Colonialism, Social Structure and Nationalism: The Philippine Case

Author(s): Martin Meadows

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 337-352
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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 SocialStructure
Colonialism, and
Nationalism:
thePhilippine
Case
MartinMeadows

FILIPINOS JUSTIFIABLY TAKE PRIDE in the factthat theirnationalistic and

revolutionary traditionsare the oldest in SoutheastAsia, particularly
fromthestandpointof overtsystematic effortsdesignedto expelthecolonial
rulersand attainindependence.Thus the factthattherehas been a resur-
genceof Philippinenationalismduringthe past decade in one senseshould
nothave been unexpectedin view of its relatively long history.Nonetheless,
becauseof the pragmaticand moderatenatureof thatnationalismpriorto
the i960s, many observersof the Philippinepoliticalscene were surprised
bothbytherapiditywithwhichtheresurgence occurredand bytheextentto
whichit came to reflectthe impactof radical interpretations of Philippine
societygenerallyand ofPhilippine-American relationsspecifically.
Yet the nationalistmovementundoubtedlywould have developedeven
more rapidly-and more radically-than it has, but for the fact that a
numberoffundamental issuesdividedtheranksof itsadherentsin thei960s.
The main purposeof thisarticleis to describethe natureof thosedivisions
by examiningthe social dynamicsunderlyingthe nationalistrevivalin the
Philippines.*This will be done aftera briefgeneralaccountof the major
reasonsforthatrevival.The secondpartof the articlefocuseson theprinci-
pal societal sectorsand groups involved in the nationalistmovement,
with emphasison the factorsthat have hamperedtheireffortsto achieve
unity,both internallyand externally. The analysisprovidesa case-study of
thepersisting (i.e.,post-independence) effectsofcolonialismon thecolonized
country.Finally,in the lightof thatanalysis,the thirdsectionassessesthe
prospectsfor,and the likelypoliticalimpactof, the nationalistmovement
in the i97os. Throughout,this essay stressesthe ideas and perspectives of
the movement'smore radical segments,whose views have receivedlittle
scholarly attention eitherwithinor outsidetheircountry.
Philippinenationalismreachedunprecedented heightsof intensitydur-
ing the last years of Spanish control,as manifestedin the revolutionary
* This articleis considerablyrevisedand
condensedfrom my two papers: "Resurgent
PhilippineNationalism:the 196os," preparedfor a 1970 CornellUniversitySymposiumon
PhilippineNationalism;and "Constitution or Revolution?The PhilippinesAfter25 Years,"
presentedat the 28th InternationalCongressof Orientalists,
Canberra,in January197i. A
more extendedanalysisis containedin my largerstudy,Nationalismin the Philippines(not
yetpublished).

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 PacificAflairs
movement ofthelatei890s, and remained strongthroughout theAmerican
occupation.AfterWorldWar II, however, itdeclined considerably as a poli-
ticalfactor.In partthedeclinecan be attributed to theimpactof thewar,
whichcompelled Filipinosto contrastthetreatment theyreceived fromthe
Japaneseand the Americans. More positively, the comparatively benign
Americancolonialpolicy,at leastas contrasted withthatof Spain,had
servedto win Filipinoloyaltyand gratitude. Additionally, it was only
naturalfornationalistic sentiment to die downafterthePhilippines gained
itsindependence in 1946.
The revivalof nationalism following therelatively quiescent periodof
thei950s is theresultprimarily of theemergence of a newgeneration of
Filipinos.This generation, sinceit did not matureduringtheAmerican
period,has a background and outlookquitedifferent fromthoseofitspre-
decessors.Thesedifferences havebeenreflected in theriseofnewissuesthat
dominate theconcerns ofnationalists,perhaps thechiefonebeingan intense
andemotional searchfora nationalidentity. Thistakestheformofa desire
forclosertieswithAsians;conversely, it is manifested bythegrowth ofso-
called"anti-Americanism," whichis aimednotonlyat gainingeconomic as
wellas politicalindependence butalso at demonstrating to Asiansthatthe
Philippines is nottheAmericanpuppetthatsomethinkit is. Finally,re-
surgent Filipinonationalism can be explained by theimprovement in eco-
nomicconditions in thePhilippines sinceWorldWar II, whichin turnhas
helpedlessenthe extentof the country's economicdependence upon the
UnitedStates.1
The natureand significance of thesechangesfirstbecameclear,insofar
as theirpoliticalimplications wereconcerned, duringtheperiodfrommid-
I964 to mid-i965, at whichtimea seriesof unprecedented anti-American
demonstrations occurred. The intensity of thenationalistic feelingthaten-
suedshookthepreviously complacent Americanassumption thatthe"spe-
cial relationship" betweenthe two countries would continueindefinitely
witha minimum of friction.
The eventsthattookplaceduringI964-1965
werenottheusual "incidents" or "irritants" of onlylimitedimport;not
onlydidtheyoccurwithinthethreemostsensitive areasofcontact between
the two countries-trade, investment and militaryrelations-buttheir
cumulative impactfurther magnified theirrepercussions." One resultwas
thatthepotential support fornationalism on thepartofcertain keysectors
of urbanFilipinosociety(labor,business, students and intellectuals) for
1 On these generalpoints see, e.g., T. A. Agoncillo,The Developmentof Filipino Na-
tionalism(Manila, i965), pp. 41-42; A. E. Lapitan,"On the Special Filipino-American Rela-
tionships,"
PhilippineStudies,Vol. '5 (OctoberI967), pp. 735 if.; S. K. Roxas, "Reflections
on EconomicNationalismin thePhilippines," Comment,No. 6 (I958), pp. i5-I6.
2 See Martin Meadows, "Recent Developmentsin Philippine-American Relations,"Asian
Survey,Vol. 5 (Junei965), p. 305.

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 Colonialism,Social Structure
and Nationalism
perhapsthefirsttimewas activated simultaneously on behalfof the na-
tionalistcause.
Sincei965 it hasbeenclearthatthefuture courseofFilipinonationalism
dependschiefly on thesupport of thesegroupsand on thedegreeof unity
theycan achieve, bothinternally and amongthemselves. Insofaras strategy
is concerned, themainpointofdisagreement involves theissueof whether
to workwithintheexisting politicalsystem in thestruggle forreform, or to
attempt to alterthesystem itselfas partof thestruggle. Adherents of the
former positionwillbe termed herepragmatic or moderate nationalistsand
thoseofthelatter, ideological orradicalnationalists.
Buteventhosein favorof altering thepoliticalsystem-ontheground
thatit is dominated byupper-class elitesand is totally unresponsive to the
urgent needforchange-aredividedon thequestionofhowtobringabout
change.Someprefer attempting to transform theoutlookofthosewhorun
the system, by exerting pressureon themthroughthe mass media,for
example, and byreform of theeducational system. Othersfavormoreim-
mediateand moredrasticaction,up to and includingresortto violence
and revolution. The chancesfora revolution in thePhilippines in the1970s
willbe discussed in theconcluding sectionfollowing a survey ofthemajor
elements involvedin thenationalist movement and theissuesthatdivide
them.
The twopotentially mostimportant urban-centered sourcesof support
forcontemporary Philippine nationalism aretheemerging classofindustrial
and commercial entrepreneurs (in termsof financial assistance)and the
ranksof organizedlabor(in termsof numerical support).Unfortunately
forthenationalist cause,however, neither grouphasbeenparticularly help-
fulin thisregard, at leastas theradicalnationalists seethings. Businessand
laborconstitute thebackbone of thepragmatic nationalist membership, but
attention willbe focusedhereon theactivities of theradicals-chiefly com-
prisedof intellectuals and of students-who havehad a fargreater impact
thanthemoderates onthenationalist movement.
Untiltheendof thei940s, thePhilippine economic elitewas composed
almostentirely of landlords and of thosewhosewealthderivedfromthe
agricultural sector.By the1950s,however, a new groupof Filipinoindus-
tralistsbegantoemerge, largely theresultofthegovernment's imposition of
importand exchangecontrols in I949. Amongotherthings, thisdevelop-
mentencouraged theestablishment of variousprocessing and otherindus-
tries.It also servedto demonstrate to Filipinobusinessmen that,withade-
quateprotection, theyhavetheability to engagein industrial development.
By thetimethatimportand exchangecontrols wereremoved in i962, the
ranksofthenewentrepreneurs hadgrownconsiderably andmostwereable
to survivetheadverseeffects of decontrol, thoughnot withoutsomedif-
ficulty.

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 Pacific flairs
Despitetheirincreased numbers and financial strength, thenew entre-
preneurs havenotplayedan important political role,chiefly because-asthe
radicalnationalistsargue-theyare notunitedon thequestionof whether
toallythemselves withthetraditional FilipinoelitesandAmerican business
interests,or to side withthe forcesfavoring socialand politicalreform.
Manyofthenewbusiness elitesopposeAmerican economic imperialism,but
at the sametimehave littleregardfortheFilipinomasses.As a result,
according totheideological nationalists,theyareledtosupport theAmerican
military presence in thecountry, if onlybecausethisassurestheprotection
ofcapitalism againstanyattempt to alterthestatusquo byforceful means.
OtherFilipinoentrepreneurs whosympathize withthemassesareprevented
fromactingon theirbeliefsby thefearof losingtheirmarketand credit
linkswithFilipinoandAmerican financiers.
Someofthenewentrepreneurs, ofcourse, openlysupport thenationalist
cause.Accordingto theircritics, however, manyof theseare motivated
primarily bythedesireto use nationalism to decreaseor eliminate foreign
businesscompetition ratherthanto improve theeconomic condition of the
averageFilipino.Critics alsomaintain that,ifFilipinoentrepreneurs succeed
in gainingfullcontrolof the economyfromforeigninterests, the result
wouldsimply be totransfer economic powerfroman alientoan indigenous
elite.The entrepreneurs have attempted to counterthiskind of attack,
butit seemsclearthatthusfartheradicalnationalists forthemostpartare
unconvinced bytheirrebuttals.
Extremist nationalists also areconcerned by politicaldevelopments that
threaten to deflectthe entrepreneurial class into nonradicalchannelsof
politicalaction;a casein pointwas thelaunching oftheChristian Socialist
Movement in mid-I968 byformer SenatorRaul Manglapus, longnotedfor
his efforts on behalfof moderate reform in theislands.3 Thus,whilethe
radicalnationalists constantly stresstheneedforunityifthestruggle against
foreign domination and fornationaldevelopment is to succeed,it is clear
thatmuchremainsto be donebeforea rapprochement is achievedbetween
theentrepreneurs and theotherelements involvedin thenationalist cause.
Thisincludestheothermajorsegment ofpragmatic nationalism-the labor
movement.
Historicallythe Philippinelabormovement has had littlepoliticalin-
fluence.Indeed,rarelyin its history has it evenbeenpolitically oriented;
thefewexceptions tothispattern occurred priorto1953 whenthePhilippine
Congress passedtheso-called MagnaCartaofLabor,an actwhichreformed
manyof thedefects of thelabormovement and of labor-management re-
3 For the nationalist
view, see, e.g., P. Daroy, "Our Middle-ClassCulture,"Graphic(June
i2, i968), pp. 84-85; "Imperialismin the Sixties,"Praxis (August-Septemberi968), pp. I-2I;
P. Daroy, "Will the ChristianSocial MovementWork?" Graphic (December I8, i968),
pp. 22 if.

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 Colonialism,Social Structure
and Nationalism
lations.
Fromthattimeuntilthenationalist revivalofthei96os,Philippine
labor,unlikemostotherAsianlabormovements, was largelyuninvolved
in thepoliticalprocess.Despiteits growinginvolvement in thatrevival,
however, the labor movement remainsbasicallypragmaticratherthan
radicalin itspoliticalorientation.
According to "impartial" studiesby social scientists, the nonpolitical
characteroflabor,orat leastitspolitical weakness, be
can partially attributed
to variousstructural aspectsof societyand politics:the natureof the
electoralsystem, whichdetersthedevelopment ofthirdparties(theformin
whichlaborand socialistpartiesusuallyemergein a predominantly con-
servative two-party system);the extentand the timingof suffrage; the
natureand timingof sociallegislation; theexistence of a privateenterprise
economy;and so on.4The radicalnationalists, however, have a simpler
explanation: labor'searly(i.e.,nineteenth-century) weakness stemmed from
theminuscule size of theproletariat and fromthefactthatit was more
influenced byWestern liberalismthanbyMarxism. In thetwentieth century
thisweaknesshas been fostered by theefforts of Americanimperialism,
working in conjunction withreactionary indigenous forceswhichcontrol
thePhilippine political
system.5
In morerecenttimes,it seemsclearthatone of themajorfactors con-
tributingto labor'spoliticalweaknesscontinues to be its lack of strength,
bothquantitatively and qualitatively. The Philippine laborforcetotalsap-
proximately twelvemillionpersons, abouttwo-thirds agriculturalworkers,
mostof whomare notorganized.Of theapproximately fourmillionin-
dustrialand othernon-agricultural workers, probably lessthanone million
are members of unions.In bothcases,suchfactors as unemployment and
workerapathy,as well as employer opposition, are responsible for the
smallness oftheorganized laborforce.Whatis more,mostmembers ofthe
industrial workforceare unskilledlaborers, so thatthe labormovement
suffersfroma qualitative as wellas a quantitative
deficiency.
In addition, Philippine laboron thewholehas beenbadlyservedbyits
leaders.Whilethelabormovement oftenis accusedof corruption and lack
of purpose,suchtraitsare attributable largelyto the actionsof Filipino
laborleaders, whoare characterized bya chronic inabilityto achieveunity
amongthemselves. In turn,thisresultspartlyfromthe factthatmany
laborleadersareopportunists whoeithersuccumbtotheluresofpoliticians
or attempt to gainpoliticalsuccesses on theirown.And oncetheyachieve

4 D. Wurfel,"Some Noteson thePoliticalRole of Labor Movements," Labor Review,vol. I

(April i965), pp. ii if., 2i if.
5 See J. M. Sison, "Nationalismand the Labor Movement,"Progressive Review, No. 9
(i966), pp. 39 if.; I. Lacsina, "A Philosophyfor IndustrialLabor," Solidarity,
vol. I (July-
Septemberi966), pp. 52 ff.

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 PacificAffairs
such success,labor leadersusuallydo not maintaintheirold loyalties;
instead,theyarecoopted intothe"Establishment."'
A goodexampleof thisphenomenon, one whichalso servesto explain
whymostradicalnationalists are suspicious of the motivations of labor
leaders,was provided bythepolitical the
ofthelatterduring early
activities
i960s. Afteryearsof inactivity on thepoliticalfront, in February i963 the
twobiggestPhilippine laborconfederations mergedto formtheLapiang
Manggagawa, or LaborParty.ByAugusti963theLaborPartyhad signed
a coalition agreement withtheLiberalParty,at thattimeheadedby then
President Diosdado Macapagal,whereupon some laborleaderswereap-
pointedtogovernment positions. The LaborPartyjustified itsactionon the
groundthattheopposition Nacionalista Partywasdominated byreactionary
forcesand vestedinterests. But bythetimetheNacionalistas had become
themajority party following thei965elections, theLaborPartywasattacking
ex-President Macapagal,explaining thatthelatter's apparentlyradicalout-
lookhaddeceived labor.7
In viewof labor'srecord, therefore, it is notsurprising thattherewas
littleifanyexcitement arousedwhensegments oftheLaborPartyin a i967
convention changedtheirnameto the SocialistPartyof thePhilippines.
Noris itunexpected that,in theopinionofmostobservers, themoststriking
characteristicofPhilippine unionism is conservatism ratherthanradicalism.
If somelaborleadersprofess to espousetheradicalcause,theyarerelatively
fewin number.Someof those,moreover, are notentirely trustworthy,at
leastin theeyesoftheideological nationalistsfromtheranksofintellectuals
andstudents.
Unliketheircounterparts in mostof the otherdeveloping countries,
intellectuals in thePhilippines havenotalwaysheldpositions of leadership
in thestruggle forpolitical,economicand culturalindependence and the
effort to stimulate thegrowthof nationalism. It is truethatmanyintel-
lectuals-defined simply, andbroadly, torefer tothosewho,owingtohigher
education, have someknowledgeof "modern"or "Western" ideas-have
playedimportant rolesin thedevelopment of Filipinonationalism. Con-
sideredas a whole,however, theintelligentsia has beenin a ratherambi-
valentposition, at best,in relationto thenationalist movement, notonly
according toitscriticsbutbytheadmission ofintellectualsthemselves.
This situationis attributable in partto thehistorical circumstancessur-
rounding theemergence ofan educated Filipinoelite,a development which
cametowardtheend of theSpanishoccupation in thenineteenth century,
6 J. Tan, "The ManyFaces of RP Labor,"Manila
Times,Novemberi2, i964, pp. I, I6, and
"The PhilippineLabor Vote," Times,Novemberi9, i964, pp. I, 13; Wurfel,op. cit., p. 20.
7 "Labor: a new PoliticalForce?" PhilippinesFree Press (May 4, i963), p. I2; I. Lacsina,
"Lapiang Manggagawaand the Liberal Administration," ProgressiveReview,No. 6 (i965),
pp. 26 if.

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 Colonialism,
Social Structure
and Nationalism
in theformof a groupknownas ilustrados. Becauseeducation was limited
almost to
entirely thosewithfinancial means,thegap between theeliteand
themassesin Filipinosociety was basedon bothwealthand culturaldif-
ferences.
Sincetheilustrados benefitted fromthesystem, theysoughtonly
assimilationand notindependence. Nevertheless, theyservedthefunction
of involving the massesin theirreformist movement and makingthem
awareoftheirFilipinoidentity.
AftertheAmerican occupation theFilipinoelitesremained in positions
of dominance and thuscontinued to support thestatusquo. Although the
adoption oftheAmerican system ofmoreor lessuniversal education ended
theupperclassmonopoly on education, radicalnationalists
arguethatthe
colonialeducation receivedbyFilipinos insured thatmostoftheintelligentsia
endedup in theserviceof Filipinoor Americanelites.As a result, intel-
lectualsgenerally havebeenambivalent on theissueof nationalism; many
of themhavesupported nationalism in theabstract,buttheirsupport has
beenvitiated bytheir materialdependence onanti-nationalistelements.
ThesefactshelpexplainwhyFilipinointellectuals, and theliberalcreed
theyhave tendedto espouse,have failedto provideleadershipto the
nationalist movement, and whytheresultant leadershipvacuumhas been
filledby leftists ratherthanby liberals, particularlywithinthe ranksof
studentsas wellas ofintellectuals. As radicalsseethesituation, theFilipino
liberalintellectual todaystillfindshimselfin the middlebetweenelites
(foreign or indigenous)and masses,attempting to mediatebetweentheir
opposedinterests and failingto becometrulycommitted to either. In brief,
theirvariedclassorigins, theirschooling, and thepressures emanating from
therulingeliteshaveprevented theintellectuals frombeingas aggressively
nationalisticas intellectuals
inotherdeveloping countries.8
There are otherfactorsinvolvedin the failure-orinability-ofthe
intellectualstoinfluence thepoliticalscenesinceindependence. Asidefroma
traditional reluctance toenterpolitics(whichmaybe a universal traitamong
intellectuals),theintensity ofpolitics in thePhilippines,combined withthe
natureof thepolitical partysystem(in theviewof manyFilipinosmerely
a "one-party, two-faction" system),serveto restrainthe intellectual. In
addition, government emphasison the dangersof communist subversion
has inhibited thepoliticalinvolvement of intellectuals,
bothbecauseof the
possibilityofdirect legalactionbythegovernment andalsobecausemanyin-
tellectuals(particularly teachers)dependon thestatefortheirjobs.Further-
more,the fearof communism reinforces the "conformism" of a society
which,in theviewof mostintellectuals, has alwaysbeenanti-intellectual.
Finally,evenifintellectuals desiredto express themselves on politicalissues,
"The FilipinoElite," Graphic(Septemberi8, I968), pp. 20 ff.;P. Daroy,
8 R. Constantino,
"The Failure of Liberalism,"Politika,no. i (i965), pp. 4 ff.; Daroy, "Our Middle-Class
Culture,"op. cit.

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 PacificAfairs
they wouldbe debarred from doingso byvirtue oftheelite'scontrol (ac-
cording totheradicals) ofthemassmedia.Radicalnationalists assertthat
allthesefactors servetorestrict theright ofdissent, at leastin practice,in
thePhilippines.' Thisfactis particularly relevanttoanyevaluation ofthe
political roleofintellectuals, whoalmost bydefinition shouldperform the
primary function, as faras politics is concerned,of articulating reasoned
critiques-rather thandefenses-of socialinstitutions
andpractices.
Butthestatus ofFilipino which
intellectuals, reached itsnadirduring the
I950S, beganto change in thei960s. On theonehand,thegrowing com-
plexityofthegovernment, andthepublic's increasingneedforexplanations
ofthatcomplexity, led to a demand fortheintellectual'sinvolvement in
politics, orat leastin thepublicarena.On theother hand,theintellectuals
themselves begantoagreeonthenecessity as wellas thedesirability ofsuch
involvement. In largepartthisrecognition derived from, andin turncon-
tributed to,thegrowing acceptance within Filipinosociety oftheideaof
nationalism andof itsradical(especially in thePhilippine context) con-
comitants. Additionally, a consensus appeared tobe emerging amongintel-
lectuals on thevitalimportance of bridging thegap between themselves
andthemasses;according to thisview(whichalsohasbeenadvanced by
student leaders),theonlywaytomakenationalism effectiveis through a
reciprocal process whereby eachsector teaches,
andis taught by,theother.10
To whatextent didintellectualsinfluence thedevelopment ofFilipino
nationalism during theig6os?At thebroadest level,manyofthembegan
tofulfill therolenormally expected ofthem:notsimply politicalinvolve-
ment, butinvolvement basedon thorough-going analyses andcritiques of
society, frequently combined withproposals andsuggestions (utopian and
otherwise) onhowtogo aboutthetaskofchanging andreforming society.
In a lessdirect sense,intellectuals
(mainly university
professors) haveplayed
a crucial rolein fostering thekindofintellectual climate essential forthe
development of radicalideas,especially amongstudents. Finally, thereis
evidence thatintellectualsarebeginning to getinvolved in politicsin the
narrow senseof campaigns and elections,as wellas in suchotherfields

O. D. Corpuz,"Our Intellectuals:Askanceand Briefly," Critique,No. i (FebruaryI958),

pp. i ff.;J. Cabanos-Lava,"The Dilemma of the FilipinoIntellectual,"Comment(October
i956), pp. 67 ff.; J.M. Sison,"The Nationalistas PoliticalActivist,"
ProgressiveReview,No. io
(i967), pp. I ff.; I. Crisostomo,"The Frustrations of the Filipino Intellectual,"Graphic
(Decemberii, i968), pp. 26 if.
10P. Daroy, "Politicsand the Intellectuals," Politika,No. 2 (i965), pp. 38 ff.; Daroy,
"EditorialCommentary," Retort(Septemberi958), p. I; I. Crisostomo,"Should Intellectuals
Seek PoliticalPower?" Free Press (March 8, i969), pp. io if.; E. Ordofiez,"Note on Politika,"
Politika,No. i (i965), pp. i if.; Daroy,"The FilipinoIntellectualand the PoliticalSituation,"
Comment,No. 3 (1957), pp. 3 ff.; "The Mass Man: Revolutionary," Trends,Vol. 4 (July-
October i968), pp. 20 if.; R. Garcia, "Wanted: PatrioticIntellectualism," Trends, vol. 2
(August-October i966), pp. 82 ff.

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 Colonialism,
SocialStructure
andNationalism
as public administration, journalismand industry.11 Admittedlythis kind
of participation shouldnot be overemphasized, becauseas yetit has neither
reachedsignificant proportions thepoliticalprocessappreciably.
nor affected
Nonetheless, it is growing.
On theotherhand,intellectuals continueto be plaguedby variousprob-
lems,some old and some new. Perhaps the major one is a lack of unity.
This is not to implythatintellectuals can or shouldalwaysagreeon major
issues; but Filipino intellectualsare perhapsmore divided than those of
most developingcountries.They are splitby the dichotomybetweentheir
clericaland seculartraditions;by inabilityto agree on the kind of society
theywould like to have in thePhilippines,as well as on themeanswhereby
such a societycould be attained; and by failure to agree on whether
Americaninfluencein the countryshould be eradicatedor whethersome
Americanrole is a necessaryevil for economicdevelopment.Finally,in-
tellectualshave begun to recognizethat, the more deeply they become
involvedin politicsand public affairs,the more theylose the abilityto be
"intellectual.
For theseand otherreasons,intellectuals have not playedas importanta
role in the developmentof Filipino nationalismas one mighthave antic-
ipated from the record of intellectualselsewhere.Although intellectuals
comprisea relativelyhigh proportionof ideologicalnationalists, radically
inclinedintellectuals are onlya smallpercentageof theFilipinointelligentsia
generally.This situationhelps explainboth why Philippinenationalismin
the twentiethcenturyhas been basicallyof a moderatenature,and why
the leadershipof the resurgentnationalistmovementin the i96os appeared
to be in thehandschiefly of studentactivists.
In the Philippines,thoseelementsin favorof change and reformhave
appeared to be dominatedby studentgroups. This does not mean that
Filipino dissentis primarilythe preserveof the young; it merelysignifies
that,as elsewhere, olderindividualstendto be morecautiousand calculating,
with the resultthat the more aggressivestudentgroupsnormallycapture
theheadlines.Radical nationalists generally,
and studentleadersin particular,
stronglyemphasizethe role of the country'syouthin advocatingreform.
Accordingto these arguments,youthservesas the vanguard of the left
because no othersectorof societysees Philippineproblemsso clearlyand
is so strongly in favorof radicalchanges.In the opinionof some observers,
in fact,studentscomprisea new eliteemergingon thePhilippinescene.
This situationcontrastssharplywith that which prevailedbeforethe

11 See, e.g.,Y. Makabenta,"We Will Not Vote," Graphic(NovemberI5,

I967), pp. 28 ff.;
Makabenta,"Politicsand the FilipinoIntellectuals," Graphic(September28, i966), pp. i2 if.
12 L. Yabes, "Two Intellectual Traditions,"Diliman Review,Vol. ii (October i963), pp.
39I if.; Yabes, "Let's Build a ModernDemocraticState,"Horizons Unlimited,Vol. 7 (June
i968), pp. I3 if.; Daroy,"Politicsand theIntellectuals,"
op. cit.

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 PacificAffairs
i960S. In the i95os, forinstance, Filipinostudents werecharacterized by
apathytowardpoliticalissues.As bothcauseand effect of thissituation,
student groupsforthemostpartwereled by professional organizers who
werewillingto sell theirsupportto politicalpartiesand politicians, and
who did littlemorethan arrangeoccasionalconferences and seminars.
Whilea fewdemonstrations had occurred priorto the i96os, theywere
aimedat isolatedand unrelated matters, wereuncoordinated, and lacked
botheffective leadershipand ideologicalfoci.Thingsbegan to change
afteri960, however, as manifested primarily in thenatureand frequency
ofyouth-led demonstrations againstauthority,bothFilipinoand American.
The factthatsuchdemonstrations now are carriedout withconsiderable
forcefulness and determination-and oftenresultin violence-helps explain
whystudentgroupsdominateprotest movements in thePhilippines, and
whysuchactivities obscure theefforts
oflessradicalprotest organizations.'3
The first picketingof theAmerican Embassyin Manilaapparently oc-
curredas earlyas i957 (overan issuestillcontroversial today-thequestion
of criminal jurisdictionoverAmericanservicemen), buttheturning point
in studentprotestcame in a i96i demonstration againsta congressional
committee's investigationofcertain University ofthePhilippines professors
suspected ofbeingcommunists. In i963 thefirst CollegeStudent Conference
on Nationalism was held (at the University of the Philippines), and in
I964-i965, in reaction to the eventsmentioned in thefirstsectionabove,
camethefirst majorwaveofstudent demonstrations.'4
The spearhead ofthelatterdevelopment was an organization calledthe
KabataangMakabayan(K. M.), or Nationalist Youth,established in i964.
Sincethenmanyotherradicalstudent groupshavesprungup, butit was
chiefly theK. M. thatrevitalized Philippinestudent-youth activism, par-
ticularly in the use of the demonstration as a politicalweapon.In the
i960s theK. M. was in the forefront of numerous protests,
perhapsthe
mostnotablebeingthenearriotin Octoberi966at theManilaHotel,where
thethenUnitedStatesPresident, LyndonB. Johnson, was staying while
attending theManilaSummitConference on Vietnam.The K. M. claimed
in thei96os to havea membership of severalhundredactivists (centered
mainlyin theUniversity of thePhilippines and theLyceumof Manila)
andcontacts orchapters invirtually
alloftheprovinces.

13 See Y. Makabenta,"The Radical in PhilippineSociety,"Graphic(March I3, i968), pp.

28 ff.;P. Daroy, "Revoltfromthe Campus," Graphic(November20, i968), pp. 6o ff.; N.
Rosca, "The Youth Movementin Retrospect," Graphic(March 5, 1969), pp. 6 ff.;M. Sison,
"The Riseof StudentPower,"WeeklyNation(Februaryio, i969), pp. 2 ff.
14S. Mayuga, ". . . the Left May Find ItselfForced to Violence,"Graphic (March I3,
i968), pp. 25 ff.;A. Cruz, "A NaturalHistoryof our NationalistDemonstrations," Graphic
(February9, I966), pp. 20 ff.; F. Llaguno, "Events,"Politika,No. I (i965), pp. 24 ff.;
"Filipino Student NationalistDeclaration," ProgressiveReview (January-February i964),
Pp. 4I ff.

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 Social Structure
Colonialism, and Nationalism
How successful have student groupsbeenin achieving theirobjectives
thusfar? To answerthisrequiresa distinction betweenimmediate and
long-range goals.The short-run accomplishments cannotbe dissociated from
theimpactof demonstrations. In thisregard, therewas generalagreement
-prior to theviolence-prone protests of i969, i970 and I97i, at anyrate-
thatsuch activities on the wholewerebeneficial, in the sensethatthey
compellededucatorsto rethinkold dogmasand promptededucational
reforms of variouskinds(e.g.,alteredcurriculum requirements). On the
otherhand,thesereforms forthemostparthavenotextended beyondthe
realmof education, principally highereducation. This is notsurprising in
viewof thesourceof studentprotests, but otherareasof thePhilippine
educational system,perhapsevenmorein need of reform, have not yet
benefittedfromtheeffectsofdemonstrations.
The impactofstudent protest on politicsis muchmoredifficult todeter-
mine.Perhapstheonlythingthatcanbe saidwithcertainty is thatstudent
activismhas becomeinvolved in politics,
butin a negative fashion. During
the i969 presidentialelectioncampaign,for example,both presidential
candidatesaccusedeachotherof using,or plotting to use,student demon-
strationsforpoliticalreasons.But whatever theirpoliticalimpact,demon-
strationsserveseveralpurposes, suchas callingpublicattention to otherwise
unpublicized issuesandindicating toleadersofprotest movements theextent
of theirorganizational strength and masssupport. Thereis no question,
therefore, thatdemonstrations will continueto be employed, and will
increasein frequency andintensity.'5
Regardless of the uses and achievements of demonstrations, however,
thelong-run prospectsof student-youth groupsforsuccessare cloudedby
severalfactors.Anysuchsuccessdependson theunitythestudent organi-
zationscan achieve,and thefactthatthereare morethan36,oooschools,
colleges,anduniversitiesin thePhilippines, dispersed throughout theislands,
makesit almostimpossible to establisha singleunifiedstudent grouping.
On thecontrary, manysuchorganizations now exist;theirrelations often
have beencharacterized by power-struggles, whileattempts to consolidate
themthusfarhavefailed.Whatis more,thestudent groupsare divided
internally as wellas amongthemselves; thustheK. M. ranksin thei96os
weredividedovera number ofissues,including thenatureandroleoftheir
leadership.'
Perhapsa morebasicissueis thecharacter
ofFilipinoyouth,
shapedby
whatvirtually
allobservers
agreeis a highly
conformist
andfamily-dominated
15 See, e.g., Q. Ataviado,"ReformsTake Effect. . ." PhilippinePanorama (July6, i969),
pp. 4-5; Mayuga,op. cit.;Rosca,"The YouthMovementin Retrospect," op. cit.
16 Quijano de Manila,"The Nixons,"Free Press (August2,
i969), p. 4; A. Florendo,"The
Age of Juvenocracy," Mirror(Februaryi8, i967), pp. io ff.; M. Abesamis,"Proteston the
Campus,"Times Magazine (October27, i968), pp. 22 if.; J.Agcaoili,"Revolt19681" Trends,
Vol. 4, (July-October i968), pp. 33 ff.

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 PacificAfairs
culture, thenatureof whichhas beengreatly influenced by thecolonially-
imposedCatholicChurch.BecausePhilippine society fosterssubmission and
obedience, theaverageFilipinoyouthis notideologically oriented;Filipino
students longhavebeennotedfortheirpassivity and politicalapathy, their
mainconcerns beingcentered on theirimmediate friends and relations.Al-
thoughdemonstrations occur,onlya tinyminority of students areinvolved
andeventheleadersofyouthmovements frequently are attacked forbeing
subservient to politicians or "alien interests."This adversely affectsthe
attitudeof thepublicto studentgroups.Publichostility is further rein-
forcedby government efforts designedto de-fuse studentactivism on the
one handand to strengthen publicantipathy on theother(as in thecase
of claimsby militaryauthorities thatcapturedHuk documents prove
conclusively the existence of a directlink betweenthe K. M. and the
Communist Partyof thePhilippines).17
For theseand otherreasonsit appearedin thei96os thatstudent groups
weredestined, at leastin theforeseeable future,to be moresuccessful in
achieving piecemealreforms, primarily limitedto education, thanin pro-
motingthekindof wholesalepoliticalchangetheyclaimto seek.Yet by
thestartof thei97os, thatjudgment alreadyseemedto be outdated, fora
qualitative changeoccurred in thenatureof studentactivism, comparable
to thatwhichemergedduringi964-i965.This was reflected in a series
ofstudent demonstrations, unprecedented in intensity(including deathand
destruction) andin political impact;forexample, students,protesting in part
againstthe corruption thataccompanied the i969 presidential elections
earlyin i970, wrungfromPresident Ferdinand E. Marcostheassurance that
he wouldnotseeka constitutional amendment to permit himtorunforre-
electionin I973. On the otherhand,sincethe variouspost-i969 demon-
strations wereviolentenoughto provokemounting publicreaction against
thestudent movement, it maybe thatoverallstudent activism is no closer
to achieving itspoliticalgoalsthanit was in thei96os. Butanyconclusion
on thismusttakeintoaccountthe widercontextof the majorpolitical
developments of theig7osand theirlikelyimpactupontheprospects fora
revolutionary upheavalin thePhilippines.
It is evidentthattheprincipal problem confronting Philippine nationalism
is lackof unityamongitssupporters. This disunity existsbothwithinand
amongthemajorsectorsof societythatare potential contributors to the
nationalist movement. Such unityas existsis limitedmainlyto agreement
17 D. Feria, "The Youth as Innovator," Trends,Vol. 4 (July-October I968), pp. 86 if.; A.
Felix Jr.,"A New Elite," Graphic(March 27, i968), pp. 26 if.; M. Tagle, "The Youth as
Catalystof Mass Action,"Trends,Vol. 4 (July-October i968), pp. 97 if.; J. Lacaba, "Look
Out, Sirl . . ." Free Press (August i6, i969), pp. 9 if.; F. Reyes,"StudentPoliticiansTake
AfterElders,"PhilippinePanorama(August3, i969), pp. 6-7; Rosca, "The Youth Movement
in Retrospect,"op. cit. On the alleged Huk influence,see Manila Bulletin,Aug. i, i969,
pp. I, 3, and Daily Mirror,Aug. 23, i969, pp. I, 7.

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 Colonialism,Social Structure
and Nationalism
on goalsthatare difficult to achievein practice(how does one go about
developing a nationalidentity or a "Filipino"culture?),or is basedupon
fundamentally negativeattitudes (mostobviously thatof "anti-American-
ism.")
This is neither to denythatthenationalist causehas madeconsiderable
progress in recent years-both in termsoffostering thegrowth ofthespirit
of nationalism, and of specific accomplishments-nor to downgrade those
accomplishments. The pointis simplythatmuchremainsto be doneand
manyotherdifficult problems-aside fromlackofunity-must be overcome
beforethe nationalists can attaintheirgoals.The keyproblemremains
thatthepoliticalsystem is stillfirmly controlled by thetraditionalpower-
centers, and thatthusfarnationalism does notappearto be makingmuch
headwaytowarddislodging them.This was mostrecently demonstrated
bythei969 election campaign, in whichbothpresidential candidates(along
withmostoftheothernationalcandidates) wereviewedbyradicalnation-
alistsas beingindistinguishable in theirsupport ofthestatusquo.In addition,
manyof thepoliticalleaderswho espousethenationalist causeare clearly
opportunists not sincerely committed to that cause. Furthermore, the
nationalist recognition of theirpoliticalweaknessmanifests itselfin the
recurrent expression of the fearof possiblegovernment infringement of
civilliberties; thatis,themoresuccessful thenationalistsarein thepolitical
realm,thegreater thedangerthattherewillbe government actiondesigned
tothrottle sucha threat tothesystem.18
Meanwhile, theexistingnationalist "coalition" remainsweak and dis-
united.Otherthingsbeingequal it is notlikelyto alterthepoliticalsystem
on itsown,and thisraisesa basicquestionas to whether peacefulchangeis
at all possible, at leastfromthenationalist pointof view.Assumingthat
government repression does not occur,thepossibility of peacefulchange
probably will dependon threemainfactors: theabilityof thenationalists
to formulate an effectiveideologyto uniteradicalsand moderates as well
as to spearheadthe driveforreform;the futurerole of the peasantry;
and the courseof politicaldevelopments in the I970s. All of theseare
closelyrelated.The presenceof an attractive and workableideology, for
example, woulddo muchto enlistthesupport of thepeasantry (and urban
workingclass) behindthe nationalists, and thisin turnwouldmake it
muchmorelikelythatthe resultant alliancecould achievereforms by
working withintheexisting politicalsystem. Similarly,thechancesforthis

18 R. Constantino, "Ethics for Nationalists,"Graphic (March I3, i968), pp. 29 ff.; N.

Prudente,"All NationalistsMust Unite . . ." Trends,Vol. 2 (August-October i966), pp. 5
if.; J. A. Lansang, "Nationalismand Civil Liberties,"ProgressiveReview,No. i (May-June
i963), pp. 28 if.; Sison,"The Nationalistas PoliticalActivist,"op. cit.,p. i6; P. Daroy, "The
RevolutionComesto Town," Graphic(Oct. i6, x968), pp. 22 if.

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 PacificAffairs
happening will dependin largeparton thenatureof thepoliticalclimate
in thecomingyears.
Despitenationalists' recognitionof theneedforan ideology withbroad
appeal,and despitetheiremphasison gettingout and learningfrom(as
wellas teaching)themasses, thereis littlechancethatsuchan ideology can
be workedout in the immediatefuture.Not onlyare the nationalists
dividedamongthemselves butalso,iftheydo achieveideological agreement,
it willmostlikelybe on thebasisofessentially socialist
ideasand principles
that(howevervalidin thePhilippine context)havenotyetgainedgeneral
acceptance andprobably couldnotdoso fora decadeormore.'9
If thepreceding analysisis correct,thepeasantry willcontinue toremain
isolatedfromtheurbanleadersof thenationalist movement, although the
peasants mightstillattempt toalterthestatusquo byviolent means,motivated
either bya growing senseofnationalism or,morelikely, simplybya refusal
to acceptthemiserable conditionsunderwhichtheylive.Sucha possibility
is enhancedbothby thehistory of Philippine agrarianradicalism, and by
varioussociological studieswhichindicatea positivecorrelation between
ruralbackground and politicalalienation.20 This doesnotnecessarily mean
thattheruralsegment ofthepopulation, or portions thereof,
willattempt-
with or withoutthe supportof the urbannationalists-to changethe
statusquo by violence, northatsuchan attempt wouldsucceedin over-
throwing thepoliticalsystem. Whatis significant is thatdiscussionof the
revolutionarypotential in thecountryside has becomewidespread among
Filipinos.
To assessthe prospectsfora revolution in the Philippines,it is nec-
essaryto turnto thethirdfactormentioned above:politicaldevelopments
in thei97os.Threeimportant eventsscheduled forthefirsthalfofthedecade
willhavea critical
impactonpoliticsthroughout thei97os: theConstitutional
Convention thatbeginsin JuneI97I to evaluatethecountry's fundamental
law after25 yearsof experiencewithit as an independent nation(though
thedocument itself,
adoptedin themid-i930s, datesto thecolonialera);
the I973 presidential
election;and theexpiration in JulyI974 of thetwo

19See L. Yabes, "Plaridel as Intellectualand Writer,"Diliman Review,

Vol. ii (July
i963), p. 302; B. M. Muego, "A PoliticalIdeologyfor the Filipino,"Trends,Vol. 3 (July-
OctoberI967), pp. 67 ff.; J. M. Sison, "Youth on the March," Free Press (November 2,
I968), pp. i2 if.; N. Prudente,"Nationalismand the Economicsof Survival,"Trends,Vol. i
(November i965-Februaryi966), pp. 84 if.; A. Que, "Toward a WelfareState," Politika,
No. I (I965), pp. i6 if.; S. K. Roxas, "EconomicIdeologiesand Theories in the Current
PhilippineScene,"Comment, No. 5 (1958), pp. 3 ff.
20F. Araneta,"Are the Poor GettingPoorer?" Graphic(June 26, i968), pp. i6 if.; E.
Aldaba-Limet al., "A CursoryStudy of the Lapiang Malaya . . .," PhilippineSociological
Review,Vol. i5 (July-October I967), pp. i5i if.; S. H. Guerreroand G. T. Castillo,"A
Preliminary Studyon Alienation,"PhilippineSociologicalReview,Vol. I4 (April i966), pp.
85 if.

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 SocialStructure
Colonialism, andNationalism
primaryinfluences on Philippine-American economicand politicalrelations
sinceI946-the parityamendment tothePhilippineConstitution (whichgives
Americanbusinessmen equal rightswithFilipinos),and theLaurel-Langley
Trade Agreement.While a detailedanalysisof theseeventscannotbe given
here,some speculationon theirlikelyoutcomesis relevantto the question
of revolution.
First,barringa total (and unforeseen)reversalof Philippinepolitical
patterns,the i97i Constitutional Conventionprobablywill do littlein the
way of producing fundamentallegal revisionspromotingmeaningful
social change. Such alterationsas are made will probablybe limitedto
institutionalmatters,and in practicewill have no real impacton thestatus
quo. At best,theymightpromotetheillusionthatthe conventiondid enact
reforms,and this could temporarily bank the firesof unrestthat many
professto detectin the islands.Second,it is riskierto speculateabout the
I973 election,particularly in view of variousunprecedented elementsthat
will be involved,includingthefactthatit will be thefirstelectionin which
an incumbentPresidentwill not be seekingre-election. But the safestbet
is that it will be business(or ratherpolitics) as usual in I973, assuming
thattherehas been no drasticupheavalin the meantime,such as a strong
nationalistreactionto the resultsof the i97i convention.Third, a similar
conclusionapplies to the problemsraised by the expirationof parityand
the Laurel-LangleyAgreementin I974: the United Stateswill continueto
play therole of Scrooge,and thePhilippineleadersmay findit expedientto
succumbto Americanpressure,as theyhave so oftendone before.Even
if this does not happen, the American militarypresencein the islands
undoubtedly will remainand will continueto exacerbatenationalistsensibil-
ities.
Nevertheless,the possible illusion of constitutionalreforms,and the
noveltysurroundingthe i973 election,will probablyserve to delay any
immediatereaction.But when it becomesevidentthatnothingfundamental
has changed,and when this recognitionis reinforced by eventsconnected
withthetermination of parityand theLaurel-LangleyAgreement, national-
ist strength, and consequentlynationalistpressureon the politicalsystem,
will gain momentumonce again.The questionis whetherthisdissatisfaction
will buildup to revolutionary action.
During the i96os it becamecommonplaceforFilipinosof all ideological
hues and all walks of life-includingPresidentsand formerPresidents-
to discussthesubjectof revolution. To some,thisdevelopment was disquiet-
ing, particularly in a societythatis thoughtto have a democraticpolitical
systemand values that fosterconformity ratherthan dissent.Otherssaw
thisas a hopefulomen,notnecessarily becausetheyadvocatedviolentchange
but because they believed that growing awarenessof the potentialfor
revolutionmightat last promptthe country'spoliticalelites to carryout

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 PacificAgairs
much-neededreforms.And still otherswere skepticalthat change could
occurat all withoutat leasta minimaldegreeofviolence.
Many argumentshave been advanced,by scholarsand laymen alike,
for and against the propositionthat a revolutionis impendingin the
Philippines.-1An analysisof theseviews is beyondthe scope of thisarticle,
buttwopointsare worthnoting.
Those who believetherewill be a revolutionin thenear futuretendto
be "laymen" (i.e. not social scientists).Most social scientistsare foundin
the anti-revolution
camp and regardthe pro-revolution case as scientifically
unsound,since it tends to be based on speculationand intuitionrather
than on "hard" data producedby empiricalstudies.On the otherhand,no
one has deviseda foolproof scientific
methodforpredictingrevolutions, and
less "scientific"
approachesseem to indicatea seriouspotentialthreatto the
Philippinepoliticalsystem.
Second,theresurgence of nationalismin thei96os and theactivitiesof the
variousnationalistgroupsin that revivalhave been the principalreasons
for the newly awakened concernover the threatof revolution.It is also
worthnotingthatadvocacyof violenceto bringabout changeis spreading
among nationalistleaders.If social and economicconditionsremain un-
reformedthisfactwill help to promoteunitywithinthe ranksof the na-
tionalistsand theywill gain a wider body of supporters.There is little
doubt that nationalism,particularlythe radical variety,will become in-
creasinglyimportant as a politicalforceduringtheI970s. Thus thepossibility
of violentchange in the Philippines,though unlikelyin the immediate
future,cannotbe ruledout forthelongerrun.
The American
University,
Washington,
D. C.,May197I
21 Sison, "The Nationalistas Political
Activist,"op. cit.; E. Romero,"Reflections
on the
Revolutionto Come," Free Press (November23, i968), pp. io ff.; T. Sumaray,"There Will
Be No Revolution,"Free Press (October i9, i968), p. 22; Editorial,"Revolution,Anyone?"
Free Press (February8, i969), pp. i f.; R. E. Agpalo,"Revolutionand thePhilippinePolitical
System,"Solidarity,
Vol. 4 (Julyi969), pp. 64 ff.

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