Aur24 P

~AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION (ONLINE) 2021~
TEAM CODE: AUR24
AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION (ONLINE) 2021
Before
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTA
WRIT PETITION NUMBER _______ / 2019
CLUBBED WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NUMBER / 2019
FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 AND 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF ARYAVARTA
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:
CHRISTOPHER ELIS AND MAISEL [PETITIONER]

ELIS
versus
UNION OF ARYAVARTA [RESPONDENT]
As Submitted to the Chief Justice & other Companion judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Aryavarta.
MEMORIAL for PETITIONER
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS iii | P a g e

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents....................................................................................................................iv
List of Abbreviations..............................................................................................................vi
Index of Authorities................................................................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION....................................................................................vii
STATEMENT OF FACTS...................................................................................................viii
Arguments Advanced...............................................................................................................1
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE SLP AND THE WRIT PETITION ARE MAINTAINABLE BEFORE
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT..........................................................................................1
[1.1] SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution................................................................1
[1.1.2]There Has been a Grave injustice against the petitioner.........................................2
1.2 Writ Petition under Art. 32...........................................................................................4
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE CHARGES UNDER 498A OF THE APC CAN BE UPHELD AGAINST
THE ACCUSED.........................................................................................................................9
2.1 There was no cruel treatment by Vincent Eris or his parents that satisfies 498(A)...10
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE ARYAVARTA PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

CONVERSION OF RELIGION ORDINANCE, 2019 IS ULTRA VIRES THE
CONSTITUTION...............................................................................................................14
3.1. Procedural Impropriety In Ordinance Promulgation.................................................14
3.2. The Ordinance violates the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under The Constitution
Of India, 1950..................................................................................................................15
3.3. The impugned Ordinance involves a Reverse Onus Clause and places the Burden of
Proof on the Accused.......................................................................................................19
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS iv | P a g e

3.4 The impugned Ordinance is dissimilar to previous legislations with similar object. 21
3.5. The supreme court can strike down laws ultra vires the constitution.......................21
PRAYER.................................................................................................................................24
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS v|Page

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVATIONS FULL FORM
AIR All India Reporter
Sec. Section
Art. Article
Cl. Clause
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
Ed. Edition
& And
No. Number
Ors. Others
Pg. Page
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
Anr. Another
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Hon’ble Honourable
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS vi | P a g e

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 88............................................................39
2. AK Roy v. Union of India, 1982 AIR 710....................................................................33, 39
3. Amita v. Union of India, (2005) 13 SCC 721.....................................................................32
4. Arunachalam v. PSR Sadhanantam AIR 1979 SC 1284.....................................................15
5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898..........................................................32
6. Balakrishna Iyer v. Ramaswami Iyer AIR 1965 SC 195.....................................................15
7. Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454...........................................32
8. Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570............................................................21
9. C.C.E. v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298....................................................13
10. C.K. Rajan v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1994 Ker 179.............................................23
11. C.Selvam vs State Rep. Crl.O.P.No.9409 of 2018..............................................................15
12. Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir, (2008) 13 S.C.C. 17;...................14
13. City of Chicago v. Morales et al, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).........................................................32
14. Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha AIR 1954 SC. 34
15. Daryao v State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457....................................................22
16. Dataram Singh v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SCOR/31224/2018.......................36
17. DC Wadhwa vs. the State of Bihar, 1987 AIR 579.............................................................29
18. Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 65.....................................................13
19. Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520...........................................................15
20. E.P. Royappa State of Tamil Nade, AIR 1974 SC 555.......................................................32
21. Esher Singh v. State of A.P.,AIR 2004 SC 3030................................................................16
22. Evangelical Fellowship Of India v. State Of H.P. (CWP No. 438 of 2011).......................19
23. Evangelical Fellowship Of India v. State Of H.P., MANU/HP/1259/2012........................37
24. Ganpat v. State of Maharashtra 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 130.............................................27
25. Giridhar Shanlar Tawade v State of Maharashtra, 2002 5 SCC 177...................................25
26. Gopi Chand v. The Delhi Administration (AIR 1959 SC 609)...........................................30
27. Gopi Chand vs The Delhi Administration (AIR 1959 SC 609)..........................................18
28. Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer, 1954 S.C.R. 1133; Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) S.C.R.
1 753....................................................................................................................................14
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 1|Page

29. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v. Union of India And Ors. 2017 10 SCC 1....................34
30. Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 2003 SC 3828..................................................25
31. Kanhaiya Lal v. State Of Rajasthan, 2014 (2) AJR 486......................................................36
32. Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (1985) 87 PLR 231.................................................................26
33. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (Cri) 899.........................................................32
34. Kelvin Cinema v. State of Assam, AIR 1996 Gau 103.......................................................32
35. Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 129............................................22
36. Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde AIR, 2008 SC 1325...............................36
37. Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Ors MANU/SCOR/00003/2017..........29
38. Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587.......................................................13
39. Ma. Gouthaman v. The State of Tamilnadu, 2012 SCC Online Mad 4201........................22
40. Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968....................................................38
41. Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 1 SCR 818...................................32
42. Mahendra Lal Jaini v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 AIR 1019...................................39
43. Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, 1978 AIR 597.............................................................36
44. Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 2014 SC 1782.........................................................26
45. Master Construction Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1047........................................16
46. Mohammad Shujat, Ali & Ors. Etc v. Union Of India & Ors. (1974 AIR 1631)...............30
47. Mohammad Shujat, Ali & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors. (1974 AIR 1631................18
48. Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardichand, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1622.....................................17
49. Nagpur Improvement Trust & Ors. vs Vithal Rao & Ors. (1973 AIR 689)........................31
50. Nathulal v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1976 Raj 12.............................................................14
51. National Legal Ser. Auth v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 186..............................35
52. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, AIR 2006 SC 1675.............................................................24
53. Noorjahan v State, 2008 11 SCC 55....................................................................................25
54. Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958.........................................................24
55. Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667........................................................27
56. Prem Chand Garg v Excise Commissioner, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 996.....................................22
57. Pritam Singh v. The State AIR 1950 SC 169......................................................................16
58. R v. Paddington, (1966) 1 Q.B. 380....................................................................................17
59. Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr (2012) 9 SCC 791.......14
60. Rajendra Kumar v. State (AIR 1980 SC 1510).............................................................13, 16
61. Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1...........................................................21
62. Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, AIR 2005 SC 2277..............36
63. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs The State Of Bombay 1954 AIR 388...................................34
64. RC Cooper vs. Union of India, 1970 AIR 56......................................................................29
65. Rev. Stainislaus v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors. AIR 1977 SC 908........................38
66. S. P. Gupta v Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149...........................................................17
67. Sachidananda Pandey v State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 109................................18
68. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, 2007 4 SCC 511...................................................................25
69. Satpal v State of Haryana, (1998) 5 SCC 687.....................................................................24
70. Satpal v State of Haryana, 1998 5 SCC 687........................................................................24
71. Savitri Devi v. Ramesh Chand 2003 CriLj 2759.................................................................26
72. Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State Of Ajmer, 1956 AIR 404..............................................36
73. Sheikh Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 2600..................37
74. Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105.........................................................24
75. Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I (2015) 5 SCC 1............................................................................32
76. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendulkar 1958 AIR 538, 1959 SCR 279 18
77. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 537......................................32
78. Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR
1962 SC 1314......................................................................................................................13
79. Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778..........................................14
80. State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318.........................................................40
81. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, 1 S.C.R. 970..................................................33
82. State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525.................................39
83. State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sundar, (2011) 8 SCC 737............................................32
84. Suvetha v State, (2009) 6 SCC 757.....................................................................................27
85. The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. State Of Gujarat (1974 AIR 1389).......................30
86. The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Anr., (1962) 3 S.C.R.
786.......................................................................................................................................33
87. The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, 1957 AIR 699, 1957 SCR 874........40
88. United States v. Reese 92 U.S. 214 (1875).........................................................................32
89. Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, Section 3.......19
90. V. Bhagat vs D. Bhagat, 1994 SCC 1 337..........................................................................24
STATUTES
1. Article 13(2) of Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950................................................................39
2. Article 25, Constitution of Aryavarta..................................................................................20
3. Aryavarta Evidence Act, 1872, Section 101.......................................................................36
4. Aryavarta Evidence Act, 1872, Section 102.......................................................................36

5. Aryavarta Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section.............................33
6. Aryavarta Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 8..........................35
7. Aryavarta Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 8 (3.....................35
8. Aryavarta Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 9..........................35
9. Aryavarya Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 2(a)....................33
10. Aryavarya Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 2(f).....................33
11. Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950, Article 123......................................................................29
12. Constitution of Aryavarta, Article 123................................................................................28
13. Constitution of India, 1950, Article 14................................................................................30
14. Constitution of India, 1950, Article 25................................................................................34
15. Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967................................................................................38
16. United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 18.......................................35
17. Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, Section
2(a).......................................................................................................................................21
2(d)......................................................................................................................................21
8(1)......................................................................................................................................21
8(3)......................................................................................................................................21
21. Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020............8, 35
BOOKS
1. DD Basu Commentary on the Constitution of India, Volume 2, Part III Fundamental Rights 32
2. PSA Pillai, Criminal Law 14th Ed, (Lexis Nexis 2019)...........................................................20
ONLINE DATABASES
1. Lexis Nexis Academics (www.lexisnexisacademics.com)
2. Manupatra (www.manupatrafast.com)
3. SCC Online (www.scconline.com)


STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavarta has jurisdiction to hear the matters under Art. 136
of the Constitution of Aryavarta as the leave has been granted by the Court and subsequently
the matters have been numbered as Criminal Appeal No.___/2019.
“Art.136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territoryof Aryavarta.
2. Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or orderpassed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating tothe Armed
Forces.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavarta has the jurisdiction to hear the instant matter under
Article 32 of the Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950.
“Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution”.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
Aryavarta is an Asian country with 30 states and 7 union territories. The laws of Aryavarta
are in pari materia to the laws of the Republic of India.
Aryavarta has a rich spiritual and cultural history. With the second largest population in the
world, the country has immense religious diversity in its population, with a majority of the
population (75%) practising Hindu religion, and around 24% are followers of Islam, Judaism,
and Christianity.
The country is also the largest democracy in the world, and follows a quasi federal structure.
There are two major parties in the country - the Aryavartian People Party (APP) and the
Aryavartian Congrential Party(ACP). APP won the 2017 elections with a clear majority,
electing Mr. Mahendra Kumar as the Prime Minister. The new government brought in a
number of policies and programs.
OUTBREAK OF CORONA VIRUS AND PROMULGATION OF THE UNLAWFUL CONVERSION OF

RELIGION ORDINANCE.
Uttam Desh, the largest State of Aryavarta, was going to conduct state elections in November
2019. However, in early 2019, the world was plagued with the outbreak of a communicable
viral disease called the Corona virus. Aryavarta suspended all functions except essential
services indefinitely, due to which the summer session of the Parliament could not take place.
On May 18, 2019, the President promulgated an ordinance for "Unlawful Conversion of
Religion" and came into force on the same day. According to the preamble of the ordinance,
the purpose of the Ordinance is - "to provide for prohibitions of the unlawful conversions
from one religion to another by misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion,
allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage and for the matters connected
therewith and incidental thereto." The ordinance is in pari materia to the Uttar Pradesh
Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020.
Mr. Vincent, a Christian by religion and Miss Sukrati, a Hindu woman who worked in Mr.
Vincent’s office as an office assistant, were to marry each other on July 2, 2019, unaware of
the aforementioned ordinance. While agreeing to marry Vincent, Sukrati had placed a
condition that her parents would not be privy to their marriage.
The marriage took place on February 14, 2019 under the Special Marriage Act, 1956. The
couple resided in Zumbai for 3 months, until Vincent’s family invited them to visit Vincent’s
hometown. A few days after their arrival, Vincent’s mother proposed that a marriage
ceremony according to Christian rituals be held in their hometown for Vincent and Sukrati.
The idea was initially welcomed by Sukrati, who later, however, became hesitant upon
gaining knowledge of the fact that Vincent’s mother wanted her to convert to Christianity for
the ceremony. Nevertheless, she converted to Christianity, on May 22 and the ceremony took
place on May 25.
Owing to the outbreak of coronavirus, all modes of transportation were suspended till further
notice and hence, Sukrati could not return to her place of work, while Vincent managed to
reach Zumbai. Sukrati expressed her will to go back to Mumbai on July 25, as a few private
vehicles had started operating. Despite multiple requests, her in-laws did not allow her to go
back unless Vincent came to fetch her. Vincent and Sukrati also had frequent quarrels
regarding this, but Vincent refused to take her with him.
Three months later, Sukrati informed her father about the marriage and the subsequent events
and requested him to take her away from Vincent’s hometown. Her father filed an FIR under
the anti-conversion ordinance, while Sukrati filed an FIR under section 498A of the
Aryavartian Penal Code (APC). Sukrati’s in-laws were hence arrested and denied bail by the
Magistrate court, while a non-bailable warrant was issued against Vincent.
Sukrati’s in-laws filed a Special Leave Petition (currently at the admission stage) before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavarta, and also challenged the constitutional validity of the
Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance through a writ petition.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE SLP AND THE WRIT PETITION ARE MAINTAINABLE
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT
It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Special Leave Petition
filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of Aryavarta is maintainable as there exists a
substantial question of law(1.1.1), the petitioner has suffered a grave injustice(1.1.2), and
alternate remedy is no bar to the maintainability of an SLP(1.1.3).
It is also humbly contended that the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is
maintainable before this Hon’ble Court as the petitioners possess the requisite locus
stand(1.2.1), there is a violation of Fundamental Rights enshrined under Part III of the
Aryavartian Constitution(1.2.2) and the exhaustion of alternate remedy is no bar for a writ
petition (1.2.3).
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE CHARGES UNDER 498A OF THE APC CAN BE

UPHELD AGAINST THE ACCUSED
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the charges under section 498(A) of the
Aryavartan Penal Code cannot be upheld as the essentials under explanation (a) of the section
have not been fulfilled. Explanation (a) of section 498(A) lays emphasis upon the grievous
nature of the cruelty inflicted upon the health of the wife by the husband or his relatives. The
argument denying charges is based on two primary contentions [2.1] there was no cruel
treatment by Vincent Eris or his parents that satisfies 498(A), [2.2] there was no wilful
conduct on part of the Sukrati’s husband or her in-laws.


CONSTITUTION.
It is humbly contended before this Hon'ble Court that the Aryavarta Unlawful Religious
Conversion Ordinance, 2019 is unconstitutional. A five-fold approach is undertaken to
support this contention. [3.1] Firstly, the procedural impropriety in the promulgation of the
ordinance is demonstrated. [3.2] Secondly, the provisions under the impugned ordinance is
shown to be violative of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constiution. [3.3]
Thirdly, the reverse onus clause enacted by the Ordinance and the placement of burden of
proof on the accused is challenged. [3.4] Following the same, the dissimilarities of the
impugned ordinance to the previous legislations with similar objects are illustrated. [3.5]
Lastly, it is submitted that the Honourable Supreme Court is empowered to strike down such
laws which are ultra vires the Constitution.
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 10 | P a g e

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE SLP AND THE WRIT PETITION ARE MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT
[1.1] SLP UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION
1. Under article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may grant special leave to appeal
from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence, or order, in any matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal in the country.
2. The aggrieved party can approach the SC under this article when there exists a substantial
question of law, or when gross injustice has occurred1.
3. It is contended that this special leave petition filed by the petitioners against the non
bailable warrant issued against Vincent Eris is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court as there exists a substantial question of law (1.1.1), the petitioner has suffered grave
injustice (1.1.2) and the existence of alternate remedy is no bar (1.1.3).
[1.1.1.] THERE EXISTS A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW
4. The power bestowed upon the SC via Art. 136 can only be invoked in special
circumstances2, when there exists a substantial question of law of general importance 3, or
miscarriage of justice4.In the present matter, the question of law may be such as would
substantially affect the rights of the parties and thereby gain a position of general public
importance5.
5. Whenever a question of general importance arises, the jurisdiction can be invoked 6,

especially when the question pertains to the violation of fundamental rights7.
1
Rajendra Kumar v. State (AIR 1980 SC 1510).
2
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 65
3
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587
4
. C.C.E. v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298
5
Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314.
6
Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir, (2008) 13 S.C.C. 17;
7
Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778.

6. In this case, the petitioner’s Fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 has been
violated by the unjust issuance of the non-bailable warrant against him by the Magistrate
court. Therefore, it is a question of general importance, as the present issue pertains to a
grave violation of Fundamental Rights.
7. The charges against the accused under 498A are baseless, with no evidence to substantiate
the charge. The requirements under Section 498A are not fulfilled, and the law has been
misused in the present matter. Due to this, a grave miscarriage of justice has occurred to
Vincent Eris. The issuance of the non-bailable warrant under these charges by the Magistrate,
is therefore, a substantial question of law. Therefore, it is submitted that a substantial
questions of law exists, and thus the SLP is maintainable before this Hon’ble Court.
[1.1.2]THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE INJUSTICE AGAINST THE PETITIONER
8. Article 136 empowers the Apex Court to warrant the review of those questions of law
which involves manifest and grave injustice caused to the parties in a particular case 8.The
Court may issue a writ to enforce a promise made by the state on the basis of which the
petitioner has altered his position causing injustice9.
9. Non-bailable warrants cannot be issued mechanically, without taking into account the facts
and circumstances of the case at hand. Courts must be vigilant in issuing a non bailable
warrant, as wrongful issuance of a non-bailable warrant would violate an individual’s right to
life and liberty, bestowed under Article 21 of the Constitution 10. In Inder Mohan Goswami &
Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.11, the Supreme Court issued certain guidelines to be kept
in mind by courts when issuing non-bailable warrants, and has stated that such warrants must
only be issued “when summons or bailable warrants would be unlikely to achieve the desired
result”12, such as when the court believes the person will not voluntarily appear in court 13, or
the police authorities are unable to find the person14 or if it is believed by the court that if the
person is not taken into custody immediately, he/she could harm someone15.
8
Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer, 1954 S.C.R. 1133; Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) S.C.R. 1 753;
9
Nathulal v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1976 Raj 12.
10
Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr (2012) 9 SCC 791]
11
(2007) 12 SCC 1.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.

10. In the present matter, these guidelines were not followed by the Magistrate Court, and a
non-bailable warrant was issued, even though there was no requirement for such a warrant, as
none of the aforementioned conditions were fulfilled.
11. In the same judgment, the apex court also stated that warrants of any kind “should never
be issued without proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind”, as doing so can
result in extremely serious consequences for the accused. These warrants must be issued in
the rarest of rare cases, by exercising extreme caution 16. In the present case, this guideline has
also been ignored by the Magistrate court, as the non-bailable warrant has been issued
without taking into account the facts and hasn’t been admitted without merit.
The apex court has also stated that personal liberty is paramount, and that courts must attempt
to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants.The petitioner’s right to liberty has been
unjustly curtailed by the issuance of such warrant, and hence it is submitted before this
Hon’ble Court that the petitioner has suffered a grave injustice.
[1.1.3] Existence of alternate remedy no bar for SLP
12. Article 136 is a plenary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 17. The only limitation cast on
its effect is judicial discretion18 that is the “wisdom and good sense of the judges” of the
court.19 Mere existence of an alternative remedy cannot be a bar to maintainability.20
13. The Article gives the SC the power to hear appeals from any court in Aryavarta, and even
entertain cases in which appeals have not been first filed in the High Court21. The SC can also
hear appeals in wide variety of cases (criminal, civil, etc.) under this article 22 and has
complete discretionary powers23.
14. Thus, the Supreme Court is empowered to hear this petition, as it deals with the question
of a non-bailable warrant unjustly being issued by the Magistrate court against the petitioner.
15. Additionally, it is not mandatory under Article 136 to have exhausted the remedy under
Art. 226, the reason being that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 226 is discretionary
16
C.Selvam vs State Rep. Crl.O.P.No.9409 of 2018.
17
Arunachalam v. PSR Sadhanantam AIR 1979 SC 1284.
18
Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520.
19
Balakrishna Iyer v. Ramaswami Iyer AIR 1965 SC 195.
20
Union of India & Ors.v. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd., (2011) 5 S.C.C. 697.
21
Rajendra Kumar v. State (AIR 1980 SC 1510).
22
Pritam Singh v. The State AIR 1950 SC 169.
23
Esher Singh v. State of A.P.,AIR 2004 SC 3030;

and its scope is rather limited and so an appeal under Art. 136 cannot be dismissed by the SC
for the sole reason that the appellant did not exhaust Art. 22624.
16. Thus, the present petition cannot be rejected on the basis that the petitioners did not first
approach the High Court, and have directly approached the Supreme Court.Therefore, it is
humbly submitted that the present Special Leave Petition is maintainable before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
1.2 WRIT PETITION UNDER ART. 32
17. It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the current writ petition is
maintainable since - The petitioners in the present matter have the locus standi(1.2.1), there is
violation of fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution(1.2.2), and
exhaustion of alternate remedy is not a bar
1.2.1 The petitioners possess the requisite locus standi
18. Where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person by reason of violation of any
constitutional or legal right, any member of the public can maintain an application seeking
judicial redress for the legal wrong or legal injury caused to such person or determinate class
of persons25.
19. The gravity of justice from the traditional individualism to the community orientation is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in the Preamble26.
20. The Supreme Court has power to evolve new remedies and strategies to enforce the
fundamental rights. If questions raised are of substantial public interest, the issue of locus
standi of the person becomes irrelevant27 and the Courts, in such circumstances, are
empowered to listen to anyone whose interests are affected28.
21. In the present matter, the petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of the Unlawful
Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019 (hereafter also referred to as the Ordinance), as its
24
Master Construction Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1047 :
25
S. P. Gupta v Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149
26
Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardichand, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1622
27
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v Union of India, 2006 W.P.(C) No. 202 of 199
28
R v. Paddington, (1966) 1 Q.B. 380

provisions violate the Fundamental rights and freedoms bestowed upon every citizen of the
country under part III of the Aryavartian Constitution, namely Articles 14, 21 and 25. Thus,
the questions raised in this petition are of substantial public interest, as it is contended that
these provisions will adversely affect the fundamental rights of every citizen of Aryavarta.
22. Therefore, it is submitted that the petitioners have the requisite locus standi in the present
matter.
1.2.2 There is a violation of the Fundamental rights enshrined in part III of the Constitution
23. It is humbly contended that the present petitions are maintainable as the ordinance is in
violation of fundamental rights. When Fundamental Rights are at stake, the Court “may not
shrug its shoulders”, it has the basic duty to examine whether the relevant considerations
have been borne in mind29.
24. It is contended that Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019 violates and
infringes upon the fundamental rights enshrined under articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the
Constitution of Aryavarta.
1.2.2.1.Violation of Article 14 and 15
25. Article 14 and 15 prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion, sex, caste creed, etc.
by the state. Any classification must be reasonable 30 and shall be made only on the basis of an
intelligible differentia31. This intelligible differentia must be supported by a rational nexus
between the classification so made and the object sought to be achieved by the law32.
26. The Ordinance makes an unreasonable classification on the basis of whether the married
couple in question belong to the same religion or different religions, and if one of the partners
wishes to wilfully convert to the religion of the other. Couples belonging to the same religion
do not need to abide by the rules of the Ordinance.
27. Section 5 of the Ordinance provides for a much more serious punishment of upto 10 years
of imprisonment, if a woman, minor or person belonging to a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled
29
Sachidananda Pandey v State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 109
30
Mohammad Shujat, Ali & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors. (1974 AIR 1631)
31
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendulkar 1958 AIR 538, 1959 SCR 279
32
Gopi Chand vs The Delhi Administration (AIR 1959 SC 609)

Tribe is not converted according to the strict procedures laid down in the ordinance, and thus
makes an unreasonable classification, as the object of the ordinance is to prevent unlawful
religious conversions, and there is no rational nexus between the two.
28. The Ordinance also peculiarly states that “reconversion” or conversion to the so-called
“original” or “immediate previous” religion or belief of a person does not come under the
ambit of the Ordinance33. Therefore, it does not treat all religions equally, and fails to take
into account the possibility that a person may be unlawfully or forcibly converted to his/her
“immediate previous” religion, and will have no recourse under the Ordinance in question.
Hence, this provision also does not provide for a rational nexus between the classification
made and the object sought to be achieved by the ordinance.
30. Therefore, it is submitted before the Hon’ble court that the provisions of the Ordinance
violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Aryavartian Constitution.
1.2.2.2. Violation of Article 21
31. Article 21 states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to a procedure established by law34.
32. The Ordinance states that a 60-day notice must be given to the District Magistrate in
order to convert to another religion. Section 8 of the Ordinance requires people wanting to
convert to furnish details such as names of parents, address, occupation, income, marital
status, caste etc. The date and place of conversion, and details of the priest/person conducting
the conversion must also be provided. This is a grave violation of a person’s right to privacy
under Article 21, which not only includes the right of belief and the right to change his belief,
but also the right to keep his beliefs secret35.
33. The ordinance also does not pass the three-fold requirement laid down in the judgment of
K.S. Puttuswamy v. Union of India, which allows a law to infringe an individual’s right to
privacy only if all three of these requirements are fulfilled.
“(i) legality, which postulates the existence of law
(ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim

33
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, Section 3
34
Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950, Article 21.
35
Evangelical Fellowship Of India v. State Of H.P. (CWP No. 438 of 2011)

(iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means
adopted to achieve them.36”
34. Firstly, the ordinance is not legally sound, as it also infringes upon an individual’s right to
practise and profess a religion of his/her free will, guaranteed to every individual under
Article 25.
35. The ordinance also does not fulfil the second criterion, as there was no need to bring in an
ordinance relating to unlawful conversion, based on speeches, allegations and remarks passed
by politicians37 of the ruling party.
36. Lastly, the means adopted to achieve the object of the ordinance (preventing and
punishing unlawful conversion) are also in direct contravention with the right to privacy of an
individual, as the ordinance enables the police to investigate and thus infringe upon the
private lives of individuals.
37. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the provisions of the Aryavartian Unlawful
Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019 are in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.
1.2.2.3. Violation of Article 25
38. Article 25 of the Constitution gives every individual the right to practise, propagate and
profess any religion or belief of their choice38. When read along with Article 19, it is implied
that an individual has the freedom to marry a partner of their choice and the State cannot
interfere with the free will of two majors. The rights bestowed under Article 25 can only be
subjected to the following restrictions - public order, morality and health39.
39. The Ordinance enables the state to interfere with and investigate inter-religious
marriages.The state cannot enforce such provisions which violate basic fundamental rights to
tackle the issue of unlawful or forced conversions for the sake of maintaining public order, as
“the solution for the problem of abrogation of one zone of constitutional values cannot be the
creation of another zone of abrogation of constitutional values 40.” Therefore, it is submitted
that the Ordinance is in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution.
36
K.S. Puttuswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
37
Moot Proposition, para 5.
38
Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950, Article 25.
39
Ibid.
40
Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1.

1.2.2.4. Mere apprehension of violation of Fundamental Rights can also be considered as a

violation of Fundamental Rights
40. It is also contended that mere apprehension of fundamental right violation is also a
fundamental right violation. The right under Art. 32 arises not only when a fundamental right
has been infringed but also when a serious threat to infringe Fundamental rights has been
posed by the State.41
41. In the present Ordinance, the powers given to the state authorities are arbitrary in nature.
An inter-religious couple who wish to marry need to seek the permission of a magistrate42 and
undergo a police inquiry43 to get lawfully married, if one of the spouses wishes to convert to
the religion of the other.
42. There exists immense ambiguity in this provision, as there are no guidelines given based
on which requests for such conversion will be approved or denied. Hence, it leaves a scope
for infringement of an individual’s fundamental rights.
43. Furthermore, terms “allurement44” and “force45” have not been adequately defined, and
are prone to misuse by authorities.
44. Hence, arguendo, even if it is proved that the provisions of the Ordinance do not
explicitly violate the Fundamental Rights under part III of the Aryavartian Constitution, there
still exists a reasonable apprehension of violation of fundamental rights of the citizens by the
Ordinance.
45. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance,
2019, is in violation of Fundamental Rights under Article 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the
Aryavartian Constitution.
1.2.3 Exhaustion of alternative remedy no bar for writ petition
41
Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570.
42
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, Section 8(1) [in pari materia
to the Aryavartian Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019].
43
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, Section 8(3).
44
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, Section 2(a).
45
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, Section 2(d).

46. The bar relating to alternate remedy is a rule of self-imposed limitation by the Courts, a
rule of policy and expediency, convenience and discretion46.However, the mere existence of
an adequate alternative legal remedy per se cannot be a worthy and sufficient ground for
rejecting a petition under Article 32 if there is existence of a fundamental right and there is a
breach of such right, actual or threatened or alleged as prima facie established in the petition.
47. In the present case, there is a breach of Fundamental Rights as established in the above
issues, with regards to Article 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.
48. The remedy provided by Art. 32 is a fundamental right and not merely a discretionary
power of the Court47. This right is absolute and may not be impaired on any ground. 48
Therefore, it is contended that a refusal to entertain the instant petition would be inconsistent
with the aforesaid obligation.49
49. Additionally, in matters where there are allegations of infringement of fundamental rights
or the pursuit of alternate remedy is a meaningless ritual or an empty formality or the
alternate remedy is not equally efficacious or there is violation of the principles of natural
justice or fairness, the alternate remedy is never a bar.50
50. The present petition deals with the violation of Fundamental rights by the Ordinance, as
well as the principles of natural justice, and hence the petition cannot be rejected on the
grounds that alternate remedies were not sought prior to approaching the Supreme Court.
51. Therefore, it is humbly submitted by the petitioners that the present petitions be
maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and a liberal approach be adopted.
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE CHARGES UNDER 498A OF THE APC CAN BE UPHELD AGAINST
THE ACCUSED
52. It is contended before this hon’ble court that the charges against the accused persons
under section 498(A) of the APC are not maintainable due to the requirements of which, not
being fulfilled.
46
Ma. Gouthaman v. The State of Tamilnadu, 2012 SCC Online Mad 4201.
47
Daryao v State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457.
48
Prem Chand Garg v Excise Commissioner, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 996.
49
Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 129.
50
C.K. Rajan v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1994 Ker 179.

53. Section 498(A) explicates upon the acts perpetrated by a husband or a relative of the
husband of a woman aiming at subjecting the woman to cruelty. The commission of such acts
that are proved to amount to cruelty, invites punishments that may extend up to three years
54. and fines. The section lays down two conditions out of which, at least one has to be
satisfied in order for the court to punish the accused under this section. The offence under
section 498A is restricted to only acts of commission or omission done by the husband or his
relatives.51
55. This arguments will be expounded on further as the requirements of section 498A of APC
are not satisfied . This is because [2.1] The accused Vincent and Sukrati’s in-laws did not
commit any cruelty as per 498(A) APC and [2.2] There is no wilful conduct on part of the in-
laws or the husband.
2.1 THERE WAS NO CRUEL TREATMENT BY VINCENT ERIS OR HIS PARENTS THAT
SATISFIES 498(A)
56. The first explanation of section 498(A) of the APC elucidates upon wilful conduct and
cruelty. Any kind of conduct which is of such nature which drives a woman to commit
suicide or causes grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health of the woman amounts to
cruelty under this section. Health in relation to this section refers to mental as well as
physical health. 52
57. According to section 498(A), for the purposes of constituting the offense, the offense
does not necessarily have to be physical. 53 Even abnormal behaviour or mental torture can
amount to cruelty in a case.54 Cruelty is the conduct of one which adversely affects another.
55
Generally, Mental cruelty means, when either party causes agony, suffering or mental pain
of such a magnitude or nature that as a result, it becomes impossible for the parties to
continue to live with each other. The situation or the consequences must be such that, the
wronged party cannot be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the
accused party. 56
51
PSA Pillai, Criminal Law 14th Ed, (Lexis Nexis 2019).
52
Satpal v State of Haryana, (1998) 5 SCC 687.
53
Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958; Satpal v State of Haryana, 1998 5 SCC 687.
54
Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105
55
V. Bhagat vs D. Bhagat, 1994 SCC 1 337.
56
Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, AIR 2006 SC 1675.

58. The definition of cruelty under 498(A) is of more grievous nature than the definition of
cruelty required for other purposes such as divorce. It can be seen to involve a number of
persistent, systematic and wilful acts perpetrated with the view to make the life of the woman
burdensome or insupportable.
59. It is, however, important to note that every act of cruelty or harassment does not attract
the provisions of section 498A. Cruelty or harassment (caused with a view to meeting dowry
demand) to a married woman which only is likely to drive her to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury to life or limb or health, whether mental or physical, comes within the ambit of
section 498A, IPC.57There are no general definitions for cruelty. According to precedents,
mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which happens in day to
day life, does not amount to cruelty.58
60. According to Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that to constitute an offense under Section 489A, the consequences of the cruelty inflicted
should likely cause grave injury or danger to the woman’s life, limb or health whether it is
mental or physical health or it should likely drive the woman to commit suicide.59
61. It is stated that there was an unfortunate outbreak of the Corona Virus. It is also further
stated that there was a suspension of all major functions except for essential services
indefinitely due to the Corona Virus pandemic. 60
62. Sukrati and her husband, Vincent, visited his hometown to meet the in-laws of Sukrati. 61
It is elaborated that there was a discontinuance of transport services due to the pandemic but
Vincent had left Sukrati in the house of the in-laws and left to his workplace, which was
situated in Zumbai by hitchhiking, private vehicle and tagging with vans of essential
services.62
63. Sukrati was left behind in the house of the in-laws by Vincent. Vincent may have done
this to protect her. Vincent’s parents did not allow Sukrati to go out despite multiple requests
from the side of Sukrati because they were reasonably concerned about her safety and did not
57
Giridhar Shanlar Tawade v State of Maharashtra, 2002 5 SCC 177, Noorjahan v State, 2008 11 SCC 55.
58
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, 2007 4 SCC 511.
59
Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 2003 SC 3828.
60
61
62

want her to contract the virus. It is mentioned that it was an “unknown place” 63 to Sukrati and
this can quite possibly be the reason the in-laws wanted Vincent to come fetch her. The in-
laws thought that she would be safer with Vincent with her. Thus, such conduct should not be
seen as mental torture rather, it should be perceived as means adopted to protect their
daughter-in-law.
64. It is stated that frequent quarrels occurred between Vincent and Sukrati. 64 It has been
stated that mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of married life which
happens in day to day life, does not amount to cruelty. This cannot be considered as grounds
for mental cruelty and an essential ingredient to invoke section 489A is to establish that there
was mental cruelty involved. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh65, it was established that mere
trivial irritations, quarrels cannot per se amount to mental cruelty.
65. Hence, it is submitted that there was no mental torture or cruelty inflicted upon Sukrati.
There was no persistent or systematic conduct that made her life burdensome. The conduct of
the in-laws cannot be misconstrued as mental cruelty as they were trying to protect her and
her husband did not want to put her in the face of danger by taking her with him to their place
of work.
2.1.2 There was no wilful conduct on part of the accused.
66. It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there were no acts of
cruelty wilfully inflicted upon Sukrati by Vincent and his parents with a view to cause
grievous injury or danger to her mental health.
67. The definition of the cruelty under explanation A of section 498(A) of the APC lays
emphasis upon the word ‘wilful conduct’. When there is no intention on the part of the
husband or his relatives to injure a woman, a conduct, though willful and may even hurt her
feelings, cannot be said to amount to cruelty.66
68. Wilful leaving of the wife by the husband at his parental home i.e the matrimonial home
of the wife, and not taking her with him to his place of posting, however, by itself does not
63
Moot Proposition, para 15, line 6.
64
65
2007 4 SCC 511.
66
Savitri Devi v. Ramesh Chand 2003 CriLj 2759.

amount to “wilful conduct” within the expression “cruelty” by the husband67. In cases where
such accusations are made against the relatives of the husband, the acts attributed to such
persons other than the husband are required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 68.
Howsoever strong the desire of the wife might be of staying separately, and howsoever
genuine her grief would be for having been required to stay in a joint family, can not
constitute as “willful conduct” of the appellants which was likely to drive the same person to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury to her health and hence, does not amount to cruelty69.
69. The facts touch on the conduct of the in-laws but do not state their intentions or what the
reasons for their conduct was. Any conduct which is put forth without the intention to cause
grievous hurt to the health of the wife does not amount to cruelty under section 498A. Hence,
the benefit of doubt should be granted to the in-laws. The conduct of the in-laws may be
justifiable to the extent that they wanted to keep her safe as there is a mention about the
‘Corona’ pandemic.70
70. Furthermore, according to the ratio followed in Ganpat v. State of Maharashtra 71, however
strong the desire of the wife might be of staying separately, and however genuine her grief
would be for having been required to stay in a joint family, the same can not constitute as a
“wilful conduct”.
71. It is commonly seen that most of the complaints under section 498(a) are filed in the heat
of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberation. 72Frequent fighting between
Vincent and Sukrati might have driven her to file a case against him.Therefore, it is submitted
before this Hon’ble Court that the accused cannot be held under the charge of 498(A) as the
essential elements of cruelty and wilful conduct are absent.
2.1.3 There was no dowry demand with respect to the section.
72. It is contended before this hon’ble court that there have been no dowry demands with
respect to explanation (b) of section 498(A) of the APC.
67
Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 2014 SC 1782.
68
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (1985) 87 PLR 231.
69
Ganpat v. State of Maharashtra 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 130.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667.

73. The second explanation of 498(A) of the APC elaborates upon harassment faced by a
married woman with respect to dowry demand where such harassment is conducted with a
view to coercing her or any other person relating to the woman to meet any unlawful
demand73 for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any
person related to her to meet such demand.
74. The section states that the woman must be subjected to cruelty affecting her life or that
she must be subjected to harassment with respect to dowry demand. It is not disputed that
Sukrati was harassed with respect to dowry demand. It can be concluded that there was
mental cruelty inflicted upon her but there was no dowry demand. Hence clause (a) of section
498(A) applies.

CONSTITUTION.
75. It is humbly contented before the Honourable Supreme Court of Aryavarta that the
Aryavarta Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2019 is unconstitutional. It is so
contended, as: [3.1] Procedural impropriety in Ordinance Promulgation, [3.2] The ordinance
violates Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, 1950, [3.3] The
impugned ordinance involves a reverse onus clause and places the burden of proof on the
accused, [3.4] The impugned ordinance is dissimilar to previous legislations with similar
object and [3.5] The Supreme Court can strike down laws ultra vires The Constitution.
3.1. PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY IN ORDINANCE PROMULGATION
76. Article 123 of the Constitution of Aryavarta 74 lays down the provisions and conditions
under which the president may be empowered to promulgate an ordinance. The conditions
under which an ordinance may be brought about by the president include75:
 The Legislature should not be in session.
 The provision so intended to be made by virtue of the ordinance is within the
competence of the parliament.
73
Suvetha v State, (2009) 6 SCC 757.
74
Constitution of Aryavarta, Article 123
75
Ibid

 The existing circumstances should be of such nature of emergency that they warrant
an immediate action.
77. The Supreme Court had laid down that an ordinance could be challenged on the grounds
that there were no circumstances that required 'immediate action' to be taken and the
ordinance had been promulgated to bypass legislative procedures 76. It had also been observed
that the legislative powers had only been given to the executive by virtue of the ability to
promulgate ordinances to be utilized in exceptional circumstances77. Further, the Court had
also recently held: "The power of promulgating ordinances is not an absolute entrustment but
conditional upon a satisfaction that circumstances exist rendering it necessary to take
immediate action"78. This observation of the Court further clarifies the fact that ordinances
are only to be promulgated in times where there is reasonable circumstances which indicate
that an immediate action is required to be taken, and not to circumvent legislative authority.
78. The impugned ordinance was promulgated on the May 18, 2019. It came into effect on
the very same day. It was noted that the ordinance was promulgated in a very hasty and
urgent fashion and was noted by many to be an "onslaught" on the secular framework of the
Aryavarta. Furthermore, elections were to be conducted in the State of Uttam Desh, which
also play a very decisive role in the elections of the central government, during the same time
of the promulgation of the ordinance.
79. The facts of the present case do not indicate a situation wherein there was a high-level of
emergency regarding unlawful conversions of religion, which required the president to
promulgate such an ordinance. As established earlier, Article 123 79 and the relevant
judgments by the Court explains very clearly that an ordinance must not be promulgated
unless there is an exceptional situation wherein the president is warranted to take immediate
action. While the ordinance was promulgated, all other functions, except those of essential
services were suspended indefinitely in the country. Therefore, there was no reasonable
grounds for the president of Aryavarta to be satisfied that there existed a circumstance that
required the immediate action. Further, the ordinance was promulgated without reasonable
grounds while a major election in the country was upcoming. Therefore, it is submitted that
76
RC Cooper vs. Union of India, 1970 AIR 564
77
DC Wadhwa vs. the State of Bihar, 1987 AIR 579
78
Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Ors MANU/SCOR/00003/2017
79
Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950, Article 123

the promulgation of the ordinance itself was unreasonable and violative of the provisions
under article 123.
3.2. THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
80. As established earlier, the promulgation of the impugned ordinance had commenced in a
largely unconstitutional manner. However, arguendo, the ordinance in question had been
promulgated constitutionally, it would still be unconstitutional as the ordinance is violative of
the fundamental rights which are guaranteed in the constitution of India. It is humbly
contended before the Honourable Supreme Court that the impugned ordinance is
unconstitutional on the grounds that: [1] The ordinance infringes article 14, [2] The ordinance
is violates Article 21 , [3] The ordinance is violates of Article 25.
3.2.1 The Ordinance infringes Article 14
81. Article 14 of the Constitution80 of Aryavarta guarantees equal treatment and equal
protection to all persons before the law. Therefore, no individual shall be discriminated on the
basis of caste, creed, gender, etc. This clearly prohibits any discrimination based on the
religion of an individual81; further implying that there shall not be any discrimination towards
a person who chooses to convert to another religion. The doctrine of reasonable classification
allows certain classifications by the legislature. However, it also requires that the
classification must be reasonable82. Therefore, in order for a classification made by the
legislature to be permissible by law, such classification should only be made on the
foundation of an intelligible differentia and that differentia must be supported by a rational
nexus between the classification so made and the object sought to be achieved thus 83.
Furthermore, the Courts have identified that the object hence sought to be achieved in such
cases should also not be unlawful or discriminatory84.
82. The ordinance mentioned herein distinguishes between married couples, wherein both
persons belong to the same faith and inter-religious married couples. Couples belonging to
the same religion, who intend to get married, may do so without any pre-requisite consent of
80
Constitution of India, 1950, Article 14
81
The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. State Of Gujarat, 1974 AIR 1389
82
Mohammad Shujat, Ali & Ors. Etc v. Union Of India & Ors., 1974 AIR 1631
83
Gopi Chand v. The Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 609
84
Nagpur Improvement Trust & Ors. vs Vithal Rao & Ors., 1973 AIR 689

the state. However, in cases where one party to the marriage wishes to adopt the religion of
the other, they are required to provide a declaration to the District Magistrate and go through
a police inquiry.
83. The object sought to be achieved through Ordinance is stated to be the prohibition of
unlawful conversion of religion, effected through force, coercion, marriage, etc. The state
seeks to institute that there exists a rational nexus between the differentia made and the object
sought, on the basis of some remarks made about forced or alluring conversion of religion, by
a few Members of the parliament. Marital conversion has, therefore, been criminalized by the
State if not done according to the permissible guidelines stipulated by the State in the
ordinance.
84. The ordinance discriminates against inter-religious married couple on the sole ground that
one of the party to the marriage chooses to take up the religion of the other. This violates the
constitutional guarantee under Article 14 which clearly implies that that no person shall be
discriminated on the basis of religion. Hence, it is evident that the classification under the
ordinance is unlawful and unreasonable. The object sought to be achieved by the ordinance is
based on a few remarks by some members of parliament 85, and is a classic example of the
commission of an anecdotal evidence fallacy, wherein anecdotal evidence, instead of any
statistical or valid data, is found to be the grounds for instituting a cause. Basing an entire
legislation on such anecdotal evidence is completely unreasonable and absurd. Therefore,
there exists no rational nexus between the classification and the object sought to be achieved.
Furthermore, the object itself is discriminatory and unreasonable as it attempts to treat
individuals differently on the basis of religion.
85. Additionally, Arbitrariness in law, is essentially denial of Rule of Law 86. Article 14
inhibits executive and legislative State action, from the vice of such arbitrariness 87 as equality
is antithetic to arbitrariness88. 'Arbitrariness' refers to an act done unreasonably or done
without determining principle89, not instituted in order of things, according to reason or
85
Moot proposition, Para 5
86
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.
87
Ibid
88
E.P. Royappa State of Tamil Nade, AIR 1974 SC 555.
89
Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 1 SCR 818.

judgment90 but based on will alone91. Substantively92 arbitrary or unreasonable93 laws, which
suffer from despotism are inherently violative of Article 14 94. Therefore, any law conferring
arbitrary power violates Article 1495.
86. Vagueness in laws which delegates matters to the police or other authorities lead to
arbitrary and discriminatory application96. The usage of vague expressions or complete failure
to provide precise definition or safe guidelines for inferring the meaning of expressions used
in the legislation, is not justifiable 97. In the case of Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I 98, the Supreme
Court upheld the view that the legislature is not permitted to set a net large enough so as to
catch all possible offenders and initiate prosecution to differentiate the actual offenders from
the lot99. It was further observed in the case that a penal law is void for vagueness if it fails in
defining the offence with a sufficient degree of definiteness 100. Besides, even if certain
guidelines are provided to reach a prescribed decision, if the wordings are vague, the doctrine
of vagueness invites invocation101 and such legislation cannot be saved by submitting the
mere possibility of it being administered reasonably102.
87. Section 8(4-6)103 and Section 9(7)104 of the impugned Ordinance gives arbitrary power to
the District Magistrate to deem the conversion of religion underwent by an individual illegal
and initiate proceedings against him/her. Also, the Ordinance, in Section 8(3) 105 allows the
Police unchecked power by allowing the encroachment of privacy by initiating a Police
inquiry with no warranted grounds. The arbitrariness of the law is worsened by provisions
under Section (7)106 of the Ordinance, which makes offenses registered under the statute non-
bailable.
90
Kelvin Cinema v. State of Assam, AIR 1996 Gau 103.
91
State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sundar, (2011) 8 SCC 737.
92
A. Satyanarayana v. S. Purushothaman, (2008) 5 SCC 416
93
Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 537
94
Amita v. Union of India, (2005) 13 SCC 721
95
Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454
96
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (Cri) 899.
97
Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I (2015) 5 SCC 1
98
Ibid
99
United States v. Reese 92 U.S. 214 (1875)
100
City of Chicago v. Morales et al, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)
101
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, 1 S.C.R. 970
102
The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty and Anr., (1962) 3 S.C.R. 786
103
Aryavarta Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 8
104
Id Section 9(7)
105
Id Section 8(3)
106
Id Section 7

88. Section 2(f)107 defines the term 'Mass Conversion' vaguely as when two or more persons
are converted and considers it as a more serious offense. Further, Section 2(a) 108 defines
allurement in an undeniably vague manner also. Vagueness in the definition of such
provisions widens the ambit for abuse of power and violates right to equality as provided
under Article 14.
89. In light of the above arguments, it is submitted that the provisions under the Ordinance
has allowed the permeation of arbitrariness and vagueness into the law. The Supreme Court
has evolved the well-settled principle that this violates Article 14109.
3.2.2 The Ordinance violates Article 25
90. An individual is entitled to the right to freely determine their religion, faith and matters of
conscience under Article 25 of the Constitution 110. It is the liberty of a person to determine
matters regarding his/her life including where his conscience should lie or which faith he
should adopt or not adopt111. In the famous case of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs The State Of
Bombay112, The Supreme Court held that:
"Every person has a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to
entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or
conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or
sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate his religious views for the
edification of others."
91. The impugned ordinance brings about a great degree State involvement into the freedom
of a person to choose the religion according to his/her wish. The procedural requirement
prescribed by the State restricts the freedom of individuals to independently decide matters of
faith, conscience and religion. Effectively, this gives the State great power to dictate the
choice of religion of individuals. Therefore, it is evident that the contested Ordinance
impinges the provisions for freedom of religion as guaranteed under Article 25 of the
Constitution.
107
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 2(f)
108
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019, Section 2(a)
109
AK Roy v. Union of India, 1982 AIR 710
110
Constitution of India, 1950, Article 25
111
Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha, AIR 1954 SC
112
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs The State Of Bombay, 1954 AIR 388

3.2.3 The Ordinance violates Article 21
92. Right to privacy was identified to be a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution by the Supreme Court and that the State has a duty to protect the privacy of
the individuals113. In the same judgment, it was held by the Court that "Privacy recognises the
ability of individuals to control vital aspects of their lives and safeguards the autonomy
exercised by them" and that "Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to
privacy"114. Furthermore, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which was
greatly influential in the formulation of Article 21 of the Constitution states that every
individual has the right to determine or change his/her own religion and belief115.
93. The right to self-determination in matters of one's way of life and other vital aspects is an
important element of an individual's personal liberty 116. Since so, it very evidently forms a
part of Article 21.
94. Section 8117 and 9118 of the impugned ordinance lays down strict procedure to be followed
by an individual in the event of his/her conversion to another religion. This involves the
intervention of the State's authorities such as the District Magistrate and the Police. The
consent of the individual and the background of his choice is to be determined and
investigated by the District Magistrate, who may, if he deems necessary, direct an extensive
police inquiry119 and/or record and review others' objections to the conversion 120, according to
the provisions of the ordinance. Further, the District Magistrate is also given authority to
deem the conversion illegal and void121.
95. The provisions of the ordinance, as aforementioned, impair the individual's ability to
make choices related to personal matters such as choice of religion/faith, making these
choices subject to extensive scrutiny by the State. The matter of choice of one's religion
pertains to the vital aspects of one's personal life. By allowing the State to decide upon such
matters is prima facie, a violation of one's privacy and right to self-determine. This forms as
an infringement of the rights guaranteed to an individual by Article 21 of the Constitution.
113
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v. Union of India And Ors. 2017 10 SCC 1
114
Ibid
115
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 18
116
National Legal Ser. Auth v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 1863
117
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, Section 8
118
Id, Section 9
119
Id, Section 8 (3)
120
Id, Section 9 (5)
121
Id Section 8(4) & Section (7)

96. Summarily, it is submitted that the Aryavarta Prohibition of Unlawful Religious

Conversion Ordinance, 2019 is evidently in violation of Article 14, 21 & 25 of the
Constitution.
3.3. THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE INVOLVES A REVERSE ONUS CLAUSE AND PLACES THE
BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ACCUSED
97. The presumption of innocence has been considered as a fundamental postulate by the
Supreme Court122. It has also been explained by the Court that inference of guilt is only
justifiable when all other factors connected therein have been observed to be in disagreement
towards the innocence of the accused 123. The law has also settled on the domain that any
procedure prescribed by the law must be reasonable, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful
or oppressive, under the provisions of Articles 20124 and 21125126. The legal maxim, Actori
Incumbit Onus Probandi, which means that the burden of proof lies on the one instituting the
claim has been upheld by the Indian Judiciary 127. Additionally, Section 101128, read along
with Section 102129 of the Evidence Act lays down that proof of the commission of a crime
must be brought by the one imputing the crime, and not by the one on whom the crime is
being imputed.
98. The Supreme Court of India, in case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs Dattatraya G. Hegde 130
observed that presumption of innocence is a human right. Also, in another instance, the Court
had held that the right to fair procedure is protected under Article 21131 of the Constitution132.
99. In the case of Sheikh Zahid Mukhtar v State of Maharashtra, a four-fold test was laid
down to assure the validity of any reverse burden clause133. The four aspects to be ascertained
were laid down as: (i) Whether the State is required to prove the basic facts constituting a
122
Dataram Singh v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SCOR/31224/2018
123
Kanhaiya Lal v. State Of Rajasthan, 2014 (2) AJR 486
124
125
Id, Aricle 21
126
Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, 1978 AIR 597
127
Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State Of Ajmer, 1956 AIR 404
128
Aryavarta Evidence Act, 1872, Section 101
129
Aryavarta Evidence Act, 1872, Section 102
130
Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde AIR, 2008 SC 1325
131
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, AIR 2005 SC 2277
132
133
Sheikh Zahid Mukhtar v. State of Maharashtra 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 2600

crime so as to raise a presumption of balance facts (considering the probative connection

between these basic facts and the presumed facts) to bring home the guilt of the accused, and
to disprove which the burden is cast on the accused (ii) Whether the proof of the facts so
furnished involve a burden to prove the negative facts (iii) Whether these facts come within
the special knowledge of the accused and (iv) Whether such a burden subject the accused to
any oppression or hardship.
100. Section 12134 of the impugned Ordinance places burden of proof on the person who is
alleged to have caused such conversion, making them liable for the discharge of evidence to
verify that the conversion was effected with consent of the person undergoing conversion.
However, justly, the burden of proof to establish the fact that an unlawful conversion has
commenced must lie upon the State in such cases.
101. In such cases of conversion, the State, with all its abundant resources is at a better
position to furnish the proof of commission of the crime by the accused and instigating a
burden to prove the negative facts on an individual with limited resources is highly unjust.
Furthermore, the commencement of a religious conversion is often an overt and public event
wherein there is an active participation of the individual who is being converted. Therefore, it
is highly unlikely that there exist any facts which come under the special knowledge of the
accused.
102. Finally, instigating such a reverse onus of proof requires the accused to prove the
existence of consent of the individual who underwent conversion; which at all times exists
within the mind of the such individual135. Consequently, this burden of proof lands great
oppression and hardship upon the accused.
103. Therefore, the State being allowed to invoke an inherent assumption that all conversions
complained of are unlawful, without any proof to such complaint/claim is inequitable.
3.4 THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS DISSIMILAR TO PREVIOUS LEGISLATIONS WITH

SIMILAR OBJECT.
134
Aryavarta Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, Section 12
135
Evangelical Fellowship Of India v. State Of H.P., MANU/HP/1259/2012

104. Legislations similar to the impugned Ordinance have been enacted in the past. The
Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam136 and Orissa Freedom of Religion Act137
constitute examples for such similar legislations. At instances, when challenged, the
Constitutional validity of these legislations have been upheld138.
105. Although the aforementioned previous legislations have been given an affirmative
response in regards to their Constitutional validity, it is crucial to bring to the attention of the
Honourable Supreme Court of Aryavarta, that the impugned ordinance in the present case is
dissimilar to the mentioned previous legislations. Unlike these legislations, the contested
Ordinance is far more stricter in the sense that the offenses under the Ordinance has been
made non-bailable139 and the quantum of punishment is also much greater140. It has also made
conversion for marriage or vice versa punishable explicitly141. Other notable dissimilarities
include the police inquiry prescribed at the pre-conversion stage142, mandatory submission of
pre-conversion declaration to the District Magistrate 143, the non-requirement of prior sanction
of District Magistrate before prosecution and the explicitly specified reverse onus clause on
the accused144.
106. From the abovementioned facts, it is evident that the impugned ordinance is very
dissimilar from the previously enacted legislations. The strict procedure prescribed and
greater quantum of punishment for offenses are unconstitutional and violative of
Constitutional provisions.
3.5. THE SUPREME COURT CAN STRIKE DOWN LAWS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION
107. Article 13(2) of the Constitution lays down very clearly that the State shall not enact any
law which contravenes the fundamental rights as conferred in part III of the constitution,
136
Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968
137
Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967
138
Rev. Stainislaus v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors. AIR 1977 SC 908
139
140
Id, Section 8(5-6) & Section 10
141
Id Section 6
142
Id Section 8(3)
143
Id Section 8(1)
144
Id Section 12

which includes Article 12 to Article 35145. It is further specified in Article 13(3) that
ordinances also form a part of 'laws', with respect to Article 13(2). Moreover, it was also
observed that ordinances are, in no way, outside the scope of Judicial review 146. The Supreme
court also observed the fundamental rights to be paramount147 and sacrosanct148, and had
further stated that laws in contravention of these fundamental rights shall be void, nugatory
and ineffectual149.
108. Article 13 further establishes that such laws shall be void to the extent of the
contravention, implying the applicability of the doctrine of severability. The doctrine of
severability states that when some particular provision of a law is found to be void or invalid,
but it is the case that such provision(s) is severable from the rest of the law, then only that
specific provision will be declared void as per the Court150.
109. The doctrine of severability and the rules in determining its applicability to specific laws
have been examined and laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Bombay
v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala151. The Court, in the said case mentioned the following
guidelines for the same. The main motive of the authority which promulgated the law is taken
into consideration, along with aspects such as the statute's history, title, preamble and
objectives. Further, it is investigated whether the valid and invalid provisions were meant to
be a part of the same scheme and if so, the whole scheme will be voidable. The case had also
established that the law needs to be read in its entirety and not as independent provisions, in
order to understand the interdependence of the provisions. If the invalidated provisions are
found to be a core part of the object sought to be achieved with the promulgated law, then the
entire legislation requires striking down152.
110. No scientific studies have been undertaken by the State to deduce the requirement of
such an ordinance. Only a few remarks made by some members of parliament had been
recorded to have paved the way to the promulgation of the ordinance. The preamble of the
ordinance states that the ordinance is:
145
Article 13(2) of Constitution of Aryavarta, 1950
146
AK Roy v. Union of India, 1982 AIR 710
147
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 88
148
State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525
149
Mahendra Lal Jaini v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 AIR 1019
150
DD Basu Commentary on the Constitution of India, Volume 2, Part III Fundamental Rights.
151
The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, 1957 AIR 699, 1957 SCR 874.
152
State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318.

"to provide for prohibitions of the unlawful conversions from one religion to another by
misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement or by any fraudulent means
or by marriage and for the matters connected therewith and incidental thereto".
111. It is evident that prohibition of marital conversions forms a core object sought to be
achieved by the State by virtue of this ordinance. Prohibition of conversion by marriage, as
established earlier, is a violation of the fundamental rights and is therefore invalid. Further, it
has been established that provisions such as section 8 153 and section 12154 of the impugned
ordinance are clearly encroaching upon the right to privacy of an individual, and therefore
invalid. Further, the state, dictating and introducing controls to the choice of religion of an
individual is also clearly a violation of the right to privacy.
112. The valid and invalid provisions of the impugned ordinance are clearly inseparable from
each other as they are tied together under the same scheme/object sought to be achieved by
the ordinance. Further, the invalid provisions contained therein form the core part of the
ordinance and striking them down would also take away major provisions of the ordinance.
Doing so would defeat the very purpose of the ordinance. Consequently, the ordinance, in its
entirety, should be declared ultra vires and hence, struck down.
113. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Honourable Supreme Court of Aryavarta
that the Aryavarta Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019 is ultra
vires the Constitution and void; and therefore must be struck down..
153
154
Id, Section 12

PRAYER
Wherefore, it is humbly prayed to this Hon’ble court that in the light of issues raised,
arguments advanced and authorities cited, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
1. DECLARE that the Special Leave Petition and writ petition are maintainable before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
2. SET ASIDE the order of the Magistrate Court and
3. QUASHthe FIR filed under Section 498A of the APC.
4. DECLARE the Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2019 to be ultra vires of the
Constitution of Aryavarta and strike down the same.
AND/OR
Pass any other order, direction, relief that it may deem fit in the best interest of Justice,
Fairness and Good Conscience.
For this act of kindness, the petitioners shall duty bound forever pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for Petitioners)

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~AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION (ONLINE) 2021~

TEAM CODE: AUR24

AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION (ONLINE) 2021

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTA

WRIT PETITION NUMBER _______ / 2019

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NUMBER / 2019

FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 AND 32 OF THE

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:

CHRISTOPHER ELIS AND MAISEL [PETITIONER]

UNION OF ARYAVARTA [RESPONDENT]

MEMORIAL for PETITIONER

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS iii | P a g e

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT..........................................................................................1

[1.1] SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution................................................................1

[1.1.2]There Has been a Grave injustice against the petitioner.........................................2

1.2 Writ Petition under Art. 32...........................................................................................4

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE ARYAVARTA PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

3.1. Procedural Impropriety In Ordinance Promulgation.................................................14

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS iv | P a g e

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS v|Page

ABBREVATIONS FULL FORM

AIR All India Reporter

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS vi | P a g e

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 1|Page

4. Aryavarta Evidence Act, 1872, Section 102.......................................................................36

1. Lexis Nexis Academics (www.lexisnexisacademics.com)

3. SCC Online (www.scconline.com)

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 4|Page

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 5|Page

“Art.136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

“Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 6|Page

OUTBREAK OF CORONA VIRUS AND PROMULGATION OF THE UNLAWFUL CONVERSION OF

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 8|Page

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE CHARGES UNDER 498A OF THE APC CAN BE

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 9|Page

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE ARYAVARTA PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 10 | P a g e

[1.1] SLP UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION

[1.1.1.] THERE EXISTS A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW

5. Whenever a question of general importance arises, the jurisdiction can be invoked 6,

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 11 | P a g e

[1.1.2]THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE INJUSTICE AGAINST THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 12 | P a g e

[1.1.3] Existence of alternate remedy no bar for SLP

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 13 | P a g e

1.2 WRIT PETITION UNDER ART. 32

1.2.1 The petitioners possess the requisite locus standi

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 14 | P a g e

1.2.2.1.Violation of Article 14 and 15

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 15 | P a g e

1.2.2.2. Violation of Article 21

“(i) legality, which postulates the existence of law

(ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 16 | P a g e

1.2.2.3. Violation of Article 25

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 17 | P a g e

1.2.2.4. Mere apprehension of violation of Fundamental Rights can also be considered as a

1.2.3 Exhaustion of alternative remedy no bar for writ petition

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 18 | P a g e

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 19 | P a g e

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 20 | P a g e

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS 21 | P a g e