated in RA 4790. The office of
the president recommended to the Comelec that the statute be
suspended pending correcting legislation. Comelec issued another
resolution that only a declaration of its unconstitutionality could
stop the implementation of the law. Lidasan argued that it is
unconstitutional for violating the one bill on subject rule.
The SC upheld the contentions of Lidasan, as no bill may be
enacted into law should include more than one subject. Congress
must refrain from conglomeration of different subjects. The title of
the bill must be couched in such a language sufficient to notify the
public of the import of the single subject. A change in the
boundaries fo 2 provinces may be made without necessarily
creating a new municipality.
The principle that only the unconstitutional portion of a statute
should be invalidated and the constitutional part must remain does
not apply here. The explanatory note of the bill which this statute
originated expressed that the envisioned municipality would be
self-sufficient. This of course includes the 21 barangays and not
the 9 barangays that would be left if the valid portion would be
allowed to continue. Factors affecting the independence of a
municipality include population, territory and income.
TAULE VS SANTOS 200 SCRA 512 (1991)
In this petition for certiorari, Taule seeks the reversal of the
resolution of Santos nullifying the election of the officers of the
FABC in Catanduanes which was held even with the absence of 5
of its members.
He contended that Santos as the Secretary of Local Government
has no jurisdiction over the said election thus committed grave
abuse of authority and the respondent governor has no legal
personality to file an election protest.
The SC held that the issues raised were without merit since the
Secretary has the rule making power under the Administrative
Code and the Governor has the legal capacity since the elected
president of FABC becomes a member of the assembly.
However, the appointment made by the Secretary was not in
accordance with the law since the appointee did not meet the
minimum qualification to be the president of the FABC. He acted
in excess of his jurisdiction as it is more than what the Constitution
grants him. The SC granted the supplemental petition and ordered
for the conduction of a new election in accordance with the rules
and regulations.
BADELLES VS CABILI 27 SCRA 113 (February 27, 1969)
This is an appeal of the order of the lower court dismissing the
election protest filed against the duly proclaimed mayor of Iligan
City, Camilo P. Cabili. The appellant seeks the reversal of the
order dated March 23, 1968 dismissing his election protest for his
failure to allege a cause of action to justify and to try the same.
The lower court concluded that mere irregularities or misconduct
on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the
result of the elections are not grounds for contest or for proper
matters of inquiry. According to the lower court, there was no
allegation in the petition that those who failed to vote are for herein
petitioner Badelles and those illegal voters are for the responded
Cabili.
SC reversed the said order and remanded the two cases to the
lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with the opinion
and the law. Its dismissal according to them would amount to
judicial abnegations of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon
in a appropriate proceeding, allegations of misconduct and of such
characters.
If there be a failure to observe the mandates of the Election Code,
the aggrieved parties should no be left remediless. Under the law
as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves that
purpose.
GALLARDO VS TABAMO 218 SCRA 253 (1993)
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, Gallardo and others seek to prohibit,
restrain and enjoin public respondent Tabamo, Presiding Judge of
RTC-Mabajao, Camiguin from continuing with the proceedings in
a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a
taxpayer’s suit. In the said case herein private respondent seek to
prohibit and restrain herein petitioners from pursuing with certain
public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban imposed by the
OEC although it started prior the ban they do not fully comply with
the requirements.
They contended that the case principally involves an alleged
violation of the OEC thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in
the Comelec.
The petition was granted based on the principal issue and that is
the jurisdiction of the Comelec over the matters being raised by
herein private respondent which are primarily the alleged violation
of the provisions of the OEC.
MONTEJO VS COMELEC 242 SCRA 415
LIDASAN V COMELEC
FACTS: 18 June 1966: President signed HB 1247 into law—RA
4790. It created the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao
del Sur. The officials were elected in 1967. However, 12 barrios
were in Cotabato and not in Lanao del Sur. COMELEC adopted a
resolution that Dianaton shall be composed of the areas
enumerated in RA 4790. The Office of the President recommended
to the COMELEC that the statute be suspended pending correcting
legislation. COMELEC issued another resolution that only an
3
declaration of unconstitutionality could it stop implementing the
law. Lidasan argued that it is unconstitutional for violating the one
bill one subject rule.
ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional for violating the one-
bill one-subject rule. YES.
RATIO:
No bill may be enacted into law should include more than one
subject. Congress must refrain from conglomeration of different
subjects. The title of a bill must be couched in such a language
sufficient to notify the public of the import of the single subject. A
change in the boundaries of 2 provinces may be made without
necessarily creating a new municipality.
The principle that only the unconstitutional portion of a statute
should be invalidated and the constitutional part must remain does
not apply here. The explanatory note of the bill from which this
statute originated expressed that the envisioned municipality would
be self-sufficient. This of course includes the 21 barangays, and
not the 9 barangays that would be left if the valid portion would be
allowed to continue. Factors affecting the independence of a
municipality include population, territory, and income.
JAVIER vs. COMELEC ( 144 SCRA 194 )
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates
in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. 
The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter
had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power.  On the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. 
Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing
trial for these murders.  Conceivably, it intimidated voters against
supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the
candidate of the ruling party.  It was in this atmosphere that the
voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run
true to form.  Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad
the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns.  His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaime;;;;;d winner by the Second Division of the said body. 
The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Comelec en banc as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Comelec
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming
the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held: Article  XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides
that:
“The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions.  All
election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except
contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which
shall be heard and decided en banc.”
P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. VS.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Facts: In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was
proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines. The
second-placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an
election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When the Protestant
died in the course of his medical treatment, his widow, Mrs. Jesusa
Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene as a
substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claims that there is an
urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband
to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the
interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee, GMA asserts that the
widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace
the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a
property that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also contends that
under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the
registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes
for the presidency may contest the election of the president.
Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who
died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case?
kilometers as its territory. The Solicitor General argued that BP
885 enjoys a presumption of legality and that the question is moot
since the province of Negros del Norte had already been
proclaimed.
ISSUE: WON Negros del Norte was validly created. NO.
RATIO: Two political units would be affected in case of a division
of a province—the parent and the proposed province. The
Constitution commands that “affected units” be considered in a
plebiscite. The Court noted that the case of Paredes v Executive
Secretary, which involved the creation of a new municipality
where the parent unit was not involved, could not be considered as
a precedent. That case involved a barangay while this case
involves a province. Almost half of the sugar plantations would be
dismembered form the parent province and some of its most
important cities.
The SC also considered the new province as lacking in the territory
requirement since the land mass of the new territory was only
2,856 square kilometers. The Court rejected the suggestion of the
Solicitor General that even the area of the EEZ should be
considered in determining the territorial requirement.

Held: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-

President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President
or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within
thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution and intervention
is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ
herself denies any claim to the office of President but rather G.R. No. 179271
stresses that it is with the “paramount public interest” in mind that
she desires “to pursue the process” commenced by her late BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL 
husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an Petitioner,
election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a
person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and
 vs. 
of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the
Canvassers), Respondent.
outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not
truly get the highest number of votes.
By: Tere Arana
Tan v COMELEC

FACTS: BP 885 was passed or “An Act Creating the Province of

Negros del Norte.” The petitioners in this case wanted to stop The Case
COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite. The petitioners were
residents of Negros Occidental. The BP provided that the plebiscite  
was to be conducted 120 days from the approval of the Act and
that the President was to appoint the first officials.           Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 —  Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a
The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional and
petition for certiorari and mandamus, assails the Resolution
contrary to statute. The Constitution states that no province, city,
promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL).  The COMELEC’s
or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, subject to of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of
approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The LGC set as Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT
a standard that a province must have at least 3,500 square
4
for being moot.  BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc,
acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-
List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
          Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and
Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A
Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition, assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated on 9
July 2007.  NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties,
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of
the total votes cast under the Party-List System.  The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each
winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC  (Veterans).
Facts:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC.   
BANAT filed its petition because “the Chairman and the Members
of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers
that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the
Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in
allocating party-list seats.”  There were no intervenors in
BANAT’s petition before the NBC.  BANAT filed a memorandum
on 19 July 2007.  The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60.  NBC Resolution No. 07-
60 proclaimed 13 parties as winners in the party-list elections.
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the
additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties.  Thereafter,
acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-88 declaring BANAT’s petition as moot and
academic. Hence, this petition by BANAT. Meanwhile, on 9 July
2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans
formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the
Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic
Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941).  On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
Issues:
1.  WON the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely
a ceiling.
 2. WON the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941constitutional.
5
 3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
 4. WON the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections?  If not, can the major
political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections.
 
Held/ Ratio
          WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition.  We
SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August
2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9
July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60.    We declare unconstitutional the
two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats.  The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3
of this Decision.   Major political parties are disallowed from
participating in party-list elections.  This Decision is immediately
executory.  No pronouncement as to costs.
1. No. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that
the “House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law.” 
representatives and party-list representatives.  The Constitution
allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives.
  Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other
hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives.   We compute the number of seats
available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts.  On this point, we do not deviate from the first
formula in Veterans, thus:
 
Number of seats   Number of seats
available to available to
legislative districts x .20 
= party-list representatives
.80    
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number
of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a
legislative district is created by law. Since the 14 th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats
available to party-list representatives.
 
220 x .20  = 55
.80    
          After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to
party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
2. Yes, but only insofar as allocation of additional seats is
concerned. The two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.  contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
           To illustrate:  There are 55 available party-list seats.  elections as either “a political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No.
Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in
the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat.  Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.  Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.  Because of
the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat
itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats
and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.  Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”
3. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
a. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections;
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each;
c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
6
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated;
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
          In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter.  Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats.  Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
4. No. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system.  On the
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings.  In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats and
in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups.  In defining a “party” that participates in party-list
7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections.  Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. 
This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
           Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations
for electoral or political purposes.  There should not be a problem
if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list
election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing.   The other major political parties can thus
organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors.  To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this
fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.  Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
Fermin vs. Comelec
Facts:
After the creation of Shariff kabunsuan, the ARMM Regional
passed Autonomy Act No. 205 creating the Municipality of
Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff kabunsuan. This new municipality
constituted by separating 11 Barangays including Brgy. Indatuan
from the Municipality of Kabuntalan.
Mike Fermin was a registered voter of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntulan. On December 30,2006, formally making Barangay
Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan.
Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved Fermin's
application for the transfer of his voting record and registration as
a voter to Precint 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Morthern Kabuntalan
in the May 14,2007 elections.
However, Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another mayoralty
candidate , filed a Petition for Disqualification against Fermin
before the COMELEC. The petition alleged that Fermin did not
possess the period of residency required for candidacy and that he
perjured himself in his COC and his application for transfer of
voting record.
Elections were held pending the petition. Dilangalen was
proclaimed winner while Fermin as second.The latter filed an
election protest with RTC of Cotabato City. Meanwhile, the
COMELEC ruled against Fermin and held that he is a resident of
Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before
Datu Andal Ampatuan , Fermin could not have been a resident of
Barangay Indatuan for at least one year. COMELEC en banc
affirmed. Hence , the petition before the Supreme Court.
During the pedency of the above petition with the SC, Dilangalen
filed a motion to dismiss in the protest case on the ground that
Fermin had no legal standing to file the said protest, the
COMELEC En Banc having already affirmed his disqualification
as a candidate and that no TRO was issued by the SC. MTD
denied. MR also denied. Dilangalen brought the case to SC. The
two petitions were consolidated.
ISSUES:
1. Wheather or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68
or Section 78 of the OEC;
2.Wheather or not it was filed on time;
3.Wheather or not the COMELEC ravely abuse its discretion when
it declared petitioner as not a resident of the locality for at least one
year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections; and
Held:
7
1. The nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
under Section 78 of the OEC. The petition contains the essential
allegations of a “Section 78” petition, namely:
(1) The candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the
representation
pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive
rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which
he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false
representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his
qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible. It likewise appropriately raises a question on a
candidate’s eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession
of the one-year residency requirement under the law.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may
relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is
running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following
the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253
of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification
of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a
“Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition
for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the wining
candidate.
2. Since the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 78 of the
OEC, the Court now declares that the same has to comply with the
25-day statutory period for its filing.
Aznar v. Commission on Elections and Loong v. Commission on
Elections give ascendancy to the express mandate of the law that
“the petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.”
Construed in relation to reglementary periods and the principles of
prescription, the dismissal of “Section 78” petitions filed beyond
the 25-day period must come as a matter of course.
3. COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it
precipitately declared that:
Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one
year prior to the said elections. The COMELEC relied on a single
piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a
resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath
of office subscribed and sworn to before Governor Datu Andal
Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident of
Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of

April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of evidence does not
necessarily support a finding that petitioner was not a resident of
Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the
May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner merely admitted that he was a
resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was more
than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his
subsequent claim that he complied with the residency requirement
for the elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to
Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May 14,
2006.

Neither does this evidence support the allegation that petitioner

failed to comply with the residency requirement for the transfer of
his voting record from Barangay

Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given that a voter is required to

reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months
immediately preceding the election, petitioner’s application for
transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier
admission that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27,
2006. Be that as it may, the issue involved in the Dilangalen
petition is whether or not petitioner made a material representation
that is false in his CoC, and not in his application for the transfer of
his registration.