The frustration-aggression theory and the relative deprivation

theory suggests that individuals become aggressive when there

are obstacles (perceived and real) to the attainment of their goals
and aspiration and general success in life. One is not unmindful
here of the problems and limitations of the frustration–
aggression thesis, such as the fact that an aggressive response to
frustration may be dependent upon the individual’s level of
tolerance. Or the fact that frustration need not lead to aggression
or that aggression need not always be negative and violent, but
could also be positive and constructive. Howbeit, it is an
established fact that frustration does produce a temporary
increase in motivation, and thus lead to more vigorous
responses (Bandura and Walters, 1963). And this is perceived
to be of sufficient generality to provide a basis for
the explanation of virtually all forms of aggressive
behaviour, including political violence. This is probably
why Maire (2004,) argued that; “Men who are frustrated
have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in
proportion to the intensity of their frustration…”
Relative deprivation theory. The relative deprivation theory
The associated with Ted Gurr (1970) and others informs us
that people are bound to rebel when they realise that there is
much discrepancy/difference in value between what by right
they ought to get and the actual reward. The emergence of
militant groups in the niger delta is a good example: they expect
that if Nigerias economy os sustained by the Niger Delta ol,
much of that revenue should be allocated to the region. However
the total revenue allocated to the region from oil proceeds is
13%. Find other examples in Africa. Cabinda enclave in Angola
is rich in oil deposits and the people of the region demand more
proceeds from the oil revenue on the region.
However, it has been argued that relative deprivation is not
supported by data and that the problem of its application to
explain the resort to violent conflict is that its proponents do
not present adequate systemic evidence to establish that
inequality and structural changes are necessary and sufficient
conditions for violence (Sambanis). Yet, at the same time, it has
been put forward that the growing levels of unemployment
associated with dwindling economic activities and lack of social
and welfare security systems exacerbate social ills, making
violent conflicts real possibilities, in such situation, it is difficult
for any meaningful development to take place (Hemso, 2007