Land Titles and Deeds 4.

they have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of

Atty. Francesco Manuel P. Valdez
I. Original Registration – (PD 1529) is a proceeding brought
before the RTC (as a land registration court) to determine title or
ownership of land on the basis of an application for registration or
answer by claimant in a cadastral registration.
a. Cadastral/Administrative/Involuntary - is a compulsory
registration initiated by the government.
b. Ordinary/Judicial/Voluntary - by filing with the proper court;
application by the private individual himself.
the subject lot as owners for more than 30 years.
The Solicitor General opposed the application on the grounds
that, neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject lot since or earlier than June 12, 1945 as required by Sec.
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141; that applicants failed to
adduced any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax
declaration appended to the application was filed beyond the period
allowed under P.D. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the public
domain which cannot be subject of private appropriation.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a Registration of
Title over the land, based on the evidences presented by the
petitioners as they apply for the Registration of Title.

PD. 1529, Section 14
Who may apply. The
following persons may file
in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for
registration of title to land,
whether personally or
through their duly
authorized representatives:
Section 14 (1)
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Held: The court held that the applicant indubitably established
sufficient basis to grant the applicant for registration. The whole
parcel of land was purchased by the petitioner and his brothers and
was declared in the name of the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest, and its taxes has been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the possession and
ownership of the petitioners over the land has been continuous and
peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the
instant application for registration.

1. Ong vs. Republic G.R. No. 175746, March 21, 2008 Therefore the court orders and decrees the registration of a
parcel of land in favour of Charles L. Ong as a representative of his
Facts: Petitioner Charles L. Ong, in behalf of his brothers filed an brothers.
application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911 situated in
Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, with an area of 574 square
meters, more or less. Petitioners alleged that: NOTES
1. they are the co-owners of the subject lot.
2. the subject lot is their exclusive property having it acquired by
purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on
August 24, 1998.
3. the subject lot is presently unoccupied.

Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
1.) Canete vs. Genuino Ice Company G.R. No. 154080, January 22,
2008
Facts: January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for
cancellation of title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. N-140441; 14399; RT-94384 (292245); RT-94794
(292246); and 292247. Petitioners alleged that said titles are
spurious, fictitious and were issued under mysterious circumstances,
considering that the holders thereof including their predecessors-in-
interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the
property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said
property under the Friar Lands Act. Petitioners also sought to nullify
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which the
foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action because
petitioners are not real parties-in-interest; that no relief may be
granted as a matter of law; and that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial
court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a Second Amended
Complaint[10] which sought to annul, in addition to the titles already
alleged in the original complaint. Petitioners alleged that:
1. plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are
among those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession in concept of owners of unregistered
parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat,
Quezon City, Metro Manila;
2. the real property is a portion of a friar land known as Piedad
Estate, which property is intended for distribution among the
bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
3. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or
derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued
by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer
certificates of title are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and
null and void, for the following reasons: (a) that no record of
any agency of the government shows as to how and in what
manner was OCT 614 issued; (b) that no record of any
proceedings whatsoever, whether judicial or administrative, can
support defendants claim that the said property originated from
OCT 614; and (c) that the transfer certificates of title over the
above-described property were issued under mysterious
circumstances for the above-named defendants and their so-
called predecessors-in-interest never had any actual, adverse,
physical possession of the said property, thus, not allowed to
acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant to the Friar
Lands Act.
4. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the
above-described property, which transfer certificates of title are
null and void, for reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6
hereof x x x;
5. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer
certificates of title in violation of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws are prejudicial to plaintiffs rights over the above-
described property.
6. That equity demands that defendants transfer certificates of title
as specified in Paragraph 7 hereof be declared fictitious,
spurious and null and void ab initio.
Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
which was denied by the trial court. Hence the respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the court of appeals
The appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari
and dismissed petitioner’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are the bona fide occupants of the
property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act
and other existing laws.
Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
 Held: The petition is denied. The petitioners are not the owners; nor are
they qualified applicants thereof. it has not been shown in their
complaints that they have previously taken steps to avail the benefits
under the Friar Lands Act, since all they seek, should the questioned
titles be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property
covered by the questioned titles. Neither is there any indication that
they possess the qualifications necessary to enable them to avail the
reference granted under the act.
2. Malabanan vs. Republic G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009
Section 14 (2)
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Facts: On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel
of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71, 324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
notorious and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than 30 years. Velasco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban-the fourth being Aristede’s grandfather. Upon
Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife had become the administrator
of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons. After the death of
Esteban and his wife, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated June 11, 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject
property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On
December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged
to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the
RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property
in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and Dismissed the application of
Malabanan.
Issues:
1. For puposes of Section 14(2) of PD1529, may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance
with the Civil Code?
2. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands
be registrable under Section 14(2) of PD 1529 in relation to the
provision of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
3. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in
their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?
Held: the petition is denied.
1. In complying with Section 14(2) of PD1529, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable and disposable. There must be an expressed
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.
Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
 Section 14(3)
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or 3. Republic vs. Abrille G.R. No. L-39248, May 7, 1976
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.

a.) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The

person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription
under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of PD1529.
b.) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property
may be required, one ordinary and extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquirs ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least 10 years, in
good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted averse possession of
patrimonial property for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to

establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence – the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular – is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis

for registration. While the subject property was declared alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, comfortably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
 Section 14 (continuation)
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro
may file an application for the original registration of the land,
provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire
during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to
the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be
substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the
instrument creating the trust.
 by law Act 712 New Civil Code
NOTES
Section 14 (4)
(4) Those who
have acquired
ownership of
land in any
other manner
provided for by
law.
 Titles by escheat under Rule 91, Rules of Court
Section 1. When and by whom petition filed. — When a person dies
intestate, seized of real property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or
person by law entitled to the same, the Solicitor General or his
representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file a
petition in the Court of First Instance of the province where the
deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the
Philippines, setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the
deceased be declared escheated.
Section 2. Order for hearing. — If the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, which date shall be not
more than six (6) months after the entry of the order, and shall direct
that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a
week for six (6) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall be deem best.
Section 3. Hearing and judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof in open
court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published
as directed and that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal
property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person entitled to the
same, and no sufficient cause being shown to the contrary, the court
shall adjudge that the estate of the estate of the deceased in the
Philippines, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat;
and shall, pursuant to law, assign the personal estate to the municipality
or city where he last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to the
municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated. If
the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole estate may be
assigned to the respective municipalities or cities where the same is
located. Shall estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and
public charitable institutions and centers in said municipalities or cities.
The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion,
may order the establishment of a permanent trust, so that the only
income from the property shall be used.
Section 4. When and by whom claim to estate filed. — If a devisee,
legatee, heir, widow, widower, or other person entitled to such estate
appears and files a claim thereto with the court within five (5) years
from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of
and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for the proceeds after deducting reasonable charges
for the care of the estate; but a claim not made within the said time shall
be forever barred.
Section 5. Other actions for escheat. — Until otherwise provided by
law, actions reversion or escheat of properties alienated in violation of
the Constitution or of any statute shall be governed by this rule, except
that the action shall be instituted in the province where the land lies in
whole or in part
Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
 Donation - is the act by which the owner of a thing voluntarily transfers
the title and possession of the same from himself to another person,
without any consideration; a gift. A donation is never perfected until it
is has been accepted, for the acceptance is requisite to make
the donation complete.
 Succession - The taking over of a previous official's office, rank, or
duties by a new person; the process by which a decedent's property or
rights passes to the inheritors thereof, under the laws of descent and
distribution.
 Voluntary Alienation - is the legal term for the voluntary conveyance
of title. If the owner of the real estate is still alive, then the conveyance
is achieved by executing a deed to convey title; otherwise, title is
conveyed through a will, and will be subject to probate.
II. Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or
Incomplete Titles
a. Imperfect Titles- refers to title that is defective and does not
convey full legal transfer of a parcel of land or real estate.
A title can be imperfect because: It contains an “encumbrance”,
such as a property lien or easement.
The Public Land Act, C.A. 141
Section 48
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act , to wit:
Section 48(b)
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter
NOTES
1. Susi vs. Razon G.R. No. 24066, December 9, 1986 (full case)
Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
 This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff
the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the
second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land
is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of
title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied
each and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense,
alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine
Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance
with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the
plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against
Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this
appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding
that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling
in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the
possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the
Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate
of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to
Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of
the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio
Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession
thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to
Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it
(Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had
already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing
himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale
of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and
occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse
and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to
recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered
judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon,
dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E).
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in
question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of
Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto
on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-
five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of
Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant
the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the
proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document,
Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and
as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and
detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real
property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions
raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been
in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year
1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been
in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied
for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in
possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-
Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had
already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18,
1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy
it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of
memory.
These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449  1), is applicable here. In favor of
Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and
of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being
of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof. If, as above stated, the land, the possession
of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private
property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his
title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession
thereof and hold it. For the foregoing, and no error having been found in
the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
2. Republic vs. LAC, G.R. No. 73002, December 29, 1986
Facts: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr
Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of
the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land. The possession of the Infiels over
the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant
to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-
Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain. Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than P45M worth of improvements. And the ownership and
possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by
the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela donated part of the land as the town site of Maconacon Isabela,
which LAC affirmed.
Issue:
1. WON the land is already a private land.
2. WON the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporations or associations applies.
Held: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
 it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law
2. NO
Samayla Notes
Bukidnon State University
College of Law
  If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land
to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares
3. Republic vs. CA and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057, December 29, 1986
Facts: On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration
of title of a parcel of land.  The application sought a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title over the land. The public
prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed
the petition.  The court issued an order of general default against
the whole world except as to Angeles and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945.
Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject
property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956.  Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who
thereupon started occupying the same.  possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted
trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60
years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any
private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.  Since
the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable
or disposable. The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands
of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant.
Issue: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified
as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
Held: Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing
original registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession
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 is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government
from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed.  If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title
under Section 14(1) had been met by Naguit.  The parcel of land
had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land evidenced by the 50 to 60-
year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the
tax declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954,
which strengthened one's bona fide claim of ownership.
4. Republic vs. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005
Facts: Respondents are the Herbieto brothers who filed with the
MTC a single application for registration of two parcel of land. They
claimed to be owners by virtue of its purchase by parents. The
Republic filed an opposition arguing that (1) respondents failed to
comply with the period of adverse possession required by law. (2)
Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition
of the Subject Lots; and (3) the subject lots were part of the public
domain. MTC granted the application for registration of the parcel of
land of Jeremias and David Herbieto. This decision of the MTC was
also affirmed by the CA, holding that the subject property, being
alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23,
1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of
private ownership.
Republic appealed to the SC contending that (1) MTC had no
jurisdiction since there was a procedural defect in filing of a single
application for two parcels of land; and that (2) Respondents failed
to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the
Concept of owners since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Issue: WON there is procedural defect which resulted to MTC’s
lack of jurisdiction.
Held: Yes, but not with the ground stated by the petitioner, but
because respondents, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the property Registration Decree.
NOTES
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 Misjoiner of causes of action and parties do not involve
question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the
case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.
PUBLICATION: MTC did not acquire jurisdiction because
publication on the Freeman and Banat News was only done 3
months after hearing which renders inutile the intention of the
mandatory publication. In the Instant Petition, the initial hearing was
held on September 3, 1999. While the Notice thereof was printed in
the issue of the Official Gazette, dated August 2, 1999, and officially
released on August 10, 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat
News only on December 19, 1999 (more than 3 months from the
initial hearing). Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way
after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and
ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The
Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was
deprived of due process for it was already late for him to appear
before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose
respondents’ application for registration, and to present his claim
and evidence in support of such claim.
With regard to the period of possession, Respondents failed
to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots
for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title. The said land are public lands classified as alienable
and disposable only on June 25, 1963 and the respondents were
seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title through
judicial legalization. Under Sec. 28 of the Public Land Act, which is
the ruling law in this case, respondents were not able to prove their
continuous ownership of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because said lands were only classified as alienable and disposable
since June 25, 1963.
NOTES
5. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic
Facts: On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application
for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a
parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71, 324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, notorious and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than 30 years. Velasco testified that
the property was originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned
by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban-the fourth being
Aristede’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited
the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Esteban’s wife had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons. After the death of Esteban and his
wife, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his
uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was
a Certification dated June 11, 2001, issued by the Community
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 Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982.” On December 2002, the RTC approved the
application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession
of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and Dismissed the
application of Malabanan.
Issues:
1. For puposes of Section 14(2) of PD1529, may a parcel of
land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private
land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription
in accordance with the Civil Code?
2. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of
forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of PD 1529 in
relation to the provision of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
3. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land
in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?
Held: the petition is denied.
1. In complying with Section 14(2) of PD1529, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable and
disposable. There must be an expressed government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.
a.) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.
The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of PD1529.
b.) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be required, one ordinary and extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquirs
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at
least 10 years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted averse possession of patrimonial property for at
least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence – the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular – is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was declared
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that
is no longer intended for public use service or for the development
of the national evidence, comfortably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
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 disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
NOTES
6. Diaz vs, Republic, G.R. No. 181502, February 2,2010
Facts: This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration for the
third time of the resolution of the Supreme Court denying the
petition for review filed by petitioner Florencio Diaz. The petitioner
filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land in Nueva
Ecija. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked,
developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the
same continuously, publicly and adversely for more than 26 years.
OSG opposed the application because the land in question
was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation. Thus, it was
inalienable as it formed part of the public domain. Prior to this case,
the SC already ruled in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes that
the property was inalienable as it formed part of a military
reservation and the existence of a Possessory Information Title No.
216 (registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla) which the
respondent in the sited case anchored its claim on the land, was not
proven.
CFI ruled in favour of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA
ruled in favour of the Republic. Subsequently, CA encouraged the
parties to reach an amicable settlement and informed CA that the
track of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the
military reservation. CA ruled in favour of the Republic.
Petitioner then wrote letters addressed to Justice Quisumbing
and Justice Puno alleging there was a miscarriage of justice and that
the petitioner was tempted to go to the media regarding the situation.
Issue: WON the land in dispute can be registered to the petitioner.
Held:
1. The ruling in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes is applicable
in this case and thus constitutes res judicata. The SC ruled that in
registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land
Act for judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title,
an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring
the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not
only against the adverse claimant but also against all persons.
2. Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that
the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a
matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
forest. It is well-settled that forest land is capable of registration;
and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using
the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title. However, it is true that forest lands
may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable
by the president in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
recommendation of proper department head who has the
authority to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession by
the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, she was not able to produce such
evidence. Her occupation thereof could not have ripened into
ownership of the subject land.
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 3. The compromise agreement is null and void. The land in question
could have not been a valid subject matter of a contract, being
forest land, it was inalienable.
NOTES
7. Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, G.R. No. 173423
Facts: In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application
for registration of a 2,597 square meter land in Bo. Canaoay, San
Fernando, La Union, with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
interrupted possession of the land for more than 50 years, and
submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description
and certificate of assessment.
In its decision dated May 7, 2001, the RTC granted the
application for registration in favour of the spouses Fortuna. In May
16, 2005, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the
alienable and disposable nature of the land, they failed to show that
they compiled with the length of possession required by law, i.e.,
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Through the present petition, the
spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
They contended that the applicable law is Sec.48(b) of the
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, which requires
30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to
acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain.
However, this 30-year period was removed by PD No. 1073 and
instead required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945.
The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Sec.
14(1) of the PDR.
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD 1073 was issued on
January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was
issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the
basis of the Court’s ruling in Tanada vs. Tuvera, they alleged that
PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May
24, 1977 and January 17, 1979. By these dates, they claim to have
already satisfied 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942
amendment because Pastora’s possession dates back, at least, to
1947.
Issue: WON Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the
Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 1942 is applicable for
registration of a 2,597-square meter land in favour of the spouses
Fortuna.
Held: No, the petition is denied. The decision of the CA are
affirmed insofar as these dismissed the spouses Fortuna’s application
for registration.
Although Sec. 6 of PD No. 1073 states that the Decree shall
take effect upon its promulgation, the Court has declared in Tanada
vs. Tuvera that the publication of laws is an indispensable
requirement for its effectivity. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectiviy date is fixed by the legislature.
Accordingly, Sec. 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean
that the decree took effect only upon its promulgation, or on May 9,
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1977. This, therefore moves to cut-off date for applications for III. Registration Under The Indigenous People’s
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
Rights Act
48(b) of PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words applicants must prove
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public  R.A No. 8371
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997."
least 30 years or at least since May 8 1947. The spouses Fortuna
were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8,  Constitutionality:
1947.
1.) Cruz vs. Sec. of DENR

Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution.

Issue: WON the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution.

Held: The provisions of IPRA does not contravene the Constitution.

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA
to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which
the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not

part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private

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 land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.
 Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands
Is there a Constitutional basis for ancestral
domains? Yes. Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution provides:
The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure
their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domain.
Is there any law which covers ancestral domains? Yes. Under
Republic Act No. 8371, also known as “The Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997,” the State recognizes and promotes certain
rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) within the framework of the Constitution.
What is “Ancestral Domain”? It refers to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence
of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It
shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable
and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources,
and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence
and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. It is subject to
property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or
vested upon effectivity of R.A. 8371.
What is “Ancestral Land”? It refers to land occupied, possessed
and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of
the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional
group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots. It is also subject to property rights within the ancestral domains
already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of R.A. 8371.
What are the rights to Ancestral Domain? Certain rights of
ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains are
recognized and protected, including the right:
1. Of ownership. This includes lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at
any time within the domains.
2. To develop, control and use lands and natural resources. This
includes the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws.
3. To stay in the territories. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without
their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other
than eminent domain.
4. To regulate entry of migrants. ICCs/IPs have the right to regulate
the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into the domains.
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5. To claim parts of ancestral domains previously reserved for
various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common
and public welfare and service.
6. To resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with customary
law.
Who has priority over natural resources within ancestral
domains? The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs
concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and
utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding
twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25)
years, provided that a formal and written agreement is entered into
with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its
own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation.
Do the ICCs/IPs have the righ to self-governance? Yes. ICCs/IPs
have the inherent right to self-governance and self-determination.
The State respects the integrity of their values, practices and
institutions. The State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs to freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use their own commonly accepted
justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building
processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices
within their respective communities and as be compatible with the
national legal system and with internationally recognized human
rights.
Are lands lands certified to be ancestral domains covered by real
estate taxes? These lands are exempt from real property taxes,
special levies, and other forms of exaction except such portion of the
ancestral domains as are actually used for large-scale agriculture,
commercial forest plantation and residential purposes or upon titling
by private persons.
What are the applicable laws? Customary laws, traditions and
practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where the conflict arises shall
be applied first with respect to property rights, claims and
ownerships, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes.
Any doubt or ambiguity in the application and interpretation of laws
shall be resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.
What is the process of delineation of ancestral domains? The
identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following general procedure:
a. Petition for delineation. The process of delineating a specific
perimeter may be initiated by the National Commission on
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) with
the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for
Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the
ICCs/IPs.
b. Delineation proper. The official delineation of ancestral domain
boundaries including census of all community members therein,
shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office
upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned.
c. Preparation of maps. – On the basis of such investigation and the
findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the
NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical
descriptions, and a description of the natural features and
landmarks embraced therein.
d. Report of investigation and other documents. A complete copy of
the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be
prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP.
e. Notice and publication. A copy of each document, including a
translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall
be posted in a prominent place therein for at least 15 days. A copy
of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and
regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper
of general circulation once a week for 2 consecutive weeks to allow
other claimants to file opposition thereto within 15 days from date of
such publication. In areas where no such newspaper exists,
broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute. Mere
posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio
station are not available.
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 f. Endorsement to NCIP. Within 15 days from publication, and of the
inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a
report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is
deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed
insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the
submission of additional evidence. The Ancestral Domains Office
shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent
after inspection and verification.
g. Issuance of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT).
ICCs/IPs whose ancestral domains have been officially delineated
and determined by the NCIP shall be issued a CADT in the name of
the community concerned, containing a list of all those identified in
the census.
h. Registration of CADTs. The NCIP shall register issued
certificates of ancestral domain titles and certificates of ancestral
lands titles before the Register of Deeds in the place where the
property is situated.
What are not covered by this process? The delineanation process
shall not apply to ancestral domains/lands already delineated
according to DENR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1993, nor
to ancestral lands and domains delineated under any other
community/ancestral domain program prior to the enactment of R.A.
8371. ICCs/IPs whose ancestral lands/ domains were officially
delineated prior to the enactment of the law shall have the right to
apply for the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT) over the area without going through the process.
 National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
MANDATE:
The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-being of
the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs and
institutions.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION:
 To serve as the primary government agency through which ICCs/IPs
can seek government assistance and as the medium, through which
such assistance be extended;
 To review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs including existing
laws and ideas pertinent thereto and to propose relevant laws and
policies to address role in national development;
 To formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects
for the economic, social and cultural development of the ICCs/IPs
and to monitor the implementation thereof;
 To request and engage the services and support of experts from other
agencies of government or employ private experts and consultants as
may be required in the pursuit of its objectives;
 To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;
 Subject to existing laws, to enter into contracts, agreements,
arrangements, with the government or private agencies or entities as
may be necessary to attain objectives of this Act, and subject to the
approval of the President, to obtain loans from government lending
institutions and other lending institutions to finance its programs.
 To negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts and/or
properties in whatever form and from whatever source, local and
international, subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines, for the benefit of ICCs/IPs and administer the same in
accordance with the terms thereof or in the absence of any condition,
in such manner consistent with the interest of ICCs/IPs as well as
existing laws.
 To coordinate development programs and projects for the
advancement of ICCs/IPs and to oversee the proper implementation
thereof.
 To convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review;
assess as well as propose policies or plans;
 To advice the President of the Philippines on all the matters relating
to the ICCs/IPs and to submit within 60 days after the close of each
calendar year, a report of its operations and achievements;
 To submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals intended to
cary out the policies under this Act;
 To prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the
President;
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 To issue appropriate certification as a precondition to the grant of
permit, lease, grant or any other similar authority for the disposition,
utilization, management and appropriation by any private individual,
corporate entity, or any government agency, corporation or
subdivision thereof or any part or portion the ancestral domain
taking into consideration the consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs
concerned;
 To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various
offices within the Commission;
 To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Act;
 To exercise such other powers and functions as may be directed by
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, and;
 To represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences
and conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and other related
concerns.
IV. Forms and Contents
Section 15-19
1.) Benin vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. L-26127, June 25, 1974
Facts: On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate
complaints containing substantially the same allegations. In Civil
Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in
paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now
barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan,
province of Rizal and that they inherited said parcels of land from
their ancestor Sixto Benin;
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were
the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land,
described in paragraph V of the complaint, and that these parcels of
land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso
Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the
owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the
Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan,
province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square
meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their
ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his
parents; and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the same; had said lands
declared for taxation purposes.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in
their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they
were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants,
particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their
agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and
intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment,
illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying
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 the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements.
They made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their
lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been
fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud,
in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the
province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for
registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz,
Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason
y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that
the registered owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of
land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate; that the
registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court
of Land Registration;
They allege that the application for registration in LRC No.
7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of
parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate)
was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was
handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical
descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the area of
parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area
of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that the amendments and alterations,
which were made after the publication of the original application,
were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered
in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the
decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July
6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the
names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate
and Diliman Estate).
They contend that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC
No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no
jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree
No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC
No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was
issued pursuant to a void decision and that Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and
void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void
decree of registration. The lower court rendered a decision in favour
of the plaintiffs.
A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new
trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965,
filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on
February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal. The record on appeal,
after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized
by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965.
Issue: Whether or not the LRC had jurisdiction to render the decision
for the reason that the amendment to the original plan was not
published.
Held: The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that
sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta
Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed
with the Court of Land Registration an application for the registration
of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans
accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617
square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters.
The application and the notice of hearing, containing the
technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were
published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911.
On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing
the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681. November 11, 1913 the
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applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the
Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for
registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman
(Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be
allowed to remain.
On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration
rendered a decision which, among others, stated that during the
registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications
were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject
of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that the
Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration
was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended)
plans had included lands which were not by the original plans, and
whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already
been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563.
In compliance with the Chief of the Survey Division of the
Court of Land Registration submitted a stating that the new plan of
Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been
previously included in the original plan. The decree contains the
technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the
plan as amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of
8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10
square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that was stated
in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which
were published in the Official Gazette.
The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of
the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an
application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of
registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act). We
believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land
Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in
LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court
may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration
when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and
proper. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application
for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in
the original application, as published, a new publication of the
amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all
persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original
application, and the decision of the registration court would be a
nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is
infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice. But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a
portion of the area covered by the original application and the original
plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary.
In the case at bar, we find that the original plan covering
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration
in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that
were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another
registration case. , when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1
in the decree of registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the
application as published, it did not mention the fact that the difference
in area is only 27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of
27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in
the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735. We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters
would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended
plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in
Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that
Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86
hectares), we believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters,
between the computation of the area when the original plan was made
and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared,
cannot be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel
1.
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 It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases
where the original survey plan is amended during the registration
proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in the
original plan should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was
added after the publication of the original plan. The settled rule,
further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction
over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings
in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches
to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application.
If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included
land or lands not included in the original application as published,
then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must
be declared null and void in so far ⠀” but only in so far ⠀” as the
land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the
publication-the publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the
court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to
the lands that were included in the publication, are valid.
Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued
covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the
certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or
lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.
The court sited the Santiago case which states that, (T)he mere fact
that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration
proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favour of
the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that
would invalidate the decree.
The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate
as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against
those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against
parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear.
The registration by the appellees predecessors in interest freed the
lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed
against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except
those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Sivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein).
In addition, there being no allegation that the registered
owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration
proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from
the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of
such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
2.) Dream Village vs. Bases Development Authority, G.R. No. 192896,
2013
Facts: Petitioner Dream Village Neighbourhood Association, Inc.
claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have been
occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City
since 1985 “in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously.
The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban, owned
by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under Torrens Title, Original
Certificate if Title No. 291, issued on October 17, 1960 by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
The United States of America purchased the subject land
early in the American colonial period, to be converted into the military
reservation known as Fort William Mckinley. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 192 was issued in the name of the USA to cancel OCT No.
291. On December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William
Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines, and on September 11,
1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524,
this time in the name of the Republic.
On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or settlement the tracts
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of land within Fort William Mckinley, now named Fort Bonifacio, and
reserving them for military purposes. On January 7, 1986, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain
portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable in the manner
provided under RA. No. 274 and 730, in relation to the Public Land
Act, 16, thus allowing the sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper
Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village and Western Bicutan.
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 172 amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to
Lots 1 and 2 of the survey SWO-13-000298 the areas in Western
Bicutan open for disposition. On March 13, 19992, RA. No. 7227 was
passed, creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority
(BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic
military reservations and their extension camps to productive civilian
uses. Sec. 820 of the said law provides that the capital of the BCDA
will be provided from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in 9 military
camps in Metro Manila.
Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to
Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting is members, on November
22, 1999 the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek
its assistance in the verification survey of the subject property, which
they claimed is covered under Proclamation No. 172. They also claim
that they have been occupying the area for more than 30 years in the
concept of owners continuously, exclusively, and notoriously.
On the basis of the DENR’s verification survey report, the
COSLAP resolved the Dream Village life outside of BCDA. CA in its
decision dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the complaint because the question of whether
Dream Village is within the areas declared as available for disposition
in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even
as the land in dispute has been under a private title since 1906, and
presently its title is held by a government agency, the BCDA.
Issue: WON the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of
acquisition by prescription.
Held: In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, it was pointed out that
from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military
lands in Metro Manila became alienable and disposable. However, it
was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become
patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that
they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the
former American bases in Clark and Subic.
The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to
either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property
of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and
disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a
private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they
become private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion
Under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it
is provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence, the
property sought to be registered must not only be classified as
alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the
State that it is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth, or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio
remains property of public dominion of the State, because although
declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for
the conversion of military reservations in the country to productive
civilian uses.Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by
Dream Village has not even begun to run.
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Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Section 47
of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly
provides that no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. 
And, although the registered landowner may still lose his right
to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches, nowhere has Dream Village alleged or proved laches, which
has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.
 Survey of Lands:
3.) Republic vs. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 169397, March 13, 2007
Facts: Restituto Sarmiento (respondent) through his brother-attorney-
in-fact Magdaleno Sarmiento filed on November 29, 2000 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig, Metro Manila an
application for registration of a parcel of land, delineated as Lot 535-D
under Approved Survey Plan Swo-13-000465 with a total land area of
2, 664 square meters and located at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro
Manila.
Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through donation
under a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988 executed by
his father, Placido Sarmiento, which lot formed part of Lot 535 that
was allegedly inherited by Placido from Florentina Sarmiento.
Respondent further claimed that he and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and
public possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years.
To discharged the onus, respondent relies on the blue print
copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR
Center which bears the notation or the surveyor-geodetic engineer that
“this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No.
27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau
of Forestry.”
By decision of May 20, 2005, the appellate court held that as
the lot was sufficient identified by the blue print copy of the plan and
the technical description, the presentation of the original cloth ceased
to become indispensable for the grant of the application The appellate
court thus affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration having been denied by Resolution28 of August 19,
2005, petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review
of the certiorari.
On January 17, 2001, the Solicitor General, through the
Prosecutor of Taguig, filed an Opposition to respondent’s application
for registration.
Issue: WON, the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision
plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the
surveyor-geodetic engineer that “this survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area, certified by the Bureau of Forestry.” is sufficient
proof that the land in question has been declared alienable.
Held: NO. The application for registration filed by respondent is
DENIED.
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the
printed words which reads: “This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project NO. 27-B as per L.C Map No. 2623,
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 30, 1968, appearing on
Exhibit “E”.,
The proof is not sufficient. Sec. 2 Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution provides: “All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
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potential energy, fisheries, forests, or timber, wildlife, flora, fauna and
other natural resources are owned by the State……”
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineer’s notation in Exhibit “E” indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute
a positive government act validly changing the classification of the
lands of public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared alienable.
4.) Carpo vs. Ayala Land, G.R. No. 166577, February 3, 2010
Facts: Spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint
for Quieting of Title against Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) claiming
that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names.
They further alleged that ALI was claiming to have titles (specifically,
TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property
covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463. 
In its Answer, ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT
Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos’
claimed property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by
the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las
Piñas Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945
in the name of Ayala Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation
contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged
with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the property
covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back its title to Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while the Carpos’
title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also
claimed the Carpos’ complaint was barred by res judicata in view of
the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro which upheld
the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as
Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar
who was asserting ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
The RTC ruled that the Carpos’ title is superior to that of ALI.
The CA reversed RTC’s decision. The Carpos filed their motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, the instant
petition for review.
The Carpos contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule
that their cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches.
According to them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is
void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of action did
not prescribe.
Issue: Whether or not the Carpos cause of action has been barred by
prescription and laches.
Held: YES. OCT No. 242 of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest was
issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before the Car[pos
filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Court’s
firmly held view that the Carpos claim is barred not only by
prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree
of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that the
Carpos could have availed of is also barred. Although the Carpos’
complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering
that the Carpos were alleging in said complaint that there was a
serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in
favor of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an
action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name, must be filed within ten
years from the issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a
constructive notice. Since ALI’s title is traced to an OCT issued in
1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
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to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is
principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right,
which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to
permit. In the instant case, the Carpos, as well as their predecessor-
in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to
nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALI’s title was derived, for forty- V. Publication, Opposition of and Default
five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful,
would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the  PD1529 Section 23
validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are
protected by P.D. 1529 Section 23
Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five
days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the

application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause notice of
initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
whom it may concern". Said notice shall also require all persons
concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause
why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

2. By mailing.
(a) Mailing of notice to persons named in the application. The
Commissioner of Land Registration shall also, within seven days
after publication of said notice in the Official Gazette, as
hereinbefore provided, cause a copy of the notice of initial hearing to
be mailed to every person named in the notice whose address is
known.

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 (b) Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Public Highways, the
Provincial Governor and the Mayor. If the applicant requests to have
the line of a public way or road determined, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a copy of said notice of initial hearing
to be mailed to the Secretary of Public Highways, to the Provincial
Governor, and to the Mayor of the municipality or city, as the case
may be, in which the land lies.
1.
(c) Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the
Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public
Works, the Director of Forest Development, the Director of Mines
and the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. If the land
borders on a river, navigable stream or shore, or on an arm of the sea
where a river or harbor line has been established, or on a lake, or if it
otherwise appears from the application or the proceedings that a
tenant-farmer or the national government may have a claim adverse
to that of the applicant, notice of the initial hearing shall be given in
the same manner to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor
General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Mines and/or the
Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, as may be appropriate.
3. By posting.
The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also cause a duly
attested copy of the notice of initial hearing to be posted by the
sheriff of the province or city, as the case may be, or by his deputy, in
a conspicuous place on each parcel of land included in the application
and also in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal
building of the municipality or city in which the land or portion
thereof is situated, fourteen days at least before the date of initial
hearing.
The court may also cause notice to be served to such other persons
and in such manner as it may deem proper…..
NOTES
Dir. of Lands vs. CA, G.R. No. 102858, July 28,1997
Facts: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 square meters of land under PD No. 1529. The land
registration court in its decision dated July 13, 1989 dismissed the
petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent
Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented
by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: WON the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper
publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is mandatory.
Held: Yes. Petition was granted.
The pertinent part of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 requires
publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further
that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
Samayla Notes
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 The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for lad
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.
2. Republic vs. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010
Facts: On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz,
Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz,
represented by Jose R. dela Paz, filed with the RTC of Pasig City an
application for registration of land under PD 1529 otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of
land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property,
which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob
dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and
Ester dela Paz, who earlier acquired the said property from their
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz by virtue of a Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay, dated
March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they
are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the
same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987.
Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession,
they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of
more than 50 years since the filing of the application of registration
with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration on the
following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a
period of not less than 30 years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or
the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied
for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public
domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation.
Except for the Republic, there was no other oppositor to the
application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted
respondents' application for registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal,
which the CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed, and
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were
able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property through themselves
and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents
acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who
have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The
CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain.
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings
that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of
owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive
possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is
Samayla Notes
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within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The
subject property remained to be owned by the State under the
Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able
to present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open,
notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several
tax declarations, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest.
In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the
Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to
date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain
that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land
serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain,
Issue: WON the respondents can apply for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529.
Held: No, Petition is granted.
Under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, the respondents need to prove
that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These
the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.
In the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified
or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private
person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.  The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.  To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim)
is alienable or disposable.
To support its contention that the land subject of the application
for registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-
00-000084 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) with the following
annotation: ”This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.” Respondents' reliance
on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
The surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the
kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls
within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit
a certification from the proper government agency to establish that the
subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove
that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.
Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject
property, a reading of the records failed to show that the respondents
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession
and occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of
Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot.
However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents
predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject property
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19,
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1939, testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew
that the land subject of this case belonged to them. Amado testified
that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since
1950, and on about the same year, he knew that the respondents were
occupying the subject land.
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general
statements with no specific details as to when respondents'
predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of
this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously
owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the
property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented
to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had
been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period
of possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that
are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case
cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the
application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint
a clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of
the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration
of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
3. Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 108998, August 24, 1994 (full case)

Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax

declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in
the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since
said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that
their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in
the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in
1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other evidence.   The fact that
the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in
the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-
interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

Samayla Notes
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4. Republic vs. Nellas, G.R. No. 159595, January 23, 2007 5. Ting vs. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, March 14, 2007

Facts: On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title over the same
lot. The RTC dismissed Ting‘s application on the ground of res judicata.

Issue: WON the application for land registration should be barred for

being res judicata.

Held: In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private

land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the
title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. The land
registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court‘s approval
in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirioand Flora
Atienza‘s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is
binding on the whole world including Ting.

Ting insists that the duty of the respondent land registration officials
to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that
they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity
with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and
they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon

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any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their
duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of
the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the
court. They are specifically called upon to “extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.”

As for Ting‘s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of

Court reading: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also
be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the
December 10, 1976 decision became “extinct” in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the
effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after
five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by
a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
NOTES
6. Manotok Realty vs. CLT, G.R. No. 123346, December 14, 2007 and
Resolution Dated March 31, 2009
Facts: Respondent CLT Devt. sought to recover from petitioner Manotok
Realty the possession of Lot 26 covered by Maysilo Estate. Respodents
claim is based on a title issued in its name by the Register of Deeds-
Caloocan, which title in turn was derived from Estilita Hipilito by virtue
of a Dead of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated December 10, 1988.
Hipolito’s title came from Jose Dimson’s title, which was issued pursuant
to a CFI order. Dimsons’s title appears to have been sourced from OCT
994
Petitioners challenged the validity of the title relied by
respondent, alleging that Dimson’s title was irregularly issued, and hence
the subsequent titles flowing therefrom are void. Petitioners’ title
likewise traced as its primary source OCT994, which was transferred to
Alejandro Ruiz & Mariano Leuterio who acquired the property through
an “Escritura de Venta” (Deed of Sale) executed by Don Tomas
Arguelles & Don Enrique Llopis. Ruiz & Leuterio then sold the property
to Gonzales and then to his heirs, wherein the lot was subdivided into 7

Samayla Notes
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parcels. The RTC rendered a decision in favour of the respondents, which
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In December 1979, Dimson filed with CFI a complaint for
recover of possession and damages against petitioner Araneta Institute,
alleging that he was the absolute owner of part of the Maysilo Estate, and
that petitioner had been illegally occupying the land & refused to vacate
the same. On the other hand, petitioner alleged that Dimson’s title to the
land was void.
CFI ruled in favour of Dimson, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. On November 29, 2005, SC denied the consolidated
petitions. The petitioner then duly filed the respective motions for
reconsideration.
Issue: WON the Court can still overturn (at this point) its decision in
MWSS vs. CA & Heirs of Gonzaga vs. CAwherein its sustained the
validity of OCT 994 registered on April 19, 1917, and nullified the same
OCT registered on a later date, May 3, 1917
Held: YES. The Court held that the earlier factual finding in the case of
MWSS vs. CA is indefensible. What is now acknowledged as the
authentic OCT994 indicates that it was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on May 3, 1917, it is that date that is the date of
registration since that was when he was able to transcribe the decree in
the registration book, such entry made in the book being the original
certificate of title.
The aforementioned case recognized an OCT 994 registered on
April 19, 1917, a title had never existed and, even assuming that it did
exist, it now acknowledged as spurious. It would be incoherent for the
Court to reiterate jurisprudence that gave effect to OCT 994 registered on
April 19, 1917, and at the same time, acknowledged that the same OCT
994 never existed. Hence the Court can certainly decline to infuse
validity to such erroneous premise.
Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the
petitions now before us. Undisputedly, the two cases involved different
parcels of land. The present petitioners could not be bound by the
decision in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and their
properties were not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is
basic that no man shall be affected by any proceedings to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by the judgement rendered
by the court.
7. Angeles vs. Sec. of Justice, 614 SCRA 478, March 9, 2010
Facts: On 3 January 1997, the Provincial Prosecution Office issued
a resolution recommending the filing of criminal information for estafa
against Mercado. This resolution, however, was issued without Mercados
counter-affidavit.
Meanwhile, Mercado filed his counter-affidavit on 2 January 1997.
On receiving the 3 January 1997 resolution, Mercado moved for its
reconsideration. Hence, on 26 February 1997, the Provincial Prosecution
Office issued an amended resolution dismissing the Angeles spouses
complaint for estafa against Mercado, as the accusation of estafa here
lacks enough credible evidentiary support to sustain a prima facie finding.
On appeal to the Secretary of Justice, the Angeles spouses
emphasized that the document evidencing the contract of sanglaang-
perde with Juana Suazo was executed in the name of the Mercado
spouses, instead of the Angeles spouses. The Angeles spouses allege that
this document alone proves Mercados misappropriation of
their P210,000. However, the Secretary of Justice found otherwise. Thus,
the Angeles spouses failed to show sufficient proof that Mercado
deliberately deceived them in the sanglaang perde transaction. The
document alone, which was in the name of Mercado and his spouse,
failed to support the allegation that there was deceit or false
representation on the part of Mercado that induced the Angeles spouses to
part with their money. Mercado satisfactorily explained that the Angeles
spouses do not want to be revealed as the financiers. Indeed, it is difficult
to believe that the Angeles spouses would readily part with their money
without holding on to some document to evidence the receipt of money,
or at least to inspect the document involved in the said transaction. Under
the circumstances, it is deemed that the Angeles spouses knew from the
very start that the questioned document was not really in their names.
Samayla Notes
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 In addition, the partnership truly existed between the Angeles
spouses and Mercado. The formation of a partnership was clear from the
fact that they contributed money to a common fund and divided the
profits among themselves. Records would show that Mercado was able to
make deposits for the account of the Angeles spouses. These deposits
represented their share in the profits of their business venture. Although
the Angeles spouses deny the existence of a partnership, they, however,
never disputed that the deposits made by Mercado were indeed for their
account.
The transcript of notes on the dialogue between the Angeles
spouses and Mercado during the hearing of their barangay conciliation
case reveals that the Angeles spouses acknowledged their joint business
ventures with Mercado although they assailed the manner by which
Mercado conducted the business and handled and distributed the funds.
The veracity of this transcript was not raised in issued by the Angeles
spouses. Although the legal formalities for the formation of a partnership
were not adhered to, the partnership relationship of the Angeles spouses
and Mercado is evident in this case. Consequently, there is no estafa
where money is delivered by a partner to his co-partner on the latter’s
representation that the amount shall be applied to the business of their
partnership. In case of misapplication or conversion of the money
received, the co-partners liability is civil in nature (People v. Clarin, 7
Phil. 504)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED
Issue: 1. Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
appeal of the Angeles spouses;
2. Whether a partnership existed between the Angeles spouses and
Mercado even without any documentary proof to sustain its
existence;
3. Assuming that there was a partnership, whether there was
misappropriation by Mercado of the proceeds of the lanzones
after the Angeles spouses demanded an accounting from him of
the income at the office of the barangay authorities on 7
September 1996, and Mercado failed to do so and also failed to
deliver the proceeds to the Angeles spouses;
4. Whether the Secretary of Justice should order the filing of the
information for estafa against Mercado.
Held: The petition has no merit.
Whether the Secretary of Justice Committed
Grave Abuse of Discretion
An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of
discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal
hostility.[13]
The Angeles spouses fail to convince us that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed their appeal.
Moreover, the Angeles spouses committed an error in procedure when they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justices
resolution. A previous motion for reconsideration before the filing of a
petition for certiorari is necessary unless: (1) the issue raised is one purely
of law; (2) public interest is involved; (3) there is urgency; (4) a question of
jurisdiction is squarely raised before and decided by the lower court; and (5)
the order is a patent nullity. [14] The Angeles spouses failed to show that their
case falls under any of the exceptions. In fact, this present petition
for certiorari is dismissible for this reason alone.
Whether a Partnership Existed
Between Mercado and the Angeles Spouses
The Angeles spouses allege that they had no partnership with Mercado.
The Angeles spouses rely on Articles 1771 to 1773 of the Civil Code, which
state that:
Art. 1771. A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where
immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a
public instrument shall be necessary.
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Art. 1772. Every contract of partnership having a capital of three thousand spouses] to part with their money. [Mercado] satisfactorily explained that the
pesos or more, in money or property, shall appear in a public instrument, [Angeles spouses] do not want to be revealed as the financiers. [15]
which must be recorded in the Office of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Even Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
which decided the civil case for damages, injunction and restraining order
filed by the Angeles spouses against Mercado and Leo Cerayban, stated:
Failure to comply with the requirements of the preceding paragraph shall not
affect the liability of the partnership and the members thereof to third
xxx [I]t was the practice to have all the contracts of antichresis of their
persons.
partnership secured in [Mercados] name as [the Angeles spouses] are
apprehensive that, if they come out into the open as financiers of said
Art. 1773. A contract of partnership is void, whenever immovable property
contracts, they might be kidnapped by the New Peoples Army or their
is contributed thereto, if an inventory of said property is not made, signed by
business deals be questioned by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or worse,
the parties, and attached to the public instrument.
their assets and unexplained income be sequestered, as xxx Oscar Angeles
was then working with the government.[16]
The Angeles spouses position that there is no partnership because of the
lack of a public instrument indicating the same and a lack of registration
Furthermore, accounting of the proceeds is not a proper subject for the
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) holds no water. First,
present case.
the Angeles spouses contributed money to the partnership and not
immovable property. Second, mere failure to register the contract of For these reasons, we hold that the Secretary of Justice did not abuse his
partnership with the SEC does not invalidate a contract that has the essential discretion in dismissing the appeal of the Angeles spouses.
requisites of a partnership. The purpose of registration of the contract of
partnership is to give notice to third parties. Failure to register the contract of WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Secretary of Justice.
partnership does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners The present petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
to third persons. Neither does such failure to register affect the partnerships
juridical personality. A partnership may exist even if the partners do not use
the words partner or partnership.
Indeed, the Angeles spouses admit to facts that prove the existence of a
partnership: a contract showing a sosyo industrial or industrial partnership,
contribution of money and industry to a common fund, and division of
profits between the Angeles spouses and Mercado.

Whether there was

Misappropriation by Mercado

The Secretary of Justice adequately explained the alleged

misappropriation by Mercado: The document alone, which was in the name
of [Mercado and his spouse], failed to convince us that there was deceit or
false representation on the part of [Mercado] that induced the [Angeles

Samayla Notes
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College of Law