People v.

Beriales

Facts: The Court of First Instance sentenced each of the three accused to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the death of Saturnina Porcadilla. The trial court initially postponed trial upon a motion for
deferment after appellants’ counsel asked for a reinvestigation. The trial court, however, motu proprio
moved up the arraignment and trial one week earlier after it was already postponed for two weeks.
Appellants counsel manifested that if this were to be done, the reinvestigation would not yet have been
started by the Fiscal, yet the court issued the order a quo. On the date set by the trial court, the judge
insisted on arraigning the accused in spite of their refusal to do so in the absence of the fiscal, and
entered pleas of not guilty for each of them. Trial ensued in the absence of the fiscal, with the private
prosecutor presenting evidence, while the defense counsel refused to cross-examine and present
evidence for the defense, manifesting that they were not agreeing to the trial.

Issue: Whether or not the trial could have ensued without the reinvestigation.

Ruling: No. After the trial court granted the appellants’ motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent
upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have
conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on its
part, not only to be consistent with its own order but also to do justice and at the same time to avoid a
possible miscarriage of justice.

Dimatulac v. Villon

Facts: A complaint was filed against the accused for the death of SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac who, according
to the information, was shot dead by them. Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores conducted a
reinvestigation, not being clear whether or not the same was done motu proprio or upon motion of
private respondents. In the Resolution, APP found that the Yabuts and assailant Danny were the only
ones against whom probable cause was found, to the exclusion of others, and downgraded the felony
charged from murder to homicide. Complainants filed an appeal on the resolution to the DOJ. Private
prosecutor also filed a motion to defer on the ground of the said appeal, which the judge then denied.

Issue: Whether or not the appeal to the DOJ would have been sufficient ground to defer the
arraignment and trial.

Ruling: Yes. After the trial court granted the appellants’ motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent
upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have
conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on its
part, not only to be consistent with its own order but also to do justice and at the same time to avoid a
possible miscarriage of justice. The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to
appeals by respondents or accused. So we held in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals that nothing in the ruling
in Crespo v. Mogul, reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals, forecloses the power or authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information
already having been filed in court. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as
practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a
complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the
prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the
discretion of the court. In Roberts we went further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said
power or authority of the Secretary of Justice “without doing violence to, or repealing, the last
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court” which is quoted above.

Santos v. Orda

Facts: The DOJ directed the prosecutor to withdraw the informations after the prosecution witnesses
recanted their testimonies. The RTC then issued an Order allowing the withdrawal of the informations
and consequently recalling the warrants for their arrest. CA nullified said RTC order. SC affirmed the
nullification. Ligaya filed for an MR. The Court finally resolved petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
holding that the RTC, Branch 258,11 must make an independent evaluation of the records before
allowing the withdrawal of the Informations against petitioners. This impelled Ligaya to file before the
RTC, Branch 257, an Urgent Motion to Resolve Anew and on the Merits Previous Motion to Withdraw
Criminal Informations Pursuant to the DOJ Finding on Lack of Probable Cause. RTC then issued an Order
dismissing the case for murder on the ground of lack of probable cause which led to respondents filing a
Petition for Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Certiorari is the proper remedy.

Ruling: No. —On the first issue, the petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC, granting the motion of the
prosecution to withdraw the Informations and ordering the case dismissed, is final because it disposed
of the case and terminated the proceedings therein, leaving nothing to be done by the court. Thus, the
proper remedy is appeal. Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available to him under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to
an ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action
under Rule 65 cannot cure a party’s failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or resolution. Rule 65 is
an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal. To be sure, a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Indeed, we have
noted a number of exceptions to this general rule, to wit: 1) when public welfare and the advancement
of public policy dictate; 2) when the broader interest of justice so requires; 3) when the writs issued are
null and void; 4) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority; 5)
when, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or 6) in other meritorious
cases.
Rontos v. People

Facts: Petitioner was arrested when, during surveillance, he was seen scrutinizing two plastic sachets
which, upon a closer look, appeared to contain a white crystalline substance similar to shabu.

Issue: Whether or not any irregularity with regard to his arrest may still be raised if he fails to raise this
issue or move for the quashal of information on this ground.

Ruling: No. We cannot uphold the contention of petitioner that his warrantless arrest was illegal. The CA
correctly ruled that his failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering his plea during
arraignment operated as a waiver of that defense. “It has been ruled time and again that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his arraignment.” In his
arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and instead “freely and voluntarily
pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged.” Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality
of his arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this Court.

People v. Lorredo

Facts: The CFI decreed the forfeiture of the bail bond for illegal possession of firearms after he had
absented himself from the locality. When the accused was not apprehended after a warrant was issued
against him, the sureties were issued upon summons and ordered to produce the body of the accused.
Accused was later arrested by virtue of another warrant issued upon motion of one of the sureties.
Sureties then prayed that orders of forfeiture of bail be declared null and void. Prayer and MR were
denied.

Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of the bond should have been granted and therefor the
forfeiture, improper.

Ruling: No. A surety who desires to produce and surrender the body of the accused in open court is not
relieved from liability upon his bond until the court accepts said surrender. (Du Lawrence vs. State, 31
Oh. Cir., 418). The mere presentation or presence of the accused in court is not sufficient in itself. The
attention of the court must be called to his presence and the intention to surrender the body of the
accused must be clearly and definitely stated and understood by the court.

People v. Arconado

Facts: The CFI denied Arconado’s petition to reopen the case and prove the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the denial was proper

Ruling: No. It is true that the discretion is lodged with the trial court to permit or not submission of
evidence of mitigating circumstances, after a plea of guilty has been entered. But such discretion must
be exercised in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case and said discretion should not
be used to prevent the disclosure of circumstances that would mitigate in any manner the responsibility
of the accused who has pleaded guilty. In the case at bar the records show that some of the mitigating
circumstances composing that of incomplete self-defense, attended the commission of the crime and
the aims of justice would not be subserved by the denial of the motion to submit evidence of the said
mitigating circumstances. The rules of procedure were not designed to curtail the disclosure of the real
facts especially of mitigating circumstances, that the criminal law may be applied with justice and
fairness both to the prosecution and to the accused. Were we to make the discretion of the judge in
matters like the case at bar absolute, no accused would be induced to enter a plea of guilty and thereby
abbreviate in a way the proceedings and -especially the trial of the case. When, as in the case at bar, the
facts and circumstances, as appearing in the record itself, justify the claim of the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense, we believe it was error for the trial court to deny the privilege to submit
evidence thereof.

People v. Mogol

Facts: Caballas was charged in a complaint for Serious Physical Injuries to which he entered a plea of not
guilty. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information to Frustrated Murder before the
presentation of evidence. Motion was denied. Trial ensued but the judge refused to render judgement
claiming that doing so would be to render judgement on a case outside of its jurisdiction. Case was
dismissed without prejudice to the filing of information for frustrated murder. When such information
was filed with the CFI, the same was dismissed upon motion of the defense on the ground of double
jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal was proper.

Ruling: No. There can be no question, as indeed it is quite clear, that in the case at bar, the Order of
dismissal issued by the Municipal Court did not actually terminate or put an end to the prosecution
against herein private respondent for the felonious act he was alleged to have committed. On the
contrary, the dispositive portion of said Order expressly directed that the records of the case be
forwarded to the Court of First Instance so that the Office of the Provincial Fiscal could file a complaint
for frustrated murder. The fundamental question then in the case at bar is: Was the dismissal Order
terminating the case before respondent Judge legal and valid? The answer is No. We hold and rule that
respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case for serious physical injuries “to give way to the filing of a
complaint for frustrated murder.” For it is the duty of the respondent Judge to render the decision as
the evidence injuries, and not dismiss the case on his idea or belief that there was evidence of intent to
kill the intended victim. The Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction thereby rendering his Order of November 29, 1972 null and void. Since the order of dismissal
was without authority and, therefore, null and void, the proceedings before the Municipal Court have
not been lawfully terminated. Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no double
jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for serious physical injuries is in order.
People v. Basca

Facts: The accused were charged with robbery with homicide of Teodora Sese and multiple rape of
Celestina Torres. Among those initially charged, two were discharged to be state witnesses, resulting in
the conviction of Bacsa and the acquittal based on reasonable doubt of three other accused. Bacsa now
imputes irregularity in the trial judge for permitting the release of two defendants, as by his
interpretation, the rules permit only one.

Issue: Whether or not the rules permit only one defendant to be discharged to be a state witness.

Ruling: No. We do not think the said Rule implies a prohibition against the discharge of more than one
co-defendant. It all depends upon the needs of the fiscal and the discretion of the trial judge. Anyway,
any error of the trial judge in this matter cannot have the effect of invalidating the testimony of the
discharged co-defendants.

US v Guzman

Facts: Guzman and Fajardo were charged in a complaint for personal injuries. Fajardo was acquitted but
Guzman was convicted. Guzman appealed.

Issue: Whether or not Guzman can be convicted or punished of an offense included in that charged in
the complaint.

Ruling: Yes This court accepts as proven the guilt of the appellant as found by the trial judge in his
sentence in this case, such findings being in accordance with the facts and merits. We can not say this,
however, with respect to the penalty imposed, such penalty not being in accordance with the offense as
alleged and charged. This case or charge being one of lesiones menos graves (personal injuries), treated
successfully and cured within a period of sixteen days after the infliction of the same, as is expressly
alleged and set forth in the complaint herein, the penalty in this case should have been that of arresto
mayor, or banishment, together with a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas, within the discretion of the
court; this is in accordance with and as prescribed in article 418 of the Penal Code.
US v. Sotavento

Facts: Accused Sotaventos were convicted sentenced to suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua. They
filed an appeal through counsel de officio which the fiscal prayed to be declared null and void because
accused had failed to transmit a written copy of the notice of appeal to the provincial fiscal.

Issue: Whether or not the appeal may be declared null and void

Ruling: The appellant's failure in not serving- a copy of his written notice of appeal to the provincial fiscal
or to the official government representative in the court that had rendered the judgment appealed
from, is not a defect which can either nullify the appeal or prejudice the unquestionable rights of the
accused, inasmuch as what is important is that the appellant should be able to exercise, at the proper
time, as one of the rights essentially belonging to him, the right of appeal, against whatever resolution
or judgment he might consider prejudicial to his rights or interests, and that the actual and physical
exercise of such right should be effected in writing within the period of fifteen days; so that for the
computation of this period it is necessary for the clerk of court to cause to appear in the case the date of
the service upon the accused of the notice, signed by the latter, of the rendition of the judgment or
resolution.

Uy v BIR

Facts: 3 search warrants were issued to search the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation for alleged
violations of the NIRC. As a result of the searches and seizures, the BIR filed a case against them before
the DOJ and petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants which were denied. Their
petition fot certiorari to the CA was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to challenge the validity of the search
warrants

Ruling: Yes. The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman, where we held that the issuing judge’s
disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion,
which may be remedied by certiorari. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the
foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the
warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
Abelita v. Doria

Facts: Judge Abelita III and his wife were headed home when policemen told him to head to the PNP
office where a search was conducted on his car. Police found a licensed shotgun and a caliber .45. He
was then detained. He now claims for damages against Doria and the other police for what he alleges
was an illegal search conducted against him.

Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal search and seizure

Ruling: No. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Personal
knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt.
Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and
learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down
petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially
agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying
to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Under the plain
view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.