Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Statutory Construction by Rolando Suarez
Statutory Construction by Rolando Suarez
CONSTRUCTION
ROLANDO A. SUAREZ
LL.B., SAN BEDA COLLEGE
Professor of Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law Review,
and Political Law Review
Former Professor of different law subjects in
several colleges (i.e., San Beda College of Law,
Adamson University, MLQU, Lyceum, University of Perpetual Help,
PUP and University of Manila); Lecturer; Powerhouse Law Review
Center; Center for Global Best Practices; IBP-MCLE; UM Review;
Perpetual Help, Las Piñas and Biñan, MLQ Pre-week,
Knowledge Providers Law Review Center,
Suarez, Zamora, Suarez and Suarez
Author: Political Law Reviewer, Constitutional Law Reviewer;
Six Months Before the Bar Outline/Reviewer; Three Months Before
The Bar Outline Reviewer Principles; Comments and Cases in Constitu-
tional Law, Volume I, First Edition and Second Edition; Principles, Com-
ments and Cases in Constitutional Law, Volume II, First Edition and
Second Edition; Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation;
Comparative Study; Roman Law and Philippine Law, First and Second
Edition; Introduction to Law, First, Second, Third and Fourth Editions;
Notes and Comments, Proclamation No. 3 and
The Provisional Constitution of the Philippines;
Agrarian Reform, Cooperatives and Taxation;
A Mile to Go for Genuine Land Reform in the Philippines;
Statutory Constitution, First and Second Edition; Torts and Damages
First and Second Edition; Legal Forms;
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Made Easy
iu
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
V
PREFACE
ROLANDO A. SUAREZ
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT,
PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
Statutory construction, defined ................................................ 1
Construction distinguished from interpretation .....................1
The most basic rules to remember ........................................... 2
Decisions of the Supreme Court that clarify the rule on
the issue of when to apply and interpret the law 2
Three (3) cardinal rules when the wordings of the
Constitution are subject to interpretation ......................3
Who interprets the law? ............................................................ 3
Purpose of interpretation and construction ............................. .4
When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret
and construct? ...................................................................4
New Case
Cynthia S. Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos
G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 .................................5
Old Case
Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second
25% grant of the special allowance for judges be
included in the computation of his retirement
benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004 7
Ambiguitydefined ...................................................................... 9
The present structure of government, and how this
affects interpretation and construction of statutes 9
Legislative power ... . ................................................................... 10
Case
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997...........10
ix
Judicial power, traditional concept of judicial power 13
What is the traditional concept of judicial power? ......... 13
What is the new definition of judicial power? ................13
New Case
Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 ...............................14
Old Case
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel
Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 122156,
February3, 1997...............................................................18
The Court or the judicial arm of the government shall be
governed by rules..............................................................22
Executive Department...............................................................23
The three (3) principal branches of government.....................24
CHAPTER II
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
Use intrinsic aids before resorting to extrinsic aids...............27
What are the intrinsic aids? ......................................................27
New Case
Spouses Pascual, et al.,
Francisco A. Pascual, Margarita Corazon D. Mariano,
Edwin D. Mariano and Danny R. Mariano v.
Spouses Ballesteros, et al.,
G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012 ..............................29
Old Case
LandBank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 118745, July 5, 1996 .........................................31
New Case
South Pacific Sugar Corporation and
South East Asia Sugar Mill Corporation v.
Court Of Appeals and
x
Sugar Regulatory Administration
G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011 ................................. 32
Old Case
New Case
Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v.
Hon. Court Of Appeals and Asia United Bank
G.R. No. 187919, April 25, 2012......................................43
Old Cases
People v. Hon. A. Purisima, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L.420050-66, November 20, 1978 ................... 46
ExtrinsicAids ............................................................................. 53
1. Contemporaneous circumstances ..................................... 53
2. Policy .................................................................................. 53
3. Legislative history of the statute ..................................... 54
4. Contemporaneous and practical construction ................. .54
5. Executive construction ...................................................... 54
6 . Legislative construction .................................................... 54
7. Judicial construction ......................................................... 55
8. Construction by the bar and legal commentators .......... 55
Cases
CelsO Halili and Arthur Haul v. C.A. and Helen
Meyers Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 113539,
March12, 1998.........................................................................73
Emilio M.R. Osmefla and Pablo Garcia v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998.....................................78
Cases
Joker Arroyo, et al. v. Jose de Venecia, et al.,
G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998........................................87
xli
New Case
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danio B. Faller and
Ferdinand N. Talabong v.
Commission On Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo,
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009..............................99
Old Case
Socrates v. COMELEC & Hagedorn,
G.R. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002 ........................... 101
Cases
Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989 .................................... 105
Case
De Guia v. Guingona, et al.,
G R No 119525, April 18, 1995 114
Presumption against implied repeals 115
Presumption against violation of public policy 115
Presumption of knowledge of existing, laws 115
Presumption of acquiescence to judicial
construction 116
Presumption of jurisdiction . 116
Presumption of acting within the scope of authority 116
Presumption against violation of international law ....... 116
CHAPTER III
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
Definition of law ......................................................................... 117
Classification of law ................................................................... 118
Sources of law ............................................................................ 119
Statutes ...................................................................................... 121
Kinds of statutes ........................................................................ 121
As to nature
Penal statutes ........................................................... 121
Remedial statutes ...................................................... ... 121
Substantive statutes ................................................. 121
Labor statutes ........................................................... 121
Tax statutes .............................................................. 121
As to application
Mandatory ................................................................. 121
Directory .................................................................... 121
As to performance
Permanent ................................................................. 121
Temporary ................................................................. 121
As to scope
General ...................................................................... 121
Special ....................................................................... . 121
Local .......................................................................... 121
Other classifications
A statute could either be prospective
orretroactive ...................................................... 121
A statute could either be a repealing act
or an amendatory act ......................................... 121
A statute could either be a reference statute
or a declaratory statute ..................................... 121
Identification of statutes 122
...........................................................
Title...........................................................................122
Preamble 124
...................................................................
xiv
Body 125
Proviso.......................................................................127
Interpretative clause ........... ...................................... 128
Repealing clause.......................................................128
Savingclause ............................................................129
Separability clause...................................................129
Otherlaws ................................................................. 130
1. Presidential issuances........................................130
Background......................................................... 130
Examples............................................................. 130
2. Ordinances..........................................................136
Effectivityof laws ...................................................................... 140
When shall a law take effect? .......................................... 140
Scope of Tañada v. Tuvera............................................... 140
Effectivity of presidential issuances................................ 140
Effectivity of ordinance..................................................... 140
Who are subject to Philippine laws? ........................................ 141
CHAPTER IV
VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTES
Validity and constitutionality of statutes................................ 142
Actual case or controversy ......................................................... 143
Properparty............................................................................... 143
Earliest opportunity .................................................................. 143
Decision of the constitutional question
is necessary to determine the case itself ......................... 144
Effect of unconstitutional statute............................................. 144
If totally declared unconstitutional.......................................... 144
If partially declared unconstitutional ...................................... 144
What is the effect of a statute which is declared
unconstitutional? ............................................................... 145
What is the extent of judicial power to declare the
unconstitutionality of assailed legislative
and executive acts? ............................................................. 146
Requisites for declaration of partial unconstitutionality........ 147
CHAPTER V
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
Statutes must be read and construed as a whole ................... 148
xv
Legislative intent must be ascertained from the
statute as a whole ............................................................. 148
New Case
Lorenzo T. Tangga-an v.
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013....................................149
Old Case
Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit
G.R. No. L-59154, April 3, 1990 ....................................... 152
Case
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 138810, September 29, 2004 ............................. 159
CHAPTER VI
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF
SPECIFIC STATUTES
xw
Construction of each statute..................................................... 162
PenalStatutes............................................................................ 162
How are penal statutes interpreted? ................................ 162
RemedialStatutes ..................................................................... 162
How are remedial statutes construed? ............................ 162
Substantive Statutes ................................................................. 162
LaborStatutes ........................................................................... 163
How are labor laws interpreted? ...................................... 163
TaxStatutes............................................................................... 164
How are tax statutes interpreted? ................................... 164
MandatoryStatutes................................................................... 165
DirectoryStatutes ...................................................................... 165
PermanentStatute .................................................................... 168
TemporaryStatute .................................................................... 168
GeneralStatute.......................................................................... 168
SpecialStatute........................................................................... 168
LocalStatute.............................................................................. 168
OtherStatutes ........................................................................... 169
Statutes in derogation of rights....................................... 169
Statutes granting privileges............................................. 169
Naturalization laws .......................................................... 169
Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties ................... 169
Statute authorizing suits against the government ........ 169
Statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing
power of local government units ............................. 170
Statute imposing penalties for non-payment of tax 170
Electionlaws ..................................................................... 170
Adoptionstatutes.............................................................. 170
Amnesty proclamations .................................................... 171
Veteran and pension laws................................................ 171
General welfare legislations............................................. 171
Probationlaw .................................................................... 171
Laws on attachment ......................................................... 171
Rulesof court..................................................................... 171
Statutes prescribing qualifications for an office ............. 171
Election laws on qualification and disqualification........ 172
Other classifications .................................................................. 172
A statute could either be prospective or retroactive............... 172
Prospective statute............................................................ 172
Retroactivestatute............................................................ 173
A statute could either be a repealing act or an
Amendatoryact................................................................. 173
Repealingact ..................................................................... 172
Repeal 174
The repeal of a statute is either total or partial..................... 174
Amendatoryact .......................................................................... 175
A Statute could either be a reference statute, a
supplemental statute, a reenacted statute or an
adopted Statute ................................................................. 176
Reference statute .............................................................. 176
Supplemental statutes...................................................... 176
Reenacted statutes ................................................ . ............ 176
Adopted statutes ............................................................... 177
CHAPTER VII
LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING
AND IMPORTANCE
Importance of Latin Maxims .................................................... 178
Latin maxims applicable to statutory construction ................ . 179
On the principle that laws should be prospective,
not retroactive ........................................................... 179
On the principle that when the law is clear, what
the courts should do is to apply it, not to
interpretit................................................................. 180
On the principle that it is not the letter of the law
that killeth, it is the spirit of the law that
givethlife .................................................................. 181
On the principle that what is not included in those
enumerated are deemed excluded........................... 182
On the principle that special provisions prevail
over general provisions ............................................ 183
New Case
Maria Virginia V. Remo v.
The Honorable Secretary Of Foreign Affairs
G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010......................................183
On the principle that while the law may be hard,
it is the law that will be followed ...........................186
New Case
Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. People Of The Philippines
G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012..............................186
xvrn
On the principle that ignorance of the law excuses
no one but ignorance of fact may be an excuse .....188
On the principle that when the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish........................................189
Latin Maxims and phrases related to the subject
of statutory construction................................................... 189
Mens legislatores............................................................... 189
Reddendo singula singulis................................................ 190
Cassus omissus pro omisso habbendus est...................... 190
Noscitur a sociis ................................................................ 191
Ejusdem generic ................................................................ 192
CHAPTER VIII
Case
Macasaet v Commission On Audit
G.R. No. 83748, May 12, 1989 .........................................196
New Case
Antonio D. Dayao, et al., v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193643 and
Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. v.
COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193704, January 29, 2013.................................201
kAm
Old Case
Civil Service Commission v. Saturnino Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004 ..................................205
The words "SHALL" ..................................................................206
The word "MAY" ........................................................................ 208
The word "ALL," "EVERY," and "ANY .................................... 208
The words "AND SO FORTH,"
and "AND THE LIKE ........................................................ 208
Negative terms "CANNOT," "SHALL NOT,"
and"NO .............................................................................. 209
CHAPTER IX
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
OF CONTRACTS
Can the contracting parties enter into any kind of
agreement and establish such terms and conditions
that they may deem proper? ............................................ 216
Who are bound by the terms of the contract 9 ......................... 217
When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret the
terms of the contract? ....................................................... 217
In case of conflict between the words of the contract
and evident intention of the parties,
which prevails? ............................................. .....................219
How to judge the intention of the parties? .............................. 219
xx
Rules governing the following:
Effect of the use of several terms.................................... 220
Effect of stipulations that admit of several
meanings................................................................... 220
Effect of words which may have different
significations ............................................................. 220
Effect of usage or custom of the place ............................. .220
Effect of obscure words or stipulation in a contract 220
Use of general terms ................................................................. 220
Stipulations that admit general meanings.............................. 220
Usage or custom of the place .................................................... 220
Obscure words or stipulation.................................................... 220
Rule in case of doubt as to the principal object and as to
the incidental circumstances ............................................. 221
Other rules of interpretation.................................................... 221
New Case
Salun-At Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz v.
Eloisa Espejo, et al.,
G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010 . ...................................223
CHAPTER X
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Cases
Emeteria Liwag v.
Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189755, July 4, 2012 ........................................227
Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Commission On Audit
G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010 .....................................227
Batangas Power Corporation v. Batangas City and
National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 152675;
and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Ricardo
R. Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 152771,
April28, 2004....................................................................228
Lucio Morigo v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004.................................231
Mel
United Harbor Pilots' Assn. of the Phils., Inc. v.
Assn. of Int'l. Shipping Lines, G.R. No. 133763,
November 13, 2002 ........................................................... 234
People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan
and Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., G.R. No. 101724,
SupremeCourt .................................................................... 235
Tupas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 89571,
February6, 1991 ............................................................... 238
Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor And
Employment Accreditation Committee For
Medical Clinics v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 724, April Z, 1931 ...............................................
xxil
Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit,
G.R. No. 59154, April 3, 1990 . ......................................... 245
xon
xxiv
CHAPTER I
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
1967; People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967; Luzon
Security Co. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-25659, October 31, 1969).
New Case:
ISSUE:
Whether A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC entitled 'Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages" is applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Old Case:
X. AMBIGUITY DEFINED
Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinct-
ness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written in-
strument. (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 105) It has been
held, however, that ambiguity does not only arise from the meaning
of the particular words but also from the general scope and meaning
of the statute when all its provisions are examined. There is also an
ambiguity when a literal interpretation of the words would lead to
unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences, or where a statute is
in conflict with the Constitution, or where the statute would defeat
the policy of the legislation. (Tarlac Development Corporation v. CA,
L-41012, September 30, 1976)
FACTS:
On February 17, 1978, former President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government
Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain
located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned
proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San
Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement
center for the said squatters. Only after resettling these squatters
would the municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal
government center on the subject land.
CHAPPER I 11
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
ISSUE:
Is Proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power?
More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?
HELD:
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of
legislation —Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of
legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in
1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be
amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164
is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless
revolution on February 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution,
or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under
Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall
continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected
and convened under a new constitution. Then came the ratification
of the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution.
When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino
lost this legislative power under the Freedom Constitution.
Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued
on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely vested
in Congress.
The Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No.
164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently,
said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID -
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed
to be valid (Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCR4 734 [1970]). However,
this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by
legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear
usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch. For th[e]
Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all constitutional
principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption of validity of
a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and
defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this task
that we take this exception from the Court's usual practice of not
entertaining constitutional questions unless they are specifically
raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
CHAPTER I 13
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. bagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. They contend
that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its
sole object makes the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) an "ad-
venture in partisan hostility."
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events
prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno
Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahi rap."
The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to
carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aqui-
no found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of
graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous ad-
ministration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July
30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010.
HELD:
Although the purpose of the PTC falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
ISSUE;
Does MHC fall under the term "national patrimony"? Is
Section 10(2) of Article XII self-executing?
HELD:
Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987 Cons-
titution, is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words, the provision does
not require any legislation to put in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concession covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; con-
sequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains
to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has
become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened
in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events, which have shaped Philippine history. It was
20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
called the Cultural Center of 1930's. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed
as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government, it plays
host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality.
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by the Filipinos.
This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered
the higher bid, it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the required approvals. Since the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is
not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
winning bidder. Reluctantly, respondents are not bound to make
the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with
the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution, the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties. (Emphasis supplied)
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism.
It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as
a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so
it must be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention
of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and
welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution.
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material
values- A commercial, nay enen a budgetary, objective should not
be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
CHAPTER I 21
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct
in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when
the Constitution is involved.
In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., what particularly
is the effect of the Supreme Court's "expanded jurisdiction and
authority?"
The power, authority and discretion to determine whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
was committed goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or
transaction, whether it is committed, or entered into by the highest
official of the land, or any official or branch of our government.
The wisdom and propriety, which may be invoked by the
executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing
minds of the justices.
Are the powers of the President limited only to those that are
expressly enumerated in the Constitution?
No. The President has residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President as
steward of the people (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66811989]).
disapprove the acts of the legislative if in its judgment they are not
in conformity with the Constitution or if they will cause hardship to
the people.
Here, the judicial arm of the government has no role to play
yet. It is only called upon to interfere and to exercise its authority
when an action is brought to it for decision, and only upon reaching
this stage when the courts should apply, among others, these basic
rules, to wit:
When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not
to interpret it.
In applying the law, the court should discover the real
intent and the purpose of the legislature. If that intent
and purpose can be discovered within the law, it is the
duty of the court to carry out that intention. If that intent
and purpose cannot be found within the law, the court
should resort to extrinsic aids.
3. When all other rules of statutory construction fail, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended, right and
justice to prevail.
When conflicting claims are brought to the court for determina-
tion, it is authorized to determine the validity of the said legislative
measures or executive acts.
27
28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
New Case:
FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land situated in Laoag City which
is co-owned by the spouses Albino and Margarita Mariano, the
spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor, and Angela Melchor.
Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share was in-
herited by their daughter Lorenza. Subsequently, Lorenza and her
husband Antonio Ballesteros acquired the share of Angela.
In 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with her
children, sold their share to Spouses Pascual and Francisco. The
old TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in their names
together with Angela and Spouses Melchor.
Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for legal redemp-
tion, claiming that they did not receive any written notice of the said
sale and argued that they are entitled to redeem the portion sold as
co-owners of the same.
RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that they failed to sea-
sonably exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day period
pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the lack
of a written notice since they had actual notice of the said sale.
CA granted the appeal of the respondents.
The petitioners sought for reconsideration, but it was denied.
30 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents could no longer exercise their right of
redemption having failed to exercise the same within 30 days from
actual knowledge of the said sale.
HELD:
Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption.
The Supreme Court held that no reversible error on the part
of the CA in ruling that the 30-day period given to the respondents
within which to exercise their right of redemption has not
commenced in view of the absence of a written notice. Despite the
respondents' actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a
written notice is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of
the commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the
right of redemption.
Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that:
Old Case:
FACTS:
Petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAB) and the
Land Bank of The Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions
for reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the Court's
conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting
landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of R.A. No.
6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is no legal basis for allowing
the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting
landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their
properties.
The Supreme Court denied their motions for reconsideration.
HELD:
The Court rejects the said contention. Sec. 16(e) of RA No.
6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as
compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in
"LBP bonds," to wit:
The Sugar Mill submitted the winning bid for 10,000 metric
tons while Pacific Sugar submitted the winning bid for 20,000 metric
tons, for a combined total volume of 30,000 metric tons of sugar.
Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar paid
25% of the conversion fees.
Aa it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar delivered only
10% of their sugar import allocation, or a total of only 3,000 metric
34 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Old Case:
CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE
CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997
FRANCISCO, J.
FACTS:
In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurrec-
cion, the President of petitioner Cecileville Realty and Service Cor-
poration, in the latter's land at Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When
Sotero died, his wife Ana Pascual, succeeded him in tenancy by op-
eration of law. As such tenant she had a home lot and a house on
the landholding. She was assisted in the cultivation of the land by
her son, private respondent Hermigildo Pascual, who also occupies a
portion of the landholding distinct from that occupied by his mother.
Petitioner Cecifieville sought to eject Hermigildo from the
portion occupied by his house but the latter, insisting that he is
entitled to occupancy since he is helping his mother in the cultivation
of the land, refused to vacate. Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit
36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 3, RA No. 1199,
as amended by RA No. 2263, only a tenant is granted the right to a
home lot and the right to construct and maintain a house thereon.
Private respondent is not entitled to a home lot. As the Court sees
it, the issue lies on the interpretation of Sec. 22, paragraph 3, of RA
No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263. This section provides in full
as follows:
FACTS:
First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City, Leo C.
Tabao, accused Judge Pedro S. Espina of: (a) Gross Irregularity, (b)
Abuse of Authority, and (c) Bias in favor of the accused.
In another sworn complaint, Regional State Prosecutor Fran-
cisco Q. Aurillo, Jr. manifested that he had earlier assailed before
the CA an order issued by respondent granting bail to the accused
without giving the prosecution a chance to present evidence to op-
pose the grant of bail. The Court of Appeals annulled respondent's
orders, granting bail to the accused and denying the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration of the order that granted bail. Respon-
dent failed to comment on this aspect of the complaint against him.
40 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The records show that respondent Judge had set the promulga-
tion of judgment in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People of
the Phils. v. Salvador Padernal, "a case for violation of RA No. 6425
for drug pushing and had promulgated his decision thereon despite
the defense's manifestation for time to allow it to submit other docu-
mentary evidence, make its formal offer of exhibits, and to rest its
case. Judgment was promulgated and the prosecution was not given
a chance to adduce rebuttal evidence.
Respondent filed his comments on the separate complaints,
arguing that he proceeded to decide the case without the documentary
evidence of the defense because they were not submitted on time;
that the evidence to be submitted, consisting of business licenses
and permits, was immaterial to the innocence or guilt of the accused;
that official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed
unless the contrary is shown; that his grant of bail to the accused
is now allowed in view of the ruling in People v. Simon (G.R. No.
93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555).
HELD:
The Office of the Court Administrator held that respondent's
acts constituted an exercise of judicial prerogative.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge should be
sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure
of rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the
prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that
a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine
whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not
alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose
bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this
case.
The Supreme Court dismissed respondent from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
The Court has repeatedly stressed the ruling in People v.
Dacudao (170 SCRA 489), that a hearing is absolutely indispensable
before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's
evidence is weak or strong on the issue of whether or not to grant
bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime where the imposable
CHAPTER II 41
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
New Case:
the general public and PD No. 1689 does not distinguish the
nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds
of such corporation should come from the general public.
This was highlighted by the third "whereas clause" of the
quoted law which states that the same also applies to other
"corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from
the general public."
FACTS:
In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSI) claim-
ing to do business under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or
Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit
Line for various credit facilities with Asia United Bank (AUB). To
induce AUB to extend the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through its
directors and officers, presented its Articles of Incorporation with its
400-peso million capitalization and its congressional telecom fran-
chise.
Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted
a P250 million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of Smartnet
Philippines, RMSI's Division. Later, it was increased to P452 minion
after a third-party real estate mortgage by an affiliate of Guy Group
of Companies, in favor of Smartnet Philippines, was offered to
the bank. Simultaneous to the increase, RMSI submitted a proof
of authority to open the Omnibus Credit Line and peso and dollar
accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert
Guy, et al., represented as a division of RMSI, as evidenced by the
letterhead used in its formal correspondences with the bank and the
financial audit made by SGV & Co. Attached to this authority was the
Amended Articles of Incorporation of RMSI, doing business under the
name of Smartnet Philippines, and the Secretary's Certificate of SPI
authorizing its directors, Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact
with AUB. Prior to this major transaction, however, and, unknown
to AUB, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI
with a paid-up capital of only P62,500.00.
Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines AUB
granted it, among others, an Irrevocable Letter of Credit in the total
sum of $29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia
Ptd. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover
this liability Gilbert Guy executed Promissory Note (PN) in behalf of
SPI in favor of AUB. This PN was renewed twice, once, in the name
of SPI, and last, in the name of Smartnet Philippines, bolstering
CHAPTER II 45
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause to prosecute Gilbert Guy,
et al., for the crime of syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689.
HELD:
Anent the issue as to whether or not Gilbert Guy, et al., should
be charged for syndicated estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No.
1689, which states that:
Old Cases:
FACTS:
Information for violation of PD No. 9 was ordered quashed by
Judge Purisima. The latter reasoned out that the information failed
to allege an essential element of the offense; thus: That the carrying
outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
CHAPTER II 47
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
The Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor
General. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within
the purview of PD No. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the
intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others
in the preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or
events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanction stated therein.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged with vagrancy under
Section 1 of RA No. 519. This section enumerates certain classes
of persons who are to be considered as vagrants such as those
"found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,
or tramping or straying through the country without visible means
of support."
Accused-appellants were prosecuted and convicted for "loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses" the first part of
Section 1. The second part, it will be noticed is worded as follows:
"or tramping or straying through the country without visible means
of support."
48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it
is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give
it effect.
The construction should be based upon something more
substantial that the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If
the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable
and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words
of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon
punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to
change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the effect
intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect
punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
The accused-appellants were acquitted.
FACTS:
An alien employment permit was issued by DOLE to Earl
Timothy Cone, as sports consultant and coach of General Milling
Corporation. The change of admission of status of said Earl Timothy
Cone was approved to a pre-arranged employee. Months later, CMC
requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full pledged coach.
The request was granted.
CHAPTER II 49
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
ISSUE:
Was there a grave abuse of discretion in revoking the alien
employment permit of Cone? Is the contention of General Milling
Corporation (that it is an employer's prerogative to hire a foreign
coach) valid and tenable?
HELD:
There was no grave abuse of discretion. It is not true that
the hiring of foreign coach is an employer's prerogative. The law is
clear on this point. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer
seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment
permit from the Department of Labor. General Milling Corporation's
right to choose who to employ is limited by the statutory requirement
of an employment permit.
GMC will not find solace in the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. No comparison can be made between Cone and
Norman Black as the latter is "a long-time resident" of the country
and thus, not subject to Article 40 of the Labor Code which applies
only to "non-resident aliens."
Neither will obligation of contract be impaired by the imple-
mentation of the Secretary's decision. The Labor Code and its imple-
menting Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits
were in existence long before GMC and Cone entered into their con-
tract of employment. Provisions of applicable laws especially those
relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written
into contracts. Private parties cannot constitutionally con-
tract away the applicable provision of law.
GMC's contention that the Labor Secretary should have
deferred to the Immigration Commission's finding as for the need to
employ Cone is again bereft of legal basis.
FACTS:
Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan
City, who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay. COMELEC scheduled the petition signing
on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1996. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition,
well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Due to Paras'
opposition, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time
on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election,
Paras filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a
CHAPTER II 51
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
ISSUE:
Is RA No. 6657 constitutional?
56 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the land and the
physical possession of the land in excess of the retention limit and
all the beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the for-
mer beneficiary. This is within the power of the State to take and
regulate private property for which payment of just compensation
is provided.
Although the proceedings in Section 16 of CARL are described
as summary, the landowners and other interested parties are never-
theless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value
of the property.
DAR's determination of just compensation is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any interested party.
DAR's determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all
parties concerned. Otherwise, the court of justice will still have the
right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise
of what is admittedly a judicial function.
Regarding Section 18 thereof which requires the owners
of expropriated properties to accept just compensation in
less than money, the Supreme Court said: "This is not an
ordinary expropriation where only a specific property is
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific
and perhaps local purpose. WHAT WE DEAL WITH HERE IS
A REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION."
Such program will involve not merely millions but billions
of pesos. "[The Court] assume[s] that the framers of the
Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called
for agrarian reform as a top project of the government.
There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial
limitation of the government and had no illusions that there
would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the
lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers."
"[The Court] may assume their intention was to allow such
manner of payment as provided by the CARP Law conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government
upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAB of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, the title remains with the landowner.
No outright change of ownership is contemplated."
CHAPTER II 57
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
Mayor Demetriou of Tabaco, Albay charged that Governor
Salalima violated Section 60, pars. (c) and (d) of the Local Government
Code, Section 3, par. (G) of RA No. 3019, and the provisions of PD
No 1594, as amended Mayor Demetriou alleged that despite the
delay in the completion of work under contracts entered into by
the Provincial Government for the construction of Tabaco Public
Market, liquidated damages were not imposed, nor collected from
the contractor by the provinces.
In another case, Governor Salalima and the members of the
Sanggumang Panlalawigan were charged with having retained
CHAPTER II 59
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
ISSUE:
Salalima contends that the Office of the President committed
grave abuse of discretion in suspending him after he was re elected,
since the administrative offense were allegedly committed during
his first term.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that Governor Salalima
could no longer be held administratively liable in 0.P. Case No
5450 in connection with the negotiated contract entered into on
March 6, 1992 with RYU Construction for additional rehabilitation
work at the Tabaco Public Market. Nor could the petitioners be held
administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469 for the execution in
November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago
and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public
officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija (106 Phil. 466 [1959]) and Aguinaldo
v. Sdntos (212 SCRA 768 [1992]). In Pascual, th[e] Court ruled:
The Court comes to one main issue of the controversy - the
legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful
act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of
office.
In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, [the Court]
ha[s] resorted to American authorities. The Court found that cases
on the matter are confficting due in part, probably, to differences
in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a
divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the
subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct.
The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule
denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct
during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
60 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
Nine of the fourteen detainees in this case were arrested on
July, 1982 at about 1:45 P.M., when three teams of the PC/INP of
Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, etc., after securing
a search warrant issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Viscaya, conducted a raid at the residence of Dra.
Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the raid were Dra. Aurora
Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia,
Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portugese and Mariano
Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining room of
Dra. Parong's residence which had been going on since 10:00 A.M.
of that same day. The other four detainees were arrested on the
following day. The detainees, herein petitioners, were all detained
at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya
from July 6, 1982, until their transfer on the morning of August 10,
1982, to an undisclosed place reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon
City, to Echague, Isabela and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Josefina Garcia-Padilla, a mother of detained petitioner
Sabino G. Padilla, Jr., filed a petition for. habeas corpus on August
13, 1982. It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners
were patently unlawful since it was effected without any warrant of
arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were
armed only with a search warrant issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and no where in said
warrant was authority given to make arrest, much less detention;
that the search warrant which authorized respondents to seize
"subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and
CHAPTER II 63
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED
"x x x At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen
(14) detainees on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then
having conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence
from 10:00 A.M. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen
(14) detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified
as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines engaging in
subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Parong
as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delieto, the nine (9) de-
tainees scampered towards different directions leaving on top of
64 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
they do not accord to them any of the rights now being demanded
by the herein petitioners, particularly to be set at liberty upon the
filling of bail. As a matter of common knowledge, captives of the
rebels or insurgents are not only denied the right to be released, but
also denied trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even be
liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is among others, to put
the government forces on equal fighting terms with the rebels, by
authorizing the detention of their own rebel or dissident captives as
the rebellion goes on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces
have over those of the government, as when they resort to guerilla
tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least minimized, thereby
enhancing the latter's chances of beating their enemy x x x."
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection."
"Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon
being arrested or captured, cease to be as committed to the cause
against the government. Through a grand conspiracy, as is of the
essence of how rebellion is committed, involving a great mass of
confederates bound together by a common goal, he remains in a state
of continued participation in the criminal act or design. His heart
still beats with the same emotion for the success of the movement of
which he is an ardent adherent and ally x x x."
What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the
Lansang case with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon v.
Baker (5 Phil. 87), a 1905 decision, and Montenegro v. Castañeda
(91 Phil. 882 [1952]), that the President's decision to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon
the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled ruling was
diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of the
Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was held as permissible,
and the test as laid down therein is not whether the President acted
correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be
pure semanticism, if we consider that with particular reference to
the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of
the grave emergency he has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated
in Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, partakes of military
measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to
assume the authority to check, reverse or supplant the presidential
actions.
NOTE:
THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT ON THIS QUESTION ARE NOW LAID TO REST
BY ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION.
The conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on this
question are now laid to rest by Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
FACTS:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in
1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs
were his widow, private respondent Helen Meyers Guzman, and
his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom are
also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed
74 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
PIWTOALTO
(1) The land is urban; thus, no right of redemption. -
Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question
which, as a rule, is not reviewable by th[e] Court. Basic and long-
settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme
Court. This admits of only few exceptions, such as when the finding
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there
is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run
contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when
the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific
evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of
evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record.
The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited ex-
ceptions. In fact, the conclusion of the trial court - that the subject
property is urban land - is based on clear and convincing evidence
xxx
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character,
petitioners have indeed no right to invoke Article 1621 of the Civil
Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed, is
rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity
in construction.
"Article 1621. The owners of adjoining lands
shall also have the right of redemption when a piece
of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one
hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not
own any rural land. xxx"
FACTS:
Petitioners Emilio M.R. Osmeña, candidate for President of the
Philippines, and Petitioner Pablo Garcia, candidate for governor of
Cebu, urged the re-examination of the ruling in NPC v. COMELEC
upholding the validity of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646. They contend
that the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the
playing field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the
poor candidates by depriving them of a medium which they can
afford to pay for while their most affluent rivals can always resort to
other means of reaching votes like airplanes, boats, raffles, parades
and handbills.
Petitioners claim that the reasoning of NPC is flawed, because
it rests on the misconception that Article TX-C, Section 4, mandates
the absolute equality of all candidates regardless of financial status,
when what this provision speaks of is "equality of opportunity-"
For the foregoing reasons, petitioners filed a petition for pro-
hibition, seeking a re-examination of the validity of Section 11(b)
of RA No. 6646, the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which prohibits
mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air
time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commis-
sion on Elections.
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and sustained its
ruling in NPC v. COMELEC on the following grounds:
1. There is no suppression of political ads, but only a
regulation of the time and manner of advertising. -
The term political "ad ban," when used to describe Section
11(b) of RA No. 6646, is misleading, for even as Section
11 (b)prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air
time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC
to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and
time in the media.
2. The law's concern is not with the message or content of the
ad but with ensuring media equality between candidates
80 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
Majority Floor Leader Representative Rodolfo Albano was
then moving for the approval of the conference committee report on
the bill that became RA No. 8240, which led the Chair, then Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza, to ask if there was any objection to the motion,
and Representative Joker P. Arroyo asked: "What is that Mr.
Speaker?" The Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared
the report approved. Petitioners claim that the question "What is
that Mr. Speaker" was a privileged question or a point of order that,
under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters,
with the exception to motion to adjourn.
ISSUE:
Is the said contention of Rep. Arroyo valid and meritorious?
HELD:
The contention has no merit. Representative Arroyo did not
have the floor. Without first drawing the attention of the Chair,
he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did
not hear him and proceeded to ask if there were objections to the
Majority Leader's motion. Hearing none, he declared the report
approved. Rule XVI, Section 96 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives provides:
"Section 96. Manner of Addressing the Chair.
- When a member desires to speak, he shall rise
and respectfully address the Chair "Mr. Speaker."
was. Only after he had been told that the Chair had called for
objection to the motion for approval of the report did Rep.
Arroyo register his objection. It is not, therefore, true that
Rep. Arroyo was ignored. He was simply not heard because
he had not first obtained recognition from the Chair.
Nor is it correct to say that the question ("What is that, Mr.
Speaker?") he was raising was a question of privilege or a point of
order.
At all events, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a reconsideration
of the ruling of the Chair declaring the conference committee report
approved. It is not true that he was prevented from doing so. The
session was suspended, obviously to settle the matter amicably.
From all appearances, the misunderstanding was patched up
during the nearly hour-long suspension because, after the session
was resumed, Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. As the
Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows, the session
was thereafter adjourned.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate, and certified by the respective
secretaries of both houses of Congress as having been finally passed.
The following day, the bill was signed into law by the President of
the Philippines.
Petitioners take exception to the following statement in the
decision that "The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House." They contend that, following
this ruling, even if only 10 members of the House remain in the ses-
sion hall because the others have gone home, the quorum may not
be questioned.
That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted
in the decision, at 11:48 A.M. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo
questioned the existence of a quorum, but after the roll call, it was
found that there was none. After that, he announced he would
again, question the quorum, apparently to delay the voting on the
conference report. Hence, the statement in the decision that the
question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.
In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the
conference committee report on what later became RA No. 8240 was
railroaded through the House of Representatives. Nor is there any
90 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
need for petitioners to invoke the power of this Court under Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting
RA No. 8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse
of discretion, since that it is what we have precisely done, although
the result of our review may not be what petitioners want. It should
be added that, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the disregard
of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of RA No.
8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for
the enactment of laws. It is well-settled that a legislative act will not
be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.
FACTS:
On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson,
a long time friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords. The next day, then Senate Minority Leader Teofisto
CHAPTER II 91
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Statement from
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Re-
public of the Philippines, while along with many other le-
gal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclama-
tion as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will pre-
vent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang
Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people.
I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join
me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved
people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
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"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of
the Constitution, lam hereby transmitting this declaration
that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
2. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable contro-
versy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave
while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
3. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings
is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption
that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune
from criminal prosecution.
4. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
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AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
1. WHETHER THE CASES AT BAR INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION - Petitioner's claim that respondent
Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she
has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic;
that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she
has been recognized by foreign governments. All these, constitute
"the political ticket which the Court cannot enter." This claim is not
applicable and the Supreme Court said
x x Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and
not political questions. The principal issues for resolution re-
auire the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution, notably Section 1 of Article II. and Section
8 of Article VII. and the allocation of governmental powers un-
der Section 11 of Articile VII. The issues likewise call for a
ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity." As early as the
1803 case of Marbury v Madison, the doctrine has been
laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is
Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of politi-
cal question is but a foray in the dark. (Emphasis and Un-
derscoring supplied)
2. WHETHER THE PETITIONER RESIGNED AS PRE-
SIDENT - Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he
suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the Of-
fice of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took
her oath as President. The Supreme Court rejected this claim and
said:
"x x x In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner
did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacu-
ated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001,
after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from
his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20
2001, or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
Using the totality test, [the Court] hold[s] that petitioner
resigned as President."
96 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
This case is also an example where the Supreme Court took into
consideration the contemporaneous circumstances that preceded
before former President Joseph Estrada left Malacanang Palace
on June 20, 2001, as well as the posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence that led it to conclude that:
President Joseph Estrada resigned; and
2. The national spirit of reconciliations and solidarity cannot
be attained if he will not give up the presidency.
FACTS:
Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, re-
spectively. During his third term of office, on September 2005, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. The Supreme Court, however,
subsequently lifted the suspension order; hence, he resumed per-
forming the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CO C)
for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to
his COC or to cancel it on the ground that it would violate the three-
term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of BA No. 7160.
The COMELEC's Second Division ruled against the petitioners.
Subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the preventive suspension of an elected public official
is an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term
limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of RA No. 7160.
HELD:
No. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an
effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason
to avoid the three-term limitation.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renun-
ciation of the office for any length of time shall not be con-
sidered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
Old Case:
FACTS:
Petitioner contested respondent's proclamation of private re-
spondent's victory in the recall election and its discretion in uphold-
ing the latter's qualification to run for mayor in the said election on
the ground that the same has served for three consecutive terms
prior to the contested recall election, and as such, he is constitution-
ally and statutorily prohibited from running for the same office for
the fourth time and consequently, cannot be proclaimed the winner
and serve a fourth consecutive term for the same position he has
held before.
ISSUES:
a) Whether private respondent's victory in the recall election
constitutes a "fourth term" as contemplated by law.
b) Whether private respondent was qualified to run for
mayor in contested recall election.
HELD:
1. No. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-
election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the
prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution
is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other
subsequent election.
2. From the end of his third term in June 30, 2001 until
September 24, 2002, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. His
new recall term from September 24, 2002 until June 30, 2004 is not
a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as
mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three terms
with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive
term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002, which broke
the continuity or consecutive character of his service as mayor. The
established rule is that the winner in the recall election cannot be
charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of
counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's term.
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holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions
on the employer, which sanctions, however, must be stiffer than the
P1,000.00 imposed on Wenphil.
In the Agabon case, the Supreme Court held that the violation
of the right of petitioners Jenny M. Agabon and Virgilio C. Agabon
to statutory due process by the private respondent Riviera Home
Improvements, Inc., as their employer, warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which,
according to the Supreme Court, is addressed to the sound discre-
tioii of the co1rt 7 takiriB into acconnit the relevant circiimstanices.
FACTS:
A had an altercation with B, and for which they were suspended
on the following day. In the afternoon of the same day, A was advised,
through a memorandum issued by the Operations Manager, about
his dismissal from the service in accordance with their personnel
manual. The formal notice of dismissal was served to him four days
later. A is an employee of the company for about one (1) year and five
(5) months at the time of his dismissal.
A filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the same was
dismissed by the labor arbiter for lack of merit. The said decision,
however, was set aside by the NLRC which ordered Xs reinstatement
to his former position with one year back wages without qualification
and deduction.
HELD:
The failure of the petitioner to give private respondent the ben-
efit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringe-
ment of his constitutional right to due process of law and equal pro-
tection of the laws. The standards of due process in judicial as well
as administrative proceedings have long been established. In its
bare minimum due process of law simply means giving notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
The claim of petitioner that a formal investigation was not
necessary because the incident which gave rise to the termination
of private respondent was witnessed by his co-employees and
supervisors is without merit. The basic requirement of due process
is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial.
The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement
to the service of an employee without the loss of seniority and the
payment of his wages during the period of his separation until his
actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without
qualification or deduction, when it appears that he was not afforded
due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and
authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Department
of Labor and Employment should be re-examined. It will be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the
services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the
charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed,
it will demoralize the rank and ifie if the undeserving, if not
undesirable, remains in the service.
In the instant case, the private respondent appears to be of
violent temper. He caused trouble during office hours and defied his
superiors as they tried to pacify him. He should not be rewarded with
re-employment and back wages. Reason: It may encourage him to
do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline
that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances,
the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be
maintained. He has no right to return to his former employment.
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for
failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation
before causing his dismissal. The dismissal of an employee
must be for just or authorized cause and after due process.
Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus,
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AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
RUBEN SERRANO v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
AND ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE
G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner was a contractual employee in 1984. He became a
regular employee in 1985. He became head of the security checker
of private respondent in 1988. Sometime on October 11, 1991, Is-
etann phased out its security section and engaged the services of an
independent security agency. Consequently, Isetann wrote a memo-
randum to petitioner terminating his services on the very day that
said paper was given to him. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
However, the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter and
ordered that petitioner be given separation pay, unpaid salary and
proportionate 13th month pay. Subsequently, a petition was filed to
raise the issue of the validity of the cause of petitioner's dismissal.
HELD:
It was part of management's prerogative to avoid redundancy.
However, there was an extended discussion on the notice require-
ment. While the court has agreed that the Wenphil Doctrine ought
to be abandoned, the members of the court are not unanimous on the
issue of the applicability of the due process clause to the situation.
Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process.
Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right
granted to a party can be exercised. Others are simply an application
of the Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil Code, to act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith
toward one's fellowmen. Such is the notice requirement in Arts.
282-283. The consequence of the failure either of the employer or
the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in
damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case
108 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
may be) void. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the
employee should have received were it not for the termination of his
employment without prior notice. If warranted, nominal and moral
damages may also be awarded.
[The Court] hold[s], therefore, that, with respect to Article 283
of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the notice
requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere
failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment
which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.
The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action
taken by the employer to terminate employment either for an
authorized or just cause can result in an injustice to the employer.
For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing an employee,
who is otherwise guilty of say, theft, or even of an attempt against
the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his
employ such guilty employee. This is unjust.
It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social
economic force." But also does it declare that it "recognizes the in-
dispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise,
and provides incentives to needed investment." The Constitution
bids the State to "afford full protection to labor." But it is equally
true that "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." And it is
oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment one
who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in operation when it
is not economically in his interest to do so.
In sum, [the Court] hold[s] that if in proceedings for reinstate-
ment under Article 283, it is shown that the termination of employ-
ment was due to authorized cause, then the employee concerned
should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to com-
ply with the 30-day notice requirement. Instead, he must be granted
separation pay in accordance with Article 283.
If the employee's separation is without cause, instead of
being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case,
whether he is reinstated or only granted separation pay, he should
be paid in full backwages if he has been laid off without written
notice at least 30 days in advance.
On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under
Article 282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any
of the just causes mentioned in said Article 282, then, in accordance
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AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal illegal, ordered
the payment of backwages, payment of separation pay instead of
reinstatement, and payment of the monetary claims. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter
because it found that petitioners abandoned their work and that
they were not likewise entitled to any monetary award. The Court
of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the petitioners, finding that they
had abandoned their employment having already started working
for another employer. The appellate court, however, ordered the
110 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be valid
because the legislature is supposed to have considered the question
of its validity in approving it.
The question of validity of every statute is first determined by
the legislative department of the government itself, and the court
should resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts
are not justified in adjudging a statute invalid in the face of the
conclusion of the legislature when the question of its validity is at
all doubtful. The courts must assume the validity of the statute,
and that it was fully considered by the legislature before it was
adopted. Statutes should not be presumed to be invalid unless it
clearly appears that they are within some of the inhibitions of the
fundamental laws of the state. (U.S. v. Ten Yu; 24 Phil. 1; U.S. v.
Joson, 28 Phil. 1)
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Every statue passed by the legislature is presumed to be con-
stitutional.
The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain. (Yu Cong Rag u. Trinidad, 47Phil. 385) However,
when the statute is really unconstitutional, the courts are authorized
112 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
in the 60's and the 70's. It is but proper that those issues should be
left to the better judgment of a new legislature. In the year 2000, the
people will surely be confronted with problems of their own
FACTS:
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of RA No. 7887,
enacted on February 15, 1995 insofar as it provides that elective
members of the Sanggurnang Panlungsod and Sanggumang Bayan
outside Metro Manila shall be elected at large. RA No. 7887 amend-
ed Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of BA No. 7166, enacted on No-
vember 26, 1991, which provides that said officials shall be elected
by district on the May 8, 1995 election. He argued that RA No. 7887
is contrary to and inconsistent with the earlier law, RA No 7166"
He urges the Court to strike down RA No. 7887 and to "reinstate RA
No 7166"
ISSUE:
Is RA No 7887 contrary to or consistent with RA No 7166?
HELD:
It is of no moment that RA No. 7887 is contrary and inconsistent
with RA No. 7166. HA No. 7887 was enacted precisely to amend
Section 3[c] and [d] of RA No. 7166. Congress has the inherent
power to amend, modify and repeal its own laws for there are no
irrepealable laws Its perception of what is good for our people can
change over time. This perception is reflected by them through the
amendment or outright repeal of our existing laws. By the principle
of separation of powers, the Supreme Court cannot supersede the
wisdom of Congress in enacting, amending or repealing a law. It
cannot strike down an amendatory law on the ground that the
amended law is better for the people Petitioner's supplication
that the Supreme Court '.reinstate" RA No 7166 betrays his basic
ignorance of our constitutional system.
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PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION
A statute will not be construed in such a manner as to oust or
restrict the jurisdiction of superior courts, or to vest a new jurisdic-
tion in them, unless there are express words or a necessary implica-
tion to that effect. (G.R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976; U.S. v.
Palacio, 33 Phil. 208)
I. DEFINITION OF LAW
The term "law, "in its broadest sense, means any rule of action
or norm of conduct applicable to all kinds of action and to all objects
of creation. In this sense therefore, it includes all laws, whether they
refer to state law, physical law, divine law and others.
In a strict legal sense, law is defined as a rule of conduct, just
and obligatory, laid down by legitimate authority for the common
observance and benefit. (Sanchez Roman, p. 23) Based on this
definition, law has the following elements:
1. IT IS A RULE OF CONDUCT - Laws serve as guides
of an individual in relation to his fellowmen and to his
community.
2. LAWS MUST BE JUST - The chapter on human rela-
tions is now precisely embedded in the New Civil Code
in order to obtain stability of the social order. Laws, as
guides for human conduct, "should run as golden threads
through society; to the end that law may approach its su-
preme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 39)
3. IT MUST BE OBLIGATORY— If laws are not enforced,
the purpose for which they are intended will not be served.
4. LAWS MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY - If laws are not prescribed by legitimate
authority, the people could not be expected to observe
them. Authority to make laws is conferred upon those
duly chosen by the sovereign will of the people. This is
in consonance with Section 1, Article II, of the Philip-
pine Constitution, which says that "sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from
them."
117
118 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CLASSIFICATION OF LAW
1. NATURAL LAW
This law derives its force and authority from God. It is
superior to other laws. It is binding to the whole world, in all
countries and at all times.
2. POSITIVE LAW
Physical Law - Universal rule of action that governs
the conduct and movement of things, which are non-free and
material.
Moral Law - Set of rules which establishes what is
right and what is wrong as dictated by the human conscience
and as inspired by the eternal law.
Divine Law -
(a) Divine Positive Law i.e., Ten Commandments,
(b) Divine Human Positive Law i.e., Commandments of
the church
PUBLIC LAW
(a) Constitutional Law - is the fundamental law of the land,
which defines the powers of the government.
(b) Administrative Law - that law which fixes the organiza-
tion and determines the competence of the administrative
authorities and which regulates the methods by which
the functions of the Government are performed.
(c) International Law - body of rules, which regulates the
community of ntion.
CHAPTER III 119
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
H, SOURCES OF LAW
Law is derived from different sources, namely: (1) legislation;
(2) precedent; (3) custom; and (4) court decision.
LEGISLATION - Before the declaration of martial law in
the Philippines on September 21, 1972, the power to legislate laws
is vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which consists of the
Senate and the House of Representatives Upon the imposition of
martial law and after the dissolution of the old Congress, the power
to legislate law is vested in the President of the Philippines. This is
the reason why the President issued presidential decrees and letters
of instructions. When the Batasang Pambansa was organized,
legislative power is principally vested in this body although the
President, under and by virtue of what is known as Amendment
No. 6, continued to issue decrees when the exigency of the situation
requires and in case of other emergencies. Among many others,
this is one of the dictatorial acts that was severely questioned
by several lawyers and critics of the past regime. Now, after the
People's Revolt on February 22-25, 1986, and in accordance with
the wishes and the will of the sovereign Filipino people, the three
branches of government operating under the doctrine of separation
of powers are restored, with each department being committed to do
its utmost share in bringing about a more democratic and efficient
system of government that is responsive to the needs of the people.
PRECEDENT •- This means that the decisions or principles
enunciated by a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of law
do not only serve as guides but also as authority to be followed by all
other courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction in all cases involving the
same question until the same is overruled or reversed by a superior
120 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
III. STATUTES
Statutes are enacted by the legislature. They
are actually the bills submitted to Congress for
consideration and approval. Once approved finally
by Congress and by the President of the Philippines
these bills become statutes. (The rules on the
approval of bills are found in Article VI, Section 27
of the 1987 Constitution) Other laws, which have the
same binding force as statutes are the presidential
decrees, issued during the period of martial law
and under the 1973 Constitution.
V. IDENTIFICATION OF STATUTES
EXAMPLE:
'WHEREAS, there is pressing need to accelerate the
Agrarian Reform Program of the Government for the early
attainment of the objectives set forth in [RA] No. 3844, as
amended;
WHEREAS, among such objectives is to achieve dignified
existence for the small farmers free from the pernicious insti-
tutional restraints and practices which have not only retarded
the agricultural development of the country but have also pro-
duced widespread discontent and unrest among our farmers,
one of the causes of the existing national emergency; and
CHAPTER III 125
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
EXAMPLE:
"Presidential Decree No. 1612, Anti-Fencing Law of 1979"
Sections 1 to 8.
SECTION 1. TITLE. - This decree shall be known as
Anti-Fencing Law.
SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS. - The following
terms shall mean as follows:
a. 'TENCING"is the act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
126 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
EXAMPLE
Article 33 of the Family Code
"Article 33 Marriages among Muslims or among
members of the ethnic cultural communities may be per-
formed validly without the necessity of marriage license,
provided they are solemnized in accordance with
their customs, rites or- practices." (Emphasis and un-
derscoring supplied)
128 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
MALACA1SEANG
Manila
PD NO. 2
PROCLAIMING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AS LAND
REFORM AREA
WHEREAS, there is pressing need to accelerate the
Agrarian Reform Program of the Government for the ear-
CHAPTER III 131
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
PD NO. 27
DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANT FROM
THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL,
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP
OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING
THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR.
Inasmuch as the old concept of land ownership by
a few has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that
gave rise to violent conflict and social tension,
I *Y I á m
2. ORDINANCES
The respective legislative bodies of the Sangguniang Baran-
gay, Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panglungsod, and the Sang-
guniang Panlalawigan can enact ordinances and resolutions.
Under the rules and regulations implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, particularly under Article 107 to 114,
Rule I thereof, the pertinent provisions related to ordinances and
resolutions are as follows:
ARTICLE 107. Ordinances and Resolutions. - The following
rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:
(a) Legislative actions of a general and permanent character
shall be enacted in the form of ordinances, while those which are
of temporary character shall be passed in the form of resolutions.
Matters relating to proprietary functions and to private concerns
shall also be acted upon by resolution.
(b) Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall be in writing
and shall contain an assigned number, a title or caption, an enacting
or ordaining clause, and the date of its proposed effectivity. In
addition, every proposed ordinance shall be accompanied by a brief
explanatory note containing the justification for its approval. It shall
be signed by the author or authors and submitted to the secretary to
the sanggunian who shall report the same to the sanggunian at its
next meeting.
(c) A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner
prescribed for an ordinance, except that it need not go through a
third reading for its final consideration unless decided otherwise by
a majority of all the sanggunian members.
(d) No ordinance or resolution shall be considered on second
reading in any regular meeting unless it has been reported out by
CHAPTER III 137
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
EFFECTIVITY OF ORDINANCE
Under 3ection 11 of the Local Government Code, an ordinance
enacted by a local government shall take effect after the lapse of
CHAPTER III 141
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
ten (10) days from the date a copy of it is posted in a bulletin board
located in a conspicuous place at the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay hail, at the public market, and/or at the church or chapel.
In highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance
must, in addition thereto, be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city. (Section 11[2], B.P. 337, or the Old Local
Government Code)
142
CHAPTER IV 143
VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
EXAMPLES:
In Lim v. Pacquing (240 SCRA 649) Section 3 of PD No.
771 is violative of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
Reason: Section 3 offends the Constitution, which
demands faithful compliance with the requirement of due
process, equal protection of the law, and non-impairment
of contracts.
2. The Bar Flunkers bill was sustained insofar as it amend-
ed the Rules of Court prospectively but the part thereof
which retroactively reduced the passing average in the
bar examinations was declared unconstitutional, the
same being an encroachment to functions belonging to
the judiciary.
CHAPTER V
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
148
CHAPTERV 149
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
New Case:
LORENZO T. TANGGA-AN v.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., et al.,
G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013
FACTS:
This is a case for illegal dismissal with a claim for the payment
of salaries corresponding to the unexpired term of the contract,
damages and attorney's fees filed by Lorenzo Tangga-an against the
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Universe Tankship Delaware
LLC, and Carlos C. Salinas.
It was alleged that Tangga-an entered into an overseas employ-
ment contract with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for
and in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware,
LLC. Under the contract, he was to be employed for a period of six
months as chief engineer of the vessel S.S. "Kure" with US$5,000 as
basic salary, vacation leave pay of US$2,500 per month, and US$700
tonnage bonus a month.
On February 11, 2002, he was deployed. On or about Mar. 13,
2002, the vessel berthed at a port in Japan to discharge its cargo.
150 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Thereafter, it sailed to the U.S.A. While the vessel was still at sea,
the master required him and the rest of the Filipino Engineer Offi-
cers to report to his office where they were informed that they would
be repatriated on account of the delay in the cargo discharging in
Japan.
Tangga-an filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer
for payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract,
leave pay, exemplary and moral damages, attorney's fees and inter-
est.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision finding the peti-
tioner to have been illegally dismissed As regards to the claim for
back salaries, it ruled that he is not entitled to four months which
is equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract, but only to
three months, inclusive of vacation leave pay, and tonnage bonus
pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Respondent's
motion for reconsideration was denied.
The CA modified the NLRC decision, as to monetary awards, it
considered only basic monthly salary and disregarded the monthly
vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus and likewise held that the
"unexpired portion of contract" for which he is entitled to back
salaries should only be three months pursuant to Section 1017 of
RA No. 8042.
Petitioner filed a Motion for (Partial) Reconsideration, but was
denied. Thus, he filed the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the indemnity awarded by the CA in petitioner's favor
consisting only of three months basic salaries conforms with the
proper interpretation of Section 10 of RA No 8042
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that in resolving petitioner's
monetary claims, the CA utterly misinterpreted the Court's ruling
in Skippers Pacific, Inc v Skippers Maritime Services, Ltd., using it
to support a view which the latter case precisely ventured to strike
down. In that case, the employee was hired as the vessel's Master
on a six-month employment contract, but was able to work for
only two months, as he was later on illegally dismissed. The Labor
CHAPTER 151
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
Arbiter, NLRC, and the CA all took the view that the complaining
employee was entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract, but limited to only three months pursuant to Section 1024
of RA No. 8042. The Court did not agree and hence modified the
judgment in said case. It held that, following the wording of Sec. 10
and its ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, when the illegally dismissed employee's
employment contract has a term of less than one year, he shall be
entitled to recovery of salaries representing the unexpired portion of
his employment contract. Indeed, there was nothing even vaguely
confusing in the Court's citation therein of Marsaman
In Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, involving Section
10 of RA No. 8042, it was held:
"[The Court] cannot subscribe to the view that private re-
spondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain
reading of Section 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which
amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract
worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play
only when the employment contract concerned has a term of
at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the [word-
ing] "for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the
[wording] "salaries x x x for three months." To follow petition-
ers' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is
to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the
statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-
established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting
a statute, care should be taken that every part or word
thereof be given effect since the law making body is pre-
sumed to know the meaning of the words employed in
the statute and to have used them advisedly. Ut res ma-
gis valeat quam pereat." (Emphasis supplied)
It is not disputed that private respondent's employment
contract in the instant case was for six (6) months Hence, no
reason to disregard the ruling in Marsaman that private re-
spondent should be paid his salaries for the unexpired portion
of his employment contract.
Thus, petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding
to the unexpired portion of his six-month employment contract,
152 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Old Case:
ISSUE:
The sole issue concerns the rate of interest properly imposable
in relation to a judgment for payment of money: 6%, as provided
by Article 2209 of the Civil Code; or 12% conformably with Central
Bank Circular No. 416.
HELD:
1. The issue has already been passed upon and resolved by the
Court in two earlier cases. In one case, the Court held that
CHAPTER V 153
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
Tariff Customs Code and to HA No. 1937, which took effect on July
1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. Besides, it is
more reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest
the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property
that is subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of
the Tariff and Customs Code. (Pacis v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22526,
November 29, 1966)
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install,
and operate a Community Antenna Television (CATV) system in
Batangas City, which provides that petitioner is authorized to charge
its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided,
however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod."
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscrib-
er rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent
Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit un-
less it secures the approval of respondent Sanggumang Panlungsod.
160 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ISSUE:
Is Executive Order No. 205 impliedly repealed by RA No. 7160?
HELD:
At any rate, [the Court] find[s] no basis to conclude that RA
No. 7160 repealed Executive Order No. 205, either expressly or
impliedly. It is noteworthy that RA No. 7160 repealing clause, which
painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which
are repealed, does not include Executive Order No. 205.
Neither is there an indication that Executive Order No. 205
was impliedily repealed by RA No. 7160. It is a settled rule that
implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear
and unmistakable showing of such intentions.
CHAPTER VI
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES
SPECIFIC STATUTES
There are several kinds of statutes and each statute has its
own rules of construction.
161
162 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
V. TAX STATUTES
Those, which impose rules and regulations, related to taxation
or to creation of particular sources of revenue such as taxes, fees,
and charges that are needed for the support of government and for
all public needs.
In case of doubt, statutes levying taxes and duties are to be
construed most strongly against the government and in favor of
the subjects or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor
presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly
import. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Company, et al., G.R. No. L-30644, 9 March 87, Second
Division, Paras, J.)
"x x x
Examples:
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
"Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives may hold any other office or employ-
ment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat Neither shall he be ap-
pointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected."
M. SPECIAL STATUTE
It is a statute, which relates to particular persons, entities or
things of a class.
Example: Child and Youth Welfare Law
Inc. v. Smith, Bell & Co. [Phil.], Inc., G.R. No. L-24383,
August 26, 1967) To justify a suit against the state or
any of its agencies, the statute conferring the right to
maintain the action must be plain and positive, and its
meaning should not be left to doubt (Compania General
de Tabacco de Filipinas v Government 45 Phil 663)
Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
declares that the State may not be sued without its
consent. When this consent therefore is given, the State
can be sued but this does not necessarily mean that it
concedes to liability. This only means that the one
bringing the suit is merely given the opportunity to prove
that the State is liable.
The consent of the State to be sued may be given
expressly or impliedly. The first may be given through
a general or special law. The second is given when the
state itself commences litigation or when it enters into
a contract. Here, the state devolves into the level of an
ordinary citizen.
6 STATUTES PRESCRIBING LIMITATIONS ON
THE TAXING POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS - They are strictly construed against the national
government and liberally in favor of the local government
units. Any doubt as to the existence of the taxing power
will be resolved in favor of the local government The
reason for this is that local government units are now
granted the power to create its own sources of revenue.
Under the 1973 Constitution, the local government units
have no inherent power of taxation
7 STATUTE IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR NON-PAY-
MENT OF TAX - They are liberally construed in favor
of the government and strictly observed and interpreted
against the taxpayer The reason is obvious, this facili-
tates the collection of taxes and penalties and tax eva-
sions will be avoided
8 ELECTION LAWS - They should be construed liberally
to give effect to the expressed will of the electorate
Technicalities should not be allowed to prevail against
the true will of the people
9. ADOPTION STATUTES - They are liberally construed
in favor of the child to be adopted in order to promote the
CHAPTER VI 171
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES
REPEAL
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones (Article 7, New
Civil Code) and laws are repealed either expressly or impliedly.
However, implied repeals are not looked upon with favor. (U.S. v.
Palacio, 33 Phil. 208) Hence, if both statutes can stand together,
there is no repeal. (Lechoco v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138)
The Civil Code repeals the Old Civil Code of 1889.
The Family Code has expressly repealed Title III on marriage;
Title IV on legal separation; Title V on rights and obligations
between husband and wife; title VI on property relations between
husband and wife; Title VII on the family; Title VIII on paternity
and filiation; Title IX on support; Title XI on parental authority, and
Title XV on emancipation and age of majority.
Article 254 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X
and XV of Book 1 Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known
as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and
Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42
of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed."
This article specifies the provisions of the Civil Code and the
Child and Youth Welfare Code that were expressly repealed by the
Family Code.
The closing sentence in Article 254 which states "x x x all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed," indicates
that the repeal referred to is merely an implied repeal.
what statute is intended. In this case, the courts should respect the
specific intent of the legislature to repeal what it has so specified.
Article 254 of the Family Code specifically enumerates the
provisions of the Civil Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code
that were repealed by the Family Code
Repeals by implication can be done in two ways (1) By covering
the whole subject matter so that it is intended as a substitute for
the earlier statute, and (2) By containing provisions which are
inconsistent and irreconcilable with the earlier statute.
The courts are slow to hold that a statute has repealed another
by implication If the courts cannot avoid doing so through the use of
a fair and reasonable construction, they will not make adjudication
that a statute has repealed another by implication. This is in accor-
dance with the established principle that repeals and amendments
by implications are not favored (Quisimbing v Lachica G B No
L-14683, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 182)
The second sentence in Article 254 of the Family Code which
says "x x x and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed," gives rise to this question Will that be considered
a repeal? If so, what is it?
It is not an express repeal, unlike the first sentence of Article
254 which states specifically the provisions, and the titles, which are
repealed It is merely an implied repeal because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
AMENDATORY ACT - It makes an addition to the original
laws or it operates to change it
An amendment of a statute is effected through the enactment
of an amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of the
statute. The amendment could either be express or implied.
There is an express amendment when the amendatory act
specified the provisions of a statute that are amended. There is an
implied amendment where a part of a.prior statute embracing the
same subject has become inconsistent with the new provisions as
amended
How should the amendment be construed?
1. A statute and its amendment should be construed in its
entirety. The amendment becomes part of the original
statute as if it had always been contained therein;
176 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
178
CHAPTER VII 179
LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE
From time to time, this question has been asked: What if the
letter of the law conflicts with its spirit, which prevails?
There are two schools of thought on this matter. In the case
of People v. Sales, et al., G.R. No. L- 66469, July 29, 1986, Justice
182 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Isagani Cruz articulated his thoughts in this manner: "A too literal
reading of the law is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found
not in the 'letter that killeth but in the spirit that giveth life,' which
is not really that evanescent or elusive. Judges must look beyond
and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover by
their own lights the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That
they may properly apply it according to its ends, they need and must
use not only learning but also vision."
The thinking of Justice Isagani Cruz is more in line with
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which says: "In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This is also
the gist of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the old cases of
Torres v. Limhap, 56 Phil. 141; De Castro v. Olondriz and Escudero,
50 Phil. 725; and in the celebrated case of Dominador Aytona v.
Andres Castillo, et al., G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962.
Former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino, on the other hand, finds
it risky to rely on the "so-called spirit of the law". He said: "It is dan-
gerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see
nor handle and about which we do not know very much." (Villanue-
va v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-54718, December 4, 1985)
The author thinks that it is safer to be guided by the ruling in
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, G.R. No. L-44717,
August 28, 1985. In the said case, this ruling was pronounced. "If
the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, then read the law
to mean exactly what it says. If not, look for the intention of the
legislature."
FACTS:
Maria Virginia Remo is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco
R Rallonza, whose Philippine passport was then expiring on Octo
ber 27, 2000 Prior to its expiry, she applied for renewal with the
4
ISSUE
Whether petitioner can revert to the use of her maiden name in
her replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage.
184 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use
the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article
370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of
the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name
upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames
indicate descent.
The law governing passport issuance is RA No. 8239 and the
applicable provision in this case is Sec. 5(d), which states:
"Section 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport.
- No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless
the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is
satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has
complied with the following requirements: x x x
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated,
divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been an-
nulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certifi-
cate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or
annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse
duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce de-
cree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the
woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden
name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized
under existing laws of the Philippines; x x x"
Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband's surname
in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name,
except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239. Since
petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume
using her maiden name in the replacement passport.
Even assuming RA No. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the
provisions of RA No. 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing
with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII
of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames
A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails
over a general law, thus:
CHAPTER VII 185
LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE
Old Case:
In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, G.R. No. L-84811, August 29,
1989, it was held that B.P. Big. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act)
is the general law, and PD No. 1344 (Decree empowering the Na
tional Housing Authority to issue writs of executions in the enforce-
ment of its decisions under PD No. 957 is the special law.
The conflict sought to be resolved in that case is this: B.P. Big.
129 was promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975
and PD No. 1344 in 1978. In case of conflict between the two, which
prevails?
It was held that in case of conflict between a general law and
a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their
enactment. Thus, it has been held that "the fact that one law is spe-
cial and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remarking an exception of the general act, one
as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the particu-
lar case."
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after
the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law
is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification
of, the general act, and where the general law is later, the special
statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms,
unless repealed expressly or by necessarily implication.
In Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-80593,
December 18,1989, it was held that whenever two statutes of different
dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later
expression of legislative will.
Thus, the Supreme Court uphold the preference accorded to the
employees in view of the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code.
The phrase "any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding"
indicates that such preference shall prevail despite the order set
forth in Articles 2241 and 2245 of the Civil Code. No exceptions
186 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
were provided under said articles. Furthermore, the labor code was
signed into law decades after the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
HELD:
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code has three elements: a) that the
offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public
funds or property under his administration to some public use;
and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were
applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally
appropriated by law or ordinance.
Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea
of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from
him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those
beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot
be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation.
The law punibhes the act of diverting public property earmarked by
law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
188 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The first maxim is still found in Article 3 of the New Civil Code
which provides as follows: "Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance therewith."
Article 3 applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or
penal (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; U.S. v. Allan, 2 Phil. 630)
and whether substantive or remedial. (Article 12, Revised Penal
Code) The maxim, however, does not apply to the following:
1. Ignorance of foreign law is not ignorance of the law but
merely an ignorance of fact;
2. In Tuvera v. Tafiada, a law should first be published
before it becomes effective.
saying that this will be more in keeping with the trend that adoption
is not merely an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied the contention
that there "should be no adoption of an acknowledged natural child
because there is already a relationship of paternity and filiation,"
and ruled that in adopting his own acknowledged natural child, the
father is precisely raising such child to the category of a legitimate
child. (The law on adoption is now governed by Article 183 of the
Family Code)
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, riv-
ers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar charac-
ter;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."
A question arises: Is a riverbank a property of public dominion?
The Supreme Court ruled that it is a property of public dominion
(Hilario v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570, April 27,1967) because
the bed of a river is of public dominion, and the bank being a part of
the bed, is also a part of public dominion. The enumeration shows
that the words "banks" and "rivers" were mentioned separately. It
did not mention "river banks," and yet it was ruled that river banks
are of public dominion. The interpretation is influenced apparently
by the company of words enumerated, which the law considers as
properties of public dominion.
192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
EJUSDEM GENERIS
When general words follow the designation of particular things,
or classes of persons or subjects, the general words will usually be
construed to include only those persons or things of the same class
or general nature as those specifically enumerated.
Section 185 of the implementing rules and regulations of the
Local Government Code enumerates the property that shall be
exempt from distraint and levy, attachment or execution. It provides
as follows:
194
CHAPTER VIII 195
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE
3.) When the word used has no meaning in harmony with the
legislative intent; and
4.) When the word or phrase is repeatedly used in a statute.
EXAMPLES:
The word "hospital" is known to the general public as
a place where sick persons are treated or confined either
for medical treatment, medical examination or operation.
In PD No. 1519, otherwise known as the New Medical
Care Law, the word "hospital" is defined as "any medical
facility, government or private, accredited in accordance
with rules and regulations by the commission." (The word
"commission" in PD No. 1519 is understood to be the
Philippine Medical Commission)
The word "medical practitioner" is understood to be
a doctor who is engaged in the general practice of medi-
cine. Under said PD No. 1519, however, the word "medi-
cal practitioner" is defined as any doctor of medicine duly
licensed to practice in the Philippines who is a member in
good standing of the Philippine Medical Association and
accredited in accordance with rules and regulations pro-
mulgated by the Commission."
And yet, PD No. 1519, Section 4(a) thereof, defines
that the word "individual" applies only to cases involving
natural persons.. (Vda. De Borrorneo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA
207)
EXAMPLES:
The word "marriage" has a very special meaning
and technical meaning under Article 1 of the Family Code
of the Philippines which provides as follows:
"Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of perma-
nent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an invio-
lable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipula-
tion, except that marriage settlements may fix the prop-
erty relations during the marriage within the limits pro-
vided by this Code"
The term "negotiable instrument" has a technical
meaning under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. It provides as follows:
"Section 1. Form of negotiable instrument. - An in-
strument to be negotiable must conform to the following
requirements:
a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or
drawer;
b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to
pay a sum certain in money;
c) Must be payable on demand or at fixed or determin-
able future time;
d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and
e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he
must be named or otherwise indicated therein with
reasonable certainty."
FACTS:
Under a contract for Project Design and Management Services
for the Development of the Proposed Zamboanga Golf and Country
Club, petitioner was to be entitled to seven (7%) percent of the
"actual construction cost." Also, periodic payments were to be based
CHAPTER VIII 197
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE
ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to additional professional fees, i.e., should
the price escalation be included in the "final actual project cost?"
HELD:
1.) The Supreme Court set aside the COA's ruling, ordered
the PTA to pay petitioner the additional amount of
P219,302.47 to complete the payment of its professional
fee.
2.) The very terminologies used in the contract call for
affirmative relief in petitioner's favor. The use of the
terms "actual construction cost," graduating into "final
actual project cost" is significant.
3.) The real intendment of the parties was to base the
ultimate balance of petitioner's professional fees not on
"actual construction cost" alone but on the final actual
project cost. By so providing, the contract allowed for
flexibility based on actuality and as a matter of equity for
198 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
As a Rule
The word "and" is a conjunctive term, and if it is used in a
sentence, it means that the members of a sentence are to be taken
jointly.
Exception
The word "and" may mean "or" if this is the plain intention
of the legislature which could be gleaned from the context of the
statute.
New Case:
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners' complaints and motions for reconsideration
respectively
HELD:
Section 6, RA No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure
for the cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz:
Old Case:
FACTS:
Respondent was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) when he was promoted to the position of Chief Aviation
Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. Annabella
A. Calamba of the ATO Aviation Security Division filed with the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) a protest
against respondent's promotional appointment on the ground that
respondent did not meet the 4-year supervisory requirement for the
position.
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia found the protest to be
without merit. Calamba appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC-NCR). After CSC-NCR Director Nelson Acebedo had requested
ATO Executive Director Manuel Gio to comment three times to no
avail. On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered a decision
upholding the protest of Calamba on the ground that respondent
did not meet the requirements of the contested position and hence
recalled his appointment.
Thereafter, ATO Director Gio asked the CSC-NCR to suspend
the order recalling the appointment of respondent and then,
subsequently manifested that Calamba had no legal personality to
206 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ifie the protest because she was not a qualified next-in-rank; that
the protest was filed out of time, and that respondent was qualified
to the position. On January 5, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo
denied the requests of Director Gil. However, in a letter dated
January 13, 1998, Director Acebedo granted the request of Director
Gilo and affirmed the approval of respondent's appointment.
Calamba asked the CSC to implement the January 5, 1998 ruling of
Director Acebedo. When asked by the CSC to clarify his conflicting
rulings, Director Acebedo explained that the January 5, 1998 ruling
is unofficial and inexistent. Thus, the CSC treated Calamba's
request as an appeal.
On November 13, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 98-2970
granting the appeal of Calamba, disapproving respondent's appoint-
ment, and directing his reversion to his former position. The CSC
having denied his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a pe-
tition for review with the CA. The CA granted the petition by setting
aside the CSC resolutions and approving respondent's appointment.
Petitioner CSC's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Civil Service
Commission tenable?
HELD:
Petitioner's insistence that respondent failed to meet the
four-year managerial and supervisory experience requirement is
misplaced. It is well-settled rule in statutory construction that the
use of the term "and/or" means that the word "and" and the word
"or" are to be used interchangeably. The word "or" is a disjunctive
term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from
another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term "or" in this controversy
connotes that either the standard in the first clause or that in the
second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective
applicant for the position under question may qualify.
Example:
"Article 420. The following are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character x x x" (Underscoring Supplied)
EXAMPLE:
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when
the public safety requires it." (Section 15, Article III, 1987
Constitution) (Underscoring Supplied)
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws." (Section 1, Ar-
ticle III, 1987 Constitution)
"Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with
law and in a just and humane manner." (Section 10,
Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)
Examples:
1.) An undertaking in a letter agreement premised on the
termination of a marital relation is not only contrary to
law but also contrary to Filipino morals and public policy.
As such, any agreement or obligation based on such
unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public
policy should be deemed null and void. (Lichauco de Leon
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80965, June 6, 1990)
2.) An agreement to work, as a servant without pay is im-
moral and void since this would amount to involuntary
servitude. (De los Reyes v. Alojado, 16 Phil. 499)
3.) An agreement exempting a carrier from liability for
gross negligence (Heacock v. Macondray, 32 Phil. 205) is
contrary to public policy.
4.) The stipulation in a contract, between a student and the
school that the students scholarship is good only if he con-
216
CHAPTER IX 217
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS
FACTS
ISSUE:
Whether the admitted contents of the documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties.
HELD:
No. Admitted contents of the documents do not adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put
in issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express the
true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond
these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions
of the parties in order to determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract,
not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities.
To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere
typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
The instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence
Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9.
Here, the petitioners' VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. It de-
scribed the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap), and
also said that the location is in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents'
Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule because
it referred to 'PCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), however RBBI con-
tended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was
squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true
intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the case necessitates an
examination of the parties' respective parol evidence, in order to determine
CHAPTER IX 225
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS
the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt,
it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention
is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity,
and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose
of agreements.
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the
Civil Code involving the interpretation of contracts:
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation
of documents is likewise enlightening:
PRINCIPLE:
WHERE A GENERAL WORD OR PHRASE FOLLOWS
AN ENUMERATION OF PARTICULAR AND SPECIFIC
WORDS OF THE SAME CLASS, THE GENERAL WORD OR
PHRASE IS TO BE CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE - OR TO BE
RESTRICTED TO -THINGS AKIN TO OR RESEMBLING, OR
OF THE SAME KIND OR CLASS AS, THOSE SPECIFICALLY
MENTIONED.
The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis
states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumera-
tion of particular and specific words of the same class, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include - or to be restricted to
- things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned.
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of PD No.
1216, we find that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the
common welfare of the community. Thus, the phrase "other similar
facilities and amenities" should be interpreted in like manner.
227
228 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Neither can the NPC successfully rely on the Basco case as this
was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when there was still
no law empowering local government units to tax instrumentalities
of the national government.
Consequently, when NPC assumed the tax liabilities of the
BPC under their 1992 BOT Agreement, the LGC which removed
NPC's tax exemption privileges had already been in effect for six (6)
months. Thus, while BPC remains to be the entity doing business
in said City, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable to pay said taxes
under the provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement and the 1991
Local Government Code
Hence, the petition of BPC and NPC were dismissed.
HELD:
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of
bigamy, thus:
232 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
In 1985, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued an Ad-
ministrative Order on the payment of additional charges for pilot-
age services on Sundays and Holidays referring to "nighttime and
overtime pay." In 1986, the President issued Executive Order No.
1088 providing for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services
without mentioning nighttime and overtime pay. The Executive Or-
der contains a repealing clause that all orders, letters of instruction,
rules, regulations and issuances inconsistent with it are repealed or
amended accordingly.
ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Order repealed the Administrative
Order.
HELD:
No, the Executive Order did not repeal the Administrative
Order The Executive Order provides a general repealing clause,
the effect of which fails under the category of an implied repeal,
as it does not identify the orders, rules or regulations it intends to
abrogate.
Repeal by implication is frowned upon in this jurisdiction. It
is not favored, unless it is manifestly intended by the legislative
authority enacting it or, unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the subject laws or orders are clearly repugnant
and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is because
the legislative authority is presumed to know the existing law so
that if repeal is intended, the proper step is to express it.
NOTES
In 1922, the Supreme Court in Lichauco & Co v Apostol, 44
Phil. 138 ruled that:
1992 CASES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR.
G.R. No. 101724
SUPREME COURT
PRINCIPLES:
B.P. BLG. 195 WHICH AMENDED SECTION 11
OF REPUBLIC ACT 3019 CANNOT BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
THE DATE OF THE VIOLATION OF THE LAW BE-
COMES THE OPERATIVE DATE FOR THE COM-
MENCEMENT OF THE PERIOD OF PRESCRIP-
TION
"[B.P.] 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending
Sec[tion] 11 of RA No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen
(15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be
given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed
by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the
benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Sec[tion]
11, RA [No.] 3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at
the time he committed it."
1991 CASES
uity should yield to positive rules, which preempt and prevail over
such persuasions. Emotional appeals to justice, while they may ring
the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of
the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which
goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists - and is now still
reverently observed - is "aequUas nun quam contravenit legs"
On June 26, 1991, The Supreme Court made an additional pro-
nouncement in Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-93401, thus:
"The application by the trial court of its equity
jurisdiction is misplaced Equity is available only in the
absence of law and not as its replacement. All abstract
arguments based only on equity should yield to positive
rules (judicial rules of procedure), which preempt and
prevail over such persuasions Moreover, a court acting
without jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption thereof
by invoking its equity jurisdiction."
PRINCIPLE:
LAWS SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AS A CONDITION
FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is so
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature
i.e. , regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
240 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
MACEDA v. MACARAIG
G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
REPEAL BY IMPLICATION IS NOT FAVORED;
STRICTISSIMI JURIS (STRICT INTERPRE-
TATION);
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
HAS WEIGHT
Repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest that
the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it is not
intended to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the
same subject matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not
only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the
language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject
matter of the earlier. The first effort of a court must always be to
reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of another
so as to give sensible effect to both provisions.
The law did not intend that the provisions of PD No. 938 should
be construed strictly against the National Power Corporation.
On the contrary, the law mandates that it should be interpreted
liberally so as to enhance the tax-exempt status of the National
Power Corporation. Hence, the rule on strictissimi juris with respect
to the interpretation of statutes granting tax exemptions to the NPC
cannot be invoked.
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions
running to the benefit of the government itself or its agencies. In
such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the
amount of money that has to be handled by government in the course
of its operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions
to government agencies may be construed liberally, in favor of non-
tax liability of such agencies.
CHAPTER X 241
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
BASCO v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
ALL PRESUMPTIONS ARE INDULGED IN FAVOR
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
One who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. That a law may
work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. If any reasonable
basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld
242 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
and the challenger. must negate all possible basis. The. courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a
statute. A liberal interpretation of the Constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. It is safer to construe the Constitution from what
appears upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers' understanding thereof.
PRINCIPLE:
LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS
The Philippine law, following the lex loci celebratioais, adheres
to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid
everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Article 71 of
the Civil Code (now Article 26 of the Family Code) provides that "all
marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
CHAPTER X 245
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country..." And any doubt as
to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far
the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences
of the coverture is answered by Article 220 of the Civil Code in this
manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of
the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts lean towards the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parenth over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression."
Bearing in mind the "processual presumption," he who asserts that
the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to
present the foreign law.
1990 CASES
ALVENDIA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
EQUITABLE REASONS WILL NOT CONTROL
AGAINST ANY WELL-SETTLED RULE OF LAW
Equity is justice outside legality. It applies only in the absence
of and never against statutory law or judicial rules or procedure.
"Equity follows the law" but where the law gives a particular remedy
and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules,
it would be improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves
it and to extend it further than the law allows. Courts exercising
equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary
discretion to disregard them. Equitable reasons will not control
against any well-settled rule of law or public policy.
ISSUE:
The sole issue concerns the rate of interest properly imposable
in relation to a judgment for payment of money: 6%, as provided
by Article 2209 of the Civil Code or 12% conformably with Central
Bank Circular No. 416.
HELD:
1. The issue had already been passed upon and resolved by
the Court in two earlier cases. In one case, the Court held
that the "judgments spoken of and referred to are (only)
judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of
any money, goods or credits." It declared that any kind
of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor
involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law
(PD No. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority
granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may
not tread on forbidden grounds. It cannot rewrite other
CHAPTER X 247
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
HELD:
1. Resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no
law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. Even
in the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is
only persuasive.
2. For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough
applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under Article 1764 and
Article 2206[1] of the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is
computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of
his beneficiary.
1989 CASES
LLAMADO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989
PRINCIPLE
• WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT ANY STATUTORY LAN-
GUAGE THAT APPEARS TO FAVOR THE AC-
CUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD BE GIVEN
A "LIBERAL INTERPRETATION," COURTS, HOW.-
EVER, HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO INVOKE "LIB-
ERAL INTERPRETATION" OR "THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAW" WHERE THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE
THEMSELVES LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT OR
INTERPRETATION.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of
penal statutes, the court notes that the Probation Law is not a penal
statute. The Court, however, understands petitioner's argument
to be really that any statutory language that appears to favor the
accused in a criminal case should be given a "liberal interpretation"
Courts, however, have no authority to invoke "liberal inter-
pretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute
themselves and as illuminated by the history of that statute leave
no room for doubt or interpretation. The spirit of the law may not be
legitimately invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and
definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true
legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all
others who are charged with the application and implementation of
a statute The spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given ef-
fect are to be derived from the words actually used by the lawmaker,
and not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source inde-
pendent of and transcending the words of the legislature.
"Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives, which too frequently
impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning that the
law-making authority projected when it promulgated the language
CHAPTER X 251
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
that the court must apply. The first duty of a judge is to take and
apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise,
confusion and uncertainty in application will follow, stability and
continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve.
Where the language is plain, subtle refinements, which tinge
words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory, are
not only unnecessary but also decidedly harmful. That which has
caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult
for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect
to a given matter is in considerable measure the unwarranted inter-
ference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in
statutes and contracts cutting the words here and inserting them
there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought
to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them
meaning which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fit-
ting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to
advice their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract
until it has been submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction.
The words to be given meaning whether they be found in the
Constitution or in a statute define and therefore limit the authority
and description of the judges who must apply those words. If judges
may, under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the
law, disregard the words in fact used by the lawgiver, the judges
will effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations
on their authority and description.
Once the judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of
the words of the legislative authority, he is essentially on uncharted
seas. In a policy like ours, which enshrines the fundamental notion
of limiting power through the separation and distribution of powers,
judges have to be particularly careful least they substitute their
conceptions or preferences of policy for that actually projected by
the legislative agency. Where a judge believes passionately that he
knows what the legislative agency should have said on a particular
matter dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach
the conclusion that the law-making authority was really saying or
trying to say, if somewhat ineptly.
Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large.
They are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in
its particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under
the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic
252 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
JANDUSAY, et al., v.
COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
G.R. No. 48714, April 18, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
ONE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST HIMSELF BE
DESERVING OF EQUITY
The laches of one nullifies the laches of the other. One who
seeks equity must himself be deserving of equity. When parties are
in culpability similarly situated (in eodem loco), one may claim no
advantage over the other. This is a principle of law applied in the
'ari delicto" rule embedded in our legal system.
FRANCISCO v. PERMSKUL
G.R. No. 810061, May 12, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
TO JUSTIFY THE NULLIFICATION OF A LAW,
THERE MUST BE A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
BREACH, OF THE CONSTITUTION
IN CASE OF DOUBT, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE
JUDICIARY TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO PRE-
VENT THE INVALIDATION OF THE LAW
When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption in
favor of its constitutionality is employed. To justify the nullification
254 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION