Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies

ISSN: 2576-5949 (Print) 2576-5957 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmei20

Analysing a Tumultuous Relationship: Turkey and

the US in the Middle East

Lenore G. Martin

To cite this article: Lenore G. Martin (2019) Analysing a Tumultuous Relationship: Turkey and the
US in the Middle East, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 13:2, 262-277, DOI:
10.1080/25765949.2019.1605571

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ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES
2019, VOL. 13, NO. 2, 262–277
https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1605571

ARTICLE

Analysing a Tumultuous Relationship: Turkey and the US

in the Middle East
Lenore G. Martina,b,c
a
Political Science and International Studies, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA, USA; bCenter for Middle
Eastern Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; cWeatherhead Center for International
Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article analyses the US-Turkish relationship in the Middle Trump administration;
East. Washington and Ankara’s policies have clashed in Syria, Iran, Turkey; US Middle East
Israel, Egypt, the GCC states and Iraq. The two NATO members policy; diplomacy; US-
strongly disagree over military sales, the extradition of Fetullah Turkish relationship
Gulen, the leader of the Hizmet movement accused of fomenting
the 2016 coup attempt who is ensconced in Pennsylvania, and
their ideological visions often diverge with President Erdog
an’s
affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood. Through the use of realist
and constructivist theories the article examines the decisions of
Presidents Erdog
an, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald
Trump as they have impacted US-Turkish relations in the Middle
East. The realist lens raises issues of changing systems and ques-
tions of balancing, while the constructivist lens is employed to
examine the weighty ideational and identity issues prevailing in
the region. The article concludes by applying the theoretical ana-
lysis to policy solutions.

1. Introduction
At the beginning of February 2018, after exchanging threats, it looked like US and
Turkish forces might even come to blows over Manbij, a Syrian town west of the
Euphrates.1 This was a new low in the contentious relationship that had been building
between the US and Turkey over their respective Middle East policies. Through intense
diplomatic efforts Ankara and Washington reached a tentative agreement over Manbij
and avoided a military incident between the US forces operating with the Syrian
Kurdish militia to combat the so called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) militants in the area and the
Turkish forces seeking to push the Kurds back from the border.2 Nevertheless, the cri-
sis in US-Turkish relations in the Middle East remains tumultuous and begs for a more

CONTACT Lenore G. Martin lgmartin@fas.harvard.edu Political Science and International Studies, Emmanuel
College, Boston, MA, USA; Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; Weatherhead
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambrige, MA, USA
1
C. Mun ~oz, ‘US, Turkish forces on course for clash in Syrian town’, The Washington Post, (5 February 2018), available
at: https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/feb/5/turkey-us-forces-course-clash-manbij-syria.
2
‘Syria conflict: US and Turkey agree to avert Manbij clash’, BBC, (16 February 2018), available at: https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-43084963.
ß Shanghai International Studies University 2019
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 263

comprehensive and longer lasting resolution. This is not the first time that relations
between Turkey and the US have been on a path towards a crisis, as exemplified by
the enormous tension over Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Turkey’s refusal to
allow the US to invade Iraq over the Turkish border in 2003, and Turkey’s vote against
the US resolution in the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran in 2010.3 It is
noteworthy that the two states were able to recover from these crises. This paper will
explore the extent to which a combination of realist and constructivist approaches will
provide both a fuller understanding of the wellsprings of this current crisis that a sin-
gle approach would not, as well as clues to achieving a resolution.
The paper will, accordingly, first describe the multifarious disputes and tensions
between Ankara and Washington that continue to stoke the current crises in their
Middle East foreign policies. We will next explore the explanations for these crises
from realist and constructivist perspectives. The last section of the paper will combine
both perspectives into proffering solutions that the Erdog
an administration and Trump
administration could adopt to resolve these crises.

2. The Current Crises in the US-Turkish Middle East Policies

Almost every relationship Turkey and the US has with each of the major actors in the
Middle East has produced serious tensions between their foreign policies. The list is
as follows.

2.1. Syria
The most acrid of the Ankara-Washington foreign policy disputes arises from their sup-
port of opposing forces in the Syrian civil war and their attitudes towards the Assad
regime. As is well known by now, in its quest to destroy the IS the US supports the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Washington is also wary about Russia and Iran extend-
ing their influence over the Assad regime and establishing bases in Syria that could
pose military threats to US allies in the region, namely Saudi Arabia and the other
monarchies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Jordan, Egypt and Israel.
The Syrian Kurdish militia known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG) leads the SDF
which also includes other Arab forces supported by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and Jordan.4 The Saudis, UAE and Jordan oppose the extension of
Iranian influence into Syria. Tehran has been providing ground forces of its own as
well as funding for other Shiite militia reinforcements such as Hezbollah for the Assad
regime. Qatar has a different agenda for its intervention in Syria, as Doha maintains a
friendly relationship with Tehran to the chagrin of the Saudis, the UAE, Bahrain and
Egypt. Qatar initially supported Muslim Brotherhood opposition groups in Syria.5 Then
when more radical Islamists associated with Al-Qaeda proved to be more effective

3
L. Martin, ‘Turkey and the US’, in R. Looney, ed., Handbook of US-Middle East Relations (London: Routledge, 2009),
pp. 297–309.
4
‘Saudi-UAE-Kurdish military meeting in northern Syria’, Middle East Monitor, (31 May 2018), available at: https://
www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180531-saudi-uae-kurdish-military-meeting-in-northern-syria.
5
C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East, (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2016) p. 136 and 193–194; A. Krieg and A. Bowman, ‘Qatar’s pragmatic Syria gamble’, The National
264 L. G. MARTIN

opponents of the Assad regime, Qatar allegedly supported these groups.6

Nevertheless, Qatar, needing US support in its dispute with the Saudi group, permitted
the US to strike Syria from its air base at Al-Udeid.7
For its part, Ankara views the YPG and the Syrian Kurdish political party, the
Democratic Union Party (PYD), as affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The
PKK is a terrorist group that for almost 35 years has been using violent means first to
win Kurdish independence and more recently to push for greater Kurdish cultural and
political rights in Turkey. Ankara therefore strongly opposes the PYD, viewing it as a
direct threat to Turkish territorial integrity. Instead, Ankara supports the Free Syrian
Army (FSA) in its goal to carve a security zone controlled by Turkey out of the Kurdish
controlled northern border. Turkey has also aligned with Qatar in seeking to support
various Islamist factions among the disparate rebel forces in the Syrian civil war.8
Moreover, Ankara has been coordinating its actions in Syria with Russia and Iran, in
order to align their support for suppressing Syrian Kurdish desire for autonomy in
Rojava, or ‘western Kurdistan.’ Turkey also needs Russian cooperation to hold back a
massive invasion of Assad regime forces in Idlib province that could send up to
another 800,000 refugees across the border into Turkey to add to the cost of caring
for the 3.5 million Syrian refugees already there.9
While the agreement between Washington and Ankara that required the PYD with-
drawal from Manbij has held, it has not stopped Turkey from pushing east to oppose
YPG operations across the Euphrates,10 renewing concerns of confrontations with US
forces.11 Complicating this is whether Washington would be willing to withdraw all US
forces and end its support of the YPG as Turkey has demanded.12 Moreover,
Washington harbors suspicions that Turkey has been engaging former IS and other
Islamic extremists to assist in Ankara’s efforts to oppose Syrian Kurds from establishing
autonomy at the Turkish border.13 Hence, the tension between Turkey and the US
over Syria will likely continue.14

Interest, (4 October 2017), available at: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/qatars-pragmatic-syria-gamble-

22602?page¼0%2C1.
6
C. Phillips, ‘Eyes bigger than stomachs: Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in Syria’, Middle East Policy xxiv(1), (Spring
2017), available at: https://www.mepc.org/journal/eyes-bigger-stomachs-turkey-saudi-arabia-and-qatar-syria.
7
S. Holland and T. Perry, ‘US, Britain, France launch air strikes in Syria’, Reuters, (13 April 2018), available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria/corrected-wrapup-15-us-britain-france-launch-air-strikes-in-
syria-idUSL8N1RQ5AZ; ‘Syrian official denounces Qatar’s ‘shameful’ stance on strikes’, Egypt Today, (14 April
2018), available at: http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/47774/Syrian-official-denounces-Qatar%E2%80%99s-
%E2%80%98shameful%E2%80%99-stance-on-strikes.
8
T. Perry and S. Al-Khalidi, ‘Gulf crisis seen widening split in Syria rebellion’, Reuters, (14 June 2017), available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-syria/gulf-crisis-seen-widening-split-in-syria-rebellion-idUSKBN19517O.
9
K. Kirisçi, ‘The Idlib offensive could create a major refugee outflow – what should Turkey do?’, Brookings, (6
September 2008), available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/06/the-idlib-offensive-
could-create-a-major-refugee-outflow-what-should-turkey-do.
10
‘Turkish army hits east of Euphrates in Syria’, Hurriyet Daily News, (28 October 2018), available at: http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-army-hits-east-of-euphrates-in-syria-138339.
11
A. Yackley, ‘Turkey raises stakes in Syria with shelling of Kurdish targets’, Al-Monitor, (29 October 2018), available
at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/turkey-raise-stakes-syria-shelling-kurdish-targets.html.
12
M.Specia, ‘The Planned U.S. Troop Withdrawal From Syria: Here’s the Latest’ ( 16 January 2019), available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/world/middleeast/syria-us-troops-timeline.html.
13
C. Clarke and A. Yayla, ‘Erdog
an’s fatal blind spot’, The Rand Blog, (16 February 2018), available at: https://www.
rand.org/blog/2018/02/erdogans-fatal-blind-spot.html.
14
See K. Kanat and J. Hannon, ‘The Manbij roadmap and the future of US-Turkish relations’, Middle East Policy 25(3),
(Autumn 2018), available at: https://www.mepc.org/journal/manbij-roadmap-and-future-us-turkish-relations.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 265

2.2 Iran
When the Trump administration disavowed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) to restrain Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and re-imposed sanctions
on Iran, Ankara denounced the sanctions and told Washington Turkey would not stop
trading with Iran.15 Turkey, which is heavily dependent on energy imports, maintains a
strong bilateral economic relationship with Iran, depending on its neighbor for signifi-
cant supplies of oil and gas. In 2015, for example, Iran supplied 21% of Turkey’s
imports of oil and 16% of its imports of gas.16 Moreover, Iran was Turkey’s largest
trading partner in the Gulf region in 2016 in terms of their balance of trade, and its
second largest in 2017 (ceding first place that year to the UAE).17 For these reasons,
Turkey has opposed the US policy of isolating Iran and has declared its willingness to
evade sanctions that the Trump administration intends to impose on Iran.18
Despite Iranian-Turkish cooperation with respect to the Syrian Kurds as already
noted, their Middle East policies are not necessarily congruent.19 This is particularly
the case when it comes to Iran’s reluctance to provide Turkey with full cooperation in
suppressing Kurdish nationalism across the Iranian border in northern Iraq.20 Iran may
wish to keep its options open to ‘play the PKK card’ in the future, as it has in the past,
when Turkey accused Iran of surreptitiously aiding the PKK.21 For example, in aid of
Assad’s reintegration of Syria if the civil war ends, Iran may wish to apply counter
pressure against Turkey’s maintaining a permanent security zone in Syria.

2.3 Israel
The third most contentious issue between Ankara and Washington over their Middle
East policies arises from the strong support of the Trump administration for Israel,
symbolised by its decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, and the equally
strong antipathy for Israel by the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). This was symbolised by the acrimonious exchange between the
governments and downgrading of their diplomatic representatives after the violence
at the Gaza border with Israel in May, 2018.22 The AKP animosity towards Israel arises

15
‘Turkey told US it opposes sanctions on Iran: foreign minister’, Reuters, (24 July 2018), available at: https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-oil-iran-turkey/turkey-told-u-s-it-opposes-sanctions-on-iran-foreign-minister-idUSKBN1KE27J.
16
US Energy Information Administration, ‘Country Analysis Brief: Turkey’, (2 February 2017), p. 4, full report pdf,
available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/intemational/analysis.php?iso¼TUR.
17
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Turkey-Iran economic and commercial relations’, available at: http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-and-commercial-relations-with-iran.en.mfa; International Monetary Fund, ‘Direction of
Trade Statistics 2017’.
18
‘Turkey says it will not abide by renewed sanctions on Iran’, New York Times, (6 November 2018), available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2018/11/06/business/06reuters-usa-iran-sanctions-turkey.html; ‘Turkey ‘ready’ to
launch SPV with Iran to bypass US sanctions’, Al Jazeera, (14 February 2019), available at: https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2019/02/turkey-ready-launch-spv-iran-bypass-sanctions-190214140123572.html.
19
B. Friedman, ‘Iran and Turkey: between cooperation and conflict’, Tel Aviv Notes 12(7), (30 April 2018), available at:
https://dayan.org/content/iran-and-turkey-between-cooperation-and-conflict.
20
M. Cavusoglu, ‘Turkish FM calls for joint efforts with Iran against PKK’, Hurriyet Daily News, (22 June 2018),
available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-fm-calls-for-joint-efforts-with-iran-against-pkk-133656.
21
L. Martin, ‘Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy’, in L. Martin, ed., The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2004), p. 174.
22
I. Yasha, ‘A new crisis in Turkey-Israel relations’, Middle East Monitor, (17 May 2018), available at: https://www.
middleeastmonitor.com/20180517-a-new-crisis-in-turkey-israel-relations/.
266 L. G. MARTIN

in part from President Erdog
an’s efforts to push Turkey into a leadership position in
the larger Islamic world, garnering popularity by supporting the Palestinian cause,
including by cultivating friendly relations with Hamas. Examples abound, including
Turkey’s highly publicised ships bringing food and humanitarian aid to Gaza.23 These
policies and Erdog
an’s sharp criticism of Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos in
2009 garnered a huge bump in Erdog
an’s popularity, making him the most admired
leader in the region in a 2011 public opinion poll.24 Nevertheless, Ankara has recently
engaged in quiet moves to restore diplomatic relations with Israel, and avoid disrup-
tion of trade and acquisition of Israeli military technology.25 The US remains a major
supporter of Israel. So, without a softening of Ankara’s hostile attitudes towards the
Israeli government, incidents are likely to occur in the future that will add to US-
Turkish tension.

2.4 Egypt
The Erdog
an government’s antipathy to the Al-Sisi regime in Egypt is almost as pro-
nounced as its self-professed animosity to Israel. It creates another area of tension
with the United States which has maintained strong support for Egypt since Al-Sisi’s
ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt in 2013. Among other things,
Washington views Egypt as an important ally contributing towards stability in the
Arab world, including for its maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. Accordingly,
the US provides political support and $1.3 billion dollars annually of military aid for
Cairo.26 Though it should be noted that economic aid has been reduced as a number
of US officials are concerned about democracy deficits.27
Turkey fuels its breach of relations with Egypt by harboring leaders of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood and supporting Hamas in Gaza, which Cairo views as a terrorist
organisation.28 Furthermore, Egypt and Turkey have downgraded their diplomatic rep-
resentatives and engaged in other diplomatically hostile exchanges including threats
over Egypt’s claim to a significant gas field close to Cyprus.29 They have also sup-
ported opposing factions in the Libyan civil war.30 Relations exacerbated when Egypt

23
‘Turkish aid ship carrying tons of supplies for blockaded Gaza Strip arrives in Israel,’ Daily Sabah, (21 June 2017),
available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2017/06/21/turkish-aid-ship-carrying-tons-of-supplies-for-blockaded-
gaza-strip-arrives-in-israel.
24
S. Telhami, ‘2010 Annual Public Opinion Poll’, page/slide 64, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/0805_arabic_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf.
25
H Siegers, ‘Geopolitics keeps pushing Turkey and Israel back together’, Stratfor Worldview, (8 October 2018),
available at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-keeps-pushing-turkey-and-israel-back-together.
26
J. Sharp, ‘Egypt: background and US relations’, Congressional Research Service, (7 June 2018), available at: https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf; B. Klingan, ‘Commentary: the US is right to restore aid to Egypt’, Reuters, (30
July 2018), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-
to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE.
27
J. Sharp, pp. 15–17.
28
B. Kotan, ‘An overview of Turkish-Egyptian relations since the Arab Uprising’, TRT World, (27 November 2017),
available at: https://www.trtworld.com/mea/an-overview-of-turkish-egyptian-relations-since-the-arab-uprising-12658.
29
A. Megahid, ‘Tensions rise between Egypt and Turkey over Eastern Mediterranean resources’, Arab Weekly, (11
February 2018), available at: https://thearabweekly.com/tensions-rise-between-egypt-and-turkey-over-eastern-
mediterranean-resources.
30
S. Cagaptay and M. Sievers, ‘Turkey and Egypt’s great game in the Middle East’, The Washington Institute, (8
March 2015), available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-egypts-great-game-in-
the-middle-east.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 267

joined the Saudi, UAE, Bahrain boycott of Qatar, for Doha’s support for the Muslim
Brothers, among other reasons. Nevertheless, as with Israel, economic relations do not
appear to have been disrupted by these diplomatic disputes.31 Trade between Egypt
and Turkey increased by 12% in 2018, though trade between Egypt and Qatar
declined.32 Washington’s relations with Ankara are sufficiently rocky that it is unable
to apply pressure to resolve these ideological disputes between Turkey and Egypt
and Qatar.

2.5 Saudi Arabia and the Other GCC States

There is tension between the US and Turkey concerning their foreign policies and rela-
tionships with Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), but of a less contentious nature. This tension arises from Turkey’s support of
Qatar in its dispute with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. The Saudi led
group imposed an embargo on Qatar starting in June of 2017 and demanded, among
other things, that Doha end its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, considered by
the group to be a terrorist organisation, and shut down the Turkish base which had
received more support from Ankara in response to the 2017 embargo.33 The UAE in
particular has engaged in strong ideological antipathy to Turkey. Both countries have
escalated their diplomatic exchanges with scathing rhetoric. These include accusations
by Ankara of Abu Dhabi’s support for the coup attempt against President Erdog
an on
34
15 July 2016 and sparring over the history of the Ottoman sultans.
On the other hand, until the Khashoggi incident at least, it appeared as though
Ankara would not let its support for Qatar and the Muslim Brothers create the same
rupture with Saudi Arabia as it has its contentious relations with Egypt. For example,
President Erdog
an made a trip to the Gulf with an important stop in June 2017 to try
to mediate an end to the Saudi-Qatar split. Moreover, despite the Saudi Crown Prince,
Mohammed bin Salman, linking Turkey with Iran and hardline Islamists in March, 2018,
Saudi troops participated with Turkish forces and others in a military exercise in Izmir
in April, 2018.35
However, the Turkish-Saudi relationship again soured as a result of the murder of
Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist critic of the Saudi regime, by Saudi operatives in the
Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. It is not clear how far Ankara wants to

31
T. Sakr, ‘Turkey plans to establish a global industrial city in Egypt by 2019’, Egypt Independent, (19 June 2018),
available at: https://www.egyptindependent.com/turkey-plans-establish-global-industrial-city-egypt-2019.
32
A. Fouad, ‘Despite friction, Egypt retains economic ties with Turkey, Qatar’, Al-Monitor, (17 March 2019). Fouad
quotes Trademap.com for his statistics which the author also checked.
33
‘Saudi and the Brotherhood: from friends to foes’, Al Jazeera, (23 June 2017), available at: https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2017/06/saudi-brotherhood-friends-foes-170623093039202.html; B. Hubbard, ‘Arab nations demand Qatar
shut Al Jazeera, cut Islamist ties and detail funding’, New York Times, (23 June 2017), available at: https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/06/23/world/middleeast/qatar-saudi-arabia-al-jazeera.html.
34
Y. Sheiko, ‘The United Arab Emirates: Turkey’s new rival’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (16
February 2018), available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-united-arab-emirates-turkeys-
new-rival.
35
‘Saudi prince says Turkey part of ‘triangle of evil’: Egyptian media’, Reuters, (7 March 2018), available at: https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-saudi-turkey/saudi-prince-says-turkey-part-of-triangle-of-evil-egyptian-mediaidUSKCNlGJlWW; ‘Saudi
Arabia troops participate in joint military drills in Turkey’, Middle East Monitor, (30 April 2018), available at: https://
www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180430-saudi-arabia-troops-participate-injoint-military-drills-in-turkey.
268 L. G. MARTIN

take this incident. It appears to be joined by the Trump administration in an unwilling-

ness to severely jeopardise relations with the Kingdom.36 Moreover, the Trump admin-
istration also appears unwilling to sever ties with Qatar, which permits the US to
maintain an important air base at Al Udeid.37 This despite Qatar’s circumventing US
sanctions against Turkey for refusing to release the US pastor, Andrew Brunson, by
loaning it $15 billion.38

2.6 Iraq
Ankara dropped its support of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after oppos-
ing the ill-fated referendum for Iraqi Kurdish autonomy in September 2017. That has
revitalised Turkey’s willingness to support the federal government in Baghdad. This in
turn has facilitated a reduction of Turkey’s tension over relations with Baghdad which
had opposed Ankara’s energy deals with the KRG. Nevertheless, as we saw with the
Gulf countries and Egypt, economic relations between the KRG and Turkey continue.
Washington also proclaims its support for a federal government. There has even been
intelligence cooperation between the US and Turkish military in Turkey’s operations
against the PKK in northern Iraq.39 Washington even offered a reward for information
leading to the capture of the three top PKK military leaders.40 Ankara and Washington
have both operated militarily in Iraq: the US in combating pockets of the so-called
Islamic State,41 and Turkey in its military incursion into the northeast of Iraq to elimin-
ate the PKK from its havens in the Qandil mountains. Iraq currently appears to present
the least contentious source of tension between the US and Turkey.

3. Other Tensions Fueling the Turkish-US Relationship in the Middle East

While not directly related to their Middle East foreign policies, Turkey and the US have
generated additional disputes in their relationship that help fuel their Middle East pol-
icy crises. There are four areas of dispute: (i) Turkey’s desire to install Russian surface
to air missile systems; (ii) the refusal by the US to extradite Fethullah Gu€len to Turkey;
(iii) Washington’s imposition of economic pressure on Turkey; and (iv) Ankara’s toler-
ance and at times encouragement of popular antipathy against the US.

36
‘Donald Trump says ‘rogue killers’ may have murdered Khashoggi’, The Guardian, (15 October 2018), available
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/15/turkey-jamal-khashoggi-granted-permission-search-saudi-
arabia-consulate-istanbul.
37
N. Obeid, ‘Trump will regret changing his mind about Qatar’, Foreign Policy, (15 August 2018), available at: https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/trump-will-regret-changing-his-mind-about-qatar.
38
J. Ewing and C. Gall, ‘Qatar comes to aid of Turkey offering $15 billion life line’, New York Times, (15 August
2018), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/world/europe/turkey-andrew-brunson-tariffs.html.
39
G. Lubold, J. Barnes and M. Coker, ‘US to expand intelligence cooperation with Turkey’, Wall Street Journal, (10
May 2017), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-expand-intelligence-cooperation-with-turkey-1494436533;
S. Demirtas, ‘Turkey eyes ‘four-way deal’ against PKK in northern Iraq’, Hurriyet Daily News, (15 July 2018), available
at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ypg-to-be-disarmed-as-it-leaves-manbij-turkish-fm-132807.
40
E. Erkoyun and A. Kucukgocmen, ‘US offers reward for information on senior PKK figures’, Reuters, (6 November
2018), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-usa-pkk/u-s-offers-reward-for-information-on-senior-pkk-
figures-idUSKCN1NB2CH.
41
‘War against Islamic State in Iraq’, Council of Foreign Relations, (15 October 2018), available at: https://www.cfr.
org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/war-against-islamic-state-in-iraq.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 269

3.1 Turkey’s Purchase of S-400 Missile System from Russia

Washington views Turkey’s purchase of the Russian ballistic missile defense system,
known as the S-400, as upping the ante in Ankara’s negotiations over a number of
other critical issues in the US-Turkey relationship. US and NATO spokespersons reject
Ankara’s contention that S-400 is a more capable and less costly system than alterna-
tive US or European missile defense systems. They claim the system will be one-third
the price.42
Perhaps most importantly Turkey wants the missile defense system to include tech-
nology transfer to bolster Turkey’s own weapons production.43 This is something the
US has been resisting. Washington argues that the Russian system makes little sense
for Turkey, given the lack of ‘interoperability’ with NATO systems and the US concern
that Russia would be able to gather vital intelligence information on the 100 F-35 air-
craft that Turkey has ordered from the US.44 Washington is, therefore, trying to per-
suade Ankara to purchase US made Patriot missiles instead of the Russian system.45
This row has an interesting twist. The F-35 was partially developed with Turkey and
Turkey sources some parts of the fighter. Ending Turkey’s access to the fighter could
slow down the program. On the other hand, Turkey would not be included in the
development of the fifth generation of the fighter.46

€ len
3.2 Washington’s Refusal to Extradite Fethullah Gu
Ankara released Pastor Andrew Brunson who was jailed in Turkey for two years after
being accused of links to the PKK and Gulenist ‘terrorists.’47 Brunson’s release reduced
one of the stakes in the diplomatic poker game being played between Ankara and
Washington over the demands for releases of ‘political prisoners’ roiling their

42
‘Turkish S-400 buy to stop US from supplying patriot missiles, F-35 fighters: local media’, Defense World.Net, (9
February 2019), available at: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/24233/Turkish_S_400_Buy_to_Stop_US_from_
Supplying_Patriot_Missiles__F35_Fighters__Local_Media#.XJg8ei2ZO_N.
43
‘Allure of domestic arms drives Turkey Toward Russian Missiles’, Voice of America, (19 July 2018), available at:
https://www.voanews.com/a/allure-of-domestic-arms-drives-turkey-toward-russian-missiles/4489495.html; X. Guo, ‘Is
Turkey acting fairly? — Turkey’s choice in T-LORAMIDS,’ Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 11(2),
(2017), p. 69.
44
‘Pompeo presses Turkey on S-400 missile purchase from Russia’, Reuters, (27 April 2018), available at: https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-foreign-usa-turkey/pompeo-presses-turkey-on-s-400-missiles-purchase-from-
russia-idUSKBN1HY2A6; A. Macias, ‘Turkey begins constructing site for Russian missile system – despite US
warnings’, Reuters, (6 September 2018), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-foreign-usa-turkey/
pompeo-presses-turkey-on-s-400-missiles-purchase-from-russia-idUSKBN1HY2A6; B. Harris, ‘Congress splits over F-
35 sale to Turkey’, Al Monitor, (12 June 2018), available at: https://www.al-m01onitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/
06/congress-splits-f35-sale-turkey.html.
45
M. Stone, A. Shalal, ‘US State Department in talks with Turkey to sell Patriot system’, Reuters, (16 July 2018),
available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-airshow-patriot/u-s-state-department-in-talks-with-turkey-to-
sell-patriot-system-idUSKBN1K61LH.
46
T. Copp, ‘Pence: ‘we will not stand idly by’ as Turkey purchases S-400’, Military Times, (16 February 2019), available
at: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/24233/Turkish_S_400_Buy_to_Stop_US_from_Supplying_Patriot_Missiles__F_
35_Fighters__Local_Media#.XJfsQutKhsY.
47
E. Cunningham, ‘US pastor Andrew Brunson leaves Turkey after being detained for 2 years’, Washington Post, (12
October 2018), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkish-court-orders-release-of-us-
pastor-andrew-brunson/2018/10/12/a793df78-ccbf-11e8-ad0a-0e01efba3cc1_story.html?utm_term¼.6fb1c0d0690b; P.
Baker and C. Gall, ‘Trump welcomes home pastor Andrew Brunson, but denies link to Saudi case’, New York Times,
(13 October 2018), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/us/politics/trump-pastor-brunson-
khashoggi.html.
270 L. G. MARTIN

respective publics.48 That leaves a number of these issues still on the table, central to
which is Ankara’s demand that the US extradite Fethullah Gu €len to face charges in
Turkey of fomenting the failed coup of July 2016. It continues to rankle the Erdog
an
administration that Fetullah Gulen, the leader of the Hizmet movement, remains at
large. Gulen, a former Erdog
an ally, is seen as turning on the AKP government when
using his followers in the police and judiciary to investigate and reveal government
corruption on December 17, 2013 and then for allegedly organizing the 2016 coup
attempt when Erdog
an began putting pressure on the Gulenists. Following the
attempted coup of 2016 almost 5000 professors49 and thousands of ‘suspected’
Gulenists that have been arrested, jailed, denied civil service jobs, pension and pass-
ports, on charges of plotting the coup or supporting ‘terrorism,’50 as well as the hun-
dreds of journalists jailed on similar charges.51 While Pastor Brunson was a high-profile
case that ended well on a personal level, there are other Americans typically with dual
citizenship held in Turkish jails that remain hostages in this diplomatic poker game.52

3.3 American Economic Pressure on Turkey

Turkey previously evaded US sanctions imposed on Iran because of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram. This led to the conviction in the US of a Halkbank official and the prospect of
heavy fines on the bank that could affect the Turkish economy.53 The US granted
Turkey a temporary waiver of US sanctions on Iran on November 5, 2018 that would
have crippled Turkey’s import of oil from Iran.54 But the waiver only includes 60,000
bpd as compared to the 200,000 bpd it imports.55 Even if sanctions on the import
of Iranian energy supplies are reimposed, Turkey has announced that it will
not comply with them.56 The Trump administration has also been imposing tariffs
on Turkish goods that put pressure on the Turkish economy and weakened the

48
C. Gall, ‘Turkey frees pastor Andrew Brunson, easing tensions with US’, New York Times, (12 October 2018),
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/world/europe/turkey-us-pastor-andrew-brunson.html.
49
H. Pamuk and E. Toksabay, ‘Purge of academics leaves future of Turkish universities in doubt’, Reuters (1 March
2017), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-academics/purge-of-academics-leaves-future-of-
turkish-universities-in-doubt-idUSKBN1684DE.
50
S. Hansen, ‘Inside Turkey’s purge’, New York Times, (13 April 2017), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
04/13/magazine/inside-turkeys-purge.html.
51
‘Turkey: anti-Erdog
an journalists defiant after convictions on terror charges’, The Guardian, (25 April 2018),
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/26/turkey-anti-erdogan-journalists-defiant-convictions-
terror-charges.
52
C. Gall, ‘Americans jailed after failed coup in Turkey are hostages to politics’, New York Times, (7 October 2017),
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/07/world/europe/turkey-american-detainees.html.
53
B. Weiser, ‘Turkish banks in Iran sanctions-busting case sentenced to 32 months’, New York Times, (16 May 2018),
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/turkish-iran-sanctions-trial.html; ‘Turkish finance minister
upbeat over Halkbank sanctions-busting case,’ New York Times, (5 November 2018), available at: https://www.
nytimes.com/reuters/2018/11/05/world/middleeast/05reuters-turkey-usa-halkbank-minister.html.
54
C. Mun ~oz, ‘Turkey to continue importing Iranian oil, despite US sanctions’, The Washington Post, (25 July 2018),
available at: https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jul/25/turkey-to-continue-importing-iranian-oil-despite-u;
S. Dadouch, ‘Turkey has US waiver on Iran sanctions: minister’, Reuters, (2 November 2018), available at: https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-sanctions-turkey-waiver/turkey-has-us-waiver-on-iran-sanctions-minister-idUSKCN1N71TR.
55
J. Payne, ‘Turkey resumes Iranian oil imports under US sanctions waiver’, Reuters, (8 January 2019), available at: https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-iran-oil/turkey-resumes-iranian-oil-imports-under-u-s-sanctions-waiver-idUSKCN1P21AD.
56
‘President Erdo
gan in talks with Hassan Rouhani in Russia vows to strengthen trade with Iran’, Al Jazeera, (14
February 2019), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/turkey-ready-launch-spv-iran-bypass-sanctions-
190214140123572.html.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 271

lira.57 It’s not clear, however, that such economic pressures would make a material dif-
ference on Turkey’s overall trade imbalances, as US foreign direct investment in Turkey
and its import/export balance is not significant compared to Turkey’s economic relations
with Europe or even major trading relations with the larger Middle East players.58

3.4 Popular Antipathy to the US

On the other hand, US sanctions and increased tariffs have given yet another excuse for
President Erdog
an to blame the US for Turkey’s economic woes and the slide in the
59
lira. The President’s salvos against the US are intended not just to deflect blame from
self-made economic blunders but generally to boost his popularity among the voting
public and support for his increasingly autocratic governing style. Stoking popular antip-
athy against the US by blaming the US for the July 2016 coup, and criticising the US
among other things for moving the US embassy to Jerusalem,60 makes it even more dif-

an to reverse his positions so as to move Washington and Ankara
ficult for Erdog
towards a reconciliation of their foreign policies in the Middle East.

4. Realist Explanations of the Turkey-US Crisis Concerning Their Middle

East Policies
Common to the various schools of realism61 and their analysis of foreign policy is their
emphasis on the need to examine the power position of states in the international
arena,62 or in our case the Middle East region. To maintain their national security,
states need to build up their own resources and/or form alliances to balance the
power of a potential hegemon.63 Balancing power to oppose a potential hegemon in
an international political system does not always succeed however.64 If a multipolar

57
C. Gall and J. Ewing, ‘Tensions between Turkey and US soar as Trump orders new sanctions’, New York Times, (1
August 2018), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/europe/us-sanctions-turkey-pastor.
html?login¼email&auth¼login-email.
58
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Turkey-Iran economic and commercial relations’, available at: http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-and-commercial-relations-with-iran.en.mfa; International Monetary Fund, ‘Direction of
Trade Statistics 2017’; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, ‘Foreign direct investments in Turkey’, p. 20, available
at: https://www.economy.gov.tr/portal/content/conn/UCM/uuid/dDocName:EK-230270; E. Bayrsli, ‘Welcome to the
new US-Turkish relationship’, The New Republic, (9 August 2018), available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/
150558/welcome-new-usturkish-relationship.
59

an to Turkey: the West is waging ‘economic war’’, The New York Times, (17 August 2018), available
C. Gall, ‘Erdog
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-economic-crisis-lira-trump.html; K. Sengupta,
‘The Turkey-Erdog
an crisis is the first geopolitical disaster in a while that isn’t actually Trump’s fault’, The
Independent, (14 August 2018), available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/turkey-financial-economic-crisis-
lira-erdogan-trump-us-row-a8491141.html.
60
‘Turkey’s president blames US for moving world towards ‘dark days’’, The Guardian, (14 May 2018), available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/14/turkey-president-blames-us-for-returning-world-to-dark-days.
61
See S. Walt, ‘International relations: one world, many theories’, Foreign Policy 110, (Spring 1998), available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275?seq¼1#page_scan_tab_contents; F. Liu and R. Zhang, ‘The typologies of
realism’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, (2006), pp. 109–134.
62
See S. Walt, ‘US grand strategy after the Cold War: can realism explain it? should realism guide it?’ International
Relations 32(1), (2018), pp. 3–22.
63
Ibid.
64
See for example the examination of historical balance of power and hegemonial systems in W. Wohlforth, R. Little,
S. Kaufman, D. Kang, C. Jones, V. Hui, A. Eckstein, D. Deudney and W. Brenner, ‘Testing balance-of-power theory in
world history’, European Journal of International Relations 13(2), (2007), pp. 155–185.
272 L. G. MARTIN

Table 1. Middle East Major Actor Capabilities 2017.

Total Armed Combat Main Battle Defense Budget
Country Forces (Reserves) Aircraft Tanks 2017 (in US bn) GDP (in US bn)
TURKEY 355,200 333 2485 7.98 841
(378,700)
IRAN 523,000 334 1513þ 16 (estimated) 428
(125,000
Revolutionary Guards;
40,000 paramilitary)
SAUDI 227,000 365 900 76.7 679
ARABIA (24,500 paramilitary)
EGYPT 438,500 557 2460 3.97 (incl. 1.3 US 332 (2016)
(479,000) military
assistance)
ISRAEL 176,500 347 460 21.6 (incl. 3.1 US 348
(465,000) military
assistance)
Figures are from The Military Balance, 2018.

system becomes ‘unstable’ it could be transformed, for example, into another system
such as a bipolar system, as evidenced by the Cold War blocs that eventuated after
World War II.65 Realists would explain this systemic ‘instability’ by the ‘reality’ that in
choosing their alliances, states need to rationally analyse the relative costs, benefits
and risks of joining the hegemon’s bandwagon or joining the allies that oppose it. As
a result, in an anarchical international system, cooperation among contending states is
fragile and a state’s ability to shift its alignments becomes critical.66
From a realist perspective it is evident that the power structure in the Middle East
has undertaken a transformation following the US ceding dominance over the region.
This occurred after the Obama administration withdrew most of the American ground
and air forces from Iraq in 2011. The US retraction of its hard power created a power
vacuum. This allowed five major states in the region with relatively equal military and
material capabilities to contend for power: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt
(See Table 1), to which can be added the US and Russia. Both of these global actors
have the capability to interject cruise missiles and aircraft into the area without main-
taining substantial numbers of ground forces in the region. While the current structure
of the Middle East system should be conducive to balance of power politics in the
region, the sectarian ideological splits interferes with the shifting of alignments that is
critical for the stability of the system.
In the inter-state politics of the current Middle East, we observe that two of the
major actors in the region have collided in their contention to fill the vacuum: Iran
and Saudi Arabia. They have also vied for allegiance from sectarian allies. Thus, Iran’s
Shiite ‘crescent’ of alignments that include Shia militias in Iraq, the Assad regime in
Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, are seen as posing a threat to
encourage regime opposition among the potentially restive Shia populations in the
GCC states, and in particular the Shias that predominate in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich

65
For explanations as to how instability transformed the European dominated global balance of power in the
twentieth century into a bipolar system, see M. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York:
Wiley, 1957), pp. 22–36.
66
See S. Walt, ‘US grand strategy after the Cold War: can realism explain it? should realism guide it?’ International
Relations 32(1), (2018), pp. 3–22.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 273

Eastern Province. To counter the risk of Iranian-backed Shia dominance, Saudi Arabia
has coalesced a Sunni group that includes primarily the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan and
Egypt. This Sunni alliance has the tacit support of the US through its provision of mili-
tary equipment, training and intelligence, military bases in the Arabian Gulf, plus a lim-
ited number of ground forces actively opposing the so called Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria.67 There are also reports of covert military cooperation between Israel and Saudi
Arabia and Israel and the UAE.68 This is not surprising given their common view of
Iran as a hegemonial threat in the region.
Given this Middle East balance of power, applying a realist perspective, how should
Turkey craft its foreign policies in the region? More pointedly, should Ankara try to
resolve its crises with Washington and align itself closer to America’s Middle East poli-
cies? Or is it more advantageous for Turkey to maintain its independence and act as a
‘balancer’ between the contending Sunni-Shia factions in the region, or between the
various intervenors into the Syrian civil war, even at the risk of disturbing its US ally
and NATO?
In making its strategic calculus, to what extent should Ankara be concerned about
Russia filling the power vacuum in the region? Moscow has projected hard power into
a greatly updated naval base and a new air base in Syria while supporting the Assad
region in the Syrian civil war. Furthermore, Russia has built up its ground and air
forces in the Crimea69 and its naval forces in the Black Sea.70 All of these extensions
of Russia’s military power in the Middle East and the surrounding areas should, from a
realist perspective, increase the risk of threats to Turkish national security.
Yet Ankara has shown no outward signs of increased concern as it continues to
engage in crisis mode with the US with apparent impunity. While the US press has
speculated as to how long Turkey’s allies in NATO will tolerate Ankara’s wayward
behavior and ‘coziness’ with Moscow,71 there have been no strong indications from
NATO spokespeople that NATO is seriously considering the expulsion of Turkey from
the alliance. From a realist perspective, Turkey is critical for the alliance because of its
geostrategic importance. This significance is enhanced by Turkey’s willingness to allow
the US to use the Incirlik air base with its proximity to Syria and easy reach to the rest
of the region, notwithstanding Ankara’s occasional disruptions in the American use of
Incirlik to score political points.72

67
T. El-Ghobashy and P. Sonne, ‘US disbands command overseeing American ground forces in Iraq, as major combat
against ISIS ends’, Washington Post, (30 April 2018), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_
east/us-shuts-down-ground-forces-office-in-iraq-as-combat-against-islamic-state-ends/2018/04/30/2c7b3fcc-4c61-11e8-
af46-b1d6dc0d9bfe_story.html.
68
M. Wang, ‘Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: new regional alliances and the Palestinian struggle’,
SOAS Middle East in London, (27 January 2018), available at: https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/the-middle-east-in-london/2018/
01/27/israel-saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-new-regional-alliances-and-the-palestinian-struggle.
69
‘Number of Russian military in Crimea increased almost 2.7 times for five years – Defense Ministry’, Ukrinform, (24
April 2018), available at: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/2448058-number-of-russian-military-in-crimea-
increased-almost-27-times-for-five-years-defense-ministry.html.
70
D. Majumdar, ‘All is not well with Russia’s Black Sea fleet’, The National Interest, (20 June 2018), available at:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/all-not-well-russias-black-sea-fleet-26352.
71
A. Malcolm, ‘Is it time to boot Turkey from NATO to save it?’ San Francisco Chronicle, (23 August 2018), available
at: https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Is-it-time-to-boot-Turkey-from-NATO-to-save-it-13178635.php.
72
K. Rempfer, ‘US considering permanent cutbacks at Incirlik air base in Turkey’, Military Times, (12 March 2018),
available at: https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/03/12/us-considering-permanent-cutbacks-at-incirlik-air-
base-in-turkey; G. Lubold, F. Schwartz and N. Youssef, ‘US pares back use of Turkish base amid strains with Ankara’,
274 L. G. MARTIN

In response to these questions concerning Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East,
there is no lack of commentary from realist analysts.73 Not all of the realist commen-
tary has been supportive. For example, Yuri Nesilyurt criticises the policies of the
Erdog
an government during the Arab Uprising for diverting from realism with their
promotion of a Muslim Brotherhood agenda abroad and more autocracy at home.74
On the other hand in defence of the Middle East policies of the Justice and
Development Party, a realist could commend Ankara for pursuing a rational foreign
policy in the unstable system of Middle East politics by playing a balancing game for
the purpose of maximising its security interests/options. Ankara maintains friendly rela-
tions with the ‘enemies of the US,’ namely Iran and Russia and their respective Middle
East allies, to secure energy supplies and enable Turkey to combat Kurdish extremists
in Syria. These political friendships stoke much of the crises in Ankara’s relations with
the US. At the same time, Ankara is careful not to provoke a complete rupture of its
relations with Washington to forestall loss of its existential protection from NATO and
potentially trigger an adverse effect on its economic lifeline with Europe.
Alternatively, could a realist blame the crises with Turkey on the failure of the US
to conduct a Middle East foreign policy that is congruent with the changing power
balance in the region? Certainly, the Trump administration has been loudly faulted for
its confusing style in the conduct of US foreign policy in the region.75 One example is
its flip-flop on withdrawing ground troops from Syria.76 On the other hand, what
shines clearly through the confusion is the Trump administration’s reversal of Obama’s
Middle East policies.77 A keystone of Trump’s Middle East policies is Washington’s
identification of Tehran as the source of instability in the region.78 The Trump adminis-
tration upended the JCPOA deal and imposed sanctions on Iran, providing even stron-
ger support for Saudi Arabia and Israel in their opposition to Iran. For hardcore realists

The Wall Street Journal, (11 March 2018), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-pares-back-use-of-turkish-
base-amid-strains-with-ankara-1520766121.
73
See for example: R. Soylu, ‘Tune of Turkish foreign policy: pragmatist realism’, Daily Sabah, (31 January 2018),
available at: http://www.foreignpolicyandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/yesilyurt-2017.pdf; M. Mufti, ‘The AK
Party’s Islamic realist political vision: theory and practice’, Politics and Governance 2(2), (2014), available at: https://
www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/48; M. Yesiltas, ‘Erdog
an’s new way in Turkish foreign
policy’, The New Turkey, (11 May 2018), available at: https://thenewturkey.org/erdogans-new-way-in-turkish-
foreign-policy.
74
N. Yesilyurt, ‘Explaining miscalculation and maladaptation in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East during
the Arab Uprisings: a neoclassical realist perspective’, All Azimuth, (2 May 2017), available at: http://www.
foreignpolicyandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/yesilyurt-2017.pdf.
75
See M. Indyk, ‘A Trump doctrine for the Middle East’, The Atlantic, (14 April 2018), available at: https://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/trump-syria-middle-east/558053; R. Wright, ‘One year in, Trump’s
Middle East policy is imploding’, The New Yorker, (19 January 2018), available at: https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/one-year-in-trumps-imploding-middle-east-policy; Jennifer Rubin, ‘Trump’s Middle East Policy reaches new
levels of incoherence,’ The Washington Post, (5 April 2018), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com; S. Walt,
‘Has Trump become a realist’, Foreign Policy, (27 April 2018), available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/17/has-
trump-become-a-realist.
76
J. Davis, ‘Trump drops push for immediate withdrawal from Syria’, New York Times, (4 April 2018), available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/trump-syria-troops.html.
77
J. Thompson, ‘Trump’s Middle East policy’, CSS Analyses in Security Policy 233, (October 2018), available at: http://
www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse233-EN.pdf;
‘US-Saudi relations’, Council on Foreign Relations, (12 May 2017), available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-
saudi-relations.
78
W. Hennigan, ‘President Trump’s efforts to isolate Iran at the UN backfired’, Time, (26 September 2018), available
at: http://time.com/5407295/donald-trump-iran-united-nations.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 275

like John Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, the Obama policies in the Middle East
were closer to their realist program of ‘offshore balancing.’79 Thus, Walt sees the lack
of flexibility in the Trump administration’s Middle East alignments as straying from the
requisite ‘offshore balancing’ in America’s Middle East policies.80
From this overview of the realist perspectives on both Turkish and American Middle
East foreign policies, it would be difficult to conclude that there was any consensus among
the analysts as to whether or not Ankara and Washington were pursuing realist policies
and whether or not a total rupture between their policies would be inevitable. That leads
us to consider a different approach to the analysis of the crisis – constructivism.

5. Constructivist Explanations of the Turkey-US Crisis Concerning Their

Middle East Policies
The various schools of constructivism81 are well-suited for the analysis of foreign pol-
icy by virtue of their exploration of the socially constructed, ideational and identity
bases that inform the ways in which foreign policy decision makers define the national
interests that they seek to protect and promote. The foreign policies of the AKP since
coming to power in 2002 make attractive foci for constructivist analysts.82 Among
other things, this is due to the party’s Islamist roots and Ottomanist identity exempli-
fied in the writings and speeches of former Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister,
Professor Ahmet Davutog
lu,83 as well as the post-Davutog
lu foreign policies of
President Erdog
an that appear to have a Muslim Brotherhood agenda.
One of the tenets of constructivist analysis applied to foreign policy is that idea-
tional foundations and identities can change over time, including as a result of
changes in societal attitudes that affect domestic political support for the leadership.
A classic example in the Turkish case that fed into the crisis with US Middle East policy
is the volte-face in the AKP willingness to seek a negotiated resolution of PKK violence
in the period from 2009 to 2015, when government officials pursued on and off nego-
€
tiations with the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Then in 2015, following a deadly
violent disruption of a Kurdish youth rally in Suruç and PKK retaliation, the Erdog
an
government declared all-out war against the PKK. Commentators suspected that the
President wanted to turn the voting population against the Kurdish People’s
Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) that might have gained more

79
J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, ‘The case for offshore balancing, a superior US grand strategy’, Foreign Affairs, (July-
August 2016), pp. 70–83, available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-
offshore-balancing.
80
S. Walt, ‘Has Trump become a realist?,’ Foreign Policy, (17 April 2018), available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/
04/17/has-trump-become-a-realist; D. Larison, ‘No, Trump is not a realist’, The American Conservative, (16 April
2018), available at: https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/no-trump-is-not-a-realist.
81
See M. Behravesh, ‘The relevance of constructivism to foreign policy analysis’, (17 July 2011), available at: https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/261402206_The_Relevance_of_Constructivism_to_Foreign_Policy_Analysis.
82
See L. Hintz, Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018); H. Ulusoy, One Policy Many Identities (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2007); P. Ipek, ‘Ideas and
change in foreign policy instruments: soft power and the case of the Turkish international cooperation and
development agency’, Foreign Policy Analysis 11, (2015), pp. 173–193; U. Yukaruc, ‘A constructivist approach to
foreign policy: the case of Turkey and Valley of the Wolves: Ambush’, (2017), (Ph.D. thesis, University of East Anglia),
available at: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/65370.
83
See M. Mufti, ‘The AK Party’s Islamic realist political vision: theory and practice’, Politics and Governance 2(2),
(2014), pp. 28–42.
276 L. G. MARTIN

Parliamentary seats in the coming elections that would have reduced the power of
the AKP.84 Nevertheless, the outbreak of renewed fighting between the PKK and the
Turkish military exacerbated the tensions between Turkey and the US over the US sup-
port for the YPG.
A second example of an ideational development that has fed into the crisis with US
Middle East foreign policy is the AKP government’s becoming increasingly supportive
of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization with which President Erdog
an has had
close ties.85 That support has estranged Turkey from Egypt. It has also roiled its rela-
tions with Saudi Arabia and the UAE when Ankara came to the aid of Qatar in Doha’s
dispute with its GCC neighbors. The dispute arose, among other things, over Qatar’s
support for the Muslim Brotherhood.
There are analysts of American foreign policy in the Middle East that also take a
constructivist approach to explain particular policies. Examples include President
George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 200386 and President Barak Obama’s ‘War
on Terror.’87 On the whole, however, President Trump’s Middle East policies remain
confusing with no clear definition of the US national interest in the region for either
realists or constructivists on which to hang their analytical hats.88

6. Solutions to the US-Turkey Middle East Policies Crisis

Realists and constructivists have expressed the need to bridge their theoretical divide.89
A combination of these theoretical approaches may in fact hold out the prospect of
helping to resolve the US-Turkish crises over their respective Middle East foreign poli-
cies. Thus, Ankara and Washington from a realist perspective could accept the reality of
the unstable balance of power in the region and therefore the likelihood that their alli-
ances and alignments will be fragile. From a constructivist perspective, their decision-
makers could demonstrate a better understanding of their respective concerns in the
region. For example, Washington should accept the fact that Turkey’s coordination of its
Syria policy with Russia, Iran and the Assad regime derives from Ankara’s fear of the
development of Syrian Kurdish autonomy under PYD control and affiliation with the
PKK, as well as the need to secure energy supplies from Russia and Iran.
On the other hand, Ankara should accept the fact that the best antidote for this
fear of increasing PKK violence and push for Kurdish self-rule would be for the AKP

84
Z. Dogan, ‘Suruç attacks highlights parallels with 2015 elections’, Ahval, (19 June 2018), available at: https://
ahvalnews.com/suruc/suruc-attack-highlights-parallels-2015-elections.
85 €
B. Ozkan, ‘The Cold War-era origins of Islamism in Turkey and its rise to power’, The Hudson Institute, (5
November 2017), available at: https://www.hudson.org/research/13807-the-cold-war-era-origins-of-islamism-in-turkey-
and-its-rise-to-power.
86
A. Flibbert, ‘Chapter 4: Ideas and entrepreneurs: a constructivist explanation of the Iraq war’, in J. Cramer and A.
Thrall, eds., Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (London: Routledge, 2011).
87
R. Jackson and M. McDonald, ‘Chapter 2: Constructivism, US foreign policy, and counterterrorism’, in I. Parmer and
L. Miller, eds., Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2014).
88
M. Barnett, ‘Trump and international relations theory: a response to Robert Jervis’s ‘President Trump and IR
theory’, (7 February 2017), available at: http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5L-Trump-IR.
89
See S. Walt, ‘International relations: one world, many theories’, Foreign Policy 110, (Spring 1998), available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275?seq¼1#page_scan_tab_contents; P. Jackson, D. Nexon, J. Sterling-Folker, J.
Mattern, R. Lebow and J. Barkin, ‘Bridging the gap: toward a realist-constructivist dialogue’, International Studies
Review 6(2), (October 2004); J. Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES 277

government to seek a negotiated settlement with the PKK over the conflict. This will
require a reversal of the Erdog
an view that only a military solution is possible when
dealing with the PKK.90 It would require a resumption of peace talks and reconsider-
ation of expanding cultural rights and some degree of local political autonomy within
southeast Anatolia for Turkey’s Kurds.
Ankara should also recognise that their ideological support for the Muslim
Brotherhood interferes with their ability to align with key actors in the region such as
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While retaining their ideological beliefs, Turkey’s
decision makers should take steps to repair these relationships.
For its part, Washington could reduce the opportunities for Tehran to align Arab
support against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank by seeking a negotiated reso-
lution of the Israel-Palestinian dispute on the two-state model.91 Admittedly that is a
tall order, but fulfilling the promise of the Oslo Accords of some 25 years ago, would
legitimise Israel’s acceptability as a potential alliance partner for Ankara as well as
within the Arab world.

7. Conclusion
As realism counsels us, the only acceptable resolution of the struggle for power in the
Middle East will be to implement rational foreign policies that promote a more stable
balance of power by maintaining flexible alignments that are ready to oppose any
hegemonial bid by a regional actor. The current crisis between Wasington and Ankara
over their Middle East policies restrains the development of system stability. As con-
structivism instructs us, the adversarial perceptions by the political communities within
Turkey and the US that are fueled by their respective administrations only contribute
to those crises. They need to be changed. Opinion leaders, public intellectuals and
academics can help bring about those changes. This combination of realism and con-
structivism takes both a so-called ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach to the reso-
lution of these crises. Changing perceptions and retreating from destructive policies
take time. The time to start is now.

Acknowledgement
The author expresses her sincere appreciation to the two anonymous reviewers for their sugges-
tions on the early version of the paper.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

90
‘Only solution is to destroy the PKK: Erdo
gan’, Hurriyet Daily News, (19 April 2016), available at: http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/only-solution-is-to-destroy-pkk-erdogan-98037.
91
See A. Berger, H. Cox, L. Martin, E. Mendelsohn, A. Norton, H. Steiner, S. Walt, ‘Israel and Palestine two states for
two peoples if not now, when?’ Foreign Policy Association, 2010, available at: https://www.fpa.org/usr_doc/Israel_
and_Palestine_Two_States_for_Two_Peoples_2010.pdf.