Final Memorial Petitioner

3rd ANNUAL CAPACITY BUILDING MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021, NLUJA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
TC5
3RD ANNUAL CAPACITY BUILDING MOOT COMPETITION
NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL ACADEMY, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SHIKHARABAD
UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD
IN THE MATTER OF
MR. BHAVYA KOHLI AND
MS. CHITRAVANDINI SINGH …PETITIONERS
V.
THE UNION OF SHIKHARABAD …RESPONDENT
PETITION NO. ****/2021
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
COUNSEL APPEARING ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of authorities..................................................................................................................3
Statement of jurisdiction.........................................................................................................7
Statement of facts.....................................................................................................................8
Statements of issues..................................................................................................................9
..................................................................................................................................................10
Summary of arguments.........................................................................................................10
Arguments advanced.............................................................................................................11
[1] WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE

GOVERNMENT WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD?..............................................................................11
[A] THE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FAIL THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS UNDER ARTICLE
19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD....................................................................12
[i] The Travel Restrictions Were Imposed Under The Authority Of Law................13
[ii] The restrictions imposed by the lockdown regulation were arbitrary and of an
excessive nature...............................................................................................................13
[iii] The restrictions imposed are not related to the purposes mentioned under
clauses 19(2) to (6)...........................................................................................................15
[B] THE IMPUGNED ACT IS ARBITRARY AND CLASSIFIED AS AN UNREASONABLE LAW

UNDER ARTICLE 14..............................................................................................................16
[i] Absolute discretion.....................................................................................................17
[ii] Administrative discrimination.................................................................................18
[C] THE REGULATION PASSED IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH ARTICLE 21 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD.......................................................................................19
[i] Infringement of personal liberty...............................................................................20
[ii] The procedural requirements were not fulfilled....................................................21
[D] THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON TRADE AND COMMERCE WERE AGAINST THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 301 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD........................23
2
[II] WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN

DRAFTING THE FARMERS WELFARE BILL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
SHIKHARABAD WAS LEGITIMATE?............................................................................24
[A] DRAFTING OF THE FARMERS BILL WAS BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT'S JURISDICTION...........................................................................................25
[i] Arbitrary expansion of the term "food stuffs" by the central government to
disband APMCs..............................................................................................................26
[ii] Legislative competence of state government on the subject agriculture under

State List (List II) of the Constitution of Shikharabad...............................................27
[B] UNRESTRICTED HOARDING WILL LEAD TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD.......................................................................................30
[C] ENFORCED QUARANTINE OF SEVERAL OPPOSITION LEADERS LED TO AN UNFAIR

VOTE.....................................................................................................................................31
Prayer......................................................................................................................................31
3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Paragraph
& And
AIR All India Report
Art. Article
Const. Constitution
ed. Edition
Govt. Government
Ibid. Ibidem
Ors. Others
Pg. Page
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
UOI Union of India
v./v/vs Versus
Vol. Volume
WHO World Health Organization
CASES REFERRED
A. K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 27 ................................................................13

Anuradha Bhasin Vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1031 of 2019.........................9
4
Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. the State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232..............................................18
Bachan Singh v. the State of Punjab, 1982 AIR 1325 ............................................................10
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1951 AIR 118 ....................................................8
CPIO v Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 .................................10
District Collector v. Ibrahim, 1970 AIR 1275.........................................................................17
District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496......................................12
G K Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 375.........................................................6
Gilles Pfeiffer v. Union of India, AIR 1996 Mad 322...............................................................6
Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228.....................................................6
Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, AIR 1955 SC 367 : (1955) 1 SCR
1284......................................................................................................................................23
Himalayan Lever v. the State of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 SCC 438..........................................19
Hoechst Pharm Ltd. vs State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1983 SC 1019..................................................22
I.T.C. Ltd. v. APMC, Appeal (Civil) 6453 of 2001.................................................................22
Justice (Retd.) K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012 ...10
Kartar Singh v. the State of Punjab, 1961 AIR 1787...............................................................15
Koteswar v. K.R.B. & Co, 1969 AIR 504................................................................................17
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597.....................................................................6
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,1978 AIR 597, 1978 S.C.R. (2) 621.................................13
Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1970 AIR 93 .................................................8
Navichandra Mafatlal v. Commr. Of Income – tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 58 : (1955) 1 SCR
829........................................................................................................................................23
Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1986 AIR 180...................................15
Om Kumar v. Union of India, SLP (Civil) 21000 of 1993........................................................8
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Others (PU CL), Writ Petition (Civil)
No.196 of 2001 .......................................................................................................................24
Ram Chandra Palai v. the State of Orissa, 1956 AIR 298.......................................................17
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 124, 1950 SCR 594........................................7
SheoNandanPaswan v. the State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 SC 877, 895......................................12
Shri Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. A.V. Visvanatha Sastri..............................................13
Shrinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah, A.I.R. 1993 SC 929.................................................................11
SR Bommai v. the State of Kerala, 1994 AIR 1918................................................................22
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, 1952 1 SCR 889.............................................................21
5
State of Rajasthan v. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 904...........................23
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 1963 AIR 1241, 1964 SCR (1) 371.........................23
State of West Bengal vs Union of India, 1963 AIR 1241........................................................19
T.V. Vatheeswaran vs State Of Tamil Nadu, 1983 AIR 361...................................................14
The Elel Hotels and Investment Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1664..........................23
VG Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196........................................................................6
Welfare Assn. ARP v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358 : AIR 2003 SC 1266....................23
STATUTES REFERRED
Constitution of India
6
Constitution of Shikharabad
BOOKS REFERRED
1. D. D. Basu, Commentary on The Constitution of India, Vol. 3, 3138 (8th ed., Lexis
Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Publications, Nagpur, 2008).
2. M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th ed., Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa,

Nagpur, 2015).
3. J.P.S. Narayana, Law of Writs, (7th ed., Asia Law House, Hyderabad, 2013).
4. J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India (54th ed., Central Law Agency, Allahabad,
2014).
5. N. Kumar, Constitutional Law of India (2nd ed., Allahabad Law Agency, 2016).
6. H. N. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary (4th ed.,

Universal Law Publishing Co. Ltd., Lexis Nexis, 2015).
7. Granville Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation (Indian Constitution), Volume 75 (Oxford

India, New Delhi, 1999).
LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED
1. Manupatra Online Resources
2. Lexis Nexis Academica
3. SCC Online
4. Supreme Court of Inia
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
7
In the instant case, the writ petition has been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of
Shikharabad for violation of Fundamental Rights enumerated under Part III of the
Constitution and thereby challenge the validity of various activities conducted by the
Respondents in violation of the law in force.
The present memorandum sets forth the acts, contentions and arguments on behalf of the
petitioners.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND OF SHIKHARABAD
The United Republic of Shikharabad is a parliamentary democracy with a population of 30

million. It has a quasi-federal structure with a unitary bias and has 21 provinces with their
8
respective provincial governments. An oil reserve-rich Digboi is its capital. Based in its
financial capital, Bharatpur, the tertiary sector is the principal contributor to its GDP.
COVID- 19 VIRUS AND SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWN REGULATION
On the reports of the spread of a transmissible virus in the province of Juhan in the People's
Republic of Lina, the World Health Organization on 10th February issued a declaration on the
spread and named it COVID- 19 virus. Due to its spread, various nations started
implementing travel restrictions. However, the WHO produced several scientific reports and
concluded that border closures were ineffective in controlling the spread of the COVID- 19
viruses. The Government of Shikharabad, based on an intensive risk assessment, brought a
regulation on 2nd March 2021, prohibiting intra-state travel of all persons in the territory of
Shikharabad from 5th March 2021 with immediate effect. Due to this travel restriction, Mr
Bhavya Kohli, who owns a petroleum business in Digboi, suffered severe losses and filed a
P.I.L. challenging the constitutional validity of the Lockdown Regulation.
AGRICULTURAL REFORMS AND PROTEST
Agriculture employs more than 75% of the workforce, and acting on their electoral promise
the Prime Minister of Shikharabad Ujjwala Udita Misra drafted the Farmers Welfare Bill and
introduced it in the Lower House on 13 th April 2021 and in the Upper House on 14 th April
2021; however, several leaders of the opposition were quarantined compulsorily due to the
violation of Lockdown restrictions. Due to their absence, the Government managed to pass
the bill in the Upper House and notified the law on 15 th April 2021. The Farmers across the
Country sensed a violation of their rights and started blockading the Capital City of Digboi,
and all of such protesting farmers were quarantined forcibly on 15 th April 2021 due to the
violation of the Lockdown guidelines. In response to this, Ms Chitravandini Singh, the leader
of the farmer's protest filed a P.I.L. in the Supreme Court on 16th April, 2021 challenging the
validity of the Farmers Welfare Act, 2021, and the Lockdown Regulation.
The Supreme Court registry clubbed both the petition together since these involved similar
questions of law and hence, the present matter.
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES
9
[ISSUE 1]: WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE
GOVERNMENT WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
SHIKHARABAD?
[ISSUE 2]: WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN DRAFTING THE
FARMERS WELFARE BILL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SHIKHARABAD WAS LEGITIMATE?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
10
[ISSUE 1]: WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE
GOVERNMENT WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
SHIKHARABAD?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the impugned Act, firstly,
violates the petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 19, 14, 21 of the Constitution of
Shikharabad and is thus unconstitutional. Secondly, the restrictions imposed on trade and
commerce contravene Article 301 of the Constitution of Shikharabad and are thus ultra vires
as the restrictions imposed are "restrictive" and not "regulatory" in nature.
[ISSUE 2]: WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN DRAFTING THE
FARMERS WELFARE BILL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SHIKHARABAD WAS LEGITIMATE?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Government of
Shikharabad, firstly, overstepped its jurisdiction by expanding the term "foodstuff" to disband
APMCs and by legislating a law on one of the subjects of the State list (List II) of the
Constitution of Shikharabad, secondly, by removing the limit on hoarding, it violates the
Right to food which is inherent to a life with dignity under the Right to life of Article 21 of
the Constitution of Shikharabad, and thirdly, the incident of enforced quarantine of several
opposition leaders on the day of voting and the passing of the bill by taking advantage of the
absence of those opposition leaders is an attack on the very essence of democracy as
mentioned in the Constitution of Shikharabad.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
11
[1] WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE

GOVERNMENT WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD?
1. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the impugned
Act, firstly, violates the petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 19, 14, 21 of the
Constitution of Shikharabad and is thus unconstitutional. Secondly, the restrictions
imposed on trade and commerce contravene Article 301 of the Constitution of
Shikharabad and are thus ultra vires as the restrictions imposed are "restrictive" and
not "regulatory" in nature.
2. It is humbly contended that the test of reasonableness under Article 19 should be

applied to each statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.1
3. It is humbly contended that there is always an initial presumption of validity of law2

and that due importance should be given to the legislative intent while deciding the
constitutionality of a provision.3
4. It is humbly contended that Art. 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to the 'procedure established by law'. This
procedure cannot be fanciful and arbitrary but must answer the test of reasonableness
to satisfy the requirements of Art. 21.4
[A] THE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FAIL THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS UNDER

ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD.
1
VG Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196 (India).
2
G K Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 375 (India).
3
Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228 (India).
4
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597 (India).
12
5. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute in nature. They are subject to
restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article 19, which must be reasonable. 5
In order to prove that such restrictions are ‘reasonable’ in nature, they should follow
the underlying conditions:
a. There must be an authority of law.
b. The restrictions imposed must not be arbitrary and excessive.
c. The restrictions imposed must not travel beyond the contours of clauses (2) to (6)
of Article 19 of the Constitution of Shikharabad.
6. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the travel restrictions imposed
violate Article 19 of the Constitution of Shikharabad. This can be proved by firstly
emphasizing on the arbitrary and excessive nature of the regulation that hurdle with
the fundamental rights of the citizens. Secondly, the restrictions imposed do not fall
within the ambit of reasonable restrictions mentioned under clauses 19(2) to (6).
[i] The Travel Restrictions Were Imposed Under The Authority Of Law.
7. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if a restriction is

imposed on Article 19, it must be with the authority of law. 6 To impose reasonable
restrictions on the Freedom of movement along with trade and commerce, the
Government of Shikharabad firstly carried out an intensive risk assessment
throughout the country whose report concluded that there was a need to prevent inter-
state as well as intra-state travel immediately. 7 After the intensive risk assessment, the
Government brought the regulation which the Parliament promulgated on the
subsequent day, imposing reasonable restrictions on travel. It is contended that the
Government followed all the procedures, and the restrictions were imposed under the
authority of law.
5
Gilles Pfeiffer v. Union of India, AIR 1996 Mad 322 (India).
6
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 124, 1950 SCR 594 (India).
7
¶ 5 of the Moot Proposition of the 3rd Annual Capacity Building Moot Court Competition, 2021, NLUJA.
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[ii] The restrictions imposed by the lockdown regulation were arbitrary and of an
excessive nature.
8. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the restrictions
imposed by the Lockdown regulation were excessive and arbitrary in nature, as a
blanket restriction on travel of all persons was imposed without having a sun-set
clause.8 It is also contended that the Central Government went against the World
Health Organization, which strongly recommended against any travel restrictions and
border closures on the basis of several scientific reports.9
9. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the Central Government also
kept the sole discretion of determining the essential services with themselves, which
poses a threat of its misuse by the administration.
10. In Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh,10 this Hon'ble Court stated that the
word 'reasonable restriction' connotes that the limitation imposed on a person's
enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what
is needed in the interests of the public. The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care
and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation that
arbitrarily or excessively infringes on the right cannot be said to have the quality of
reasonableness, and it must be held to be lacking in that quality unless it strikes a
proper balance between the Freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the social
control permitted by clause (6) of Article 19."
11. In Om Kumar v. Union of India,11 this Hon'ble Court explained the principle of
proportionality, in light of administrative orders, as the question of whether, while
regulating the exercise of fundamental rights of the people, the appropriate or least
restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator to
achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order,
depending on the case. On the contrary, In the lockdown regulation, the
administrators were given the power to compulsorily quarantine any individual who is
seen to be violating the provisions of lockdown regulation.
8
Ibid.
9
10
1951 AIR 118, 1950 SCR 759 (India).
11
Special Leave Petition (civil) 21000 of 1993 (India).
14
12. It is further submitted before the Hon'ble Court that a Constitution Bench of this
Hon'ble Court in Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh 12 while determining
rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, discussed the doctrine of
proportionality as the Court must in considering the validity of the impugned law
prohibiting the carrying on of a business or profession, attempt an evaluation of its
direct and immediate impact upon the fundamental rights of the citizens affected
thereby and the more significant public interest sought to be ensured in the light of the
object sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict the citizen's Freedom. With this,
the Court also emphasized the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less
drastic restraint or that a less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be
achieved, which questions the present nature of the ban, which restricts all person's
intrastate travel without clearly giving the names of essential services and without an
attempt to impose a less drastic restriction.
[iii] The restrictions imposed are not related to the purposes mentioned under clauses
19(2) to (6).
13. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the Constitution of
Shikharabad, although guarantees fundamental rights with the help of Article 19(1).
However, these rights are not absolute and can be barred by restrictions. These
limitations should be reasonable rather than arbitrary. The term "reasonable" refers to
deliberation and thoughtful analysis as the most crucial factor in deciding on a path
guided by reason. Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, Clauses (2) to (6), recognizes
the authority of governments to enact legislation that imposes reasonable restrictions.
14. In Anuradha Bhasin Vs. Union of India,13 this Hon'ble Court stated that the Freedom
of speech and expression and the freedom to practice any profession or to carry on
any trade, business or occupation over the medium of the internet enjoys
constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(g). The restriction
upon such fundamental rights should align with the mandate under Article 19 (2) and
(6) of the Constitution, inclusive of the test of proportionality. The restrictions must
be put to the test using the proportionality anvil.
12
1970 AIR 93, 1970 SCR (1) 156 (India).
13
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1031 of 2019 (India).
15
15. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that pervasive blanket prohibitions
might have very inequitable enforcement consequences. The directions mentioned
above go beyond the allowed area under Article 19(5) and might be considered
excessive to that extent. The principle of proportionality of restrictive measures is
based upon an inherent understanding that one uniform formula does not apply to all
situations and all citizens at all times. Breaches of Article 19’s proportionality
requirements can be linked to failures of Article 14 equality standards and Article 21's
basic right to a dignified existence.
16. It is further submitted that the requirement of balancing various considerations brings
us to the principle of proportionality. In Justice (Retd.) K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India,14 this Hon'ble Court held that proportionality is a crucial aspect of the guarantee
against arbitrary State action as it ensures that the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the right are not disproportionate to the purpose of the law.
17. Furthermore, in CPIO v Subhash Chandra Aggarwal,15 this Hon'ble Court elucidated
the meaning of proportionality. It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to
be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than required to
fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question. Learned Senior
Counsel submitted in the case that Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution require that
any action of the State must demonstrate five essential features: (a) backing of a 'law',
(b) legitimacy of purpose, (c) rational connection of the Act and object, (d) necessity
of the action, and (e) when the above four are established, then the test of
proportionality. On the point of proportionality, the learned senior counsel submitted
that this Hon'ble Court upheld the test of proportionality in the case of K. S.
Puttaswamy.16 Therefore, the proportionality of a measure must be determined while
looking at the restrictions being imposed by the Government on the fundamental
rights of citizens. Here in the present scenario, the presence of these features can be
questioned as such a blanket ban could have been avoided as even WHO
recommended against the travel ban, and even called it ineffective based on several
scientific reports. Thus, the proportionality of the regulation fails here.
14
15
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2019 (India).
16
Justice (Retd.) K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 (India)
16
[B] THE IMPUGNED ACT IS ARBITRARY AND CLASSIFIED AS AN UNREASONABLE LAW

UNDER ARTICLE 14
18. This Hon'ble Court has held in Bachan Singh v. the State of Punjab,17 the rule of law
which permeates the entire fabric of the Constitution of Shikharabad excludes
arbitrariness. Every State action must be non-arbitrary and reasonable. Otherwise, the
Court would strike it down as invalid
19. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that this new dimension of Art. 14
transcends the classificatory principle or the test of reasonable classification. 18 Hence,
even if the respondents can prove that there is a rational nexus between the
restrictions imposed and the object sought to be achieved, they would still have to
establish the non-arbitrariness of this impugned Act. Art. 14 is primarily a guarantee
against arbitrariness in state action, and the doctrine of classification has been evolved
only as a subsidiary rule for testing whether a particular state action is arbitrary or not.
The petitioners maintain that the impugned Act classifies as an unreasonable and
arbitrary law because of two reasons: firstly, it confers absolute discretion on the state
machinery secondly, leaving scope for administrative discrimination.
[i] Absolute discretion
20. It is humbly submitted that in order to ensure the discretion is exercised correctly, the
statute in question must lay down some norms or principles according to which the
administrator has to exercise the discretion. Not doing the same gives rise to the
danger of official arbitrariness, which is subversive of the doctrine of equality. This
guarantee against any administration's action, which may be arbitrary, discriminatory
or unequal, draws from Art. 14 and has evolved over time. 19 Moreover, discretionary
power may not necessarily be a discriminatory power. However, where a statute
confers power on an authority to decide matters of the moment without laying down
any guidelines or principles or norms, the power must be struck down as violative of
Art. 14.20
21. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Article 14 secures all
persons against arbitrary laws and arbitrary application of laws. Thus, ensuring non-
17
A.I.R. 1982 SC 1336 (India).
18
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 909 (7th ed. 2016).
19
Shrinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah, A.I.R. 1993 SC 929 (India).
20
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 911 (7th ed. 2016)
17
discrimination in state action both in the legislative and the administrative spheres. In
the lockdown regulation imposed by the Government, section 3 of the regulation
states that in case of violation of any of the provisions, or any rules passed
subsequently by the competent authority, the violator will be compulsorily
quarantined in a Government-sponsored quarantine facility for two weeks, and
repeated offenders will be required to pay for such facilities at a rate to be decided by
the competent authority.21 Thus, leaving absolute discretion on the administrator or
the official on duty.
22. In the instant case, the phrase "essential services, to be notified by the Union
Government from time to time" in the Lockdown Regulation is the source for this
absolute discretion. As Bhagwati, J. has observed: "The law always frowns on
unanalyzed and unfettered discretion conferred on any instrumentality of the State."22
Where power granted is open to use disproportionate to purpose to be achieved is
invalid in the absence of guidelines or principles or norms which are 'essential' for the
exercise of such power.23 The impugned Act allows the state machinery to define
essential services and include any service at its discretion. With the help of this
regulation, the Central Government forcibly quarantined only opposition leaders on
the voting day to prevent them from voting and pass the Farmers Welfare Bill. 24 The
purpose sought to be achieved here is not to allow the opposition leaders to vote on
the Farmers Welfare Bill.
[ii] Administrative discrimination
23. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Art. 14 deems
discrimination in the actual exercise of any discretionary power as illegal. It is
contended that while the statute already suffers from the vice of conferring absolute
discretion to the state machinery, it also allows the administrative authority to
implement it in a discriminatory manner.
24. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that discrimination in the
actual use of any discretionary authority is prohibited under Article 14. It prohibits
administrative action that is arbitrary and assures justice and equality of treatment. In
21
22
SheoNandanPaswan v. the State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 SC 877, 895 (India).
23
District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496 (India).
24
¶ 9 of the Moot Proposition of the 3rd Annual Capacity Building Moot Court Competition, 2021, NLUJA
18
the regulation imposed by the Government, the administrator is left with absolute and
wide ambit of power to decide whom to quarantine and whom not to, which breaches
the principles as laid down within the purview of Article 14.
25. In Shri Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. A.V. Visvanatha Sastri 25, the Hon'ble Court
held that Art. 14 not only guarantees equal protection as regards to substantive laws,
but procedural laws come within its ambit as well. The implication is that all litigants
similarly situated are entitled to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for
relief and defence with like protection and without any sort of discrimination.
26. It is further submitted that in Bachan Singh v. the State of Punjab,26 Justice Bhagwati
said that when arbitrariness or unreasonableness is found in a scenario, there is a
denial of the rule of law. Article 14 is essentially a protection against arbitrariness,
and it prohibits governmental activity that suffers from the vice of arbitrariness,
whether legislative or executive. Every action taken by the Government must be
reasonable. Otherwise, the Court would declare it unconstitutional. The lockdown
regulation passed thus can be deemed unconstitutional as they fail to check the
discretion and the power of administrators and the protection against
unreasonableness.
27. In the instant case, the administration, here, the state machinery, is given broad and
sweeping powers, and minimal guidelines, at best, are provided. Thus, the impugned
piece of legislation leaves much scope for administrative discrimination. The
petitioners have already observed the same in the form of enforced quarantine of
several opposition leaders on the voting day.
[C] THE REGULATION PASSED IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD
28. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Art. 21 states that no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law. According to A. K. Gopalan v. Union of India,27 Art. 21
guaranteed citizens' right to life and personal liberty only against the arbitrary action
of the executive, and not from legislative action. The state could interfere with the
liberty of citizens if their action could be supported by a valid law. But after the
25
26
AIR 1980 SC 898 (India).
27
A.K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 SC 27 (India).
19
judgment pronounced in the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India28 case, Art. 21 now
protects the right to life and personal liberty of citizens not only from the executive
action, but from the legislative action as well.
29. The most significant and creative aspect of Maneka is the re-interpretation by the
Hon’ble Court of the crucial expression "procedure established by law" as used in Art.
21. This Court has upheld that the procedure established by law to deprive persons of
their liberty cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. In other words, the procedure
contemplated by Art. 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to conform to
Art. 14. Arts. 14 and 21 are not mutually exclusive.29
30. It is most humbly submitted before the Apex Court that the very essence of Art. 21
has been violated by the respondents in the instant case. This has been through two
ways: firstly, the regulation infringes personal liberty. Secondly, the procedure
followed was devoid of fairness, justness, and reasonableness, qualifying it as bad
under Art. 21.
[i] Infringement of personal liberty
31. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Part III of the
Constitution of Shikharabad provides Fundamental Rights, which contains Article 21.
Article 21 guarantees that an individual's life or personal liberty will not be taken
away except according to the procedure established by law. It is most humbly argued
before the Hon'ble Court that the restrictions infringe the petitioner's fundamental
rights guaranteed under Article 21 and are thus void. It is contended that according to
Article 13(2), the State shall not make any law which takes away the Fundamental
Rights, and a law made in such contravention, to the extent of the contravention, will
be void.
32. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Article 21 forbids the state from
depriving anybody of their "life" except by procedure established by law. As a result,
the term "life" as used in Art. 21 must inevitably include the right to appropriate
livelihood and employment so that the person concerned is not reduced to a shadow of
his true self and is not reduced to a living skeleton. The same can be seen to be
28
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,1978 AIR 597, 1978 S.C.R. (2) 621 (India).
29
T.V. Vatheeswaran vs State Of Tamil Nadu, 1983 AIR 361 (India).
20
infringed here as the intrastate travel ban disturbs the livelihood of many individuals,
including Mr Bhavya Kohli. The principal contributor to the G.D.P. of the nation is
the tertiary sector which includes transportation as one of the facets. 30 Thus, such a
regulation effectively hurts the right to livelihood of many individuals.
33. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that if the right to livelihood is not
considered an integral component of the constitutional right to life, the easiest method
to deprive a person of his right to life is to deprive him of his means of livelihood till
abrogation. In Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,31 this Hon'ble
Court held that the right to life, as defined in Art. 21 of the Constitution, included
means of livelihood because, if the State is required to provide citizens with an
adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be utter pedantry to
exclude the right to livelihood from the ambit of right to life. The Hon'ble Court held
in the aforementioned case, a case in which pavement dwellers brought to resist
eviction from their habitat by the Bombay Municipal Corporation, that the right to
livelihood arises from the right to life because no one can survive without the means
of livelihood.
34. In Anuradha Bhasin Vs the Union of India,32 the Hon'ble Court stated that there has
always been a conflict between liberty and security. Simply put, the decision before
the Court was whether there is a need for more liberty or security. Although the
option appears to be difficult, it must be ensured that every person has appropriate
protection and liberty. The pendulum of preference should not swing too far in either
way, compromising one preference at the expense of the other. It is not within the
expertise to determine if being free is preferable to being secure or being secure is
preferable to being free. However, the need to guarantee that individuals are afforded
all of their rights and liberties to the maximum degree possible in any particular
scenario while maintaining security was emphasized. It is contended that the
lockdown regulation compromises with the freedom of individuals in the name of
security without attempting to regulate the situation with regulatory nature of
provisions and has put forth provisions restrictive in nature simultaneously breaching
the right to life and personal liberty of the people of Shikharabad.
30
¶ 1 of the Moot Proposition of the 3rd Annual Capacity Building Moot Court Competition, 2021, NLUJA
31
1986 AIR 180, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 51 (India).
32
21
[ii] The procedural requirements were not fulfilled
35. In Kartar Singh v. the State of Punjab,33 the Hon’ble Court held that procedure
contemplated by Art. 21 is that it must be "right, just and fair" and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive. The expression "procedure established by law" extends to both
substantive as well as procedural law.34 Art. 21 envisages a fair procedure.35
36. It is humbly contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the procedure
established by law in the instant case is not just, fair or reasonable. In District
Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank,36 it was held that any law interfering with
the personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test - (i) it must prescribe a
procedure; (ii) procedure must withstand one of the tests of Art. 19 (whichever one is
applicable); and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14. We
find that there was a procedure prescribed. Moreover, when tested in reference to Art.
14, the procedure is unreasonable. The failure of the procedure to satisfy the test of
equality or non-arbitrariness in and of itself proves its unreasonableness. The
stringency and utter disregard for basic human rights in the procedure established
makes it unjust.
37. It is also humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the onus of proof in the
instant case lies on the State. This Court held it in Bachan Singh v. the State of
Punjab,37 which is a challenge under the provisions of Art. 21, once the petitioner
shows that his right has been taken away, it is for the State to justify that the
procedure is not arbitrary, rather it is just, fair and reasonable. The weakness of the
petitioners cannot establish the cause of the Government.
38. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that despite the recommendations by
the WHO against the need for travel restrictions on scientific reports, the lockdown
regulation imposed unreasonable restrictions. If the procedure established by law is
unreasonable, Article 21 read, and Articles 14 and 19 can declare the law itself as
unconstitutional. A law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal
liberty has to meet the requirements of Article 19. Also, the procedure established by
33
1961 AIR 1787, 1962 SCR (2) 395 (India).
34
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1128 (7th ed. 2016).
35
Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. the State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 (India).
36
Appeal (Civil) 6350 – 6374 of 1997.
37
22
law in Article 21 must answer the requirement of Article 14 as well. Article 39,
clauses (a) and (e), require the Government to make efforts to guarantee that people
have a right to adequate means of subsistence and that citizens are not forced to
engage in unsuitable occupations due to economic necessities. These responsibilities
are part of the Directive Principles of State Policy, which are deemed essential to the
country's governance. The current lockdown would produce situations that would
violate these commitments. It is difficult to choose between COVID-19 and economic
death. Thus, For whatever good reason, the citizen has been deprived of their right to
choose.
[D] THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON TRADE AND COMMERCE WERE AGAINST THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 301 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD.
39. In Koteswar v. K.R.B. & Co.,38 the Hon'ble Court has held that power conferred on the
State government to make an order providing for regulating or prohibiting any class
of commercial or financial transactions relating to any essential service permits
imposition of restrictions on freedom of trade and commerce and, therefore, its
validity has to be assessed in accordance to Article 304(b). In this case, a restriction
on forwarding contracts was held to be violative of Article 301.
40. In District Collector v. Ibrahim,39 the Hon'ble Court has invalidated the attempt by the
state to create a monopoly to deal in sugar in favour of co-operative societies under
Article 301 by an administrative order. It is contended that according to Article 301 of
the Constitution of Shikharabad, "trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the
territory of Shikharabad shall be free." When read with Article 19(g), which again
talks about the Right to Freedom of Trade, the Constitution guarantees its citizens and
corporations the right to trade and commerce. Given this right, section 1 of the
regulation, which bars the intra-state travel of all persons in the territory of
Shikharabad with immediate effect, contravenes with Article 19(g) and Article 301 of
the Constitution of Shikharabad as the restrictions also include a restriction on trade
commerce without any specified time limit up till which these restrictions will be
imposed.
38
1969 AIR 504 (India).
39
1970 AIR 1275 (India).
23
41. In Ram Chandra Palai v. the State of Orissa,40 the Hon'ble Court held that Article 301
is a mandatory provision and a law contravening the same is ultra vires. It is
contended that Article 301 deals with providing safeguards for the carrying on of
trade as a whole, distinguished from an individual's right to do the same. In Dist.
Collector, Hyderabad v. Ibrahim,41 the Hon'ble Court denounced the theory that
Article 301 guarantees freedom "in the abstract and not of the individuals". Whereas
Article 19(1)(g), which is a fundamental right, deals with the right to Freedom of
trade of individuals and is not available to a corporate person. Article 301 may be
invoked by a corporation and even by a State on complaints of discrimination or
preference which are outlawed by Article 303.
42. In Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. the State of Assam,42 the Hon'ble Court emphasized that
whatever else Article 301 may or may not include, it certainly includes movements of
trade which are of the very essence of all trade and is its integral part and further that
primarily it is the movement part of the trade which Article 301 has in mind that the
movement or the transport of trade must be free and that it is the free movement or the
transport of goods from one part of the country to the other that is intended to be
saved. It is further contended that the restrictions imposed on the trade and commerce
by the regulation despite the scientific reports of the World Health Organization
against the restrictions prove that it is 'restrictive' in nature and not 'regulatory and is
thus ultra vires.
[II] WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN

DRAFTING THE FARMERS WELFARE BILL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
SHIKHARABAD WAS LEGITIMATE?
40
1956 AIR 298 (India).
41
1970 AIR 1275 (India).
42
24
43. It is most humbly submitted that the Constitution of Shikharabad accepts the federal
concept and distributes the sovereign powers between the coordinate constitutional
entities, namely, the States and Provinces. This concept implies that one cannot
encroach upon the governmental functions or instrumentalities of the other unless the
Constitution expressly provides for such interference.43 It is most humbly submitted
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the impugned Act passed by the Central
Government is an encroachment on the State list (List II) under Article 246 of the
Constitution of Shikharabad, and thus, is ultra vires.
44. In the instant matter, the petitioner would like to point to the concept of federalism as
enshrined in the Constitution of Shikharabad. The Hon'ble Court explained in In re:
Under Article 143, Constitution of India, (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964), the
essential characteristic of federalism is the distribution of limited executive,
legislative, and judicial authority among bodies coordinated with and independent of
each other. The supremacy of the Constitution is fundamental to the existence of a
federal State in order to prevent either the legislature of the federal unit or those of the
member States from destroying or impairing the delicate balance of power which
satisfies the particular requirements of States which are desirous of Union, but not
prepared to merge their individuality in unity.
45. Federalism connotes a legalistic government. There being a division of powers

between the Centre and the States, none of the Government can step out of its
assigned fields, and if it does so, the law passed by it becomes unconstitutional. If the
matter is within the exclusive competence of the State Legislature, i.e., List II, then
the Central Legislature is prohibited from making any law concerning the same. 44
Thus submitted before this Hon'ble Court, the Centra; government passed the "The
Farmers Welfare Bill" whose provisions fall under the exclusive competence of the
State Legislature, i.e., List II and is ultra vires to the extent it falls under the ambit of
List II.
43
State of West Bengal vs Union of India, 1963 AIR 1241, 1964 S.C.R. (1) 371 (India).
44
Himalayan Lever v. the State of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 SCC 438 (India).
25
[A] DRAFTING OF THE FARMERS BILL WAS BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT'S JURISDICTION
46. It is most humbly submitted before the Apex Court that the respondent has violated
the very essence of the distribution of power in the instant case. This has been through
two ways: firstly, there was an arbitrary expansion of the term "foodstuff" to disband
APMCs. Secondly, the legislative competence of the State government on the subject
of agriculture under State list (List II) has been violated.
[i] Arbitrary expansion of the term "food stuffs" by the central government to disband
APMCs
47. It is most humbly submitted before the Apex Court that the States, under Entry 14 in
List-II, have the sole prerogative to legislate on the subject of agriculture. Moreover,
the power to make laws concerning markets and fairs also falls in the exclusive
domain of the states, under Entry 28 in List –II. Entry 33 in List– III empowers either
the Parliament or the State legislatures to inter alia legislate on matters concerning
the 'trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs,
including oilcake and concentrates; raw cotton, whether ginned or unpinned and
cottonseed; and raw jute.
48. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the impugned Act provides
a 'trade area' that facilitates transactions involving a farmer's produce. However,
premises controlled by marketing committees established under the APMCs do not
fall within the definition of such a 'trade area'. It is highly relevant to note that the
impugned Act does not permit the States, either through their APMC legislation or
any other law, to impose any kind of market fee on the trade area. By imposing such a
condition in the Act, the Parliament seeks to oust the states' authority concerning
dealings in a farmer's produce.
49. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Entry 33 of the Concurrent
List (List III) mentions trade and commerce, production, supply and distribution of
domestic and imported products of an industry over which Parliament has control in
the public interest; foodstuffs, including oilseeds and oils; cattle fodder; raw cotton
26
and jute. However, like education, farming is an occupation, not a trade or commerce.
If foodstuffs are considered synonymous with agriculture, then all the States' powers
in respect of agriculture, listed so elaborately in the Constitution, shall become
redundant. In-State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh,45 the Court, while interpreting the
three lists, invoked the doctrine of colourable legislation, which states that you cannot
do indirectly what you cannot do directly.
50. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that even though markets fall
exclusively within the legislative competence of the states, Parliament has gone ahead
and passed this Act that seeks to alter the dynamics of trading in a farmer's produce in
market areas, which could have an adverse impact on states. The Union government
has misled the Parliament to believe that it has the power to make laws under the term
"food stuff" in Entry 33 (b) of List-III, but, by any means, "food stuff" does not mean
farm produce. This move of Parliament, stepping on the legislative mandate of the
states, goes against the very essence of Indian federalism and violates the basic
structure of the Constitution.
[ii] Legislative competence of state government on the subject agriculture under State
List (List II) of the Constitution of Shikharabad
51. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Entries 14, 18 & 28 of
List II give exclusive powers to States to make laws on "Agriculture (14), Land (18),
Markets and Fairs (28)." 'Agriculture', etc., includes all its aspects, such as land, the
agricultural operations, seeds, the produce and market. It is contended that it will be
erronious to say that 'agriculture' does not include 'farm produce'.
52. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that under List I in entries
82, 86, 87, and 88 (where the word "agriculture" appears), Parliament's law-making
power has been circumscribed by the words "other than" agriculture income (entry
82) or "exclusive of" agricultural land (entry 86), or "other than" agricultural land
(entries 87 and 88). It is contended that due to this, the Union List does not empower
the Parliament to enact any law on agriculture.
45
1952 1 SCR 889 (India).
27
53. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. APMC,46 the Hon'ble Court upheld the validity of several State laws
relating to agricultural produce marketing and struck down the central Tobacco Board
Act, 1975. The Hon'ble Court interpreted Entry 28 of the State List (markets and
fairs) in favour of States and rejected the Centre's argument based on Entry 52 of the
Union List read with Entry 33 of Concurrent List that tobacco is an industry declared
as being under the control of Parliament in the public interest. The Hon'ble Court said
raw materials or activity that does not involve manufacture or production cannot be
covered under 'industry'. Thus, it is contended that the term' market and fairs' falls
under the ambit of State list (List II).
54. It is humbly contended before the Hon'ble Court that the Parliament, by enacting a
law on the subject 'agriculture' falling under the ambit of State list (List II), violates
the basic structure of the Constitution of Shikharabad, i.e., federalism. Federalism
essentially means both the Centre and the States have the freedom to operate in their
allotted spheres of power, coordinating with each other. In SR Bommai v. the State of
Kerala47, the Hon'ble Court held that under the scheme of our Constitution, greater
power is conferred upon the Centre vis-a-vis the States, but it does not mean that
States are mere appendages of the Centre. Within the sphere allotted to them, States
are supreme and the Centre cannot tamper with its powers. More particularly, the
courts should not adopt an approach, an interpretation, which has the effect of or
tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved to the States."
55. The petitioner would also submit that under Article 246, the Centre's law will prevail
over contradictory State laws on subjects in the concurrent list. Nevertheless, there is
an important exception: if the state's bill is assented to by the President, the State's law
will prevail and override the Centre's law in that particular state.48
56. Before the Legislation concerning a subject in one List and touching also on a subject
in another List is declared to be wrong, the Courts apply the rule of pith and
substance. This rule envisages that the legislation as a whole needs to be examined to
ascertain its 'true nature and character' in order to determine to what entry in which
46
Appeal (Civil) 6453 of 2001 (India).
47
1994 AIR 1918 (India).
48
Hoechst Pharm Ltd. vs State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1983 SC 1019 (India).
28
List it relates.49 To ascertain the true character of a law, it must be looked into as an
organic whole.50
57. Firstly, the object of the impugned Act, as reflected from S. 3, is to disband the
APMCs. Secondly, the circumstances due to which the impugned Act came into
existence reveal that the Act is primarily concerned with 'agriculture'. Hence, the
whole object of the Act is to modernize 'agriculture'. Thus, the petitioner humbly
submits that the pith and substance or the subject matter of the impugned Act is
'agriculture'.
58. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution spells out different fields of legislation
under the Union List (List I), State List (List II) and Concurrent List (List III). An
important principle to interpret the entries in Schedule Seven is that none of them
should be read in a narrow, pedantic sense; that the 'widest possible' and 'most liberal'
construction be put on each entry, and that each general word in an entry should be
held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be
said to be comprehended in it.51
59. Part XI of the Constitution of Shikharabad lays down the relationship between the
Union and the States. Art. 246 in Part XI of the Constitution demarcates the
legislative fields with precision and emphasizes the exclusive power of the Union and
the States to make laws in respect of the matters enumerated in the lists in the Seventh
Schedule and allotted to the Union or the States, as the case may be. 52 Article 246 (3)
confers an exclusive power on the States to make laws concerning the matter
enumerated in the State List.
60. The Union is empowered to legislate concerning a matter in the State List in certain
exceptional circumstances which are specified in the Constitution in Arts. 249, 250,
49
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591, (7th ed. 2016).
50
Id.
51
The Elel Hotels and Investment Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1664, at 1669 : (1989) 3 SCC 698; State
of Rajasthan v. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 904; Hans Muller v. Superintendent,
Presidency Jail, Calcutta, AIR 1955 SC 367 : (1955) 1 SCR 1284; Navichandra Mafatlal v. Commr. Of Income
– tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 58 : (1955) 1 SCR 829; See also Welfare Assn. ARP v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9
SCC 358 : AIR 2003 SC 1266;
52
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 1963 AIR 1241, 1964 SCR (1) 371 (India).
29
252 and 253.Vide Arts. 249, 250, 252 and 253, the Parliament is empowered to
legislate on a State subject in the national interest by obtaining a resolution from the
Council of States to that effect, and during a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation or when two or more states consent and to enact such legislation for the
implementation of treaties or international agreements respectively. As none of these
exceptional circumstances is present in the instant case, the Union is not justified in
legislating upon a subject within the State's exclusive domain.
[B] UNRESTRICTED HOARDING WILL LEAD TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD.
61. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Right to Food
is inherent to a life with dignity, and Article 21 of the Constitution of Shikharabad,
which guarantees a fundamental right to life and personal liberty, should be read
along with Articles 39(a) and 47 to understand the nature of the obligations of the
State in order to ensure the practical realization of this right.
62. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that Article 39(a) of the Constitution,
enunciated as one of the Directive Principles, fundamental in the governance of the
country, requires the State to direct its policies towards securing that all its citizens
have the right to an adequate means of livelihood which adds meaning to sustain life
with dignity., while Article 47 spells out the duty of the State to raise the level of
nutrition and standard of living of its people as a primary responsibility. The
Constitution thus makes the Right to Food a guaranteed Fundamental Right.
63. In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Others (PUCL),53 the
Hon'ble Court explicitly established a constitutional human right to food and
determined a bare nutritional floor for the nation's impoverished millions. The basic
argument in this case, was that Central and State Governments had violated the right
to food by failing to respond to the drought situation, notably by accumulating
gigantic food stocks while people went hungry. Finally, this Hon'ble Court held that
the Government should be held accountable for what it claims to be doing to protect
the right to food.
53
Writ Petition (Civil) No.196 of 2001 (India).
30
64. Before the Hon'ble Court, it is further submitted that removing the limit on hoarding
of food grain/item will lead to price hike-up and black-marketing. It is contended that
unlimited hoarding will allow big companies to store a large amount of food
grain/item, which will eventually lead to price-hike and scarcity and increase in rural
poverty and have an adverse impact on the public distribution system.
[C] ENFORCED QUARANTINE OF SEVERAL OPPOSITION LEADERS LED TO AN UNFAIR VOTE
65. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the term
'democratic' in the preamble of the Constitution of Shikharabad signifies that
Shikharabad has a responsible and parliamentary form of government, accountable to
an elected legislature. It is contended that the compulsory enforced quarantine of
several opposition leaders only on the day of voting to pass the Farmers Welfare Bill
defeats the spirit of a 'democratic state' as enshrined in the Preamble of the
Constitution of Shikharabad.
66. The enforced quarantine of the opposition party members was wrong as they went
against the lockdown regulation to attend the parliament which was in session which
the central government itself allowed and the session could have been classified as an
essential service. Thus, the party members were wrongfully quarantined to influence
the results of voting and pass the bill without much opposition in the house.
31
PRAYER
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED, AND

AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS HUMBLY PRAYED THAT MAY THIS HON ‘BLE
COURT BE PLEASED TO:
1. Allow this writ petition on the grounds of violation of Fundamental Rights and to
declare the Lockdown Regulation as unconstitutional as it violates the petitioners'
fundamental rights.
2. To Declare the Farmers Welfare Act, 2021 as unconstitutional.
AND/OR
Pass any other order, direction or relief, that this Hon'ble Supreme Court may deem fit
and proper in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Petitioner shall duty-bound forever pray.
Sd/-
Counsels for the Petitioners
32

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3rd ANNUAL CAPACITY BUILDING MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021, NLUJA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

3RD ANNUAL CAPACITY BUILDING MOOT COMPETITION

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL ACADEMY, 2021

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SHIKHARABAD

UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SHIKHARABAD

MR. BHAVYA KOHLI AND

MS. CHITRAVANDINI SINGH …PETITIONERS

THE UNION OF SHIKHARABAD …RESPONDENT

PETITION NO. ****/2021

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

[1] WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE

[B] THE IMPUGNED ACT IS ARBITRARY AND CLASSIFIED AS AN UNREASONABLE LAW

[i] Absolute discretion.....................................................................................................17

[ii] Administrative discrimination.................................................................................18

[C] THE REGULATION PASSED IS IN CONTRAVENTION WITH ARTICLE 21 OF THE

[i] Infringement of personal liberty...............................................................................20

[ii] The procedural requirements were not fulfilled....................................................21

[II] WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN

[ii] Legislative competence of state government on the subject agriculture under

[B] UNRESTRICTED HOARDING WILL LEAD TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

[C] ENFORCED QUARANTINE OF SEVERAL OPPOSITION LEADERS LED TO AN UNFAIR

A. K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 27 ................................................................13

2. M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th ed., Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa,

6. H. N. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary (4th ed.,

7. Granville Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation (Indian Constitution), Volume 75 (Oxford

LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED

1. Manupatra Online Resources

2. Lexis Nexis Academica

4. Supreme Court of Inia

The United Republic of Shikharabad is a parliamentary democracy with a population of 30

COVID- 19 VIRUS AND SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWN REGULATION

AGRICULTURAL REFORMS AND PROTEST

[ISSUE 1]: WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE

GOVERNMENT WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

[ISSUE 2]: WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN DRAFTING THE

FARMERS WELFARE BILL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SHIKHARABAD WAS LEGITIMATE?

[ISSUE 1]: WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE

GOVERNMENT WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

[ISSUE 2]: WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN DRAFTING THE

FARMERS WELFARE BILL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SHIKHARABAD WAS LEGITIMATE?

[1] WHETHER THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE

2. It is humbly contended that the test of reasonableness under Article 19 should be

3. It is humbly contended that there is always an initial presumption of validity of law2

[A] THE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FAIL THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS UNDER

a. There must be an authority of law.

b. The restrictions imposed must not be arbitrary and excessive.

7. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if a restriction is

[B] THE IMPUGNED ACT IS ARBITRARY AND CLASSIFIED AS AN UNREASONABLE LAW

[i] Infringement of personal liberty

[ii] The procedural requirements were not fulfilled

[II] WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE IN

45. Federalism connotes a legalistic government. There being a division of powers

[B] UNRESTRICTED HOARDING WILL LEAD TO THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

[C] ENFORCED QUARANTINE OF SEVERAL OPPOSITION LEADERS LED TO AN UNFAIR VOTE

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED, AND

2. To Declare the Farmers Welfare Act, 2021 as unconstitutional.

Counsels for the Petitioners

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