Robert B. Sklaroff, M.D., F.A.C.P.

Medical Oncology/Hematology  Telephone: (215) 333-4900

Smylie Times Building - Suite #500-C  Facsimile: (215) 333-2023
8001 Roosevelt Boulevard  rsklaroff@gmail.com
Philadelphia, PA 19152-3041 August 31, 2021 – Afghanistan Day

To: Distribution [Politicians, Media, Potentially-Interested Persons]

Re: Pennsylvania “Forensic Audit” of 2020 POTUS Election [PART LXXXIII] – Suggested Subpoenae
{}

During today’s fascinating Zoom-AVA call (the content of which remains confidential), I was asked
to “transmute” the four memos elucidating desirable testimony distributed last week [LXXIII - (A);
LXXIV - (B); LXXV - (C); and LXXVI - (D)] into a format that the Senate Intergovernmental Operations
Committee could most easily appreciate; it is noted that “No meetings scheduled at this time”
via its website and, of course, the proposed portal for public submissions has yet to materialize.
I’d felt that the queries could easily be derivative of what had been composed, based upon the
State Government Committee hearings; nevertheless, this memo will honor this “suggestion.”

AGAIN, what must be emphasized is the fact that the goal is to BUILD UPON the extant-data
RATHER THAN to create a de novo submission; thus, not only must these requests be directed at
the counties, but they must also be directed at specific people; we leaned in the Georgia cases
that the Court may force specifically naming people responsible for what institutions had done
and, therefore, for the sake of efficiency, the initial submission should encompass both pathways.

Memo LXXIII - (A) - Philly

Raw data summarized on Memo XXXI {https://tinyurl.com/vf2smw8k} serves as the basis for the
need to subpoena key members of the Philly government, to be expanded by review of affidavits
filed by citizens who were blocked by the police and sheriff from oversighting the vote tabulation.
They must include the three Commissioners and Seth Bluestein, Chief Deputy Commissioner and
Chief Integrity Officer of the City of Philadelphia. Senate State Government Committee hearings
weren’t transcribed, but the videos are damning, particularly when meshed with House hearings
[vide infra] which were transcribed; note inherent contradictions uttered under oath:

The Senate [https://tinyurl.com/rp7awr47] hearings won’t be transcribed and its

audio is faint, but confessions by two Philadelphia City Commissioners
[https://tinyurl.com/y2wt5cx3], Chairwoman Deeley [D] and Vice Chairman
Schmidt [“R”] confirm that observers were “set up” (no pun intended) to be
distant from the tabulators because of “health and safety” considerations
[@ minute-42] and that everything done was consistent with precedent and law
[@ minute-44]; that Deeley’s admitted deviation rationale proved the procedure
was inconsistent with precedent created a contradiction apparently lost on
listeners, but prove absence of “meaningful oversight.”

Here are excerpts from the rendition of the Philly testimony focused on the oversight issue,
noting that there was additional discussion of other issues such as satellite offices; the latter must
not be ignored, for the need to ensure oversight thereof seems to have been ignored, along with
the chain-of-custody concerns associated with the infamous “3 a.m. Biden spike.”
1
 Seth Bluestein [representing the three City Commissioners] was queried on why
poll observers were denied “meaningful observation” of the tabulation process;
he claimed, “activities were clearly visible the entire time for every observer who
wished to observe them.” The grist of the colloquy was brief exploration of the
“distinction with a difference” between simple and meaningful visibility:

REPRESENTATIVE DIAMOND: Okay. And clearly visible is

different than actual meaningful observation. I mean, for
example, you said the person looking at the envelope is looking
at the information on the envelope. Do you think, is it your
opinion that someone who is an official poll observer should be
able to actually read that same information and you’d have a
Republican and a Democrat who could both be watching that at
the same time and confirm that that person who’s actually
employed there to do that job is actually doing the job
correctly? I mean, would that fit in with meaningful observation
to you, or would it be okay to be able to see, you know, 30 feet
across the room that, okay, that’s the job somebody’s doing?
Or should they be able to see the detail of what that job
encompasses?

MR. BLUESTEIN: Sure, yes, no, like I said, it’s a good question. The
past practice has been that that’s never been the case. I think
it’s a reasonable definition of meaningful observation if the
legislature chose to do so, but I ’m not aware of any instance in
Philadelphia for sure and possibly throughout the Common-
wealth where the activity you’re describing has occurred.

Attendees of the election-symposium held @ the PA Leadership Conference said they had filed
affidavits claiming inability to have been able to read the ballots as they were being adjudicated;
for example, one person told me that, after a judicial order was issued that they should be placed
six feet closer to the tables, the tables were moved to be six feet further away from observers.

Seth Bluestein had acknowledged there had been “a pause of a few hours from processing while
we rearranged how closely observers were to the process, but nothing was shut down”; he
claimed all observers had been allowed access, defined as “were always present” as in the past,
and that “meaningful observation” was manifest despite inability of observers to read the ballot
that a poll worker is processing. (“All those activities were clearly visible for the entire time for
every observer who wished to observe them.”) When confronted with the observation that
“clearly visible is different than actual meaningful observation,” he incredulously asserted “the
past practice has been that that’s never been the case” and claimed ignorance “of any instance
in Philadelphia for sure and possibly throughout the Commonwealth where the activity you’re
describing has occurred.” Anyone who has served as a Judge of Elections and/or a poll-watcher
would know that this claim is deceitfully obfuscatory and constitutes an overt cover-up. Indeed,
multiple testifiers acknowledged this perspective, which is ensconced in Colorado law because
election observers (watchers) are an additional layer that can witness and verify to the public.

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 Watchers must be permitted access that would allow them to attest to the
accuracy of election-related activities. This includes personal visual access at a
reasonable proximity to read documents, writings or electronic screens and
reasonable proximity to hear election-related discussions between election
judges and electors. (a) Election activities include: (4) Signature verification of
mail ballot envelopes at close enough distance to challenge the signature [and]
(6) Ballot tabulation. [Here, if the observer can’t observe, there is no observing!]

On the basis of this information, not only should the affidavits filed with other entities (such as
when the SCOTUS case was filed in December) be reviewed (one hopes, containing the names of
the city personnel who blocked the Republicans), but also all city officials involved must be
served with queries related to involvement in this escapade; my observation to the “Zoomers”
this-a.m. was that, although Detroit’s officials used plywood to block oversight, in Philly, the need
for binoculars seemed to emerge. The absurdity of this scenario illustrates the need to probe how
Philly officials did/didn’t comply with overarching needs for Republicans to watch tabulators;
this would entail serving all three Commissioners, plus Mr. Bluestein as Chief Integrity Officer,
plus all officials in the leadership of the Sheriff/Police departments and whomever was on-site.

All must be queried as to their roles in what transpired, including initial lockouts to subsequent
distancing, as was elucidated at the Four Seasons Total Landscaping in NE-Philly by Rudy, et al.
Assuredly, acquiring input from “America’s Mayor” would serve to amplify subpoenae specificity.
Experts in writing dozens of questions based upon these concepts/observations are empowered.

Memo LXXIV - (B) - Auditor General

Newly-elected Auditor General Timothy DeFoor reported on a 2019 report composed by his
predecessor; it had been composed by a Dem, and its summary lambasted the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, also a Dem. It did not a review voting machines or counting of votes; it was a
retrospective post-election SURE audit that examined the voter registration system. Each facet
of its overview must be scrutinized so as to probe whether ANY of the defects in the system had
been corrected; for example, it stated the Department of State planned to replace the SURE
system in 2019 and, thus, why this hadn’t occurred two years hence must be probed by querying
all 16 (sixteen) Commonwealth officials to whom it had been sent (see last page). Whether any
of its 50 (fifty) recommendations had been addressed must also be assessed; this conceptual
distillation dramatizes the pervasiveness and profundity of the electoral defects distilled in this
“Performance Audit,” and all executive-branch individuals had a potential role in this task:

•Weaknesses in the voter registration application process and the maintenance

of voter records in the SURE system had resulted in instances of potentially
inaccurate voter record information.
•Data analysis had identified tens of thousands of potential duplicate and
inaccurate voter records.
•The necessity for the Department of State to continue to implement leading
information technology security practices and information technology controls to
protect the SURE system and ensure the reliability of voter registration records.
•The view that incorporating edit checks and other improvements into the design
of SURE’s replacement system will reduce data errors and improve accuracy.

3
Yellow Book auditing standards were applied despite the inability to review a sufficient number
of source documents; 70% of the voter records weren’t verified due to lack of cooperation and
failure to provide “necessary information from the Department of State, PennDOT, and selected
county election offices, specifically, denial of access to critical documents or excessive redaction.”
Amazingly, “there is no accountability for people when they refuse to participate.”

That “Incorporating edit checks and other improvements into the design of the replacement
system for SURE would reduce data error records and improve accuracy” suggests that the SURE
system had data errors and inaccuracies. Rep. Ryan noted three audit objectives couldn't be
completed and that the “Auditor General was not able to conclude that there was reasonable
assurance that the SURE system is secure and that the Pennsylvania voter registration records
are complete, accurate, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.” Submitting
affidavits didn’t supplant ability “to review system settings ourselves or reviewing documents.”

Forgotten is the fact that the Pennsylvania House approved auditing the 2020 election, citing
inconsistencies and confusion in the electorate; the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee
(bipartisan, with members from both House and Senate) was to oversee a “risk-limiting” audit.
An outside contractor could be hired to do the work. [https://tinyurl.com/btswt5] {Results???}

{When I spoke briefly to DeFoor in Bradford, during a sprinkle (I asked him to “step into my private
office” under a tent), he disclaimed interest in conducting an audit because he said his office
lacked subpoena power; he said he’s support others doing so, yielding the possibility that he may
be invoked to facilitate what is now planned. Subsequently, publicly, he reiterated disinterest,
and this actually helped discount the then-pending SB528 (which would have asked him to do it);
Mastriano also discounted it, because he didn’t trust that DeFoor would abide by what he’d seen
in Maracopa. Thus, I concluded DeFoor could become involved in the process, albeit adroitly.}

An effective Pennsylvania audit process would combine aspects of Arizona’s Hand Count Audit
[https://tinyurl.com/ywus6rbh] with Michigan’s procedural audit, which necessitates greater
county-level uniformity and flexibility [https://tinyurl.com/c68cftbs]. Thus, I conclude here that
any type of audit/investigation should encompass these two prongs, noting results and process.
To accomplish this, it will first be necessary to probe the origins, for example, of Ms. Boockvar’s
intransigence; it will then be possible to explore why audit results were overtly ignored.

Memo LXXV - (C) - Boockvar’s Department of State

Rep. Grove, the Chair, cited the legislature’s oversight responsibility, but recognition of error
must yield commensurate intervention if “due diligence” reveals failure to “provide our residents
with the best election process which conforms to our constitutional requirements, is transparent,
has integrity, and is accessible.” Also, the Chair noted that the state constitution expressly
mandates uniformity in our election laws [Article VII, Section 6], apparently perceived as a
fungible concept by (then) Secretary of State Kathy Boockvar; she defined “Election Guidance” as
“a mix of what’s uniform and what’s discretionary.” In contrast with diversity, state rules that are
uniform include “deadlines for voter registration [and for] absentee mail-in ballots.” Yet, even
this wasn’t automatically “directory” because there is no “process to evaluate Guidance.”

4
Boockvar said one Directive advised providing “information to party and candidate
representatives during the pre-canvass and canvass periods that identifies voters whose ballots
have been rejected” to ensure counties manifest transparency; authorized representatives,
people in attendance would have the opportunity to know why a ballot is being set aside. Yet,
the Department did not provide any specific guidance on curing ballots; this “new information”
was shocking personally, for I had never previously heard of public notice of such a forum:

Boockvar said, “Third-party notification [is now] authorized under Pennsylvania’s

Election Code” because “it’s the duty of the County Board of Elections in an open
meeting to provide information about decisions that it’s making on the validity of
individual voter ballots [because this also would be] within the discretion of the
County Board of Elections.” She felt that “the Election Code [hadn’t] anticipated
that decisions about individual ballots during an open meeting would be kept a
secret”; further, the Election Code may lack a specific citation to justify third-party
involvement, but there is no provision that prohibits “giving the county a duty to
be open and transparent about the decisions that it’s making on individual
ballots.” After she said, “ballots must be signed, dated, and something else,” she
admitted that this hadn’t become “Guidance” and that there was no “specific
regulatory authority in most of the election realm.” She concluded “I don’t think
there can be flexibility,” probably because she desires less variation among
counties in terms of how they handle voters who haven’t done everything needed
to have their ballot count.

When confronted with the observation that “The way counties dealt with mail-in ballots differed
substantially because only some voters in the county are notified prior to election day or only
some counties in Pennsylvania provide this notice,” she denied this created a 14th Amendment
concern as well as uniformity concern under Article 7, Section 6, of the Pennsylvania Constitution
because she claimed federal/state courts had ruled otherwise, honoring local authority. Indeed,
when a Rep. said constituents couldn’t fix ballots, she said counties were to exercise “discretion.”

Periodically, when challenged, reference was made to supportive decisions by the Democrat-
controlled PA Supreme Court, to wit: “ballots could be counted” after November 3rd through
November 6th,” and “We saw very, very few election contests or petitions for recount” despite
multiple challenges because “unfounded allegations [were] thrown out [because t]here was no
evidence.” Ignored was the fact that there hadn’t been an opportunity to present evidence in a
judicial/legislative setting. Also, unexplained were discrepancies between “the official numbers
that they said that they certified versus what the Department of State had on the website.”

{I was unable to review all e-mails that had provided Guidance, documents on election machine
certification, and a list of all complaints filed with the Department of State; data satisfying pledges
honored to provide follow-up information were not uploaded to the WWW. These omissions are
manifest in testimony/supplements, for they are homologous; they also should be subpoenaed.}

The fundamental issue with Ms. Boockvar’s professional activities was the issue of whether they
complied with the “Equal Protection” lingo in the PA Constitution; each potential defect supra
must be explored to dramatize how she corrupted Act 77 when revealing her Dem-biases.

5
 Memo LXXV - (C) - SURE [“Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors”] Nightmares

The SURE system stores data provided inter alia by counties after confirmation of qualifications.
Cited was “ID PA OVR specification version 1.5, the Web API specification 3/5/3000 document”
that stated, “posted entries would be granted access and authority not only to create voter
registrations but also to submit mail-in ballot applications and permanent mailing list
selection.” There were minimal if any audits of employees entering data. It is this type of laxity
that was condemned by Lt. Col. Shaffer as a potential cybersecurity vulnerability [vide infra].
Boockvar must be asked to cite the authority that allowed her to issue this Directive.

The post-election SURE audit (not of machines/tabulation) found that weaknesses in the voter
registration application process and the maintenance of voter records had resulted in instances
of potentially inaccurate voter record information [vide supra]. Data analysis had identified tens
of thousands of potential duplicate and inaccurate voter records. It was advised that the
Department of State implement leading information technology security practices and
information technology controls to protect the SURE system and to ensure the reliability of voter
registration records. It was advised that edit checks and other improvements be incorporated
into the design of SURE’s replacement system to reduce data errors and improve accuracy. That
this necessity was concluded yields the inescapable conclusion that errors in the SURE system
had poisoned the 2020 election; despite provision of missing information by voters; no testifier
had been able to conclude that a definitive, accurate tabulation could be identified.

Concerns arose also related inter alia to downtime, printing, alternate address, blank precinct
voters, disappearing batches, imported batches [“it’s not necessarily that the information is
incomplete, but it’s not completely accurate”], system reboots, and pending labels; in fact,
“a lot of unnecessary work [emerged because] ‘Permanent’ records in the SURE system were not
generating labels for the voter even though we had their application from the Spring Primary and
the voter had selected ‘Annual Mail In Ballot Request.’ [As a result,] We went through pages of
records to try to make sure those who had selected this did indeed have labels and the mail in
ballot sent to them. It was random and unexplainable.” Statewide implications of these
anomalies were profound and also “unexplainable.”

Timothy Benyo said such aberrations occurred because “the SURE technology is a band-aid on
changes that needed to happen to the system because of legislation and changes in the
environment of the voting process.” Michael L. Anderson corroborated the prior sentiments by
noting “frustration with the SURE system” is based on its being slow and working incorrectly; also,
a living voter had been rejected as deceased probably due to “a user error [where] they probably
matched to the wrong record and they marked the wrong individual deceased.” This is why he
had “used a mail house for the first time for this past election, and so we were guesstimating
when we thought they were going to be able to print everything and fulfill it.”

Witnesses and representatives noted confusion that could not be rectified with any consistency,
compounded by inconsistency within the system itself; voters Westmoreland County were listed
multiple times and then, during the mail-in ballot process, they were received as multiple votes
that “pinking” hadn’t been filtered out by, a critical step in ensuring voters hadn’t voted twice:

6
 When you sign in at your polling place, the electronic or paper pollbooks have a
barcode next your name; it correlates with your name and your record. After an
election with a paper system, the SURE system mandates using a small handheld
scanner to go page-by-page through every pollbook, and bink. That person then
gets credit for having voted. Electronic systems obviate binking.

Notwithstanding U.S.P.S. delays, people getting text files of the amount of ballots requested day
by day were confused because they found that “one day it would be one number, and then the
next day it would actually come down in terms of the number of ballots requested.” In multiple
counties (Lancaster, Lebanon, Lehigh), “when an individual moved from one address to another
address within their county, the mailing label within the SURE system did not update.”

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a security tip stating, “Voter
registration databases are rich targets and maybe an attractive target for computer intrusions.”
Claims that breaches are caught on the county-level were countered by citing just-delivered
testimony by County Commissioners that noted “significant confusion about voters who stated
they’ve moved in an area and how these batches go.” Problems with the helpdesk were
identified, sometimes ascribed to insufficient training. And these issues persisted despite the
ability to block multiple-state voting by invoking the National Change of Address program and the
Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC). Inactive voters are supposedly identified after
a half-decade absence followed by two more general elections, but J. Christian Adams had to
sue PA because of its retention of deceased individuals on the voting rolls.

Recall the Auditor General Report [vide supra] didn’t satisfy three audit objectives and that the
“Auditor General was not able to conclude that there was reasonable assurance that the SURE
system is secure and that the Pennsylvania voter registration records are complete, accurate, and
in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.” Submitting affidavits didn’t supplant ability
“to review system settings ourselves or reviewing documents.” The bases for this report merit
probing, particularly because it doesn’t seem the 50 recommendations therein were honored.

Everyone involved in the SURE system—which is to be replaced—must be grilled as to why

awareness of the multitude of deficiencies therein hadn’t been addressed. This probe must
include communications, particularly e-mails, to determine the origin[s] of such intransigence.

Memo LXXVI - (D) - Mail-in and absentee ballots

People who apply for an absentee or mail-in ballot through the county are sent a ballot with a
unique identification number that is tied directly to the voter registration record, to the specified
address; people who affirm having neither a driver’s license nor a Social Security number will be
issued a ballot. It’s unclear how the former cannot be easily supplanted by a PennDOT ID and it’s
unclear how an individual can be a citizen without the latter. In any case, for that ballot to be
counted, an alternate form of identification must be provided, such as a government photo ID or
some forms of non-photo ID (confirming the address) such as a utility bill. In any case, every state
with Photo-ID has adopted these common-sense alternatives, available gratis.

7
People who want to determine if a ballot had been requested in their names could go onto the
Department of State website and search by their names and perhaps date of birth; this is “new
information” to me and, undoubtedly, to most everyone. There is no recourse they might have if
they discover their “votes” have been filed prior to election day, 100% fraudulently. Despite these
obvious flaws, mail-in/absentee ballots are entrenched in PA and nationally; the no-excuse
request procedure should be eliminated along with pre-canvassing, both “fraud invitations.”

Thad Hall detailed multiple categories of defects experienced in 2020 with regard specifically
to mail-in/absentee voting, emphasizing that “most of the work for the election flowed through
a system built in the last 1990s/early 2000s (SURE) and not designed for the task.” A lack of
uniformity of some dates and an overlapping of processes in certain areas made mail-in voting
complicated [e.g., mailing out ballots, ballot request deadlines, overlapping ballot
mailing/registration deadlines, and conflicts with third-party filing and challenge deadlines].

Other defects relate to the current pre-canvass period for mail-in ballots, logic and accuracy
testing of the tabulation equipment used to count mail-in ballots prior to mailing out ballots,
returning ballots, cumbersome in-person mail-in voting, drop boxes and satellite locations,
permanent mail-in and absentee voters, third-party mailings, and signature verification.
Attached to the written testimony were a dozen specific bullet-points detailing the impact of
deficiencies; clearly, such problems adversely affected the veracity of 2020 data profoundly.

Drop-boxes render moot the mandates personally experienced regarding affirmation that an
individual returning a ballot was indeed the voter and/or functioning on a disabled voter’s behalf;
they must be secure and dispersed uniformly across a jurisdiction, for the absence of such
safeguards (plus no signature-verification) would yield the potential for fraud. Recognized is the
complexity of detecting/tracking people crossing state lines, moving from one state to another,
because input from other states is received periodically rather than regularly. Finally, Ed Allison
claimed satellite offices are expensive and not authorized by statute.

Ensuring mail-in/absentee ballots be assessed also at the precinct-level will undermine any
double-franchise (purposeful or accidental), maximizing empowerment of local officials; review
of how they were requested/granted by the counties interacting with the state is needed. Thus,
whatever impact these loose tabulation processes may have had merits acquisition of critique
via any number of officials, for the aforementioned issues of uniformity have been eviscerated.

Memo LXXVI - (D) - Photo-ID and Signature Verification

The underlying force animating the “access vs. integrity” dynamic is Photo-ID; the Chair cited a
recent study showing that this version of Voter-ID—no matter how strict—hadn’t shown
disproportionate individuals not being able to vote and had actually increased voter turnout.
Curiously, recalling the adage that a politician might oppose an idea before supporting it,
opposition to this procedure was voiced by the Democrat Minority-Chair claiming such laws are
discriminatory despite having previously praised accepting “government letters, utility bills,
government program statements, and other kinds of identifying information that will allow a wide
berth of people to be able to access the voter rolls.” The pro/con arguments are well-known.

8
Some witnesses felt signature verification shouldn’t be provided by human beings who aren’t
specifically trained to do that, particularly absent supportive software; this assertion contravenes
personal experience validated over the decades when conflict can ultimately be rectified by a
Commonwealth Court judge (if parties maintain disagreement). Having been on both “sides” of
petition challenges, I have noted concurrence emerges routinely; no special training is needed.
Classically, proper procedure has been to cover the signature in the registration book (upside
down from the clerk) and then to compare old/new versions; this is why online registration data
exclude signatures, precluding the ability of a stranger to learn how to mirror a signature.

Pam Anderson emphasized Colorado’s “election integrity and security are in the ballot envelope
and signature verification”; permitted are a certain amount of automatic (software) and manual
verification. Only early in-person ballots are processed daily; if a voter’s ballot is rejected for any
reason, he/she must have an opportunity to cure the issue(s) within 8 days after Election Day.
Bipartisanship reigns; no single person views an unfolded ballot and envelope with voter data.
And signature verification is facilitated when the current signature is compared with the one that
had been provided most recently, rather than relying upon initial registration forms (precluding
concern that a signature might evolve dramatically over the decades). Threaded throughout this
quality written/oral input was how this ecosystem combines people, law and technology.

In Pennsylvania, signature-verification is routine when processing mail-in ballot applications, for

“the signature that’s on the application is compared with voter registration signature.” Claiming
this occurred also merits confirmation via an audit, noting erratic “curing” initiatives.

Memo LXXVI - (D) - Voting machines (certification, operation, contracted vendors)

The 10/13/2020 document Guidance on Electronic Voting System Preparation and Security states:
“Counties should maintain a robust chain of custody protocol that documents access to all
components of the system including the county computers and the warehouse storing the voting
systems.” Yet, there isn’t 24-hour video surveillance of certified machines in all counties and
pivotal in post-election analysis is whether chain of custody mandates have been honored
regarding all submitted ballots (before/during/after being processed through machines). This is
why the absence of true observers in Philadelphia is the overarching theme of this memo;
tangential is the fact that Penetration Testing is mandated to optimize security.

Judging from the aggregate testimony by government officials, it seems the Dominion voting
machine would not be able to wreak havoc in Pennsylvania; it’s one of two main certified venders
(the other is ES&S), although the number of counties employing them wasn’t specified. It seems
the Global system became Diebold which, when sold to ES&S, divested 50% of itself to Dominion.
Jonathan Marks quoted the Department of State’s PA Voting System Security Standard:

No components of the voting machine shall be connected to any modem or

network interface, including the Internet, at any time, except in a standalone
wired local area network configuration in which all connected devices are
certified voting components. Transmission of unofficial results can be
accomplished by writing results to media, and moving the media to a different
computer that may be connected only to a closed network (i.e., the voting system
uses air-gapped computer networks that necessarily isn’t connected to anything
else or any other electronic computer).

9
Timothy A. Benyo also emphasized the disconnect between voting machines and tabulators, a
narrative that is also consistent with my recollections as a Judge of Elections; we submitted a gray
disc from each voting machine inter alia, and there seemed to be no other type of interface:

Most of the devices are never connected to the Internet; computers that upload
results are not connected to the voting system itself. Electronic poll books are the
only one that uses a web-based connection to load the poll books. The other parts
of the voting system are the precinct scanners. They are your central tabulating
and scanning systems and your electionware, the software that runs the whole
system, the database for collecting all the votes and tabulating them. These
machines are never on the Internet. They have no means to go on the Internet.
it’s a completely stand-alone system, and the only way to transfer data from the
electionware system is to physically and, quoting in very old terms, “sneakernet”
your results from a drive to a computer off of this centralized network to a
computer that has Internet access that can load stuff to your website or to the
Department of State.

All of these reassurances have been countered during conversations with Dr. Frank and, thus,
conveying questions from this Ph.D. who has explicitly scrutinized PA would be highly desirable;
essentially, he claims (and the Dominion Guidebook confirms) the capacity for INTERMITTENT
connections to the Internet are built into the machines, as per his multiple lectures (including
those delivered @ the Third Constitutional Convention in Philly on 7/6/2021 and for Lindell). Also,
county-level tabulation machines must be probed, mutually exclusive of those in precincts.

Memo LXXVI - (D) - Security Concerns

Election offices were flooded with calls because various interest groups were mailing documents
to people that resembled government mailers; also, people would present documents that
resembled applications or were applications that had already been populated and had been sent
to them by third-party organizations employing public databases. Recalling the fact that Boockvar
countenanced such disclosures as a manifestation of transparency, it is clear that it’s necessary
to step away from a system that allows for third-party vote harvesting; indeed, when the voter
has permitted this level of access to the system, it isn’t difficult to imagine that such permission
might live in perpetuity, granted and never rescinded. Jonathan Bechtle related additional
concerns regarding how the electoral process can be sabotaged by money, meshing with
manipulation financed by Zuckerberg. Emphasized throughout this memo is concern that the
electoral impact on 2020 is undeniable when testimony suggests deficiencies must be corrected
legislatively to enable counties to tackle the “daunting task” of performing future audits
effortlessly; indubitably, citation of potential improvements impugned the quality of what had
been generated, in multiple realms. 2020 must be fixed before 2022 is addressed.

Again, acquiring input from national experts in this realm should include contacting John Fund,
Tony Schafer, and J. Christian Adams; myriad organizations such as the Thomas More Society are
also deeply enmeshed in the details of what has occurred nationally, easily applied to PA.

10
 Dramatis Personae

Each/every PA testifier infra before the House State Government Committee must be targeted;
cited herein are transcripts [https://tinyurl.com/ub6nmva6], videos and submitted testimony
provided by some of the speakers [underlined]. Multiple concepts have been tethered to specific
observations [the reader who wishes to vet how this was generated can pull Memos IV/V, indexed
to Bates Numbers and the Navarro Decalogue]; this tabulation may be viewed as a “denominator”
of the exhaustive list of providers of sworn-testimony and, thus, a reason to exclude any of them
must be articulated, for each provided evidence of the magnitude of the PA’s system corruption.

Department of State
transcript & video
Kathy Boockvar
Jonathan Marks

Election information technology (SURE System)

transcript & video
Michael L. Anderson
Timothy Benyo
Joseph E. Kantz
Jonathan Marks
Lisa Schaefer

Election Audits: Office of the Auditor General, 2% Audits, and Risk-Limiting Audits
transcript & video
Janet Ciccocioppo
Timothy DeFoor
Thad Hall
Liz Howard
Jonathan Marks
Anne Skorija
Hope Verelst

Voter registration
transcript & video
Jonathan Marks
Frank LaRose
Forrest Lehman
Shane Hamlin

Voting machines (certification, operation, contracted vendors)

transcript & video
Timothy A. Benyo
Paul Lux
Jonathan M. Marks

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 Mail-in and absentee ballots
transcript & video
Pam Anderson
Richard T. Gebbie
Thad Hall
Jonathan Marks
Amber McReynolds
Charles Stewart, III

County election day operations and satellite offices

transcript & video
Ed Allison
Pam Anderson
Seth Bluestein
Sambo Dul
Shane Fitzgerald
Tim Mattice
Patricia P. Nace

Election integrity
transcript & video
William T. Adler
Jennifer Garman
Ray Murphy
B. Clifford Neuman
Peri Jude Radecic
Nathan R. Savidge
Jason Snead

How other states conduct elections

{no transcript yet} video
Sam Adolphsen
Jared Dearing
Jennifer Morrell
Wendy Underhill

Stakeholders
transcript & video
J. Christian Adams
Khalif Ali
Jonathan Bechtle
Donna Bullock
Margo Davidson
Pam DeLissio
Wesley Gadsden
Jeff Greenburg
Doyle Heffley
Malcolm Kenyatta

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Kate Klunk
Carol Kuniholm
Amber McReynolds
Lisa Schaefer
Paul Schemel
Anthony A. Shaffer
Hans von Spakovsky
David Thornburgh
Scott Walter

Executive Summary

It is mandatory the initial subpoenae encompass both the county-level information (anticipated)
and the perps who testified before the House State Government Committee (not anticipated);
provided the opportunity to submit testimony, I would glean the key-info from the Memo IV,
which resulted from my grunt-work based upon review of 9/10 hearing transcripts/attachments
[https://tinyurl.com/49w85hvk]. I would invoke whatever Bruce Marks generated on behalf of
Mastriano, the subpoenae that were to have been approved on 8/6/2021 via his committee; and
I would invoke the pending Maracopa requests (logs, routers, passwords, outside-envelopes).

Recall that these data were subsequently conveyed via multiple formats, most prominently by
showing a crosswalk with the three-volume Navarro Report; dubbed the Navarro Decalogue,
major concerns (and their electoral impact) provided a useful structure for congealing my data.

When historians probe “how [Corman] spent his summer vacation,” they will inevitably conclude
this level of unconscionable procrastination could have been precluded by positive leadership,
rather than heightened vindictive treatment of a resolute colleague; he can rationalize antipathy,
but the bottom-line is that he failed to act forthrightly during this entire calendar year. Indeed,
that external forces had to be exerted illustrates the intransigence of the RINO/GOPe; that I have
had to compose eight op-eds (and someone else had to publish my unique efforts)—along with
these exhaustively-researched memos—channels the personal anguish suffered upon crusading
election critics, who have incrementally processed each excruciating step to this endpoint.

In any case, it’s necessary to adopt a prospective, workman-like posture and, thus, ongoing
efforts will be directed toward drawing attention to integrating PA-specific aberrations into
subpoenae, to be directed both at counties and the perps who countenanced this debacle.

Regarding these issues, it is felt that “Legislatures have both the ability to intervene in some of
this litigation when necessary, and then also to ensure that that litigation cannot result in
settlements or consent decrees that lead to the promulgation of regulations that fundamentally
countermand or undermine established law.” Similarly, legislatures can manifest intent to discern
optimal election law in 2022 by mandating a Forensic Audit of what transpired in 2020.

It is anticipated that stiff legal opposition will be mustered to forestall an election investigation
of any ilk, let alone a probe of the accuracy of the tabulation and the pathogenesis of PA’s ills.
Nevertheless, specifics in these four memos have been gleaned from PA-specific testimonies and,
thus provide grist for legislative discovery of the manifestations of aberrations (if not fraud). And
all citations are linked directly to quotes from Memo IV, often with Bates-Number references.

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