There are many interpretations of 

Otto von Bismarck's behaviour before the Austrian-Prussian

war, which concentrate mainly on the fact that he had a master plan that resulted in this war, the
North German Confederation and the unification of Germany. Bismarck maintained that he
orchestrated the conflict in order to bring about the North German Confederation, the Franco-
Prussian War and the eventual unification of Germany. [9]
On 22 February 1866, Count Karolyi, Austrian ambassador in Berlin, sent a dispatch to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Alexander Mensdorff-Pouilly. He explained to him that Prussian
public opinion had become extremely sensitive about the Duchies issue and that he had no
doubt that "this artificial exaggeration of the danger by public opinion formed an essential part of
the calculations and actions of Count Bismarck [who considered] the annexation of the
Duchies ... a matter of life and death for his political existence [and wished] to make it appear
such for Prussia too."[10]
Possible evidence can be found in Bismarck's orchestration of the Austrian alliance during
the Second Schleswig War against Denmark, which can be seen as his diplomatic
"masterstroke". Taylor also believes that the alliance was a "test for Austria rather than a trap"
and that the goal was not war with Austria, contradicting what Bismarck later gave in his memoirs
as his main reason for establishing the alliance. It was in the Prussian interest to gain an alliance
with Austria to defeat Denmark and settle the issue of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.
The alliance can be regarded as an aid to Prussian expansion, rather than a provocation of war
against Austria. Many historians believe that Bismarck was simply a Prussian expansionist,
rather than a German nationalist, who sought the unification of Germany. It was at the Gastein
Convention that the Austrian alliance was set up to lure Austria into war.[11][page  needed]
The timing of the Prusso-Italian alliance of 8 April 1866 was perfect, because all other European
powers were either bound by alliances that forbade them from entering the conflict, or had
domestic problems that had priority. Britain had no stake economically or politically in war
between Prussia and Austria. Russia was unlikely to enter on the side of Austria, due to ill will
over Austrian support of the anti-Russian alliance during the Crimean War and Prussia had stood
by Russia during the January Uprising in Poland, signing the Alvensleben Convention of
February 1863 with Russia, whereas Austria had not. [12][page  needed]

France[edit]
France was also unlikely to enter on the side of Austria, because Bismarck and Napoleon III met
in Biarritz and allegedly discussed whether or not France would intervene in a potential Austro-
Prussian war. The details of the discussion are unknown but many historians think Bismarck was
guaranteed French neutrality in the event of a war. Italy was already allied with Prussia, which
meant that Austria would be fighting both with no major allies of its own. Bismarck was aware of
his numerical superiority but still "he was not prepared to advise it immediately even though he
gave a favourable account of the international situation". [13]
When the Prussian victory became clear, France attempted to extract territorial concessions in
the Palatinate and Luxembourg. In his speech to the Reichstag on 2 May 1871, Bismarck said:
It is known that even on 6 August 1866, I was in the position to observe the French ambassador
make his appearance to see me in order, to put it succinctly, to present an ultimatum: to
relinquish Mainz, or to expect an immediate declaration of war. Naturally I was not doubtful of the
answer for a second. I answered him: "Good, then it's war!" He travelled to Paris with this
answer. A few days after one in Paris thought differently, and I was given to understand that this
instruction had been torn from Emperor Napoleon during an illness. The further attempts in
relation to Luxemburg are known.[14]

Military factors[edit]
The memorial to the Battery of the dead in Chlum, (modern Czech Republic) commemorates some of the
heaviest fighting during the Battle of Königgrätz.

Bismarck may well have been encouraged to go to war by the advantages of the Prussian army
against the Austrian Empire. Taylor wrote that Bismarck was reluctant to pursue war as it
"deprived him of control and left the decisions to the generals whose ability he distrusted". (The
two most important personalities within the Prussian army were the War Minister Albrecht Graf
von Roon and Chief of the General Staff Helmuth Graf von Moltke.) Taylor suggested that
Bismarck was hoping to force Austrian leaders into concessions in Germany, rather than provoke
war. The truth may be more complicated than simply that Bismarck, who famously said that
"politics is the art of the possible", initially sought war with Austria or was initially against the idea
of going to war with Austria.
Rival military systems