Arriola v.

Arriola
G.R. No. 177703
January 28, 2008
Facts:
John Nabor C. Arriola filed a Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
254, Las Pias City against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for judicial partition
of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola . Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first
wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second
wife, petitioner Vilma. On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition
of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola. As the parties failed to agree on how
to partition among them the land, respondent sought its sale through public auction, and
petitioners acceded to it. The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be
reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject
land.This prompted respondent to file motion praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.
On August 30, 2005, the RTC denied the motion. On January 3, 2006, denied respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a family home.

Ruling:
Yes, the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased
and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
Code the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of
its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security
and unity by imposing restrictions on its partition such as: (1) the heirs cannot extrajudicially
partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and
(2) the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds
compelling reasons . On the case, there was no compelling reason has been alleged by the
parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home,
either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as
suggested by the parties. Moreover, the Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the
family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on
which it stands. Thus, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on
which it stands is deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.

Medequillo v. Breva
 G.R. No. 86355
May 31, 1990
Facts:
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals setting the
liability of Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay. The judgment having become final and
executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. On July 7,
1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at PoblacionMalalag, Davao del
Sur containing an area of 600 square meters and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares. A motion to quash
was filed by Jose Modequillo alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built
since 1969 prior the commencement of the case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155, and
that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural
minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153. On August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Modequillo and it was denied for lack of merit on September 2,
1988.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

Held:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. The petitioner’s contention that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is
not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this
Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does
not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the
effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code. As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made
shall be on whatever rights Modequillo may have on the land.
 Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060
November 27, 2008
Facts:
Albino Josef was the defendant in a case for collection of sum of money filed by Otelio
Santos, who claimed that Josef failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from
Santos on 1994. The Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, found Josef liable to
Santos in the amount of P404,836.50 with interest at 12% per annum reckoned from January 9,
1995 until full payment. On February 17, 2003, Santos moved for issuance of a writ of
execution. In an Order dated July 16, 2003, the trial court granted the motion. A writ of
execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August 29,
2003, personal properties subject of the writ of execution were auctioned off. A real property
located at Marikina City was sold on October 28, 2003 by way of public auction. Santos emerged
as the winning bidder. On November 5, 2003,Josef filed an original petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the personal and real properties.
Josef claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the
real property was his family home; thus, exempt from execution.

Issue:
Whether or not the sheriff erroneously attached, levied and sold on execution the real property
because it is a family home.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which
it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except
in certain special cases. The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred
institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our
nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as
a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the lower court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified. The same is true with respect to
personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioner’s allegations in his
Opposition, the lower court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether
the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to
someone else.
 Kelly, Jr. v Planters Products, Inc.
G.R. No. 172263
July 9, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay despite demand,
PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57. The RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Sheriff
Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution real property located in Naga City. After being belatedly
informed of the sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to
dissolve in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the property was their family home which
was exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was denied for failure to comply with the three-
day notice requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution
of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged
family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant
to the Civil Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly
provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises
before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.

Gomez v. Sta. Ines

G.R. No. 132537
October 14, 2005
Facts:
On 17 June 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo filed a
complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines alleging that
they are the children of the deceased Purificaciondela Cruz who entrusted rice land in Nueva
Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of
the produce of said rice lands while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the property. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment
against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of the TCT and pay damages. A
writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, a parcel of land located in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, with an area of 432 square meters registered in the name of Marietta dela Cruz Sta.
Ines, was levied upon by Flaviano Balgos, Jr., then Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Vizcaya, to
satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction on 25
August 1992 to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Register
of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on 17 September 1992. Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with
theirchildren, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya
on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence;
thus, exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the
houseand lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time
they occupied it in 1972.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property can be sold provided that it is a family home.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family homeshall be exempt
from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debtsincurred prior to
the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the houseand lot was
constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed
constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is
deemed constituted as the family home only upon theeffectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in1986 to for acts committed as early as
1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property was constituted as the family home
in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within the exception provided for in Article 155
of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.

MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97898
August 11, 1997
Facts:
Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-squaremeter
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. The property was located in
Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On March 17, 1986, E & L
Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against FloranteManacop and F.F. Manacop Construction
Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of
P3,359,218.45. Manacop and his company entered into a compromise agreement with E & L
Merchantile, Inc., the salient portion of provides that Manacop and his company will undertake
to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible
as their collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment
approving the compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in
good faith. On July 15, 1986, E & L Merchantile, Inc filed a motion for execution which the
lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff
levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the
judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction. On August 1, 1989, Manacop and his
company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from
continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged
that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there was no showing that they had the
means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected.

Issue:
Whether the final decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of
the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the
Family Code.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article 155 of the Family Code also
provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution
of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. In
the case at bar, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation
of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home
upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the
laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop. Since the debt involved was incurred
and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, Manacop cannot be
shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
 TANEO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108532
March 9, 1999
Facts:
As a result of a judgment in a case for recovery of property in favor of AbdonGilig, two (2) of
petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a
parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of
about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis
Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the Abdon
Gilig as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final
deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and
conveying said properties to the AbdonGilig. To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an
action on November 5, 1985 to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the
land. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo
and Narcisa Valaceras. Upon their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT No. P-
12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through
free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the
payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they
were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V.
Yasay issued a Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance in favor of the AbdonGilig over the subject
property including their family home that was extra judicially constituted in accordance with
law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain
in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the
title and ownership of petitioners over said property.

Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the applicable law in the present case is the Civil Code where registration of
the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances
where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. The court
found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land
of PlutarcoVacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was
registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on
January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet
constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their
father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2). Moreover, the constitution
of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that constitution did not comply
with the requirements of the law. The lower court found that the house was erected not on the
land which the Taneo’s owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition
of the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and
the land on which it is situated, it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land
not belonging to another.
 Fortaleza v. Lapitan
G.R. No. 178288
August 15, 2012
Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan
in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza
executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and
lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna. When spouses Fortaleza failed
to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. Dr. Raul
Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million.
The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession with Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City. On September16, 2005, the RTC
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court.
Spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to the CA, however, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were bared on their right of redemption over the foreclosed
property by demanding a redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the
amount of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is a family
home.

Held:
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.However, Article
155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured
by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt
that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage
over the subject property. Assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was
sold at the public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption.

Oliva-De Mesa v. Acero

G.R. No. 185064
January 16, 2012
Facts:
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. in the amount
of P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the property. As payment, Araceli issued
a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. However, the check was
dishonored for reason of account closed. On April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's
Office of Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 against the
spouses. On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decisionacquitting the petitioners but
ordering them to pay Claudio the amount of P100,000.00 with legal interest from date of demand
until fully paid. On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L.
Samonte levied upon the property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on public
auction and Claudio was the highest bidder. Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the
subject property to the spouses De Mesa and JuanitoOliva for a monthly rent of P5,500.00. On
March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale over the property was issued to Claudio and on April 4,
1995, the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan issued TCT No. T-221755 in Claudio’s
favor.Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the spouses De Mesa. On July
22, 1999, the MTC rendered a decision ordering the spouses De Mesa to vacate the property.

Issue:
Whether the subject property is exempt from execution.

Held:
The family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, this
right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the
property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. It is a well-
settled rule that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.
This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. The Court held that the
petitioners’ omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption
that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153
of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove
the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status
of the subject property as a family home

KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN

Uy vs. Chua
G.R. No. 183965
September 18, 2009
Facts:

Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She
alleged in her complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with
Irene Surposa and that the respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie)
and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the latter instructed that
petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO F.
SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of
Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. However, respondent
Chua financially supported petitioner and Allan and even provided employment for her.
He and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community
as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his
brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative and Respondent’s relatives even
attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter. Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit
relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter. Hearings then ensued and
petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner
had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against
respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision
dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement was made
between the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges that
there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand
and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled in
favor of the respondent hence this appeal

Issue:

Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement.

Held:

The compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of the
late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has
the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the
merits. A contract must have requisites and no according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one
of the requisites of such to be valid is that the compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status
of a person and the issue of Future Support and Future Legitime. The agreement in this
case is intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she
is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and
Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said
Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and
future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the
prohibition

under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused in the case of Advincula v. Advincula. It is
settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that
must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public
policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent
is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect
at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. Decision Reversed and Set Aside.

DE ASIS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127578
February 15, 1999
Facts:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the
legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here)
is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to
provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied his
paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support
for him. On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a
manifestation. By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to
move for the dismissal of the case. "Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos
Santos, counsel for the defendant, that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no
objection that this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant will withdraw the
counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with prejudice." On September 7, 1995,
another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this
time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel
D. Andres. In said case, the complainant manifested that because of the defendants judicial
declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it was futile and a useless
exercise to claim support from defendant. Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation,
in effect, admitted the lack of filiation between him and the minor child, which admission binds
the complainant, and since the obligation to give support is based on the existence of paternity
and filiation between the child and the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim
for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on
the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for support, especially so because the
order of the trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.

Issue:
Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support.

Held:
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article
301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads: Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be
renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what
the recipient owes the obligor. Xxx The right to support being founded upon the need of the
recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this
would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be
renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. In the
case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she
was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his
paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of
filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that
such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and
bars any and all future complaint for support. The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in
the first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support,
amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right
to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into
between the petitioner and respondents mother for the dismissal of the complaint for
maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a
compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise
of the right to support. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first
be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. "The civil status of
a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived being
in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative
declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause." "Furthermore, the right to support
can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p.
648, 1956 Ed.). "

Fernandez v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 143256
August 28, 2001
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners
of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey
building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration. It is undisputed that Generosa gave
birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as
paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez it was revealed that the late Spouses being
childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month
baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein
appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental
technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled. On July 20, 1982, Jose
K. Fernandez died leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an
estate. On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves. On the same day, Generosa de Venecia
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son. After learning the
transaction, the nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being
a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of
Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants),
motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff and other
heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to
succession or inheritance, taking advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the
deceased Generosa de Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and
conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic contracts. ruling of
the trial court defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of
spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not
inherit from the spouses.Because of the following reasons:
(1) he only reached high school and was told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic
of Dr. Fernandez
(2) he failed to present any birth certificate
(3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected people such as
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the
geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child.
(4) the certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that there was no
available information about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez
(5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his
son was doubtful considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the original copy
(6) that Rodolfo's baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no available
records of baptism with the parish. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed
of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular
circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.
Ruling of Court of Appeals
It found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a
child of the spouses Fernandez and the application for recognition of rights to back pay under
RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not
acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has the right to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses
Fernandez.

Ruling:
appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the
spouses openly and continuously until they died Open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually
attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the
parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents. However, it must be
noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession of status of a child
does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel
recognition by his assumed parent. Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child
appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza. Stating therein that
appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on
November 24, 1934. Baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but
not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. It
may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal
certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman issued a certification on October 16,
1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged.
Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures
do not constitute proof of filiation. In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated August
31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void.
Petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr.
Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa. De Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void. Pursuant to Art. 1105
of the New Civil Code which states: "A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir,
but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person."
 LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Aguilar v. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169
January 28, 2015

Facts:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and
without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate
are two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title and of the Registries of Deeds of
Bago and Bacolod. In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTCa civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. The alleged that
petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the
Siasat clan could have stolen the same.respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses
out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the
latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles
were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her
aunt. Petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their son. To
prove filiation, he presented the following documents:
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
2. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS)Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
3. His Individual Income Tax Return
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employmentindicating that petitioner is his son;
5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan, where it is declared that the Aguilar
spouses are his parents; and Letter of the BMMC Secretary introducing petitioner as Alfredo
Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment. Respondent testified among others that
she is a retired teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his name
from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to
petitioner. Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-
Nicavera) that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner,
although she admitted that she knew a certain "Rodolfo" whose
nickname was "Mait"; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses Ruling of the RTC, is
that no solid evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a
legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever
introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and
Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilars he expressly
announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate
of Alfredo is concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally
adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar. Ruling of the Court of
Appeals, in the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and
unmistakable right that has been violated. "Student record or other writing not signed by alleged
father do not constitute evidence of filiation. That a baptismal certificate, a private document is
not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which
only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount that the Highest Tribunal declared that
a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of
filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition in a public instrument.

Issue:
Whether or not SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code (3) in conjunction with Section 19 and Section
23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court

Ruling:
The Court grants the Petition. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment
of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment. It
must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of
Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. Pursuant to Art. 54.
"Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be
legitimate."
 Concepcion v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123450
August 31, 2005
Facts:
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December
29, 1989. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. On
December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10,
1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. Ma.Theresa did
not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the
marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma.
Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a
result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights. Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She
held him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She argued that there was nothing in the
law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further
maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting visitation rights to Gerardo.
Ruling:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the
appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, we
cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates: The child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor
cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even
much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the
information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It
should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. The status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or
born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. The law requires that every reasonable
presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. In the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals
the presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based
on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on
the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Gerardo invokes
Article 166 (1) (b). Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can
contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a
child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
 Angeles v. Maglaya
G.R. No. 153798
September 2, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Franciscos estate. In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged
having married Francisco on August 7, 1948. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be
the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado,
has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being
the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving
spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his
estate. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf. Respondent also offered in
evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary
Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon
the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate?

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado.

Ruling:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove
the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. For, save for respondents gratuitous
assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents
marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. In all, no evidence whatsoever was
presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when
and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons
present, and like significant details. Petitioner, however, contends, that [respondents] Birth
Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva
who are legally married. The Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against
whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending
physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such
certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth
of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or
by the mother alone if the father refuses. Also respondent can hardly derive comfort from her
marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records which
indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her
wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving respondents hands in marriage. These papers
or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are
not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.
 Jao v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49162
July 28, 1987
Facts:
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother
and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support against private
respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon
order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, indicated that Janice could not have
been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado. Jao appealed to the Court of
Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests.
As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of
the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable
evidence of his non-paternity.

Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.

Ruling:
In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given weight to the
findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of
the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950"s.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the result of
the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-
paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented showing
any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the
proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reflecting a scientific fact. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed
parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal
scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity— that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by
such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of
the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that
of the alleged father.

Babiera v. Catotal
G.R. No. 138493
June 15, 2000
Facts:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as Presentacion) filed a petition for the cancellation
of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as Teofista) in the Civil Registry of
Iligan City. Presentacion asserted 'that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that
on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the
spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena
Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature. that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw
with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their
house, assisted by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was
totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries:
a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not;
b) The signature of Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the
informant;
c) The family name BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO,
her mother being single;
d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child And it is clinically and
medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old;
b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born;
c) Eugenio was already 65 years old
Ruling of the Court of Appeals it ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena
became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and
that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth
took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant
medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different
from her other signatures.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA failed to hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is
superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent.

Ruling:
While it is true that an official document such as petitioners Birth Certificate enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of
the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were
already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. Second, there is no
evidence of Hermogenas pregnancy, such as medical records and doctors prescriptions, other
than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was
already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was
highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper
medical care normally available only in a hospital. The most significant piece of evidence,
however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to
petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenios.
 Liyao v Tanhoti-Liyao
G.R. No. 138961
March 7, 2002

Facts:
On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia,
filedan action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William
Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that
petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William
Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during
his lifetime.The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.
Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams’s untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children
from her subsisting marriage. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

Ruling:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only
in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory. It is
therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the
then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao,
Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to
maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed
to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed,
and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand,
if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
husband who successfully defeated the presumption. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional
cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is
nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the
birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar
was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique
and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
 De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon
G.R. No. 142877
October 2, 2001

Facts:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982. Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.
Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets, leaving
behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real
property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a
complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. Petitioners maintain that their
recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in
itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial
approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.

Issue:
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, Juan G.
Dizon.

Ruling:
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. The rule that the written
acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of
the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in
lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by
law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.
 Geronimo v Santos
G.R. No. 197099
September 28, 2015
Facts:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession
against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She
alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of land
and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she
discovered that defendants executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman
declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to
themselves the property in question; and that consequently[,] they took possession and were able
to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed that the
document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred to her, and that
the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages. Defendants disclosed that the deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in
truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a
simulated document. It was allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the
plaintiff because they had never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an
elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate of respondent and
the offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the
birth certificate itself. According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself.

Issue:
Whether or not the secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action.

Ruling:
The Court grant the petition. Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent
offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate child and
the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on
secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate children
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under
Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and
proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy
under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and
separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. Stated in the case of Tison v. Court of
Appeal, [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The
rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born
in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can
be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within
the period limited by law.Thus, The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose."
 Tijing v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125901
March 8, 2001
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez
in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent
Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila. According to Bienvenida in August 1989,
Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her
way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-
month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of
the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.When Bienvenida returned from the market,
Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in
Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer
went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house
after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas
for assistance.Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her
spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even
more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this
time, they looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they
saw no traces of his whereabouts.Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and
whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four
years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the
late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to
return to her the boy despite her demand to do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for
habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To substantiate their petition,
petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first
witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April
27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical
records.The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez,
could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that
Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing him
excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that
Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and
Angelita were not blessed with children. Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the
child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the
clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two
other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was
registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on
August 4, 1989. the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could
not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court
also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled
that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural
child of petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not John Thomas Lopez is actually the missing son of Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she
admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital
in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.
Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she
gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or
discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted. Second, there is strong evidence which
directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared
in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to
him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal
wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas
Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring. Third,
we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by
Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth
of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should
cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within
thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and
private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is
false because even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry
puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. Fourth, the trial court observed several times
that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their
faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. All these considered, we are constrained
to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to
regain custody of said child.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Cabatania v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124814
October 21, 2004

Facts:
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. During the trial,
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9,
1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her
in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was
eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on
January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan
Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexu. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her
home. But petitioner instead brought her towhere he rented a house for her. On September 9,
1982,, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner Camelo
Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a businessman.
Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her
employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the
following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job.
According to petitioner, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse.
While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was
pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day. Petitioner was
therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She was
demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the
alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in its application of article 283 of the civil code on the
compulsory recognition and award of support in favor of respondent-appellee Camelo Regodos

Ruling:
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. We
now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate
court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was
a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony.
We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy. The petition is hereby granted.
 Eceta v. Eceta
G.R. No. 157037
May 20, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the
subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties,
among which is the disputed property.Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as
his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria
Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his
mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a casefor
“Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s
death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and coowner of the Cubao property. Rosalina alleged that
the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.

Issue:
a. Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent
evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her
alleged father Vicente Eceta.
b. Whether the admission made by petitioner that respondent is her granddaughter is enough to
prove respondent’s filiation with Vicente Eceta, the only son of petitioner.

Ruling:
Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for
partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente
Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed and
admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s
granddaughter. Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a
duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate
thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have
acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. The Court find no necessity to discuss the other
issues submitted.

Rivero v. Court of Appeals

 G.R. No. 141273
May 17, 2005
Facts:
On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of
his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995. During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was
engaged in business, under the business name Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted
Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's mother) in 1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise
promising that her college education would be financed and that she would be provided with a
better life. Blinded by his promises and assurances of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an
amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with a
residential house and lot located in Canaman, Camarines Sur, where they cohabited and resided;
he also financed her college education in midwifery. On October 5, 1995, "Benedick Arevalo Dy
Chiao, Jr.," the plaintiff, was born, the product of the amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr.
acknowledged as his son. He also continued to give Shirley and their son financial and moral
support. It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate
son of their father. as such, there was a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate
to preserve his (Benedick's) rights over the same before its partition. In an answer to the
complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers,
denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous relationship and that Benedick
was the illegitimate son of their father for want of knowledge or information; the allegation that
they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father was, likewise, specifically
denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiff's action was for a claim against the estate of their
father, which should be filed in an action for the settlement of the estate of their deceased
parents. The plaintiff, through counsel, filed a "Compromise Agreement". On December 13,
1996, the trial court approved the agreement and rendered judgment

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for recognition as
the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for partition and
distribution of the latter's estate

Ruling:
The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was a
compromise relating to the latter's filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate
son of her deceased father, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane is
null and void; as such, the decision of the RTC based thereon is also without force and effect. It
is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her
deceased father –that the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the
plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. Such recognition,
however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the
putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.

People v. Bayani
G.R. No. 120894
October 3, 1996
Facts:
The complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed in the
following manner: That on or about the 28th day of June, 1992, in the City of Laoag, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Moreno Bayani, by means
of force and intimidation with the point [sic] of a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto, against her will. The
accused not only admitted having sexual intercourse with the complainant on the 28th day of June
1992; he asserted, in the main, that the complainant was his mistress and that the further acts of
sexual intercourse after the said date were with her consent. As to the complainant's motive to
falsely testify against him, the accused claimed that she harbored hatred against him because he
did not stand up for her pregnancy and that she lost a boyfriend; moreover, the accused was not
able to give the amount of P5,000,00 in December 1992.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be made to support his illegitimate child with the complainant

Ruling:
The Court addresses the Solicitor General's recommendation that the accused should be made to
support his illegitimate child with the complainant, in conformity with Article 345(3) of the
Revised Penal Code. While it has been held that recognition of offspring of rape cannot be
ordered in the absence of evidence, in this instance, however, before both the trial court and this
Court, the accused expressly admitted paternity of the complainant's child thus giving rise to the
obligation to provide support, i.e., "But this ploy of hers boomeranged because she not only lost
her boyfriend but also Bayani who promised to sustain her and the fruit of their love, if she
would not see anymore her boyfriend." With this judicial admission twice recited, the accused
has indisputably admitted his paternity of the complainant's child. Article 176 of the Family
Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise provides
for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no further
need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married
which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim
and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case then, the accused should also be
ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto, with Marie Elena Nieto, but in
light of Article 201 of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined by the
trial court only after due notice and hearing.

People v Manahan
G.R. No. 128157
September 29, 1999
Facts:
Manuel Manahan alias Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the court a
quo. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50, 000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs,
and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. Teresita who was asleep was
suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused
Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of her. She tried to shout but the
accused covered her mouth. He then forcibly spread her legs. He lifted her skirt, removed her
panty and then inserted his penis into her vagina. He succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her. After satisfying his lust, the accused warned the victim not to report the incident to anyone
and threatened her that should she squeal he would kill her and her family. Thereafter, he left
her. She was terribly afraid and shaken and could do nothing but cry until dawn. Within the
month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her parents in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The
sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy. Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a
healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar.

Issue:
Won the accused is indemnify acknowledgement and support of the Child

Ruling:
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a
quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall
also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing
so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in
doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People
v. Guerrero, "the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize
the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we
sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law. The
portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the accused, a married man, to acknowledge the
child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

Alberto v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 86639
June 2, 1994

Facts:
When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his recognition of a child, the
courts can do no less than confirm said acknowledgment. In the instant case, we have, therefore,
affirmed the decision of the probate court declaring petitioner as having acquired the status of a
natural child of the deceased Juan M. Alberto and, as such, entitled to participate in the latter's
estate. On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to
one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto"
as her surname in all her school records and correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan M.
Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s gun, died intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto,
filed a petition for the administration of his estate, after the publication of notices, she was
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed
a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be
declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate
of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.

Issue:
May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the
deceased’s natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner to establish her
claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child?

Ruling:
We rule in the affirmative.
In the probate court, the following have been established:
1) That prior to Juan M. Alberto's marriage to Yolanda Reyes, herein private respondent, Juan
M. Alberto and Aurora Reniva, mother of herein petitioner, were sweethearts;
2) That as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva conceived and gave birth to herein
petitioner Ma. Theresa Alberto on September 18, 1953;
3) That petitioner used 'Alberto' as her surname in all her school records and Juan M. Alberto
was known to be her father;
4) That through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was given to Aurora
Reniva;
5) that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, the youngest sister of
Juan M. Alberto, arranged the first meeting between petitioner and Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC
and during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the deceased gave petitioner P500.00 and
two telephone numbers;
6) That Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her birthday in her school, International
School, if not for his untimely death on September 18, 1967;
7) that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion of Juan M. Alberto’s
death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked the guard to make way for her as she was a
daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
8) That after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother, Saturnina Alberto
introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latter’s sister;
9) That the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their niece and introduced her to
their children as the eldest daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
10) That the children of Juan M. Alberto’s siblings regarded her as their cousin;
11) That petitioner was known by Juan M. Alberto’s friends as his daughter;
12) That Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of petitioner and remarked that those
were the grades of his daughter. Letters presented by Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto do not
prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto. All that the letters stated
was that Aurora Reniva was having a difficult time raising a child by her own self and therefore,
she was seeking the assistance of Juan M. Alberto.

Nepomuceno v. Lopez
G.R. No. 181258
March 18, 2010

Facts:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez
(Araceli), filed a Complaint for recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno
(petitioner). Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an
extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her
Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless
obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1, 500 on the 15th and 30th
days of each month beginning August 15, 1999. Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was
established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to:
(1) Recognize her as his child,
(2) Give her support and
(3) Give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he
was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National
People’s Army. On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court’s
decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered
petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support

Issue:
Whether or not the absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled
to support from the putative parent.

Ruling:
The above quoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to
petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) Vis--vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The note cannot also
be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera.
For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of
filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous
actions. He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence submitted by
Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is
petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more,
fails to establish her claim of filiation. The petition is GRANTED.
Cruz v. Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422
August 7, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal,
and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal
during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura
Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. On 18 June 1926,
Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land. Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura
Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents
had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their
names. Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them
and private respond for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer,
they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents To prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of
Elisa,Anselmo,and the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31
January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940,
1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. The trial court rendered a
judgment dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant
evidentiary value and that petitioner’s inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject
property because of laches.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal

Ruling:
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
In the present case, the were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable
documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
certification Issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and
1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Petitioners likewise presented Ester
Santos as witness who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the
community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife.
Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the
status as a legitimate child. In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable
to present any proof to refute the petitioners claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura
Cristobal. The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.

Perla v. Baring
G.R. No. 172471
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively respondents),
filed for support against Antonio. They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived
together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born
on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them
and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to
support Randy. Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having
fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never
became his common law wife nor was she treated as such. On November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave
birth to Randy. She presented Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate
indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio
supplied the information in the said certificates. Next to take the witness stand was Randy who at
that time was just 15 years old. Randy claimed that he knew Antonio to be the husband of her
mother and as his father. When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised that he would
support him. Ruling of the Trial Court, the RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the
relief sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. It also noted that
when the 15-year old Randy testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father. Ruling of
the Court of Appeals is that the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed Decision is affirmed.

Issue:
Whether the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy.

Ruling:
Although the appellate court, for its part, cited the applicable provision on illegitimate filiation, it
merely declared the certified true copies of Randy’s birth certificate and baptismal certificate
both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing
more. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature.
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father.
However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since
the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."
"To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot
be attributed to pure charity.1âwphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only
the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously." Anent Randy’s baptismal
certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonio’s paternity of
Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the
preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.
Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him
cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize,
"[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to
exist." Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of
Antonio treating Randy as his son.