transmissioncompany.

Eventhis purchasepricedoes notreflect The analysisaboveshows thatthe rootsof the currentfreefor

fully the actualcost of energy.This has historicallyled to the all statuscan be tracedto a varietyof factors- some linkedto
policy of delayingthe releaseof agricultureconnections.Thus the utility performanceand othersto the wider socio-political
currentlythe backlogfor agricultureconnectionsgoes back to environment.The frameworkfor interventionthat emerges is
almost 15 years.A farmerwho appliedfor an agriculturecon- holistic in natureand proposesinterventionsalong all aspects
nectionin 1990 is yet to get a connection.This situationbegan of the system- technical,commercial,social, and institutional.
to changewith the releaseof the new agriculturepolicy of the Perhapsthemostsalientrecommendation is thatlarge-scaletheft,
BJP governmentthatcame to power in the state in late 2003. the primarycause of high commerciallosses, cannotbe curbed
However,as explainedlater,even this is unlikely to do away unless the utilitiesdevise methodologiesto involve consumers
with the problem.This huge backlog contributesto theft by in distributionmanagementat the local level leadingto social
providinga moraljustification.Farmersbehindin the waiting vigilance.Theframeworkproposedis verymuchin keepingwith
list tap the lines directly. the recommendationsof the 'DistributionPolicy Committee
Poor and interrupted supply:Another method of controllingthe Report'by the ministryof power(MoP).The reportstressesthat
consumptionof electricityin agricultureis to limit the hoursof any solutionto India'sdistributionreformproblemsshouldbe
supply.Typicallyelectricsupplyto agriculturedoes not exceed multi-faceted,one that combines technicalinterventionswith
eight hoursat the maximum,duringseasons of peak demand. commercialpractices,corporategovernance,regulatoryreform,
Even this is subjectto frequentto breakdownsbecauseof the social marketing,policy reform,and politicalcommitment.
poorstateof the electricitynetwork.In such a scenario,farmers
tend to increasethe numberof pumpsets thus furtherloading V
thelinesandcontributingto thefailureof transformers. Theburn Recommendations andPolicyImplications
outrateof distributiontransformers in the areastudiedis as high
as 25 percent. The high incidenceof transformer bum out puts The analysisclearlyshows thatthe currentbreakdownof the
pressureon farmersandis exploitedby corruptutilityengineers systemcannotbe tackledthroughregularmeans.Thecurrentstate
to get commissions. resemblesa log jam which will need a big push to be cleared.
High tariffand entrycost: High costs, both at the entrylevel Italsoshowsthelimitationsof theapproachesadoptedby utilities
and in terms of regularelectricity bills, also lead to higher to controltheft.Theutilitiesareseekingto makethesystemtheft
incidenceof theft.Recentyearshave seen a gradualincreasein proof and tryingto create with heightenedvigilance.
domestictariff- variableas well as fixed. This trendhas been (1) Not possible to control theft in agriculture through a purely
accompaniedby an increasein domestic disconnections as poor technical approach:Thephenomenonof thefthas acquiredvery
householdsfind it difficult to pay high electricitybills, in the seriousproportions,comprisingthe majorcomponentof distri-
rangeof Rs 200 per monthor more. It needs to be noted that butionlosses. It is not possible to tackle the problemof theft
the corresponding expenditurefor poorhouseholdson domestic throughpurely technical means. Right now the utilities are
if
lighting they revertto keroseneuse is only Rs 20-25 permonth. undertaking a massiveFRPwith investmentsrunninginto hun-
However,the optionexercisedby most householdswho choose dredsof crores.The programmeseeks to tacklethe problemof
to get disconnectedis-toget eithera directtapora subconnection theft throughpurely technical means. It tries to make theft
from an existingconsumer.While tarifffor agricultureis low, impossibleby installinga system thatis theftproof.The study
the entrycost (the initialconnectioncharge)can be very high, questionsthisassumption.It says thatunlesstherootcausesthat
Thisalsodissuadingfarmersfromevenapplyingforaconnection. lead to theftin the firstplace areremoved,the problemwill not
The study revealsthat,of the potentialapplicants,only a few go away.
have appliedfor a connection. (2) Release of temporaryconnections: Looking at the situation
Collusionby sectionsof utilityemployees:Corruptionamongst prevailingin Pratapgarh REC(commerciallosses arefive times
a section of public employees is not very surprising.As said the technicallosses for the two feeders studied),the primary
earlier,theft in the area studied has a recent history.Utility strategyshouldbe to bringillegalconsumersinto the billingnet
employeeshave playeda crucialrole in promotingtheft. This by grantingthemtemporaryconnections.Thegrantof temporary
is truefor mostareaswhereknowledgeableobserverswill point connectionsis the main demandraisedin the area.Once this
outtheroleplayedbyspecificutilityemployeesininstitutionalising is met, it will remove the majorjustificationfor theft.
a cultureof theft. The utility employees, in fact, have created While the new connectionpolicy of the state acceleratesthe
a virtue of the currentbreakdownof normalfunctioningby releaseof connections,this is not likely to bringabouta change
charginga commissionfor releasingtransformers. The farmers in the immediatefuture.The reasonis that(i) It will takefour
whooperateelectricpumpsetsillegallypaya regularcommission years for the waiting list to be cleared. (ii) The minimum
to the local line man. paymentof Rs 25,000 is an entrybarrierfor the small farmers.
Overallenvironment wherecorneringofpublicgoodsforprivate (iii) Onlya smallproportionof potentialconnectionholderswho
ends(especiallyby thepowerful)is the norm:The all pervasive are tappingthe line illegally have their names on the current
atmosphereof corruptionprovidesa justificationfor electricity waitinglist.
theft. It is commonto hearrejoindersthatall indulgein theft, Utility engineers have traditionallyopposed the release of
includingthe big and respectedindustrialists.While theft is agricultureconnectionson a temporarybasis consideringthem
indulgedinbyall,therichfarmerclass derivesmaximumadvantage to be not technicallyfeasible. Similarlythereis oppositionto
for the simple reasonthat it has the maximumaccess to land. theregularisation of existingillegalconnectionsdue to the logic
Theirdisproportionate access to landis furtherstrengthenedby thatthereis notenoughelectricityavailableforanindiscriminate
theirunequalaccess to water.Thusrichfarmersown landswith release of agricultureconnections.The study findings reveal
maximumwater. thatregularisationof existing connectionswill not lead to any

Economic and Political Weekly February 12, 2005 647

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significantincreasein electricitysupply as these farmersare operation which in turn depends upon the water availability in
alreadyhookedon to the system. It is a win-win situationfor the region.
the utility. (5) Need for study in other regions: A major problem in the
(3) Conversion of flat rate into meter: The study points out
thattheRERCdirectiveto convertflatrateconnectionsintometer
connectionshas led to an increasein distributionlosses in the
region,aswherefarmerswillinglygottheirconnectionsconverted
into meterones andthenproceededto bypasstheirmeters.One
reasonwhy the RegulatoryCommissionshave disallowedthe
flat rate system is that distributionutilities were using this to
hide theirlosses. One solutionto this problemlies in allowing
the flat rate system to continueand install metersonly to find
out actualconsumption,which can be used for the calculation
of actual losses in the system. Completely disallowing the
practiceof flat ratetariffis akin to throwingout the babywith
the bath water.
(4) Region (agro climatic) specific commercial policy: The
studypointsto the need for havingregionspecific commercial
policies.As of now thereis one commercialpolicyfor thewhole
stateof Rajasthan.Thereare two aspectsof commercialpolicy
thatvary with changesin geographicalfeatures.These are the
initialchargesforanagricultureconnection,calleddemandnote,
and the tarifffor flat rate connections.Both these aspectsare
verycritical.The initialchargevarieswith the numberof poles
neededand the installedcapacityfor which the connectionis
sought.Theinstalledcapacitywill varywiththeirrigationsource.
It will be low forshallowwell areasandhighfordeepborewells.
The tariff for the flat rate depends on the averagehours of
electricity sector is the lack of qualitative information. There are
simply no reliable figures that can pinpoint the causes of high
losses at various stages. The study investigated the system in one
region of Rajasthan. There is a need for similar studies in other
major agro climatic regions of Rajasthan. BI
Address for correspondence:
sudrak@sancharet.in
Notes
1 Subdivision is the basic unit of operation in electricity distribution
covering a geographicalarea that can be as large as 100 villages or even
more depending upon the consumer density in the area.
2 Distribution losses are divided into two categories - technical and
commercial. Technical losses as the name suggests are losses caused
because of technical reasons. Commerciallosses, on the other hand are
those caused by human agency.
3 Flat rate category consumers are not metered and charged on the basis
of an assumed average consumption per month.
4 Distributionlosses are negligible for this category of consumers.
References
CI(2002): India Electricity Distribution Reform:ReviewandAssessment,
CORE International, Incorporated, Washington, DC, September 18.
Dixit, ShantanuandGirishSant(1997): 'How ReliableareAgriculturePower
Use Data?, Economic and Political Weekly,April 12, pp 754-55.

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Research Training Programme 2005-06

The Centrefor Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta,invites applicationsfor its Research

TrainingProgramme in History, Economics, Political Science, Geography, Sociology,
SocialAnthropologyandCulturalStudies.The programmewhich will runfromAugust2005
to June 2006 is meant for research students in India and the countries of the South in the

early stages of their doctoral work. Applications are invited from research students below
the age of 30 years with a post-graduatedegree in any branchof the social sciences with at
least 50% marksor B+ on an eight point scale. The detailedprospectusis availablefrom
the Administrative Officer, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, R-1,
BaishnabghataPatuli Township, Kolkata- 700 094, India, email: cssscal@vsnl.net,or
on the website www.cssscal.org. Last date for receipt of applicationsfrom international
participantsis 31 March, 2005 and for studentsfrom India 15 June, 2005.

648 Economic and Political Weekly February 12, 2005

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