See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/321292720

Case Studies in Managing Geotechnical Risks During Procurement

Conference Paper · January 2018

CITATIONS READS
0 445

2 authors:

Ricardo Tapia Douglas D. Gransberg

Iowa State University Gransberg & Associates Inc.
6 PUBLICATIONS   10 CITATIONS    401 PUBLICATIONS   2,279 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Alternate Design / Alternate Bid Process for Pavement Type Selection View project

Low Volume Asset Management View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Douglas D. Gransberg on 25 November 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 1 CASE STUDIES IN MANAGING GEOTECHNICAL RISKS DURING PROCUREMENT
2 FOR DESIGN-BUILD PROJECTS

3 Ricardo M. Tapia, PhD, PMP

4 Civil Engineer
5 Panama Canal Authority
6 Panama City, Panama
7 rtapiapereira@gmail.com
8
9 Douglas D. Gransberg, PhD, PE
10 Professor
11 Department of Civil, Construction, and Environmental Engineering
12 Iowa State University
13 Ames, Iowa 50014
14 dgran@iastate.edu
15
16 Word count: 5,660 words text + 5 tables/figures x 250 words (each) = 6,910 words
17 Submission Date: 07-31-2017
18 Final accepted manuscript – published as
19 Tapia P. R.M. and Gransberg, D.D., “Case Studies in Managing Geotechnical Risks During Procurement
20 for Design-Build Projects,” Compendium, 2018 Transportation Research Board, National Academies,
21 Paper # 18-03515, January 2018.
22
23 ABSTRACT

24 The risk associated with the subsurface conditions in a construction project can only be

25 quantified accurately if a thorough geotechnical investigation is performed or subsurface work

26 has already started. In projects delivered using Design-Bid-Build (DBB) the design is completed

27 before awarding the contract, allowing the opportunity to mitigate the geotechnical risk by means

28 of geotechnical investigations tailored to the design. Projects delivered using Design-Build (DB)

29 present a challenge since the design is not completed at the time of contract award, changing the

30 way risks are allocated between owner and contractor. Previous studies have demonstrated that

31 despite owner attempts to contractually shift the geotechnical risk to the DB contractor, courts

32 often assign the risk of differing site conditions to the owner. This paper presents the results of

33 10 DB project case studies aiming to benchmark the state-of-the-practice for managing

34 geotechnical risks during DB project procurement. The paper proposes 12 tools that can be used

35 to reduce the uncertainty associated with subsurface conditions and improve the way

36 geotechnical risks are allocated among the parties in DB contracts.

37 INTRODUCTION

38 Geotechnical risk in the construction context refers to the uncertainty in subsurface ground

39 conditions which can cause adverse effects on project cost, time, quality, and environmental

40 objectives (1). Every construction project that relies on the characteristics of the soil for its

41 design and constructability will have a degree of uncertainty with regard to subsurface

42 characteristics inside the project footprint until work starts and the subsurface soil is uncovered.

43 This is especially important for projects in the transportation industry where large project
44 footprints are required, making the impact of having actual conditions differ from those assumed

45 during design very critical to achieving project cost and time objectives (2).

46 The analysis presented in this paper focuses on the unique risk profile that occurs when projects

47 are delivered using the Design-Build (DB) method. DB is a contracting scheme in which one

48 party performs both design and construction services in a single contract with the owner of the

49 project (3). It is considered an alternative project delivery method to the standard Design-Bid-

50 Build (DBB) low bid approach where the owner furnishes a complete design before a

51 construction contract is awarded.

52 The nature of DB contracting provides a unique opportunity for sharing the geotechnical risk

53 because the design-builder is able to perform its own subsurface investigation and accommodate

54 actual site conditions in the design while it progresses with construction. On the other hand, the

55 delivery method also presents some challenges when determining which party is responsible for

56 the differing site conditions risk (2).

57 There are two opposite and mutually-exclusive positions regarding the allocation of the

58 geotechnical risk in DB projects:

59 1) Position 1: The Design-Builder is responsible for the design of the project as well as its

60 construction; therefore, some owners believe it is within the contractor’s responsibilities

61 to account for potential variations in the subsurface conditions when pricing the project

62 (4).

63 2) Position 2: The project site belongs to the owner and the Design-Builder cannot be

64 reasonably expected to accurately predict the subsurface conditions before submitting a

65 price proposal, therefore, the impact of unexpected conditions should be borne by the
66 owner. Moreover, some contractors will not participate in projects if they face unlimited

67 risk for differing site conditions (5). The unintended result is less competition and higher

68 construction costs.

69 Public owners typically deliver projects using DB when there is a need to accelerate process by

70 streamlining the design and construction process (6). This time is of essence approach alongside

71 the fact that the geotechnical activities are amongst the first to be performed after contract award,

72 typically makes geotechnical task critical path activities in a construction schedule (7).

73 Therefore, the geotechnical risk must be addressed earlier in the DB project development process

74 than it is in DBB construction projects. (2). In most cases, that means during the development of

75 the DB RFP before the project advertised. The criticality of the geotechnical work exacerbates

76 the above cited conflicting positions on liability for differing site conditions, and contributes to

77 conclusions from existing literature in that geotechnical risk could be the most difficult aspect to

78 manage when using alternative project delivery methods (4; 8; 9; and 10).

79 Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to identify effective practices for managing the

80 geotechnical risk in DB projects from US public agencies and their DB contractors, synthesize

81 the findings and propose a set of tools for allocating the geotechnical risk in DB project

82 procurement.

83 BACKGROUND

84 DB project delivery has proven to be effective in accelerating project schedules in the

85 transportation industry by allowing construction to start before the design is complete (11).

86 Taking advantage of that benefit, the use of DB has significantly increased in the recent decades

87 with 48 states currently implementing this delivery method in their infrastructure projects (3).
88 Despite its increasing popularity, many agencies are challenged by DB projects with high

89 subsurface condition uncertainty. The primary issue is the lack of information available from not

90 having a geotechnical design report during the procurement phase. Thus, the incomplete

91 geotechnical scope of work hinders the ability to characterize the actual subsurface site

92 conditions in the Request for Proposals (RFP) (12).

93 Several past studies support the need to identify, quantify and mitigate the risk of differing site

94 conditions before the DB contract is awarded (4). McLain et al. (13) suggest expediting the

95 review of geotechnical designs during execution as well as improving communication between

96 owner and contractor through a thoughtfully developed differing site conditions clause. The

97 subject has also been studied from the legal perspective and improvements have been proposed

98 to mitigate the risk by incentivizing early contractor design (ECDI) through contractual

99 provisions such as alternative technical concepts (ATC) (14). Gransberg and Loulakis (2) found

100 in that regardless of the specific contractual language, the Design-Builder is entitled to rely on

101 the information provided in the RFP and that differing site conditions (DSC) clauses constitute

102 the provision under which the Design-Builder can claim compensation for the time and cost

103 associated with encountering conditions differing from the information provided by the owner in

104 the RFP.

105 The wording and information included in the RFP plays a critical role in the successfully

106 allocating subsurface risk in a DB project with significant geotechnical issues. A well-written

107 RFP provides the proposers with either sufficient information to price the job accurately or with

108 fair mechanisms such as the DSC to claim compensation if the risk materializes (15). The study

109 presented in this paper seeks to identify and provide the effective practices to contractually

110 allocate, manage and mitigate the geotechnical risk in the procurement phase. By proposing a set
111 of tools rather than a utopian single solution allows owners to adapt their practices to incorporate

112 improvements while remaining within their policies and risk profile.

113 METHODOLOGY

114 The study presented in this paper relied on four different research instruments to assess the

115 current practices in managing the geotechnical risk in DB projects. The first step was to perform

116 a literature review of publications in the subject and a formal content analysis of 59 RFPs across

117 29 state departments of transportation (DOT) that procure projects using DB. While performing

118 the RFP content analysis, a survey was conducted to collect general information from agencies

119 and contractors across the US regarding practices for managing geotechnical risks in DB projects

120 (16).

121 This paper focuses on case studies that were selected based on the results of the content analysis

122 and the survey. Ten (10) DB projects with high geotechnical risks were identified to obtain

123 details of commonly observed practices and assess their effectiveness on a case-by-case basis.

124 The case study methodology has proven to be effective in collecting, categorizing and analyzing

125 emerging technologies and practices (17). This research instrument is appropriate since it allows

126 the in-depth analysis of a project with all of its details and provides understanding behind the

127 rationale followed by the agency when selecting a mechanism to manage the geotechnical risks.

128 The case study data collection is performed by means of structured interviews that follow a

129 standard protocol to ensure replicability and ability to compare the different cases. Following

130 Yin’s (18) protocol on the case study research instrument, the interviews are performed in face-

131 to-face meetings having sent the interview protocol ahead so the interviewees can prepare and

132 collect supporting information. This tool has been proven its robustness when emerging
133 technologies or practices are being analyzed (17). It allows the researcher to glean in-depth

134 information to facilitate the understanding of the rationale behind the distinctive characteristics

135 in a cross-case comparison (18).

136 The completed case studies provide different practices regarding the management of the

137 geotechnical risks will be detailed and put in context so their effectiveness can be assessed and

138 conclusions can be drawn with respect to each tool’s efficacy in providing a contractual base for

139 managing the geotechnical risks in DB projects. Figure 1 shows the methodology process for this

140 paper.

141

Conduct Survey: DOT

Content Analysis of
practices for managing
Several Requests for
geotechnical risks in DB
Proposals
Projects

Identify Potential Case

Studies with significant
geotechnical risks

Perform structured
interviews for selected
case studies

Summarize best practices

in DB Contracts

Evaluate effectiveness of
different strategies and
draw concusions
142
143 Figure 1 - DB Geotechnical Risk Management Practices Case Study Methodology

144 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

145 As described in the methodology, a content analysis of DB RFPs and a nation-wide survey were

146 conducted and based on those efforts and a comprehensive literature review, projects eligible for

147 case studies were identified. A case study protocol was developed with the objective of

148 identifying, analyzing and understanding the current models for successful geotechnical risk

149 management on projects delivered using DB. This protocol is then used to conduct structured

150 face-to-face interviews, producing results with established points of comparison and a high level

151 of reliability.

152 Interviews were performed on ten (10) case study projects across nine (9) states in the US:

153 California, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas and Utah. All of

154 these case studies are projects that involved significant geotechnical risks and several differences

155 and similarities were found in the way the DOTs managed them, which provided valuable insight

156 towards identifying different tools and methods that are currently being used to handle the

157 geotechnical risk. Table 1 provides summary information on each case study project as well as

158 key geotechnical risk mitigation practices that were identified during the structured interviews.

159 Table 1 - Case Study Projects and Summary of Mitigation Practices Used.

Case DOT Case Study Project Contract Contract Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Practice
No. Award Amount
Year
$million

1 MO I-64 Daniel Boone 2012 $111 Provide as much information as possible to

Bridge over the proposers, accepting requests for additional
Missouri River investigation.
 2 CA I-15/I-215 2012 $208 Perform additional studies if the project
Interchange at requires it. Prescriptive requirements.
Devore

4 UT I-15 Corridor 1997 $1,600 GDR nearly 100% AASHTO. Increase

Reconstruction settlement warranty requirement.
Project

5 UT SR-73 Pioneer 2009 $282 Exclude owner's studies from DSC clause.
Crossing, Lehi Mandatory specifications and extended
warranty for settlement.

6 TX Dallas, Horseshoe 2012 $818 DSC clause with caps. Two NTPs. Not limiting
Project contractor's geotechnical investigation.
Mandatory pavement designs.

7 MD IS-270 Innovative ~2017 $100 Progressive DB. Scope validation period.

Congestion Appropriate amount of studies (not extensive).
Management Project

8 OH Columbus Crossroad 2011 $200 First $250,000 of DSC is considered incidental.

- Project 1 Requirement for contractor to provide GBR for
tunneling.

9 OH Cleveland Innerbelt 2010 $287 Robust subsurface exploration. Requirements

CCG1 (I90WB for deep foundations and drilled shafts. A
Bridge) $500,000 DSC threshold was included.

10 SC Port Access Road 2016 $220.7 Extensive geotechnical and environmental

investigation (including deep boring).
Threshold for Hazmat. Seismic parameters
provided. Elimination of geotechnical DSC.

11 NC I-40 Landslide 2004 $10.5 Provide as much raw data as possible in the
Project contract. Allow requests for more borings. No
DSC clause. Nested DB.

160

161 Detailed information from each of the case studies follows including the geotechnical risks

162 involved and the approach followed by the agency to manage the geotechnical risk in the

163 procurement phase.

164 Case Study 1: I-64 Daniel Boone Bridge over the Missouri River – St. Louis, Missouri

165 Location: St. Louis, Missouri Award Year: 2012

166 Contract Amount: $111,000,000 Status: Completed

167 Scope of work: The project consists of building a new bridge over the Missouri River to connect

168 St. Charles and St. Louis, replacing the existing 80-years old structure which is required to be

169 removed, and constructing a bicycle pedestrian facility to connect the Katy Trail State Park to the

170 Monarch Levee Trail.

171 Geotechnical Risks: MoDOT considers that every bridge project has a higher geotechnical risk

172 as compared to other projects. The risk analysis initially performed by MoDOT included the

173 identification of Differing Site Conditions, Scour and Settlement as geotechnical risks related to

174 this project. Table 2 shows MoDOT’s Risk Assessment Worksheet for this project where a

175 quantitative analysis was performed for each identified risk. This case study stands out for

176 analysis since a complex geotechnical risk such as the potential for liquefaction was identified by

177 the proposers during the procurement process.

178 Table 2 - MoDOT Risk Assessment Worksheet – Geotechnical / Daniel Boone Bridge Project

Impact to Project Effort to Mitigate Risk

Probability of Impact (if no
Goals Risk Factor
Risk element action taken)
Low—Med—High Low—Med—High
0—1.00
0 3 6 0 3 6 A*B*C
Differing Site
6 6 .3 10.8
Conditions
Scour 6 3 .3 5.4
Subsurface
6 6 1 36
Investigations
Settlement of
St Louis 4 3 1 12
Approach
Settlement of
St. Charles 2 2 .5 2
Approach
179
180 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: The overall approach to manage the

181 geotechnical risks in this project was to provide as much information as possible to the proposers

182 in the form of a geotechnical baseline report (GBR). This includes performing additional borings

183 -as requested by the proposers- before awarding. The agency considers that the main

184 geotechnical risk factor in DB contracts is the lack of a detailed design when the contract is

185 awarded. In this case, the agency had to estimate the location of the piers or the final alignment

186 of the bridge to perform the geotechnical studies

187 Case Study 2: I-15/I-215 Interchange – San Bernardino, California

188 Location: San Bernardino, California Award Year: 2012

189 Contract Amount: $208,000,000 Status: Completed

190 Scope of work: The project consists of designing and building improvements to the I-15/I-215

191 interchange by eliminating existing lane reductions on I-15, reducing operational issues due to

192 weaving trucks, reducing interchange operational deficiencies such as non-standard design

193 features, and correct arterial highway deficiencies.

194 Geotechnical Risks: The project site is located in the highly seismic Southern California region

195 within the influence of two fault system (San Jacinto and San Andreas) that are considered to be

196 potentially active. The owner anticipates that the project site will periodically experience ground

197 acceleration due to of small to moderate magnitude earthquakes. The geotechnical report

198 prepared by the owner during the preliminary engineering design identified the two potential

199 faults within the project limits as well.

200 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Although this project was the first design-

201 build project in their district, the agency knew that there was an inherent risk that needed to be

202 dealt with. In order to manage the geotechnical risk, the agency decided to do a fault trench study

203 to determine and confirm the presence of a fault and to estimate the degree of fault rupture. In

204 addition, adequate subsurface exploration was conducted at strategic locations to help to provide

205 reasonable geotechnical parameters to the proposers.

206 Case Study 4: I-15 Corridor Reconstruction Project – Salt Lake City, Utah

207 Location: Salt Lake City, Utah Award Year: 1997

208 Contract Amount: $1,600,000,000 Status: Completed

209 Scope of work: The work consisted of reconstructing the I-15 Corridor extending approximately

210 26 km (16 miles) which included widening, a new high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane and

211 several intersections.

212 Geotechnical Risks: This project was considered to have a high geotechnical risk because the

213 presence of soft compressive soil was identified in the preliminary studies, which creates the

214 potential for settlement. Despite the accuracy of the information provided in the RFP, a change

215 order had to be issued by the DOT after a claim was filed due to the occurrence of settlement in

216 the structures adjacent to the project due to the weight of the embankment. The solution to the

217 problem was to redesign the embankment so the dimensions are reduced and the load on the soil

218 lowered.

219 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Being their first large DB project, UDOT

220 approached the geotechnical risk by providing a GDR including nearly 100% AASHTO standard
221 borings which they consider uncommon for a project delivered under the DB scheme.

222 Additionally, having identified the risk of settlement in the preliminary studies, UDOT decided

223 to increase the settlement warranty requirement for this project to three years instead of their

224 standard two years.

225 Case Study 5: I-15 SR-73 Pioneer Crossing – Lehi, Utah

226 Location: Lehi, Utah Award Year: 2009

227 Contract Amount: $282,361,000 Status: Completed

228 Scope of work: The project included six miles of a new connector featuring a new Diverging

229 Diamond Interchange, a ne1 60-in. waterline for the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, a

230 5- to 7-lane urban arterial with PCCP pavement, new bridges over the Jordan River and Union

231 Pacific Railroad, new concrete box culverts at the Dry Creek and Lehi Trail crossing, noise

232 walls, retaining walls, aesthetics/landscaping, drainage, utility relocations, ATMS, and traffic

233 signal work.

234 Geotechnical Risks: This project was not initially considered to have particularly high

235 geotechnical risks when estimated by UDOT. The presence of a wetland was identified but the

236 original alignment was not intended to use that area. During the procurement process, an ATC

237 was received to shift the alignment. The ATC was approved but the new alignment did cross

238 through the wetland area resulting in encountering soft soil conditions which led to a claim that

239 was settled in favor of the contractor by means of a contractual change order.

240 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: UDOT provided a Geotechnical Data Report

241 (GDR) in the contract with an estimated cost of 0.5% of the total project amount and dedicate
242 around six (6) months to perform the preliminary studies. Additional studies were allowed to be

243 performed by the proposers if requested, which did not occur in this project. Along with the

244 GDR and the contractual provisions for ATCs and the DSC clause, UDOT provided

245 specifications that had to be followed to mitigate differential settlement and also required at least

246 2 years of warranty against settlement.

247 Case Study 6: Horseshoe Project – Dallas, Texas

248 Location: Dallas, Texas Award Year: 2012

249 Contract Amount: $818,000,000 Status: Completed

250 Scope of work: The U-shaped $818 million bridge and roadway project near Dallas’ Central

251 Business District is referred to as The Horseshoe Project. TxDOT replaces bridges that cross the

252 Trinity River on Interstate 30 and I-35E, as well as upgrade the connecting roads just south of

253 downtown Dallas. The Horseshoe improves safety and increases capacity on these bridges and

254 roadways, which are central to the vitality of the Dallas economy.

255 Geotechnical Risks: This project is considered to have high geotechnical risks due to the high

256 uncertainty related to presence of around 30 to 40 feet of loose clay and soft soil (poor soil

257 conditions) in the site. These conditions present a challenge, especially for the foundations of the

258 Margaret McDermontt Bridges due to their inclined design

259 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Given the inherent geotechnical risk,

260 TXDOT procured the project as a DB delivery in order to encourage innovation. In addition,

261 TxDOT managed the geotechnical risk by not limiting geotechnical investigations to be

262 performed by the contractor, promoting the proposal of ATCs, and letting the contractor decide
263 on geotechnical solutions like using a bridge instead of a retaining wall. However, some

264 mandatory design parameters are included as a mitigation action, such as standard pavement

265 designs and a full geotechnical manual that has to be followed except for approved ATCs as

266 occurred in this project (Allowable Skin Friction vs Texas Cone Penetrometer Chart).

267 TxDOT also included liability caps to the DSC clause to clearly establish the shared

268 responsibility of the geotechnical risks and incorporated two notices to proceed (NTP) in the

269 contract; the first NTP included preliminary work and studies, and the second NTP corresponds

270 to all other work pertaining the Project.

271 Case Study 7: Innovative Congestion Management Project – Montgomery and Frederick

272 Counties, Maryland

273 Location: Montgomery and Frederick Counties, Maryland Award Year: 2017 (Est.)

274 Contract Amount: $100,000,000 Status: Not awarded

275 Scope of work: The project consists of a 32-mile corridor, being delivered using Progressive

276 Design-Build, there is no specified scope of work in the RFQ, but mobility, operation and safety

277 are the overall goals. The progressive DB contract consist of a two-phase, fixed value contract.

278 The first phase is for the Design-Builder to provide design and preconstruction services up to a

279 point where specific work packages can be priced. At which point the Design-Builder negotiates

280 a Construction Agreed Price (CAP) price and, if approved by the owner, then a NTP for the

281 second phase is issued and the Design-Builder is able to start construction. The owner reserves

282 the right to not proceed with the second phase is a CAP is not agreed upon.
283 Geotechnical Risks: Given that this projects is procured using Progressive-DB, the Design-

284 Builder and the owner have the flexibility to negotiate the geotechnical scope of the project. This

285 project is considered as a common project with regards of the geotechnical risk. Considering that

286 the contract has not been awarded at the moment of this study and the scope is very broad at this

287 point; there are no specific geotechnical risks identified.

288 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Progressive DB is considered a way to

289 manage the geotechnical risk since the uncertainty associated with the subsurface conditions is

290 resolved by the contractor early in the project. Additionally, a scope validation period is

291 incorporated in the contract to allow the contractor to incorporate any differing site conditions

292 early in the project. The agency also considers that there should be a balance in the amount of

293 information that is given to contractors, as too much information or interpretation can give

294 foundations for change orders during the project execution. Giving the DB additional

295 information could reduce the initial cost but cause a change order down the line. Additionally, a

296 scope validation period is incorporated in the contract to allow the contractor to incorporate any

297 differing site conditions early in the project, no DSC claims are allowed outside of this period.

298 Case Study 8: Columbus Crossroad - Project 1 – Columbus, Ohio

299 Location: Columbus, Ohio Award Year: 2011

300 Contract Amount: $200,350,000 Status: Completed

301 Scope of work: The work involved realignment of l-670 EB so through traffic stays to the left

302 and traffic to I-71 exits to the right and work on I-71 from over Jack Gibbs to Long Street.
303 Includes 21 mainline, ramp and overhead bridges. Includes one bridge cap on Spring St and two

304 bridge caps on Long St.

305 Geotechnical Risks: Given the overall size of the project, the geotechnical risk was considered

306 higher compared to other projects. In addition, other risks were the high water table on northern

307 section of project, the required dewatering to occur prior to construction, the micro tunnel

308 required with location of pre-determined receiving pits.

309 The location of the project was categorized as: Below the pavement and topsoil layers, the

310 borings encountered primarily Medium dense to very dense sand and gravel consisting of gravel

311 (a-1-a), Gravel with sand {a-1-b), fine sand (a-3) and coarse and fine sand {a-3a) With lesser

312 amounts of gravel with sand and silt (a-2-4) and gravel with Sand, silt, and clay (a-2-6). Hea vino

313 sands were also encountered generally below depths of 15.0 feet. Conditions of specific layers

314 were of quality and gradation that it met the requirements of MSE wall backfill. Contractor did

315 utilize onsite materials for MSE walls with synthetic reinforcement (Tensar).

316 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: The first $250,000 of differing site

317 conditions was to be considered incidental. Micro Tunnel required with location of pre-

318 determined receiving pits defined. Requirement to provide a geotechnical baseline tunneling

319 report from Design-Builder to address risks with tunneling.

320 Case Study 9: Cleveland Innerbelt CCG1 (I90WB Bridge) – Cleveland, Ohio

321 Location: Cleveland, Ohio Award Year: 2010

322 Contract Amount: $287,400,000 Status: Completed

323 Scope of work: Replacement of the I90 Bridge over Cuyahoga River valley in downtown

324 Cleveland. Includes associated roadway work to reconfigure the Interchanges adjacent to the

325 bridge work. First project includes new bridge which will initially carry bi-direction I90 traffic,

326 but in the future will carry only I90WB traffic. The project included approximately 2 miles of

327 mainline interstate reconstruction, including a 4,000’-long viaduct over the Cuyahoga River

328 Valley, system ramps, on/off ramps, local street grid modifications. The work includes

329 reconstruction of 15 bridges and 17 retaining walls.

330 Geotechnical Risks: ODOT only identified the stabilization of landslides (west slope adjacent to

331 Cuyahoga River) as complex geotechnical activity. However, given the size of the contract, the

332 project was considered as a complex. In addition, geotechnical risks identified were: abandoned

333 foundations; 150' average depth of poor quality soils above bedrock, for main viaduct bridge;

334 vibration impact on existing structures; control over foundation and wall types; and mitigation of

335 unsuitable soils.

336 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: the agency conducted a robust subsurface

337 exploration program in advance of the procurement, prescribed the west bank slope stabilization

338 with sealed construction plans in the contract documents, and provided scope language requiring

339 deep foundations to bedrock for the main viaduct bridge, and drilled shaft foundations for main

340 viaduct substructures located within the Cuyahoga River west bank zone. A $500,000 differing

341 site conditions threshold was included in the contract.

342 Case Study 10: Port Access Road – Charleston County, South Carolina

343 Location: Charleston County, South Carolina Award Year: 2016

344 Contract Amount: $220,700,475 Status: Ongoing

345 Scope of work: The Project consists of the construction of a new fully directional interchange on

346 I-26, a Bainbridge Connector Road, the extension of Stromboli Avenue and associated roadway

347 improvements to surface streets to serve the proposed Naval Base Terminal (NBT) in Charleston

348 County, South Carolina.

349 Geotechnical Risks: The risk was perceived to be very significant, therefore, extensive

350 geotechnical and environmental testing was completed prior to advertising the project to assess

351 the potential risk. The project is located in a highly seismic area. Underground conditions consist

352 of soil potential for liquefaction, soft compressive clays, variable conditions and dipping stratum,

353 and the potential for environmental contamination.

354 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: A total of about $1.2 million and more than

355 7000 man-hours were used for performing the geotechnical and environmental investigations in

356 this project, around a third of the cost was due to deep boring for seismic consideration.

357 There is interpretation of the data, though it doesn’t specifically reference DSC clause and is

358 provided for information only. Interpretation of the data is used in part in developing the RFP to

359 determine liquefaction potential and preliminary stability analysis.

360 Some additional actions are detailed as follows:

361 - More information was made available to the proposers, including deep boring. As much

362 drilling as the agency could do was performed, up to approximately 70% of what would

363 have been done for a DBB. Regular projects are around 20-30% or enough to meet NEPA

364 test.
365 - The alignment was narrowed down for this project, so the contractor did not have too

366 much freedom to change it.

367 - Seismic parameters where provided. Liquefaction or loss of shear capacity and slope

368 stability.

369 - An attempt to reduce overall risk was made by conducting relatively extensive

370 geotechnical and environmental testing prior to issuing an RFP. A specified dollar

371 allowance was included in the RFP Agreement for testing and handling of hazardous

372 materials (environmental contamination).

373 - Differing Site Conditions rights due to geotechnical/geological issues were eliminated

374 from the contract.

375 Case Study 11: I-40 Landslide Project – Haywood, North Carolina

376 Location: Haywood, North Carolina Award Year: 2004

377 Contract Amount: $10,584,740.53 Status: Completed

378 Scope of work: The 2004 hurricane season wreaked havoc in western North Carolina from four

379 different storm events with immense rainfall. These rains caused a massive amount of damage to

380 the communities and transportation facilities in western North Carolina. The Pigeon River,

381 swollen with runoff from Hurricanes Jeanne and Ivan and a flood release from the Walters Dam

382 scoured away the toe of several embankment slopes supporting Interstate 40 near the North

383 Carolina-Tennessee border. On September 17, 2004, several landslides occurred between Mile

384 Markers 1 and 4. Portions of eastbound I-40 fell into the river. I-40 was closed in both

385 directions and traffic was rerouted. The NCDOT was faced with the challenge of re-opening all

386 lanes of traffic on I-40 to the traveling public as soon as possible. Numerous units from the
387 Design Branch and the Division Construction staff of the NCDOT had to work together within a

388 tight schedule in order to accomplish this task.

389 Geotechnical Risks: NCDOT realized that the required tie-backs for the retaining wall were

390 going to have to be long, a risk was identified for the case that the required length ends up being

391 longer than expected due to the site conditions. In addition, the potential was identified for

392 finding underground boulders on the site, which would impact the project execution.

393 Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: NCDOT provides as much raw geotechnical

394 data (no interpretation) as possible in their contracts. In this project, due to the emergency nature,

395 four different geotechnical firms were contracted to perform borings and collect data at each

396 landslide location. A total of 35 borings were performed in a 3-week timeframe, which was the

397 time spent for letting and awarding the contract. The geotechnical studies in this project

398 represented around 5% of the project total amount, when the typical value for NCDOT’s DB

399 projects is around 1%.

400 The proposers are typically able to request additional borings to be performed by NCDOT during

401 the letting process. The results of these additional borings are made available to all competitors,

402 but sometimes the agency performs more borings to avoid giving away the location requested by

403 a proposer so the competitive advantage is retained.

404 TOOLS FOR MANAGING GEOTECHNICAL RISKS IN DB PROJECTS

405 Considering that there is no unified approach towards managing the geotechnical risk in DB

406 projects and every agency and project will have distinctive characteristics that may constrain

407 agencies from implementing all possible pre-award mitigation actions available, the main
408 contribution of this study is a set of tools that can be independently implemented to

409 accommodate the risk profile of a given project. Based on the findings of the case studies

410 intersected with the results of the content analysis of 59 RFPs across 29 DOTs, the proposed

411 tools are separated in two main groups.

412 The first group is comprised of tools that are commonly used in the transportation industry,

413 Table 3 shows a synthesized list including the state in which they were found in the case study

414 analysis and the relative frequency in which the same tools were found in the content analysis.

415 The relative frequency is presented as a ratio (%) of the frequency and the total number of

416 analyzed RFPs (59).

417 Table 3 - DB Geotechnical risk management commonly used tools

Source
Content Analysis
Tool
Case Studies (% relative
frequency)
Allow proposers to request/perform MO, CA, IN, UT, TX,
42%
additional studies during procurement. MD, OH, SC, NC
MO, CA, UT, TX,
Request of geotechnical ATCs 58%
MD, OH, SC, NC
Provide enough geotechnical
MO, CA, UT, TX,
investigation data to thoroughly 64%
OH, SC, NC
describe the site before advertising.
MO, CA, IN, UT, TX,
Include differing site conditions clause 59%
OH, SC
Incorporate prescriptive design
parameters on critical aspects (e.g. CA, TX, OH, SC 63%
seismic risk).
Include differing site conditions clause,
MO, CAL, OH 17%
allow claims based on owner's studies
Require additional performance
UT 7%
warranties
Include owner's interpretation of the
SC 8%
geotechnical data in the contract (GBR)
418
419 The second group is comprised of those considered emerging tools found in the case study

420 analysis, which are shown in Table 4. These tools are characterized by innovation and represent

421 the current direction in which agencies pursue an increase in effectiveness when managing the

422 geotechnical risk in DB projects.

423 Table 4 - DB Geotechnical risk management emerging tools

Tool Case Studies

Multiple NTPs with one designated for geotechnical investigation, design,
CA, TX
and a second specifically to commence other works.

Monetary allowance included in the contract for the event of finding

differing site conditions/contaminated materials. An amount is specified in
TX, SC, OH
the contract as the contractor’s responsibility, any cost exceeding such
amount is paid by the owner.

Progressive DB: two (or more) phases DB contract, scope is developed and
prices are agreed upon as the design progresses and preliminary engineering
MD
is performed by the Design-Builder, the owner retains option to not proceed
with the project (or its components) if prices are not agreed.

Scope validation period: a timeframe is specified in the contract after the

NTP is issued for the contractor to perform design and preconstruction
services to thoroughly verify and validate its understanding of the scope of MD
work and site conditions. No DSC is allowed outside of the scope validation
period.

424

425 Conclusions

426 The case study bottom-line is that geotechnical risk is best managed by getting project

427 excavations underway as soon as practical so that any differing site conditions can be identified

428 and resolved. The worst way to approach geotechnical risk is to attempt to shed it using

429 exculpatory contract clauses because the courts have repeatedly ruled against owners who

430 naively address this risk in an adversarial manner (19). Therefore, risk management and
431 mitigation tools that facilitate the sharing of geotechnical risk and those that seek to accelerate

432 the start of geotechnical design and project excavation appear to be potentially more efficient

433 than those that rely on additional subsurface investigations during preliminary engineering. Put

434 another way, increasing the boring and testing effort will reduce the differing conditions risk, but

435 it does not reduce the impact of a differing site condition established after award of the DB

436 contract. Means like the scope validation period found in the MSHA progressive DB project

437 delivery method provide a mechanism to jointly identify and address geotechnical risk early in

438 project execution and appear to be quite effective in mitigating the impact of difficult

439 geotechnical conditions.

440 It is important to note that even though some tools are found to be more widely used than others

441 and might be interpreted as the ‘tested and proven’ approaches, the more innovative tools like

442 Progressive DB, Scope Validation Period, Multiple NTPs, or Monetary Allowances are the ones

443 pushing forward towards finding a solution to effectively mitigate the geotechnical risk. This is

444 consistent with the overall perception collected from the case studies that the involvement of

445 potential contractors early on the process allows for better risk sharing and problem solving,

446 increasing the effectiveness of any mitigation action that the owner might implement on its own.

447 Each project will have its own context and no single tool will eliminate the geotechnical risk

448 entirely before the work starts and the subsurface conditions are uncovered. However, a

449 combination of the proposed tools, as shown in the case studies, does provide an effective way to

450 mitigate the effects of the risk by incorporating innovative approaches while complying with

451 agency and state policies.

452 Data Availability Statement

453 Data generated or analyzed during the study are available from the corresponding author by

454 request.

455 REFERENCES

456 1. Clayton, C.R.I., Managing Geotechnical Risk. The Institute of Civil Engineers, UK,

457 2003.

458 2. Gransberg D. D. and M.C. Loulakis, NCHRP Synthesis 429: Geotechnical Information

459 Practices in Design-Build Projects, Transportation Research Board, National Academies,

460 Washington, DC, 2011, 124 pp.

461 3. Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA). State Statute Report, 2015. [online] Available

462 at: https://www.dbia.org/advocacy/state/Documents/state_statute_report151029.pdf

463 [March 6, 2017].

464 4. Christensen M.R. and Meeker, L.E. “Design/Build Projects – Lessons Learned from the

465 Contractor’s Perspective,” Proceedings, American Railway Engineering and

466 Maintenance-of-Way Association, Lanham, Maryland, 2002, p.14

467 5. Loulakis, M.C., B.P. Wagner, and H.C. Splan. Differing Site Conditions, Chapter 11,

468 Construction Claims Deskbook, Aspen Law and Business, New York, N.Y., 1995, 131–

469 166.

470 6. Songer, A. D., and K.R. Molenaar. "Selecting design-build: Public and private sector

471 owner attitudes." Journal of Management in Engineering, 12.6, 1996: 47-53.

472 7. Smith, R. “An Evolving View of Geotechnical Engineering – A Focus on Geo-Risk

473 Management Geotechnical Special Publication No. 178, GeoCongress 2008:

474 Geosustainability And Geohazard Mitigation, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 9-12 2008,

475 pp. 231-239

476 8. Clark, G.T. and Borst A. “Addressing Risk in Seattle’s Underground,” PB Network,

477 January 2002, pp. 34-38.

478 9. Hatem, D.J., “Risk Allocation for Subsurface Conditions and Defective Design,” Design

479 Build Subsurface Projects. Edited by Brierley, G.S. Corkum D.H. and Hatem, D. J.

480 Society for Mining, Metallurgy and Exploration, Englewood, Colorado, 2011, 228pp.

481 10. Schaefer, V.R., Douglas, S.C. and Berg, R.R., “SHRP2 R02 Geotechnical Solutions for

482 Transportation Infrastructure: Guidance and Selection System,” TRB 2011 Annual

483 Meeting, Washington, D.C. January 2011.

484 11. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). Design-build effectiveness study – as

485 required by TEA-21 Section 1307(f): final report, US Department of Transportation,

486 Federal Highway Administration. Washington, DC.: Federal Highway Administration,

487 2006.

488 12. Beard, J. L., M. C. Loulakis, and E. C. Wundram. Design-build: planning through

489 development. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 2001.

490 13. McLain, K., D.D. Gransberg, and M.C. Loulakis. "Managing geotechnical risk on US

491 design-build transport projects." Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and

492 Building 14, no. 12 (2014): 1.

493 14. Papernik, B.G. and Farkas, D.J., “Using Alternative Technical Concepts to Improve

494 Design-Build and PPP Procurements,” Nossaman E-Alerts, (2005) [Online]. Available:

495 http://www.nossaman.com/using-alternative-technical-concepts-improve-designbuildppp,

496 [March 6, 2017].

497 15. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Army Reserve Design/Build RFP Instruction

498 Manual, USACE, Washington, D.C., Sep. 2009, 73 pp.

499 16. Castro-Nova, I., G. M. Gad, and D. D. Gransberg. Assessment of State Agencies’

500 Practices in Managing Geotechnical Risk in Design–Build Projects. Transportation

501 Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, Vol. 2630, 2017, pp.

502 9–14.

503 17. Eisenhardt, K. M. Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of

504 Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1989, pp. 532–550.

505 18. Yin, R. K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications, New York,

506 2011.

507 19. Loulakis, M.C. and Shean, O. J., “Risk Transference in Design-Build Contracting,”

508 Construction Briefings, 2nd series, Federal Publications, Washington, DC, 1996, 12pp

509

View publication stats