AM. No.

02-11-10-SC
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS VS DANILO T. BOLOS
G.R. 186400
OCTOBER 20. 2010
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Later, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. Later, a copy of said decision
was received by Danilo and he timely appealed an appeal. RTC subsequently denied
due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section20 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied and the RTC issued the order declaring the
decision which granted the annulment as final and executor, this lead to Danilo filing
with the CA a petition for certiorari to annul the orders of the RTC. The CA granted the
petition and reversed the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the
requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo
was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SCis not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized
on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.

Issue:

Whether or not the phrase “Under the Family Code in A.M. No.02-11-10-SC pertains to
the word petitions rather than to the word marriages.
Held:

No, it does not. The Rule On Declaration Of Nullity Of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriage as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is ruled to be that its
categorical language is explicit in its scope. In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC which
the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, reads that:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of 
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philli
pines.
  The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule 
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code w
hich became effective on August 3, 1988. The Court therefore cannot apply merit to the 
petitioner’s interpretation stating that “petitions” is being categorized in the phrase “unde
r the Family Code” when the Rule took effectivity.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is tha
t when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for constr
uction or interpretation, only application. It must therefore be given its literal meaning an
d applied without attempted interpretation in what is known as “plainmeaning rule” or ver
ba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of inte
ntion”. Additionally, there is also the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the 
words of a status there should be no departure.
 Grounds for declaration of nullity of marriage
RESTITUTO ALCANTARA VS. ROSITA ALCANTARA
G.R. NO. 167746
AUGUST 28, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:
Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara
alleging that on December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a “fixer” who
could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on
the same day.  Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo,
Manila, on March 26, 1983.  The marriage was again celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license.  The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident
of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil
registrar of the said place.  In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Restituto prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage
void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and
its entry on file.     Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite; that   Restituto has a mistress with whom he
has three children; that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
Restituto.

ISSUE: 
1. Was there an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio?
2. Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of lack of marriage liscence?

HELD: 
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the
State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law

requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the parties.  In this case, the marriage contract
between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom
the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This
certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and
the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage. 

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license,
claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.  Even then, we
still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of
either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence
of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.  An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a “fixer” who
arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest --
will not strengthen his posture.  The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or
not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All
the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law.
 Proper action and procedure
VIRGINIA A. LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112597
April 2, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of
the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they
had three kids. While her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with
another woman. This prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her
husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts,
contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid marriage certificate.
The Swiss Court held in favor of the private respondent. Subsequently the
Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the
Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioners appeal. The
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the
same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA’s
decision.

ISSUE:
Can the entry to the Local Civil Registrar be changed?
HELD:
The only errors that can be cancelled or c o r r e c t e d u n d e r R u l e 1 0 8 o f
the Rules o f C o u r t are typographical or clerical errors, not material
or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one
which i s visible t o the eyes o r obvious t o t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; e r r o r m a d e b y a c l e r k o r a t r a n s c r i b e r ; a mistake in
copying or writing (Black vs. Republic,L-10869, Nov.28,1958); or some harmless and
innocuous change such as a c o r r e c t i o n o f n a m e t h a t i s c l e a r l y m i s s p e l l e d
o r o f a m i s statement of the occupation of the parent. Where the effect of a
correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her
children from legitimate to illegitimate, the s a m e c a n n o t b e g r a n t e d e x c e p t
o n l y i n a n a d v e r s a r i a l proceeding.
The summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of
the Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginias civil status from
married t o single and of their three children from legitimate to
illegitimate. Neither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare
their marriage null and void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil
registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry. Further, the respondent trial
judge gravely a n d seriously abused h i s discretion in
unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear
evidence on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage under the Civil Code
and/or Family Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings
under the Rules.
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All the acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emancipating from it have n legal effect. Hence, it can never become final
and any writ of execution based on it is void.
 Proper action and procedure
ERIC U. YU vs. HONORABLE JUDGE AGNES REYES-CARPIO and CAROLINE T. YU
G.R. No. 189207
June 15, 2011
VALASCO, JR., J

Facts:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu
with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that
Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution
after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the
issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006,
Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution, considering that the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of
the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be
resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations. Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of
nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s
opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to
another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by
Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation
by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as
codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on nullity be
already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously.
Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of
action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely
ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge
Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first
before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.
Held:
No. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to
have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An
interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end
the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion and that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the
requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been
an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits, incorporating
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of
evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the
assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence
relating to custody, support, and property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was
not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly
allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial
court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the
petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the
petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate
court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed
with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing
rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at
hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly
the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody,
support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En
Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly,
Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may
receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but
before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed
out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence
on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is
certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge
can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious
and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when
she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and
legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio
and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
 Proper action and procedure
PHILIP YU VS. VIVECA LIM-YU
G.R NO. 200072
JUNE 20, 2016
TINGA, J.

FACTS:
Viveca brought against her husband Philip an action for legal separation and
dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical
abuse before RTC Pasig
Viveca moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum
to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. to compel production of the insurance
policy and application of a person suspected to be Philip’s illegitimate child.

RTC denied the motion. An Insurance contract is inadmissible evidence pursuant to

Circular Letter No. 11-2000 issued by the Insurance Comm’n to prevent insurance
companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to
insurance policies. Production of the application and insurance contract would violate
NCC 2801 and Sec. 5 of the Civil Registry Law 2, both of which prohibit the
unauthorized identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.

Viveca then filed a Motion to Attach Excluded Evidence to the Record concerning
the above mentioned documents .Upon a petition for certiorari, CA reversed and ruled
that Viveca was merely seeking the production of insurance application and contract
and was NOT yet offering the same as part of her evidence.
Pursuant to a letter from the Insurance Comm’r, the documents cannot be
considered as privileged information as the Circular Letter was not intended to be a
legal impediment in complying with lawful orders.
RTC cannot deny a party’s privilege to tender excluded evidence. Philip now contends
before SC that: the CA erred in delving into errors of judgment when in fact Viveca only
filed a special civil action and not an ordinary appeal to CA failed to show any specific
instance of grave abuse when RTC denied Viveca’s motion to CA petition was mooted
since she eventually filed her formal offer of rebuttal exhibits, with tender of excluded
evidence

Issue(s):
a. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing RTC denial of Viveca’s Motion
b. Whether or not the documents are privileged in nature.

HELD:

First issue: No. While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence,
such power is exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered. For a long
time, the Court has recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof,
it is impossible for a trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant
or not, and thus the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality should be avoided. When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the SC, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly
unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, — a
step which the SC is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of
proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial
judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the
case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this
course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this
court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to
be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, Viveca was merely
asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when
the trial court issued the assailed Order.
 Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible,
the trial court was not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point.
Thus, it barred
the production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth.
As observed by petitioners, the assailed Orderwas not a mere ruling on the admissibility
of evidence; it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling within the general
powers of the judge is not authorized and is consequently void with respect to the
particular case because the conditions under which he was only authorized to exercise
his general power in that case did not exist and therefore, the judicial power was not
legally exercised.Thus, in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible
even before they were formally offered, much less
presented before it, the trial court acted in excess of its discretion.

SECOND Issue: No. It was clarified and settled by the Insurance Commissioner’s
opinion that the circular on which the trial court based its ruling was not designed to
obstruct lawful court orders. Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting the
insurance application and policy.

Under ROC 132.403, before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence
must have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is
made, the evidence must have been identified and presented before the court. While
Viveca made a "Tender of Excluded Evidence," such is not the tender contemplated by
the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not
formally offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said "Tender of
Excluded Evidence" was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject
documents were declared inadmissible by the trial court even before these were
presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate remedy which
private respondent could have resorted to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed
before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the said petition moot.
 Parties
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 169766
March 30, 2011

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

In May 1993, Mamintal A.J. Tamano (a former senator) married Estrellita Juliano-

Llave under a civil ceremony. In June 1993, both got married again to each other but
this time under Muslim rites. Unfortunately, in less than a year, Tamano died.
In November 1994, mother and son Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano and  Adib
Ahmad Tamano filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Tamano for being bigamous. It appears that Zorayda and Tamano were
already married in 1958 under civil rites and Muslim rites.
In her defense, Estrellita averred that Tamano was already divorced when he
married Estrellita in 1993. This was evidenced by Tamano’s declared status of
“divorced” at the time of their marriage in 1993.
After a long and tedious process, the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano
was finally declared void for being bigamous by the RTC and later the Court of Appeals.
Estrellita now questions the said ruling on the ground that:
a. Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to question the marriage between Estrellita
and Tamano because they were not parties to the marriage contract; that under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an action to file the declaration of nullity of marriage
is only limited to the husband or the wife;
b. The proceedings in the RTC and the CA are void because under Article 48 of the
Family Code as well as A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Solicitor General or the public
prosecutor are required to appear or participate in the proceedings in order to determine
collusion between the parties – this was not the case here, according to Estrellita;
c. The Muslim Code or PD 1083 was enacted in 1977 and that the marriage between
Zorayda and Tamano happened in 1958; that Muslim Code provides for Muslim
Divorce; that under said law, if Muslim divorce need not be registered.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Estrellita was denied her right to due process.

2. Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano is void.

3. Whether or not Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case.

HELD:

First issue: Estrellita argues that the RTC prematurely issued its judgment, as it should
have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
subsequently, before this Court. However, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that
"[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case."
The participation of the Sol-Gen or the public prosecutor can be dispensed with. First of,
the public prosecutor was actually ordered by the RTC at the onset of the case to make
a report on whether or not there was a collusion between the parties. And as the
records of the case would show, the prosecutor did submit a report finding no collusion.
Second, the rationale behind the requirement for the Sol-Gen or public prosecutor to
participate is to make sure that there’s no collusion between the parties. In this case,
the lack of collusion between the parties is apparent because of the vehement
opposition of Estrellita to the petition filed by Zorayda.

Second issue: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil
Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given
time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.
For Estrellita, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However,
PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. As ruled in Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, Article 13 of PD
1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites. Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights
on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage
which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as voidab initio. The Muslim Code did not automatically cover all
Muslim marriages already existing at the time of its enactment. Further, the Muslim
Code finds no application to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim rites.
Further still, the Muslim Code did not provide for retroactive application. It
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain Civil Code
is divorce allowed. The declaration of Tamano that he was divorced is therefore without
effect as to the validity of his earlier marriage with Zorayda. Hence, the ruling of the
RTC and the CA is correct – the marriage between Tamano and Estrellita in 1993 is
void for being bigamous. Thus, the law applicable on the marriage between Tamano
and Zorayda.

Third issue: Zorayda and Adib have the legal personality to question the marriage
between Estrellita and Tamano, they filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s
marriage in November 1994. Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, "Only an aggrieved or
injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages." This refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse," it
limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in
application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a
bigamous subsequent marriage. If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule
contemplated, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken
place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.
 Parties
LOLITA D. ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614,
September 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC,
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D.
Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven
children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004,
Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the
requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that
Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage
license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May
2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of
lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together
as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they
were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that
the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan,
and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the
dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living
who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUE:
  Which applies in the case at bar: the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC?
  
HELD:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because it is the law that governs petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code.
The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004.

While it is true that Nial allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the

declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of
their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned
marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court
in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages
involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage
sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
  
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for
doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took
effect on 15 March 2003. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they
vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
 (a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. 

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.  The Committee is
of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.  Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse  filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage
and not to seek its dissolution.
 Parties
ENGRACE NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24,
1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. 

After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license, fearing for problems in successional rights
(succession only occurs after the death of an ascendant) due to the second marriage.

ISSUES:

Can there be such a petition when the heirs’ parent is deceased and are the heirs a
‘proper party’?

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that:
The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not
the Family Code. (In determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in
force at the time the marriage was contracted.). There is no second marriage. The
absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The exemption for a
marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not
the one described by the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first marriage,
was only twenty months whereas the law requires five years. If the respondent took into
consideration the other years and months before the second marriage, then the
cohabitation would include the period of the first marriage. This is in violation of the law.
A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place. A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while a void marriage can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.
  The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.
  The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage
before determining succession rights. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. But Article 40
of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
 Parties
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS VS. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 179922
December 16, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:

FACTS:

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death,
two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August
1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his
complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was
a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained
that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo
Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him

ISSUE:
1. Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings
or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.
2.    Whether one who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity of marriage. 

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule
35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment
on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
SECOND ISSUE: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring
a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to
deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad
in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as
to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.
 Parties
ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition
for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had
been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who
had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any
person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the
marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of
time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus: While an action to declare
the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law
nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in
this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Certainly, a surviving
brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More
so that the surviing wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a
party to said case.
ISSUE:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code.

HELD:

The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a
marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.
As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by
a subsequent amendment of the governing law. 

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed
herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took
effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the

limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute

nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1)       Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and
2)      Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15,
2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted

on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the
parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity
of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the
children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of
the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11,
1986 due to lack of a marriage license.
 Parties
MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a

Filipino, here in the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki
was still subsisting, married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the
Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to Japan.
In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair.
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same year.
Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the Philippines together.
In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition
entitled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)”. He filed the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or
Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be
done:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the “Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages”, a petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in this case
either Maekara or Marinay only.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:
Yes.  Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country.  Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy.”

The Supreme Court further held that:

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a

marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

xxx

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.

xxx

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an

action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.   Article 26
of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”

Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.