"Parallel" Muftiates As The "Third Force" Among Spiritual Administrations of Muslims in Russia

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285
brill.com/jome
“Parallel” Muftiates as the “Third Force” among

Spiritual Administrations of Muslims in Russia
Renat Bekkin
Institute of Oriental Studies, Herzen State Pedagogical University, Russia;
leading research fellow, Institute for African studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences
renat.bekkin@gmail.com
Abstract
Throughout 230-year long history, from Russian Empire, through Soviet Union to pres-
ent day Russia the institution of muftiate has continuously served as an instrument
of state religious policy in relation to Muslims. Guided by various considerations, the
authorities have kept the institution itself but did not allow individual muftiates to
create a united all-Russian Muslim centre. The article discusses such a phenomenon
of 2010s as “parallel” muftiates, designed to become an alternative, “third force” to the
existing federal muftiates. The article hypothesizes that one of the main tasks of “par-
allel” muftiates is to prevent federal muftiates from uniting.
Keywords
muftiate – “parallel” muftiates—the Russian Association of Islamic Consensus (All-

Russian Muftiate) (rais) – the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia (dsmr)
1 Introduction
Authors of scholarly and popular science works writing about spiritual admin-
istrations of Muslims (muftiates) in Russia sometimes divide them into all-
Russian (federal) and regional.1 However, this division is not strict in the sense
1 See for example: Yemelianova G., “Russia’s Umma and its Muftis”, in Religion, State and Society,
Vol. 31, No. 2 (2003), 143; Bekkin R., “The Central Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/22117954-12341400

Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
via Linnaeus University
266 Bekkin
that it is not laid down in the law. According to the Russian law “On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations” 1997, based on their territorial scope,
all religious organisations in Russia, including Islamic ones, are divided into
two types: centralised and local.2 From the Russian law perspective, all mufti-
ates in today’s Russia (and there are around 80 of them), no matter whether
they are present in one or several regions, are regarded as centralised religious
organisations of Muslims (TsROM). In other words, the law and the Russian
authorities do not distinguish between regional and federal muftiates.
A fairly simple procedure for creation of TsROMs3 against the background
of weakening of the authority of the heads of the muftiates has opened up
broad opportunities for the establishment of new muftiates acting both at the
all-Russian and regional level.
The classification of religious organizations of Muslims, provided by the law
“On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, comes in handy when
considering the establishment of muftiates, as well as their interaction with
government bodies: TsROMs—with federal and MROMs—with regional au-
thorities. However, this classification does not appear to be useful for studying
how various muftiates interact with each other, as well as with Muslims.
In scholarly literature and journalistic accounts, muftiates comprising at
least several spiritual administrations of Muslims representing different re-
gions of the country are commonly treated as federal. In my opinion, such a
division is simplified and does not allow to fully understand the reasons for
the creation and elevation of some muftiates and the disintegration and disap-
pearance of others.
I propose to classify all muftiates in Russia into the following three categories:
1) Federal muftiates. This group includes the so-called umbrella muftiates,
i.e. spiritual administrations that control communities in different re-
gions of the country and have been functioning since 1990s. There are cur-
rently two muftiates which belong to this category: the Central Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Russia (Tsentral’noe Dukhovnoe Upravlenie
Musul’man Rossii, TsDUM) and the Council of Muftis of Russia (Sovet
muftiev Rossii, smr).
Russia (TsDUM) and its strategy of subordinate partnership in dialogue with the Russian
Orthodox Church”, in Context, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2017), 11 and others.
2 Article 8.2 of the Federal Law ”On freedom of conscience and religious associations” 1997.
3 In order to create a TsROM, the law requires a decision to unite of at least three local reli-
gious organizations of the same faith (Article 9, paragraph 2). In turn, in order to found a
local Muslim religious organization (mrom) a decision of at least “ten citizens of the Russian
Federation who have reached the age of eighteen years and permanently reside in the same
locality or in the same urban or rural settlement” is required.
Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
“ Parallel ” Muftiates as the “ Third Force ” 267
2) Regional muftiates, including: a) independent regional muftiates (in

Tatarstan, Dagestan and Chechnya) and b) muftiates within the structure
of federal muftiates.
3) “Parallel” muftiates. In this category, I refer to the spiritual adminis-
trations that were created as an alternative to the federal muftiates.
According to formal criteria, “parallel” muftiates do not significantly dif-
fer from federal ones—including by such important indicators as the
number of their constituent Muslim communities and the number of
regions in which they are represented. Their peculiarity is that they do
not aspire to absorb other all-Russian muftiates, but act as a “third force”,
which spiritual administrations coming out from the jurisdiction of the
federal muftiates, tend to join. I consider two muftiates as belonging to
this category: the Russian Association of Islamic Consensus (All-Russian
Muftiate), (Rossijskaya Associaciya Islamskogo Soglasiya (Vserossijskij
Muftiyat), rais), which existed from 2010 until 2013, and the Spiritual
Assembly of Muslims of Russia (Dukhovnoe Sobranie Musul’man Rossii,
dsmr), which was created in 2016.
In this article I aim to examine the genesis and history of these two “parallel”
muftiates in order to understand their nature and their place in the system of
muftiates in Russia.
2 Brief History of Muftiates in Russia
Speaking of the Russian muftiates, it should be noted that their recent his-
tory (i.e. since 1992, when disintegration of the Spiritual Administration of the
Muslims of the European Part of the ussr and Siberia (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie
Musul’man Evropeiskoj Chasti SSSR i Sibiri, dumes) began, is not as well stud-
ied as their history in the imperial and Soviet periods.4 There are only a few
publications of authors specializing in the modern history of Islam in Russia,
which consider the activity of some muftiates.5
4 Skovgaard-Petersen J., “Historical Retrospective on Muftiship: Muftis, State Muftis and Of-
ficial Muftis”, in Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and
Russian Empires, E. Racius and A. Zhelyazkova (ed.), (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2018), p. 18.
5 Among such studies one cannot omit mentioning Galina Yemelianova’s publications
(“Islam in Russia: A Historical Perspective” in Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private
Faces, edited by H. Pilkington, G. Yemelianova (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), Islamic
Leadership: the Russian and Soviet Legacy, in ‘Islamic Leadership: The Russian and Former
Ottoman and Russian Empires. Legacy, Challenges and Change’, ed. E. Racius, A. Zhelyazkova
Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

268 Bekkin
Speaking of the recent history of the muftiates one should not disregard
their earlier history, how they came into existence and evolved over time. Let
us further consider a brief history of the institution of muftiates in Russia on
the example of TsDUM.
Not only is TsDUM the oldest, but also the most significant muftiate in the
country in the context of the state’s confessional policy towards Muslims in
the 18th and 20th centuries. TsDUM is the legal successor of the first colle-
gial body administering Muslim religious affairs which appeared in Russia at
the end of 18 century. In 1788, Russian Empress Catherine ii issued a decree
approving the establishment of a new institution, later called the Orenburg
Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly (Orenburgskoe Magometanskoe Dukhovnoe
Sobranie, omds). The institution, named after the title of its head (mufti) a
muftiate, had its headquarters in the provincial Ufa6 and eventually became an
administrative body, which head mufti acted as a state official responsible for
ensuring loyalty of Muslim subjects of the Empire and was accountable to the
imperial Ministry of Internal Affairs.
There is no unity among researchers on the question of whether the
muftiate is an exclusively Russian institution or was borrowed from foreign
countries. Some researchers are categorical in saying that it was introduced
from the Ottoman Empire.7 Others argue that, although the very system of
administration of Muslim religious affairs was borrowed from the Ottoman
Empire, it was later creatively reworked and adapted to the Russian realities.8
Meanwhile, some authors note that the Turks themselves took as a model the
hierarchy established in the Orthodox clergy of Byzantium.9 Thus, if we as-
sume that the latter proposition is right, it turns out that the system of state
(Leiden: Brill 2018), pp. and others. In these publications consideration is given, among other
issues, to the muftiates, primarily TsDUM and the Council of Muftis.
6 The muftiate was opened in Ufa in 1789, it then moved to Orenburg where it operated from
1796 to 1802, after which it moved back to Ufa. The Orenburg trace in omds’s history is re-
flected in its name.
7 Nabiev R., “From the “autonomy” of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly to the
spiritual administrations of the post-Soviet period”, in Orenburgskoe magometanskoe duk-
hovnoe sobranie i dukhovnoe razvitie tatarskogo naroda v poslednei chetverti 18-nachale 20 vv.,
ed. (Kazan: Institut istorii im. Sh. Mardjani, 2011), p. 120; Matsuzato K., “Governing Muslims
in Non-Arabic Peripheries: Comparative Analysis of Turkey, Russia, India, and China”, in
Sravnitel’naya politika, 4 (10) (2012), 68.
8 Zagidullin I., “Introduction”, in Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie i duk-
hovnoe razvitie tatarskogo naroda v poslednei chetverti 18-nachale 20 vv., ed. (Kazan: Institut
istorii im. Sh. Mardjani, 2011), p. 5.
9 Matsuzato K., “Governing Muslims in Non-Arabic Peripheries: Comparative Analysis of
Turkey, Russia, India, and China”, in Sravnitel’naya politika, 4 (10) (2012), 63.

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
control over religious affairs in both Orthodoxy and Islam in Russia was adopt-
ed from Byzantium (in the case of Orthodox Church directly and in the case of
muftiates indirectly, through Ottoman Turkey).
The term ‘mufti’ in Russian realities has a meaning different from how it is
understood in classical Islam. In pre-modern times in Islamic world the term
‘mufti’ denoted a person who performed the following functions: issued fatwas
addressed to ordinary believers; consulted the court on Shariah issues; per-
formed certain administrative functions, in particular, related to waqf proper-
ty; headed ‘ulama’, appointed local muftis etc.10 Although mufti was an official
in the service of the state, he nevertheless had to at the very least have a good
religious education, and at most be a mujtahid.
In the Russian Empire before 1788 mufti’s functions were carried out by ak-
huns who controlled the activities of imams (e.g. ensured that religious rites
were executed correctly), interpreted Shariah, resolved disputes on matrimo-
nial property and heard other cases between Muslims and others.11 Akhuns
also acted as intermediaries between the authorities and the believers.12
The government tried to build relationship with individual akhuns. The un-
derstanding that the structure of ‘ulama’ in the country needs to be stream-
lined came to the authorities in the middle of the 18th century. Despite the fact
that by that time, certain changes aimed at strengthening control over ‘ulama’
had been introduced in the Volga-Ural region, the existing system could not
fully satisfy the government. The main problem was that akhuns and other
Muslim ‘ulama’, though controlled by the authorities, continued to rely on
their own authority as Shariah experts among Muslims rather than on the au-
thority granted to them by the state. This, firstly, made them less controlled by
the state, and, secondly, posed a threat that in the event of unrest authoritative
leaders could stand at the head of the uprising.
In such circumstances, it was in the interest of the state to create a bureau-
cratic structure, in which its head, mufti, would be, in the first place, an indus-
trious government official pursuing state interests among Muslims of Russia
and neighbouring countries and only in the second place, an authoritative
theologian and spiritual leader.
Taking into account the above remarks, the following definition of a mufti
can be proposed for the purposes of this article: mufti is a functionary who
is at the head of an all-Russian or regional religious organization of Muslims
10 Skovgaard-Petersen J., Op. cit., 16.

11 Denisov D.N., Ocherki po istorii musul’manskih obschin Chelyabinskogo kraya (XVIII-
nachalo ХХ v.) (Moscow: ID Mardjani, 2011), p. 46.
12 Ibid, p. 43.

270 Bekkin
(referred to in this article as muftiate, or Spiritual Administration of Muslims),

whose main tasks are to implement state confessional policy towards Muslims
and represent the interests of the latter before state authorities.
It did not occur to the Muslims (who were predominantly Tatars) at once
that the muftiate, which they perceived as the state’s instrument of control
over Muslims, could also help them to preserve their national identity. Only
by the middle of 19 century, had omds earned social capital and started to be
recognised by followers of Islam as an institution through which they could
consolidate and defend their common interests.
After the February Revolution of 1917, Muslims had the opportunity to liq-
uidate the institution of muftiate, but never used it. During the 1st All-Russian
Muslim congress in Moscow in 1917 omds was renamed to Diniya Nazaraty
(literally: Ministry of religion). This institution de facto and de jure started to
play the role of a ministry of religious affairs within the Government of the
National Autonomy of Muslim Turk-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia (a self-
government body for Muslim people of Russia).
The only thing that was revised were administrative procedures, includ-
ing for electing the mufti and other officials of the muftiate.13 In Soviet times,
not only was the muftiate in Ufa not liquidated, but in fact preserved, with
the strengthening of various forms of state control over its activities. The
Soviet government did not interfere with the creation of the Central Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia (Central’noe Dukhovnoe
Upravlenie Musul’man Vnutrennej Rossii i Sibiri), which on the basis of Diniya
Nazaraty became the legal successor to omds in 1920.14 Thus, the interests of
Muslims and the state in the matter of preserving such an institution as a muf-
tiate coincided. For Muslims, the muftiate acted as the main religious centre,
for the state it was an instrument of control over the life of Muslims.
It should be noted that throughout its history, the muftiate in Ufa was
not the only administrative institution with the help of which the state-
confessional policy towards Islam and Muslims was implemented. Both in
the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union, the jurisdiction of the muftiate
13 More about it see: Yunusova A.B., Azamatov D.D. 225 let Central’nomu dukhovnomu uprav-
leniyu musul’man Rossii. Istoricheskie ocherki (Ufa: gup RB upk, 2013), pp. 184-189.
14 More about the history of the muftiate in Ufa in Soviet times see in: Bekkin R., “The muf-
tiates and the state in the Soviet time: the evolution of relationship”, in Islam in Russia
during today’s transformation processes: New challenges and development trends in the 21st
century, Ed. Z.R. Khabibullina (Ufa: Dialog, 2017), pp. 54-75. More on the subject of con-
fessional policy in relation to Islam in the first years of the Soviet state, see, for instance,
in Roberts G.L., Comissar and Mullah: Soviet-Muslim Policy from 1917 to 1924 (Boca Raton:
Dissertation.com, 2007).

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
did not cover a number of regions with a significant Muslim population: the
North Caucasus15, the Transcaucasia16, Central Asia17, the Crimea18, and oth-
ers. In other words, neither in the Russian Empire, nor in the Soviet Union, nor
in the Russian Federation has there ever existed a single muftiate which juris-
diction would include the affairs of all Muslim subjects (citizens) of the state.
As noted above, the successor of omds today is TsDUM. Since 1992, TsDUM
under the name of dumes19 had been going through a period of disintegration,
as a result of which a handful of muftiates independent from Ufa were formed.
In 1996, some of the regional muftiates that had separated from TsDUM found-
ed the Council of Muftis of Russia (smr). In 1998, another federal muftiate,
the Coordinating Centre of Muslims of the North Caucasus (Koordinatsionnij
Tsentr Musul’man Severnogo Kavkaza, KTsMSK), covering the Muslim commu-
nities in the North Caucasus was established. Since then, the tripolar system of
federal muftiates existed in Russia: in the jurisdiction of TsDUM and the smr
were Muslim communities in the European part of Russia and Siberia, while
the communities in the republics of the North Caucasus belonged to KTsMSK.
The situation changed again in 2009. In a short time, a new muftiate claim-
ing the all-Russian level was created and registered—the Russian Association
of Islamic Consensus (All-Russian Muftiate), (rais).20 The muftiate did not
exist for long and ceased its activities by 2013. In 2016, a similar muftiate
15 In the Russian Empire, the project to create a separate muftiate in the North Caucasus
was discussed, but it was never implemented. The religious affairs of Muslims in the re-
gion were governed by local administration. Only in 1944 a separate muftiate for the re-
gion was established—the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the North Caucasus.
16 In 1872, two muftiates, the Transcaucasian Mohammedan Spiritual Directorates of Sunni
and Shiite Teachings, were established to manage the religious affairs of Transcaucasian
Muslims with headquarters in Tiflis (present-day Tbilisi). In 1917, they ceased to exist. In
1944, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Transcaucasia was recreated with a
residence in Baku.
17 The question of the establishment of muftiates for the Kazakh steppe and Turkestan
was repeatedly discussed by both imperial officials and the Muslims themselves. But it
was only in 1943 that a separate muftiate, sadum, was established with a residence in
Tashkent.
18 In 1794 shortly after annexation of Crimea by Russia by the Empress Catherine ii, the
Taurian Mohammedan Spiritual Directorate (Tavricheskoe Magometanskoe Dukhovnoe
Pravlenie, tmdp) was established. Since the mechanism of functioning of tmdp was not
clearly spelled out in the decree of 1794, the muftiate could gain the legal basis of its ac-
tivities only in 1831 after the publication of the “Regulations on the Taurian Mohammedan
Clergy and the Affairs subject to its Jurisdiction”.
19 During 1948-1992 TsDUM was called dumes.
20 There are different variants of writing the name of this organization. Here I use the offi-
cial name fixed in the charter of the muftiate. As for the abbreviated name, going forward
I will use the abbreviation rais, which is also used in its charter.

272 Bekkin
emerged under a similar scenario, which also claimed the federal level: the
Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia (dsmr).
In terms of the classification that I suggested above, I view rais and dsmr
as “parallel” muftiates. I argue that there are two main features, which differ-
entiate “parallel” muftiates from the already existing federal ones. Firstly, it is
what I call lack of legitimacy. In this article, I will argue that unlike federal
muftiates, these two “parallel” muftiates were organized as a result of govern-
ment intervention (this may be the reason why they are not recognised by the
existing federal muftiates). Secondly, their coming into existence may have
been caused by the state’s unwillingness to allow the three major federal muf-
tiates to unite. The fact that neither of the “parallel” muftiates contemplated
from the outset to absorb other all-Russian muftiates speaks in favour of the
proposition that the state is unwilling to have a single united muftiate which
could represent the majority of Muslim communities in Russia. Both rais and
now dsmr act as a “third force”21, to which the spiritual administrations which
come out of the jurisdiction of TsDUM, smr or KTsMSK, gravitate.
That said, one cannot rule out that the opposite proposition is true, i.e. that
the “parallel” muftiates were created by the authorities with the aim of gradu-
ally ousting the existing federal muftiates from the system of managing Muslim
religious affairs and replacing them with a single puppet muftiate. However,
from my perspective, the latter proposition does not look plausible against the
background of the increasing influence of independent regional muftiates.
No matter what the real intention behind the creation of the “parallel” muf-
tiates was, one cannot exclude that at some point in future they may acquire
necessary legitimacy and authority and become one of the federal muftiates.
3 Circumstances Surrounding Emergence of “Parallel” Muftiates
The second half of 1990s and 2000s is characterized by the ongoing competi-
tion between two federal muftiates: TsDUM with headquarters in Ufa and the
Council of Muftis with headquarters in Moscow, which faded at times, then
flared up again. For any federal muftiate, two quantitative indicators are of
great importance: 1) the number of its constituent communities and 2) the
21 I use the term “third force” rather than “fourth force” intentionally. When the first “paral-
lel” muftiate, rais, was established, there were only two really competing federal muf-
tiates: TsDUM and smr, whereas KTsMSK maintained a neutral position. By the time
the second “parallel” muftiate, dsmr, was established, KTsMSK had lost its federal status
after dum of Chechnya and dum of Dagestan left it.

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
number of regional spiritual administrations that form its part. Based on the
first parameter, some regional spiritual administrations, comprising a signifi-
cant number of communities, play a special role and sometimes act at the fed-
eral level as full participants in various state events along with representatives
of the federal muftiates.
In terms of these two indicators, TsDUM and the Council of Muftis were
almost in equal position in the second half of 1990s-2000s.22 The third mufti-
ate, the Coordinating Centre of Muslims of the North Caucasus maintained a
neutral position in competition between TsDUM and smr. Jurisdiction of this
muftiate covered the territory of national republics in the North Caucasus. In
the course of the confrontation, regional spiritual administration of Muslims
(dums) outside the North Caucasus could either join any of TsDUM or smr,
or function as independent institutions (independent regional muftiates as
per my classification). Several times during this period, an idea of a merger
between TsDUM and smr started to be discussed, but none of the initiatives
were realized.
In this situation, the projects envisaging creation of alternative spiritual
administrations of the all-Russian scale on the basis of some independent
regional muftiates appeared. Formally, the creation of a federal muftiate re-
quired an appropriate decision to unite taken by several regional dums. Such
a union would then need to be registered by appropriate government agencies.
However, in practice, in Russia of 2000-2010s the issue of consolidation of re-
gional muftiates could not have been solved without involvement of the state
authorities.23 Hence, the question arises: why did the state authorities allow
creation of such new muftiates?
In post-Soviet Russia TsDUM, which is positioned by its chairman Talgat
Tadzhuddin as a “pro-state (derzhavnij) muftiate”, managed to win the posi-
tion of a reliable partner of the authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church
in deterring the religious and political activity of Muslims belonging to com-
munities under its control. However, Tadzhuddin’s extravagant actions and his
authoritarian style of management reduced the popularity of TsDUM’s peren-
nial mufti among Muslims.24 It was necessary for Russian authorities to attract
people loyal to the political regime established in Russia, people who would
not cause conflicting feelings among the majority of believers. In addition, the
22 Data on the number of communities within the structure of federal muftiates is contra-
dictory and is subject to speculation.
23 Interview with Abdul-Vahed Niyazov, 29 March 2018. Author’s field materials.
24 See, for example: “Chem proslavilsa Talgat Tadzhuddin”, Kommersant, 15 February 2006,
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/650095 (accessed 20 March 2019).

274 Bekkin
supreme mufti is getting old. As his successor Tadzhuddin has long been pre-
paring his son Muhammad. According to experts, however, Muhammad does
not have the charisma and authority like his father.25 It cannot be ruled out
that for the elderly Tadzhuddin doubles are being sought in the face of young-
er, ambitious muftis.
To deconstruct the circumstances under which the two “parallel” muftiates
had been created, I turned to people who were involved in the events in ques-
tion. In the course of my research, I have taken interviews from people who
occupied key positions at the “parallel” muftiates: M. Khuzin, F. Salman and
A. Krganov, as well as some people connected with the federal muftiates. I have
also interviewed experts who write about this subject (historians and politolo-
gists). Below I set out my findings.
According to some experts, the actual reason for the creation of one of
the “parallel” muftiates, rais was not the conflict between Tadzhuddin and
Gaynutdin, but rather an attempt to unite undertaken by the three federal muf-
tiates.26 Indeed, at the end of 2009, the leaders of TsDUM, smr and KTsMSK
began to publicly discuss the need to unite. Negotiations and consultations
between them were held until March 2010. A working group consisting of rep-
resentatives of the three muftiates was formed.27
One of the associates of mufti Gaynutdin, the chairman of the Islamic
Cultural Centre of Russia in 1992-2009, Abdul-Vahed Niyazov, asserts that the
uniting process was going at a rapid pace, and both Tadzhuddin and Gaynutdin
were interested in it.28 However, according to Niyazov, it were the federal au-
thorities who subsequently suspended creation of the united muftiate.29
25 Interview with Ruslan Aysin, 30 May 2018. Author’s field materials.
26 Interview with Abdul-Vahed Niyazov, 29 March 2018. Author’s field materials. Also, other
interviews.
27 Silantyev R. “Chetvertaya sila Rossiyskogo islama”, NG-Religii, 07 April 2010, www.ng.ru/
events/2010-04-07/2_islam.html?id_user=Y (accessed 20 March 2019).
28 Interview with Abdul-Vahed Niyazov, 29 March 2018. Author’s field materials. According
to A.-V. Niyazov, Gaynutdin was quite sceptical about the idea of uniting the muftiates.
However, Niyazov, one of the key intermediaries in the unification process, managed to
convince Gaynutdin to take part in the negotiations on the unification.
29 Ibid. These words were confirmed by R. Gaynutdin himself in one of his interviews. In
an interview given to “Azatliq” radio, he said that “the decision (i.e. to unite) did not
please the state” and that “Talgat Tadzhuddin’s proposal (i.e. to unite) does not corre-
spond to the state policy”. (“Govorit’ o pritesnenii islama v Rossii koschustvenno, schitaet
Talgat Tadzutdin”, Interfax Religiya, 17 December 2010, http://www.interfax-religion.ru/
islam/?act=news&div=38780 (accessed 20 March 2019)).

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
Eventually, not only did the muftiates fail to unite but also an advisory body30
that would include representatives of all three Muslim religious organizations
failed to be formed.
Even if we take for granted Niyazov’s version that all the main negotiators
sincerely sought to unite, their statements and actions during this process sig-
nal that they did not have an agreed-upon concept of a united muftiate, the
shared idea of how to unite. For instance, in the press release of the presidium
of TsDUM, it was emphasized that the uniting of muftiates is possible only
within the framework of TsDUM.31 As for Gaynutdin, he did not make any
public statements that would confirm his determination to create a united all-
Russian muftiate. Perhaps, he took part in the negotiations on uniting so that
none of Muslims could in future reproach him that he did nothing to overcome
the split in the Russian ummah. Head of KTsMSK Berdyev did not play an ac-
tive role in this process at all.
By the end of spring 2010, it became obvious that the attempt to unite the
federal muftiates had failed. However, the very initiative to unite caused suspi-
cion in certain circles. In April 2010 in his article “The Fourth Force of Russian
Islam” the alarmist publicist Roman Silantyev32 wrote that “against the back-
drop of perturbations in the largest centralised organisations incomprehen-
sible to ordinary Muslims, the number of independent Muslim organisations
is growing every year, and they can soon form a full-fledged fourth force in
Russian Islam”.33
Silantyev’s article looked like an announcement of the “fourth muftiate”.
Indeed, six months later, on 8 December 2010, the creation of a new religious
organisation, the Russian Association of Islamic Consensus (All-Russian
Muftiate), was announced.34
30 The idea to create such an advisory body was voiced by TsDUM “(TsDUM otkazalos’ uchast-
vovat’ v peregovorah ob obyedinenii veduschih islamskih organizatciy strany”, Interfax
Religiya, 11 December 2009, http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=33331 (ac-
cessed 20 March 2019)).
31 “Zayavlenie presidiuma TsDUM po voprosu ob obyedinenii islamskoi ummy”, Info-Islam,
16 March 2010, www.info-islam.ru/publ/novosti/rossiya/zajavlenie_prezidiuma_cdum_rossii
_po_voprosu_ob_obedinenii_islamskoj_ummy/1-1-0-10161 (accessed 20 March 2019).
32 More about R. Silantyev see: Ragozina S. “Protecting “Traditional Islam” from “Radical
Islam”: Discourse of Islamophobia in the Russian Media”, in State, Religion and Church in
Russia and Worldwide, № 2 (2018), 289-292.
33 Silantyev R. “Chetvertaya sila Rossiyskogo islama”, op.cit.
34 This name was not chosen by chance. The abbreviation “rais” which is often used in
Russian press to refer to this muftiate is translated from Arabic as “chairman, leader”.

276 Bekkin
4 The Russian Association of Islamic Consensus (All-Russian

Muftiate)
Among the experts I interviewed there is no unity regarding actual reasons for
the creation of rais as the forth federal muftiate. Shortly after the creation of
rais, the Council of Muftis of Russia made a tough statement addressing the
new religious structure:
rais appeared in response to the steps to unite undertaken by Gaynutdin,

Berdiyev and Tadzhuddin. It was decided that, since the Muslims have
embarked on the path of unity, it is necessary to create a puppet mufti-
ate that will vocally obstruct this movement. A religious theatre of the
absurd is being created. The designated “pocket muftis” will be used as
puppets that impede the activities of Muslims in the development of
Islam. These puppets, as well as Islamophobes from among the authori-
ties, such as Grishin35, will undoubtedly strive to suppress the develop-
ment of Islam in Russia.36
The version of state authorities’ involvement into the creation of rais is shared
by A.-V. Niyazov, who asserts that some bureaucrats from the Presidential
Administration of Russia were directly involved in the establishment of rais,
and later of one more “parallel” muftiate—dsmr. Niyazov repeats the of-
ficial point of view of smr that the creation of rais was a response to the
federal muftiates’ attempt to unite in 2009-2010.37 Niyazov’s point of view is
largely shared by the chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims
of the Volga Region, Muqaddas Bibarsov38, the former mufti of the Spiritual
35 Alexey Grishin, a former member of the presidential administration, where he served as
adviser to the Office for Internal Policy from 2002 to 2011.
36 “Vpered k proshlomu. Perspektyvy Dukhovnogo sobraniya musul’man Rossii”, IslamRF,
16 December 2016, http://www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusmonitorings/41031/ (accessed
20 March 2019).
37 Interview with A.-V. Niyazov, 29 March 2018. Author’s field research. The fact that rais
was created not from the ground, but from the top, is also confirmed by A. Krganov, for-
mer colleague of Khuzin (Interview with Al’bir Krganov, 07.03.2018. Author’s field ma-
terials). It is noteworthy that Khuzin is of the similar opinion about Krganov’s Spiritual
Assembly of Muslims of Russia: “I think that this was made only for one person—Al’bir
hazrat Krganov. And this is a stillborn child rather than a viable undertaking”. (Interview
with Muhametgali Khuzin, 04.12.2017. Author’s field materials).
38 Interview with Muqaddas Bibarsov, 8 August 2018. Author’s field research.

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan Gabdullah Galiullin39

and politologist Ruslan Aysin.40
Furthermore, this point of view is actually confirmed by R. Silantyev’s state-
ment: “The All-Russian Muftiate was created as a guard against the exces-
sive ambitions of Mufti Ravil Gaynutdin and was considered as a temporary
measure”.41
A completely different version of the origin of rais is stated by one of its
founders, Muhametgali Khuzin. In 2010, Khuzin, being the mufti of the Perm
Muftiate (a regional muftiate independent of both TsDUM and smr), was
elected chairman of the executive committee of rais.42
According to Khuzin, the motive for the organisation of the new muftiate
was the desire of a number of Muslim religious figures to “progress and bring
benefits to the society”.43 According to Khuzin, not only did the bipolar sys-
tem of the Russian muftiates, established in the second half of the 1990s, suit
well the leadership of the country, but also was comfortable to the leaders of
the two competing spiritual administrations—Tadzhuddin and Gaynutdin.44
Thus, according to Khuzin, the creation of rais was an antisystem action
aimed at “not playing according to a pre-written … scenario, but making a jerk
to the side, to break the circle”.45
The material at my disposal does not allow me to categorically confirm
or disprove Khuzin’s words that the competition between Tadzhuddin and
Gaynutdin was only a skilful staging. Those tough, often even insulting state-
ments that smr addressed to Tadzhuddin46, can indicate that participants in
the “staging” either overplayed or the confrontation between them really did
take place.
39 Interview with Gabdullah Galiullin, 31 May 2018. Author’s field research.
40 Interview with Ruslan Aysin, 30 May 2018. Author’s field research.
41 “Duhovnomu sobraniyu predstoit dokazat svoyu zhiznesposobnost’”, op.cit.
42 In 2005, Khuzin was removed from the post of a deputy chairman of TsDUM at the mufti-
ate’s plenary meeting after he and his associates F. Salman and A. Krganov had attempted
to restrict the authority of T. Tadzhuddin (“Huzin Muhametgali Ravilovich”, Musul’mane
Rossii, 21 July 2011, http://dumrf.ru/common/biographies/ 1088 (accessed 20 March 2019)).
43 Interview with Muhametgali Khuzin, 04.12.2017. Author’s field materials.
44 Ibid. Author’s field materials. Khuzin’s point of view about the artificiality of the con-
flict between Tadzhuddin and Gaynutdin is shared by the former chairman of the coun-
cil of ‘ulama’ of rais F. Salman. (Interview with Farid Salman, 01.06.2018, Author’s field
materials).
46 See, for example, the reaction of smr to the announcement by Tadzhuddin of jihad against
the United States. smr declared Tadzhuddin a false prophet, with whom “no Muslim has
the right to perform prayer and follow instructions from his side”, Kommersant, 15 April
2003, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/376940 (accessed 20 March 2019)).

278 Bekkin
In any case, no matter what version of the relationship between Tadzhuddin

and Gaynutdin we take as the main one, none of them confirms or refutes the
idea that in 2009 both of these muftis seriously planned the uniting of their
subordinate spiritual administrations.
If we operate only with well-known facts, then we will have the following
sequence of events: Tadzhuddin initiated the uniting of all-Russian Islamic
centres (TsDUM, smr, KTsMSK) (November 2009); the leaders of all three fed-
eral muftiates took part in the negotiations on unification (December 2009—
spring 2010); the process of unification was suspended for unknown reasons
(spring 2010); a new muftiate was announced, claiming for the all-Russian sta-
tus (announcement—April 2010, constituent conference—December 2010).
Everything happened in this sequence.
Thus, even if the establishment of rais were not a direct response of the
state to the uniting process among all-Russian spiritual administrations, grant-
ing of consent to the creation of rais by itself seemed to indicate with that
the state’s confessional policy was aimed at preventing unity in Russian Islam.
The founders of rais were several regional spiritual administrations of
Muslims: of the Stavropol Territory, of the Republic of Mordovia, of the Urals
and the Muslim community of Ryazan city. Mufti of the Stavropol Territory
(Stavropoloskiy Krai) Muhammad Rahimov was elected the chairman of
rais. Earlier, on 27 April 2010 Rahimov was elected chairman of dum of the
Stavropol Territory. Considering that this regional dum was created on pur-
pose in April 2010, when the idea of the “fourth muftiate” was being openly
discussed in the press, it cannot be ruled out that the establishment of dum of
the Stavropol Territory and the appointment of Rahimov as its chairman was
part of the project called rais.
Rahimov was not the sole leader of the newly created muftiate. At the helm
of rais was a triumvirate: Muhammad Rahimov (mufti, chairman of the muf-
tiate), Muhametgali Khuzin (chairman of the executive committee), Farid
Salman (chairman of the council of ‘ulama’).
The actual main ideologist of rais was Khuzin.47 When he worked at
TsDUM, he positioned himself as an irreconcilable fighter against Wahhabism.
Under Wahhabis Khuzin understood religious figures and their followers who
were disloyal to the official Muslim religious figures.48 In his public speeches,
47 According to F. Salman, he (i.e. Farid Salman) as the chairman of the council of ‘ulama’
was the main person responsible for the ideological work at rais (Interview with Farid
Salman, 01.06.2018. Author’s field materials).
48 “Vselenskaya lozh’. Ili kto kleveschet na musul’man?”, Golos islama, 14 January 2012,
https://golosislama.com/news.php?id=4549 (accessed 20 March 2019).

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
Khuzin openly admitted that he was the initiator of the persecution of his co-
religionists, whom he considered Wahhabis, and criticized siloviki49 for their
lack of initiative in persecuting them.50
Thus, the “right” mufti with his anti-Wahhabi rhetoric and open support for
the siloviki, Khuzin fit perfectly into the realities of Putin’s Russia.51 However,
not he, but a practically unknown outside the North-Western Caucasus,
Rahimov was elected the mufti of rais. According to Khuzin, the appointment
of Rahimov to the post of a mufti was part of a thought through strategy:
It was clear that the creation of the All-Russian Muftiate rais would
cause a storm of emotions from muftis Tadzhuddin and Gaynutdin. And
in order not to exacerbate criticism and attacks on the organization
with attacks on my person, they decided to make a newly baked mufti …
Rahimov, chairman of rais with purely representative functions. The
logic was that he was a new man who had not done anything (zero) and
he had almost nothing to be criticized for …52
Subsequently, Khuzin evaluated the decision to appoint Rahimov as a fatal

mistake, which led to the collapse of the muftiate.53
At first, there was a certain unity among the members of the triumvirate
on the issues of interaction with the state and roc. In the list of priorities for
the new muftiate was to deepen the dialogue with the representatives of the
traditional religions of Russia, “first of all with the fraternal Russian Orthodox
Church”.54
The organization was ready to cooperate with TsDUM and other muftiates.55
smr was not named among the potential partners of rais. This was not an
49 This political slang word is used in Russia to denote representatives of the Russian secu-
rity forces (Federal Security Service, police, armed forces, etc.), as well as politicians and
businessmen affiliated with them.
50 “Vselenskaya lozh’. Ili kto kleveschet na musul’man?”, op.cit. Accusations of Wahhabism
against one’s opponents or competitors have long ago become the norm among Russian
muftis. Khuzin is no exception.
51 By the way, Khuzin was the first mufti who visited Syria after the start of the civil war
there and expressed support for president B. Asad on behalf of Russian Muslims. (https://
golosislama.com/news.php?id=10968).
52 Interview with Muhametgali Khuzin, 04.12.17. Author’s field research.
53 More about it see further.
54 “Vserossiyskiy muftiat officialno vozglavil mufti Permskogo kraya”, Newsru, 26 August
2013, http://www.newsru.com/religy/26Aug2013/khuzin.html (accessed 20 March 2019).
55 “Sozdan vserossiyskiy muftiat”, Religiya i pravo, 8 December 2010, http://www.sclj.ru/news/
detail.php?SECTION_ID=227&ELEMENT_ID=3110&print=Y (accessed 09 October 2018).

280 Bekkin
accident, but reflected the conscious position of the leadership of the new
muftiate in relation to the former. Moreover, one of the first initiatives of the
leadership of rais was the appeal to the authorities asking to suspend the ac-
tivities of smr on the ground that “the activities of the Council cause “substan-
tial harm to the security interests of the country” and are aimed at “inciting
interethnic and inter-confessional discord and war”.56
The appearance of the new muftiate was met with great enthusiasm by
Roman Silantyev. According to him, rais “has already changed the alignment
of forces … This organization immediately, in just a couple of weeks, became
a full-fledged player on the field of four players, and by some parameters sur-
passing the Council of Muftis of Russia”.57
However, the “new player” did not live up to the expectations of its organis-
ers and those who welcomed its appearance. Less than two years later serious
disagreements arose between its founders. In July 2012, the members of the
presidium of rais made changes to the charter. Khuzin was removed from
the post of the chairman of the executive committee of rais. The reason for
this, in the opinion of the members of the presidium, was that: “the activity
of mufti of Perm Territory Khuzin M.R. creates an unhealthy situation at rais
and interferes with the productive activity of the organisation”.58 Mufti of the
Republic of Mordovia Fagim Shafiev was elected a new chairman of the ex-
ecutive committee. However, Khuzin refused to recognize the decision of the
presidium. Thus, rais split into two groups: one headed by Khuzin and mufti
of the Urals Sibagatullah Saidullin, and the other, led by Shafiev and chairman
of rais Rahimov.
In August 2013, Khuzin managed to return to the leadership of rais, he
was elected its chairman. Khuzin’s opponent Shafiev became his first deputy.
At the same time, such bodies of rais as the executive committee and the
council of ‘ulama’ were abolished. Earlier in July of the same year, after a vote
56 More about it see in the statement published by rais: “Muftiyat prizval vlasti priosta-
novit’ deyatel’nost Soveta Muftiev”, M. Khuzin’s blog, 20 December 2010, http://khuzin
.ucoz.ru/publ/raskol_i_razborki/muftijat_prizval_vlasti_priostanovit_dejatelnost_soveta
_muftiev/21-1-0-442 (accessed 20 March 2019).
57 “Roman Silantyev schitaet, chto Vserossiyskij muftiat uzhe izmenil situaciyu v rossiys-
kom islame”, Religare, 28 December 2010, http://www.religare.ru/2_82117.html (accessed
20 March 2019).
58 “Mufti Khuzin otstranen ot rukovodstva Vserossiyskogo muftiata”, ria Novosti,
30 November 2011, https://ria.ru/society/20121130/912952877.html (accessed 20 March
2019).

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
of no-confidence, Rahimov resigned. Following this, dum of the Stavropol

Territory, led by Rahimov, left rais and became part of KTsMSK.59
However, personnel changes within rais were no longer able to stop the
centrifugal tendencies inside the muftiate. The decision to elect Khuzin was
challenged by several muftis headed by the chairman of the abolished Council
of ‘ulama’ of rais—Farid Salman.60 In October of the same year, Khuzin was
forced to leave the post of the head of the Perm Muftiate, and the muftiate
itself was returned to the control of TsDUM. Thus, having remained a mufti
without a muftiate, Khuzin could no longer claim any influence on the mem-
bers of rais.
According to Khuzin, his own mistake, which became fatal for the fate of
rais, was that he “made a compromise … at a key moment in the creation of
the organization”.61 The compromise, according to the ex-mufti, consisted in
the fact that he allowed the situation of dual power and agreed to the appoint-
ment as the nominal head of the muftiate of M. Rahimov.62
The example of rais in general and of M. Khuzin in particular demonstrates
that the strategy built by the initiators of the creation of this “parallel” muftiate
was justified at the initial stage. Khuzin, who claimed the role of the number
one man in the muftiate, demonstrated not only unconditional devotion to
the authorities, but also the willingness to take an active part in sweeping the
space from not completely loyal religious organisations and groups of believ-
ers. The part of the strategy that affected relations with roc also differed with
greater determination. Not only did Khuzin recognize the leading role of roc
in the Russian society, but also demonstrated the readiness to accept the views
of Orthodox hierarchs, among others, on problems relating to Muslims. Such a
strategy would undoubtedly have been even more in demand against the back-
ground of the strengthening role of the concept of the Russian world (Russkiy
mir) in the country after 2014. rais had, however, ceased to exist by that time.
The break-up of rais returned the situation with the federal muftiates to
the former tripolar system: TsDUM, smr and KTsMSK. However, in 2013—the
year in which rais collapsed—a new trend was becoming more and more
59 “Muftiat Stavropolya: edinoglasnoe “za”, Kavpolit, 29 July 2015, http://kavpolit.com/

articles/muftijat_edinoglasnoe_za-18672/ (accessed 20 March 2019).
60 Interview with Farid Salman, 06.01.2018. Author’s field materials.
62 Ibid. Compare this with the statement by R. Silantyev: “It (rais. – R.B.) has coped well
with its task, but in this case the primary was the structure itself, for which then the
leaders were sought. Little administrative experience of the leaders of the All-Russian
Muftiate and their multiplicity, in fact, predetermined the fate of this organisation”.
(“Duhovnomu sobraniyu predstoit dokazat svoyu zhiznesposobnost’”, op.cit.).

282 Bekkin
noticeable. It was the trend towards strengthening of the role of regional muf-
tiates, in particular those which were leaders by the number of Muslim com-
munities (e.g. muftiates in Russian national republics: Tatarstan, Chechnya
and Dagestan). Their strengthening and claims to represent the interests of
Muslims of Russia at the federal level were a powerful disintegrating factor in
the issue of the unity of Russian spiritual administrations.
Despite the failure of the rais project, the idea of creating a “parallel” mufti-
ate was not discredited. In 2016, three years after rais ceased to exist, another
muftiate claiming the all-Russian scale was established, the Spiritual Assembly
of Muslims of Russia (dsmr).
5 The Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia (dsmr )
The creation of dsmr was announced in Moscow on 30 November 2016.63 The

founders of dsmr were ten Muslim spiritual administrations, including dum
of Tomsk region, dum of Mordovia, dum of Chuvashia etc. that used to be a
part of either TsDUM or smr. According to the chairman of the newly created
muftiate, Al’bir Krganov, the issue of creating dsmr was discussed as early as
in 201364, that is, when rais was in a deep crisis, and it was clear that this proj-
ect was no longer viable.
Analyzing the history of the establishment of dsmr, one may not omit not-
ing that the creation of the new “parallel” muftiate was announced after an-
other unsuccessful attempt to unite the two federal muftiates—TsDUM and
smr, which took place in 2015.
In 2005, Krganov was appointed first deputy mufti of Tadzhuddin after
the scandalous resignation of Khuzin, who was accused of separatism. This
appointment was made notwithstanding the fact that Krganov had been in-
volved in the plot against Tadzhuddin along with M. Khuzin and F. Salman.65
In 2012, at the Ninth Congress of TsDUM, Krganov was eventually removed
from his post “in connection with the loss of confidence”.66 Despite this con-
flict situations, by 2015 Krganov had already formed (in the eyes of both the
63 “Rol’ religii v ukreplenii edinstva obschestva i razvitii mezhcivilizacionnogo dialoga v 21

veke”, As-Salam, 01 January 2017, https://as-salam.ru/news/1/ (accessed 20 March 2019).
64 “Dlya chego sozdano novoe Duhovnoe Sobraniye Musul’man Rossii”, Posredi, 15 January
2017, http://posredi.ru/duxovnoe-sobranie-musulman-rossii.html (accessed 20 March
2019).
65 Interview with Farid Salman, 06.01.2018. Author’s field materials.
66 “Sozdanie Duhovnogo sobraniya musul’man Rossii”, 29 December 2016, http://www
.ng.ru/faith/2016-12-29/11_6897_muslim.html (accessed 20 March 2019).

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
Russian authorities and Muslims) the image of a person who was completely
loyal to the established political regime in the country, which recognizes the
supremacy of the roc over other religious organisations in Russia.67
From the very first days of the existence of dsmr, mufti Krganov did not
hide his intention to create another all-Russian muftiate.68 The very name of
the new muftiate—the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia—was not
chosen by chance. It was called upon to evoke analogies with the Orenburg
Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly69, the successor of which is TsDUM.
Unlike the leadership of rais, Krganov is more cautious in his statements
and does not make harsh attacks on other muftiates. In an ideological sense,
Krganov himself demonstrates his closeness to his former chief, Tadzhuddin.70
This is manifested not only in the statement of Krganov on the canonical unity
with TsDUM, but also in the almost joint view of the leaders of the two muf-
tiates on the confessional policy pursued in Putin’s Russia. Both Tadzhuddin
and Krganov view Russia as an Orthodox state with religious minorities. The
principle that “everyone sows in their own kitchen garden”, proclaimed by
Tadzhuddin, is completely shared by Krganov.71
The founders of dsmr took into account the negative experience of its pre-
decessor, rais.72 In particular, dsmr has a sole leader. There are also structural
67 Interview with Ruslan Aysin, 30.05. 2018. Author’s field materials. In 2005, Krganov was
appointed first deputy mufti of Tadzhuddin after the scandalous resignation of Khuzin,
who was accused of separatism. This appointment was made notwithstanding the fact
that Krganov had been involved in the plot against Tadzhuddin along with M. Khuzin and
F. Salman. (Interview with Farid Salman, 06.01.2018. Author’s field materials). In 2012, at
the Ninth Congress of TsDUM, Krganov was eventually removed from his post “in con-
nection with the loss of confidence”. (“Sozdanie Duhovnogo sobraniya musul’man Rossii”,
29 December 2016, http://www.ng.ru/faith/2016-12-29/11_6897_muslim.html (accessed
20 March 2019)).
68 “Sozdanie Duhovnogo sobraniya musul’man Rossii”, op.cit.
69 “V Rossii poyavilsa novy federalnij muftiat”, Official website of Moscow muftiate,
03 December 2016, http://rosmuslim.ru/news/8109/?lang=ru (accessed 09 October 2018).
It is noteworthy that when creating rais, the original version of the name of rais alleg-
edly proposed by Khuzin was almost identical to that of dsmr. Khuzin also asserts that
the constitutive documents of dsmr were copied from those he prepared when creating
rais. (Interview with Muhametgali Khuzin, 04.12.2017. Author’s field materials).
70 Interview with Al’bir Krganov, 07.03.2018. Author’s field materials.
71 In inter-Islamic and interreligious relations, TsDUM strictly follows the principle of eth-
nocentricity extending its influence mainly to Tatars (“everyone sows in their own kitch-
en garden” as mufti Tadzhuddin once formulated it). This principle means not only the
refusal to conduct missionary activity among non-Muslims, but also the condemnation of
those ethnic Russians who convert to Islam.
72 The mufti of dsmr was on the whole negative towards rais, sharing the point of view
of those who believed that the government intervened in the creation of this muftiate

284 Bekkin
differences between the two muftiates. While the structure of rais resembled
in the greater degree that of TsDUM which has a power vertical, dsmr has
a horizontal structure similar to that of smr as it was conceived in the mid-
1990s, or of KTsMSK.
The way in which the two “parallel” muftiates were created also differed.
In the case of rais, firstly an organisation was created, then representatives
of the regional muftiates were engaged in it in different ways. In the case of
dsmr, the primary was a specific mufti who managed to gain a foothold in
Moscow and establish relations with the authorities.73 Quite soon, Krganov
succeeded in getting several large muftiates to join dsmr. Of fundamental im-
portance was the incorporation of one of the major regional muftiates, the
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of St. Petersburg and the North-Western
Region of Russia that used to be part of TsDUM. dsmr also includes (as an
associate member) the Muftiate of Dagestan (dum D), which is second after
dum RT by the number of registered communities among all Russian mufti-
ates (including federal ones).
Thus, with the existence of one-man management and, at the same time,
the presence of a horizontal structure in the muftiate itself, the risk of inter-
nal conflicts within dsmr is quite low. According to experts, unless Krganov
makes a serious mistake, he and the dsmr have good chances to become one
of the leading all-Russian muftiates in terms of such indicators as the number
of communities and the number of regions in which they function.74
6 Conclusion
The existence of three federal muftiates in Russia was a common occurrence

in the late 1990s and first decade 2000s. Federal and regional authorities have
(Interview with Al’bir Krganov, 07.03.2018. Author’s field materials). Meanwhile, accord-
ing to F. Salman, dsmr was created as a “second rais”, but Krganov took into account
the mistakes of his predecessors (Interview with Farid Salman, 01.06.2018. Author’s field
materials).
73 “The Spiritual Assembly has a different structure—this organisation was created for a
specific Muslim leader who has long been claiming to enter “the big league” of muftis.
So, Al’bir Krganov, at the end of 1999, accompanied Vladimir Putin during his trip to
Chechnya. Since then, he had gained weight and experience, which allowed him to move
to a new level.” (“Duhovnomu sobraniyu predstoit dokazat svoyu zhiznesposobnost’”,
op.cit.).
74 Interview with Rais Suleimanov, 02.06.2018. Author’s field materials; Interview with Farid
Salman, 01.06.2018. Author’s field materials.

Europefrom8 (2019) 265-285
Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM
learnt how to interact with these Muslim centres, choosing a more convenient
and tractable partner.
Strengthening of the competition among the muftiates is facilitated by the
overall political situation in Russia. In Russian realities, the mufti is not a theo-
logian, but an official or even a manager of the state corporation whose main
task is to win over competitors. Ability to solve political issues and find com-
mon language not only with federal and regional authorities, but also with the
Russian Orthodox Church is an important factor of success.
In modern conditions, even a minimal manifestation of political disloyalty
on the part of any kind of public organisation (not only muftiates) in relation
to the authorities can cost its leaders their office.75 Organisations not con-
trolled by the state, including those in the religious field, are being swept down
all over the country. There is no doubt that both muftis T. Tadzhuddin and R.
Gaynutdin are quite loyal to the existing political regime in Russia. They have
repeatedly proved this in their own words and actions in connection with the
recent political events. However, in modern political conditions, not only must
leaders of religious organizations show complete loyalty, but also complete
controllability. In this regard, Gaynutdin and Tadzhuddin are inferior to the
leaders of the “parallel” muftiates.
Meanwhile, the tightening of state control over the activities of spiritual ad-
ministrations does not seem to be yielding the expected result: i.e. replacing
disloyal or not completely loyal or controlled muftiates with fully controlled
ones. As the example of rais has shown, government intervention only is not
enough to make a new muftiate an effective and viable undertaking.
Attempts to establish rais and then dsmr demonstrate that the “architects”
of both projects did not have a clear strategy. Controversial and often unsuc-
cessful measures taken by the state when creating and managing the activity of
muftiates are, to a large extent the result of misunderstanding by the bureau-
crats who are managing religious sphere of the essence of Islamic religion and
deep processes occurring in the Muslim community of Russia. Establishment
of “parallel” muftiates could only be a short-term solution helping to tempo-
rary restrain federal spiritual administrations of Muslims from uniting under
an umbrella all-Russian muftiate according to the well-known principle divide
et impera. In the long run, however, such measures could only result in the
final loss of authority of the individual muftis involved and the institution of
the muftiate as a whole.
75 Interview with Ruslan Aysin, 30.05.2018. Author’s field materials; Interview with Gabdul-
lah Galiullin, 31.05.2018. Author’s field materials.


"Parallel" Muftiates As The "Third Force" Among Spiritual Administrations of Muslims in Russia

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

"Parallel" Muftiates As The "Third Force" Among Spiritual Administrations of Muslims in Russia

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285

“Parallel” Muftiates as the “Third Force” among

muftiate – “parallel” muftiates—the Russian Association of Islamic Consensus (All-

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/22117954-12341400

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

2) Regional muftiates, including: a) independent regional muftiates (in

2 Brief History of Muftiates in Russia

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

10 Skovgaard-Petersen J., Op. cit., 16.

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

(referred to in this article as muftiate, or Spiritual Administration of Muslims),

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

3 Circumstances Surrounding Emergence of “Parallel” Muftiates

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

4 The Russian Association of Islamic Consensus (All-Russian

rais appeared in response to the steps to unite undertaken by Gaynutdin,

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan Gabdullah Galiullin39

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

In any case, no matter what version of the relationship between Tadzhuddin

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Subsequently, Khuzin evaluated the decision to appoint Rahimov as a fatal

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

of no-confidence, Rahimov resigned. Following this, dum of the Stavropol

59 “Muftiat Stavropolya: edinoglasnoe “za”, Kavpolit, 29 July 2015, http://kavpolit.com/

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

5 The Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia (dsmr )

The creation of dsmr was announced in Moscow on 30 November 2016.63 The

63 “Rol’ religii v ukreplenii edinstva obschestva i razvitii mezhcivilizacionnogo dialoga v 21

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

The existence of three federal muftiates in Russia was a common occurrence

Journal of Muslims inDownloaded

Journal of Muslims in Europe 8 (2019) 265-285 Downloaded from Brill.com10/26/2019 09:38:19AM

You might also like

10 Skovgaard-Petersen J., Op. cit., 16.

59 “Muftiat Stavropolya: edinoglasnoe “za”, Kavpolit, 29 July 2015, http://kavpolit.com/

63 “Rol’ religii v ukreplenii edinstva obschestva i razvitii mezhcivilizacionnogo dialoga v 21