Appearance of the State

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. NO. 155409
June 8, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar
coated
romanceturned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illic
it sexual affair with her  paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner
to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour.
Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged. Thereafter, private
respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of gains and damages
imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of
the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the agreement. This motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on
the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery
disqualifies her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Is there a need for a State participation in the present case?

HELD:
Petitioners claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of
the participation of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made
during the pendency of the case is also void. The proceedings pertaining to the
Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The
settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their
marriage. Nor did the settlement amount to a collusion between the parties.
 
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
 
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
 
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- 
 
(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in action for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that
the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
 
Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the
Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the
appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the
failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise
Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the findings of the CA:
 
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the presence of
the Solicitor General and/or State prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of
collusion between the parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is
not fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor
General and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated, nothing in the subject
compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity
of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties. At the
risk of being repetitive, the compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement
between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties
partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of
marriage.
 Appearance of the State
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR,
G.R. No. 139676
March 31, 2006

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Norma and Eulogio were married in 1965 and had five children. On August 19,
1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage citing Eulogio’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. According to Norma, the
manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity were his: immaturity, habitual
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and
abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985. On November 25, 1996, the RTC
ordered the Public Prosecutor, Joven M. Maramba, to conduct an investigation to
determine if there was collusion between the contending parties. Maramba found no
collusion existed.

Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio had been a habitual
alcoholic. He sometimes slept on the streets when he was drunk. When he went to her
office, he uttered unwholesome remarks against her and dragged her home. He often
scolded their children without justifiable reason. When she would refuse to give him
money for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up and threaten her. He
remained unemployed after he was dismissed from work, and he refused to look for a
job such that Norma was the one providing for the education and the basic needs of
their children out of her salary as a government employee.

On December 27, 1985, because of unbearable jealousy to her male

officemates, Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then beat her up. Her
brothers came to her rescue and told Eulogio to get out of the house. Since then,
Eulogio had not visited or communicated with his family, making reconciliation very
unlikely. The RTC nullified the marriage of Norma and Eulogio. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed an appeal with the CA, contending that the evidence
presented were not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family
Code but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Was there a basis for the OSG’s contention to necessitate the filing of the appeal with
the CA?

HELD:

Yes. It is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The breakup of families weakens our social and
moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members. In connection with this, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that “In all
cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.” In this case, the State did not actively participate in the
prosecution of the case at the trial level other than the Public Prosecutor’s
Manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending parties and the brief
cross-examination.

No pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the
OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered. Only the active participation of the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
 Appearance of the State
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN
G.R. No. 137590
March 26, 2001

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and
testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and
throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no
collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than
having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought
to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of
participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-
forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. This
is made clear by the following pronouncement:

The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of
evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus; the case is
remanded for proper trial. Other than the "manifestation" filed with the trial court on
November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at any
stage of the proceedings.
 Appearance of the State
EMILIO R. TUASON vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON.
G.R. No. 116607
April 10, 1996
PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuazon.
Due to the series of physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner use of
prohibited drugs, cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving
minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of bank debts
without the respondent consent, respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage in
1989 on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration
to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.

Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his
evidence. Counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement, however, petitioner failed
to appear. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and
awarding the custody of common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.

Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of

Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision. The
trial court denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court should have
ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene.
RULING:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in

exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party
has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or
appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such
appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be
used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the
Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal
separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks
with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He
contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should
have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the
reason for his non-appearance.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and
60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court
for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the
cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the
proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of
private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized
by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.
 Appearance of the State
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA
A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1861
July 30, 2004

TINGA, J.,

FACTS:

Mariano Macias filed a petition for the nullification of his marriage with Margie Macias.
This was raffled to Judge Ochotorena. Said judge immediately served summons to
Margie which she did not receive because her whereabouts were unknown and she
only found out about it through a newspaper. Margie then filed a Motion to dismiss
which the judge disregarded and proceeded with the petition of Mariano. The judge
proceeded with the hearing without the resolution of the motions.

Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent judge’s actuations
constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her,
what is more glaring and conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly
ignorant of the law and procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias
concludes that the Court should sanction him. The conclusion is amply supported by the
Court of Appeals’ Decision which states that the respondent judge totally
disregarded Mrs. Macias’ right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the
merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was
filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution. The respondent
judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, which states that: “After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall
be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with bias and partiality as well as ignorance of the law.

HELD:

The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs. Macias
Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte,
ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter, considered the case submitted for
decision despite Mrs. Macias filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying
her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of the case up to its completion, the
respondent judge had acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.

It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court, even if
Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor had
elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on
its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving
declaration of nullity of marriage.

In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she
indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of his
investigation.

Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further
proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.

While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed a
Certification dated May 04, 2001 with the respondent judges court, stating, among
others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte
presentation of plaintiffs evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and his witness,
the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to
comply with the mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating
public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be
made by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case
had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the respondent judge
had ordered the termination of the case.

Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated
Mrs. Macias right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules. A
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules; it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and jurisprudence.
When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
 Prohibited: default judgment and judgment on the pleadings
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE,
EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V.
CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994

VITUG, J.

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete were married on April 30, 1938 and had a
child. Enrico contracted a second marriage with Clarita delaConcepcion. Alanis learned
of it on Aug 1, 1979.

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and
separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on
April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted
a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage
only on August 1979.

Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently

preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with
summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff
filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted.
The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. CFI granted legal separation, conjugal properties half-and-half. Thus, this
certiorari.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering
its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis
and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

HELD:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of
the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in
case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties
to reconcile.
 The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or
underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.
Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
 Final judgment and subsequent proceedings
ISABELITA SEVILLA CASTRO vs. LAMBERTO RAMOS CASTRO
G.R. No. 140484
January 28, 2008

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:

Lamberto filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Isabelita

due to psychological incapacity. The sheriff’s return of the service of summons
showed that it was received by Isabelita’s nephew, but the petitioner did not
file an Answer, hence the trial court allowed Lamberto to present
his evidence ex-parte. Thereupon, Lamberto presented his evidence, and on
August 19, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Isabelita
psychologically incapacitated and annulling her marriage to Lamberto. Isabelita,
however, moved to set aside, declare judgment null and void, contending that no valid
service of summons was made upon her as no nephew resided with her. She
also alleged that the allegations in the petition were false and only intended to free
Lamberto to marry his concubine. Lamberto opposed the motion. The RTC partially
granted the petition by allowing Isabelita to present his contrary evidence. On the first
setting, her counsel moved for resetting which the court allowed. However, she
again moved for postponement, to the vehement objection of
Lamberto’s counsel. Thus the trial court issued its order affirming the
Decision it earlier rendered. Isabelita moved for reconsideration upon receipt of
the order, which the trial court denied. The trial court affirmed its earlier decision, and
entry of judgment made on October 29, 1999.Isabelita filed her petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court, averring that no valid service of summons was made
upon her. She also assailed the finding of psychological incapacity as devoid of merit;
as well as the fact that the trial court did not set the case for pre-trial and allowed
Lamberto to present evidence ex parte.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in declaring Isabelita’s marriage to Lamberto void on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The petition fails. This Court finds no reason to set aside the findings of
the trial court. The records show that petitioner was personally informed of the
petition for annulment, and as stated by the trial court, petitioner received the summons
and the petition on July 15, 1998. She acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing her
signature on the original copy of said summons dated July 13, 1998. Petitioner neither
denied nor refuted this.
Petitioner’s claim that she was never informed of the proceedings is unbelievable
because she even submitted herself to a series of psychological examination performed
by public respondent’s expert witness, Regine Marmee C. Cosico, a
clinicalpsychologist.3etitioner was afforded due process and the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over her person. Even assuming that petitioner did not receive the
summons, she was deemed to have submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court
when she filed a motion to set aside, declare judgment null and void.
After the trial court had granted her motion and she was given the
opportunity to present contrary evidence, she and her counsel failed to appear on the
scheduled hearings for this purpose. Finally, the trial court’s decision had already
become final and executory, and judgment was entered on October 29, 1999. For this
reason and on account of private respondent’s death on January 14, 2004
the judgment is binding on both
parties. Section 24 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of 
V o i d M a r r i a g e s   a n d   A n n u l m e n t   o f   V o i d a b l e M arriages provides:

Sec. 24.Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court.-
 …(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the
judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the
settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
 Effects
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,QUEZON
CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES
G.R. No. 122749
July 31, 1996

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children.  Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null
and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.  Stella and Joaquin are
placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose
which they prefer.

 *Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage , shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its 
solemnization.( As amended by E.O.  No.227, dated July 17, 1987)

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the

procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”.  During
the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay
with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:
 The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
 Effects
ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends and sweethearts who
started living together in 1984, separated in 1994, and lived together again in 1996. On
January 14, 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas City. On
May 30, 2001, petitioner filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further
alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt
him. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce and was granted
by the Superior Court of California and that she married a certain Manuel Alcantara.
Doctor Tayag submitted a report establishing that the respondent was suffering from
Narcissitic Personality Disorder.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it
to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code”

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD:

The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City
that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code
does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be
issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on
co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relation of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership.

Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.” It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
 Fraud, Concealment
AURORA A. ANAYA vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930
November 26, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:

On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando

Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's
counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando
allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital
relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to
recover moral damages.

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and
having committed any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the
complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages." Aurora
replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties and
obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying
the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the complaint,
holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her
marriage. Aurora appealed.

Issue:

Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another

woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

Held:

No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is

not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment;
and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or
feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless
the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is
interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the
same, whether it agrees with the rule or not. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute
fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.