La Ex International Relations Current Affairs

International Relations Current Affairs
INDEX
Sl. No. Chapter Name Page No.
1. India and its Neighbourhood
1.1 India-Bhutan 14
1.2 India-Nepal 49
1.3 India-Myanmar 9  10
1.4 India-Sri Lanka 11  12
1.5 India-Maldives 12  17
1.6 India-Pakistan 17  19
1.7 India-Afghanistan 20  22
1.8 India-China 23  28
1.9 India-Bangladesh 29  30
2. India-Central Asia
2.1 India-Central Asia 31  39
3. India-North America
3.1 India-USA 39  46
3.2 India-Canada 46  50
4. India-Europe
4.1 India-EU 50  54
4.2 India-UK 54  57
5. India-Russia 57  62
6. India-East Asia
6.1 India-Japan 62  67
6.2 India-Australia 67  71
6.3 India-South Korea 71  76
7. India-Africa 76  81
8. India-South East Asia 81  86
9. India-South America
9.1 India-Brazil 86  88
10. India-Middle East
10.1 India and the Middle East 88  93
10.2 India-Iran 93  97
10.3 India-Saudi Arabia 98  101
11. Indo-Pacific Region 101  104
12. International Organization & Treaties

12.1 BIMSTEC v/s SAARC 106  109
12.2 Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) 109  111
12.3 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 112  114
12.4 Indus Water Treaty 115  118
13. Miscellaneous
13.1 Arctic Region 118  120
13.2 UNSC Reforms 120  123
13.3 Belt and Road Initiative 123  126
13.4 Brexit 126  128
13.5 Russia-India-China (RIC) Grouping 129  131
13.6 Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 131  133

MEP 2020 – International Relations Current Affairs
1. India and its Neighbourhood
1.1 India-Bhutan
1. Diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan were established in 1968 with the
appointment of a resident representative of India in Thimphu.
2. 2018 was the 50th year of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two
countries.
3. India shares 605 kilometres (376 mi) border with Bhutan. It shares border with four
Indian States: Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, West Bengal and Sikkim.
 Evolution of Ties between the Countries
1865: Bhutan came under the British suzerainty. Bhutan was a protectorate of British
India
1910: It signed the ‘Treaty of Punakha’ with the British. This allowed British to “guide”
its foreign affairs and defence.
1949: Indo-Bhutan Treaty of Peace and Friendship
 Treaty of Friendship, 1949

 On August 8, 1949 Bhutan and India signed the Treaty of Friendship, calling for
peace between the two nations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
 However, Bhutan agreed to let India "guide" its foreign policy and both nations would
consult each other closely on foreign and defence affairs.
 The treaty also established free trade and extradition protocols.
2007: India re-negotiated the 1949 treaty with Bhutan and signed a new treaty of
friendship. The new treaty replaced the provision requiring Bhutan to take India's
guidance on foreign policy with broader sovereignty and not require Bhutan to obtain
India's permission over arms imports.
 India – Bhutan a Unique and Special Relationship
 The unique relations between India and Bhutan are characterized by deep
understanding and mutual trust.
 Bhutan is the only south Asian country after India which has not signed the China’s
BRI initiative.
 Relevance of Bhutan in India’s Foreign Policy
 Trust: India Bhutan ties are governed by 1949 Friendship Treaty (amended in 2007)
which states that both countries will ensure perpetual peace, friendship and protect
each other’s national interests.
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MEP 2020 – International Relations
 Strategic: Bhutan acts as a buffer state between India and China. Chinese have
territorial disputes with, both, India and China. Thus, it is imperative for both the
countries work together against protecting sovereignty of their territories.
 India-Bhutan Cooperation
 Bilateral Trade:
o India is Bhutan's largest trading partner.
o India is Bhutan's largest trading partner. In the period from January- June, 2018,
trade between two countries stood at Rs. 4318.59 crore.
o Bhutan is the only south Asian country to have trade surplus with India. This is
because of India's pledge to buy surplus hydroelectric power
 India-Bhutan Trade and Transit Agreement 1972

 The trade between the two countries is governed by the India-Bhutan Trade and
Transit Agreement 1972 which was last renewed in November 2016
 The Agreement established a free-trade regime between the two countries.
 The Agreement also provides for duty-free transit of Bhutanese exports to third
countries.
 Financial Aid of India to Bhutan:

o For Bhutan’s 11th Five Year Plan, Government of India contributed an assistance
of Rs 4500 crore with an additional Rs 500 crore for the Economic Stimulus Plan.
o India has funded nearly all of Bhutan’s landmark projects, including the airport
at Paro, Bhutan Broadcasting Station, the Bhutan-India microwave link etc.
 Hydropower Cooperation:
o Hydropower projects in Bhutan are an example of win-win cooperation.
o It provides a reliable source of inexpensive and clean electricity to India,
o It generates export revenue for Bhutan and cementing our economic integration.
o Hydropower exports provide more than 40% of Bhutan’s domestic revenues and
constitute 25% of its GDP.
o The three hydropower projects developed with Indian assistance have
already been completed: Tala Hydroelectric Project, Chukha Hydroelectric
Project and Kurichhu Hydroelectric.
 Defence Co-operation:
o The Doklam standoff highlighted New Delhi’s defence commitment towards
Bhutan.

o Indian troops stationed in Bhutan under a special security arrangement

intervened to keep Chinese troops at bay.
o The Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), plays a critical role in training
Bhutanese security personnel.
 Cultural Co-operation:
o Bhutan has historically shared deep religio-cultural links with India.
o India Bhutan Foundation was established in 2003 to enhance people to people
exchange in cultural field.
 International Co-operation:
o Both India and Bhutan are founding members of South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
o Both of them are part of BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal), BIMSTEC
(Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation)
etc.
 Challenges
 India's Interference in Internal Affairs: The political meddling, regime
management and economic arm twisting (blockade in 2013) increases Bhutan’s
mistrust for India’s intention.
 Land Locked Location of Bhutan: Bhutan perceive this as an undue advantage for
India in trade and commerce – 60% of Bhutan’s expenditure is on imports from
India.
 Power Sector and Bhutan Debt: Over the years, it has been argued that the
economic benefits from collaboration in hydropower have declined. Interest rates
have increased and net profit per unit of electricity sold has also fallen since 2007
causing a sharp rise in Bhutan’s debts.
 Growing China’s Influence:
o Bhutan does not have diplomatic ties with China, something Beijing has been
trying to rectify in the past few years.
o Tourism stands to be the second greatest economic contributor to Bhutan’s GDP
and China has resorted to using tourist trends as economic leverage.
o China has offered to settle the border disputes bilaterally (without India’s
involvement) with Bhutan.
 Way Forward
1. Non Interference in Internal Matters: India should try as much as possible to
remain out of Bhutan’s internal matters. This will help in strengthening the
goodwill between the two countries.

2. Diversify Economic Relationship: India needs to see the Bhutanese efforts to

diversify their economy as an opportunity to partner with Bhutan. It should
transform its relation from an aid provider to an investment led developer.
3. Border Security: Both the sides need to strengthen their co-operation to deal with
any future incursion from Chinese side. Also, it needs to be ensured that border
areas remain militants free.
1.2 India-Nepal
 India and Nepal share a unique relationship of friendship and cooperation

characterized by open borders and deep-rooted people-to-people contacts of kinship
and culture.
 India shares fourth longest (1,751 km) international border with Nepal. Nepal shares
a border with five Indian States – Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and
Uttarakhand.
 Evolution of Relations
1950:
 The Republic of India and the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal initiated their
relationship with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950.
 Nepalese citizens avail facilities and opportunities on par with Indian citizens in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.
 An Indian military mission was also established in Kathmandu for the organization
and training of Nepalese army.
1962: Nepal assumed greater importance in India's security perception after the Sino-
Indian border war of 1962.
1964: Foreign Minister of India, Sardar Swaran Singh visited Nepal and signed an
agreement of large economic assistance to Nepal.
1965: The King of Nepal also visited India. Nepal gave full support to India's position on
Kashmir
1966: Boundary Disputes:
 Nepal-India relations came under stress because of boundary dispute relating to
Susta region.
1971: New Treaty of Transit:
 Negotiations were opened and a New Treaty of Transit was signed in Kathmandu in
August 1971. Thus, by the end of 1971, Indo-Nepal relations started looking
brighter.

 Constitutional Monarchy in Nepal:

o The age-old system of absolute monarchy in Nepal was replaced by constitutional
monarchy on April 8, 1990.
o The King agreed to a new constitutional arrangement in which he would continue
to be head of state, but the governance would be responsibility of a Cabinet
answerable to Parliament.
o Elections would be held on the basis of multi-party system.
2007 - Seven parties, including the former Maoist rebels and the ruling party, agreed to
abolish the monarchy and declare Nepal a Federal Republic. In the elections held on 10
April 2008, the Maoists secured a simple majority.
2013 - A second election for a new Constituent Assembly was held under a non-partisan
government led by former Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi.
2015 - The Constitution of Nepal, passed making Nepal a federal democratic republic
divided into seven unnamed provinces.
2017 - Nepal Communist Party emerged as the ruling party with a strong majority at the
federal level, as well as six of the seven provinces.
 Current Ties between two Countries in Various Fields
 Economic Co-operation:
o Between 2006 & 2017, the bilateral trade between the two countries grew over six
times from INR 5585 crores in 2006-07 to INR 39564 crores (US$ 5.89 billion) in
2016-17.
o During the same period, exports from Nepal to India more than doubled from INR
1384 crores in 2006-07 to INR 2985 crores (US$ 445 million) in 2016-17.
o Similarly, India’s exports to Nepal grew over eight times from INR 4201 crores in
2006-07 to INR 36579 crores (US$ 5.45 billion) in 2016-17.
 Indian Investment in Nepal:
o Indian firms are among the largest investors in Nepal, accounting for about 30%
of the total approved foreign direct investments.
o As on 15 September 2018, Indian ventures lead foreign investment with FDI
commitments of INR 5942.68 crores
 Defence Cooperation:
o India provies assistance to Nepalese Army in its modernization through provision
of equipment and training.
o The Gorkha Regiments of the Indian Army are raised partly by recruitment from
hill districts of Nepal.
o The ‘IndoNepal Battalion-level Joint Military Exercise ‘SURYA KIRAN’ is conducted
alternately in India and in Nepal.

 International Cooperation:
o India and Nepal are engaged in the regional and sub-regional frameworks of
SAARC, BIMSTEC and BBIN for enhancing cooperation for greater economic
integration.
o Connectivity:
1. BBIN Initiative:
o Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) had signed a framework MVA in
June 2015
o It enables movement of passenger and cargo vehicles across borders among the
four countries.
2. Motihari-Amlekhgunj Pipeline:
o Recently, India and Nepal have inaugurated a cross-border petroleum products
pipeline. This helps to deepen the trust between both the countries.
o It will be the South Asia’s first cross-border petroleum products pipeline from
Motihari (in Bihar) in India to Amlekhgunj in Nepal
 Cultural Ties:
o Hinduism and Buddhism have served India’s soft power in Nepal. Lumbini is part
of the Buddhist circuit being developed.
o India has sister city agreements with Nepal
1. Kathmandu-Varanasi
2. Lumbini-Bodhgaya
3. Janakpur-Ayodhya
o Apart from these initiatives promote people-to-people linkages in the area of art &
culture, academics and media with different local bodies of Nepal.

 Significance of Nepal for India:

o Rivers originating in Nepal feed the perennial river systems of India in terms of
ecology and hydropower potential.
o Nepal is right in the middle of India’s ‘Himalayan frontiers’, it acts as natural
buffer between India and China.
o India and Nepal share similar ties in terms of Hinduism and Buddhism with
Buddha’s birthplace Lumbini located in present day Nepal.
 Significance of India for Nepal:
o India is Nepal’s largest trade partner and the largest source of foreign investments
o India provides transit for almost the entire third country trade of Nepal.
o India is currently supplying a total of about 600 MW of power to Nepal.
 Challenges
 Open Borders:
Indo-Nepal border is virtually open and lightly policed which is exploited by terrorist
outfits and insurgent groups from North Eastern part of India eg. Supply of trained
cadres, fake Indian currency.
 Territorial Disputes:
a. Kalapani Territorial Dispute:
o The Kalapani territory has become a bone of
contention between India and Nepal and the
controversy has arisen due to the release of a new
political map by India after bifurcation of Jammu
and Kashmir.
o Nepal claims that the river to the west of Kalapani
is the main Kali river hence the area should belong
to Nepal.
o But India claims that the river to the west of Kalapani is not the main Kali river
b. Susta Territorial Dispute:
o This one square mile territory on Bihar-Nepal
border remained a subject of dispute.
o The Treaty of Sagauli defined Gandak as the
international boundary between India and Nepal.
o When the treaty was signed, Susta was on the
right bank of the river Gandak which falls in
Nepal territorial control.

o But, in due course of time, the river has changed its course and Susta now falls
on the left bank of the Gandak, which is controlled by India.
 Growing Chinese Footprint in Nepal:
o Lately, Nepal has displayed hostility in India-Nepal relations while at the same
time there is growing warmth in Nepal-China relations. This is a matter of concern
for India.
o China has overtaken India in FDI to Nepal which was about $300 mn in 2018.
o Nepal declined to participate in the first BIMSTEC military exercise MILEX-18
organized by India. However, at the same time Nepal and China conducted their
first-ever joint military exercise "Sagarmatha Friendship 2017”
 Nepal’s Participation in BRI:
o Nepal signed a Belt and Road framework agreement with China and is actively
participating in China’s Belt and Road initiative ignoring the India’s sovereignty
contention of China Pakistan economic Corridor.
o China-Nepal Economic Corridor is component of the Belt and Road Initiative.
 Delay in Infrastructure Projects:
o India has failed to deliver the Infrastructural projects on time in Nepal. This has
forced Nepal to lean towards China especially in hydropower sector.
 India’s Blockade over Madhesi Issue:
o India held that new Nepalese constitution did not address the concerns of the
people of the Terai and backed a blockade by Madhesis to cripple supplies to
generate pressure on Nepal.
o This has created bitterness among the India-Nepal relationship and also
generated anti-India feeling among the people in Nepal.
 Nepal’s Insistence on Revision of Treaty of Peace and Friendship:
o Nepal wants to amend 1950 which enjoins it to consult India before buying
weapons or enter into any security relationship with a third country.
 Way Forward
1. Nepal is strategically and economically important for India. Hence, India should
strengthen its ties with Nepal.
2. Various issues should be sorted out amicably and the 1950 agreement should be
renewed considering Nepalese interests.
3. The open border should be managed so that it does not affect the safety and
security of both nations.
4. India should effectively use its soft power to enhance its cultural ties and people-to-
people contact.

5. India should commit itself to complete infrastructure projects without delay

6. With a growing Chinese power, Nepal’s significance has only increased further. A
stable and secure Nepal is necessary as it is of immense strategic and economic
relevance for India’s security.
1.3 India-Myanmar
 India-Myanmar relations are rooted in shared historical, ethnic, cultural and

religious ties. As the land of Lord Buddha, India is a country of pilgrimage for the
people of Myanmar.
 India shares a long land border with Myanmar. Four north-eastern states viz.
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram share boundary with
Myanmar.
 Why is Myanmar Important for India?
 Insurgency in North-East India: Many of the insurgent groups such as NSCN (K)
who have attempted attacks on Indian armed forces have taken the refuge in
Myanmar. Greater co-operation between the two states will allow India to address
the issue of insurgency in North-East.
 India’s Look East Policy: India’s Look East policy represents its efforts to cultivate
extensive economic and strategic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia.
Myanmar is the only ASEAN country adjoining India and, therefore, our gateway to
South East Asia
 Connectivity to North-East: The Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project
will connect the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Sittwe seaport in Myanmar
by sea; it will then link Sittwe seaport to Lashio in Myanmar via Kaladan river boat
route and then from Lashio on to Mizoram in India by road transport
 Energy: Myanmar has “abundant oil and natural gas” reserves. This would help
India is fulfilling its growing energy needs.
 Bilateral Co-operation
 Developmental Assistance: India is providing financing help to Myanmar for
executing important projects such as India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway
and Kaladan Multi-model corridor.
 Human Resource Development: India has been actively involved in capacity
building in Myanmar.
o The Myanmar Institute of Information Technology was set up in Mandalay
Indian help and has been a success with all its graduates finding ready
employment.

o The Advanced Centre for Agriculture Research and Education was set up with
the collaboration of ICAR for agricultural research.
 Regional Co-operation: Myanmar's membership of ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong
Ganga Cooperation has introduced a regional/sub-regional dimension to bilateral
relations
 Trade and Economic Relations
o A bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 1970. India is now fifth largest
trading partner of Myanmar and is presently the tenth largest investor.
o India has an approved investment of US$ 740.64 million by 25 Indian companies
(as of 30 June 2017). Most India’s investments have been in oil & gas sector.
 Culture:
o India and Myanmar share close cultural ties and a sense of deep kinship given
India’s Buddhist heritage.
 Building on this Shared Heritage India is Undertaking Some key Initiatives:
o Restoration of the Ananda Temple in Bagan and donation of a replica of the
Sarnath Buddha Statue which has been installed at the premises of Shwedagon
pagoda in Yangon.
o ICCR and Sitagu International Buddhist Academy organised an International
Conference on Buddhist Cultural Heritage
 Challenges
 Delay in Developmental Projects: Many of the projects that India has undertaken
in Myanmar are running behind the schedule. This has led to friction in the
bilateral relationship.
 Chinese Footprint: China has invested heavily, economically and politically, in
Myanmar. This rising profile of China has created strategic and security issues for
India.
 Way Forward
1. Economic Relations: There is a strong need to expand, diversify and upgrade
commercial ties in ways that also contribute to Myanmar’s development needs and
meet India’s $3 billion trade target set in 2012.
2. Faster Project Completion: It is crucial for India to focus on timely delivery of
projects to improve its legitimacy as a successful developmental assistance partner.
3. Security Partnership: India has undertaken several joint counter-insurgency
operations in the border regions in the past. It is necessary that such co-operation
is enhanced to ensure peace and security in the North-East India.

1.4 India-Sri Lanka
 Sri-Lanka holds an important geographical location in the Indian Ocean Region. It is

located at the important sea lines in the region. With the growing importance of
Indo-Pacific geographical construct, the India-Sri Lanka relationship has also
assumed great importance.
 Bilateral Cooperation
 Commercial Relations:
o Sri Lanka is India’s largest trading partners in SAARC (South Asian Association
of Regional Cooperation) region.
o Trade between the two countries grew rapidly after the entry into force of the
India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000.
o India is among the top four investors in Sri Lanka with an investments of over
US$ 1 billion since 2003.
 Development Cooperation:
o Sri Lanka is among the major recipients of development assistance from India.
India’s overall commitment stands close to US$ 3 billion.
o The Indian Housing Project, with an initial commitment to build 50,000 houses
for the war affected as well as the estate workers in the plantation areas, is
India’s flagship project of developmental assistance to Sri Lanka.
o Sri Lanka partnered with India to develop Trincomalee port in north-eastern part
of the country.
 Defence Relations:
o The “Mitra Shakti” bilateral exercise is conducted between the two countries.
o “SLINEX” is a series of naval exercises between the two navies.
o India is imparting training to Sri Lankan military across the 3 branches of the
armed forces.
 Nuclear Cooperation:
o The civilian nuclear co-operation between the countries envisages an “exchange
of knowledge and expertise, sharing of resources, capacity building and training
of personnel in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
 Challenges
 The Fishermen Issue:
o Arrest of Indian fishermen in the Palk Straits and the Gulf of Mannar by Sri
Lankan authorities has been a long-standing problem between the two
countries. Further, there have been instances where Sri lankan Navy fired upon
Indian fishing vessels.

o The two countries have established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on fisheries to
help resolve the dispute and in future must evolve mechanisms for sustainable
fishing.
 China Factor:
o In 2014 Sri Lanka allowed two Chinese submarines and a warship to dock at its
port in Colombo. This was seen as a major breach of trust between New Delhi
and Colombo.
o As part of the Maritime Silk Route (MSR) policy, China built two ports, one in
Colombo and another in Hambantota.
 Self Government in N-E Tamil Dominated Region:
 India stands for a “united Sri Lanka”, but wants an “early and full implementation of
the 13th Amendment” that provides for devolution in the Tamil majority Northern
and Eastern provinces.
 Way Forward
1. Fishing Issues: India should persuade Colombo to permit licensed Indian
fishermen to fish in Sri Lankan waters for five nautical miles from the IMBL.
2. Maritime Cooperation: It "may include measures such as joint naval patrolling,
controlling of smuggling and piratical activities, and the strengthening of
communication networks."
3. Project Delivery: India must ensure that the project she has undertaken in Sri
Lanka must be completed on time to increase its legitimacy as a developmental
partner.
4. Co-operate with like-minded Countries: India must co-ordinate with like-minded
countries such as Japan to increase investment in Sri Lanka so as to address the
Chinese footprint as well as fulfil the developmental needs of Sri Lanka.
1.5 India-Maldives
 India and Maldives share ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and commercial links
steeped in antiquity.
 Except for a brief period between February 2012 to November 2018, relations have
been close, cordial and multi-dimensional.
 India was among the first to recognize Maldives after its independence in 1965 and
to establish diplomatic relations with the country.
 Geographical Location
 Maldives is located south of India's Lakshadweep Islands in the Indian Ocean.
Maldives is located just 700 km from the strategic Lakshadweep island chain and
1,200 km from the Indian mainland.

 Evolution of Relations:
o Both nations established diplomatic relations after the independence of Maldives
from British rule in 1966.
o India and Maldives officially and amicably decided their maritime boundary in
1976
o India and Maldives signed a comprehensive trade agreement in 1981.
1. Operation Cactus:
o In November 1988 speedboats carrying 80 armed militants of the People's
Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam landed in Maldives and along with allies
who had infiltrated the country, began taking over the government.
o The then-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered 1,600 troops to aid the
Maldivian government.
o In a military operation codenamed "Operation Cactus," Indian forces arrived
within 12 hours of the request for aid being made, squashed the coup attempt
and achieved full control of the country within hours.
o Since then, relations between India and Maldives have expanded significantly.
 However, the bilateral relations came under stress during the reign of President
Yameen (2013-18)
 Election of Ibrahim Mohamed Solih in 2018 started a new chapter in the bilateral
relations
 India undertook Operation Sanjeevani in 2020 in the wake of COVID-19 crisis
o Indian Air Force transport aircraft delivered essential medicines and hospital
consumables to Maldives.
 India-Maldives Cooperation:
 Bilateral Trade:
o India is Maldives’ 4th largest trade partner after UAE, China and Singapore.

o Indian imports from the Maldives primarily comprise scrap metals while Indian
exports to the Maldives include a variety of engineering and industrial products
like drugs and medicines radar apparatus, rock boulders, aggregates, cement
and agriculture products.
o Since 1988, defence and security has been a major area of cooperation between
India and Maldives.
o India provides the largest number of training opportunities for Maldivian
National Defence Force (MNDF), meeting around 70% of their defence
training requirements.
o A comprehensive Action Plan for Defence was signed in April 2016 to
consolidate defence partnership.
o Our defence cooperation also extends to the areas of Joint Exercises, Maritime
Domain Awareness, gifting of hardware, infrastructure development, etc.
 Development Assistance to Maldives:
o India has provided extensive economic aid and has participated in bilateral
programmes for the development of infrastructure, health, telecommunications
and labour resources.
o India has established Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital in Malé, the capital of
Maldives, expanded telecommunications and air links and increased
scholarships for Maldivian students.
o The State Bank of India has contributed more than US$500 million to aid the
economic expansion of Maldives.
 Tourism:
o The Maldivian economy is heavily dependent on its tourism sector, which is the
major source of foreign exchange earnings
o Tourism directly accounts for about quarter of GDP of Maldives. In terms of
direct employment, tourism accounts for more than a third of job opportunities
for Maldivians
o In 2018, India was the 5th largest source of tourist arrivals in Maldives Out of
the total of 14,84,274 tourists, 6.1 % (over 90,474) were from India.
o However, in the first half of 2019, with 99% growth, India has moved to second
spot and is placed just below China.
 Cultural Co-operation:
o Both the countries share long cultural links. Exchange of cultural troupes takes
place regularly between the countries.

o Hindi commercial films, TV serials and music are immensely popular in

Maldives.
o The India Cultural Center (ICC), established in Male in July 2011, conducts
regular courses in yoga, classical music and dance.
 International Co-operation:
o Both nations are founding members of SAARC, the South Asian Economic Union
and signatories to the South Asia Free Trade Agreement.
o Indian and Maldivian leaders have maintained high-level contacts and
consultations on regional issues.
o In 2016 Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) meeting India
prevented countries from executing punitive sanctions due to failure in creating
an ‘Inclusive country” and a “Genuine Democracy”.
 Instability in Maldives and Drift Away in Relations:
o Maldives' first democratically elected President from 2008 to 2012 Mohammed
Nasheed, was arrested on 22 February 2015 on terror charges.
o India and USA expressed concern over Nasheed's arrest and manhandling.
o Indian PM was to visit Maldives in March 2015 but decided against the visit
later.
o The Maldives had drifted away from India’s strategic orbit as President Yameen
was drawing his country closer to China. Yameen came out openly in support
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
o He signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with China and favored Chinese
companies for undertaking major infrastructure projects in Maldives.
o This bitterness in relation continued till the election of new government in
Maldives
 Recent Developments:
2012: Maldives annulled contract with GMR Group to develop a modern International
Airport near Male, which was later given to a Chinese company.
2015: Indian PM cancelled his trip to Maldives.
2016: Maldives signed a new law permitting developers to own islands on lease for
development and subsequently, a Chinese company took control of Feydhoo Finolhu, an
uninhabited island close to Male and its international airport, on a development lease for
50 years.
2017: Maldives endorsed China’s BRI and signed MoU on Maritime Silk Road, following
which China has invested billions of dollars in Maldives building highways and housing as
part of BRI.

2017: China and Maldives signed an FTA, which is China’s second FTA with a South
Asian country after Pakistan, while there is no FTA between India and Maldives.
2018:
o Maldives announced joint patrolling with Pak Navy to guard Maldivian Exclusive
Economic Zone, with an indirect reference to a perceived threat from India.
o India criticised the Abdulla Yameen government for imposing a 45-day
emergency earlier in 2018.
 New Elected Government in Maldives (2018) and Stability in Relationship
o New Maldives Government re-affirmed commitment to “India First Policy.”
o India reciprocated by announcing an assistance of $1.4 billion.
 Significance of Maldives to India:
 Challenges
 Low Bilateral Trade: Bilateral trade between both, which stands at US $200 million
annually, is below potential.
 Growing Radicalisation: Recently, youth in Maldives is attracted towards terrorist
groups like ISIS mainly due to political instability and socioeconomic
underdevelopment. This has increased India’s security concerns.
 China Factor in India-Maldives Relationship:
o Maldives became the second country in South Asia, after Pakistan, to enter into
an FTA with China.

o It is estimated that China’s loans to Maldives total at least $1.3 billion, or a

quarter of island nation’s GDP.
o Maldives signed China's Belt and Road Initiative, changed laws to lease out
several prime islands to China, and allowed Beijing to build an observation post
in Makunudhoo, the westernmost atoll, not far from India.
o Chinese companies were given contracts for several infrastructure projects in the
Maldives
 Way Forward
 The Maldives is strategically important to India, given its geographical location in
the Indian Ocean.
 Both the countries should understand each other concerns and act accordingly to
have peaceful and stable neighbourhood.
 India should strive to strengthen the Institutions of Democracy especially in the
light of the political crisis that Maldives had gone through.
1.6 India-Pakistan
 India-Pakistan relations have been mired with conflict, mutual distrust and
suspicion.
 Historical Background
1947/48: The first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir was fought, after armed tribesmen
(lashkars) from Pakistan invade J&K in 1947. The war officially ends on January 1, 1949,
when the UN arranges a ceasefire, with an established ceasefire line and a UN
peacekeeping force and a recommendation that the referendum on the accession of
Kashmir to India be held. That referendum has yet to be held.
1965: India and Pakistan fought their second war.
1966: On January 10, 1966, India and Pakistan signed an agreement at Tashkent (now in
Uzbekistan), agreeing to withdraw to pre-war lines and restoring economic and diplomatic
relations.
1971: India and Pakistan fought their third war over East Pakistan. The war resulted in
the independence of East Pakistan – now Bangladesh.
1972: Pakistan and India signed an agreement in Shimla to put an end to the conflict and
restore friendly and harmonious relationship Both sides agree to settle any disputes "by
peaceful means".
 The Simla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of December 17, 1971, as new
"Line-of-Control (LoC)" between the two countries, which neither side is to seek to
alter unilaterally.

1988: The two countries sign an agreement that neither side will attack the other's
nuclear installations or facilities. Both sides agree to share information on the latitudes
and longitudes of all nuclear installations.
1992: A joint declaration prohibiting the use of chemical weapons was signed.
1999: India and Pakistan signed Lahore Declaration. Both countries reaffirm their
commitment to Simla Accord, and agree to undertake 'Confidence Building Measures'
(CBMs).
1999: Kargil conflict broke out. Pakistani forces and Kashmiri fighters occupy strategic
positions on Indian side of the LoC, prompting an Indian counter-offensive.
2008: Terrorist attack in Mumbai took place killing hundreds of Indian citizens. The
attackers came from Pakistan via sea route.
2014: India and Pakistan held bilateral talks in New Delhi. Both sides express willingness
to begin a new era of bilateral relations.
2016: India conducted “surgical strikes" on "terrorist units" in Pakistan-administered
Kashmir.
2016: Uri Attack: There was an attack in Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was
reported as "the deadliest attack on security forces in Kashmir in two decades".
2019 Pulwama Attack: A convoy of security personnel was attacked in the Pulwama
district, J&K.
2019: India conducts air strike attacks against Pakistan-based terrorist groups inside
Pakistan’s territory.
 Issues in Relationship
 Territorial Disputes:
 Siachen Glacier:
o Siachen Glacier is located in Northern Ladakh in the Karakoram Range. It is the
5th largest glacier in Karakoram Range and the 2nd largest glacier in the world.
o Most of the Siachen Glacier is disputed between India and Pakistan. Before
1984, neither of the two countries had any permanent presence on the glacier.
o When India got intelligence that Pakistan was going occupy Siachen Glacier, it
launched Operation Meghdoot and occupied the glacier. Thus, India has a
strategic advantage in this region.
 Sir Creek Dispute:
o Sir Creek is a 96 km estuary in the Rann of Kutch. Rann of Kutch lies between
Gujarat (India) and Sindh (Pakistan). The dispute lies in the interpretation of the
maritime boundary line between the two countries.
o Pakistan claims the entire Sir Creek. India, on the other hand, claims that the
boundary lies mid-channel.

 Water Disputes:
o The Indus Waters Treaty is the water distribution treaty signed between India
and Pakistan, brokered by World Bank (then the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development).
o According to the treaty, three rivers, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas were given to India
for exclusive use and the other three rivers, Sindh, Jhelum and Chenab were
given to Pakistan.
o According to the treaty, India can exploit rivers under its control without
disturbing the flow or quantum.
 Cross-Border Terrorism:
o Cross-border terrorism has been an issue since independence. Over past few
decades India has seen continuous export of terrorism from groups based and
backed by Pakistan.
 Kulbushan Jadhav Case:
o Kulbushan Jadhav, a retired Naval Officer was arrested near the Iran-Pakistan
border in Baluchistan region by Pakistan. Pakistan accused him of espionage
and spying. He was sentenced to death by Pakistan’s military court.
o India approached International Court of Justice (ICJ) and court asked Pakistan
to allow consular access to India.
o The issue is still a contentious point in India-Pakistan relationship.
 Terror Financing:
o Pakistan has been kept Pakistan on its terrorist financing watch list or the
“grey list” by Financial Action Task Force has put Pakistan.
 Way Forward
 India needs to keep the international pressure on Pakistan with the support of allies
such as US to force Pakistan to address the issue of cross border terrorism into
India.
 Growing China & Pakistan security and economic relationship is posing security
threat for India. China Pakistan Economic Corridor, part of BRI, is passing through
Indian state of J&K, thereby, violating India’s sovereignty.
 Indus Water Treaty allows both the countries to address recent challenges like
climate-induced water variability in the river flow. These new challenges require both
countries to acknowledge their dependence on each other and discuss joint
solutions.

1.7 India-Afghanistan
 India and Afghanistan have a strong relationship based on historical and cultural
links. The relationship is not limited to government level but has its foundations in
historical contacts and exchanges between the people.
 In recent past, India-Afghanistan relations have been further strengthened by the
Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was signed between the two countries in
October 2011
 History of Indo-Afghanistan Relations
 India has sought to establish its presence in Afghanistan from early days of its
independence in 1947.
 In 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a “Friendship Treaty.”
 Prior to Soviet Invasion in 1979, New Delhi had formalized agreements &
protocols with various pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul.
 While India’s role in Afghanistan was constrained during anti-Soviet jihad,
between 1979 and 1989, India expanded its development activities in Afghanistan,
focusing upon industrial, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects.
 After the Taliban consolidated their hold on Afghanistan in mid-1990s, India
struggled to maintain its presence and to support anti-Taliban forces. Working with
Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan, India provided important resources to the Northern
Alliance, the only meaningful challenge to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
 Since 2001, India has relied upon development projects and other forms of
humanitarian assistance.
2001: Bonn Conference (This was the beginning of peace process for the region and the
country)
2002: India establishes a diplomatic mission in Afghanistan and begins soft diplomacy
2007: Afghanistan becomes member of SAARC
2011: India-Afghan Strategic Partnership signed
 India Afghanistan Relations Since 2001
 During Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,
India provided intelligence and logistic support for Allied forces.
 After the fall of the Taliban, India established diplomatic relations with the newly
established civilian government and participated in relief and reconstruction efforts.
 India has provided humanitarian and economic aid, making it the largest regional
provider of aid for Afghanistan.
 In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan’s membership in the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In 2007, Afghanistan finally became the eighth
member of SAARC.

 In December 2015, India donated three Mi-25 attack helicopters as part of the
bilateral strategic partnership to counter the Taliban insurgency.
 In 2015, the new Afghan parliament constructed by India was inaugurated.
 Significance of Afghanistan for India
 Gateway to Central Asia: Afghanistan is situated at crossroads between South Asia
and central Asia and the Middle East. It may provide access to India to exploit the
natural resources in central Asia.
 Security: Taliban is a religious extremist and terrorist group that sponsors
terrorism. India does not want Afghanistan to become the next Syria as it affects
security in the subcontinent including India.
 Energy Security: India is participating in TAPI pipeline project which passes
through Afghanistan. It is important for India’s energy security,
 Indian Investment: India has made significant investment in Afghanistan and it is
extremely important to protect these investment in Afghanistan
 Resource Rich Country: Afghanistan is rich in natural resource like oil gas and
rare earth materials.
 India-Afghanistan Relationship
 Developmental Partnership:
 India is the sixth largest donor to Afghanistan for development projects in
infrastructure, education and agriculture. Some of the developmental projects
India has undertaken are:
o India constructed new building for Afghanistan parliament.
o India is constructing zaranj-delaram highway.
o Salma irrigation and electricity project (or India-Afghanistan Friendship Dam)
 Economic Relations:
o India is the second-largest destination for Afghan exports.

 Connectivity:
o Air Freight Corridor: India and Afghanistan inaugurated a dedicated air freight
corridor service in 2017 which could provide Afghanistan greater access to
markets in India.
o Chahbahar Port: India is developing Chahbahar port in Iran along with Zaranj-
Delaram highway in Afghanistan. Once completed, this will allow India and
Afghanistan alternative route for trade and commerce.
o India provides training to Afghan Security Forces to fight against the evils of
terrorism, organized crime, trafficking of narcotics and money laundering.
o India donated three Mi-25 attack helicopters to Afghanistan as part of the
bilateral strategic partnership to counter the Taliban.
 Issues
 Connectivity:
o Afghanistan and Pakistan signed Afghanistan Pakistan Transit and Trade
Agreement (APTTA) in 2011 which gives each country equal access up to the
national boundaries of both.
o At present, Pakistan allows Afghan trucks carrying goods meant for India, only
up to its last checkpoint at Wagah. However, complementary access for India is
not allowed to India by Pakistan. This restricts Indian access to Afghanistan
as well as increases cost of business.
 Security:
o Recently, the Taliban have made significant territorial gains. They have also
increased the number of terrorist attack in the country. There are concern that
they may gain significant power in any peace deal between Taliban and
Afghanistan government
 Way Forward
1. An independent, sovereign, democratic, pluralistic and inclusive Afghanistan is
crucial for peace and stability in the region. The Afghan peace process should be
Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled.
2. India must ramp up its economic diplomacy in Afghanistan to bring immediate
benefits to Kabul amidst the deteriorating conditions in the country.
3. Delhi must step up security cooperation with Afghanistan, especially in the training
of its police and armed forces and intelligence sharing.

1.8 India-China
 Introduction
 With a combined market of over 2.7 billion people and a GDP of 20% of the world's
total, China and India enjoy huge potential and broad prospects for economic and
trade cooperation. However, their relationship is dotted with competition,
cooperation, and discord.
 Growth in Relationship
1950: China and India established diplomatic relations. India was the first non-socialist
country to establish relations with the People's Republic of China.
1954: China and India signed the Joint Statement advocating the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel).
1962: War between India and China was a serious setback in bilateral relations.
1976: China and India restored ambassadorial relations.
 Several high-level visits took place between both the countries within the next 25
years.
 From 1980s, the two sides agreed to solve the boundary question through peaceful
and friendly consultation, established strategic and cooperative partnership for
peace and prosperity, and achieved all-round development of bilateral relations.
2003: Declaration on the Principles and Comprehensive Cooperation in India-China
relations was signed. This led to establishment of the special representatives meeting
mechanism on India-China boundary question.
2005: China and India declared the establishment of strategic and cooperative
partnership for peace and prosperity. The two sides also welcomed signing of the
Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the
India-China Boundary Question.
2006: The two sides signed a Joint Declaration to formulate the ten-pronged strategy for
deepening the strategic and cooperative partnership.
2008: "A Shared Vision for the 21st Century" was agreed upon.
2012: This was the “Year of China-India Friendship and Cooperation”.
 After 2013, Chinese President and Indian Prime Minister initiated the "hometown
diplomacy". Two informal summits were held in Wuhan and Chennai respectively.
2018: The first one edition of India-China informal summit was held at Wuhan, Hubei.
2019: The second edition of India-China informal summit was held at Mamallpuram,
Tamil Nadu.
2020: China and India celebrated 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic
relations.

2020: The recent clashes between the Indian and Chinese armed forces have proved to be
a major turning point in the relationship with India moving closer to US while attempting a
decoupling of its economic relationship with China.
 India-China Relations
 Political & Strategic:
o There are 50 dialogue mechanisms between China and India for exchanging
views on various topics of bilateral, regional and global concern.
o Since the establishment of Special Representatives' meeting on boundary
question in 2003, the two sides have held 22 rounds of meetings, which have
played an important role in promoting the settlement of boundary question and
maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas.
o Both the countries are part of groupings such as BRICS, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Russia-India-China (RIC) among others.
 Trade and Commerce:
o Since the beginning of 21st century, trade between China and India has grown
from less than $3 billion to nearly $100 billion, an increase of about 32 times.
In 2019, the trade volume between China and India was $92.68 billion.
o Chinese companies’ cumulative investment in India is more than 8 billion US
dollars.
o Indian companies are also expanding in the Chinese market, with a cumulative
investment of nearly 1 billion US dollars in China. According to Indian
statistics, more than two-thirds of Indian companies investing in China are
making steady profits.
o India has emerged as the seventh largest export destination for Chinese
products and the 24th largest exporter to China.
 Science and Technology:
o Indian companies have set up 3 IT corridors in China, which help promote
China-India cooperation in information technology and high technology.
 Defence:
o China and India, till 2020, have held 8 rounds of "Hand-in-Hand" joint anti-
terrorist exercises to enhance mutual understanding and trust, exchange
training experiences and jointly improve anti-terrorism capabilities.
 People to People Contact:
o The two countries have established 14 pairs of sister cities and provinces, and
will establish sister provinces and cities between Fujian Province and Tamil
Nadu State, Quanzhou City and Chennai City.

o Over 2,000 young Chinese are studying in India, and more than 20,000 Indian
youth are studying in China.
o The number of Indian pilgrims to Xizang Autonomous Region of China has
surged from several hundred in the 1980s to more than 20,000 in 2019
 Education:
o Education Exchange Programme (EEP) in 2006: It is an umbrella agreement
for educational cooperation. Under this, scholarships are awarded to students,
by both sides, in recognized institutions of higher learning in each other’s
country.
 Diaspora:
o Indian community in China is growing. Present estimates put the community
strength to around 35,500.
 Issues
 Pending Boundary Settlement:
o India and China share about 3,488-km long border, which is yet to be fully
delineated.
o China considers Arunachal Pradesh as a part of Tibet and calls it “South
Tibet”. It issued stapled visa to residents of Arunachal Pradesh. It had also
announced “standardised” names for six places in Arunachal Pradesh.
o Aksai China area is also a contentious region along the boundary between
India and China.
o The recent clashes between Indian and Chinese armed forces in Galwan valley
(Ladakh) have proved to be a major setback for the relationship.
 Trade and Commerce:
o Trade imbalance between the two countries is skewed in China’s favour. China
enjoyed a trade surplus of around $50 billion in 2019.
 China-Pak Axis:
o Kashmir Issue: China supported Pakistan’s viewpoint and called upon India
that its move to abolish Kashmir’s special status “not acceptable”.
o China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor: India considers CPEC which is being
under development (part of BRI) in Gilgit-Baltistan region as interference in its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
o Nuclear Suppliers Group: China has linked India’s entry into NSG with that of
Pakistan.

 Strategic:
o String of Pearls: It is a Chinese policy to encircle India by building ports and
naval bases around India's maritime reaches.
o Ex: China is increasing its presence in the region, especially in the countries
such as Sri Lanka (Hambantota Port), Myanmar (Coco Island), Maldives,
Djibouti etc.
o Belt and Road Initiative: It is an initiative of China to increase its economic,
strategic and political footprints across the globe. India has opposed BRI
project consistently considering it as a threat to its security as well as strategic
interests.
 India’s Growing Relationship with US:
o India has signed all the foundational agreements with USA, thereby,
strengthening strategic and security relationship with the US.
o India has been recognized by US as a Major non-NATO ally.
o India is participating in multilateral platforms such as QUAD group along with
US which are being viewed as a part of a strategy to contain China’s growing
footprint.
 River Water Dispute:
o China has been building dams (Jiexu, Zangmu and Jiacha) on Brahmaputra
River. India has consistently objected to such construction as these negatively
interfere with water availability in Indian territory.
 Way Forward
1. Trade and Commerce:
o India needs to press china for providing greater market access in IT and
Pharmaceutical sectors for Indian firms so as to address the problem of skewed
bilateral trade.
2. Confidence Building Measures:
o There is a need to strengthen the confidence building mechanisms so as to
prevent the incidents such as Doklam issues.
o The concept of informal summit is a good initiative in this direction.
3. Reforming Global Institutions:
o The combined global strength of India and China has been increasing over the
last few decades. Both the countries should leverage their combined strength to
reform global institutions such as WTO, WB etc.

4. India Needs to Work With Like-Minded Countries:

o Growing Chinese footprints, globally as well as in Indian Ocean Region, have
been posing strategic threat to Indian interests. To address this issue, India
needs to work with all like-minded countries such as USA, Japan etc.
 India-China Border Dispute

 India and China share a 3,488 km long boundary. Unfortunately, the entire
boundary is disputed.
 The border dispute is over the sovereignty of two relatively large, and several smaller,
pieces of territory between China and India.
o The first is Aksai Chin. It is a virtually uninhabited high-altitude wasteland.
o The other is the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh which lies south of the
McMahon Line.
 Reasons for Border Dispute

 Colonial Legacy:
1. On Western Front:
o The British did not demarcate boundary with China. China does not accept the
demarcation done by Johnson line of 1865. Johnson line of 1865 included Aksai
Chin within the territory of India.
o Post-1962 war, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was established as a temporary
or de facto boundary line between both the nations. However, even on this LAC,
there are several grey areas.
2. On Eastern Front:
o The McMahon lines demarcated by British and accepted by Tibet under Shimla
agreement was to be the boundary. China has never accepted that border,
stating that Tibet was never independent when it signed the Shimla Convention.

 Immediate Causes of recent clashes over boundary issue

 India’s decision to strengthen its border infrastructure (Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg
Oldie road). China feels it will threaten its security and projects
 India is strengthening its strategic and security relationship with US ( Quad group
meetings + signing of 4 foundational agreements)
 China views India’s assertions regarding Gilgit-Baltistan, as an implicit attack on
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China’s flagship programme.
 India decision to change the status on former state of J&K is perceived by China as
aggression.
 Way Forward
1. Political and Diplomatic Coordination:
o It is necessary to conclude the demarcation of boundary between the two
nations as soon as possible.
o “Wuhan Spirit” must be the way forward where heads of both countries showed
maturity and it was concluded that boundary settlement should not be the thorn
in the relation between the two countries.
2. Military Measures:
o The measures need to be both trust building and preventive in nature
o Trust building measures: The recent clash in Galwan valley has increased trust
deficit between militaries of two countries. There is a need to build confidence
and trust among them. It can be done through following measures:
o Hot line between military headquarters, Border Personnel Meeting points (BPM)
for holding rounds of dispute resolution
o Joint military exercises (hand in hand)
3. Preventive Defence:
o There is a need for greater investment in persistent wide-area surveillance to
detect and track adversary moves. At the same time, it is important to build
necessary border infrastructure for faster movement of troops in case of conflict.
o India needs to build its self-reliance in defence manufacturing sector.
4. Strengthen Strategic Partnerships:
o India is strengthening its partnership with QUAD member countries to address
threats posed by China on land as well as in Indo-Pacific region.
o India has also signed the 4 foundational agreements with US

1.8 India-Bangladesh
 A Historical Background
1947: British colonial rule over India ends. A largely Muslim state comprising East and
West Pakistan is established, either side of India.
1949: The Awami League is established to campaign for East Pakistan’s autonomy from
West Pakistan.
1970: The Awami League, under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, wins an overwhelming election
victory in East Pakistan. The government in West Pakistan refuses to recognise the results.
1971: India intervened in the civil war in East Pakistan and liberated it. It was proclaimed
as Bangladesh by Awami league leaders.
 Importance of Bangladesh for India
 Connectivity to N-E India: States in N-E India are land-locked; however, they have
a shorter route to the sea through Bangladesh. A Transit agreement with
Bangladesh has the potential to spur socio-economic development of North-East
India.
 Addressing Insurgency in N-E: Several insurgent groups in N-E after attempting
attacks on Indian side take refuge in Bangladesh. Greater co-operation between the
two states would help addressing the issue of insurgency in N-E India.
 National Security: The narrow chicken neck corridor makes India vulnerable in
case of conflict with China. Transit route through Bangladesh allows India to
address such a threat by allowing quicker men and material movement in case of
any conflict.
 Regional Co-operation: India and Bangladesh are part of bodies like BIMSTEC and
SAARC. Greater co-operation between the two in multilateral forums will improve
regional integration.
 Containing Chinese Footprint: China is expanding its footprint in India’s
neighbourhood through its string of pearls. In this context, it is important for India
to have good bilateral relationship with Bangladesh to thwart any Chinese designs
against Indian interest in the region.
 Bilateral Co-operation
 Space: South Asian Satellite (SAARC Satellite) has been launched to boost regional
connectivity.
 Energy: India is undertaking Rooppur atomic energy project with the help of Russia
in Bangladesh. India will provide training, consultation and participate in
construction activity.
 Connectivity: BBIN MVA agreement will facilitate movement of vehicles across the
four countries without the need for trans-shipment of goods.

o India has extended National Knowledge Network for digital connectivity of education
with Bangladesh.
 Challenges
 Bilateral Trade: The present level of bilateral trade is around $7 billion while the
potential is at least four times this level.
 River Water Sharing Dispute: India shares 54 trans-boundary rivers. Both sides
despite some progress lack treaty framework for water distribution.
o Teesta River
o It is a major source of irrigation for Bangladesh. In 1983, an ad hoc arrangement
on sharing water was made. However, the transient agreement could not be
implemented.
o Bangladesh demanded an agreement for distribution of Teesta waters, on the
lines of Ganga Water Treaty of 1996.
o In 2011 India and Bangladesh finalized an arrangement but could not be
implemented till now to the opposition from West Bengal.
 Border Management: The Indo-Bangladesh border is of porous nature which
provides pathway for smuggling, trafficking in arms, drugs and people.
 Illegal Immigrants: India has seen continuous illegal immigration Since 1971 war
of independence. This has changed demography in N-E India causing political and
socio-economic conflict in India’s N-E.
 Growing Radicalisation: Presence of radical groups like Jamaat-e-Islami fuel Anti-
India sentiments in Bangladesh. This poses serious security issues in border regions
of India.
 Growing Chinese Footprint: China has been making inroads in Bangladesh.
o Bangabandhu-1, first communication satellite of Bangladesh, was financed
through help of China.
o China has extended its support to build Bangladesh Second Nuclear power
plant.
 Way Forward
 Greater People-to-People Contact: This would allow strengthening of economic and
trade relations, especially near the border areas, apart from building trust in the
relationship.
Resolve Thorny Issues: India needs to resolve issues such as Teesta water sharing treaty
among others to flush out thorny issues hindering growth in bilateral relationship.

2. India-Central Asia
2.1 India-Central Asia
 Central Asia Consists of 5 Nations: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
 Overview
 India has a long history of cultural and commercial relations with Central Asia,
facilitated by its geographical proximity and the Silk Route. With this point of view,
India considers Central Asia as its close extended and civilizational neighbour.
 India– Central Asia relations stagnated in the 20th century. However, the relations
have experienced a gradual growth irrespective of the absence of direct access.
 Central Asia is a part of India’s “extended and strategic neighbourhood” and,
therefore, it occupies an important role in India’s foreign policy.
 History
 India’s relation with Central Asia has a long history. The two regions have shared
deep cultural linkages with each other over the past two millennia in terms of people
to people contact, trade, and commerce.
 Ancient kingdoms like the Kushana Empire had territory in parts of both regions.
 Both regions had been connected through the Silk route from 3rd century BC till
15th Century AD until the sea route from Europe to India was discovered.

 Central Asian republics became independent in 1990s. India was among the first
countries to recognize the five Central Asian states and established diplomatic
relations with them.
 Importance of Central Asia
(a) Energy Security:
 Central Asian countries are bestowed with substantial hydrocarbon fields, natural
gas and oil reserves which make them an attractive point for investment.
 There are 3 energy-rich states in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.
 Kazakhstan, which has 15% of uranium reserves, is world’s largest producer of
this strategically critical mineral and accounts for more than a third of global
supplies. It also holds huge gas and oil reserves as well.
 Turkmenistan has the fifth-largest natural gas reserves in the world.
 Uzbekistan is also rich in gas, and is a significant local producer of gold together
with Kyrgyzstan.
 Tajikistan has enormous hydropower potential
(b) Regional Security:
 Central Asia is located in the neighbourhood of ‘Golden Crescent’ of opium
production (Iran-Pak-Afghan). Collaboration and cooperation in this regard with
India will benefits entire region.
 Terrorism: Keeping a check on the rise of radical Islamist groups that may pose a
threat to India’s security.
 Afghanistan: Central Asian nations and India can play effectively role in bringing
normalcy in Afghanistan.
(c) Strategic Location:
 Central Asia’s geo-strategic location, connecting East with the West, is significant
for international transport communication and transit corridors.
 Strategic location of Central Asia is a central point of geopolitical manoeuvring
affecting India’s relations with Pakistan, China, the US, Russia and other powers in
the region.
 India’s only foreign military airbase is in Farkhor (Tajikistan), which is operated by
IAF and Tajik Air Force.
(d) Regional Cooperation:
 Central Asian Nations and India are permanent members of SCO. These is a huge
potential to further mutual cooperation.

(e) Commercial:
 Central Asia offers a relatively untapped market for Indian consumer goods. Indian
tea and pharmaceutical industries have acquired a foothold in the Central Asian
market.
 India-Central Asia Relationship
 India Deals with Central Asia at Multiple Levels:
1. At bilateral level
2. At multilateral level through platforms such as SCO and UN.
3. At multilayered engagement between India and Central Asia such as India-
Central Asia Dialogue at the foreign ministers level.
 Contemporary Build-up in the Relationship
 In 1991–92, all the heads of Central Asian countries visited New Delhi. India, in
turn, sent a semi-official delegation led by Union Minister to Tashkent (Uzbekistan)
and Almaty (Kazakhstan) to establish diplomatic relations.
 Indian Prime Minister visited Central Asia in 1993 and provided a much-needed
financial support of US$10–15 million to each country in the region. Thus, during
the early 1990s, the India–Central Asia relations started to improve.
 However, issues such as instability in Afghanistan and India– Pakistan discord
prevented India from reaping the benefits of its engagement with hydrocarbon-rich
and geo-strategically important region.
 Political problems within Central Asian countries further hindered India’s outreach,
e.g. the civil war in Tajikistan; the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan; and authoritarian
regimes in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
 India’s Minister of State for External Affairs unveiled “Connect Central Asia Policy”
(CCAP) at the first meeting of India-Central Asia Dialogue, a Track II initiative, held
in 2012 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to fast-track India’s relations with the Central Asian
states.
 Connect Central Asia Policy

 Strong political relations through high level visits.
 Strengthen its strategic and security cooperation.
 India will step up multilateral engagement with Central Asian partners through
existing fora like Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Economic
Community (EEC)
 Improve connectivity through INSTC, air services, people to people and cultural
exchanges.
 Since 2014, there has been a renewed thrust and focus in India’s approach and
outreach to Central Asia. India wants to develop its relations with each of the

Central Asia Republics based on their own specific individual characteristics,

national goals and stages of development.
 Indian Prime Minister visited the five Central Asian Republics in 2015 and India
became a permanent member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017.
 India’s Central Asia Policy received a significant boost in 2018, when New
Delhi was admitted into Ashgabat Agreement.
 Ashgabat Agreement
This agreement allows India to use the existing land connectivity networks to facilitate
trade and commercial interaction with both Central Asia and Eurasia, by exploiting the
natural resources of the region and exporting products to Central Asia.
 The first-ever India-Central Asia Dialogue at the foreign ministers level was held in
Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in January 2019.
 Samarkand dialogue: Several initiatives were taken to enhance G2G cooperation

 The setting up of an ‘India Central Asia Developmental Group’ was announced.
 It was also decided to come up with an India-Central Asia Business Council to
enhance trade and commerce between the two regions.
 India also proposed a dialogue on air corridors with the countries of landlocked
Central Asia.
 On 6 February 2020, India-Central Asia Business Council was launched in New
Delhi.
 India will host the Second India-Central Asia Dialogue in 2020.
 Importance of Iran in India – Central Asia Relations
 The importance of Iran as a connectivity provider between India and Central Asia
cannot be overlooked. Without Iran, India-Central Asia relations cannot achieve their
full potential.
 Iran serves as a major link for Central Asia to international markets. Iran also
provides the cheapest and shortest access route for India and other emerging Asian
markets.
 Iran has established several world class ports and free trade zones intended to
stimulate regional trade.
 North-South Railway (Chabahar to Zahedan) is under construction in Iran. INSTC
plus Chabahar could be a game changer for boosting both trade and investment
between countries of the region.

 Bilateral Relations
 Kazakhstan:
o India was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Kazakhstan.
Diplomatic relations were established in 1992.
o The India-Kazakhstan Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC) established in
1993 has been the main institutional mechanism in developing bilateral trade,
economic, scientific, technological, industrial and cultural cooperation.
o In 2009, a 'Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership' was adopted.
o Kazakhstan was one of the first countries with which India launched civil
nuclear cooperation through a uranium purchase contract.
o Kazakhstan is India’s largest trading partner in Central Asia.
 Kyrgyzstan:
o The Republic of Kyrgyzstan is a part of the Eurasian Economic Union and India
is working to increase trade with the Eurasian Union.
o The India-Kyrgyzstan Business Forum was launched in June 2019, during the
official visit of Prime Minister Modi to Bishkek.
o India and Kyrgyzstan have also given final shape to the Double Taxation
Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) and the bilateral investment treaty, which would
help in creating a proper atmosphere for bilateral trade.
 Tajikistan:
o India’s overall share of overall trade of Tajikistan is only 0.5%, while Tajikistan’s
share in India’s overall trade is 0.03%. The main reason for underdeveloped
trade potential is the lack of direct access between both countries. Similar
scenario is visible in investments; India’s business and investment projects in
Tajikistan are a negligible 2%.
o In order to overcome the lack of connectivity and to enhance trade between India
and Tajikistan, Tajikistan fully supports Chabahar Project.
o Regional security and stability is an important component of India-Tajikistan
relations.
o India and Tajikistan share a rich cultural heritage; therefore, development of
tourism can complement the bilateral developmental partnership.
 Turkmenistan:
o Security is one of the key areas where both countries have fruitful cooperation.
Combating terrorism and extremism is a priority area for security cooperation
between India and Turkmenistan.

o In recent years, Turkmenistan has increased the production of petrochemicals,

which India and Turkmenistan consider as one of the key area for cooperation. It
considers India as one of the biggest markets of the world.
o Energy cooperation is also one of the main components of India-Turkmenistan
bilateral relations. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas
pipeline is an important project.
o Afghanistan is the common agenda for both countries.
o In order to overcome the barriers of connectivity, both India and Turkmenistan
have joined multi-modal connectivity projects such as the Ashgabat Agreement.
Turkmenistan also fully supports INSTC.
o Tourism is identified as a significant aspect of the state policy of Turkmenistan
and India is considered an important partner in this regard.
 Uzbekistan:
o India and Uzbekistan have a modest bilateral trade turnover of over 300 million
dollars.
o Pharmaceutical is a major area of both trade and investment by India.
o Medical tourism to India has increased sharply in the recent past.
 Issues
 Connectivity:
o India-Central Asia trade is much below its potential and the factor behind it is
the lack of direct connectivity.
o For India to reach Central Asia, the shortest route goes via Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Since Pakistan’s hostility with India and its cooperation with China
against India are evident, overland connectivity with Central Asia remains
problematic.
 Security:
o Instability: Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are not secure and stable countries
making the region unsafe for: regional stability, trade and commerce and
socio-economic development.
o Radicalism and Extremism: Central Asia finds itself exposed and vulnerable to
influences like Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Taliban, IUM, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and others.
 Trade:
o India’s relations with Central Asia are much below true potential.
o Total trade between India and 5 central Asian republics (2018-19):
1. With Kazakhstan: accounted for 0.10% of India’s total trade.
2. With Turkmenistan: accounted for 0.01% of India’s total trade.

3. With Uzbekistan: accounted for 0.04% of India’s total trade.

 Increasing Chinese foot print in the region:
o China is increasing its footprint in various sectors especially energy and
economic sector.
o Central Asian republics support the Belt and Road Initiative of China of which
India is worried about.
o Threat posed by Islamic radicalization spilling over to Uighurs in Xinjiang
province has led to China getting well entrenched in Central Asian security
affairs.
 Way Forward
1. Connectivity:
o It is imperative for India to Improve connectivity of all kinds -- Physical, digital
and people-to-people contact.
o The experience of successful operationalisation of India-Afghanistan air corridor
can be taken into consideration to further facilitate the extension of this corridor
to Central Asia.
o For Central Asia, Chabahar is the nearest sea port available. India needs to
promote it as a transit hub for trade with Central Asia.
o INSTC is 40% shorter and 30% cheaper than the traditional route taken through
the Suez Canal. It could help India, Iran, Central Asia and Russia to boost up
their bilateral trade.
o India should invest in hinterland connectivity by developing the Chabahar-
Zahedan railway project.
2. Enhancing Bilateral Cooperation:
o India should take the initiative to set up an India-Central Asia Forum Summit on
the lines of the India-Africa Forum Summit to discuss issues of mutual concern
and to come up with concrete suggestions.
3. Science and Technology:
o India should promote exports of software to Central Asia using Uzbekistan as a
hub. This would also help India access Russian markets.
o India and Central Asia should create innovative and technological highways such
as creating a ‘Virtual Silk Route’.
o Digital connectivity needs to be strengthened.
o India should leverage its achievements in space to build capacities and to promote
space cooperation with Central Asia

4. Tourism:
o In 2019, total number of Indian visas issued to Central Asian tourists was around
48, 500, including E-visas, which is very low. India should encourage tourism
with Central Asia.
o A joint tourism council to promote tourism between India and Central Asia should
be established.
o Medical tourism has immense potential due to India’s cheap and proficient
medical services. Therefore, more advertisement and awareness is required to
promote this in Central Asia.
5. Security Cooperation:
o Terrorism remains a key concern for both India and the Central Asian republics.
o Cyber and narcotics dimensions are critical to the collective security of India and
Central Asia.
o Developments in Afghanistan have a direct impact on both India and Central Asia.
India and Central Asia, being stakeholders, must have regular exchanges and
common approaches to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a proxy of
someone else or a fountainhead of international terrorism.
6. Trade and Economic Cooperation:
o To improve trade between the two regions, India and central Asia have launched
the India-Central Asia Business Council at the first India-Central Asia Dialogue to
enhance prospects of joint business development.
o Eurasian Economic Union: India needs to speed up process of admission into a
free trade agreement (FTA) with Eurasian Economic Union, which include
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
7. SCO:
o India’s full SCO membership is considered a forward movement in her
engagement with Central Asia. This has enhanced India’s strategic ‘presence’ in
the Eurasian region.
o India has been able to enhance cooperation with SCO member-states to combat
extremism and terrorism through the mechanism of Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure (RATS) at Tashkent by sharing of information.
8. Promotion of Tourism and People to People Contact:
o Popularisation of Bollywood movies, songs and Hindi TV serials in Central Asia
have added to India’s positive image in the region.
o Central Asian countries have also been participating as international partners in
the Surajkund craft fair organized by the Haryana government.

o India also issues E-Visas to most of the CARs which enables more Central Asian
people to visit India.
9. Capacity Building:
o India is involved in capacity building in Central Asia, especially in defence sector.
Training is provided to Central Asia cadets in various defence institutes across
India. Over 200 Kazakh defence personnel have undergone military training in
India till date.
o Central Asian states have benefitted from ITEC Program that offers training
courses, infrastructure-related cooperation and disaster relief.
3. India-North America
3.1 India-USA
 Introduction
 India-USA relations remained a low level affair for first 50 years after India’s
Independence. It was only after India became a nuclear weapons power in 1998 that
the nature of India’s relationship with the US underwent a qualitative change.
 Evolution of India-US Relations
Phase-I: Post independence till 1960s: This was a phase of conflict and co-operation.
a) Conflict: Examples include India becoming 1st non-communist country to recognise
communist china and India’s insistence on giving UNSC seat to china.
b) Co-Operation: Examples include USA helping India to overcome the crisis of food
security. Also, India approached USA in 1962 war which later agreed to send the help but
by that time china had declared unilateral ceasefire.
Phase-2: 1970s-1990s: This was a phase of only conflict and no co-operation. India
entered into a peace & friendship treaty with USSR. USA has build apathy against India
after Pokharan-I.
Phase-3: Since the end of Cold War: India and USA pursued close relation in this period
both countries decided to upgrade their relationship to ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic
Partnership’ in 2020.
 Growing Relationship
 India-US relationship has evolved progressively over the last 2 decades. A brief
overview of this evolution is presented below:
1998-2000: India and USA began serious and intensive high-level interaction between
Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott from 1998 to 2000.
2000: President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 signalled the higher priority given
by US to India. US’s mantra was to ‘cap, rollback and eliminate’ India’s nuclear weapons

programme. In return, it promised to lift its sanctions and give India access to high
technology. It was also very keen in strengthening India–US defence ties including through
sale of military equipment.
2002: An Indo-US High Technology Cooperation Group was set up. India thought this
might improve its access to ‘dual use’ items (items having both civilian and military
applications) from the US.
2004: The search for a mutually acceptable basis for a strategic partnership found
expression in the bilateral dialogue under the rubric of Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership (NSSP) which was intended to increase cooperation in civilian nuclear
activities, civilian space programmes, and high-technology trade. Later missile defence was
added as a fourth component to the NSSP.
2008: India-USA civil nuclear deal was signed. This was an important landmark in the
India-US relationship.
2010: India-US decided to hold institutionalized strategic dialogue.
2015: India-US decided to upgrade institutionalized strategic dialogue into India-U.S.
Strategic & Commercial Dialogue.
2016: The US recognised India as a "Major Defence Partner”. It will allow India to buy
more advanced and sensitive technologies from America at par with that of US' closest
allies.
2018: The 2+2 Dialogue: The inaugural dialogue was held in September 2018. It is the
highest-level institutional mechanism that provides for a review of security, defence and
strategic partnership between India and the United States.
2019: The US Senate has passed a legislation to accord India the same status as its
other NATO allies (non-member NATO ally). Till now, India was equivalent to Major
non-NATO allies (MNNA) of US but now the US will treat India as a non-member NATO
ally for purposes of Arms Export Control Act.
2020: India and USA decided to upgrade their relationship to ‘Comprehensive Global
Strategic Partnership’.
 Bilateral Relationship
 Defence & Security Cooperation:
o The defence partnership is a key pillar of India-US relationship and today
encompasses a broad spectrum of activities from intelligence sharing to mutual
port visits by naval ships, joint exercises; trade in military hardware and, most
importantly, co-production and co-development of military systems.
o USA increasingly regards India as a potential ally in dealing with emerging
challenges in Indo-Pacific, notably China’s growing economic and military
assertiveness.

o India’s importance as a market for arms supplies is also a major factor. Since
2008, India has purchased nearly US$ 18 billion worth of arms from US.
1995: India and USA signed defence framework agreement. This has been reviewed after
every 10 years.
2002: The first foundational agreement with US -- General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was signed in 2002.
2005-06: Indo-US defence relationship has been growing since the signing of the New
Framework for Defence Cooperation in 2005 and more particularly after the US
Congress passed the Hyde Act in December 2006 to enable bilateral cooperation on
nuclear issues.
2012: The process of forging closer politico-military relations was set in motion with
the signing of Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) in 2012.
2015
 The India-US Defence Relationship regained its momentum following the signing of
“Joint Strategic Vision” in 2015 for a shared vision for peace, stability and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
 Renewal of the ‘Framework for India-US Defence Relations’ in 2015
 Defence Framework Agreement laid a blueprint for collaboration between the defence
establishments.
2016
 India signed a military logistics agreement called Logistics Exchange Memorandum
Of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016. LEMOA is a customized version of the LSA to
facilitate each other’s operations for purposes of refuelling and replenishment with
no obligations on India to provide any basing arrangements.
 Indian Defence Minister and USA Secretary of Defence issued a joint statement
finalising India’s designation as a “major defence partner” of the US.
2018
 The CISMOA has been re-christened as Communications, Compatibility, Security
Agreement (COMCASA), in order to reflect its India-specific character. It is meant to
facilitate the use of high-end secured communication equipment to be installed on
military platforms.
 In August 2018, US granted to India the designation of Strategic Trade Authority
Tier 1. This authorisation is the equivalent of NATO allying with Japan, South Korea
and Australia.
 India and USA held first edition of 2+2 dialogue involving Indian External Affairs and
Defence Ministers and their American counterparts.

o Both countries signed Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement

(COMCASA). It allows the USA to transfer communication equipment to India for
the secure transmission of data and real-time information.
o Tri-service exercise: India and U.S. to hold a first-ever tri-service exercise in
2019.
2019: Signing of Industrial Security Annex: It will facilitate exchange of classified
military information between Indian and U.S. defence industries.
2020: Both countries have concluded Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
(BECA).
 Bilateral Cooperation
 Defence Relationship:
o India and USA have been conducting joint defence exercises such as Cope-India
(Air Force), Yudh Abhyas (Army) and Vajra Prahar (Special Forces).
o The two sides are also engaged in multi-lateral exercises such as MALABAR, RED
FLAG and RIMPAC, covering the broad expanse of the Indo-Pacific.
 Indo-Pacific:
o In early 2010s, USA declared its policy of “pivot to Asia” which was later called
rebalancing with the aim to address the growing Chinese assertiveness of which
India was an important part.
o Recently, the focus of global powers has shifted from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific
region. This region contributes 2/3rd of global growth in GDP and accounts for
60% of global GDP.
o India has emphasized that its idea of Indo-Pacific stands for a free, open, and
inclusive region — one that includes all nations within this geography as well as
others beyond with a stake in it. The India and USA are collaborating to contain
Chinese growing assertiveness in Indo-pacific region. This containment policy
involves cooperation on economic, military and strategic domains.
o Indian partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region can be broadly classified into three
groups: the Quad, ASEAN, and Western Indian Ocean.
1. Quad Group:
 Quad refers to an informal grouping including Australia, India, Japan, and USA
that facilitates discussions on areas of mutual cooperation in the region.
 Quad countries met at the ministerial level for the first time in 2019, signaling a
shift in India’s accommodative stance towards China.

2. ASEAN:
 India has emphasized the centrality of ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific framework and
India’s ‘Act East’ policy provides strategic direction to several initiatives aimed at
increasing its cooperation with ASEAN members:
a. India upgraded its bilateral relationship to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
with Vietnam in 2016 and with Indonesia in 2018.
b. India and Indonesia agreed on a plan of action to develop and manage the
Sabang Port located close to the strategic Malacca Strait.
c. India has concluded a logistics support agreement with Singapore for access to
change port and provided the city-state access to its missile testing facility in
Odisha.
3. India has begun to focus on its strategic partners in Western Indian Ocean:
a. India has a growing defence relationship with France and has decided to
conduct joint patrols in Indian Ocean.
b. India has also operationalized a mutual support logistics agreement with France
that would allow it to access French military bases in Djibouti, UAE, and French
Réunion.
c. India has been interested in building a naval facility in Seychelles’ Assumption
Island and entered into a bilateral agreement for the same in 2018.
2017: US President outlined a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, a bio-geographic
region comprising the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific
Ocean.
2019: USA has Recently Unveiled its New Security Strategy (NSS):
 It explicitly includes India in its definition of the Indo-Pacific, which stretches “from
the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States”.
 It recognizes India as a “leading global power” and seeks to increase quadrilateral
cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India. This is an upgrade from “regional
provider of security” in 2015 and one of “21st century centres of influence” in 2010.
 US had renamed its Pacific Command as US Indo-Pacific Command, an
acknowledgement of seamless connectivity that binds the Pacific and Indian
Oceans and India’s growing importance.
2020: US appreciated India’s role as a net provider of security in IOR and both countries
decided to propose a new partnership between USAID and India’s Development
Partnership Administration for cooperation in third countries.
 Economic and Commercial Partnership
 The US remains India's top trading partner in terms of goods and services, followed
by China. Goods dominate the bilateral trade between the US and India --
approximately 625 while it is 38% in services.

 USA is India’s largest trading partner (With, the bilateral trade at USD 87.95 billion
in 2018-19).
 Energy Exports: In 2018 India purchased 48.2 million barrels of U.S. crude oil, a
significant increase from 9.6 million in 2017.
 2018: India US Strategic Energy Partnership launched in April 2018 seeks to
enhance energy security, bolster strategic alignment etc.
 2019: USA has Recently Unveiled its New Security Strategy (NSS):
o It promotes a deeper partnership with India and asks Pakistan to crack down on
"transnational terrorists" operating from its soil.
2020:
 India and USA called Pakistan to rein in cross-border terror threats and bring justice
for the victims of 26/11 attack and the Pathankot terror attack of 2016.
 US supported designation of Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar as a global
terrorist under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, and played role placing of
Pakistan on the grey-list of the Financial Action Task Force.
 Other Relationship
2019:
 Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI): USA has announced its
commitment to be the founding member of the CDRI whose headquarters will be
located in India.
 Signing of S&T Agreement: It updates and replaces 2005 Agreement and provides a
framework for collaboration between the two countries.
2020: US reaffirmed support for India’s permanent membership on a reformed U.N.
Security Council and for India’s entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group at the earliest.
 Afghanistan:
o Stable government in Kabul is essential to reduce terror activities across south
Asia also in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, the most important goal for India

remains the prevention of Pakistan from regaining its central role in Afghan
affairs.
o Traditionally, India has called for “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-
controlled” process, with participation of the Afghanistan government.
o Later, India shifted its negotiating position by pointing out that it is committed
to “any process” which can help Afghanistan emerge as a united, peaceful,
secure, stable, inclusive and a economically vibrant nation.
2020: US signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” with the Taliban in
Doha, Qatar. Under the agreement US will move to UNSC to remove Taliban members from
the sanctions list.
 Recently, USA has asked India to participate in the proposed peace process in the
light of new ground realities emerging in Afghanistan after the US-Taliban peace
agreement.
 Challenges
 Economic:
o India is a major exporter of steel and aluminium from USA. In March 2018, USA
imposed 25% import duty on steel and 10% on aluminium products.
 India was the largest beneficiary of US’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
as it provided duty-free access to $5.6 billion worth of products exported to US.
However, US accused India of preventing equitable access for Americans to its
markets. Consequently, India’s special trade designation that dated back to
1970s was suspended.
 In return, India imposed retaliatory tariffs on several American imports, including
almonds, pulses etc.
 Iran: USA’s Withdrawal from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
 USA imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran after its withdrawal from Iran Nuclear
Deal. This has affected India’s oil trade with Iran which was its third biggest source
of oil in 2017.
 It may affect the progress of INSTC and Chabahar port in Iran which India sees as
a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.
 Russia: Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)
 This act was enacted in 2017 to counter the aggression by Iran, Russia & North
Korea through punitive measures.
 This affects India’s arms procurement from Russia such as S-400 Triumf air
defence system and Ka226T helicopters.

 It would also affect India’s purchase of spare parts, components and other
assistance for which Indian entities are dependent on Russia for maintenance of
existing equipment.
 Indian Diaspora
 Indians dominate the high-skilled visa category, at times making up over 70% of
H1-B visa holders.
 2019: As a result of the more restrictive US policies, denial rates have increased
significantly from just 6% in 2015 to 24% in the third quarter.
 Implication of denial and H1B visa restriction on India

 Pressure on Indian IT services: Indian company’s dependence on subcontractors for
executing projects on client’s location has risen and due to visa denial they may face
pressure.
 Increase in cost for Indian IT companies: At a time, when companies are facing pricing
pressure on their legacy business, such cost pressure will further eat into their margins
 Way Forward
 Strategic Autonomy: India is a sovereign country and it needs to take all steps so
that no country could dictate to it regarding its defence cooperation or trade ties
with any other nations.
 Pursue Multi-alignment: India should be wary of any attempts at being pitted as a
front in U.S.’s efforts to check China’s rise and jeopardise Sino-India relations.
 Address Chinese Assertiveness in South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region:
India needs to work with all like-minded countries, particularly USA, to collectively
address the threats posed by Chinese assertiveness in political, military and
economic sphere.
 Constructive Engagement: India needs to engage with USA to address the thorny
issues confronting their relationship on economic and trade front.
3.2 India-Canada
 Introduction
 Canada and India have longstanding bilateral relations built upon shared traditions
of democracy, pluralism and strong interpersonal connections.
 Canada is home to one of the largest South Asian communities abroad per capita,
with approximately 5.6% of Canadians being of Indian heritage (1.9 million people).
 India-Canada relations are strategically thin. Canada has little to offer in terms of
assisting India with core strategic objectives that include China, Pakistan, the
subcontinent, maritime security in the Indian Ocean rim and beyond.

 History
 Faultlines first emerged in 1948 when Canada supported a plebiscite, followed by a
ceasefire, in Indian state of Kashmir, a position that was antithetical to India’s
interests.
 Canadian security interests were anchored with those of US; its strategic objectives
aligned closely to US’. Thus, despite considerable opportunity, Canada could not
foster closer relations with India owing to latter’s non-aligned status, which limited
its outreach towards the Western bloc countries.
 In 1974, Canada was infuriated when India carried out nuclear tests.
 In 1980s, India’s relevance in Canada’s foreign policy rose as Punjab accounted for a
significant number of immigrants to Canada. However, India soon expressed
concerns regarding activities of Khalistan sympathisers in Canada. Bilateral ties
reached one of its lowest ebbs in 1985, when Sikh extremists blew up Air India
Flight 182.
 The cessation of Cold War hostilities provided an opportunity for India and Canada
to improve their relationship. In 1990s, India embraced gradual economic
liberalisation, rekindling Canada’s interest in its economic prospects.
 In 1995, Ottawa released its “Focus India” document, identifying India as “an
emerging economic power.”
 In 1997, both sides decided to create a bilateral Joint Working Group on Counter-
Terrorism (JWGCT) to coordinate against Khalistan separatist groups.
 India subsequently conducted nuclear tests in 1998. In response, Canada
suspended talks on trade expansion, banned all military exports, suspended
tentative nuclear cooperation with India and opposed India’s bid for a permanent
seat at UNSC.
 History: Re-Engagement
 In 2000, Canada sought broader economic partnership with India, eventually
removing all economic sanctions in 2001.
 Canada (2003–06) announced International Policy Statement that identified India as
an emerging economy with which Canada sought to broaden cooperation.
 In 2009, both sides announced creation of a Joint Study Group to probe the
possibility of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and
initiated negotiations on a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
(FIPPA).
 In 2010, India and Canada reached an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. This
was a watershed in bilateral relations.

 In 2015, Indian PM visited Canada and signed multiple MoU in areas including
space, railways, civil aviation, and S&T. Also, Saskatchewan’s Cameco industries
reached an agreement to supply 3,000 tonnes of uranium to India.
 India-Canada Co-operation
 During 2015 visit of Canadian PM Trudeau to India,Canada affirmed its support for
India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
o India is Canada’s 9th largest export market, and 10th largest trading partner
overall.
o Investment inflows from Canada, including portfolio investments, have crossed
$40 billion now, compared to $4.5 billion in 2014.
o Between 2018 & 2020, two-way trade in goods have hit record numbers, crossing
$10 billion compared to $6 billion five years ago, while trade in services has
touched $2.5 billion.
o Canada and India are undertaking bilateral negotiations toward both a
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and a Foreign Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA).
o The Joint Study Group formed in 2009 noted that there was sufficient ground
to start negotiations for a trade agreement in goods, services and
investments.
o The CEPA negotiation commenced in 2010, and the most recent round was
held in 2017 in New Delhi.
 People to People Contact:
o In 2018, India was the largest source of international students for Canada’s
universities, colleges and schools.
2015 Visit of Canadian PM Trudeau to India:
 Under Global Skills Strategy, both prime ministers agreed to facilitate the movement
of highly skilled individuals from India to Canada.
 Energy:
o According to World Oil Outlook Report 2040, India’s oil demand will double by
2040.
o In 2009, Canadian oil reached India for first time. In times of growing pressure
from US to cut oil imports from Iran, Canada could be an alternative energy
source for India.
o Canada can also be a significant source of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) for India.

o Amongst Indian investors, there has been an increased interest in Canada’s

energy sector. In 2014, IOCL acquired 10% in an LNG project at Lelu Island,
British Columbia.
o In 2015, Cameco closed a deal to supply 3,000 tonnes of uranium to India.
Additionally, India’s decision to expand its nuclear power generation creates a
new opportunity for firms involved in Canada’s energy sector.
 Infrastructure and Transport Sectors:
o India’s ambitious ‘smart cities’ initiative creates opportunities for Canadian firms
which have experience in undertaking infrastructure projects in various Indian
cities.
o India’s rapid urbanisation will boost the demand for construction companies,
town planners and architects. Canada can offer a tremendous amount of
solutions for modernization of Indian cities.
o Canada’s experience in developing environment-friendly urban infrastructure can
prove beneficial for India, as it aims to transform its metro cities as well as
smaller cities such as Jaipur.
o Canada’s less restrictive immigration policy has attracted interest of Indian IT
professionals, in times of tighter US visa regulations, who are seeking
opportunities in Canadian cities including Toronto.
 Indian Community:
o Canada is home to over 1.2 million Persons of Indian Origin (PIO). The
community is culturally active and has organized itself in various associations.
o Many Indo-Canadians hold key positions in business enterprises, public service
and other professions. The Diaspora is also well represented in federal Parliament
and provincial legislatures.
 Science & Technology:
o India-Canada S&T Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2005.
o The Indo-Canada Industrial R&D Cooperation (ICRD) was set up in 2007 to
support joint industrial projects.
 Nuclear Energy:
o The Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) was signed in 2010.
o In 2015, Department of Atomic Energy signed a $350 million contract with
Cameco, a Saskatoon-based company, to purchase 7 million pounds of uranium
concentrate over the next 5 years. The first shipment arrived in India in
December 2015.

 Challenges
 Khalistan Angle:
o Sikhs constitute make up less than 1% of Canada’s total population. Despite
this, Sikh diaspora commands a reasonable influence in Canada’s federal
politics. New Delhi wants to limit the influence of Canada-based Khalistan
sympathisers.
o Lack of a strategic core and proclivity of all Canadian political parties to associate
with pro-Khalistan elements allows bilateral relations to be easily captured and
hijacked by the thorny diaspora issue.
 Economy:
o While India–Canada economic relations have made some progress, as is reflected
in the upward trajectory of bilateral trade and continuation of CEPA negotiations,
Canada remains an insignificant trading partner for India.
o In 2017, compared to other North American countries, Indian exports to Canada
stood at just over US$2 billion, behind US and Mexico. However, imports from
Canada were valued at more than US$4.5 billion in 2017, ahead of Mexico.
 Way Forward
 Depoliticise Relations: For India to overcome the longstanding hiatus in its
relations, it must divert its attention away from politically contentious issues.
Deeper bilateral engagement will not render Sikh separatism any less important for
India. But it might not consume the energy of the diplomatic corps and rock the
relationship every few years.
 Conclude Trade Pacts: Pending trade and investment pacts — Foreign Investment
Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPPA) and Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) —will be beneficial for both New Delhi as well as
Ottawa to have these agreements ready.
4. India-Europe
4.1 India-EU
 Introduction
 The European Union is a group of 28 countries that operate as a cohesive economic
and political block.
 The year 2017 marked 55th years of diplomatic relations between two largest
democracies -- European Union and India.
 EU's partnership with India lies on the foundation of the values of “freedom,
democracy and a credible, rules-based global order”.

 History
 India-EU relations date to early 1960s, with India being amongst the first countries
to establish diplomatic relations with European Economic Community.
 A cooperation agreement signed in 1994 took the bilateral relationship beyond trade
and economic cooperation.
 Since 2000, India has belonged to a small group of countries including US, China,
Russia, Japan and Canada among others with whom the EU holds regular summits.
 At 5th India-EU Summit at The Hague in 2004, the relationship was upgraded to a
‘Strategic Partnership’.
 The two sides adopted a Joint Action Plan in 2005 that provided for strengthening
dialogue and consultation mechanisms in political and economic spheres, enhancing
trade and investment, and bringing peoples and cultures together.
 The 13 th EU-India Summit in 2016 in Brussels endorsed India-EU-Agenda for
Action 2020 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-major-powers-the-
european-union-54234/ - _edn3 and presented a clear roadmap for the next five
years of the strategic partnership.
 India-EU Relationship
 Trade:
o The EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting for 12.9% of India's overall
trade. Trade in goods between EU and India was estimated at EUR 90 billion in
2018, with a surplus of around EUR 2 billion in India’s favour.
o EU is largest destination for Indian exports and second largest investor in India
accounting for almost one-quarter of all investments flows into India between
2000 & 2017.
o There are more than 6,000 EU companies currently present in India, providing
direct and indirect employment to over 6 million people.
o Trade between EU and India has only grown since and introduction of
the Investment Facilitation Mechanism (IFM) for EU Investments in India in
2017 has led to a further increase in investments.
 Terrorism:
o India and EU adopted a declaration to counter terrorism at 14th India-EU summit
(2017). The declaration is a joint statement and an action plan to combat
international terrorism.
o It was a landmark move in the history of India and European Union. It will
certainly help both sided comprehensively and will enhance the security of the
people of both sides.

 Maritime Security:
o India-EU 14th Summit (2017):
 India and EU decided to enhance cooperation on maritime security in Indian
Ocean and beyond.
 It underlined the “importance of freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of
disputes, in accordance with United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas
(UNCLOS) 1982. This was a statement against aggressive activities undertaken
by China in South China Sea.
o India and EU conduct maritime exercises between EU’s Naval Force Atlanta and
the Indian Navy in Gulf of Aden.
 Renewable Energy and Climate Change:
o The EU-India initiative on clean development and climate change focuses on:
1. Clean technology
2. Clean Development Mechanism
3. Adaptation to climate change and sustainable development.
 ICT Cooperation:
o EU-India Cyber Security Dialogue has been set up to exchange best practice on
addressing cybercrime and strengthening cyber security.
o EU and India aim to link ‘Digital Single Market’ with the ‘Digital India’.
o "Start-up Europe India Network" initiative was launched in 2016.
 Energy Cooperation:
o Energy cooperation has been grown over time. Now, India and EU have instituted
EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership.
o EU and India are fully committed to Paris Agreement and UNFCCC at the highest
political level despite withdrawal of US from Paris agreement.
 Challenges
 CAA and Article 370:
o New Delhi’s actions in J&K and passing of Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019,
have received significant attention from EU. This resulted in the visit of a 27-
member delegation of European Parliament members to the new UT of J&K in
October 2019.
o The visit was followed by introduction of six resolutions in European
Parliament on Article 370 and CAA. The resolutions – which collectively
represented views of 626/750 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) – was
significant because it presented a divergence from previous policy of non-
interference in matters declared to be internal affairs.

 Stalled Trade Pact:

o India and EU are negotiating to finalize FTA or Broad Based Trade and
Investment Agreement for more than a decade now. Still, the two sides have not
been able to finalize it.
 Brexit:
o Brexit will weaken EU economically and politically. UK was EU’s second-biggest
economy (after Germany) and a permanent UNSC member.
o In long term, a smaller Europe can be a weaker Europe in the face of
an ambitious China and an increasingly protectionist US.
 Way Forward
1. Investment Protection:
 The issue of investment protection has emerged largely because of stalled FTA –
formally called Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) – between India and
EU.
 The uncertainty around EU-India trade relations in the wake of Brexit, coupled with
changing role of multilateralism in trade relations, necessitates urgent and clear
provisions for investment protection.
 The need has been further illustrated by devastating effect of coronavirus outbreak
on European nations and subsequent disruption of supply chains which potentially
endangers Indian investments in Europe and vice versa.
 Therefore, talks for an independent treaty of investment protection in the absence of
an FTA have gained traction, and are a necessary point that must be discussed.
2. Future Agenda:
 EU-India Agenda for Action 2020 that was proposed in 2016 must now be reviewed,
and a new agenda must be outlined and endorsed for next five years. The new
Agenda for Action 2025 would therefore ideally identify joint priority areas of
cooperation and collaboration for India and the EU.
 A renewed focus on European presence in Indo-Pacific, expansion of European
investments into defensive capacity building, collaboration on projects for lowering
emissions and combating climate change are all areas where strategic partnership
can expand.
3. Collaborative Efforts:
 EU has capacitates to deal with issues like global governance, climate change and
the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. India must utilise this through
bilateral dialogues and consultations.

4. Conclude Trade Pacts:

 There is a need to conclude the negotiations for proposed FTA or Broad Based Trade
and Investment Agreement as early as possible. This is help in strengthening the
economic partnership between EU and India.
4.2 India-UK
 Growth in Relationship
o After independence, India decided to remain in Commonwealth of Nations.
o India advocated non-alignment whereas UK allied with US during cold War.
Thus, initially, India and UK were at logger heads with each other, both politically
and ideologically.
o After the cold war, the relations have starts to improve. This trend has been
continued till now.
2004: India’s multifaceted bilateral relationship with UK intensified with its upgradation
to a Strategic Partnership.
2009: An All Party Parliamentary Group on Trade and Industry linkages with India was
set up by UK.
2010: The visit of UK Prime Minister to India saw the relations elevated to ‘Enhanced
Partnership for the Future’.
2010: India and UK agreed to establish India-UK CEOs Forum and an India-UK
Infrastructure Group to enhance trade and investment.
2015: New Defense and International Security Pact was agreed for curbing security
concerns.
2019: India and UK have agreed to set up 3 new bilateral working groups to tackle
barriers to trade in specific sectors of food and drink, healthcare and data services.
o India is the second largest investor into the UK
o UK is 4th largest inward investor in India accounting for around 7% of all foreign
direct investment into India.
o British companies now employ a staggering 800,000 people in India, representing
one in 20 jobs in India’s organised private sector.
o There are around 800 Indian businesses in the UK, employing 110,000, and
India is third largest investor in the UK.
 S&T Relationship:
o The Newton Bhabha Fund co-created by UK and GoI is stimulating scientific
research into finding solutions to the challenges facing India’s economic
development and social welfare.

o India-UK Clean Energy R&D Centre has been setup with a focus on solar energy
storage and a collaborative R&D programme in energy efficient building
materials.
 Industry-Academia Partnerships:
o Tata Motors-owned JLR and the Warwick Manufacturing group at Warwick
University are opening largest automotive R&D facility in Europe in 2018.
 Industry-Industry Relations:
o These include a partnership between UK insurance major, Bupa, and Indian
firms Practo and 1mg. Together, they have created an easy to access and
customised holistic healthcare plan for Indians who currently can’t access
insurance and, therefore, quality healthcare.
o Rolls Royce-TCS partnership to explore the applications of IoT in expanding Rolls
Royce’s manufacturing.
 Indo-Pacific:
o In 2019, British Royal Navy sent its representative to Indian Navy’s Information
Fusion Center in Gurgaon, as India and the UK edge closer on the Indo-Pacific as
part of an evolving strategy.
 Other Relationship:
o International Collaboration: UK supports India’s proposal for permanent
membership of the UNSC and is also an important interlocutor for India in the
EU, G8, G20 and global contexts.
o People-to-People Contact: UK is 5th most popular destination for Indian
tourists.
o Education: Education is an important plank of India-UK bilateral relationship.
Over the last 10 years, the relationship has grown with the introduction of
bilateral mechanisms such as the India-UK Education Forum UK-India
Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI).
o Indian Diaspora: Approximately 1.5 million people of Indian origin are living in
UK equivalent to almost 1.8% of the population. They are contributing 6% to UK’s
GDP.
 Issues
 Immigration Policies: India believes that UK has been making its immigration
policies more and more restrictive. Hence, India has been asking for easing visa
rules for Indian immigrants to UK but not much success has been achieved on this
front. Ex: Exclusion of India by UK (in 2019) from a new list of low-risk countries
with relaxed student visa rules is a case in point.

 Decreasing Indian Students: Number of Indian students coming to UK halved from

about 40,000 in 2009-10 to 20,000 in 2017-18.
 UK’s-Pakistan Relationship: UK’s ties with Pakistan complicate the process of
building a closer defence and security relationship with India.
 Brexit Impact on India
 Immigration:
o Most significant impact will be friendlier immigration policies for Indian students
and workers.
o With UK out of EU, the preferential treatment given to EU workers will no longer
remain, creating more space for Indian students and workers while levelling the
playing field.
 Trade:
o Given the slow pace of negotiations over a trade deal with the EU, Brexit provides
a fresh opportunity to India to strengthen its economic relationship with UK
through an India–UK trade and investment agreement.
 Market Access:
o UK is India’s gateway to EU, but a post-Brexit UK can change that. Currently,
India can access EU markets through UK ports. Post-Brexit, Indian ships will
need to tap into EU markets themselves.
 Way Forward
1. Brexit enables UK to set its own trade and investment agenda and this offer an
exciting opportunity to transform the UK-India relationship. India should put the
negotiation on Free Trade Agreement with UK on fast-track.
2. The trade between India and UK is below potential. Brexit provides a rare
opportunity for both the countries to strengthen their economic and commerce ties.

 Institutional Mechanisms for Bilateral Relationship between India & UK

 India-UK Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO):
o The JETCO was established in 2005 to develop a strategic economic relationship.
 India-UK Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD):
o The aim is to strengthen the financial and economic relationship between India
and the UK.
 UK India Business Council (UKIBC):
o It plays the role of a Secretariat for JETCO talks and provides a forum for UK
companies to enhance their links and develop new partnerships with Indian
businesses.
 Recent Developments in the Relationship
 Access India Programme (AIP):
o High Commission of India, London initiated the ‘Access India Programme’ in
2017 for facilitating investments by UK SMEs in India.
o The primary focus of AIP is on those companies that are intending to set up
manufacturing facilities as part of the ‘Make in India’ initiative.
 Supporting the Start- up India Initiative:
o UK will be investing £160 million across 75 start-up enterprises, apart from an
additional £20million for a Start-Up India Venture Capital Fund.
 Varanasi Smart City Development Plan:
o New technical assistance for the redevelopment of Varanasi railway station
under the Varanasi Smart City Development Plan will be extended by the UK.
 National Investment and Infrastructure Fund:
o Both Governments have committed an anchor investment of up to £120 million
each in the India-UK Sub- Fund under the National Investment and
Infrastructure Fund.
5. India-Russia
 Introduction
 Relations between India and Russia are rooted in history, mutual trust and mutually
beneficial cooperation. This is a strategic partnership that has withstood the test of
time, and which enjoys the support of the people of both countries.
 Indian prime minister invoked a Russian proverb to reaffirm India-Russia friendship
in a changing world: “An old friend is better than two new ones.”

 Historical Background
 After independence, the goal for India was attaining economic self-sufficiency
through investment in heavy industry. During India’s second Five Year Plan, of the
sixteen heavy industry projects set up, eight were initiated with the help of Soviet
Union. This included the establishment of the world famous IIT Bombay.
 A watershed moment in relations between India and the Soviet Union was the
signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1971.
 After the dissolution of Soviet Union, India and Russia entered into a new Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in 1993 and a bilateral Military-Technical Cooperation
agreement in 1994.
2000: India and Russia signed the “Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic
Partnership”. Under the Strategic Partnership, several institutionalized dialogue
mechanisms operate at both political and official levels.
2010: The Strategic Partnership was elevated to the level of a “Special and Privileged
Strategic Partnership.”
2017: India and Russia celebrated 70th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic
relations.
2019: Russia awarded Indian PM its highest state decoration - Order of St Andrew the
Apostle. The order was presented for distinguished contribution to the development of a
privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India and friendly ties between the
Russian and Indian peoples.
 India-Russia Relations
 Defence and Security Cooperation:
o The defence facet is one of the strongest pillars of the India-Russia relationship
and has withstood the test of time. India is the largest buyer of Russian military
equipment and, at the same time, Russia is India’s principal defence partner.
o The relationship is evolving from traditional buyer-seller one to that of joint
production and development, with emphasis on technology sharing. Russia is
committed to becoming a partner in the ‘Make in India’ programme.
a. BrahMos Missile System as well as the licensed production in India of SU-30
aircraft and T-90 tanks are examples of such flagship cooperation.
b. Lately, both sides concluded agreements on supply of S-400 air defence systems
& shareholders agreement on the formation of joint venture to manufacture Ka-
226T helicopters in India.
o 2019: India announced JV – Indo-Russian Rifles Pvt. Ltd. for production of AK
Series Assault Rifles at Ordnance Factory Korwa under ‘Make-in-India’ program.

o The two countries also hold exchanges and training exercises between their
armed forces annually: First-ever Tri-Services exercise –‘INDRA 2017’ in
2017.
 Trade and Economic Relations:
o Trade between the two countries is an area which has been identified for special
focus by both countries. Bilateral trade in 2015 amounted to US$ 7.83 billion.
o Russian investment in India in 2017 has reached 18bn USD and India’s total
investment in Russia so far is 13 bn USD.
o The two countries have kept their targets of increasing bilateral investment to US
$ 50 billion and bilateral trade to US $ 30 billion by 2025.
 Nuclear Energy:
o Russia is an indispensable partner in the sphere of nuclear energy and
recognizes India as a responsible country with an impeccable non-proliferation
record.
o In 2014, DAE and Russia’s Rosatom signed the Strategic Vision for strengthening
cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy.
o Eight years after India’s foreign collaborations in civil nuclear energy were
legitimised, Russia remains the only foreign country involved in nuclear power
production in India.
o Rosatom is building six units of nuclear reactors at Kudankulam site in Tamil
Nadu. Two units are already operational and the next four are in different stages
of implementation.
o Both sides are also cooperating in the implementation of Rooppur NPP
construction project in Bangladesh.
 Space:
o India and Russia have a four-decade strong relationship in the field of space.
o USSR launched India’s first two satellites, Aryabhata and Bhaskar.
o Russia has provided India help in developing Cryogenic technology to build heavy
rockets.
o Currently, selected IAF pilots are undergoing training for India’s Gaganyaan
Mission in Russia.
 Science & Technology:
o The Working Group on S&T functioning under IRIGC-TEC, the Integrated Long
Term Programme (ILTP) and the Basic Science Cooperation Programme are the
three main institutional mechanisms for bilateral Science and Technology
cooperation.
o A new High Level S&T Commission was established in 2017.

o Both the countries have set up a Russia-India Network of Universities, and

cooperation is underway in different aspects of space technology.
 Cultural Cooperation:
o There is a strong tradition of Indian studies in Russia. About 20 Russian
Institutions regularly teach Hindi to about 1500 Russian students.
o There is strong interest among Russian people in Indian dance, music, yoga and
Ayurveda.
o India conducted a six month long “Festival of India in Russia” from September
2018 to March 2019, showcasing the best of Indian music, dance, food and
spiritual traditions.
o 2018 was celebrated as the 'Year of Tourism’ between India and Russia
 Regional and International Cooperation:
o Russia has supported India’s bid for permanent seat in UNSC.
o Russia also favours India’s entry into Nuclear Supplier Group.
o India and Russia are member of important groupings such as BRICS, SCO, G20
etc. These are important platforms and both the countries are cooperating with
each other at these platforms.
 Issues
 Strategic Friction:
o Russia has directed its policy so as to counter US predominance, one that India
has shown no interest in backing due to its desire to improve its economic status
and further relations with all major powers.
(a) Growing Sino-Russian Relationship:
o Russia is deepening its strategic partnership with China due to a commonality of
interests in political, economic and strategic domains.
o Apart from bilateral trade which touched over $100 billion in 2018, Russia also
needs Chinese investment to fund its development needs.
o Russia and China also share a common opposition to US hegemony. The
imposition of western sanctions after annexation of Crimea meant Russia had to
look for a “strong external partner,” leading to a “more ambitious pivot to China.”
(b) India’s Growing Proximity with USA & Other Major Powers:
o These developments in Sino-Russian relations happened at a time when India
was decisively reaching out to US, distancing itself from the “rhetoric of non-
alignment”.
o India became a major defence partner of US (2016), began 2+2 dialogue (2018),
and signed all 4 foundational security agreements by 2020.

o India has also ramped up its engagement with other major powers like Japan,
Israel, Germany, Australia and France.
 Differences Over Indo-Pacific Region:
o The Indo-US joint statement in 2017 officially included the nomenclature of
“Indo-Pacific” in the bilateral document. India’s main concern is with respect to
the unpredictable rise of China in the region. To address this challenge, India is
keen on collaborating with like-minded major global powers.
o Russia has expressed its displeasure over the idea of the Indo-Pacific, which it
calls an “artificially imposed construct” being promoted by US, Australia and
Japan to contain China. This makes it clear that Moscow’s interpretation of the
concept is different from that of New Delhi.
 Russia-Pakistan Relationship:
o Russia’s increased engagement with Pakistan has not been received well in New
Delhi.
o In 2014, Moscow removed the arms embargo imposed on Pakistan and sale of Mi-
35 helicopters and engines for JF-17 Thunder went through.
o A gas pipeline between Lahore and Karachi was also funded by Moscow.
o The two sides also began joint military exercises—much to the dismay of India –
especially in 2016.
 Divergence over Afghanistan:
o Russia has on record said that it would not be possible to eliminate terrorism
“without the cooperation of Pakistan.”
o India does not agree with Russia’s treatment of Pakistan as “part of the solution
rather than part of the problem.”
 Defence Partnerships:
o India is currently in the process of diversifying its defence relations. Russia’s
share of Indian defence imports fell from 79% between 2008-2012 to 62%
between 2013 & 2017.
 Trade:
o Russia comprised just 1% of India’s total trade while India accounts for 1.2% of
Russia’s overall trade. Further, the trade is mainly defence based.
o Bilateral trade remains meagre at only $10.7 billion in 2017-18. This is far below
potential in comparison to India’s trade with China ($89.7 billion), the United
States ($74.5 billion).

 Way Forward
 Economic Relationship:
o India should expedite negotiations of proposed India-Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU) FTA. This will help in improving trade relations between the two countries.
o Expeditious implementation of INSTC project as well as the launch of the ‘Green
Corridor’ project for Customs facilitation (by easing Customs norms) is required.
 Russia-Pakistan Relationship:
o India should avoid raising Pakistan to the level of an over-riding preoccupation.
That’s because this also sets us up for both our friends and adversaries using
Pakistan as leverage against India.
 There are enough reasons for India to remain deeply engaged with Russia:
o It will remain a key source of sensitive technologies and hardware, even as we
diversify
our sources of supply as we must in our own interest.
o It may well become a key energy partner as our own energy demand increases
and Russia looks for markets outside Europe.
6. India-East Asia
6.1 India-Japan
 The friendship between India and Japan has a long history rooted in spiritual
affinity and strong cultural and civilizational ties. Bilateral ties have been singularly
free of any kind of dispute – ideological, cultural or territorial.
 The dimensions of India-Japan relations have transformed in recent years into a
robust and matured partnership based on convergence in their strategic
geopolitical and security concerns regionally and beyond.
 History
 After India’s independence, the bilateral ties drifted apart as New Delhi moved closer
to the USSR while Japan became a strong ally of the US.
 It was only after the end of the cold war and the break-up of USSR that they decided
to renew their ties in the wake of the new geopolitical realities.
 India came up with its “Look East Policy” in 1992 which aimed at New Delhi re-
engagement with S-E Asia and East Asia.
2007: India and Japan concluded a strategic agreement.
2009: Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation was agreed upon by the two
countries.

2010: India and Japan instituted 2+2 dialogue led by secretary level officers as per
the 2009 Action Plan
2014: India and Japan concluded a Special Strategic and Global Partnership.
2019: India and Japan held their inaugural 2+2 minister dialogue. Japan is only the
second country (after US) with which India has such a dialogue format. India-Japan
2+2 dialogue is an endorsement of the special strategic partnership.
 Reasons for Closeness in Relationship
 Regional environment in Indo-Pacific has contributed to growing ties between the
two countries. The rise of China has been an important factor, while India’s growing
closeness with US has also played a role, as the US and Japan already have a close
alliance.
 India with its huge population and a growing middle class provides a market which
no Japanese company can ignore in the long term.
 New Delhi is seeking massive investments in its infrastructure sector and Japan is a
major investor.
 Being a developing country, pollution is a serious issue in major Indian cities.
Japanese green technologies can help India tackle this threat.
 Japan’s ageing population (23% above 65 years) and India’s youthful dynamism
(over 50% below 25 years).
 India’s prowess in services and Japan’s excellence in manufacturing
 India-Japan Relationship
 Strategic Connectivity:
o What makes Japan a reliable partner in the connectivity arena is its emphasis on
‘quality’. Unlike China’s BRI projects, Japanese infrastructure initiatives are
environmentally friendly and financially sustainable.
o Not only has Japanese development aid produced demonstrable results on the
ground, Tokyo’s insistence on transparency has generated enormous trust.
(a) Within India:
o Japan has been allowed to invest in India’s North-East, which has been a no-go
area for other countries. Two countries are working together on infrastructure
projects in the Northeast.
o Japan is supporting India’s mega infrastructure projects like Delhi-Mumbai
Freight Corridor, Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, Chennai-Bangalore
Industrial Corridor and the Ahmedabad-Mumbai High Speed Rail system.
o India and Japan are also teaming up to set up a diesel power plant in Andaman
and Nicobar Islands (where New Delhi has not allowed other countries to invest).

(b) Outside India:

o Amid growing concerns about China’s BRI, India and Japan are partnering for
creating a viable alternative for infrastructure development and connectivity
among countries across regions, including Africa (Asia-Africa Growth Corridor),
South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific.
o They are building Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, whose four pillars —
developmental projects, quality infrastructure, capacity building, and people -
to-people partnership — make it an effective counterpoint to China’s Belt
and Road Initiative.
o The two countries will be cooperating in the development of East Container
Terminal in the Colombo Port in Sri Lanka.
 Indo-Pacific:
o India and Japan annual summit 2018: The joint statement titled “India-Japan
Vision Statement”, talks about converging security and economic interests in
Indo-Pacific region, and the need for them to work together for a rules-based
world order that would ensure rule of law, unimpeded trade, and flow of people,
technology and shared prosperity.
o Both the countries see China’s approach in the region as being exclusivist. There
is a clear clash between these two visions of the region. In an era that has seen
an increasingly assertive China, India and Japan both increase their options by
collaborating with each other.
o India’s economic and security outlook — often articulated in terms of its ‘Act-
East’ outreach — fits well with Japan’s vision for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.
Both countries want a regional order based on rules.
o The wavering US has made its allies unsure of its commitments toward the
region—a consideration for India-Japan partnership as well.
 Trade:
o Japan is the third-largest source of FDI investment into India after Mauritius and
Singapore. India has received $28.160 billion in FDI from Japan between April
2000 and June 2018.
o In 2016-17, India-Japan trade reached $13.61 billion. India’s export to Japan for
2016-17 was $3.86 billion, whereas India’s import from the East Asian country
for 2016-17 was $9.76 billion.
o 13th Indo –Japan Annual Bilateral Summit:
1. The biggest take away was $75 billion currency swap that Japan Offered to India
(50% higher than the last swap).

2. Both appreciated the progress made under Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Agreement (CEPA) signed in 2011 as it has helped in boosting bilateral trade.
 Defence Relationship:
o Defence relations between are quite intense with all the different wings of the
militaries engaged in joint exercises. These include Dharma Guardian land
exercise, Shinyu Maitr air exercise and Japan-India Maritime Exercise.
o The two countries are also engaged in the Malabar exercise along with USA. In
2020, India agreed to include Australia as a participant in this exercise.
o Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a strategic dialogue between India, United
States, Japan and Australia.
o India and Japan decided to have a 2+2 dialogue mechanism at ministerial level.
This is aimed at giving political muscle to the existing diplomatic, security and
defence cooperation.
o In 2020, India and Japan signed a logistics agreement that will allow armed
forces of both sides to coordinate closely in services and supplies. The agreement
is known as Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
1. The agreement would expand strategic reach and influence of both the militaries:
Japan could gain access to Indian facilities in the A&N Islands and India could
have access to Japan’s naval facility in Djibouti.
 Cooperation on Greener Technology:
o Japan-India Energy Partnership Initiative was signed in 2016.
 Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy:
o Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy reflects a new level
of mutual confidence and strategic partnership
o India has planned nuclear reactors with France and US which depend on
Japanese parts.
o GE, Westinghouse, and Areva, the companies planning reactors in India, have
important ownership stakes of Japanese companies, which were stopped by the
Japanese government from doing business with India without a final nuclear
deal.
 Other Relationship:
o Both the countries are part of G-4 and intend to bring reform into the UN
architecture.
o Cooperation on the HRD in manufacturing sector in India through
“Manufacturing Skill Transfer Promotion Programme.”

 Challenges
 Trade & Economics:
o Trade ties which have remained underdeveloped when compared to India’s trade
ties with China. In spite of CEPA India Japan trade it has not produced the
anticipated results.
o The bilateral trade between New Delhi and Tokyo in 2017-18 stood at a meagre
$15.71 billion, whereas Sino-Indian bilateral trade in 2017 stood at $84.44
billion in spite of political tensions between India and China.
o India’s complex regulations, red tape, ad hoc nature of state-level interventions
have resulted in below potential economic relations between the two countries
 Defence:
o India is one of the biggest arms importers in the world, while Japan has been
looking at arms exports. Despite this, the two sides have been unable to
collaborate in the defence sector in spite of huge potential.
o Despite repeated attempts, talks for the sale of the US -2i amphibious aircraft
have been deadlocked over issues of price and technology transfer. The deal
has been hanging fire since 2014.
o The progress with regard to the collaboration on the issue of Technology transfer
and joint production is slow.
 Way Forward
1. Trade and Economic Relationship:
 The trade and private sector capacity of India and Indian companies in S-E Asia
remain modest.
 There are some 1,350 Japanese companies present in India, while over 13,000
Japanese companies remain active in Asean.
 If India and Japan were to cooperate not only at a government-to-government but
also at government-to-government-to-business framework across Asean, the impact
would be exponential.
2. Development of N-E:
 One of India’s perennially low-hanging fruits that has been infuriatingly just out of
grasp is the development potential of eight north-eastern states.
 With a positive demographic profile, enormous horticulture and agricultural
potential, and proximity to Asean, this region could serve as the perfect platform
from which India and Japan approach Asean from the West.
 India must Act East and act fast, to ensure that it remains not only relevant to the
region but also contributes to realizing a win-win situation.

3. Defence:
 Opportunities in the areas of technology collaboration are significant. Defense
electronics is particularly important for India.
 India’s domestic defense electronic manufacturing segment is still at a nascent stage
and it has to partner with its strategic partners in building a domestic capability
base but also direct procurement of those capabilities in the interim.
6.2 India-Australia
 History
 Australia and India for the first time established diplomatic relations in 1941 when
Consulate General of India was first opened as a Trade Office in Sydney.
 India's first High Commissioner to Australia arrived in Canberra in 1945.
1950s: As part of Colombo Plan, many Indian students were sponsored to go and study
in Australia.
1992: The Australia-India Council (AIC) was established.
 India-Australia relations touched a historic low when India conducted 1998 nuclear
tests.
2009: India and Australia elevated their partnership status to “strategic partners”.
2014: A Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the two countries was signed.
Australia agreed to supply uranium to India. It was for the first time that Australia is
supplying to a non-signatory to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2014: Social Security Agreement (SSA) was signed.
 India-Australia Relationship
 Political:
o India and Australia share the common concern of China’s expanding footprints in
the region. Both the countries see this as a threat to rule-based order in the
Indo-Pacific.
o Australia supports India’s candidature in an expanded UN Security Council
o Australia is an important player in APEC and supports India’s membership of
the organisation.
o Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on East Asia in which India-Australia play an
important role to discuss ways to balance China’s growing ambitions in the Indo-
Pacific region

 Economic:
o The two-way trade between India and Australia hovers around $15 -$20 billion,
India is 9th largest trading partner of Australia and remains its 5th largest export
market.
o India occupies 17th position in Australia’s foreign investment and for India,
Australia is its 22nd largest investor.
o India and Australia are discussing about the Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Agreement since 2012. Once completed, CECA is expected to
increase bilateral investments and goods and services trade between both
countries.
o Robust economic cooperation between India and Australia has the potential to
help India in its quest for sources of energy, as the later has reserve of high
quality coal, uranium and LNG.
 Maritime Security:
o Indian Ocean binds India and Australia together and hence both India and
Australia are keen to preserve regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific
region and work together, both at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels, to
maintain peace and balance in the region.
o Both Australia and India aims to uphold the idea of free navigation in the seas
and oceans in order to maintain their trading interest.
o In 2020, India has agreed to allow Australia to participate in the Malabar
Exercise which till recently only involved India, Japan and US naval forces.
 Civil Nuclear Cooperation:
o Australia holds about 40% of world's uranium reserves. India is in need of
regular Uranium supply to ensure energy security.
o To get unrestricted Uranium supply India signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement with Australia in 2014.
o Australian Parliament passed “Civil Nuclear Transfer to India Bill 2016” in 2016
which allows Uranium mining companies in Australia to supply uranium to India
for civil use.
 Defence and Security Cooperation:
2003: An agreement on counter-terrorism was signed.
2006: MoU on defence cooperation was signed.
2007: Agreement on information sharing on defence intelligence was signed
2014: Framework on Security Cooperation was signed.
2016: Australia and India signed the civil nuclear deal.
2015: First ever bilateral joint naval exercise (AUSINDEX) was conducted.

 Cultural Interaction and People-to-People Exchanges:

2016: India organised confluence India programme in several cities in Australia to
demonstrate the vibrancy of Indian culture and heritage.
o Number of India students enrolled in Australian institutions is on the rise. In
2016, Indian students were estimated at 60000 in Australia, making them the
second largest group of foreign students in the country.
o India is 8th largest source of international tourists for Australia.
 Agriculture, Science and Technology:
o A number of collaborative research projects in agricultural research,
nanotechnology, renewable energy, marine sciences etc. have been taken up.
o An Australia-India Strategic Research Fund (AISRF) has been set up to fuel R&D
o Australia is cooperating in Clean Ganga Project.
 Resources and Energy Security:
o A Joint Working Group was established in 1999 to expand bilateral relationship
in the energy and resources sector.
o Australia joined the International Solar Alliance, led by India and France in 2017.
 Multilateral Cooperation:
o Both countries share the same platform in East Asia Summit, Indian Ocean Rim
Association, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and several other multilateral
forums with the common aim to achieve a stable and secured Indo-Pacific region.
 Challenges
(a) Strategic Divergences on Indo-Pacific:
 Australia:
 For Australia a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ means:
o Establishing a regional architecture with fellow democratic countries to help
maintain ‘rules-based order’ as China becomes most powerful actor in the region.
o Retaining US strategic engagement in the region. Since ‘engagement’ means
‘leadership’ for US, Australia implicitly — if not explicitly — continues to promote a
US-led regional order.
 Indian Ocean is still peripheral in Australia’s strategic vision. The ‘Indo’ in ‘Indo-
Pacific’ simply attaches India to Canberra’s existing strategic area of interest in the
Asia Pacific.
 India:
 India’s preferred formulation of a ‘free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific’ refers
to a multi-polar regional order within which Delhi can:
o Maintain its strategic autonomy

o Project its own leadership ambitions

o Follow a path of ‘multi-alignment’ or ‘issue-based alignment’. This is in an effort to
cultivate countries like Russia and China — in addition to Australia, Japan and
United States — as regional partners.
 While India shares Australia’s concerns about Chinese domination in the region,
Delhi does not see a reliance on US power and leadership as the way to address this
problem.
 The Indian Ocean remains strategically more important to India than Pacific Ocean
and ‘Indo-Pacific’ for India stretches out to the eastern coast of Africa.
(b) Economic:
 Key economic sectors that could be used to foster economic cooperation, such as
agriculture and education, remain protected from foreign trade and investment in
India.
 This hinders the growth in the relationship between the two countries. A strong
strategic partnership stands on a strong economic partnership.
(c) People-to-People Movement:
 India’s desire for visa reforms in Australia, which would permit more Indian workers
to seek employment in Australia, remains unmet.
 Way Forward
1. Diaspora:
o Australia is home to around 450,000 Indian and Australian citizens of Indian
origin comprise approximately 2% of total population in the country.
o The huge untapped potential of this diaspora community needs to be exploited in
advancing the bilateral relations between the two countries.
2. Expanding Chinese Footprint:
o Multilateral efforts are needed to address the threat posed by China to the rule
based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia is an indispensable partner for
India in this regard. Hence, there is a need to increase the strategic
understanding between the two countries.
o Australia in 2013 released its Defence White Paper making it first government
articulation of Indo-Pacific and endorsing India’s centrality in the Indo Pacific
construct.
o India needs Australia in Quad to balance China in the Indo-Pacific region.
3. Skill Development:
o Demographic Divided: To reap the benefits of demographic divided, India needs
to up-skill its youth population. Australia is well-equipped to assist with this
huge need for knowledge-sharing, education and skill development.

4. Promote Multilateral Co-operation:

o Though India and Australia share several multilateral platforms, they are still not
co-operating on the strategically important platforms such as JAI and MALABAR
Exercise.
o Presence of Australia in these platforms will help in strengthening the strategic
and economic relationship between India and Australia.
6.3 India-South Korea
 Introduction
 After 46 years since the two countries established diplomatic relations, their ties
especially in the last decade or so have grown robust and multi-dimensional,
encompassing a wide range of interests including nuclear disarmament, maritime
security, regional economic cooperation, counterterrorism, and energy cooperation.
 History
 During Korean War (1950-53), the warring sides accepted a UN resolution sponsored
by India calling for a ceasefire; one was declared on 27 July 1953.
 However, the relationship remained dormant for many decades for various reasons,
and it was only in 1962 that the two countries established consular relations. This
was then upgraded to Ambassador-level in 1973.
 Much talked about Look East Policy (LEP) in 1990s failed to make any visible
traction in India-RoK relations.
 A visit by Indian President to Seoul in 2006 opened a more vibrant phase in India-
RoK relations. It resulted in Joint Task Force to conclude a bilateral Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which was operationalised in 2010.
 SK President visited India as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations in
2010. It was then that the bilateral ties were raised to the level of Strategic
Partnership.
 In 2011, Indian President Visited SK and both countries signed a Civil Nuclear
Energy Cooperation Agreement.
 In 2014, South Korean President conducted a state visit to India. The “Joint
Statement for Expansion of Strategic Partnership” that was issued produced a
blueprint for further expanding the two countries’ relations in political, security,
defence, economic, scientific & technological, and IT spheres.
 The watershed in bilateral relations came in 2014 when India unveiled its ‘Act
East’ policy signaling strong commitment to deepen relations with countries in Indo-
Pacific region such as Japan and RoK.
 During Indian Prime Minister’s visit to South Korea in 2015, India-RoK bilateral
relations were upgraded to ‘special strategic partnership’.

 In 2017, SK President Moon took over the South Korean presidency and took the
crucial decision of upgrading relationship equivalent to four traditional partners
under “New Asia Community Plus” framework.
 India-South Korea Co-operation
 The South Korean President who visited India in 2018 has coined a new acronym ‘3P
Plus’ for boosting bilateral ties between India and South Korea, through cooperation
for people, prosperity and peace.
 Indo-Pacific
 Like India's Act East policy (2014), South Korea has its 'New Southern Policy' (2017)
which gives primacy to the acceleration of RoK’s economic and strategic relations
with Southeast Asia, Australia, and India.
 New Southern Policy:

 The NSP is aimed at elevating Korea’s strategic ties with ASEAN and with India to
bring relations on par with Korea’s four major diplomatic partners: the United
States, China, Japan and Russia.
 The policy places S-E Asia and India at the centre of Korea’s foreign policy agenda,
so far dominated by the Korean Peninsula and the role of these four major powers.
 Indo-Pacific presents a dilemma for both India and South Korea. This is because the
US, through its ‘Free and Open Indo Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, has adopted a
confrontational stance vis-a-vis China.
 In contrast, Indian version of Indo-Pacific is more conciliatory, emphasising
stakeholdership and inclusion.
 South Korea’s growing support for a rules-based and inclusive regional architecture
is aimed at addressing what South Korean described as the difficulty in managing
the pulls and pressures from competing initiatives from US and China.

 India’s Approach to Indo-Pacific:

a) Inclusiveness: India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a club of limited
members.
b) Regional Powers as Anchors of Stability: The need for regional powers to take
greater responsibility in matters of maritime security, and serve as anchors of
stability in Asia. If Indo-Pacific is one integrated space, the responsibility for keeping
it together rests equally on countries like India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar,
Thailand, and most importantly the ASEAN bloc, which India regards as a lynchpin
of the Indo-Pacific.
c) Connectivity: Connectivity is vital for more reasons than just the enhancement of
trade and prosperity. Beyond physical infrastructure, it also unites a region,
“building bridges of trust” of the region.
d) Rule of Law: For any collective initiatives in Indo-Pacific to come to fruition, all sides
need to adhere to some basic rules. The rules-based order must also apply to
interactions in the global commons.
e) Strategic Cooperation, not Conflict: Indo-Pacific takes us back to the era of great
power rivalries. What we need is an Asia of cooperation, not one of conflict. There is
a need to manage differences and forge partnerships on the basis of shared values
and interests.
 Economic
o South Korean Economy is heavily export dependent and its top two trade
partners are China and US. As the trade war between the two affects Chinese
economy major South Korean exporters (like Samsung and Hyundai) have seen
their profits decline.
o By strengthening ties with India and other ASEAN countries, South Korea
plans to reduce its over-dependence on its two traditional trade allies.
o To keep the export engine that drives its economy running, South Korea is now
targeting economies with the greatest growth potential and India (and its huge
consumer market) is projected to grow at more than twice of South Korea in the
coming years. That its companies already have a significant presence adds to
the comfort.
o Also, South Korea’s reliance on China’s market also arms Beijing with
considerable leverage over Seoul, which it has sometimes used to further its
political interests. China’s imposition of economic sanctions on South Korea in
2018 in response to US deployment of its anti-missile system forced Seoul to
rethink its China strategy.
o India and South Korea launched an initiative ‘Korea Plus’ in 2016 to promote and
facilitate Korean Investments in India.

 India’s Demographic Dividend:

o SK’s population is aging which will negatively affect the availability of working
age population. This means that India could be a source of talent for SK.
o Defence trade between India and South Korea, which was limited prior to 2005.
The South Korean defence industry had been virtually locked out of the Indian
arms market throughout the Cold War and immediately thereafter.
o After 2005, defence industry cooperation between India and South Korea picked
up some degree of momentum with projects like the joint development of self-
propelled artillery and mine-countermeasure vessels.
2007: Indian and South Korean defence ministers held their first-ever consultations.
2010: India and South Korea upgraded ties to a “strategic partnership” that included an
enhanced focus on political and security cooperation.
2006: India and South Korea started holding joint naval exercises and regular military
consultations.
2019: A comprehensive review of the defence relations took place resulting in the signing
of two far-reaching agreements to: 1) extend logistical support to each other’s navies
2) deepen defence educational exchanges.
o A partnership with South Korea could help in the development of indigenous
capability to fill the vital technology gap. The high-end and sophisticated nature
of the South Korean defence electronic capabilities makes Seoul an indispensable
defence partner.
o Co-production of K9 Thunder howitzer is a prime example of ongoing defence
collaboration. With ToT from South Korea, India’s L&T plans to achieve over 50%
localisation as part of ‘Make in India’.
 Afghanistan:
o South Korea would be the second country after China with whom India would
undertake a joint project in Afghanistan.
 Maritime Cooperation:
o Since early 2000s, India and South Korea have cooperated in search-and-rescue
and anti-piracy operations in Indian Ocean.
o New Delhi has welcomed South Korea’s recognition of India’s dominant security
role, and is seeking to promote closer naval ties with the latter.
o India has been reluctant to play a maritime role in Northeast Asia. While
supporting measures for establishment of a strong and unified Korea, Delhi has
desisted from playing a more direct role in Korean Peninsula.

o Seoul could also help boost Indian capacity to provide humanitarian aid and
disaster relief (HADR) in the neighbourhood.
 Other Cooperation:
o The Indo-Korea Science and Technology Centre, established in Bengaluru in
2010 as a collaboration between the Indian Institute of Science and the Korea
Institute of Science and Technology.
o In 2018, South Korea inaugurated Samsung’s mobile manufacturing plant --
biggest in the world, in Noida.
 Issues
 South Korea’s Deteriorating Relationship with Japan:
o This might pose a problem for New Delhi. In 2019, a simmering conflict between
Japan and ROK erupted into a full diplomatic crisis, when Japan threatened to
slow down exports of materials essential to South Korean industries.
o Following the threats by Japan, thousands of protesters marched in the
streets of Seoul, accusing Japan of an “economic invasion”.
o This places New Delhi in a difficult position since Japan is a close partner of
India, and a prime collaborator in the Indian Ocean.
 Trade:
o The trade target of $50 billion by 2030 is most likely to be missed.
o The trade deficit in South Korea’s favour has led India to be wary of further
opening up.
o Korean companies flag issues related with doing business in India, despite a
special “Korea Plus” desk set up by the Prime Minister’s Office in 2015.
 Weak People to People Contact:
o The Indian Cultural Centre failed to reach out to common South Koreans.
o Social and economic discrimination against Indians working and living in South
Korea is still a regular occurrence.
 Way Forward
 Trade:
o Invoking “early harvest” clause in 2010 CEPA will allow both the countries to do
away with tariffs in 11 areas. This will benefit Indian seafood exporters and food
processing units, as well as South Korean petrochemical companies.
 Strategic Cooperation:
Increasing Chinese aggressiveness and erosion in the commitment of USA to provide
security to its allies in Indo-pacific region has made South Korea wary. This provides a

window of opportunity for India and South Korea to work closely so as to secure their
interest in the region.
 Investment:
o There is a need for India to ensure smooth business environment for Korean
companies to do business in India.
o This will help India in attracting the much needed financial capital required to
make India a $5 trillion economy by 2025.
7. India-Africa
 Introduction
 Africa has been gradually transformed itself from a “hopeless continent” to a
‘happening continent’ today. All major powers across the globe have recognized
this significant positive change across most of sub-Saharan Africa.
 Africa is a continent of limitless possibility and India’s re-engagement with Africa
is taking place in a fast-changing and dynamic environment.
 Global powers like Japan, China, Malaysia, and Singapore are stepping up their
presence in Africa. In this environment, it is imperative for India to be truly
recognised as an ‘alternative development partner’.
 History
 After its independence, India rapidly built up its political ties with the newly
independent countries and freedom movements in sub-Saharan Africa as well as
with the countries in northern Africa.
 In 1950s, 60s and 70s, apart from strong political and brotherly bonds, India
was itself too heavily engrossed in solving its own socio-economic problems to be
a major partner in Africa's rebuilding and rejuvenation programmes.However,
even in those days of resource-crunch, India did share with Africa whatever it
could spare.
 India's ties with Africa have been stepped up in the last two decades both bilaterally
and with regional economic communities, initially with the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and Team-9 and continentally through the African
Union (AU).
 Progress in Relationship
 India’s engagement with Africa is consultative to a large extent is driven by the
demands of African countries. Further, India postulates that its partnership is an
amalgam of African development priorities in keeping with the African Union’s long
term plan and the Africa Agenda 2063, as well as India’s development objectives.
 India engages with African countries at three levels:

o Bilateral
o Regional
o Multilateral: Multilateral engagement was launched with 1 st India Africa Forum
Summit (IAFS) in 2008.
 Structured engagement with Africa took shape in 2008 with the First India Africa
Forum Summit (IAFS-I). IAFS-II was held in 2011. Both these events were, however,
limited to engagement with a few African leaders.
 India hosted Third India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-III) in 2015 – a landmark event
with delegations representing all 54 African countries. IAFS-III has been a 'great leap
forward' compared to our limited approach earlier.
 From 2014 onwards, there have been a total of 29 visits to African countries
from the Indian side at various levels. From the African side, more than 32
Heads of State or Government have visited India in the last five years.
 GoI had announced that 18 new embassies will be opened in the African continent
between 2018 and 2021. This will increase the number of Resident Indian
Missions in Africa from 29 to 47. The first of these resident missions opened in
Rwanda in July 2018.
 Importance for India
(a) Economic:
 Africa houses six of the world’s fastest growing economies as per World Bank
estimates.
 African continent has a population of over one billion with a combined GDP of 2.5
trillion dollars making it a huge potential market.
 Basket of goods imported from Africa is dominated by commodities, particularly
crude oil, gas, pulses, gold and other metals, all of which we lack in domestically.
Diverse sources in Africa provide protection against vulnerability of depending on
just one or two regions for supply.
 Indian exports of manufactured products like medicines, automobiles, iron and
steel products, machinery petroleum products etc. Africa provides an alternate
destination as our exports to traditional destinations in Europe and North
America are on the decline.
(b) Multilateral Issues:
 Multilateral and cross border global issues such as terrorism, UN reforms, public
health, peace keeping and security issues, climate change and international trading
regime (WTO) all require Africa's active participation.
 African countries tend to take a unified stand on such multilateral issues after
discussions and deliberations at the AU. Hence, India needs to engage constructively
with the African countries.

(c) Indian Diaspora:

 According to estimates, Africa has around 2.7 million strong India diaspora.
 India’s engagement with Indian diaspora in African countries has acquired new
salience, enabling a shift from policy of ‘active-disassociation’ in previous
decades, to ‘proactive association’ in recent years.
 It is important to ensure their safety as well their prosperity. Ex: India had to
evacuate its diapora from Juba (south sudan) due to the prevailing civil war
situation there.
(d) Energy Security:
 Africa is very resource-rich and has moved from being an underdeveloped continent
to having several fast-growing economies, and new democracies.
 Indian companies are increasingly active in other regions of Africa, notably in
resource-rich, English-speaking countries such as Ghana and Nigeria.
 India-Africa Cooperation
(a) Blue Economy:
 In 2015, India unveiled a new vision in maritime sphere - Security and Growth for
All (SAGAR). This proactive strategy calls for increase in maritime cooperation in
Indian Ocean Region and reiterates the centrality of oceans in India’s economic and
security policy.
 The outcome document of third India Africa Forum Summit, “India Africa
Framework for Strategic Cooperation” refers to blue economy as an area of future
cooperation.
 In order to keep the momentum of building political and economic ties, steps should
be taken towards funding joint projects for sustainable development of the blue
economy in Africa.
(b) Asia-Africa Green Corridor:
 India and Japan institutionalised a dialogue on Africa in 2010. Since then, they have
been exploring the possibilities of cooperation in Africa’s socio- economic
development.
 In 2017,India unveiled Vision Document of Asian Africa Growth Corridor in
partnership with Japan. It highlights the growing importance of Africa in Indian
foreign policy and also signals India’s willingness to partner with like-minded
countries, such as Japan, in this region.

 Asia-Africa Growth Corridor:

Main objective: To enhance growth and connectivity between Asia and Africa.
Four areas: a) Development Cooperation Projects: a) Agriculture, health, technology,
and disaster management have been identified as the main areas of development
cooperation b) Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity c) Enhancing Skills d)
People-to-People Partnership.
According to the vision document, AAGC will focus on enhancing skills and research and
development capacities in Africa. It will also strive to develop institutional, industrial and
transport infrastructure in the Asia -Africa region. The corridor will facilitate greater
people-to-people exchanges amongst the participating countries.
(a) Economic:
 India is currently Africa’s fourth-largest trading partner, and Africa’s third-largest
export destination. Bilateral trade volumes between India and Africa have grown
from a mere US$7.2 billion in 2001 to peak at US$78 billion in 2014, before falling
to US$62.66 billion in 2017–18.
 India is currently the fifth-largest investor in Africa with cumulative investments of
US$54 billion. So far Indian companies have invested over $ 54 billion in Africa.
(b) Maritime Cooperation:
 The Indian Ocean is a natural bridge connecting India with the African continent.
Therefore maritime cooperation is an important aspect of the relationship. This
includes maritime surveillance, anti-piracy operations and humanitarian and
disaster relief.
(c) Capacity Building:
 India is investing in capacity building providing more than $1 billion in technical
assistance and training to personnel under the Indian Technical and Economic
Cooperation (ITEC) program.
 India has invested $100 million in Pan-African E-Network to bridge the digital
divide in Africa, leveraging its strengths in information technology.
 Challenges
(a) Terrorism:
 A number of African Nations are mired with terrorist attacks or internal
disturbances. This is a major issue in expanding India’s footprints in the region. Ex:
Terrorist acts committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.
(b) Political Instability:
 Political instability in number of African Nation may impact India’s long-term
investment opportunities. Ex: South Sudan experiencing civil war since 2013.

(c) Attack on Africans:

 Incidents of racism & intolerance against African students are hindering India-Africa
relations. Such incidents generate a negative image of India in Africa and may
impact on century-old ties with the continent.
(d) Expanding Chinese Footprint:
 China's trading volume with African countries is still three times higher than India.
 China built its first overseas military base in Djibouti.
 Chequebook Diplomacy: China’s aggressive economic approach (via offering debt)
has allowed it to achieve greater influence among African countries.
 Most African countries support the Belt and Road Initiative of China. India opposes
BRI because it is wary of its suspicious designs.
(e) Limited Financial Muscles of India:
 African countries are in need of financial help for their socio-economic development.
This need is being met by China through its chequebook diplomacy. India cannot
compete with China in terms of offering financial help due to limited fiscal muscles.
 Way Forward
(a) Trade:
 India has a negative trade balance with African countries mainly due to its over-
dependence on and high demand for oil and natural resources. To correct this
imbalance, India needs to expand and diversify its exports to include both primary
and manufactured goods.
(b) Attack on Africans:
 India must take strict action against the perpetrators of such acts and establish an
effective institutional mechanism to redress the grievances of foreign nationals and
ensure their safety.
 There should be a push towards enhancing people-to-people contacts and
sensitising Indian communities about the diversity, culture, and ways of life of
Africans.
(c) Addressing Chinese Expanding Footprints:
 India needs to work with like-minded countries such as Japan, US and others to
counter the growing Chinese influence in the region. Asian African Growth Corridor
is a step forward in this direction.

(d) To strengthen the political and economic ties, steps should be taken towards
tailoring and funding joint projects for the sustainable development of the Africa.
8. India-South East Asia
Name of South East Asian Countries-Southeast Asia is comprised of 11 countries

namely: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, East Timor, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar (Burma), Thailand and Vietnam.
 India-South East Asia
India’s engagement with Southeast Asia accelerated after the announcement of the Look
East Policy (LEP) in the early 1990s. This is visible from the increase in bilateral trade,
cross-border capital flows and people-to-people contact. India and ASEAN have upgraded
their ties to a strategic partnership. India has also embedded deeper in the Southeast
Asian regional architecture through trade and investment agreements with the ASEAN and
individual Southeast Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia. The Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) being negotiated by the ASEAN, Australia,
China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea would integrate India deeper with the
region.
 India-ASEAN
 India's relationship with ASEAN is a key pillar of her foreign policy and the
foundation of Act East Policy.
 India has a separate Mission to ASEAN and the EAS in Jakarta.
 India and ASEAN already has 25 years of Dialogue Partnership, 15 years of Summit
Level interaction and 5 years of Strategic Partnership with ASEAN.
 Economic Cooperation:
o ASEAN is India's fourth largest trading partner.
o India's trade with ASEAN stands at approx. 10.6% of India's overall trade.
o India's export to ASEAN stands at 11.28% of our total exports. The ASEAN-India
Free Trade Area has been completed.
o ASEAN India-Business Council (AIBC) was set up in 2003 to bring key private
sector players from India and the ASEAN countries on a single platform.
 Socio-Cultural Cooperation: Programmes to boost People-to-People Interaction with
ASEAN, such as inviting ASEAN students to India, Special Training Course for
ASEAN diplomats, Exchange of Parliamentarians, etc.
 Funds: Financial assistance has been provided to ASEAN countries from the
following Funds:

o ASEAN-India Cooperation Fund

o ASEAN-India S&T Development Fund
o ASEAN-India Green Fund
 Delhi Declaration: To identify Cooperation in the Maritime Domain as the key area of
cooperation under the ASEAN-India strategic partnership.
 Delhi Dialogue: Annual Track 1.5 event for discussing politico-security and economic
issues between ASEAN and India.
 ASEAN-India Centre (AIC): To undertake policy research, advocacy and networking
activities with organizations and think-tanks in India and ASEAN.
 Political Security Cooperation: India places ASEAN at the centre of its Indo-Pacific
vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region.
 India- APEC
 APEC was primarily created for economic growth and cooperation. This is the reason
that members of APEC are called Member Economies rather than Member countries
and its members include Taiwan and Hong Kong also {which are not countries}.
 India has requested earlier for membership in APEC and got support from US,
Japan, Australia etc. In 2011, India was invited to be an observer member, full
membership was not given because all its current members share some part of their
border with Pacific Ocean.
 The APEC membership could help India in several ways such as –better position to
deal / bargain in RCEP negotiations {India was not involved in TPP negotiations} and
legitimising India’s standing as an Asia-Pacific power.
 India and East Asia Summit
 This 18 member grouping {ASEAN (10) + India, China, Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, South Korea, United States and Russia} was formed in 2005 to further the
objectives of regional peace, security and prosperity. India has been part of this
summit since its inception and Indian prime ministers have participated in each of
the summits of EAS.
 The six priority areas of EAS are Environment and Energy, Education, Finance,
Global Health Issues and Pandemic Diseases, Natural Disaster Management, and
ASEAN Connectivity. The major highlights of India’s East Asia Summit interaction
are as follows:
 In the field of Education, EAS leaders endorsed the proposal for revival of Nalanda
University in 2009. India not only received support from the members but also has
put in place the scholarships in Buddhist studies and other disciplines for students
from these countries.
 In Global Health Issues, Australia and India are co-chairs of Task Force for Access to
Quality Medicines and other Technologies Task Force (AQMTF).

 In Disaster Management, India hosted the first Meeting of the 24×7 Points of Contact
among the National Disaster Response Agencies of East Asia Summit (EAS)
countries on 4-5 December 2014 in New Delhi.
 Towards connectivity, India has always supported public-private partnership (PPP)
towards building connectivity. Towards Maritime co-operation India has called for a
more cooperative and integrated future via ocean based blue economy.
 India and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
 The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGCI) was set up on November 10, 2000
in Vientiane, Lao PDR.
 The goal was to enhance cooperation amongst India and the 5 Mekong region
countries – Cambodia, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Vietnam and
Thailand.
 Its establishment stressed on four areas of cooperation viz. tourism, culture,
education, and transportation linkage.
 Going ahead, five working groups were established as follows:
o Working Group on Tourism (Thailand is the lead country)
o Working Group on Education (HRD) (India is the lead country)
o Working Group on Culture (Cambodia is the lead country)
o Working Group on Communication & Transportation (Laos PDR is the lead
country)
o Working Group on Plan of Actions (Vietnam is the lead country)
o So far, seven ministerial meetings of Mekong-Ganga Cooperation have been held.
 India and CLMV
 CLMV refer to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. These four countries are
the least developed ASEAN Countries. India’s current trade with CLMV countries
is still much below its potential and very low both in terms of absolute value and
relative share.
 CLMV countries represent a bridge between India and ASEAN countries, and figure
prominently in the Look East Policy. Since they are a bridge between India and
ASEAN, the importance of a need of building overland, air and sea connectivity
between India and the CLMV countries also cannot be overlooked. The possibilities
in this regard are with Trilateral India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway Project and its
extension to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
 India, Myanmar and Thailand Highway
 A 3,200-km highway linking India, Myanmar and Thailand is expected to be ready
by 2020 and will connect Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand through
Myanmar. The project will be a significant step towards establishing connectivity

between India and South East Asian countries. The highway, once completed, is
expected to accrue the following advantages for India:
 It is important from India’s perspective as it will connect Manipur and other
northeastern states with Thailand through Myanmar.
 It could substantially increase border trade with Myanmar, which has not picked up
the way it should have because of infrastructure bottlenecks on both sides of the
border but especially inside Myanmar.
 It is expected to spur growth in trade and investment in the entire region.
 India and ASEAN have become such close partners that the highway project
assumes greater significance.
 Thailand is already well linked to Malaysia and Singapore, which means that the
trilateral highway to Mae Sot in Thailand could in effect connect India with four of its
Southeast Asian friends.
 Since, connectivity through Myanmar is the bottleneck. The highway is expected to
address it, once completed. However, India and Thailand should work together with
Myanmar to ensure rapid completion of the missing link.
 Challenges
 China:
o In the rapidly evolving geopolitical scenario marked by China’s assertive military,
political and economic rise, the Act East Policy has imparted greater dynamism
to India’s ties with ASEAN.
o The issue of ownership, control, use and exploitation of oil, gas, and mineral and
fisheries resources in the South China Sea has emerged as a major dispute
between China and several ASEAN nations like Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei and
Malaysia.
o This issue has divided ASEAN and there is no unanimity amongst them.
o The South China Sea is of economic importance for India as more than 40% of
trade is dependent on this region. Fossil fuel resources in this region are also
being harnessed by India on a collaboration basis.
o Maritime security is essential in this region for the protection of India’s national
interest.
o However, India’s effort in this regard is meager when compared to China’s
dominance in the region.
 Economic Challenges:
o India has an unfavorable balance of trade with the ASEAN nations.
o India has pulled out of the RCEP deal, as it would deepen its trade deficit with
China and the ASEAN nations.

o India should address the issue of land and labour laws so that there is an ease in
doing business within the country.
o Improving infrastructure and promoting technological growth can also solve this
problem exponentially.
 Ineffective Negotiations:
o Many bilateral deals with these nations are yet to be finalised, leading to the
halting of various aspects of diplomatic ties.
 Delayed Projects:
o India has committed to many connectivity projects like India-Myanmar-Thailand
trilateral highway.
o However, they have not been completed at the rate on par with China.
o China, on the other hand, through its BRI, is able to gain the trust of these
countries.
o Improving connectivity would mean improved business and tourism ties with the
South East Asia nations.
 Way Forward
 On Economic Front:
o India – ASEAN need to keep existing pathways up to date and relevant, including
the AIFTA.
o Streamlining rules and regulations will stimulate investments in both directions,
complement India’s ‘Act East’ policy and facilitate ‘Made in India’ exports to the
region.
 Focus on Connectivity:
o Prompt completion of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, which will
run from Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar, is the key.
o The plan is to extend this highway to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in an attempt
to project India’s role in the emerging transportation architecture.
o Improving air connectivity between India and ASEAN countries should also be
high on the agenda. Focus should be on expeditiously concluding the ASEAN -
India Air Transport Agreement.
o Digital connectivity is another important area of cooperation, and can shape
people-to-people connections for the future. India as a facilitator of the ASEAN-
wide digital economy would not only challenge China but also emerge as an
economic guarantor of its own.
o The three Cs of commerce, connectivity and culture have been highlighted but
a more granular perspective is needed in terms of a forging a forward-looking
approach.

o The cultural connect between the two needs strengthening. While India offers
scholarships to students from ASEAN states to study at Nalanda University, this
initiative should be extended to the IITs and the IIMs.
o Tourism too can be further encouraged between India and the ASEAN with some
creative branding by the two sides.
9. India-South America
9.1 India-Brazil
 India and Brazil are two large economies with a combined GDP of around $4.5
trillion and having a total population of 1.5 billion. They share close and
multifaceted relationship at bilateral level as well as in plurilateral fora such as
BRICS, G-20, International Solar Alliance, Biofuture Platform and in multilateral
bodies such as UN, WTO, UNESCO and WIPO.
 Significance of Brazil for India
 Food Security:
o Brazil is among the largest producer of agricultural products like coffee, crop-
based ethanol, sugarcane etc. Thus it can play a crucial role in India’s food
security, in addition to manoeuvring inflation cycles.
 Mineral Resources:
o Brazil is rich in mineral resources like gold, bauxite, iron ore, tin diamond,
Platinum copper etc which India struggles to meet from domestic production.
 Energy Security:
o India imports over 80% of its oil consumption and over 45% of its natural gas
needs. Brazil, on the other hand, is 10th largest producer of oil, 2nd largest known
oil shale, 6th highest uranium reserves and has expertise in hydropower
production. It has also been a pioneer in ethanol production from crops.
 Reforms in Global Governance:
o Both the countries are vocal advocates for reforms in Institutions of global
governance to give equitable weightage to the Global South. This includes IMF
quota reforms and securing for themselves a permanent seat at the UNSC.
 South-South Cooperation:
o Being a victim of colonialism and neo-colonialism, both countries favour deeper
cooperation among the members of Third World including intra-Third World
Funding for socio-economic development projects.

o The South-South Cooperation Fund under IBSA Initiative, where both countries
are major contributors, seeks to realise this objective.
 New Development Bank:
o Created by the BRICS, the Bank finances infrastructure projects in member
countries at non-exploitative terms, unlike the IMF which often demands
excessive course correction.
 Bilateral Relationship
 Political Relations:
o Both countries have played a pivotal role as leaders of the Global South or South-
South cooperation. The Brazilian foreign policy of reciprocal multilateralism is in
concurrence with India’s policy of strategic autonomy.
o Brazil and India (along with Germany and Japan) have jointly pursued
aspirations of permanent seats in UNSC and have worked towards a multipolar
world.
 Bilateral Mechanism:
o A bilateral Joint Commission Meeting (JCM) exists between India and Brazil that
is co-chaired by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. This mechanism
discusses the entire gamut of the bilateral relationship.
 Economic Co-operation:
o Brazil is one of the most important trading partners of India. India was among
the top 10 trading partners of Brazil in 2017.
o The volume of bilateral trade in 2018-19 was USD 8.2 billion which included
USD 3.8 billion worth of Indian exports to Brazil and USD 4.4 million as imports
by India.
o Brazil and India signed a bilateral ‘Defence Cooperation Agreement’ in 2003 that
calls for cooperation in defence related matters like R&D, acquisition and logistic
support between the two countries.
1. Under the agreement, a ‘Joint Defence Committee (JDC)’ has been set-up that
meets at regular intervals.
 Cultural Relations:
o Brazil has a strong community of Yoga and Ayurveda practitioners. The Brazilian
Association of Ayurveda (ABRA) is a non-profit association with offices in 9 states
of Brazil and has members all over Brazil.
o The third International Congress on Ayurveda was held from 12 to 15 March,
2018 in Rio de Janeiro.

 Diaspora:
The Indian community of PIOs/NRIs in Brazil is small, numbering around 4700 people,
with a majority of them living in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Manaus.
 Way Forward
 Both countries must create an environment conducive to trade and investment by
cutting into red-tapism and by providing stable social and political order.
 The underutilised areas of trade in fields like agriculture, mining. IT,
Pharmaceuticals etc shall also be given a renewed push. A free trade agreement
favourable to both countries can be worked out in this direction.
 The Bilateral Investment Treaty that has been under the table since 2016, needs to
be concluded on a priority basis, so as to ease and boost investment into each
other’s market.
 India must utilise Brazil’s expertise in Hydropower generation to realise the
objectives of its New Hydroelectric Policy 2019. This can also help us in cutting our
GHGs emissions.
 Brazil & India being two large democracies can cooperate across various multilateral
platforms to establish and ensure a just, equitable, and rule-based multilateral
world order.
10. India-Middle East
10.1 India and the Middle East

 India – Middle East Till 1990

 India has traditionally pursued a pro-Arab policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict
in order to counteract Pakistani influence in the region and to secure access to
Middle East petroleum resources.
 In the 1950s and early 1960s, this pro-Arab stance did not help India in establishing
good relations with all Arab countries but may have served to keep peace with its
own Muslim minority.
 India concentrated on developing a close relationship with Egypt on the strength of
Nehru's ties with Egyptian president Gamely Abdul Nasser. However, the New Delhi-
Cairo friendship was insufficient to counteract Arab sympathy for Pakistan in its
dispute with India.
 Furthermore, Indian-Egyptian ties came at the expense of cultivating relations with
such countries as Saudi Arabia and Jordan and thus limited India's influence in the
region.
 In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, India successfully improved bilateral relations by
developing mutually beneficial economic exchanges with a number of Islamic
countries, particularly Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other Persian Gulf states.
 The strength of India's economic ties enabled it to build strong relationships with
Iran and Iraq, which helped India weather the displeasure of Islamic countries
stemming from India's war with Pakistan in 1971.
 Indian-Middle Eastern relations were further strengthened by New Delhi's anti-
Israeli stance in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and by Indian support for
the fourfold oil price rise in 1973 by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).
 Closer ties with Middle Eastern countries were dictated by India's dependency on
petroleum imports. Oil represented 8 percent of India's total imports in 1971; 42
percent in 1981; and 28 percent in 1991. India purchased oil from Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait and, in return, provided engineering
services, manufactured goods, and labor.
 The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War forced India to shift its oil purchases from Iran and Iraq
to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states also
have received large numbers of Indian workers and manufactures and have become
the regional base for Indian business operations.
 Two events in 1978 and 1979--the installation of the Islamic regime under Ayatollah
Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
support of the pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Kabul--complicated India's relations with
Middle East countries.

 From the Indian perspective, these two events and the Iran-Iraq War changed the
balance of power in West Asia by weakening Iran as a regional power and a potential
supporter of Pakistan, a situation favorable to India.
 At the same time, proxy superpower competition in Afghanistan strengthened the
hand of India's adversary Pakistan by virtue of the military support Pakistan
received from the United States, China, and Arab states led by Saudi Arabia.
 In the 1980s, India performed a delicate diplomatic balancing act. New Delhi took a
position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, maintained warm ties with Baghdad, and
built workable political and economic relations with Tehran despite misgivings about
the foreign policy goals of the Khomeini regime. India managed to improve relations
with Middle Eastern countries that provided support to the Afghan mujahideen and
Pakistan by redirecting Indian petroleum purchases to Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf countries. New Delhi, which traditionally had had close relations with Kabul,
condemned the Soviet invasion only in the most perfunctory manner and provided
diplomatic, economic, and logistic support for the Marxist regime.
 In the early 1990s, India stepped back from its staunch anti-Israeli stance and
support for the Palestinian cause. Besides practical economic and security
considerations in the post-Cold War world, domestic politics-especially played a role
in this reversal.
 In December 1991, India voted with the UN majority to repeal the UN resolution
equating Zionism with racism.
 In 1992, following the example of the Soviet Union and China, India established
diplomatic relations with Israel.
 During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, Indian policy makers were torn between
adopting a traditional nonaligned policy sympathetic to Iraq or favoring the coalition
of moderate Arab and Western countries that could benefit Indian security and
economic interests. India initially adopted an ambivalent approach, condemning
both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the intrusion of external forces into the region.
 When the Chandra Shekhar minority government replaced the National Front
government led by V.P. Singh in November 1990, the Indian response changed. Wary
of incurring the displeasure of the United States and other Western nations on
whom India depended to obtain assistance from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), New Delhi voted for the UN resolution authorizing the use of force to expel
Iraqi troops from Kuwait and rejected Iraq's linkage of the Kuwaiti and Palestinian
problems.
 In January 1991, India also permitted United States military aircraft to refuel in
Bombay. The refueling decision stirred such domestic controversy that the Chandra
Shekhar government withdrew the refueling privileges in February 1991 to deflect
the criticism of Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I), which argued that India's nominal pro-
United States tilt betrayed the country's nonaligned principles.

 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's September 1993 visit to Iran was hailed as
"successful and useful" by the Indian media and seen as a vehicle for speeding up
the improvement of bilateral relations. Key developments included discussions on
the construction of a pipeline to supply Iranian natural gas to India and allowing
India to develop transit facilities in Iran for Indian products destined for the
landlocked Central Asian republics. India also sought to assuage its concerns over a
possible Iranian-Central Asian republics nuclear nexus, which some saw as a
potential and very serious threat to India should Pakistan also join in an Islamic
nuclear front aimed at India and Israel.
 When Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani visited India in April 1995 to sign a
major trade accord (the accord also was signed by the minister of foreign affairs of
Turkmenistan) and five bilateral agreements, India-Iranian relations could be seen to
be on the upswing.
 India and the Middle East Until 1991 to 2014
 India’s Look East policy began after the Cold War ended. The Soviet Union’s
disintegration removed it as India’s key global partner, obliging Delhi to work with
the United States, now the dominant power.
 India’s state-led development model was also exposed to the demands of the market
and globalization, now the principal form of economic organization.
 India’s need to develop economically made the Middle East increasingly important,
both as a source for fuel imports and for Indian labor and remittances. Saudi Arabia,
Iran and Qatar have all been vital suppliers of hydrocarbons.
 Since the oil boom of the mid-1970s, the number of Indians living and working in
Arab Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE) has
grown rapidly. The bulk came from southern states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu and Kerala and while some found employment in white collar jobs, the
majority (70%) work in the low wage, low skilled sectors, like construction.
 In response to the growing Indian diaspora, the government established the Ministry
of Overseas Indian Affairs in 2004. In the Arab Gulf states alone, the number of
Indians was estimated at around 5.7 million in 2012, rising to 8.5 million by 2018.
 Many of the Indians based there were important contributors to the country’s
finances, accounting for a significant share of its global remittances, which climbed
from $64 billion to $79 billion in the 2012-18 period.
 Over time, Indian political and business leaders realized that countries such as
Saudi Arabia and Qatar could supply more than oil and gas, respectively; the wealth
they and the UAE had accumulated also made them potential sources of foreign
investment.

 Such interest may well have contributed to the then Manmohan Singh government’s
relative silence in relation to the Arab uprisings in 2011 and opposition to any
foreign intervention.
 As a temporary member of the UN Security Council, India abstained on the vote to
impose a no-fly zone over Libya, which it saw as targeted against the Gaddafi regime.
Indian ambivalence was also apparent regarding Syria. As its uprising descended
into war, the Indian government continued its search for balance: it voted for
sanctions but also opposed any attempts at regime change.
 2014 till now and the Look West Policy
 The broad parameters of India’s Middle East policy were largely in place when new
government was elected in 2014. Rather than take a different path, the new
government followed the same course, but intensified what was becoming known as
the “Look West” policy, by focusing on three main axes: the Arab Gulf
countries, Israel and Iran.
 As noted above, India’s relations with the Arab Gulf countries had already
undergone change and expansion since the 1970s. By contrast, India’s relations
with Israel and Iran are more recent, emerging largely since the 1990s.
 In the case of Israel, India’s relationship had historically been cool. During the Cold
War, India had stood publicly with the Arab states and the Palestinian nationalist
struggle. Domestic considerations were important here. They included Arab states’
support — or at least absence of criticism — for their management of the Muslim-
majority Jammu and Kashmir and efforts to placate its sizeable Muslim minority.
 Over time, both of these considerations became less relevant. Growing Arab-Israeli
dialogue during the 1990s and the Oslo peace process between Israel and the
Palestinians diminished that conflict’s centrality in the region and among Indian
Muslims.
 In addition, India had to contend with increasingly critical resolutions against India’s
rule of Jammu and Kashmir from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
which included a number of Muslim Arab states.
 By contrast, Israel demonstrated greater sympathy for India in Kashmir. When the
US threatened an arms embargo over the Kargil crisis in 1999, Israel stepped up and
became a key supplier for India: between 2000 and 2015 the Israel-India arms trade
was worth over $2.2 billion.
 Israel also showed appeal beyond the arms trade. As one of the most hi-tech and
advanced economies in the Middle East, it potentially offered greater value-added
trade and investment.
 In July 2017, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to travel to Israel. During
the visit, Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed agreements on
international development, agriculture and space cooperation.

 The visit arguably reduced the status and influence of the Palestinians in India’s
foreign policy, which was compounded by a growing rapprochement in late 2018
between Arab Gulf Arab states, reflected in the hosting of Israeli leaders by Oman
and the UAE.
 As with Israel, India’s relations with Iran contain both a national security and an
economic dimension. Indian policy makers see relations with Iran not only as a key
energy supplier but also as a way to contribute to enhancing India’s security in
Central and South Asia, by containing India’s main rival, Pakistan, while also
offering a counterweight to China is rising regional presence. For Iran and India
alike, the path to constraining Pakistan lies through Afghanistan, which has become
a base for militant groups whose threats transcend the country’s borders.
 India and Iran first agreed to cooperate on the development of trade and transport
links through Central Asia and channel them towards Iran’s Chabahar port on the
Indian Ocean in 2003. However, it would take another decade before the two sides
were able to reach agreement with Afghanistan, in 2016.
 The development of Chabahar port and its associated infrastructure is beneficial for
India in two main ways. One is that it will make it easier to access oil imports from
Iran. Another is that it may balance Chinese trade and development projects in
Central Asia and the Middle East, which are associated with its Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). More specifically, Chabahar offers an alternative to China’s own
efforts to extend influence in the region, including through its own efforts at
improving the port of Gwadar, on the Pakistan side of the border.
10.2 India-Iran
 Political:
o India-Iran relations span millennia marked by meaningful interactions. The two
countries shared a border till 1947 and share several common features in their
language, culture and traditions. Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf have
strong commercial, energy, cultural and people-to-people links.
o India and Iran established diplomatic links on March 15, 1950. In addition to
the Embassy in Tehran, India has two Consulates in Iran, one in Bandar Abbas
and other in Zahedan. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Shah of Iran
visited India twice (March 1956 and February 1978) and Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru visited Iran in 1963. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Prime
Minister Morarji Desai visited Iran in April 1974 and June 1977 respectively.
o After the Iranian Revolution, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Iran in
1993 and President Rafsanjani paid a visit to India in 1995. Indian Vice
President Shri K. R. Narayanan visited Iran in October 1996.

o The trend was enhanced at the turn of the millennium with the visit of Prime
Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Tehran in April 2001 wherein the two
countries signed the “Tehran Declaration” which set forth the areas of possible
cooperation between the two countries.
o President Mohammad Khatami visited India from January 24-28, 2003 as the
Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade. Both sides signed “The New Delhi
Declaration” which set forth the vision of strategic partnership between India
and Iran.
o Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited Iran to attend the 16th Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit held in Tehran from August 28-31, 2012.
Prime Minister met Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President
Ahmadinejad.
o Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi paid a bilateral visit to Iran from May
22-23, 2016. 12 MoUs/Agreements were signed between India and Iran. A
Trilateral agreement on Transit and Transport was signed between India, Iran
and Afghanistan in the presence of Prime Minister
o Shri Narendra Modi, President Rouhani and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi also inaugurated the International
Conference titled “India-Iran two great civilizations” in Vahdat Hall, Tehran
and released a Persian Manuscript “Kalileh Wa Dimneh”.
o Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi met the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei
and President Rouhani. A Joint Statement titled “Civilizational Connect,
Contemporary context” was released.
o Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, paid his first
State Visit to India at the invitation of Prime Minister of the Republic of
India, Shri Narendra Modi, from February 15-17, 2018. During the visit, Dr.
Rouhani was accompanied by a high-level delegation comprising Cabinet
Ministers, senior officials and business leaders.
o Delegation level discussions were held between Prime Minister Shri Narendra
Modi and President Dr. Rouhani. President Rouhani visited Hyderabad on
February 15-16, 2018. Wide-ranging and 2 constructive discussions on bilateral,
regional and multilateral issues were held in a cordial atmosphere. 13
MoUs/Agreements were signed between India and Iran. President Dr. Rouhani
and Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi agreed to further intensify and diversify
the existing high-level engagement through frequent and wider range of bilateral
exchanges at all levels.
o A Joint Statement titled “Towards prosperity through greater connectivity”
was signed during the visit. Foreign Minister Dr. Javad Zarif visited India on May
28, 2018 and held discussions with then External Affairs Minister Smt. Sushma
Swaraj.

o The two countries have in place several Bilateral Consultative Mechanisms

at various levels which meet regularly. The 18th India-Iran JCM was held in
New Delhi on December 28, 2015. MoU on cooperation in trade, finance, energy,
infrastructure and cultural issues was signed during the JCM. The 19th JCM is
scheduled to be held in Iran.
o The first tripartite meeting of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of India was held on September
11, 2018 at the Deputy Foreign Minister level in Kabul, Afghanistan. Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan Hekmat Khalil Karzai represented
Afghanistan, whereas, the Indian and Iranian delegations were led by
Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale and Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas
Araghchi,respectively.
o The meeting focused on consolidating economic cooperation, including
Chabahar, as well as enhancing cooperation on counter-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, and continuing support to the peace and reconciliation process that is
led and owned by Afghanistan.
o The India-Iran bilateral trade during the fiscal year 2018-19 rose to USD
17.03 billion as Compared to USD 13.76 billion in 2017-18. This represents
an increase of 23.8%. The valueof India’s exports stood at USD 3.5 billion and
imports from Iran were USD 13.5 billion.
o MajorIndian exports to Iran include rice, tea, iron and steel, organic chemicals,
metals, electricalmachinery, drugs/pharmaceuticals, etc. Major Indian imports
from Iran include petroleum andits products, inorganic/organic chemicals,
fertilizers, plastic and articles, edible fruit and nuts,glass and glassware, natural
or cultured pearls, precious or semiprecious stones, etc.
 Connectivity:

o During the visit of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to Tehran in May 2016,
the contract on Chabahar was signed which, inter-alia, comprises investment of
$85 million for equipping the port.
o The contract also comprises of provision of credit of approximately USD 150
million for the development of the 1st Phase of Shahid Beheshti port at
Chabahar.
o The three transport ministers of India, Iran and Afghanistan in the presence of
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, President Dr. Rouhani and President Ashraf
Ghani signed the Trilateral Transit Agreement (Chabahar Agreement) in May
2016.
o The second Ministerial level trilateral meeting between Afghanistan, India and
Iran to discuss the implementation of Trilateral Agreement on Establishment of
International Transport and Transit Corridor was held at Chabahar, Iran on
December 3, 2017. Minister of Roads and Urban Development of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Dr. Abbas Ahmed Akhoundi, Minister of Commerce and
Industries of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Humayoon Rasaw and
theMinister of State for Shipping P Radhakrishnan led the respective delegations.
The three Ministers welcomed the inauguration of Phase-1 of the Chabahar Port
by the President of Iran.
o The 1st Coordination Council meeting of the Chabahar Agreement took place in
Tehran on October 23, 2018. After detailed discussions on the full
operationalization of the trilateral agreement for international transit and
transport through Chabahar Port, all sides shared the view that full
operationalization of the trilateral Chabahar initiative will promote connectivity
and economic development of Afghanistan and the region.
o The 1st meeting of the Follow-up Committee for implementation of the trilateral
Chabahar Agreement between India, Afghanistan and Iran at the level of Joint
Secretary/ Director General was held on December 24, 2018 in the port city of
Chabahar in Iran. On the occasion, India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) Company
opened its office and took over operations at the Shahid Beheshti port at
Chabahar.
o An Indian Cultural Centre is currently functioning within the Embassy premise,
which was inaugurated by Shri Salman Khurshid, the then External Affairs
Minister during his visit to Iran for the NAM summit in May 2013.
o During the visit of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to Tehran in May 2016,
MoUs on India-Iran Cultural Exchange Programme, ICCR and ICRO, Iran,
National Archives of India and the National Library and Archives Organisation of
Iran were signed.

o The Indian Cultural Centre was established in 2013 and renamed the Swami
Vivekananda Cultural Centre (SVCC) in 2018. The Embassy organizes
music/cultural/literary programmes/ seminars on cultural/literary issues
related to India and Iran on a regular basis.
o The International Day of Yoga was organized in 2018 and 2019. Weeklong
Yoga events were held for IDY-2019.
o In the run up to the 150th Birth Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi (from
October 2018 to October 2019), two special events were organized on
October 02, 2018.
o Tree Plantation in setting up of Gandhi Vatika near iconic Tehran Milad Tower
(world’s 6th highest tower) was done in June 2019, led by Ambassador and
Iranian officers.
o President of Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) visited Iran from
November 30-December 2, 2018 to inaugurate the seminar on ‘Linguistic
Links between Persian and Sanskrit languages – with special reference to
Sanskrit Grammarian Panini’.
 Indian Community:
o The Indian community in Iran comprises of around 4000 Indian nationals.
(This includes 80-100 families in Tehran and 13-15 families in Zahedan. There
are approx. 2800 Indian nationals in Qom, Esfahan and Mashhad consisting of
Indian students undergoing theological studies and their family members.
o There are also around 200 Indian nationals working in private companies in
Iran).
o There is an Indian school in Tehran run by the Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangathan (KVS) under the aegis of Embassy of India.
 Summing up
 To conclude, it would not be incorrect to state that Iran’s unique geography, its
population and nature have bestowed upon it a unique strategic significance,
making it one of the important players in the global arena.
 From India’s perspective, good relations with Iran are an essential imperative for
India’s sustained growth and development.
 Its energy resources could easily speed up India’s growth and its landmass could
provide Indian manufacturers’ access to Central Asia and the Caucasus.

10.3 India-Saudi Arabia
 Political Relations:
o India and Saudi Arabia enjoy cordial and friendly relations reflecting the
centuries old economic and socio-cultural ties.
o The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1947 was followed by high-level
visits from both sides.
o King Saud visited India in 1955 and the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
visited the Kingdom in 1956. The visit of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to
Saudi Arabia in 1982 further boosted the bilateral relations.
o The historic visit of King Abdullah to India in 2006 resulted in signing of
‘Delhi Declaration’ imparting a fresh momentum to the bilateral relationship.
o The reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Saudi Arabia
in 2010 raised the level of bilateral engagement to ‘Strategic Partnership’ and
the ‘Riyadh Declaration’ signed during the visit captured the spirit of enhanced
cooperation in political, economic, security and defense realms.
o The visit of the then Crown Prince, His Royal Highness Prince Salman bin Abdul-
Aziz Al-Saud, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (now King) to India in 2014 has further deepened the relations
between our two countries.
o The highly successful visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April 2016
has consolidated the domains of the existing partnership. The conferring of the
highest civilian honor on Prime Minister Narendra Modi by the Saudi King is
an indication of the importance it attaches to its relations with India.
o Further, the ‘State Visit’ honor accorded to the visit of the Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammad bin Salman to India in February, 2019 cemented the ties

in diversified fields. The announcement on Saudi investments of worth US $

100 billion in India; increase in Hajj quota to 2, 00, 000; release of 850 prisoners;
proposal to set up a high-level mechanism at the leadership level; and identifying
India as one of the Kingdom’s 8 Strategic Partner Countries under ‘Vision
2030’ clearly earmarks the growing bilateral ties in an upward trajectory.
o Saudi Arabia is our fourth largest trade partner and is a major source of energy
as India import around 18 % of our crude oil requirement from the Kingdom. In
2018-19 (Asper DGFT), the India-Saudi bilateral trade has increased by 23.83 %
to US $ 34.03 Billion.
o During this period, our imports from Saudi Arabia reached USD 28.47 billion,
Registering an increase of 29.04 % over previous year (USD 22.06 billion)
whereas our exports to Saudi Arabia reached USD 5.55 billion registering an
increase of 2.61 % over previous year (USD 5.41 billion). The current bilateral
trade (April - August 2019 provisional figures) is valued USD 14.06 billion.
o According to Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), there are 322
Indian companies as joint ventures/100percentage owned entities of worth USD
1.4 billion in the Kingdom until Dec, 2017.
o These licenses are for projects in diverse sectors such as management and
consultancy services, construction projects, telecommunications, information
technology, financial services and software development, pharmaceuticals, etc.
o Major Indian Companies such as L&T, TATAs, Wipro, TCS, TCIL, Shapoorji &
Pallonji, etc. have established strong presence in Saudi Arabia. SAGIA is in talks
with Indian Start-Ups such as OYO, Delhivery, Firstcry, Grofers, Policy Bazaar,
Paytm to enter the Saudi market.
o On the other hand, Saudi investment in India has so far been relatively modest at
USD 228 million only from April 2000 to March 2019 (Source: DIPP).
o Saudi Petrochemical Giant SABIC had set up its R&D Centre in Bangalore with
an investment of over USD 100 million in November 2013.
o Saudi Aramco and UAE’s ADNOC are jointly participating in the development of
US $ 44 billion ‘West Coast Refinery & Petrochemicals Project Limited’ in Raigad,
Maharashtra.
o Saudi Company Al- Fanar is currently executing a 300 MW power project in
Kutcch. Saudi Aramco signed a MoU with the Mumabi based GumPro for setting
up a drilling fluids facility in 2018. Reliance announced that Saudi Aramco would
take over 20 % share (US 10- 15 Billion) in the RIL Oil and Chemical business at
an enterprise value of US $ 75 billion. Several Saudi Companies have invested in
India through their non-Saudi subsidiaries.

o A cultural troupe from ICCR comprising of a Shehnai and a Qawwali group,
performed in Jeddah and Riyadh from 25-29 January 2012, coinciding with the
Republic Day celebrations.
o A 54-member cultural delegation visited the Kingdom to participate in the
‘Indian Cultural Week’, organized in Riyadh in collaboration with the Saudi
Ministry of Culture from November 3-7, 2012. In January-February 2017, an
ICCR sponsored 5-member Qawwali troupe performed in Riyadh, Dammam,
Jubail and Jeddah.
o India successfully participated as ‘Guest of Honor’ in the 32nd edition of the
prestigious Saudi National Festival of Heritage and Culture – Janadriyah
from February7 – 28, 2018.
o Former External Affairs Minister Smt. Sushma Swaraj jointly inaugurated the
India Pavilion with His Majesty King Salman. The India pavilion comprised the
friendship wall, traditional & contemporary India, business stalls, states
part, flavours of India and information desk.
o Yoga was announced as a ‘sports activity’ in November 2017. Since then, the
Embassy has been organizing the International Yoga Day celebrations in an open
area in the centre of Riyadh. The IDY 2018 and IDY 2019 witnessed participation
of large number of Saudi nationals, particularly the youth, in addition to the
Diplomatic Corps, Journalists and Indian diaspora.
 Indian Community in Saudi Arabia:
o The 2.6 million (as of August 2019) strong Indian community in Saudi Arabia is
the largest expatriate community in the Kingdom and is the ‘most preferred
community’ due to their expertise, sense of discipline, law abiding and peace
loving nature.
o The contribution made by Indian community to the development of Saudi Arabia
is well acknowledged. In April 2013, His Majesty King Abdullah announced a
grace period allowing overstaying expatriates to correct the status, get new jobs
or leave the country without facing penal action until the end of the grace period
i.e. November 3, 2013. More than 1.4 lakh Indians availed the amnesty and
returned to home without facing penalty.
o Again, Saudi authorities announced amnesty (April – November 2017) during
which around 70, 000 undocumented Indians were issued travel documents to
return back to India.
o The Haj pilgrimage is another important component of bilateral relations. The
Hajj Quota was increased by 24, 975 in 2019, enabling 2, 00, 000 Indians
performing Hajj in 2019. Around 7, 00, 000 Indians also visit the Kingdom to
perform Umrah every year.

 Way Forward
The India-Saudi Arabia relationship is important for a variety of reasons but New Delhi
should be careful not to make convergence on Pakistan and Afghanistan a litmus test for
making further progress.
11. Indo-Pacific Region

 Background
 For first time, the term 'Indo Pacific' was used by Japanese PM Shinzo Abe in 2007
to emphasize that there is a connect between Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean.
 Indo-pacific combines Indian Ocean Region and Western Pacific Region –into a
singular regional construct.
 It refers to maritime space stretching from littorals of East Africa and West Asia,
across the Indian Ocean and western Pacific Ocean, to the littorals of East Asia.
 Context
 Recently, Ministry of External Affairs has setup a dedicated Indo-Pacific division for
the matters related to the Indo-Pacific.
 Why “Indo-pacific” has Gained Importance in Recent Times
 There is a growing understanding among global powers that the Indian and Pacific
Ocean are linked strategic theater.
 Centre of global power has begun to shift towards the east, especially to Asia.
 United States, India, Japan, and Australia — the “Quad” group — is emphasizing
“Indo-Pacific” as a new strategic space.
 China’s increasingly active presence in the Indian Ocean region as well as its efforts
to expand geopolitical reach in Asia and beyond by the use of trade and military.

 Significance of Indo-Pacific
 About 3.5 trillion dollars international trade flows through the South China Sea.
 Trade of some of the major economies like China, Japan, Korea or the west coast of
the United States goes through the South China Sea.
 It is a very rich region in terms of natural resources (fisheries, oil, gas) as well as
mineral resources.
 Significance of the Indo-Pacific for India
 Greater Role in the Region: This concept is a shift from Asia-Pacific, where India
did not have a major role to play. However, India is a key player in the Indo-Pacific
region.
 Role of a Net Security Provider: where India is expected to assume the
responsibility for stability in the region through capacity building, military
assistance and direct deployment.
 Help Achieve Economic Potential: India is targeting a $5 trillion economy by 2025.
Indo-Pacific can aid India to achieve this objective: a) Presence of natural
resources: can help India diversify its import basket. b) Presence of high market
potential: for Indian exports.
 Development of North Eastern States: Region can become a gateway for India to
integrate with East and South-East Asia.
 It gives an extension to India’s ‘Act East Policy’
 Containment of China: Indo-Pacific presents an opportunity to capitalise on
China’s key strategic vulnerability and to showcase Indian Navy’s capability to
dissuade China from any future aggressiveness.
 Around 95% of India’s foreign trade comes by the Indian Ocean.
 India’s Vision for Indo-Pacific
 At Shangri La Dialogue, India embraced the concept of Indo-Pacific
 India’s view on Indo-Pacific can be summarized into five S’si: Samman (respect);
Samvad (dialogue); Sahyog (cooperation), Shanti (peace) and Samridhi (prosperity).
 SAGAR Approach: Security and Growth for All in the Region.
 Indian Initiatives to Strengthen its Position in the Region
 Defence Cooperation through military exercises such as Malabar, RIMPAC etc. to
improve inter-operability with other countries in the region.
 Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: economic cooperation agreement between India,
Japan and African countries.
 Project Mausam: to rediscover the cultural link of past with Indian Ocean littoral
countries.

 Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue: Indian Navy launched this conference in 2018, in

recognition towards the importance of Indo-Pacific for the region.
 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, in which the navies of the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR) participate.
 Through, Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation, India is stepping up its
interactions with the Pacific Island countries.
 Global Initiatives Towards Indo-Pacific
 Quad Group: where India, Japan and U.S. have come forward to cooperate in the
region.
 USA: recently renamed its strategically important Pacific Command (PACOM) as the
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
 2018 National Defence Strategy of US: signals USA’s resolve and long lasting
commitment to Indo-Pacific region.
 Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy rests on “two oceans” — Indian and
Pacific — and “two continents” — Africa and Asia.
 Challenges Confronting India
 Need to Build Capacity: India doesn’t have sufficient resources to counteract
China’s expanding footprints in the region. China’s aggression and debt trap
diplomacy, which impinge sovereignty, is going to test Indian diplomacy.
 Seamless Connectivity: There is a lack of good connectivity infrastructure between
India and the countries in S-E Asia and beyond.
 De-Globalization: Globalisation has received setback with rising protectionism and
trade wars.
 Heterogeneity in the Region: differences among countries in terms of sizes,
ethnicities, aspirations – Hence, it has becomes difficult to build a cohesive
approach.
 Role of North- East States: The region is underdeveloped and India may not be able
to utilize their maximum potential in present situation.
 Way Forward
1. Development of Connectivity Infrastructure: to develop connectivity and inter-
operability between the regions to encourage economic trade.
2. Improve Synergy on Common Issue: so as to build larger consensus on the Indo-
Pacific common concerns.
3. India’s should try to build consensus so as to get the membership of APEC

4.

12. International Organisation and Treaties
12.1 BIMSTEC v/s SAARC
 Background
 Context
 The last SAARC Summit was held in 2014. The 2016 SAARC Summit was cancelled
after India decided not to participate in the aftermath of Uri terrorist attack.

 In the past few years, India has been pushing for regional cooperation under the
BIMSTEC umbrella.
 BISTEC
 It was formed on June 06, 1997.
 Members include India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand.
 It is a sector-driven cooperative organization, starting with six sectors but later
expanded to 8 more sectors
 SAARC
 It was founded in 1985
 It has eight member countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
 It is aimed at promoting the welfare of the people; accelerating economic
growth, social progress and culture development; and strengthening
collective self-reliance.
 Significance of BIMSTEC
 Grouping comprises of 22% of world’s population with a combined GDP close to $3.5
trillion.
 A fourth of the world’s traded goods cross the Bay of Bengal every year.
 It has high economic potential, given the region’s economic dynamism, huge markets
and rich natural resources.
 Grouping appears as a connector to multiple regional initiatives. Among seven-
member countries, five members of BIMSTEC are also members of SAARC, two
are part of ASEAN and six are part of SASEC.
 For India, it is a natural platform to fulfil our key foreign policy priorities of
‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’.
 Issues with SAARC
 Non Implementation of Agreements: Numerous agreements have been signed
under SAARC, but they have not been adequately implemented.
 Lack of Regional Integration: South Asia Free Trade Agreement is often highlighted
as a prominent outcome of SAARC. Despite SAFTA coming into effect in 2006, intra-
regional trade continues to be at a meagre 5%.
 Member Non-Cooperation: Pakistan’s non-cooperation has stalled some major
initiatives under SAARC.
o SAARC–MVA agreement was stalled following Pakistan’s reluctance.

o SAARC satellite project was abandoned following objection from Pakistan in

2016.
 Cross-Border Terrorism: Pakistan has failed to address India’s concern of cross-
border terrorism.
 Asymmetry Among Members: Member countries perceive India as “Big Brother”
and fear that it might use the SAARC to pursue hegemony in the region.
 No Dispute Settlement Mechanism: SAARC does not have any arrangement for
resolving disputes or mediating conflicts. This inability has been detrimental to its
growth.
 Growing Bilateralism: Given SAARC’s failures, member countries have turned to
bilateralism, which in turn has adversely affected the organisation.
 Why India is Shifting Focus from SAARC Towards BIMSTEC
 SAARC has been internally fraught with Indo-Pak rivalry proving to be a paralyzing
deadlock -- “slow boat to nowhere”
 For India, hopes of an India-led model of regionalism will never be possible with
Pakistan in the same grouping. Thus, SAARC minus Pakistan model is way
forward.
 Member countries of BIMSTEC have cordial relationships.
 Focusing on BIMSTEC will help unleash the potential of north-eastern states in
India.
 Centred primarily on Bay of Bengal, BIMSTEC has the capacity to connect South
and Southeast Asia through sea. It also expands India’s traditional arc of influence.
 China is seeking to expand its influence in Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Deeper ties
with littoral states so as to project itself as a net-security provider would help India
counter Chinese advances.
 India has moved from Look East Policy to Act East Policy and also shifting its
focus on Indo Pacific region.
 Challenges Facing BISTEC
 BIMSTEC’s Own Record has been dismal in terms of concrete achievements. In
over 20 years, it has had only four summits.
 Until 2014, BIMSTEC did not even have a secretariat and even at present, the
secretariat is severely understaffed with a paltry budget.
 BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement which was negotiated in 2004 boost the intra-
regional trade from its present level of 7% to 21% is yet to be finalized.
 India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway had not been completed, which is
crucial to trade movement between the countries.

 Way Forward
 India has to be open to Pakistan because India has investments in Afghanistan &
Pakistan is a key player there.
 SAARC and BIMSTEC complement each other in terms of functions and goals ---
totally abandoning SAARC is not a viable option.
 India must ensure timely implementation of infrastructural projects in neighbouring
countries.
12.2 Shanghai Co-operation Organization

 Background
 SCO is a Eurasian political, economic, and security organization formed in 2001
and headquartered in Beijing.
 Its driving philosophy is known as The “Shanghai Spirit” which emphasizes
harmony, working by consensus, respect for other cultures, non-interference in
internal affairs of others, and non-alignment.
 SCO comprises eight-member states, India, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyz Republic,
Pakistan, Russian, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
 Significance of SCO for India
 SCO’s main objective of working cooperatively against “three evils” -- terrorism,
separatism and extremism – sits well with India’s focus on counter-terrorism.
 SCO bolsters India’s status as a major pan-Asian player, which is boxed in South
Asian paradigm.
 SCO countries comprise almost half of world population. Presently tourists from
SCO countries constituted only 6% of India’s total tourists, this can be doubled.
 Security: India through RATS can improve its counterterrorism abilities by
working toward intelligence sharing, law enforcement and developing best
practices.
 Cooperation on common challenges of terrorism and radicalisation.
 Energy: India being an energy deficient country, SCO provides an opportunity to
meet its energy requirements through regional diplomacy.
 Talks on construction of stalled pipelines like TAPI pipeline; IPI pipeline can get a
much needed push through SCO.
 Trade: SCO provides direct access to Central Asia – overcoming the main hindrance
in flourishing of trade between India and Central Asia.
 Geopolitical: Central Asia is a part of India's Extended Neighbourhood – SCO
provides India an opportunity to pursue the “Connect Central Asian Policy”.
 Challenges Confronting India in SCO
 Given existing deep differences, defence and security cooperation with Pakistan
and China would remain challenging for India.
 Russia and China recognise Pakistan’s role in counter-terrorism, India’s position
here is at odds
 US’s power struggle with China and adversarial attitude towards Russia (affects
India’s defence purchase like S-400) – India has to tread carefully here.
 India has refused to endorse BRI project. Besides, Military standoff at Doklam
damaged the India-China relations.

 India and Pakistan: Without any progress on Kashmir issue, mutual cooperation
seems difficult.
 India-US-Japan-Australia quadrilateral has also been revived recently against the
backdrop of Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.
 India’s ability to assert itself would be limited and it may have to play second fiddle
since China and Russia are co-founders of SCO and its dominant powers.
 India-Afghanistan and SCO
 India has been invited to join SCO contact group on Afghanistan to discuss
prevailing security situation and economic potential of the landlocked country.
 SCO membership put India into the heart of Eurasian geo-politics enabling a
larger say in Afghanistan that has direct bearing on security situation here.
 A stable Afghanistan too is in India’s interest, and RATS provides access to non-
Pakistan-centred counter-terrorism information there.
 Way Forward
 SCO provides an opportunity for India and Pakistan to cooperate on issues of
mutual interest without bringing in their bilateral disputes.
 With India indicating little use for SAARC, SCO provides only multilateral platform
for it to deal in close proximity with Pakistan and Afghanistan.
 SCO’s relevance for India lies in geography, economics and geopolitics.
 Multi-alignment: India needs to tread carefully to balance its relationship ties with
US, Japan etc. on one hand and Russia and China on the other – India needs to
pursue multi-aligned foreign policy.
 India should follow the SECURE strategy for comprehensive security in the SCO
region.

12.3 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 Background
 It was adopted by United Nations General Assembly in 1996.
 So far, 184 countries have signed the treaty and 168 of them have also ratified it.
 CTBT will come into force when all 44 countries which possess nuclear capability
and research reactors agree to sign and ratify it.

 It has not come into force till now because eight countries have not signed or ratified
it as yet.
 Treaty bans all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all
environments.
 India did not support the treaty based on its discriminatory nature.
 Context
 India has been invited to join Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organisation
in the capacity of an observer.
 CTBTO has been trying to build trust with India and address its concerns which
have restricted India from joining it
 Measures Taken to Build Trust Among the States so as to Operationalize CTBT

 Preparatory Commission for CTBT Organization (CTBTO) was established in 1997 to
work towards bringing the Treaty into force.
 The CTBT Verification Regime: to monitors the planet for nuclear explosions and
shares its findings with Member States.
 India’s Stand on CTBT

 India does not Support CTBT for Following Reasons:
o Complete Nuclear Disarmament: India emphasize universal and complete
nuclear disarmament in a time-bound manner. CTBT does not address complete
disarmament.
o Discriminatory in Nature: UNSC permanent members have already conducted
nuclear tests and developed required nuclear technologies. For India, CTBT
would only act as hindrance for conducting nuclear test and developing their
technology.
o Entry into force clause of CTBT: India considers it as a violation of its right to
voluntarily withhold participation in an international treaty.
o Technological differences: Those already possessing nuclear weapons can
upgrade their arsenals through laboratory simulated testing which is not banned
under CTBT.
o No time frame mentioned to dismantle existing nuclear weapons.
o Does not address India’s security concerns: as India faces a hostile
neighbourhood. By being a party to CTBT, India would be waiving the
possibility of testing and developing its own nuclear weapons whereas China
would be able to retain its arsenal as per the NPT.
o It would hinder India’s strategic nuclear program development.

 Benefits India can Accrue by Joining CTBT:

o Strategic Interests: India can get easy entry to Nuclear Supplier’s Group as
well as strengthen its claim to the UN Security Council.
o May help end the nuclear race in Asia: especially in neighbourhood, as it may
lead to a follow up by Pakistan.
o Gain access to data from the International Monitoring System: IMS uses
advanced technologies and can help India in areas such as disaster management,
mining and exploration.
o Become a part of international scientific community: it will help India in
tapping into scientific cooperation with the world.
 Way Forward
 Joining as an observer will help India in taking an informed decision on joining
CTBT as well as in negotiating a CTBT that would enjoin equal obligations and
responsibilities on all Nuclear Weapon States.

12.4 Indus Water Treaty
 Background
 The distribution of waters of the Indus and its tributaries between India and
Pakistan is governed by the Indus Water Treaty (IWT).
 The treaty brokered by World Bank, was signed on 19 September 1960.
 The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) was set up as a bilateral commission to
implement and manage the Treaty.
 The World Bank’s role in relation to “disputes” is limited to the designation of
people to fulfil certain roles when requested by either or both of the parties.

 Context
 In light of recent terrorist attack in Uri, India has said that the “Blood and Water
cannot flow together”.
 Government of India has set up a high level Task Force to look into all the strategic
aspects of the IWT with Pakistan.
 Indus Water Treaty --- Success Story
 It has been seen as one of the successful water treaty across the globe because it
has survived various India-Pakistan wars and other issues.
 Most disagreements have been settled via legal procedures, provided for within the
framework of the treaty. [PIC and World Bank appointed neutral expert]

 Indus Water Treaty --- Issues involved

 UNDP report titled ‘Development Advocate Pakistan’: Treaty fails to address the
Division of water during the shortage of river water flow.
 Complicated Provisions: Treaty has been criticised being highly technical which
leads to far ranging interpretations and divergence. Due to this, two countries have
frequently sought time consuming and expensive international arbitration.
 Emerging Issues: Currently, there is no institutional framework for addressing the
effects of climate change on water availability in the Indus Basin.
 Abrogation of IWT – Implications
 Pakistan has maintained that revocation of IWT by India "can be taken as an act of
war".
 Human Rights Violation: Water and sanitation was recognised as a human right
under International Law.
 India finds it difficult to store about 3 MAF (Million Acre Feet) of waters of 3
Eastern Rivers which leak out into Pakistan. Planning to stop waters from Western
Rivers (180 MAF) would be impossible due to inadequate storage on these rivers.
 India will not only cease to have moral authority to challenge China on her
violation of UN Convention but will have to be prepared to face China’s hostile acts
of denial of water from Brahmaputra in East and Sutlej in West.
 It will show that India is not a responsible state and does not respect its
international commitments
 Continuing with Status Quo on IWT
 Waters from Eastern Rivers will be allowed to continue to flow into Pakistan.
 From the Western Rivers, of the 1.35 million acres permitted for irrigation India
continues to use only 0.8 million acres.
 Hydro-electricity projects can help India to generate 18650 MW from Western Rivers
are not progressed.
 Pakistan is not doing enough to assure India that the terrorist related activities
being planned from its soil will no further be encouraged as part of quid-pro-quo.
 Way Forward
 It is imperative for India to utilise maximum out of her entitled waters from the
Eastern as well as Western Rivers under the IWT.
 India has proposed several projects in this regard. Some of them are:

 Renegotiating the Treaty: IWT has a clause for “future cooperation” which allows
the two countries to expand the treaty to address recent challenges like climate-
induced water variability.
13. Miscellaneous
13.1 Arctic Region
 Background
 Arctic council is an intergovernmental forum for discussing and resolving issues
related to the Arctic region.

 It was established by 8 Arctic countries (Canada, USA, Russia, Sweden, Norway,

Finland, Denmark and Iceland) by Ottawa Declaration of 1996.
 It is not a formalized treaty-based international legal entity and does not allocate
resources.
 All decision-making happens through consensus between the permanent members.
 Context
 Recently, India was re-elected as an Observer (first it became in 2013) to the Arctic
Council.
 Why Arctic Region has Gained Importance in Recent Times
 In 2007, a large part of the Arctic Sea became ice free in summer months for the first
time in living history.
 New shipping routes between Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean, linking Europe
with Asia in the north, have opened up. These consist of the Northern Sea Route
and North West passage.
 Opening of Arctic Sea has given way for resource mapping in the region. Arctic Sea
is estimated to have as much 10 to 20% of the world’s oil and nearly 30% of natural
gas.
 Opportunities and Conflicts in Arctic
 Arctic Sea is estimated to have as much 10 to 20% of the world’s oil and nearly 30%
of natural gas.
 Scramble for Arctic: Various countries scramble for a share of arctic resources
which may give rise to tensions. Ex: China has released its first official Arctic
policy white paper, outlining its ambition for a Polar Silk Road.
 Territorial Disputes Among Arctic Countries: such as those between Canada and
Greenland, Russia and the US etc.
 Environmental Hazards -- Arctic-paradox: As routes open up, non-renewable
resources previously inaccessible will be extracted, and in turn will contribute to
global warming.
 Lack of a Treaty: Overarching Guidelines for how stakeholders can engage are
lacking in the Arctic region unlike Antarctic Treaty of 1959 that limited the use of
Antarctic only for scientific and peaceful purposes making the Antarctic a global
common.
 Arctic Council and India
 India’s engagement with Arctic dates back to 1920 when it signed ‘Svalbard Treaty’
in Paris.
 India’s interests in the Arctic region are scientific, environmental, commercial as well
as strategic.
 In 2013, India became an Observer at the Arctic Council, which coordinates policy
on the Arctic.

 Arctic Council does not forbid commercial exploitation of natural resources in the
region. Engaging with regional actors will help in ensuring energy security of India.
 Arctic melting will help in better understanding of Himalayan glacier melting and its
effects on Indian monsoon.
 Indian Initiatives in Arctic Region
 Himadri, India’s only research station in the region opened in 2008.
 Norwegian Programme for Research Cooperation with India (INDNOR): India and
Norway’s bilateral research cooperation.
 India and Russia have signed agreements and are cooperating on shared
production projects and offshore exploration.
 India’s ONGC (Videsh) holds a 26-percent stake in Russia’s Vankorneft project.
 Way Forward
 India should try for a global commons approach, and the region being treated in
the same manner as Antarctica.
 Collaboration to Diversify the Sources: Procurement of Natural Gas or newer
resources like methane hydrates, from Arctic region will diversify India’s energy
imports.
 A Platform to Further its Global Standing: India’s relative absence in Working
Groups displays India’s underexploited potential in Arctic governance. India needs to
actively engage with Arctic Council.
13.2 UNSC Reforms

 Background
 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of
UN, charged with ensuring international peace, accepting new members to UN and
approving changes to UN charter.
 Out of a total 15 members, five are permanent --- China, United States, Russia,
France and United Kingdom (P5).
 UNSC was established in 1945
 Context
 India has criticised the slow pace of UNSC reform process and opaque
methodologies and obfuscation of references by member states which are blocking
the early reform of the UN.
 G4 (Japan, Brazil, Germany and India) has called for early reform of UNSC
 What Constitutes Reform Agenda
 Issues Identified by UN General Assembly for Reform: 1) Categories of
membership 2) Question of veto 3) Regional representation 4) Size of an enlarged
Council and its working methods 4) Security Council-General Assembly relationship.
 Since 1993, UNGA has debated UNSC reform but has not been able to reach
agreement, primarily due to “institutional inertia”.
 Need for UNSC Reforms
 Changed Geopolitics: Security Council's membership and working methods do not
reflect the present geopolitics and realities as UNSC has changed relatively little
since 1945.

 Emerging Issues: such as transnational threats and environmental degradation

call for effective multilateral negotiations, yet all critical decisions are being taken by
veto-wielding permanent members of Security Council.
 Crisis of Legitimacy and Credibility: Issues such as interventions in Libya and
Syria in the name of responsibility have put the credibility of UNSC as an institution
in jeopardy.
 Inequitable Economic and Geographical Representation: While Europe is over
represented, Asia is under represented. Africa and South America have no
representation at all.
 North South Divide: The permanent UNSC membership of portrays the big North-
South divide in decision making. For instance, there is no permanent member from
Africa, despite the fact that 75% of its work is focused on Africa.
 Reforms Long Overdue: UNSC has been expanded only once in 1963 to add 4 non-
permanent members. Although the overall membership of UN has increased from
113 to 193 but no change in the composition of the UNSC happened.
 Why should India Get Permanent Membership at UNSC
 Founding member of UN.
 World’s largest democracy and both demographically and geographically holds a
significant position.
 One of the largest contributors to UN peace keeping missions.
 India is seen as a responsible power, which adheres to rule of law, global norms.
Hence, its elevation will make UNSC more credible, representative.
 Why there is Delay in Decision Making on UNSC Reforms
 Lack of Political will: Changing the composition of veto yielding permanent
members involves changes to the UN’s charter. This requires the backing of 2/3rd
of UNGA including the current permanent members which has been proved to be a
difficult task due to lack of political will.
 Lack of consensus among UN members and groupings like G-4, African Union
(“Ezulwini Consensus”), Uniting for Consensus etc. over the contours of future
reforms. Ex: India wants expansion of veto power while African Union does not want
any expansion in veto power.
 Resistance from Veto Power- P5 such as United States, Russia and China are not
ready to accede to the proposal of expansion of veto power within UNSC.
 India’s Efforts Towards UNSC Reforms
 India has Adopted a Multi-layered Strategy: a) Maximising support in UNGA b)
Minimising resistance in UNSC. Ex: France has supported India’s claim to
permanent membership with veto.

 India has Created G4 with Brazil, Germany, and Japan: to negotiate reforms of
UNSC. The four nations support each other's bids for permanent seats on an
expanded Security Council.
13.3 Belt and Road Initiative

 Background
 Belt and Road Initiative is a development strategy adopted by China to build a
trade, investment, and infrastructure network connecting 3 continents -- Asia,
Europe and Africa along the ancient trade routes.
 BRI consists of two projects: a) Land based Silk Road Economic Belt b) Sea based
Maritime Silk Road.
 BRI was announced in 2013.
 China calls BRI as “a bid to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a
brighter future”.
 The project has a targeted completion date of 2049, which coincides with 100th
anniversary of People’s Republic of China.
 It covers about 65% of world population, 60% of world GDP and over 70 countries in
six economic corridors.
 Objectives of BRI
 Market for Excess Capacity: BRI will help China access new markets for its excess
capacity in the manufacturing and construction industries particularly steel, cement
and machinery.
 Boost Trade: with the rich European markets by means of transportation links
 Develop Western Region of China: particularly Xinjiang which is relatively
underdeveloped by increasing economic activities in those regions.
 Creating Alternative Energy Supply Routes: to the choke points of Straits of
Hormuz and Malacca, through which almost all of China’s maritime oil imports pass.
 Strategically Important as China utilizes its economic clout to build it soft power.
 Counter Asia-Pivot: BRI is also seen as a strategic response to the military re-
balancing of the USA to Asia --- Asia pivot strategy
 Internationalization of Renminbi: The massive overseas investment in BRI will
speed up the internalization of Renminbi.
 New Investment Option: China has accumulated a large amount of capital over the
last few decades. It is not looking for new investment opportunities that preserve and
increase the value of that accumulated capital.
 Who is Participating in BRI Project
 China has signed a co-operation agreement on the BRI with 126 countries and 29
international organisations.
 Most of the countries in Asia and all of India’s neighbours, except Bhutan have
taken part in the project.
 India has rejected participation in BRI project.

 Why India is Opposed to OBOR

India has stayed away from the BRI summit, citing sovereignty and procedural issues.
 CPEC: A key part of OBOR is China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. It passes
through Gilgit-Baltistan region which lies in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. It has
pointed out that the project violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
 The establishment of a project with China in the disputed territory gives Pakistan’s
occupation of the area a degree of legitimacy.
 ‘String of pearls’ policy: OBOR projects will increase Chinese presence in Indian
neighbourhood as well as in Indian Ocean Region.
 Military Deployment: Chinese have begun to deploy “security personnel” to protect
projects along the CPEC route.
 Debt-trap Diplomacy of China where BRI projects are pushing recipient countries
into indebtedness. Ex: Hambantota port, where Sri Lanka was forced to lease the
port to China for 99 years.
 Transparency Issues: The decision making and financing is highly opaque in OBOR
projects. This raises suspicion about true intention of China
 India is too big to be isolated and India’s continued objection will make China to
consider its core concerns.
 Through OBOR, China is countering the strategies of India in North East region
and is promoting its greater presence in North East India, part of which China
claims as its own territory. This may have a security impact on India.
 Why India Should Join Belt and Road Initiative
 India as a participant of Asian era: Projected as Project of the century, BRI signals
the political end of the old order where the G7 shaped the economic agenda.
 BRI involves 126 countries and 29 international organizations covering half of world
population, and India may be isolated from this new economic order.
 Economic benefits: BRI would provide direct access to Central Asia and Afghanistan.
 Improve Indo-China ties: BRI will increase co-operation between India and China.
 What can India do to Counter BRI’s Negative Fallouts
 Project Mausam: It is soft power diplomacy by India. The project aims to reconnect
and re-establish communication links between countries of Indian Ocean Region.
 SagarMala: It is a port led development strategy with a focus on infrastructure and
connectivity.
 Chabahar Port: It give access to India, besides Iran, to Afghanistan, central Asia,
and Europe, bypassing Pakistan altogether.
 International North South Transport Corridor initiated by India, Russia, and
Iran is another connectivity solution for India in Central Asia.

 Alliances: Japan has agreed to promote India’s “Act East” policy by developing
and strengthening reliable and sustainable infra that augments connectivity
within India and between India and other countries in the region.
 Way Forward
 India should cooperate with like-minded countries like Japan, US, Australia to
provide alternatives to BRI, e.g. Asia-Africa Growth Corridor etc.
 India now needs to match ambition with commensurate augmentation of its
capacities that allows it to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region.
 India needs to open free and frank discussion with China so as to address its
concerns regarding BRI.
13.4 Brexit

 Background
 A referendum was held in 2016, to decide whether UK should leave or remain in
European Union
 Referendum went in the favour of UK leaving the European Union, popularly
called as BREXIT.
 UK started the exit process by invoking Article 50 of EU's Lisbon Treaty. But
withdrawal agreement reached between EU and UK has been rejected three times
by UK MPs.
 UK’s Exit from EU - an economic and political partnership of 28 countries —
brings an end to 46 years of British membership, since it joined six-nation
European Economic Community in 1973.
 Why Britain Left EU
 Brexit discourse became popular in UK after the Eurozone economic crisis.
 Important factors for British Resentment: a) Economic insecurity b) Populist
nationalism c) British exceptionalism.
 BREXIT: Consequences
 On European Union:
o Trade Buoyancy: Disintegration of largest single market will negatively impact
global value chains.
o EU’s Share in: global exports of G&S will fall from 34% to 30%.
o Geopolitical Standing: Along with Germany and France, the UK has long been
viewed as one of the EU’s “big three”. Brexit could diminish the EU’s role as an
international actor.
o It may lead to increased xenophobia and de-globalization due to inward looking
political and economic policies of member countries in the wake Brexit.
 On Britain:
o Studies have indicated that the economic costs of Brexit can be 2-2.5% of GDP.
o After 2016 Brexit referendum, many companies have shifted their operations to
continental Europe or other regions.
o As per WB, British exports to EU would be hit by $7.5 billion in new tariffs
annually under WTO framework.
o Impact on International Treaties: After exit, UK will need to renegotiate about
759 treaties in the sectors such as fisheries, trade and transport among
others.

 On India:
o Bilateral Relations: Brexit will make the conclusion of a bilateral free trade pact
easier due to new simple procedures and processes.
o According to a report by Commonwealth: Brexit provides an opportunity to
India to strengthen its economic relationship with UK through India–UK trade
and investment agreement.
o Indian Companies in UK: At present, roughly 800 Indian companies operate in
the UK which serves as an entry point to the European market. Hard Brexit
would negatively impact this direct access of Indian companies to EU market.
o Indian professionals: will be able to compete on merit rather than on
nationality, as UK will no longer have to favour EU nationals.
 Way Forward
 India needs to expedite the negotiations to finalize the FTA with Britain.
 Indian companies should take proactive decision --- to relocate to EU from UK or not
– so as to deal with the new realities after Brexit.

13.5 Russia-India-China (RIC) Grouping
 Background
 Conceived by the then Russian foreign minister in 1998, RIC grouping has met
annually since 2002.
 Together, RIC countries occupy over 19% of global landmass and contribute to over
33% of global GDP.
 All three are nuclear powers and two, Russia and China, are permanent members of
the UN Security Council.
 RIC is important as Russia, India and China carry important voices in
international politics and have the potential to significantly influence world
events.

 Context
 For the second year in a row, trilateral Russia-India-China informal meeting took
place on the side-lines of the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan.
 Importance of RIC
 Strategic: Despite differences India, China and Russia have converging interests in
Eurasia, like, peaceful and stable Afghanistan. RIC provides an important platform
for the three countries to work together towards this objective and by extension, in
Central Asia.
 RIC forms the core of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and
BRICS. Also, Russia can act as bridge between India and China, as it enjoys strong
relations with both.
 Economic: The trio could contribute to creating a new economic order, by
pushing reforms in global economic governance and international economic
cooperation.
 Energy Security: Russia being a major exporter of energy and India and China
being major consumers -- three countries can discuss the creation of an Asian
energy grid, which could go a long way in ensuring energy security in the region.
 Climate Change: RIC countries could work together on disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance.
 RIC countries have emphasised on global issues --- reforms in UN, Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, addressing world drug problem, Prevention of arms race in outer
space etc.
 RIC Relevance to Stakeholders
 Russia: RIC becomes a tool to demonstrate to the West, that despite their shunning
Russia, it still has partners like India and China.
 China: RIC provides a platform where it can push its interests in Eurasia.
 China would also like to use RIC along with Russia to send a signal to West that
they are unhappy with its bloc-like approach to Asia-Pacific.
 India: RIC summit is a reflection of its global power status aspiration as it is being
wooed by every forum today.
 Outcomes of Recent Meet
 RIC committed itself to multilateralism and principles of Charter of United Nations.
 Countries called for reform of UN, including its UNSC, to making it more
representative, effective and efficient.
 RIC strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms. It called for early adoption of
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).

 RIC also called for adoption of convention against drug trafficking, peaceful uses of
outer space, prohibition of biological, chemical weapons.
 RIC called for peace in Afghanistan through an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace
and reconciliation process.
 Way Forward
 RIC trilateral is a significant multilateral grouping, because it brings together the
three largest Eurasian countries which are also incidentally geographically
contiguous.
 India is a member of diverse groupings like Quad, Japan-USA-India and RIC --- this
reflects India’s strategic autonomy and rising global stature.
13.6 Organisation for Islamic Co-Operation
 Background
 It is the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations,
established in 1969 with a membership of 57 states spread over four continents.
 Its administrative headquarter is in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
 OIC is the collective voice of the Muslim world.
 It endeavours to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit
of promoting international Peace and harmony among various people of the world.
 Context
 Recently for the first time India’s External Affairs Minister, attended the inaugural
plenary of 46th session of Council of Foreign Ministers of Organisation of Islamic
Countries.
 The invitation is seen as a major triumph for Indian diplomacy and a major setback
for Pakistan.
 It also reflects recent boost in economic and security ties with West Asian nations.
 OIC Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) Summit, Abu Dhabi

 Positives:
o External Affairs Minister attended the CFM summit at the invitation of UAE.
This is a milestone in the comprehensive strategic partnership with UAE.
o The invitation to address the OIC can be seen as a major diplomatic victory
as this is the first time that an Indian EAM was invited. This can be
seen as a part of India's efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.

o This is the first time that a leader of non-Muslim country has been invited to OIC
conference.
o It was recognition of third largest Muslims population in India and of India’s
contribution to Islamic world.
 Negatives:
o A resolution was passed at the summit expressing “unwavering support for the
Kashmiri people in their just cause” and condemning the recent waves of
Indian “terrorism”.
o The resolution criticised the human rights excesses of Indian forces and called
for the implementation of UNSC resolutions on Kashmir.
o Despite holding the third largest Muslim population in the world, India was
never invited to any meeting of the OIC.It is mainly due to opposition from
Pakistan to admit India into OIC.
o Pakistan used OIC to oppose India’s rule in Jammu & Kashmir.
o For first time since OIC came into existence, India attended a meet of OIC.
o The significant shift in the policy of OIC from not considering India to inviting it
is due to the changing geopolitics of Middle East.
 India and OIC
 OIC can become another important forum where India can showcase its diversity
and equal treatment of all its citizens with their diverse religious believes.
 OIC’s growing economic and energy interdependence with India has become
important in recent times.
 Presence of Pakistan: Pakistan has always objected India’s entry into the group.
 OIC’s stance on Jammu and Kashmir: OIC has been issuing statements supporting
Pakistan and criticizing alleged atrocities and human rights violations by India.
 Position on Israel: OIC condemns any arbitrary steps by Israel which undermine
international efforts to reach the two-states solution. Though traditionally, India has
been a supporter of two-State solution, its deepening relation with Israel can be a
challenge.
 India and OIC Membership
India’s Stand: India had shown an interest in joining OIC as a member state at the
time of its formation. However, India has never made a formal application to that effect.
 View of OIC Members on India’s Membership
 Former Saudi ruler Abdullah had, in 2006, proposed that India become an
observer in OIC.
 Pakistan's is opposed to India’s membership and threatened to boycott OIC. This
is a major obstacle in India's inclusion in OIC as a member.

 Arguments for India Joining OIC

 Second Largest Muslim Community: India host second largest community of
Muslims in the world.
 West Asian Diaspora: There are 8 million strong Indian diaspora in West Asia, who
contribute to these economies as well as cultural richness
 Co-Operation in Strategic and Economic Matters: India is 5rd largest economy in
the world and one of the biggest importers of hydrocarbons. West Asia and India’s
growing economic and energy interdependence makes it difficult for the former to
ignore the latter.
 The 57-nation strong OIC are too large a bloc of countries to ignore.
 Countering Pakistan: India’s deepening ties with Islamic world could act as a
bulwark to prevent Pakistan from using OIC forum for its own propaganda. [There is
an OIC Contact Group on J&K which regularly passes resolutions criticising
India]
 Conclusion
 Recent invite is not quite the triumph for India but it is an important development
for the future.
 The major basis of OIC is Muslim Brotherhood and that Muslims everywhere
can be clubbed together because of their faith. But, India does not
support such a philosophy of a collective identity based on religion. Thus, if
India decides to engage with OIC it should be on the basis of our national interest
not on account of religion.





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International Relations Current Affairs

1. India and its Neighbourhood

1.1 India-Bhutan 14

1.2 India-Nepal 49

1.4 India-Sri Lanka 11  12

2.1 India-Central Asia 31  39

6.3 India-South Korea 71  76

10. India-Middle East

10.1 India and the Middle East 88  93

10.3 India-Saudi Arabia 98  101

11. Indo-Pacific Region 101  104

12. International Organization & Treaties

12.2 Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) 109  111

12.3 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 112  114

12.4 Indus Water Treaty 115  118

13.2 UNSC Reforms 120  123

13.3 Belt and Road Initiative 123  126

13.4 Brexit 126  128

13.5 Russia-India-China (RIC) Grouping 129  131

13.6 Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 131  133

1. India and its Neighbourhood

 Treaty of Friendship, 1949

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 India-Bhutan Trade and Transit Agreement 1972

 Financial Aid of India to Bhutan:

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o Indian troops stationed in Bhutan under a special security arrangement

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2. Diversify Economic Relationship: India needs to see the Bhutanese efforts to

 India and Nepal share a unique relationship of friendship and cooperation

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 Constitutional Monarchy in Nepal:

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 Significance of Nepal for India:

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5. India should commit itself to complete infrastructure projects without delay

 India-Myanmar relations are rooted in shared historical, ethnic, cultural and

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1.4 India-Sri Lanka

 Sri-Lanka holds an important geographical location in the Indian Ocean Region. It is

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o Hindi commercial films, TV serials and music are immensely popular in

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o It is estimated that China’s loans to Maldives total at least $1.3 billion, or a

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4. India Needs to Work With Like-Minded Countries:

 India-China Border Dispute

 Reasons for Border Dispute