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Steps to an Ecology of Psychotherapy: The Legacy of Gregory Bateson

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DOI: 10.1002/sres.2549

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Systems Research and Behavioral Science
Syst. Res (2018)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/sres.2549

■ Research Paper

Steps to an Ecology of Psychotherapy: The

Legacy of Gregory Bateson
Francesco Tramonti*
Istituto di Psicoterapia Relazionale, Pisa, Italy

The article addresses the relevance of the work of Gregory Bateson for psychotherapy
today. Despite being quite eclipsed by other mental health paradigms, the author’s
ecological epistemology still seems to be topical for a proper framing of complex features
such as psychological well-being. Indeed, many approaches to psychotherapy, not only
systemic-relational approaches, affirm the crucial importance of context and the centrality
of relationships in defining psychosocial functioning and making psychotherapies
actually effective. This article recalls the most relevant contributions of Gregory Bateson
for the understanding of communication and the functioning of the mind, from the
original formulation of the double bind theory to the parallels between thought and
biological processes. In this light, Bateson’s view of mind and learning still appears to
be a valuable framework for thinking about some of the more relevant aspects of
psychotherapy, not least the issue of research and the social context in which psychotherapy
itself takes place. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords Bateson; psychotherapy; context; ecology; systems

INTRODUCTION dated theory, as an emblem of a period now

More than 60 years have passed since the publi-
cation of the historical and controversial article
‘Towards a theory of schizophrenia’ (Bateson
et al., 1956). The work of Gregory Bateson, while
remaining a source of inspiration for many
clinicians and specific therapeutic models, seems
rather overshadowed when looking at the widest
picture of mental health. The concept of the
double bind is often cited as an example of an out-
* Correspondence to: Francesco Tramonti, Istituto di Psicoterapia
Relazionale, Pisa, Italy.
E-mail: tramonti.francesco@gmail.com
passed and consigned to history by a psychopa-
thology that has been revolutionized, in recent
decades, by the findings on the neurobiological
correlates of psychic disorders. However, there
could be many reasons, as discussed in this
article, to return to Bateson’s writings to better
frame many of the doubts and questions that
psychotherapy is currently facing.
The relevance of contexts and relationships is
probably the cornerstone of Bateson’s epistemol-
ogy, and such relevance is still worth remember-
ing. Psychotherapy is primarily a context and a
relationship of curing and learning and is in turn
a practice that is embedded in a complex web of

Received 28 March 2018

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 7 July 2018
RESEARCH PAPER
contexts and relationships (Wampold and Imel,
2011). Psychological well-being can no longer be
considered as simply a matter of individual
mental processes or defective brains, although
temperament and biological factors certainly
play a role. The importance of contexts and rela-
tionships should thus be mentioned again and
restated in a new, different vein, keeping away
any temptation of reductionism and embracing
a complex and multifaceted stance on the
functioning of the mind and life processes. This,
indeed, was one of the most significant teachings
of Gregory Bateson, who relentlessly emphasized
the shortcomings, and the risks, of narrow
visions and rigid thinking.
FROM DOUBLE BIND TO COMPLEXITY
The double bind construct was presented in the
aforementioned article by Bateson et al. (1956) as
a possible etiological factor in the genesis of
schizophrenia. The concept arose from the
research studies the authors conducted in Palo
Alto. It consists of a contradiction between a
message and the related meta-message that
contextualizes it and a contradiction that is
repeated over time and within an intense and
indispensable interpersonal relationship, such as
between parent and child. Bateson considered
the publication of the text to be premature and,
later, together with Jackson and Weakland, wrote
a short new article in response to the critical com-
ments that appeared in the literature, pointing
out that the previous work did not claim to pro-
pose the double bind as the ultimate and unique
explanation of psychoses (Bateson et al., 1963).
Bateson then expanded the concept from a possi-
ble etiological factor in the genesis of schizophre-
nia, as well as a model for understanding
phenomena such as art, poetry and humour, to
a much more extensive and universal form of
communication, not limited to human language,
and to be found in the vast biological processes
of adaptation and evolution (Bateson, 1978). In
fact, according to Bateson’s epistemology, com-
munication and the relationships between mes-
sages and meta-messages are not confined to
human interactions but are inherent to learning
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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and life in living systems (Rieber, 1989). A further
and relevant insight into the semantic declina-
tions of the double bind in relation to different
psychic disorders is provided by Sluzki and
Verón (1971).
The evolving concept of the double bind has
remained marginal in scientific debate. The
theory is mostly remembered for its original
formulations and implications, while it has
become progressively discredited as the knowl-
edge of other factors affecting mental health has
increased. As often happens in this field, ‘the
winner takes it all, the loser has to fall’,1 meaning
that conflicts between different approaches are
still pronounced and harsh at times. In other
words, mental health suffers from dramatic
oscillations in the adoption of explanatory
models, resulting in a fragmentation of knowl-
edge and poor investment in collaboration and
dialectics. The long-ago proposed biopsychosocial
model in medicine (Engel, 1977) appears to be
only partially embraced in one area, that of men-
tal health, where it should be more natural to
think in those terms. The undoubted benefits for
treatment derived from the advancement of
neurobiological research on mental disorders do
not justify the obscuring of other variables,
particularly when we consider that mental health
problems do not seem to diminish, and the
explanatory models of the relationships between
biological and psychological phenomena still
raise unanswered questions (Miller, 2010;
Deacon, 2013). There could be the suspicion,
therefore, that ‘the baby has been thrown out
with the bath water’ by relegating to the annals
a theory that, although certainly insufficient to
explain the origin of psychoses, still seems to
highlight an important link between interper-
sonal communication and mind development, a
connection that is still worthy of investigation.
In this respect, the theories that originate from
attachment studies (Bowlby, 1988), which have
become increasingly popular, do not seem to
contradict those of family systems inspired by
Bateson’s work. For instance, it is stimulating to
consider the possible parallels between the
double bind concept and the contexts of human
1
The reference is to a well-known ABBA song.
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Francesco Tramonti
Syst. Res
development from which patterns of insecure or
disorganized attachment can originate, where
the balance between the perception of protection
and security in exploration is compromised
(Blizard, 2003). It is also interesting to consider
the latest developments in theoretical and clinical
perspectives that reinstate communication at the
forefront of the study of factors contributing to
the development of psychopathology (Fonagy
and Allison, 2014). In this regard, the concept of
epistemic trust, borrowed from Csibra and
Gergely’s (2011) theory of natural pedagogy,
seems to be especially noteworthy. The theory
proposes that the transmission of knowledge
through communication is a crucial aspect of
human cognitive development. From a clinical
point of view, this leads to analysing the potential
effects of the unreliability and inconsistency of
information on the development of adequate
capacities of affect regulation and understanding
of the surrounding world during the crucial early
years of life (Skolnik, 1989; Hill et al., 2003).
More generally, it is widely believed that there
is still much to be understood about the aetiology
of psychic disorders, an aetiology that is increas-
ingly defined as complex and multifactorial
(Uher and Zwicker, 2017). Our knowledge of
the genetic influences on psychic traits and
psychopathological features has grown consis-
tently in recent years, along with the awareness
that the functioning of genes is far more complex
than was thought when exploration of the
human genome began (Miller, 2010; Kendler,
2012). Nothing seems to be strictly predeter-
mined when we closely observe biological pro-
cesses, but rather, any predisposition appears to
be modulated—to a greater or lesser degree—by
the context of the development of the phenotype
and the unfolding of evolutionary processes.
Consequently, there is increasing interest in terms
and disciplines such as epigenetics, which studies
all those effects on the phenotype that derive
from the interaction between the genotypes and
the contexts of development in the absence of a
direct alteration to the DNA sequence, and
ecogenetics, which refers to the broader field of
studies on the interactions between genes and
environment (van Os et al., 2008). This does not
imply that genes should be disregarded as
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Psychotherapy on the Footprints of Gregory Bateson’s Epistemology
RESEARCH PAPER
enormously important variables in shaping psy-
chological and behavioral characteristics but
rather to give due attention to the dynamic and
continuous interaction between genes and con-
texts and to better acknowledge the role of envi-
ronmental factors in modulating gene expression.
The studies by Bateson’s group in Palo Alto
examined the interactions within families of
people with psychosis, which were understand-
ably identified as the main context of develop-
ment in which to observe the pragmatic effects
of communication. From these surveys, and from
the work of clinicians devoted to the analysis and
treatment of families of patients with psychic
disorders, the family therapy movement was
born, and with it the systemic-relational ap-
proach to psychotherapy (Goldenberg and
Goldenberg, 2009). Although, as already noted,
the double bind theory is today discredited, the
study of family relationships in relation to
psychopathology still reveals cues of significant
associations, encouraging insights that lead to
the inclusion of family relationships in a wider
framework along with other, concurrent vari-
ables, as suggested by the studies of Wynne and
colleagues (Wynne et al., 2006; Sluzki, 2007a), or
by accredited perspectives in the field of develop-
mental psychopathology (Davies and Cicchetti,
2004). In other words, it seems necessary to
fully and authentically adopt a biopsychosocial
approach, primarily investigating the interac-
tions between variables and interfaces between
different levels of analysis, without forgetting
that such levels of analysis themselves are not
things but metaphors we use to describe net-
works and hierarchies of interrelated elements
(Alessi, 1992; Onnis, 1993; Sluzki, 2007b; Miller,
2010; Kendler, 2012; Paradiso and Rudrauf,
2012). Biology, psychology and social relation-
ships are not separate or juxtaposed areas but
rather our preferred focuses to describe interde-
pendent aspects of complex phenomena.
In this vein, what we know about the impor-
tance of attachment models in shaping relational
and affect regulation skills—which are crucial
facets of psychological well-being—needs to be
studied within the context of family relationships
(Hill et al., 2003; Crittenden and Dallos, 2009), as
it is in such a context that nurturing relationships
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RESEARCH PAPER
usually take place. Where this is not the case,
either for reasons of institutionalization or be-
cause growth takes place in societies where at-
tachment relationships occur in more extensive
support networks, the need to contextualize such
relationships remains in tune with a systemic
approach that has its very foundation in the
quote ‘it is the context that fixes the meaning’
(Bateson, 1979, p. 14). The same dichotomy
between genes and environment is ultimately ob-
solete, because these variables are closely interde-
pendent and interact continuously in shaping the
development of traits and characteristics. Genetic
dispositions, in other words, do not seem to be
describable as strict instructions to build pheno-
types. Instead, they are more likely to be viewed
as factors entailing both codified restraints and
what Bateson (1970a) called an uncommitted po-
tentiality for change, which means something that
can only develop through relationships and that
encompasses degrees of flexibility that become
progressively reduced across the evolution of
the phenotypes themselves. Significantly, from
this point of view, there is evidence that the
presence of some genetic variants may exhibit
an increased risk of the development of certain
mental disorders but also, at the same time, a
stronger sensitivity to the positive effects of
environmental stimuli (Belsky et al., 2007).
Constraints and possibilities thus seem to charac-
terize the development of the biological
correlates of psychic characteristics, as already
pointed out by the science of complexity, of which
Bateson can be considered a major precursor
(Ceruti, 1996).
MIND IN CONTEXT
At a different level of analysis, we can observe
something similar when we analyse the relation-
ship between organisms—living systems—and
their environment. In this case, interdependence
is even more remarkable, as Bateson effectively
described by extending the concept of mind
outside the borders of the individual to conceive,
as a unit of evolution, or rather of co-evolution,
precisely the individual–environment system
(Bateson, 1970b). How much the individual’s
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Syst. Res
mind is deeply interconnected with life contexts
has long been a crucial issue for disciplines such
as social psychology and sociology, but what
gives substance and relevance to Bateson’s think-
ing is his emphasis on the isomorphism between
the processes of thought and biological develop-
ment (Bateson, 1979). More specifically, thoughts
and natural phenomena seem to be governed by
similar laws and processes of selection, and the
human mind is not separated from the biological
phenomena that are implicated in it, or from the
external world in which it is located. The mind
thus seems to be part of a wider sequence of pro-
cesses that, from this perspective, also displays
mental characteristics, because it can be described
in terms of organizational principles that regulate
the interaction among related elements within a
given system. Nevertheless, the human mind is
susceptible to being misled by forgetfulness
about the broader picture of life and nature. More
to the point, our conscious purpose makes us prone
to pursue goals that involve actively intervening
to modify the world we live in, often putting
aside that we only see small arcs of larger circles,
namely, segments of a broader and more complex
picture (Bateson, 1967; Bateson, 2016).
To explain this concept, in a landmark paper
on alcoholism, Bateson (1971) used the metaphor
of the woodcutter, in which the description of a
man cutting a tree with an axe is presented to
explain how each single segment of the action
involves circuits of calibration that bind the
perceptual and motor functions of the man to
the other elements, thus defining a man–axe–tree
interaction system that is ultimately inseparable.
At the core of these processes are the feedback
mechanisms acting between the elements bound
together within a system. Such mechanisms were
closely studied by General Systems Theory and
Cybernetics (Wiener, 1965; von Bertalanffy,
1967), and they became a source of inspiration
for the concept of circular causality, which defines
the interdependence between causes and conse-
quences in communication and related phenom-
ena (Watzlawick et al., 1967). Bateson attended
the famous Macy Conferences, where renowned
scholars from different disciplines gathered to
study the mechanisms of regulation in machines,
living systems and social interactions (Heims,
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Francesco Tramonti
Syst. Res
1991). Originally trained in anthropology,
Bateson first developed these concepts during
his field experience in New Guinea, where he
studied the rituals and patterns of interactions
of the Iatmul population (Bateson, 1958). These
first formulations were crucial for directing the
author towards the search for isomorphisms
and parallels at other levels of analysis and thus
towards cybernetics and the development of his
ecology of mind (Lipset, 1980).
From this perspective, Bateson conceived the
mind as the pattern that connects, the immanent or-
ganization of living systems within and outside
the boundaries of the individual organism.2 It is
not an obscure principle of vitality instilled inside
matter; rather, it is the very organization of mat-
ter itself, which is why it is necessary to discrim-
inate, as Bateson himself suggested, between
processes that are only governed by forces and
impacts, and those that are governed by signs,
that is, by the perceptions of differences (Bateson,
1970b). As specified in the ‘criteria’ of mental
process, detailed in the author’s book Mind and
Nature, information is to be understood as a
difference that makes a difference: ‘The interaction
between parts of mind is triggered by difference, and
difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon, not
located in space or time; difference is related to
negentropy and entropy rather than energy’
(Bateson, 1979, p. 92). To put it another way,
difference is what represents a sign, a significant
stimulus for the system (mind) that perceives it,
and perception is not intended here as a mere
transcription, or a passive assimilation of the
same stimulus. Rather, the perceptual system
transforms itself through stimulation, according
to the rules of its organization: ‘In the mental
process, the effects of difference are to be
regarded as transforms (i.e., coded versions)
of events which preceded them’ (Bateson, 1979,
p. 92). This is indeed how the nervous system
works, and Bateson’s contribution to what was
further explored in Maturana and Varela’s
theory of autopoiesis (1980), and constructivism
(von Foerster, 1981), is clearly relevant.
2
The footprints of Bateson’s ecology of mind can be found in some
cognitive science models (Hutchins, 2010) and, though often not ex-
plicitly quoted, the philosophy of mind (Clark and Chalmers, 1998).
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Psychotherapy on the Footprints of Gregory Bateson’s Epistemology
RESEARCH PAPER
The mind creates metaphors—or, definitively, is
a metaphor on its own—of what it perceives and,
alongside the potential of knowledge and change
inherent to difference, similarities and resem-
blances are also obvious sources of knowledge
because they are the basis of the categorization
process (Bateson, 1970b; Bateson, 1972; Bateson,
1977a; Bateson, 1979). Knowledge, development,
nature and evolution are all processes governed
by the constant interplay of perceived differences
and similarities, and psychotherapy itself can be
fruitfully described as a process that gains in
efficacy from a delicate and crucial balance
between connection and affinity on the one hand
and distinction and novelty on the other. In this
vein, therapists’ inputs are more likely to be
effective when they are intelligible to patients,
and not simply in rational terms, while at the
same time conveying the potential to make a
difference, making what Keeney and Ross
(1985) called a meaningful noise. It should be
emphasized that meaning is not an invariable
property of the message, but it is rather some-
thing the patient constructs as a reaction to the
stimulus, as we discuss further in the next
session. Decades of psychotherapy research has
taught us that patients utilize ‘whatever is
offered for their own purposes’ (Sprenkle et al.,
2009, p. 7). In fact, the balance between recogni-
tion and novelty is a fertile ground for learning,
and the dialectics between form and process is a
constant interplay that informs knowledge
(Bateson, 1979). Creating categories lets us make
sense of the world, but the fluidity of life
processes implies that such categories are not
things but descriptions of structures, and those
structures are patterns that are always part of
meta-patterns, where dichotomous thinking is
undermined and apparent contradictions may
be solved (Volk et al., 2007). This is the other side
of the double bind, the one that fuels creativity
instead of pathology.
LEARNING AND CONTROL
The implications for psychotherapy are many
and topical. In recent years, an apparent contra-
diction has arisen between the emphasis on
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technique—and the resulting creation of infinite
forms and variants of psychotherapy—and the
research evidence suggesting that techniques
actually seem far less able to explain change
and the efficacy of psychological interventions
than the so-called non-specific or common factors,
one of which is the quality of the therapeutic rela-
tionship (Norcross and Lambert, 2011; Wampold
and Imel, 2011). Good relationships and strong
therapeutic alliances are not sufficient for
shaping effective psychotherapies, but they are
certainly necessary, and the power of valid
methods stands not only in the useful strategies
they supply but also, and especially, in the solid
background and in the structure they provide
for the enhancement of potential common factors
(Sprenkle et al., 2009). Therefore, while not forget-
ting the importance of competence and profes-
sional skills, in the absence of which there
would be no distinction between psychotherapy
and other forms of social support, it seems that
the decisive therapeutic potential lies in the acti-
vation of an effective treatment system. Such a
system typically reveals a meaningful connection
between the therapist and patient, where the
tuning that occurs in therapy seems to recall the
synchronization that can be observed in attach-
ment relationships and which inform future
relational dispositions that evolve across the life
cycle under the influence of subsequent signifi-
cant relationships (Stern, 2004; Boston Change
Process Study Group, 2010). It is only within the
rich context of actual and real therapeutic rela-
tionships that techniques can have meaning and
value (Wampold and Imel, 2011).
Relationships are thus at the core of vital
processes and human development, as well as,
and not by chance, of the processes of care in psy-
chotherapy, where the aforementioned tuning
sets the conditions for promoting the processes
of learning through the power of the difference
conveyed by inputs able to expand the horizons
of thoughts and mental processes. From
Bateson’s perspective, learning, at the level of
the individual’s mind, is precisely what develop-
ment, or evolution, represents for the species
(Bateson, 1972). If structured dispositions to react
to certain stimuli are consolidated throughout
development, the therapeutic process offers a
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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chance to overcome the constraints that these
dispositions pose, especially in those contexts
where behavior results in poor adaptive func-
tioning and impaired personal growth. Learning,
however, cannot be instigated by the therapist
with control manoeuvres because, while responsi-
ble for the proposed stimuli, the therapist has no
unilateral control over the therapeutic relation-
ship, let alone over the patient (Keeney, 1983;
Dell, 1985). Therefore, learning can only emerge
from an actual transformation of the patient’s
epistemology; that is, the premises by which
stimuli are interpreted at both cognitive and
emotional levels. Going back to Bateson’s criteria
for the mental processes, what happens is a trans-
formation of the rules by which the system
modifies its structure in response to stimulation:
‘The rules of such a transformation must be
comparatively stable (i.e., more stable than the
content), but are in themselves subject to trans-
formation’ (Bateson, 1979, p. 92). This change
may be favoured but never determined, stricto
sensu, by the therapist, and this probably explains
why techniques occupy such a modest space
among the factors that foster effective cure.
The more we study psychotherapy outcomes
and processes, the more we come closer to
Bateson’s idea that ‘great teachers and thera-
pists avoid all direct attempts to influence the
action of others and, instead, try to provide
the settings or contexts in which some (usually
imperfectly specified) change may occur’
(Bateson, 1991, p. 254). There is a wealth of evi-
dence on the importance of patient-related vari-
ables in defining the efficacy of psychotherapies,
and these variables include aspects such as
patients’ preferences, attitudes, expectancies
and, not least, life events (Sprenkle et al., 2009;
Norcross and Lambert, 2011). This also corrobo-
rates what Bateson says about favouring changes
that are imperfectly specified, because as we have
previously anticipated, it is the patient who
makes meaning and actually validates it through
the experiences that psychotherapy offers and
promotes. Trying not to force the shape of
change—making due exceptions for extreme
situations or for obvious ethical reasons—is thus
a prerequisite for letting the crucial patient-
related variables play their part.
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Syst. Res
Bateson wrote important and well-known
pages about control (Bateson, 1971). In full ac-
cordance with systemic and cybernetic theories,
Bateson refused the idea that an element could
unilaterally control the system in which it is in-
cluded, in the same way that it is not given to
an organ to control the whole organism, al-
though it affects its functioning. In this regard,
it can be helpful to remember Bateson and
Haley’s disagreements about control, as well
as the nature of the double bind. Such disagree-
ments brought Bateson to abandon the group
and the research project. In fact, Haley and
Jackson proposed developing a model of
psychotherapy from the theories elaborated by
the group, emphasizing the role of control and
the inherent power of the therapeutic relation-
ship. Bateson firmly distanced himself from all
this, for reasons that are not difficult to under-
stand considering his conception of informa-
tion, difference and learning. If, on the one
hand, Haley was particularly interested in the
technical translation of what he was studying,
Bateson, on the other hand, tended to distrust
every application of his own thought, as well
as the idea that double binds were things and
that they could be counted as such (Bateson
and Bateson, 1987). His focus was rather on
the processes of learning within and through
contexts and, having shifted his interest
towards animal behavior, he also formulated a
taxonomy of learning that is still a great inspi-
ration for the study of the psychotherapeutic
process (Bateson, 1972; Boscolo and Bertrando,
1996; Visser, 2003), as psychotherapy, ultimately,
is a process of learning to learn. In a way, psy-
chotherapy can be seen as a process of learning
to recognize contexts and to move through
contexts while feeling, thinking and acting
adaptively and coherently. Similarly, from the
other side of the coin, psychopathology can also
be seen as a kind of learning. In fact, relevant
perspectives on the development of psychological
characteristics point to a description of psychopa-
thology as a progressive consolidation of adapta-
tion strategies (Crittenden and Dallos, 2009;
Fonagy and Allison, 2014). Strategies that appear
maladaptive in normal circumstances could once
have been adaptive and, thus reinforced, in
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Psychotherapy on the Footprints of Gregory Bateson’s Epistemology
RESEARCH PAPER
aversive environments, as proposed by recent
perspectives on severe personality disorders
(Fonagy et al., 2017a).
PSYCHOTHERAPY IN CONTEXT
The world of psychotherapy has been pressured,
in recent years, by the demand for outcome stud-
ies that, while legitimate and reasonable, are at
times accepted without proper critical thinking.
What raises several doubts is not the demand
itself nor the goal of verifying the efficacy and
effectiveness of interventions delivered in both
private practice and the public health sector but
rather the applied research methods and their
underlying epistemological premises. In particu-
lar, the so-called empirically supported treatments
are mainly tested by means of randomized
controlled trials that can provide high-quality
evidence and are considered the gold standard
for assessing the efficacy of medications but
whose applicability and appropriateness in
psychotherapy are questioned (Westen et al.,
2004; Deacon, 2013). Such protocols tend to be
based on strictly manualized interventions that
are scarcely representative of what really hap-
pens in clinical settings and which are informed
by an underlying idea of psychotherapy that
seems to rely on control and technical power. In
addition, such interventions are typically con-
ceived to target specific syndromes or symptoms,
yet clinical populations and psychological distur-
bances are far from being easily categorizable, as
each psychological and psychopathological
feature must be properly framed within the con-
texts of personal history and living environment.
In these protocols, psychotherapy is mostly
conceived as a clearly objectifiable active sub-
stance, putting aside variables such us the charac-
teristics of patients, therapists and the therapeutic
relationship, despite the fact that these are not
simply crucial for the effectiveness of psychother-
apy but are core aspects of its very nature. Not
least, the outcome measures need to be properly
defined and accurately chosen, as the definition
of treatment goals is not widely shared, nor is
the idea of what makes a psychotherapy effective;
whether it is, for example, the reduction of
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RESEARCH PAPER
symptoms or the improvement in quality of life
and interpersonal relationships, or even the emer-
gence of those learning processes previously
depicted, which are difficult to measure because,
as already argued, they do not belong to the
world of forces and impacts but to mind processes.
Indeed, although the reduction of symptoms is
undoubtedly an important and desirable objec-
tive of psychological treatment, it is necessary to
support and sustain it through a wider change
in the relationship between individuals and
contexts, to avoid the risk of treating ‘the symp-
tom to make the world safe for the pathology’
(Bateson, 1978, in Bateson, 1991, p. 296).
If, as research evidence suggests (Feeney and
Collins, 2015), the well-being of individuals is
inseparable from the quality of significant
relationships, the connection between people
and life contexts should be the main object of
analysis and intervention of any psychotherapy,
whether it is for individuals, families or groups.
This leads us to what is perhaps the most signifi-
cant and topical aspect of Bateson’s thinking for
psychotherapy today. Indeed, in this vein,
pursuing goals of psychological well-being can
only mean cultivating the quality of relation-
ships, of the therapeutic relationship as a means
to therapeutic ends and of the quality of the
relationships of the recipients of therapy. This
means always keeping contexts in mind, what-
ever the specific setting chosen, whether that of
an individual therapy or extended networks of
treatment. Furthermore, for psychotherapists,
including and considering themselves in com-
plex sets of intertwined systems is a necessary,
self-reflective stance to take into account the
ecology of their practice. This can strengthen the
potentialities and the effectiveness of their inter-
ventions and can reduce the risk of triggering
negative feedbacks at the level of systems larger
than the ones they target.
Psychotherapists, in other words, must be
aware of the risks they run when they arrange
their interventions on the basis of the small arcs
that they see. Therefore, therapists must not only
be aware of their own feelings and processes of
thinking, as stated by any kind of therapeutic
model, but they also need to nurture their atten-
tion to the complexity of life and their attitude
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Syst. Res
to learning, if they are to enhance their therapeu-
tic potential as persons involved in mutual and
meaningful relationships, not as technicians
repairing malfunctioning machines. In this vein,
psychotherapy could be seen as a striking exam-
ple of mutual learning, to borrow an expression
dear to Nora Bateson (2016), where not only
patients but also therapists are deeply involved
in change processes and in the calibration of ther-
apy. Any intervention, whether an attempt to
‘build emotion regulation skills’, or to ‘promote
behaviour change and cognitive reframing’,
could have no meaning at all, or even be problem
perpetuating, if the role of contexts and the role
of the therapist within the therapeutic system
are not properly taken into account. As Bateson
noted, we are in constant need of a ‘Theory of
Action within large complex systems where the
active agent is himself a part of and a product
of the system’ (Bateson, 1991, p. 254). This also
sets the limits of psychotherapy, as clinical
interventions may be ineffective if the conditions
of life contexts remain unchanged (Fonagy et al.,
2017b).
In this regard, it may be significant to outline a
tradition of clinical experiences that, especially
within the realm of systemic-relational ap-
proaches to psychotherapy, has tried to partially
fill this gap by placing interpersonal relationships
in extended social networks, even outside the
family, at the core of their treatment goals. We
can ideally, and perhaps at the expense of
oversynthesis, identify a developmental line
from the first experiences of network therapies
(Foulks, 1981), to current multisystemic therapies
(Henggeler and Schaeffer, 2016) and interven-
tions ascribable to the method of open dialogue
(Seikkula and Olson, 2003). These approaches
share a perspective focused on extended con-
texts, institutional or not, that stresses the
importance of involving networks of meaning-
ful relationships in the treatment of mental
disorders. Highlighting the importance of
contexts and relationships in defining psycho-
logical well-being is no longer an exclusive
prerogative of systemic-relational approaches
to psychotherapy but is also underscored by
important contributions from the field of
cognitive and psychodynamic theories and
Syst. Res (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/sres.2549
Francesco Tramonti
Syst. Res
therapies (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992; Hayes
et al., 2006).
When working on the person in context as the
unit of care, it is necessary to look outside the
consulting room and foster a balance between
togetherness and separateness, helping individ-
uals, families and groups to cultivate reciprocal,
fulfilling and flexible bonds in the face of life-
cycle developments and socio-cultural instances.
With such instances, as suggested by Whitaker
and Malone (1953) many years ago, psychother-
apy must maintain a dialectical relationship, with
adequate spacing, to avoid unconditional and
uncritical adhesion to patterns, trends and im-
pulses that can sometimes be harmful for mental
health. This topic is indeed of particular concern
today, when the individualist tendencies of many
modern societies, and the concomitant deprecia-
tion of human bonds, put psychotherapy up
against a concrete and high risk of collusion with
expectations informed by a spasmodic quest for
the selfish fulfilment of individual needs (Do-
herty, 1996). This can in fact move away from
personal well-being and contribute to the erosion
of the social fabric and sense of community, as
well as to the proliferation of cyclic and continu-
ous feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration. For
these reasons, psychotherapy must monitor,
more than ever, its role in the wider context of
social trends and relationships, possibly promot-
ing relational skills—the readiness to be relational,
in the words of Fishbane (2001)—and an ethical
stance that, based upon the recognition of the
crucial role of relationships in shaping psycho-
logical well-being, is far from being moralistic.
Instead, it is something that comes close to the
notion of aesthetics, as stressed by Bateson
himself, for whom ethics and aesthetics, not
without reason, tended to overlap. In this regard,
Bateson (1991) named aesthetic sensibility
precisely as the ability to grasp the connections
between and within living systems and to act
accordingly. While doubtful of psychotherapy
and of any targeted action or other remedial in-
tervention, Bateson (1972) felt that psychother-
apy itself could represent one of those contexts
in which higher grades of learning could take
place: ‘As therapists, clearly we have a duty.
First, to achieve clarity in ourselves; and then to
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Psychotherapy on the Footprints of Gregory Bateson’s Epistemology
RESEARCH PAPER
look for every sign of clarity in others and to
implement them and reinforce them in whatever
is sane in them’ (Bateson, 1969, in Bateson, 1972,
p. 495).
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, Bateson’s lessons do not appear to
be in any way outdated. They seem instead to be
extremely topical and probably essential for
shedding light on many of the most complex
facets of psychotherapy, a practice that—again
using Bateson’s words—must find its balance be-
tween rigour and imagination (Bateson, 1979).
There are no easy answers in the field, and as
Bateson himself used to remark, any good ques-
tion tends to raise other questions, rather than
elicit quick answers, and this is probably manda-
tory for cultivating a sufficiently complex view
on a practice that seems to be so distant from
mechanical interventions. There are no shortcuts
for treating complex problems with easy solu-
tions, and mental disorders are complex enough
to resist overly simplified formulations and inter-
vention plans.
Finally, how useful some of Bateson’s specific
concepts are in therapeutic practice has already
been explored in many clinical and theoretical
contributions (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980;
Boscolo and Bertrando, 1996; Madonna, 2007;
Tramonti and Fanali, 2015). Within the scope of
this article, it is sufficient to remember that the
call to Bateson’s works, as well as of other
authors who have thoroughly studied the episte-
mological underpinnings of human action and
thought, is healthy and necessary because, as
Bateson emphasized, it is impossible not to have
an epistemology: ‘those who so claim have noth-
ing but a bad epistemology’ (Bateson, 1977b, in
Bateson, 1991, p. 178).
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Francesco Tramonti