See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/273000062

IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS

LIMITATIONS Mohammad Nuruzzaman*

Article · January 2009

CITATIONS READS

0 997

1 author:

Mohammed Nuruzzaman
North South University
85 PUBLICATIONS   298 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

‘Shia – Sunni Sectarian Violence and Middle East Regional Security’ View project

Rivals in the Middle East: A Constructivist Interpretation of Iran – Saudi Arabia Relations View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Mohammed Nuruzzaman on 02 March 2015.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE:
ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Mohammad Nuruzzaman*

ABSTRACT

The Islamic Republic of Iran is on the rise. Emboldened by Shi’a empowerment in Iraq
after 2003 and the emergence of a Shi’a Crescent from Tehran to Beirut, Iran is gradually
but firmly emerging as a great actor in regional and global politics. This paper critically
examines the factors that contribute to Iranian power and influence and argues that
Iran’s rise as a major power depends on its ability to minimize external involvement in
Middle Eastern affairs and to create a new regional security order in partnership with the
Arab states. The waning U.S. influence in the Arab world and a gradual rapprochement
in Arab–Iran relations points to developments in that direction. The drive for nuclear
capability, and if Tehran finally succeeds in arming itself with nuclear weapons, will
ensure Iran’s rise as a great power in regional and global politics.

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has drawn increasing global attention as well as global
condemnation due to a host of important factors, including (a) the establishment of an
alternative functioning political system based on Islamic values and principles in a world that
was almost divided between Moscow and Washington along ideological lines; (b) Iran’s pursuit
of an independent foreign policy, a third course in global politics which the late Ayatollah

_____________________________________________________________________________________
* Formerly a College Professor of Political Science at Okanagan College, Canada and currently working as a faculty
in International Relations at the Gulf University for Science and Technology, Mishref, Kuwait.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Pakistan Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

5
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Khomeini characterized as ‘neither West nor East but only the Islamic Republic’ and thus
proclaimed the emergence of a third ideological force on the global stage; and (c) the continued
defiance of the U.S. and the resilience of the Iranian political system to survive internal and
external challenges.
Collectively, the three factors produced two significant implications for post-1979 world
politics. First, the independent foreign policy course Tehran has pursued since 1979 largely
questioned the traditional dichotomy between core versus subordinate states, the idea that
developing countries are merely subordinate actors in international politics. Second, the Iranian
political system that prioritizes Islamic values, norms and beliefs greatly undercut the Western
concept of international system which thrives on secular norms and rules of behavior 1. The
Iranian challenge to Western-dominated global politics was, however, largely neutralized by
the rising anti-Iran constellation of regional and international forces that unleashed the Iraqi
invasion of Iran in 1980 and forced revolutionary Iran to remain confined within its own
boundary until the end of the 20th century. But Iran could not be contained for long, as expected
by the U.S. and the frontline Sunni Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Iraq (until 2003), Egypt and
Jordan.
The Shi’a empowerment in Iraq after 2003 and the emergence of a Shi’a Crescent that
stretches from Iran to Lebanon2, according to some analysts, have opened the door for a ‘second
phase’ of the Iranian Revolution with clear cross-border influence and impacts.3 The U.S. war on
global terrorism launched first on Afghanistan in October 2001 and then on Iraq in March 2003
made Iran the single-most strategic beneficiary of the war. The so-called Sunni defense wall
against Iran – Taliban Afghanistan in the east and Ba’thist Iraq on the west – quickly collapsed
effectively eliminating Sunni threats to Shi’a Iran. The Sunni threats, some Middle East experts
opine, even motivated Shi’a Iran to help with the US military assault on Afghanistan and the

1 Ziba Moshaver, ‘Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran’s Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran – EU
Relations’, The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 2003), pp. 283-86.
2Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘The Middle East: Between Ideology and Geopolitics’, in Mary Buckley and

Robert Singh (eds.), The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences
(London: Routledge, 2006) Vali Nasr, ‘When the Shiites Rise’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, July-August
2006, pp. 58-74.
3Juan Cole, ‘A ‚Shiite Crescent?‛ The Regional Impact of the Iraq War’, Current History, Vol. 105, No. 687

(Winter 2006), p. 26.

6
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

invasion of Iraq.4 In the post-Iraq invasion period, Tehran mobilized the Shi’a communities in
Iraq for elections, strongly opposed the establishment of an American client government in
Baghdad5 and gradually formed a Baghdad–Tehran Shi’a axis with significant support from the
Alawites (a branch of Shi’a)-politically dominating Syria and the Lebanese Shi’a resistance
group Hezbollah.6 Tehran no longer views the Shi’a-led government in Iraq as a security threat
and the Iranian leaders see the new government in Baghdad as an instrument to speed up
American withdrawal from Iraq, a great way to win over Iraq without firing a single shoot
against the Ba’thists or the American occupation forces.7 Iran has thus carved out a sphere of
influence in the Middle East with Iraq as the most important part of this sphere of influence.8
Moreover, Iran’s determined policy and efforts to develop nuclear capability by defying Israeli
and U.S. military threats elevate its status in Middle East regional politics and extend its
influence and prestige on to the global stage. It sounds like that Iran is gradually but firmly
emerging as a great actor in global politics.
This paper critically examines the factors that contribute to the rise of Iran in global
politics and assesses its prospects as a great power. It argues that the standard yardsticks of
power, such as strategic location, military capability, economic might supported by a strong
industrial base, technological know-how, diplomatic excellence etc., do not quite favorably
support Iran’s emergence as a great power on the global stage. Tehran can, however, find the
right niche for itself in regional and global politics by achieving successes on two interrelated
fronts: (a) by minimizing external involvement in Middle Eastern affairs; and (b) by helping

4 Ken Pollack, an American academic, pointed out in February 2008 that Iran, desirous of Saddam’s
removal from power, indicated to the Bush administration that it would help with the invasion of Iraq.
Iran has also cooperated with the US over the military assault on Afghanistan and in the negotiation of
the December 2001 Bonn Agreement between anti-Taliban Afghan groups. See Middle East Institute, MEI
Transcript on ‚Iran on the Horizon‛ Panel I: Assessing Iran’s Intentions and Internal Power Centers, 1
February, 2008. Transcript available at: http://www.mideasti.org/transcript/iran/-horizon-february-1-2008
5 Kamran Taremi, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq, 2003-05’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No.

4 (Winter 2005), p. 35.

6 Cole , ‘A ‚Shiite Crescent‛?’, op. cit., p. 22.

7 Taremi, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq’, p. 42.

8 Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Understanding the Roots of Iranian Foreign Policy in the New Iraq’, Middle East

Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 49-57.

7
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

create a shared security order in the Greater Middle East region in partnership with the Arab
states. Improved relations and strategic partnership with the Central Asian republics are also an
essential requirement for the rise of Iran as a significant actor in global politics. The regional
and external challenges to the rise of Iranian power, as post-1979 developments clearly attest,
are indeed too formidable and there is no easy way that Tehran can achieve quick successes.

II. IRANIAN POWER POTENTIAL

Strategic analysts and political pundits of all stripes commonly agree that Iran’s strategic
location and huge oil and gas reserves undeniably enhance Iranian power and influence in and
outside the Middle East. The strategic significance of Iran, a country roughly the size of Alaska
in the US, originates from the geo-strategic location of the Middle East region as a whole. The
Middle East is located at a critical junction of the world’s land and sea trade routes. It connects
five major seas in the world – the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.
Historically, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf have provided the European
powers with easy sea routes to conduct trade with the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia.
The Middle East is also connected to East Asia via the historic silk route from Central Asia to
China. The strategic significance of the region in world trade and commerce and the discovery
of oil in the Persian Gulf area in the early 20th century (in Iran’s Abadan in 1907) attracted more
European, and later American, involvement which gradually resulted in intense geo-strategic
rivalry and competition between external powers for control over the region’s strategic oil
reserves.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two big states that command most geo-strategic attention
in eastern and southern Middle East. While Saudi Arabia borders on the Red Sea and the
Persian Gulf, Iran connects the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea – the world’s two most
important areas of natural gas and oil reserves. Before World War II, the U.S. Gulf of Mexico
and the Caribbean were the world’s number one oil reserves region but by the mid-1940s the
gravity of oil reserves shifted towards the Middle East that came to account for nearly half the
world’s total at that time, and currently it possesses over two-thirds of the world’s proven oil
reserves9. Approximately, 62 percent of the Middle East oil reserves are located in the Persian

9Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System (New York/Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2003), pp. 352-53.
8
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

Gulf area. Saudi Arabia alone contains over 22 percent of Gulf oil, Iran 11 percent, and Iraq,
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hold between eight and 10 percent each10.
In addition to huge oil reserves, Iran and Qatar, which share the South Pars gas field in
the Persian Gulf, together account for over 50 percent of the world’s gas reserves with the
Russian Federation holding the second position. In contrast to the Middle East, proven oil and
gas reserves in other regions of the world are paltry. According to the World Energy Council
2004 Report, the Persian Gulf oil producers (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE)
have a total of 671.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves while Venezuela has 77.3, Russian
Federation 60.0, Libya 36.0, Nigeria 31.5, and the U.S. 30.7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves
each11. Evidently, proven oil reserves in other countries and regions in the world are dwarfed by
that of the Middle East. The strategic importance of the Middle East also increases further with
growing demand for energy for economic development and industrial consumption. It is
estimated that there will be a 40 percent increase in global oil demand by 202512 and new centers
of economic growth like China and India will strongly compete for Middle Eastern oil and gas
resources driving gas prices up and posing threats to Western oil interests13.
According to current estimates, Iran possesses the world’s third-largest proven oil
reserves, the second-largest natural gas reserves and is the world’s fourth-largest exporter of oil.
Iran’s unique geographic location, with control over the entire Gulf east coast, directly connects
Central and South Asia to the Persian Gulf, and establishes link between Europe and the

10 British Petroleum, Putting Energy in the Spotlight: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005.
Available on line at:
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/publications/energy_reviews_2005/STAGI
NG/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2005.pdf
11 World Energy Council, 2004 Survey of Energy Resources, 20th edition (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), p. 35.

12 Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005. Available online at:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/forecast.html. (Information accessed: 10 July 2008).
13The US free access to Gulf oil is coming under tough competition mounted by energy-hungry China and

India that respectively consumes 7 million and 2.5 million barrels of oil a day. China imports more than
40 percent of its energy from abroad and in 2004 it surpassed Japan to become the world’s second-largest
energy-consuming country. The Middle East oil exporters supply some 51 percent of China’s energy
needs. In 2004 China also signed a mega oil and gas development deal with Iran. See Dingli Shen, ‘Iran’s
Nuclear Ambitions Test China’s Wisdom’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 60-
61.
9
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Persian Gulf via Turkey and the Caucasus. Control over the Strait of Hormuz, located at the
mouth of the Persian Gulf between Iran and the UAE, the narrow body of water through which
foreign oil tankers navigate to the Indian Ocean critically promotes Iran’s strategic value to the
outside world. Iran is also poised to be the easiest and the shortest route for Caspian Sea oil and
gas resources, estimated at 66 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 116 trillion cubic feet of
proven gas reserves14, for export to European and Asian markets. Iran has particular strategic
value for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan which are currently entangled in anti-Iran regional
equations15 but likely to court Iran in future for pure economic development reasons.
Iran’s immense strategic significance is not, however, well-matched by its economic
might. The size of the Iranian economy is rather small compared to that of China, India, or
Germany. While China, India, and Germany boast of GDP/PPP of US$ 6.991, 2.989 and 2.81
trillion respectively, the Iranian economy amounts to a total of 753 billion only.16 Despite
abundant natural resources and human capital, Iranian economy grew just at 6.4 per cent
during the 2000-06 period with a gross domestic income (GDI) growth rate of 8.7 percent.
Neighboring Azerbaijan, a country with a much smaller population and less natural resources,
registered a 15.6 percent GDP growth rate and a 23.5 percent growth in GDI in the same
period.17 The Iranian economy is not as diversified as the Chinese, Indian, German or French
economies, and remains critically dependent on its oil sector that contributes more than 80
percent of government revenues and export earnings. The industrial growth production rate
(excluding oil) stands at a staggering 4.8 percent compared to China’s 13.4 or India’s 8.9
percent.18

14 Mahmoud Ghafouri, ‘The Caspian Sea: Rivalry and Cooperation’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, No. 2,
(Summer 2008), pp. 83 & 85.
15 see Atal Subodh, ‘The New Great Game’, National Interest, vol. 81, Fall 2005, pp. 101-105; Azeem
Ibrahim, ‘Evolving United States policy towards the Caspian region: a delicate balance’, IPRI Journal, Vol.
7, No. 2, (Summer 2007), pp. 87-102.
16 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), The 2008 World Factbook. Available online at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (Information accessed: 12 July, 2008).
17 The World Bank, The World Development Indicators (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

18 CIA, The World Factbook 2008.

10
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

The poor Iranian economic performance is often explained in terms of severe external
constraints and internal disarray. The unilateral U.S. and U.S.-sponsored UN sanctions that
discourage foreign investments and technology transfer greatly eat into the vitality of the
Iranian economy. The three rounds of Security Council sanctions over Tehran’s disputed
nuclear enrichment program and targeted at Iranian giant commercial banks, business firms
and other industrial production units are a big threat to Iran’s economic future. Similarly,
internal feud between conservatives and reformists over economic reforms forecloses creative
strategies to accelerate the pace of economic growth. The reformist President Mohammad
Khatami once complained that ‘a crisis every nine days’ prevented his government from
striking out any meaningful economic reforms at all.19 Current analyses on the Iranian economy
identify a number of fundamental problems, including an overextended public sector,
dominance of government foundations or bonyads that are exempt from taxes, excessive
government subsidies for consumer goods from bread to gasoline, inefficient bureaucracy, price
control, and corruption.20 These problems largely explain low productivity and lack of dynamo
in the Iranian economy.
High oil prices for the last few years since 2003 have helped the conservative clerics to
cope with growing domestic economic difficulties but Iran should certainly do a lot better with
its 70 million people and a relatively skilled labor force of 29 million. The Iranian market is the
biggest in the Middle East but not big enough for sustained industrial growth on a long-term
basis. Successful industrialization depends on getting access to regional and global markets.
Iran conducts the bulk of its export and import trade with the European Union (EU) countries,
China, Japan, South Africa, and South Korea.21 A large portion of Iranian imports comes from

19 Afshin Molavi, ‘Buying Time in Tehran’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6 (November-December 2004), p.
10.
20 Ali R. Abootalebi, ‘Iran and the Future of Persian Gulf Security’, paper prepared at the Midwest

Political Science Annual Meeting, Chicago, Palmer House,12-15 April, 2007, p. 5.

21 Maximilian Terhalle, ‘Are the Shia Rising?’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2007), pp. 75-76.

11
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

the EU (40.4 percent) while another 10 percent originates from China and Japan. A similar
pattern is discernible in Iran’s export trade. About 68 percent of Iran’s exports go to the EU,
China, Japan, South Africa, and South Korea. Among the regional countries, only the UAE has
significant trade relations with Iran. In 2006 the UAE imported some 15.7 percent of its total
goods and services from Iran.
The low level of intraregional trade between Iran and other Middle Eastern countries is
better explained in light of their complementary oil-based and less diversified economies.
Intraregional conflicts and tensions also circumvent trade relations heavily. The Middle East, in
general, has a unique history of insignificant regional trade interactions and low level of
economic integration. Inter-Arab trade stands at an awful 10 percent which Arab economists
ridicule as a ‘10 per cent trade thesis’.22 All regional states prefer extra-regional states for trade
and economic expansion. Iran is, however, changing its regional trade structure by rapidly
expanding its trade relations and economic cooperation with Iraq. Right after the fall of late
President Saddam Hussein, Iran offered the Iraqi Governing Council financial support, export
credits and also proposed to help rebuild Iraqi power infrastructure. Iranian goods began to
flood southern Iraqi markets. The former Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari visited Iran in
mid-2005 and negotiated several trade and security agreements including a $1 billion aid
package.23 The volume of trade between the two countries reached $2.8 billion in 2006 and was
expected to surpass $4 billion by the end of 2008.24 Bilateral trade transactions between the two
countries stood at $4 billion at the beginning of 2009 25 and both countries have also constructed
several trade terminals and roads along their 800-mile long border for easy cross-border
movements of goods and services. Iran also won a $1.5 billion contract to build houses in Basra,
Southern Iraq, in February 2009.26 Undoubtedly, Iraq’s 25 million strong market has opened up

22 Doha Bank, ‘Regional Economies must open up for attracting global investment’. Available online at:
http://www.dohabank.com.qa/engSite/default.asp?catid=628 (Information accessed: 3 August, 2008.
23 Nasr, ‘When the Shiites Rise’, p. 59.

24IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency), ‘Iraq-Iran trade volume to reach 4bn US dollars this year’.
Available online at: http://ww2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-22/0806202593201647.htm (Information
accessed: 3 August, 2008).

25 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq’, Congressional Research Service, February 2009.

12
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

a new window of opportunity for Iran which the Iranian political and business leaders are
exploiting to lessen the impacts of U.S.-led economic sanctions and isolation.
The Iranian leaders are especially adept in crafting mechanisms that have proved
effective to steer Iran ahead, even in the face of extreme odds. The revolutionary leadership
spirit, spawned and buttressed by the late Ayatollah Khomeini, still holds and inspires the
Iranian leaders to bolster Iranian power and influence in regional and world affairs. What the
late Ayatollah Khomeini sought through the 1979 Islamic Revolution was not only the defiance
of the U.S. but also a denial of the Muslim world to both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.
Hence, the emphasis was on Islamic values and identity. The Khomeini-crafted foreign policy
line has undergone some changes over the past years but the sprit remains undiminished.
Post-Khomeini Iranian leaders have made some compromises on Muslim interests by
siding with the Russian Federation over Chechnya or maintaining neutrality in Armenia–
Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh but that was more due to the dictates of post-cold
war geopolitics and the imperatives of national interests27. The need to forge closer economic
and military relations with Moscow to counter U.S. sanctions and pressures forced Iranian
leaders to sacrifice their Islamic ideology at the altar of national interests. Otherwise, the
leadership, despite internal differences, has been resolute and steadfast to take a common
position vis-à-vis the U.S., particularly on the nuclear issue. The reformist and conservative
leaders converge on Iran’s basic domestic and foreign policies; what they differ over is the
mechanisms to achieve the policy objectives. The major strengths of Iranian leadership originate
from the country’s long history of independence, high ethnic and religious homogeneity and
fierce nationalism. The American policy to divide the leadership, as it has sought through
incremental sanctions and the 2004 Iran Freedom Support Act the U.S. Congress passed to
authorize funds to subvert the Iranian government, has produced no desired results.
The Iranian policy to confront the U.S., the world’s most powerful military power,
puzzles peoples across the world. This begs an analysis of Iran’s actual military power.
Although actual estimates on Iran’s military capability are lacking, there is no doubt that Iran is
a formidable conventional military power with a total strength of 500,000 to 600,000 well-
trained soldiers equipped with Russian, Chinese and home-made weapon systems. The major

26 Michael Evans, ‘Iranian Builders Win Contracts in City that Shias Help to Wreck’, The Times (London),
20 February, 2009.
27 Nur Bilge Criss and Serdar Guner, ‘Geopolitical Configurations: The Russian-Turkey-Iran Triangle’,

Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 365-76.

13
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

strength of the Iranian army, currently the second-largest in the Middle East after Turkey, is its
long-range missiles capable of hitting targets in Israel, Egypt, Greece, and other East European
countries. According to CIA 2006 estimates, Iran allocates 2.5 percent of its GDP to the military
sector, compared to China’s 4.3 or Russia’s 3.9 percent.28 Iran’s fighting capability is especially
backed up by the very nature of its terrain. Iran’s two mountain ranges, the Zagros and the
Alborz, that respectively run from the northwest to the south and north to the northeast, and
numerous rivers and hills provide the Iranian armed forces with an extremely valuable natural
defense shield. The armies of the Persian Empire easily defeated all foreign aggressors,
including the Romans and the Ottoman Turks, along Iran’s west and northwest frontiers for
hundreds of years.29
The current Iranian military policy has been to develop the best defensive capabilities to
deter the enemy. This policy has its origins in Iran’s long war with Iraq and the U.S. military
encirclement of Iran from all sides after 2003. The Iranian attention is now focused on
developing a nuclear capability that Tehran considers the last line of defense against possible
U.S. aggression. The quick fall of Baghdad, the U.S. call for regime change in Iran and Syria in
2004 created a feeling of serious insecurity in Tehran.30 Some post-cold war military
developments further led to an increase in Iran’s perception of threats and vulnerability. An
Iranian scholar claims that NATO’s out-of-area strategy to counter threats anywhere, adopted
in May 1991, already impacted on Iranian security perceptions since it promoted the prospects
of U.S.-led NATO interventions in the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus.31 These developments
surely forced the Iranian leaders to harden their nuclear ambitions.
The U.S. threats do not, however, solely propel the Iranian nuclear program. A good
number of other strategic and political factors, the most important being Iran’s regional

28 CIA, The World Factbook 2008.

29 Ali Ghafuri, ‘A Glance at the Combat Capability of the Iranian Army’, The Morning Daily, 3 October
2007.
30 James A. Russell, ‘Wither Regional Security in a World Turned Upside Down?’, Middle East Policy, Vol.

14, No. 2 (Summer 2007), pp. 141-148.

31 Nader Entessar, ‘Iran’s Security Challenges’, Muslim World, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Fall 2004), p. 539.

14
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

ambitions in the Persian Gulf and the Greater Middle East region, the need to counter
aggressions by neighboring states and thus avoid massive carnage and damages as Iraq
inflicted during the 1980-1988 war, Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons and the overt and
covert threats it poses, and domestic political dynamics quite well influence Tehran’s decision
to hold onto the nuclear option.32 The Iranians, by virtue of their strategic location, population
strength, economic and military might, see themselves as the natural leader of the Persian Gulf
region and are determined to establish their regional supremacy. Tehran’s success in preventing
the U.S. from making post-Saddam Iraq a U.S. proxy in the Middle East and finding a strategic
ally in Syria greatly materialize Iran’s regional design. Nuclear-armed Israel, which Iran views
as an American imperial agent in the Middle East, is apparently a cause of great concern to
Tehran since Israel, in concert with the U.S., has repeatedly threatened to militarily strike and
destroy Iranian nuclear facilities. But it is difficult to say exactly to what extent the Israeli
threats directly or indirectly shape Iranian nuclear ambitions since Tehran hardly refers to
Israel’s nuclear capability as a motivation behind its own program. Iran sees itself as a great
civilization and compares it with India and China, the two other great Asian civilizations armed
with nuclear weapons. The Iranian policymakers believe that they have a right to develop
nuclear capability on a par with other great civilizations but are greatly disturbed by the U.S.
policy to deny them this right.33 Moreover, they see that the U.S. pursues a double standard
policy concerning the Iranian nuclear program. The U.S. strongly backs Israeli nuclear
deterrents while opposing the development of such deterrents by any other Middle Eastern
country, including Iran. The George W. Bush administration left no stone untouched to drum
up support to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program but signed a nuclear deal with India in
2008 that legitimized New Delhi’s right to pursue both civilian and military nuclear options.

32 See Ray Takeyh, ‘Iran Builds the Bomb’, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 51-64.

33Mr. Trita Parsi, President of National Iranian American Council, and Ms. Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow
at the United States Institute of Peace, made this point at the Fifty-first Capital Hill Conference on ‘Iran’s
Strategic Concerns and U.S. Interests’ held on January 18, 2008. Transcript of the conference is available
online at: http://www.mepc.org/forums_chcs/51.html. (Information accessed: 10 April, 2008).

Mohammad Tabbar, ‘The use of the US Threat in Iran’s Domestic Politics’, paper delivered at the 2006
34

Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, held at Palmer House, Chicago, United States.
15
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The U.S. opposition and double standard policy has apparently hardened the Iranian
resolve to pursue the nuclear program more vigorously. Over the past many years the nuclear
program has become such an integral part of Iranian domestic politics that no leader can push it
down the list of national priorities. Initiated by the late Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 1970s and
spurred by the Iraq–Iran war of the 1980s, the nuclear issue provides the Iranian leaders with an
easy excuse to hunt political treasures. Both conservative and reformist leaders portray the U.S.
as a grave threat to Iranian security to maximize their respective political leverage; both sides
also emphasize nuclear deterrent to discourage external aggressors to launch an attack on Iran.34
The only difference is that while the conservative hardliners doggedly adhere to the position
that Iran is not safe until it possesses nuclear weapons to cause deterrence to aggressions, the
reformist leaders prefer a ‘breakout nuclear capacity’ within the framework of the NPT, a
capacity that would enable Iran to produce nuclear weapons at short notice to deal with
impending threats. The latter group prefers this flexible policy to enable Iran to integrate into
the international order and the global political economy35, but the recent resurgence of the
conservatives under President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has mostly silenced the reformist forces.
The post-June 12, 2009 electoral violence in Tehran points to persistent political differences
between the conservatives and the reformists but no deviations from vital national issues. Mir
Hossein Mousavi, the formidable reformist challenger to President Ahmadinejad, in a series of
interviews with different media outlets doggedly supported Iran’s right to pursue its nuclear
program. The other powerful stakeholders in Iranian politics, such as the Revolutionary Guards
and the politically influential and highly nationalistic various Iranian student groups, view any
flexibility on the nuclear issue as a sell-out of Iranian nuclear right and a capitulation to external
forces. They see nuclear capability as the best means to safeguard Iran’s political independence,
sovereignty and security interests.36

35 Takeyh, ‘Iran Builds the Bomb’, pp. 55-58.

36 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
37 Manouchehr Mohammadi, ‘Principles of Iran’s Foreign Policy’, published in The Iranian Journal of

International Affairs, 2007. Available online at:

http://foreighrelations.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30&itemid=5 (Information
accessed: 28 May, 2008).

16
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

The perceptions of threats and vulnerability have their obvious reflections on Iran’s
current security strategy. In the post-2003 period Iran adopted a new security strategy in the
Persian Gulf with two well-defined objectives – non-presence of foreign powers in the Gulf
region, and security cooperation with the Gulf littoral states.37 As noted above, Iran views the
U.S. military presence in the Gulf and in Iraq as a serious security threat and is trying to
minimize the U.S. military presence by creating regional pressures to force the U.S. to withdraw
from Iraq. The Iranian leaders are reaching out to the Gulf Arab states in order to develop better
political and strategic understandings in the Gulf area. President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s
presence at the December 2007 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Doha, an
unprecedented development in the 27-year history of the GCC, signifies that an Iran–Arab
strategic rapprochement is underway. An increase in Iran–Arab understandings and
partnership means a probable decrease in U.S. influence in the Gulf and Middle East region.

III. CONSTRAINTS TO IRANIAN POWER

Experts in global politics hardly miss the point that Iran is a country with many enemies and
few friends. The unfriendly global environment Iran has been navigating through since the
Islamic Revolution of 1979 severely constrains its power and influence, despite having clear
competitive edges in some areas like strategic location, huge oil and gas reserves, conventional
military power and population strength. Of the various constraints to Iranian power the
following are the most serious and merit specific discussion:

The Timeless US Challenge

Before 1979 the U.S. was the principal external backer of Iranian power and influence in the
Gulf and Greater Middle East region. With active U.S. support the late Reza Shah Pahlavi
turned the Persian Gulf into an Iranian backwater in the 1970s and acted as a local U.S. agent
against communist movements and insurgencies in the Gulf region. Once things were put
upside down in 1979 the U.S. predictably became the most formidable foe and Washington at
once adopted a policy to hem in Iran and curb its power and influence in the Gulf and Middle
East region. Still today, Washington remains steadfast in its policy to thwart the Iranian bid for

17
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

major power status and stop it from gaining influence in regional and global politics. The
Iranians are equally determined to steer clear of U.S. plans and anti-Iran policies.
A set of perceptional factors lie at the base of hostile Iran–U.S. relations. The Iranians
accuse the U.S. of conspiring to subvert the Islamic Revolution, supporting the Iraqi invasion of
Iran, imposing sanctions to destroy the Iranian economy, and killing of innocent Iranians.
Tehran cites the July 1988 shooting down of an Iranian civil aircraft by the U.S. that killed 290
passengers as a case of America’s sinister design against Iran. Similarly, the U.S. finds Iranian
behavior unacceptable because Tehran is out to acquire weapons of mass destruction, supports
international terrorism, violates human rights, and foils U.S.-initiated peace proposals to resolve
Arab-Israeli conflicts. The Americans are still unforgiving to Iran for the 444-day humiliating
hostage crisis that tainted US image home and abroad.38 What follow on a regular basis in Iran–
US hostile relations are the mutual condemnations and renunciations of one by the other.
Deep hostilities between Tehran and Washington are underwritten by contradictory
strategic objectives Iran and the U.S. pursue in the Middle East. Iran’s broad strategic goals in
the Middle East include the recognition by regional and external powers of Iran’s: (a) political
independence and territorial integrity; (b) natural leadership in the Persian Gulf area; and (c)
foreign policy autonomy to pursue national interests free of external pressures.39 The drive for
nuclear capability, propelled by the fear of American attacks and other regional ambitions, has
of late been added to Iran’s matrix of strategic goals.
The Iranian strategic goals pose a direct challenge to long-term U.S. interests in the
region. The U.S., as the preponderant external power in the Middle East since the end of World
War II, has been pursuing a two-pronged strategic goal. Defined by President Harry S. Truman
in the immediate post-war period and continually pursued by all American administrations, the
two-pronged strategic goal includes maintaining secure access to Persian Gulf oil, and deterring

38 James A. Bill, ‘The Politics of Hegemony: The United States and Iran’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 8, No. 3,
Fall 2001, p. 96.
39 See the summary of Congressional Staff Briefings on ‚US Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran and

Proliferation Concerns‛, held on 15 September, 2002. Available online at:

http://www.mideasti.org/summary/us-challenges-and-choices-gulf-iran-and-proliferation-concerns
(Information accessed: 21 May, 2008).

18
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

internal and external challenges and threats to American interests.40 The resurgence of Iran with
a sphere of influence from Kabul to Beirut, especially in the post-Iraq invasion period, has
threatened U.S. interests quite seriously. The American policy-makers now view Iran as a
credible challenge to American hegemony in the Middle East region. The eastern part of the
Middle East is already under Iranian control and Tehran is also quickly expanding its influence
in the western part of the region by cultivating close relationship with Syria and forging strong
relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza strip. This puts the U.S. and its ally
Israel in a difficult situation which neither Washington nor Tel Aviv can accept or change at
will.
The U.S. strategy towards Iran after 1979 has traditionally rested on two objectives:
containment of Iran through economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and the creation of an
anti-Iran alliance of Arab states. Sanctions were first imposed by the Jimmy Carter
administration in 1980 following the hostage crisis. In the last three decades the Reagan, Clinton
and the two Bush administrations have exhausted almost all sanction options to weaken the
Iranian economy and unseat the Iranian clergy from power. The creation of an Arab alliance
against Tehran recorded some success in the 1980s when Iraq invaded Iran with support of the
U.S. and the Gulf Arab states but has seen failure in recent years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Neither of the two U.S. objectives has stood the test of time, and the more the U.S. has tried to
contain Iran the stronger the Iranian determination has been to breakdown the containment
barriers.
Until now Iran has successfully mobilized its diplomatic power and connections to
neutralize the effects of sanctions. States opposed to or not allied with the US appeared to be the
probable sources of support for Iran, and the Iranian leaders cultivated strong economic and
diplomatic ties with China and Russia as a counterbalance to the U.S. This eastward orientation
in Iranian foreign policy started to take roots after former President Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani had traveled to Beijing in September 1992, and then grew stronger under President
Mohammad Khatami who visited China in June 2000 and signed a few trade, security and
scientific cooperation agreements. President Khatami paid a similar visit to Moscow in March
2001 and signed ‘The Treaty on Foundations of Relations and Principles of Cooperation’ which

40Douglas Little, ‘Gideon’s Band: America and the Middle East since 1945’, in Michael J. Hogan (ed.),
America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge/New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 466-71.
19
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

is interpreted not as a mutual defense but as a treaty on armed neutrality in case either party is
attacked by a third party, namely the U.S.41
The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President in June 2005 further spurred Iran’s
eastward national interest orientation. President Ahmadinejad views expanding trade and
security relations with China and Russia as a necessary step to boost up Iran’s regional and
global standings.42 At least for the time being, the Ahmadinejad government is successfully
using the China and Russia cards, the two countries that wield veto power on the UN Security
Council, to prevent the U.S. from using force, if not the imposition of U.S.-sponsored UN
economic sanctions, against Iran.
The growing relations between China, Iran, and Russia are often viewed as an ‘emerging
anti-U.S. nexus’43 but it promises less to be a solid anti-U.S. political or military alliance. What
brings all three states closer is the range of mutual political, economic and strategic interests
and a common opposition to American global dominance. For the Russian Federation, Iran is
the only Middle Eastern country that maintains significant political, economic and strategic
linkages with Moscow, buys most Russian military inventories and generates sizable revenues
for the Russian defense industries, pursues cooperative relationships in the energy sector and
follows a common foreign policy line with regard to Central Asia and the Caucasus. For the
Chinese leaders, Iran is a valuable source for China’s exploding energy needs, a major buyer of
Chinese naval vessels and missiles, a worthwhile political and military friend in the Middle East
who holds some definite value as a counterpoint pressure against the U.S. in relation to Taiwan.
Iran reaps similar benefits from its partnership with Beijing and Moscow. China and Russia
help Iran break the US sanctions and diplomatic isolation, protect Tehran from the possible use
of force by the U.S., bolster Iranian defense and participate in Iranian economic development.
Iran’s increasing leaning towards Beijing and Moscow should be, however, viewed with
extreme caution. Neither China nor Russia is likely to side with Iran in the event of an armed
conflict between Tehran and Washington. An Iran armed with nuclear weapons is just as

41 Robert O. Freedman, ‘Russian Policy Toward the Middle East under Putin: The Impact of 9/11 and the
War in Iraq’, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 2003), p. 78.
42 Sanam Vakil, ‘Iran: Balancing East against West’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn

2006), pp. 53-54.

43 M. Ehsan Ahrari, ‘Iran, China, and Russia: The Emerging Anti-US Nexus?’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 32,

No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 453-66.

20
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

unacceptable to Beijing and Moscow as it is to Washington. Iranian nuclear capability threatens

U.S. interests in the Middle East; it will also put China’s and Russia’s interests in the region at
Tehran’s disposal as well. Beijing currently pursues a two-pronged Iran policy: it supports
Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power under the nuclear non-proliferation regime which China
signed in 1992 but is unwilling to bedevil the basic parameters of political and economic
relations with Washington laid down by the February 1972 Shanghai Communiqué.44
Compared to Iran, the U.S. is also a much bigger trading partner for China with $202 billion
bilateral trade in 2005. China – Iran bilateral trade amounted to only $7 billion in 2004 and may
reach $10 billion by 2010.45 Evidently, it is China’s growing demand for oil that brings her closer
to Iran but it does not guarantee a Chinese military commitment to Iran’s security.
Similarly, Moscow is out to exploit the Iranian market for export of weapons and atomic
energy that brings billions of dollars and employs thousands of Russian workers in Iran. Russia
does not support the use of force to solve the Iranian nuclear issue, and it is not committed to
defend Iran militarily either.46 The 2001 Moscow–Tehran treaty is in no way a military treaty
and it does not commit Russian support to repeal a U.S. military attack on Iran. The most
Tehran can expect from Moscow is a probable Russian decision to veto a U.S.-sponsored UN
Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iran. A similar Chinese decision
to save Iran from Western military assault is also likely but a unilateral U.S. decision to strike
Iran will create a different situation altogether. A military clash between Iran and the US is,
however, a distant possibility in the post-Bush era since the new administration of President
Barack Obama has signaled a shift from confrontation to cooperation and direct diplomatic
talks with Tehran.

The Arab Challenge To Iranian Power

Tehran’s relationship with its Arab neighbors is another area of great concern to the Iranian
leaders. The trouble started right after the 1979 revolution when late Ayatollah Khomeini, who

44 See Jin Cantong, ‘Pacific Partners’, Beijing Review, Vol. 50, No. 8, 2007, pp. 8-9.
45 Vakil, ‘Iran: Balancing East against West’, p. 55
46 Mark N. Katz, ‘Putin, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4

(Winter 2006), p. 128.

21
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

thought that Islamic religion was incompatible with traditional monarchies, called on the Arabs
to rise up and overthrow their monarchs. The consternation he created provoked an ideological
rift between Shi’a and Sunnis that found its extreme expression in the 1980 Iraqi invasion of
Iran.47 The Iranian threat convinced the Persian Gulf Arab states to launch the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in 1981 as an anti-Iran collective security bulwark. The Arab negative
perceptions of Iran were already hardened by Iranian aggressive behavior in the Persian Gulf.
In November 1971 the late Reza Shah ordered the Iranian army to occupy Abu Musa and the
nearby Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb islands in the Persian Gulf. The UAE disputes the
ownership of these islands till today.
A vortex of mutual threat perceptions explains the divergences in Arab–Iran relations.
The Iranians believe that they live in a dangerous strategic environment infested with foreign
troops. The GCC states provide military base facilities to U.S. troops that pose credible threats
to Iranian security. The Arab states also unnecessarily view Iran as a source of threat and band
together with the U.S. to deny Iran its natural position of dominance in the Persian Gulf
region.48 Contrarily, Arab perceptions of threats from Iran originate from a host of geopolitical
factors, including Iran’s vast territorial size, population strength, robust conventional military
power backed by long-range missiles and Iran’s determination for a hegemonic position in the
Middle East. This prompts the Arab leaders to seek strong military relations with the U.S. to
counter Iranian threats and influence. The Arab leaders are especially dismayed by the loss of
Iraqi bulwark against Iran and the corresponding rise of a Shi’a crescent across the region49.
Arab–Iran relations remained strained in the period from 1979 to 1997 and then began to
normalize after President Khatami’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 1998. The single-most important
factor that helped improve relations is Iran’s acceptance of the domestic character of the Arab
regimes in the Gulf. Iran is now more focused on the external behavior of the Arab states and
aims at distancing them from the U.S. And there have been notable changes in Arab behavior
towards Iran in recent years. King Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia now actively
promotes Shi’a–Sunni reconciliation, initiated a national Shi’a–Sunni dialogue in 2003, and
invited Iraqi Shi’a and Sunni clerics to Mecca in October 2006 to condemn and stop sectarian

47 Ray Takeyh, ‘Iran’s New Iraq’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 13-30.
48 The Stanley Foundation, The Future of Persian Gulf Security: Alternatives for the 21 st Century (Muscatine
IA: The Stanley Foundation, 2005), p. 4.
49 Thomas R. Mattair, ‘Mutual Threat Perceptions in the Arab/Persian Gulf: GCC Perceptions’, Middle East

Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2007), pp. 133-40.

22
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

violence in Iraq. The Saudi king also refused to be a party to the U.S.-led Gulf coalition which
the Bush administration sought to create in 2007 to launch a military strike on Iran. Moreover,
in an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper published on January 27, 2007 the king explicitly
stated that Saudi Arabia was committed not to aid any foreign power to interfere in Iranian
affairs.50
A good number of factors that contributed to positive changes in Arab perceptions of
Iran need special mention here. First, as stated by Arab speakers from the Gulf at a conference
in Washington, D.C. in February 2008, the Arabs view current U.S. Middle East policy as part of
the problem rather than a solution to the region’s security tensions.51 Currently, they view the
U.S. as a new colonial power out to destroy Arab culture and civilization and welcome Iranian
opposition to the U.S. occupation of Iraq as a positive and right policy. Second, the GCC states,
particularly Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, prefer to engage Iran politically and diplomatically to
avoid confrontation that can destabilize the whole region. Third, large segments of Shi’a people
live in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and they are believed to be loyal to Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Najaf (Iraq) and indirectly to Shi’a clerics in Iran. The Shi’a in these
countries create internal pressures on their governments to pursue friendly policies towards
Iran.
Iran also has a lot to gain from improved relations with the Arab states. It provides the
Iranian government with the much needed Arab diplomatic support to effectively come out of
international isolation and promote economic and trade interactions with the Gulf Arab states.
Overall, the positive developments in Arab–Iran relations highlight two important points – a
gradual Arab shift away from the U.S. which is no longer seen as a harmless security guarantor,
and a change in Arab perceptions of Iran as a threat to their wealth and security which makes
an Arab–Iran rapprochement possible. Out of this change in Iran’s relations with its Arab
neighbors there might emerge better strategic understandings and security cooperation to the
effect of a gradual U.S. disengagement from the Persian Gulf and Middle East region. But

50 F. Gregory Gause, III, ‘Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance and the Sectarian
Question’, Strategic Insights, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2007. Available online at:
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Mar/gauseMar07.pdf (Information accessed: 24 July, 2008).
51 See the Middle East Institute conference transcript on ‚Iran on the Horizon‛ Panel II: Iran and the Gulf,

1 February, 2008. Available online at: http://www.mideasti.org/transcript/conference-iran-horizon-

febrauary-1-2008 (Information accessed: 4 April, 2008).

23
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

concrete steps to create a new Middle East security order through Arab–Iran cooperation are
still not on the horizon and this may guarantee the U.S. a longer military presence in the Gulf
area.

The Central Asian Constraint

Tensions in Iran’s relations with its Central Asian Muslim neighbors are an outcome of post-
cold war patterns of geo-strategic configurations. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991
unleashed four major powers – Iran, Russia, Turkey and the U.S. – to compete for influence in
Central Asia. China entered the foray later by seeking access to Kazakh, Azerbaijani and
Turkmen oil and gas resources. The competition between major powers gave rise to two rival
blocs: Russia-Armenia-Iran bloc versus Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia bloc backed by the U.S.
Conflicting strategic interests tie all the major powers in deadly competition for Central Asian
oil.
The U.S. interests in Central Asia clearly range from access to oil resources and energy
cooperation to open international trade that welcomes foreign investments. Russia considers
Central Asia, a part of the former USSR, its traditional underbelly and is suspicious of U.S. and
European presence on its southern border. China’s involvement in the region is mostly dictated
by its increasing demand for oil which may increase up to 40 percent by 2010. Iran is naturally
concerned about developments occurring on its north and northeastern borders but lacks the
power and technology to compete with other powers effectively.52 Turkey also has major stakes
in Central Asian oil and gas but it is the historical, cultural and linguistic bonds that tie her with
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other states in the region. The Azeri language is
particularly akin to Turkish language spoken in Anatolia.
There are significant similarities in Iranian and Russian interests in the Central Asian
region. Both Iran and Russia are opposed to the U.S. influence and both countries, with Chinese
support, seek to minimize U.S. involvement which is simply disturbing to Washington. The U.S.
strategy has been to use Turkey’s historical connections to Central Asia to counterbalance
Iranian and Russian influence. In order to isolate Iran from Central Asia the U.S. policymakers
have sought close partnership with Turkey and often preferred to negotiate with Russia

52 Ghafouri, ‘The Caspian Sea’, pp. 90-91.

24
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

directly.53 The strong U.S. support for the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
from Azerbaijan to Turkey showed waning Iranian and Russian influence in the region.
The post-cold war geopolitical alignments in Central Asia and the Caucasus have cost
Iran a lot in her relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Especially, the Iranian–
Turkish conflict developed quite a few challenging dimensions in the 1990s. Iran and Turkey,
despite being two Muslim states, sharply differ in terms of their ideological and political
orientations. While Iran is a Shi’a-dominated Islamic state, Turkey is a Sunni-dominated secular
and pro-U.S. state with Western-style democratic system of governance. Turkey perceives Iran’s
nuclear program with suspicion as it might embolden the anti-secularism Islamist
fundamentalists in Turkey and trouble Ankara’s relations with the West. Iran, on the other
hand, is dismayed by military agreements Turkey concluded with Israel in 1993 and 1996.
Tehran interprets Turkey’s growing military cooperation with Israel as an American and Israeli
attempt to encircle Iran militarily from the northern side of the Middle East region and threaten
Iranian security.54 The Turkish–Israeli defense relationship, to be sure, sparked a number of
other changes in Middle Eastern international relations. Syria moved closer to Iraq, and also
improved its relations with Iran. Iran’s missile program is thought to be greatly influenced by
the evolving defense cooperation between Turkey and Israel55.
Within the wider geopolitical competition in Central Asia, Iran’s conflicting relations
with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are largely dominated by the dynamics of Iran–Turkey
relations. Divided between Tsarist Russia and the Persian Empire in 1828, the Soviet-controlled
Azerbaijan ignited a nationalist movement in December 1989 to unite both Iranian and Soviet
Azerbaijan but, with Iranian consent, the former Soviet Union brutally suppressed the Azeri
nationalist movement. Neither did the U.S. nor Turkey support the Azeris either. Iran also did
not support Azerbaijan in her armed conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, an
Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijani territory. This obviously gave rise to strained relations
between Baku and Tehran and Azerbaijan’s shift toward Turkey and the U.S. Azerbaijan, at one
stage, even openly called on the Iranian Azeris to separate from Iran and join the motherland.56
Relations between the two Muslim neighbors still remain cold.

53 Criss and Gunar, ‘Geopolitical Configurations’, pp. 371-72.

54 Entessar, ‘Iran’s Security’, p. 550.
55 Dov Waxman (1999), ‘Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East’, The Washington

Quarterly, Vol. 22, no. 1, (Winter 1999), pp. 25-32.

56 Entessar, ‘Iran’s Security’, p. 550.

25
 PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Tehran’s relations with Turkmenistan are free from the type of hostility visible in its
relations with Baku but dominated by acute security concerns. Turkmenistan, often labeled the
Kuwait of Central Asia because of its abundant natural resources and fewer people, shares a
long border with Iran and most of its people live along the Iran– Turkmenistan border region.
Scared of its powerful neighbor on the west and dictated by the logic of classical balance of
power, Turkmenistan sought to counterbalance perceived Iranian influence and threats by
concluding military agreements with the Russian Federation in July 1992. Turkmenistan also
sought closer military relations with Turkey while attempting to maintain a low profile
relationship with Iran.57 Ice in Iran – Turkmenistan relations, however, began to melt by the
early 2000s, as evident in the construction of the Korpezhe-Kurt-Kui gas pipeline in 1997 and
export of gas to Iran, but security concerns still dominate Turkmenistan’s relations with Iran.
Iran’s record of poor relations with the Central Asian Muslim states highlights two
points. First, despite common religious and cultural bonds, Iran has failed to cultivate strong
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that create security concerns on the north and
northeast borders of Iran. Russia is the provider of Turkmen security while Iran remains the
security threat. Second, the strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, in particular, have
pushed the Azeris to the American and Turkish camp, a rival bloc whose interests lie in
weakening the Iranian power permanently.

IV. CONCLUSION

The brief analysis on Iranian power and its major constraints highlights two important points.
First, Iran has great potential to rise as a great power. The most promising areas of Iranian
power are its geo-strategic location, literally unlimited natural resources, military geography,
conventional fire power, and demographic strength. Iran’s overall strength is comparable to, it
might not sound an exaggeration, many of the present-day major powers, such as India in
South Asia, Germany and France in Europe, or China in East Asia. Other than economic might,
Iran fares well in important respects with all these powers. Second, Iran’s great power potential,
at the same time, is seriously challenged by a good number of apparently insurmountable

Robert V. Barylski, ‘The Russian Federation and Eurasia’s Islamic Crescent’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48,
57

No. 3, 1994, pp. 396-97.

26
 IRAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: ASSESSING IRANIAN POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS

obstacles. The American challenge to Iran, despite President Barack Obama’s recent overtures,
remains the most formidable, and developments in Iran–U.S. relations since 1979 portend no
hope that Iran can minimize U.S. threats in any major way. The U.S. threats, especially after
2003, have forced the Iranian leaders to embark on a nuclear program which the U.S. and other
Western states believe is directed towards the production of nuclear weapons. Tehran’s drive
for nuclear capability, and if it succeeds to arm itself with nukes, will, however, ensure Iran’s
bid for great power status and generate recognition of its assertive role and influence in regional
and global politics by an otherwise reluctant U.S.
On the regional front, Iranian foreign policy has greatly succeeded in improving
relations with the Arab states. The traditional threat perceptions are gradually disappearing
giving way to mutual understanding, and also widening the avenues for political, economic
and security cooperation. The Iraqi threats to Gulf security are already obliterated and a
restrained Iranian external behavior is a bonus point on top of that. Positive changes in the
otherwise hardened security environment indirectly indicate less and less U.S. influence in the
Gulf and Greater Middle East region and a corresponding rise in Iranian influence. That will
largely ensure Iran’s rise as a major power and generate recognition of its natural leadership in
the Gulf and Iranian preeminence in the Middle East. This situation is likely to reorient U.S.
policy towards Iran as well. Although overtly hostile to Iran, the U.S. policymakers have
secretly maintained some kind of communications with their Iranian counterparts. The Reagan
administration’s decision to supply arms to Iran during the Iraq–Iran war and the more recent
meetings between American and Iranian officials in Baghdad over security concerns in Iraq are
good indicators of Iran–U.S. future rapprochement. Such a rapprochement will further bolster
Iran’s status as a major power in global politics. However, Iran’s accusations of U.S. and
Western involvements in the post-presidential electoral violence in Tehran undermine the
possibility of a quick rapprochement between the two countries.

27

View publication stats