LEFEBVRE-GlobalismRegionalismUS-1991

Globalism and Regionalism: U.S.
Arms Transfers to Sudan

Author(s): JEFFREY A. LEFEBVRE
Source: Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 211-227
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45305238
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Globalism and Regionalism:
U.S. Arms Transfers
to Sudan
JEFFREY A. LEFEBVRE
1950s, the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward these newly

Since 1950s, the the rapid formulation decolonization of U.S. of the foreign Third policy World toward began these in the newly mid-
emergent states has been cast as a struggle between "globalist" and

"regionalist" thinkers in the national security community. Quite simply,
the globalists maintain that the United States should give first-order
priority to countering Soviet penetration and the rise of radical anti-
Western movements in the Third World, whereas the regionalists con-
tend that Washington can contain Communist/radical penetration by
exhibiting a greater sensitivity to regional factors.1 Globalists and re-
gionalists are stimulated by different sets of concerns - a fact that pro-
duced clashes over specific policy means and objectives. However, the
debate is generally one of degrees rather than of extreme, exclusive
positions. What one finds, therefore, is a mix of global confrontation
and regional accommodation underlying American policy guidelines.
Perhaps more so than in any other area of U.S. policy, arms transfers
to the Third World have drawn attention to the potential "loss of policy
control" that results from Washington's subservience to globalist or
regionalist principles. In tilting toward either tendency, U.S. interests,
and especially those of the U.S. arms client, become subordinated to
outside concerns. The globalist proclivity to view every region and coun-
try as a political-strategic domino in the East-West (radical-moderate)
JEFFREY A. LEFEBVRE is assistant professor of political science at the University of

Connecticut, Stamford. He has written several articles on U.S. strategic policy in northeast
Africa and the Indian Ocean that have appeared in the Journal of Modern African Studies ,
Africa Report , and Northeast African Studies. He has recently completed a book manu-
script on U.S. arms transfers to the Horn of Africa that will be published by the University
of Pittsburgh Press in 1991. Address for correspondence: Professor Jeffrey A. Lefebvre,
Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut, Stamford, Stamford, CT 06903.
ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, Vol. 17 No. 2, Winter 1991, pp. 211-227.
212 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 1991
conflict may allow an arms recipient to manipulate its patron. At the

same time, the client state is being forced to choose sides in a competition
that may heighten its security risks and divert resources from more
pressing internal problems. Formulating policy in a regional context,
however, means making choices and setting the interests of more influ-
ential states ąbove those of weak states, resulting in what amounts to a
foreign "dictate" of U.S.-client relations by a third party.
Nonetheless, arms transfers continue to play a very important role
in solidifying U.S. relations with Third World governments. The fact
that the level of American arms transfers to a foreign government is
used as a barometer for measuring the state of U.S. bilateral relations
attests to the importance placed upon this policy instrument by both
sides.2 Still, this assessment must be tempered by an understanding of
the motivations and constraints underlying American security policy,
which requires that one ask two broad questions: what is the global and
regional context in which American policy is being formulated? and how
do both states adjust to, or manipulate this political-strategic setting?
This case study in how American global and regional priorities interact
and affect supplier-recipient relations, examines the evolution of the
U.S. -Sudan security relationship.
The Roots of Policy: 1956-1976
During the first 20 years of diplomatic interaction between the United

States and Sudan, arms transfers played only a minor role. From the
time of Sudan's independence on 1 January 1956 through the end of
1976, American security assistance to Khartoum totaled slightly more
than $2 million. The value of U.S. arms transfers provided to sub-Sahara
Africa during this same period was approximately $750 million.3 Ob-
viously, Sudan ranked at the very bottom of Washington's list of foreign
policy priorities in both the global and African context.
American policymakers took note of Sudan's location astride the
Red Sea across from Saudi Arabia and upstream on the Nile River from
Egypt. However, the strategic location was a difficult one to exploit
given the military and political realities of the time. In the immediate
aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, Sudan attracted the attention of Amer-
ican defense planners, who had begun preparing for the contingency of
direct U.S. military intervention in the Middle East in support of the
Eisenhower Doctrine. Sudan's military value was heightened by the U.S.
Navy's interest in acquiring access rights to Port Sudan, the need to
maintain the American strategic military airline of communication that
Lefebvre 213
extended over Sudan, and a desire not to allow Sudan to become a
staging area for Soviet influence into that part of the Middle East and
the African continent.4 But due to the underdeveloped nature of the
country, Pentagon officials felt that Sudan was of limited strategic im-
portance to the United States.5 A February 1957 Joint Chiefs of Staff
report found "no military justification at this time for U.S. military aid
to Sudan."6
Sudanese government officials, for their part, showed little interest
in establishing a security linkage with the United States. Khartoum's
official policy line was one of "positive neutrality" in global affairs,
which meant closely identifying with the Third World nonaligned move-
ment and the Arab League agenda. When Vice President Richard Nixon
met with Sudanese political leaders in March 1957, he found their sym-
pathies divided between the United States and the Soviet Union; he
also found little enthusiasm for the recently announced Eisenhower
Doctrine for the Middle East.7 The Sudanese essentially felt American
military aid was unnecessary since the "country presently has excellent
neighbors and does not feel threatened," and when the government did
decide to expand and improve Sudan's armed forces, it would do so
from its own resources.8
Khartoum's desire to keep the Americans at arm's length had much
to do with Sudan's delicate relationship with Egypt. Sudan's importance
to Egypt is twofold: Sudan acts as a strategic buffer on Egypt's southern
flank, and Khartoum sits at the juncture of the Blue Nile and the White
Nile. This latter point in particular, has provoked great concern in Cairo
over the possible threat of a hostile power attempting to control the
flow of the Nile waters in order to choke off Egypt. As a result, Egyptian
governments of various ideological persuasions have maintained a keen
interest in the "water politics" of the Nile.9 The geopolitical equation
framed by Gen. Charles Gordon, who ruled Sudan and died defending
the British position there in 1885, perceptually still holds true in Cairo
today: the stability of the region (northeast Africa) depends on the
defense of Egypt, and that, in turn, rests on the defense of the Sudan.10
Out of this geopolitical necessity Cairo has assumed the right to
influence Sudanese politics and to prevent Khartoum from aligning itself
with a foreign power deemed inimical to Egyptian interests. In the early
1950s Cairo attempted to resolve this security problem by denouncing
the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement and claiming the right
to annex Sudan. But the decision by the Sudanese Parliament in De-
cember 1955 to opt for independence rather than merger with Egypt
dealt a crushing blow to Gamal Nasser's "unity of the Nile valley"
scheme. Nasser then looked to the penetration of the Sudanese military

as a means to exert influence over Khartoum.
Despite the mutual suspicion that poisoned U.S.-Egyptian relations
and Washington's concern that radical Nasserite sympathizers might
seize power in Khartoum, American policymakers became resigned to
the fact that Egypt would constantly meddle in Sudanese affairs, and
there was little the United States could or should do to prevent it. A 4
November 1958 National Security Council report recommended that
Washington work to keep Sudan free of United Arab Republic domi-
nation, encourage Khartoum to act as a moderating influence in the
Arab League, and attempt to orient Sudan away from Arab affairs and
more toward Africa - where the American position was less tenuous
and susceptible to regional challenges.11 Thus Sudan was placed in the
Africa Bureau at the State Department when it was created in August
1958. But the National Security Council also recognized the vital im-
portance of the Nile waters to the economy of the UAR (following the
Egyptian-Syrian merger in February 1958) and the understandable in-
terest of the UAR in Sudanese policies and actions affecting the Nile.
As a strategy to avoid exacerbating problems in the region, the NSC
proposed that Washington adopt a less confrontational approach toward
Nasser, avoid espousing the specific position of Sudan or any other
riparian state with regard to the Nile, and keep a low profile by en-
couraging the United Kingdom to assume primary responsibility for
training and equipping the Sudanese military.
Washington's concomitant arm's-length policy stance satisfied the
global confrontationist and regional accommodationist impulses of the
national security community. Via the British military program and by
not subverting the Egyptian position in Sudan, the objective of denying
the Sino-Soviet bloc African bases could be secured in northeast Africa.
Moreover, Arab specialists at the State Department did not want to
antagonize Egypt, which was considered the most important and influ-
ential Arab state.12 Globalists were appeased since Nasser did not want
the Soviet Union or the United States encamped in Sudan. Thus fol-
lowing the mid-November 1958 military coup in Khartoum, American
policy toward Sudan remained unchanged, even though a subsequent
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Special National Intelligence Esti-
mate concluded that the new Sudanese government would avoid align-
ment in East- West global politics and improve relations with Nasser.13
For lack of incentive and opportunity, the Kennedy administration
also refrained from deepening U.S. military involvement in Sudan. As
outlined in NSC 6106, which was adopted on 10 January 1961 and
Lefebvre 21$
remained in effect until mid-January 1963, a number of factors damp-
ened U.S. interest in Sudan - including the unstable political situation
resulting from the increasing activities of the Anya Nya rebels in the
South, the absence of any U.S. economic objectives, continuing military
rule in Sudan, Khartoum's subservience to the Arab League agenda,
and the fact that, except for military overflight and landing rights, the
United States had no urgent military mission in Sudan.14 American
policymakers recognized that Khartoum's relationship with the UAR
represented "one if not the major influence on the development of
Sudan's foreign relations."15 Because of the importance of the Nile
waters, the United States continued to act upon the assumption that
Nasser would blunt any Communist effort to penetrate Sudan, expecting
that the UAR would "take all measures within its power to ensure a
friendly government in Sudan and to prevent a major power, including
the USSR, from gaining a dominant influence there."16 The authors of
NSC 6106 thus recommended that, while seeking to promote a stable
and independent Sudan able to resist Sino-Soviet domination and willing
to continue to make available to the United States military overflight
and staging rights, the United States should encourage Khartoum to
remain friendly to but not controlled by the UAR and that Washington
should continue to stay out of the Nile water problem.
Washington's recognition of Egypt's special interest in Sudanese
affairs was made more tenable during the late 1950s and into the mid-
1970s by the Ethiopia security alternative. Washington's security con-
nection with Addis Ababa provided the United States with a direct
presence in northeast Africa and access to one of the most important
communications/intelligence-gathering facilities in the world at Kagnew
Station, located in Ethiopia's northeast province of Eritrea. Ethiopia
appeared to be a far more hospitable and dependable client base from
which the United States could secure its interests in northeast Africa,
given Emperor Haile Selassie's generally pro- West foreign-policy ori-
entation, which included friendly relations with Israel, coupled with the
fact that Ethiopia itself was a target for Nasser's propaganda attacks
and was confronted by an Arab-supported revolt in Eritrea. As a con-
sequence, Addis Ababa was the recipient of the largest U.S. military
aid program in sub-Saharan Africa - receiving over 80 percent of Mil-
itary Assistance Program (MAP) funds dispensed in the region during
the period from FY 1955 to FY 1976.17
Washington remained wary of staking its interests in Sudan for fear
that Khartoum would align itself with radical nationalist movements
proliferating in Africa and the Middle East. For a brief time after the
Sudanese military government handed power over to civilian politicians

in October 1964, Khartoum succumbed to these forces by supporting
the Congolese leftist rebels who had established a "People's Republic"
at Stanleyville in September 1964. This stance had prompted the CIA
to consider arming the Sudanese African National Union, which was
operating against the central government in southern Sudan, for the
purpose of harassing the radical civilian government in Khartoum into
ceasing support for the Congolese rebels and to cut off the flow of arms
across the Sudanese border.18 This tense period in U.S.-Sudanese re-
lations ended following the replacement of what the State Department
labeled an "adventurous" and "communist infiltrated" government in
spring 1965. 19 But, Khartoum's susceptibility to the radical, Nasser-led
Arab agenda led Sudan to sever diplomatic ties with Washington in the
aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
Washington's strained relationship with Cairo throughout Nasser's
tenure effectively ruled out a U.S.-Sudanese alignment. Khartoum's 17-
year war (1955-1972) against southern secessionists (the Anya Nya) did
create a need for military assistance. But when Khartoum finally aligned
itself with a superpower arms bloc, it followed Nasser's lead and opted
for Moscow. Between 1967 and 1976, the Russians supplied $65 million
out of the $100 million worth of armaments acquired by Sudan.20
The 25 May 1969 military coup in Sudan, which brought Jaafar
Nimeiri to power, represented a foreign-policy triumph for Cairo and,
so it seemed, for the Soviet Union as well. CIA analysts had long
expected that junior-ranking members of the Arab, nationalist-minded,
and Egyptian-penetrated Sudanese military would attempt a takeover
of the government.21 Nimeiri's establishment of a Revolutionary Com-
mand Council based upon the Nasserite model left little doubt that
Khartoum would continue to follow Cairo's policy lead. Moreover, the
newly installed military government committed Sudan to a Socialist
course and placed a greater reliance upon the acquisition of Soviet arms
and assistance, though in 1971 Nimeiri would crush Sudan's Communist
party in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt.22
The emergence of an emphatically pro-Egyptian leader in Khar-
toum, however, would eventually work to Washington's advantage.
Concurrently, in July 1972, Anwar Sadat began to take Egypt out of
the Soviet arms orbit by expelling Russian military advisers, and Nimeiri
restored diplomatic relations with Washington. As Sadat continued to
reorient Cairo's policy toward the United States after the October 1973
Arab-Israeli war, Washington agreed to fund a small military training
program in Sudan during 1973 and 1974. Although a falling-out would
Lefebvre 217
occur over Nimeiri's decision to release into the custody of the Palestine
Liberation Organization the Palestinian responsible for the March 1973
assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan and his top aide, Khar-
toum was being pulled inexorably toward the United States by the force
of the U.S. -Egyptian relationship.
The Rise of a Regional Ally: 1977-1985
A complete turnabout occurred in American-Sudanese relations be-

tween 1977 and 1983, when U.S. arms transfers to Sudan reached levels
unprecedented for Africa. During this nine-year span, the United States
provided Sudan with approximately $135 million in MAP aid, $160
million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing credits and $506 mil-
lion in Economic Support Funds (ESF), authorized $7 million for the
International Military Education and Training Program to train 625
Sudanese military students, and approved more than $581 million in
FMS cash arms transfers. This cumulative arms package - valued at
almost $1.4 billion - represented the single-largest commitment of
American military-economic resources to sub-Saharan Africa. By com-
parison, the Sudanese SAP dwarfed the levels of security assistance
Washington provided to Kenya and Somalia, two of the strategic focal
points in the U.S. Southwest Asia facility-access network.
The opening for the United States in Sudan was partly the result of
Nimeiri's distrust of the Russians and disillusionment with Soviet mili-
tary aid. President Nimeiri had survived one Communist-inspired coup
attempt in July 1971. Five years later (July 1976) a Libyan-sponsored
rebellion, apparently carried out with Moscow's blessings, nearly suc-
ceeded in toppling him. By the end of May 1977 the last of the Soviet
military advisers had been expelled from Sudan. Despite a decade of
Soviet arms supplies, American military officials found the well-trained
Sudan People's Armed Forces to be poorly equipped.23 In Nimeiri's
eyes, Sudan needed a more "responsible" patron.
American political-military penetration of Sudan was a natural con-
sequence of Khartoum's decision to align itself with the Egyptian-Saudi
Red Sea axis. Nimeiri joined Sadat and the Saudi monarchy in assuming
a high-profile, anti-Soviet posture in the region.24 Tangible evidence of
Sudan's "moderate" policy orientation occurred during Somalia's ill-
fated 1977-1978 Ogaden campaign against the Soviet/Cuban-backed
Ethiopian army, when Khartoum provided diplomatic and material sup-
port to Mogadishu. Subsequently, Nimeiri would support Sadat's Israeli
peace initiative and the Camp David accords. Having antagonized the
218 Armed Forces ft Society/Winter 1991
Soviet Union and radical forces by the adoption of a pro-West policy

stance, a U.S. security connection became a sine qua non for Khartoum.
U.S. support for Sudan as an arms partner was intended to redress
four perplexing political-strategic problems. First, the dislocation from
its position of political-strategic paramouncy in Ethiopia in spring 1977
presented American policymakers with a difficult dilemma. The loss of
Kagnew Station would have little impact upon U.S. strategic interests
since the facility had outlived its useful life and was due to be closed by
the end of the year anyway. However, U.S. regional allies were pres-
suring the Americans to respond to the Soviet move into Ethiopia in a
forceful manner.25 But what the Saudis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Iranians,
and American globalists wanted the United States to do - arm So-
malia - was politically unacceptable to the State Department's Africa
Bureau so long as Mogadishu still laid claim to Ethiopia's Ogaden re-
gion. Establishing an American military presence in Sudan, however,
would be less provocative in the African context and did not seem to
carry the costs or risks associated with Somalia. Moreover, after the
Americans agreed to provide weapons to Mogadishu in August 1980,
the Sudanese arms connection allowed Washington to move slowly and
cautiously in the arming of Somalia.
Second, the United States wished to reverse the isolation of Egypt
in the Arab world, which might cause Cairo to rethink its position on
the Israeli-Egyptian peace process and undermine U.S. influence in the
Middle East. Sadat had taken a great risk in normalizing relations with
Israel and aligning Egypt with the United States. Moreover, during the
first half of the 1980s, the Pentagon earmarked over $500 million in
military construction funds to transform Ras Banas, Egypt into the
centerpiece for U.S. military contingency planning for Southwest Asia.26
As a reward for supporting U.S. political and strategic plans, Cairo
became the recipient of the second largest U.S. security assistance pro-
gram in the world (after Israel), which during the first half of the 1980s
ranged from $1 billion to $2 billion annually. Khartoum's open support
for Egyptian policy formed a critical psychological and political prop
for U.S. and Egyptian policy. Nimeiri's clever maneuvering on global
and regional issues created the impression that the United States had a
vital interest in assuring his political survival, especially following Sadat's
assassination in October 1981.
Third, although Washington did not conclude a formal access agree-
ment with Khartoum in response to the hostage situation in Iran and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and Nimeiri was
forced to retract an öfter of a Red Sea base made to the United States
Lefebvre 219
in early 1981, Sudan still figured quite prominently in American strategic
calculations. Sudan's location on Egypt's southern flank, its 400-mile
Red Sea coastline across from Saudi Arabia, and common border with
eight African states provided the United States with a potential point
of entry for certain contingencies in Southwest Asia and Africa.27 Khar-
toum demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the Americans by
granting the United States naval port of call rights at Port Sudan, al-
lowing some prepositioning of U.S. military equipment, conducting joint
training exercises with U.S. military forces in fall 1981 (Bright Star 82)
and again in August/September 1983 (Bright Star 83), and providing
valuable logistical support for U.S. military deployments during the 1983
crisis in Chad. Furthermore, Sudanese facilities acted as a hedge in the
event other bases were not made available to the U.S. military.
Finally, the Americans were drawn into Sudan by the desire to blunt
the designs of Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi. During the Reagan
years, in particular, a domino theory was applied to northeast and central
Africa to justify arms transfers to places such as Chad and Sudan, for
if Chad fell, Sudan would be next, and then Egypt. Sudan, itself, had
been the victim of Libyan air attacks launched from Chad in September/
October 1981, and Libyan jets allegedly bombed the Sudanese town of
Omdurman in March 1984. The Nimeiri government was the persistent
target of a Libyan propaganda campaign, which included the arming of
Sudanese dissidents. Administration officials cast these developments
in an ominous light since these aggressive actions all occurred after
Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen had signed a tripartite pact in August
1981 .M Thus on at least four occasions between October 1981 and March
1984, the United States engaged in gunboat diplomacy - from the dis-
patch of AWAC early-warning aircraft to Egypt and Sudan to the sta-
tioning of an aircraft carrier off Egypt's Mediterranean coast - to dem-
onstrate U.S. support for Cairo and Khartoum and to deter Qaddafi.
The Fall of a Regional AUy: 1986-1990
During the second half of the 1980s, the U.S.-Sudanese security

relationship experienced a steep decline that neither government made
any real effort to reverse. In stark contrast to the $800 million-plus
worth of security assistance Sudan received during FY 1977 to FY 1985,
the actual, estimated, and proposed SAP amounts for the succeeding
five-year period (FY 1986-FY 1990) only totaled $77 million. Although
U.S. security aid for sub-Saharan Africa had been sharply reduced,
Sudan fell from the top spot on Washington's SAP recipient list for the
220 Armed Forces ft Society/Winter 1991
region to 10th in 1987 - on a level with Gambia. Khartoum compensated

for this loss by acquiring weapons from other sources, most notably
Libya and, more recently, Iraq.
On the surface it would appear that the U.S.-Sudanese alliance
unraveled due to the overthrow on 6 April 1985 of Washington's close
friend, Jafaar Nimeiri. Although American policymakers had become
concerned by Nimeiri's increasingly erratic behavior, they had many
reasons to mourn his demise. Nimeiri had presided over the longest
period of political stability in postindependence Sudan, negotiated an
end to Sudan's 17-year civil war, closely aligned Sudan with the United
States on global and regional issues during the last decade of his 16-
year reign, aided the covert effort to relocate Ethiopia's Falasha pop-
ulation to Israel (Operation Moses), and cooperated with Washington
on military matters. In April 1986, Nimeiri's successors, the Transitional
Military Council (TMC), handed power over to the civilian government
of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was overthrown on 30 June 1989
and replaced by the 15-member Revolutionary Command Council for
National Salvation, led by Lt. General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Beshir.
General Beshir attempted to maintain the U.S. military connection on
terms that were perceived as running counter to American interests.
Ironically, Washington's deposed ally was responsible for putting into
motion some of the "adverse" policies and forces that Khartoum's re-
volving set of leaders have been unable or unwilling to alter.
Nimeiri's gross mismanagement of Sudan's economy not only gave
rise to the popular revolt that cost him his job but also created unpayable
foreign debt obligations (now exceeding $14 billion), which ultimately
resulted in the suspension of new U.S. military aid. Dissatisfaction with
Nimeiri's economic policies had prompted the Reagan administration
in mid-February 1985 to freeze $144 million in economic aid, and the
International Monetary Fund in March to demand the adoption of a
free market economy. The food riots and civil unrest that broke out in
Khartoum, while Nimeiri was in Washington attempting to persuade
the Reagan administration to lift U.S. economic sanctions, forced the
Sudanese military to act against the president in order to avoid a po-
tential bloodbath.29 But Sudan's continuing economic problems even-
tually placed Khartoum in violation of the 1986 Brooke amendment
forbidding new U.S. aid to any country more than one year in arrears
on loan repayments to the United States.
Nimeiri also bears responsibility for the renewal of the Sudanese
civil war, now in its seventh year. The North-South conflict erupted
again at the end of 1983 after Nimeiri had declared his intent to change
Lefebvre 221
the federal constitution and impose an extreme form of Shari^a (Islamic)
law (referred to as the "September laws") over the entire country. The
move toward adopting Sharisa had begun back in 1977 when Nimeiri,
in an attempt to accommodate his opponents, launched a National Rec-
onciliation Initiative, which the traditionalist and fundamentalist Islamic
forces exploited to infíltrate the government and press for the estab-
lishment of the Committee to Revise Sudanese Law.30 But the sudden
transformation of Sudan's legal system between 1983 and 1984 was not
only the result of Nimeiri's shifting domestic political alignment. This
change was also a maneuver to use the Shari^a to obtain an oath of
allegiance (biy'a) from the Muslim Brotherhood and traditional Islamic
leaders that would confirm his claim to the absolute powers of the
Sudanese presidency.31 Nimeiri's unscrupulous exploitation of Shaďa
divided Sudanese society, further undermined constitutionalism in the
country, and sparked the renewal of civil war in the South.
Nimieri's successors, however, have refused to repeal Shari'a law
and have continued to impose a military solution in the South. Warnings
by American officials to the TMC in mid-1985 that Washington would
not look favorably upon a military response to the conflict went un-
heeded.32 An ultimatum issued by the Sudanese military in February
1989 did eventually force the Sadiq government to accept the November
1988 SPLA-DUP (Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army-Democratic
Unionist Party) peace initiative. But the new military government of
General Beshir thus far has not repealed Shari a or offered proposals
that the SPLA/SPLM has found acceptable.33 In November 1989, the
six-month cease-fire between the two warring sides was broken by the
SPLA. With Washington becoming increasingly critical of human rights
abuses committed by the Sudanese army and government-armed Arab
militias operating in southern Sudan, American policymakers will con-
tinue to view Khartoum as an undesirable arms partner.34
Over the years, however, Sudan has been able to shield itself from
undue U.S. interference in its internal affairs by pursuing a policy of
arms diversification. During the 1980s Khartoum has acquired weapons
from France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, and China - to name
but a few of the out-of-area suppliers. Between 1976 and 1985, Bonn
ranked as the single-largest arms supplier to Sudan, accounting for $480
million, compared to $280 million for the United States, of the $1135
million worth of weapons imported by Khartoum.35 Although by the
middle of the decade the United States had become Sudan's leading
arms source, Washington only controlled about one-third of the Su-
danese arms market.36 While American military support certainly al-
leviated some of the financial costs of Sudan's arms buildup, nonetheless

Khartoum could wage war internally without U.S. cooperation.
Because of the increasing influence of the fundamentalist element
in Khartoum - which is blamed by many Western analysts for obstruct-
ing peace efforts in the civil war and opening Sudan to radical Iranian
influence - the United States appears to be "backing both horses" (both
the government and the SPLA) to hedge its bet in Sudan and as a way
to pressure Khartoum.37 In spring 1989, high-ranking American officials
began holding discussions with SPLA leader John Garang. But again,
it was Nimeiri who brought the fundamentalist (and human rights) ques-
tion to the forefront in 1984 by his temporary alliance with Sudan's
Muslim Brotherhood and by the public execution of an Arab political
opponent who opposed the Islamization of Sudanese society. The fun-
damentalist issue arose in a more accentuated form during the rule of
Sadiq al-Mahdi, who refused to abandon Shari a law and maintained a
cordial relationship with Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. More recently, the
Revolutionary Command Council has been labeled a "military funda-
mentalist government" due to the presence of National Islamic Front
elements in General Beshir's ruling circle and its refusal to budge on
the issue of Islamic law.38
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Khartoum's foreign policy in
the post-Nimeiri era was the rapprochement between Libya and Sudan
that began under the TMC and continued under Prime Minister Sadiq.
Although Khartoum's overtures to Colonel Qaddafi were seen as a
nationalist attempt to distance Sudan from Egypt and end Libyan (and
Ethiopian) support for the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Move-
ment (SPLA/M), the net effect was to put U.S.-Sudanese relations on
edge.39 Growing Libyan influence and activities in Sudan provoked fears
of Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks against Americans and prompted
the evacuation of U.S. dependents and nonessential personnel from
Khartoum in mid-April 1986 following the U.S. air raid/failed assassi-
nation attempt on Qaddafi. Despite the estrangement that has occurred
between Sudan and Libya under General Beshir, the United States has
continued to invoke section 513 of the Foreign Assistance Act against
Khartoum - the military government being declared ineligible to receive
U.S. aid because it overthrew a democratic government.
Efforts to revive the U.S.-Sudanese partnership have been stymied
by strained relations between Cairo and Khartoum, which began to
deteriorate during Sadiq's tenure and remain distant under Beshir. Al-
though Sadiq signed the Brotherhood Charter of friendship with Egypt
in February 1987, Cairo never felt comfortable with al-Mahdi, whose
Lefebvre 223
Umma party was viewed as being inherently anti-Egyptian.40 Sadiq cer-
tainly did not mollify Egyptian suspicions by continuing to court Qad-
dafi, refusing to talk peace with the rebels (which would have allowed
Sudan to loosen ties with Libya), and favoring a fundamentalist program
which was anathema to the secular government in Cairo. Egypt publicly
broke with the Sadiq government in April 1989 over its refusal to talk
peace with the SPLA/M and welcomed the new military government
after the June 1989 coup ďétat. Cairo's honeymoon with Beshir was a
short one, however, and in fall 1989 President Hosni Mubarak began
distancing Egypt from the RCC, whose days seemed numbered. For
now, Egypt is keeping a low profile in Sudan. Still, Egyptian influence
is felt via the Sudanese military, in which about 80 percent of army
officers are thought to be affiliated with the pro-Egyptian DUP.41
Finally, Sudan's fallen value as a regional ally has been affected by
Washington's lowered threat perception of the global and regional se-
curity environment. Since the Soviet Union has no real presence in
Sudan, the U.S. -Soviet relationship has been important to Sudan to the
extent that the Russian effort in Ethiopia was effective.42 But with
Moscow backing away from the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam
and with the insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigre gaining ground, the con-
fident and risk-taking Ethiopia of the early 1980s does not now seem
to pose a threat to anyone. Thus, Sudan's value as a political-strategic
counterweight to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa is diminished and this
will likely continue so long as the Soviet Union is absorbed in resolving
its own internal problems, dealing with the situation in Eastern Europe,
and/or pursuing better relations with the United States. Essentially, in
recent years, there has been no pressing reason for the United States
to take any great risk in Sudan.
Conclusion
American-Sudanese military relations presently remain in limbo.

The Bush administration is providing relief assistance but no new se-
curity aid, though U.S. weapons in the arms pipeline are still being
delivered to Sudan. Unlike the TMC, General Beshir has not set a
timetable for a return to democracy. Beshir's tenure will remain very
much dependent upon whether he acts decisively to resolve the civil war
peacefully, either through negotiations with the SPLA/M, a federal so-
lution, or by unilaterally granting secession to the south. If or when the
Sudanese military moves against Beshir, it will be interesting to observe
how Washington responds to a situation in which one military govern-
ment overthrows another. In any event, the U.S. -Sudan security rela-
tionship is unlikely to regain its former status unless there is a dramatic
change in the international environment.
Until conditions allow the resumption of U.S. security assistance to
Sudan, American policymakers might take this opportunity to recon-
sider two potentially disruptive policy assumptions. First, for the glob-
alists in particular, Islamic fundamentalist movements are seen as re-
placing the Soviet Union as the primary threat to U.S. interests in the
Middle East. There is a tendency to view Sudanese Sunni fundamen-
talism, which is rooted in nationalism and xenophobia, as being of the
same variety as Iranian Shfite fundamentalism - that is, inherently anti-
Western.43 The issue of whether a government is dominated by Islamic
fundamentalists should only be of concern in that it prolongs the civil
war or is used to divide Sudan, not because its influence is felt in the
composition of Sudan's government. Some Sudanese scholars have ar-
gued that a nondiscriminatory application of Islamic law is compatible
with the principles of constitutionalism in Sudan.44
Second, regionalists should be more circumspect in looking to Egypt
for policy guidance in Sudan. Although Washington and Cairo are now
on the same wavelength in terms of favoring a peaceful settlement of
the civil war and economic reform, Egypt has shown a disturbing pref-
erence over the years for military-based rule in Khartoum as the best
guarantor of stability.45 But the notion that "if there is trouble in Khar-
toum, Cairo is going to rumble" no longer appears true since for the
past six to seven years Sudan has been unstable with little effect upon
Egypt.46 In short, certainly the United States, and Egypt as well, can
live with trouble in Sudan. Sudanese interests do not have to be sub-
ordinated to those of Cairo in order for the United States to have strong,
positive ties with Sudan.
Notes
1. Helen Kitchen, editor, "Options for U.S. Policy toward Africa," American Enterprise
Institute Foreign Policy and Defense Review 1, ! (1979): 1.
2. Francis West, Jr., "The U.S. Security Assistance Program: Giveaway or Bargain,"
Strategic Review 11, 1 (Winter 1983):r50-56.
3. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, FY 1981 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,

1980), 479-511.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Logistics Plans Committee,
"Base Requirements for U.S. Forces Deployed in the Middle East in Support of
Lefebvre 225
CINCSPECOMME Operations Plan 215-56," Declassified Documents Quarterly Cat-
alog (DDQC), 1980 6, 2 (April/June 1980), 153A.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Military Aid for the Middle
East," 1 February 1957, DDQC , 1980 6, 2 (April/June 1980), 153B.
6. Ibid.
7. Agency for International Development, "Report to the President of the Vice-Presi-

dent's Visit to Africa (February 28- March 21, 1957)," 30 January 1958, DDQC , 1978
4, 2 (April/June 1978), 133A.
8. Ibid.
9. "'Egypt: Water Diplomacy," Africa Confidential 29, 6 (18 March 1988): 6-7.
10. Quoted in Alan Cowell, "Egypt's Friend in Need," New York Times Magazine , 20
December 1981, 40.
11. National Security Council, "U.S. Policy toward the Near East," 4 November 1958,
DDQC, 1980 6, 4 (October/December 1980), 386B.
12. See Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985), 5-6, 61-66.
13. Central Intelligence Agency, "Outlook for Sudan," 6 January 1959, DDQC, 1987
13, 3 (May/June 1987), 1304.
14. National Security Council, "U.S. Policy toward the Sudan," 10 January 1961, DDQC,
1984 10, 2 (April/June 1984), 1283.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, FY 1981.
18. See Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Covert Intelligence, "Situation in the
Congo," 16 December and 30 December 1964 and 5 January 1965, DDQC, 1978 4,
3 (July/September 1978), 218B, 218D, 219A.
19. U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with the Sudan," DDQC, 1983 9, 4
(October/December 1983), 2710.
20. See U.S. Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA),
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-1976 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1978), 159.
21. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, "Nasser's Arab Policy -
the Latest Phase," 28 August 1964, DDQC, 1977 (April/June 1977), 88D.
22. Harold Nelson, ed., Sudan : A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), 56-
62.
23. See U.S. House of Representatives, War in the Horn of Africa: A Firsthand Report
on the Challenges for United States Policy , Report of a Factfinding Mission to Egypt,
Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (12-22 December 1977) to the Committee on
International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), 26-
36.
24. See Fred Halliday, "U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Interven-
tion," Review of African Political Economy 1, 1 (September/December 1978): 8-31.
25. Zbigniew Brzeziński, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux,
1983), 178-79.
26. See U.S. House of Representatives, Military Construction Appropriations for FY 1983,
part 5, Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d sess.
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), 265-78.
27. U.S. House of Representatives, Sudan : Problems and Prospects , Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 28 March 1984, 98th Cong.,
2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985), 17-18.
28. Ibid. , 6-7; and U.S. House of Representatives, Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle : Dilemma
for United States Policy , Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), 84-87.
29. See Richard Greenfield, "Two Months That Shook Sudan," Horn of Africa 8, 1
(1985); 5-20.
30. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na4im, "Constitutionalism and Islamization in the Sudan,"

Africa Today 36, 3/4 (1989): 11-28.
31. Ibid., 14-23.
32. U.S. House of Representatives, Israel , Egypt , Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia , Report
of a Congressional Mission to Israel, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, 2-20
August 1985, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1986), 3-8.
33. "Sudan: A Chameleon Coup," Africa Confidential 30, 15 (28 July 1989): 1-3; and
David Chand, "The Sudan's Civil War: Is a Negotiated Solution Possible?" Africa
Today 36, 3/4 (1989): 55-63.
34. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988 ,
Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989), 347.
35. U.S. Department of State, ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,
1971-1980 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), 117; and U.S. Department of State,
ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1987), 143.
36. U.S. Department of State, ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,
1987 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 1988), 127.
37. "Sudan: The View from the South," Africa Confidential 30, 23 (17 November 1989):
1-2.
38. "Sudan: A Government Going Nowhere," Africa Confidential 30, 22 (3 November

1989): 3-4; and Jay O'Brien, "Sudan's Killing Fields," Middle East Report (Novem-
ber/December 1989): 32-35.
39. U.S. House of Representatives, Israel, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia.
40. "Egypt: Water Diplomacy," 6-7; and, "Sudan: The Drift Toward Dictatorship,"
Africa Confidential 28, 18 (9 February 1987): 5-6.
Lefebvre 227
41. "Sudan: A Chameleon Coup."
42. A State Department official, Bureau for East African Affairs, telephone interview
with author, 16 January 1990.
43. Ibid.
44. An-NaMm, "Constitutionalism and Islamization," 11-28.
45. "Egypt: Looking South," Africa Confidential 30, 2 (20 January 1989): 4-5.
46. State Department official, Bureau for East African Affairs, interview.

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LEFEBVRE-GlobalismRegionalismUS-1991

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Globalism and Regionalism: U.S.

Arms Transfers to Sudan

1950s, the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward these newly

emergent states has been cast as a struggle between "globalist" and

JEFFREY A. LEFEBVRE is assistant professor of political science at the University of

conflict may allow an arms recipient to manipulate its patron. At the

The Roots of Policy: 1956-1976

During the first 20 years of diplomatic interaction between the United

scheme. Nasser then looked to the penetration of the Sudanese military

Sudanese military government handed power over to civilian politicians

The Rise of a Regional Ally: 1977-1985

A complete turnabout occurred in American-Sudanese relations be-

Soviet Union and radical forces by the adoption of a pro-West policy

The Fall of a Regional AUy: 1986-1990

During the second half of the 1980s, the U.S.-Sudanese security

region to 10th in 1987 - on a level with Gambia. Khartoum compensated

leviated some of the financial costs of Sudan's arms buildup, nonetheless

American-Sudanese military relations presently remain in limbo.

3. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, FY 1981 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,

7. Agency for International Development, "Report to the President of the Vice-Presi-

17. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, FY 1981.

30. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na4im, "Constitutionalism and Islamization in the Sudan,"

31. Ibid., 14-23.

38. "Sudan: A Government Going Nowhere," Africa Confidential 30, 22 (3 November

44. An-NaMm, "Constitutionalism and Islamization," 11-28.

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