South African Journal of International Affairs

ISSN: 1022-0461 (Print) 1938-0275 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsaj20

AFRICOM: a threat or an opportunity for African

security?

Captain (SAN) D G Jamieson

To cite this article: Captain (SAN) D G Jamieson (2009) AFRICOM: a threat or an opportunity
for African security?, South African Journal of International Affairs, 16:3, 311-329, DOI:
10.1080/10220460903495215

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460903495215

Published online: 16 Dec 2009.

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South African Journal of International Affairs
Vol. 16, No. 3, December 2009, 311
329

AFRICOM: a threat or an opportunity for African security?

Captain (SAN) D G Jamieson*

South African Navy

The establishment of an African military command by the United States reflects

the growing focus of the United States on Africa in the US National Security
Strategy, which appears to be continuing under new US President Barack Obama.
This article deals with several questions. What is the stated US National Security
Strategy pertaining to Africa? What national interests does the United States have
in Africa? What is the United States officially saying about its objectives in Africa
and what has it actually been doing to date? And what are other opinion makers
saying about US military involvement in Africa? Finally, it looks at the question of
US perceptions of possible rivals in Africa and at potential scenarios for conflict
before making a series of conclusions about the threats and opportunities posed by
AFRICOM for Africa, and recommendations for a response to AFRICOM on the
part of policymakers in South Africa.
Keywords: AFRICOM; African security; global war on terror; oil security

Introduction
‘American forces support American Interests by always playing away games.’
US Naval War College Professor
During the cold war the Soviet Union armed and supported many African
countries,1 particularly Marxist countries like Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique.
In reply the United States did provide some arms but mostly responded with moral
and financial support to African allies. In the process some authoritarian govern-
ments such as Zaire, Sudan and Liberia were propped up by the United States. There
were also various examples of more active US involvement in African countries like
their covert support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) in Angola during the Reagan Administration (1981
1989) and their strong
role in facilitating the Angolan peace agreement and subsequent Namibian
independence negotiations with South Africa.2
After the Cold War ended the United States began to get involved in
humanitarian missions, particularly in the Horn of Africa. This culminated in a
massive US military mission launched by President George Bush, Sr, into conflict
and famine afflicted Somalia in 1992. In 1993 President William Clinton took over
the US presidency and oversaw the disastrous ‘Black Hawk Down’3 battle in
Mogadishu in which 18 US soldiers were killed and many wounded in October of
that year. The extensive and graphic press coverage of US casualties in this battle
caused Clinton to pull all US forces out of Somalia rapidly. It is believed that the

*Email: g.jamieson@sanavy.co.za

ISSN 1022-0461 print/ISSN 1938-0275 online

# 2009 The South African Institute of International Affairs
DOI: 10.1080/10220460903495215
http://www.informaworld.com
312 D G Jamieson

‘Black Hawk Down’ experience precipitated a cautious approach to the continent4 by

the United States, which in turn prevented the dispatching of US troops into Rwanda
during the 1994 genocide.5
Although the end of the Cold War saw the US National Security Strategy steadily
evolving as the global strategic environment changed, it is quite clear that the al
Qaeda attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001 were a
watershed in US foreign policy and defence strategy. As a result that strategy grew
increasingly belligerent and pre-emptive under President George W. Bush as the
United States waged its ‘Global War on Terror’.6
The US global war on terror and 2003 invasion of Iraq has had the unintended
result of further reducing the stability of the Middle East. Instability in the world’s
major oil supplying region is highly problematic and many countries, including the
United States, are looking for alternative energy suppliers. This brings African oil
into sharp focus. For various reasons, not the least being that most of its oil is
offshore, Africa is considered to be a relatively stable source of oil in comparison to
the Middle East. Sub-Saharan Africa has about 7% of the world’s proven oil reserves
and this figure may increase substantially due to breakthroughs in deep offshore
drilling technology. By 2010 it is estimated that African oil will provide 25% of the
total energy requirements of the United States.7
The US military is now increasing its involvement in Africa. The recent decision
to establish a dedicated Africa Command (AFRICOM)8 in addition to the existing
Central, Pacific, European, Northern and Southern Commands bears testimony to
this fact. This effort to increase military involvement in Africa comes despite the fact
that the US military is already heavily committed in Afghanistan and Iraq and would
most likely not have taken the AFRICOM decision lightly.
The US National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 specifically mention Africa
in several sections and emphasise the growing importance of the continent to US
security. If Africa is so important to the United States, it is essential that
policymakers in African countries understand fully the implications of an increased
US military involvement on the continent. There are conflicting ideas as to what the
real intentions of the United States are, and whether their involvement will help or
harm Africa.
There is a great deal of information available on recent US military involvement
in Africa, some of it positive to the idea and some of it negative. Although it is
essential to try and ascertain what America’s real intentions are, in order to obtain a
complete picture it is equally important to find out the views of other opinion makers
in this regard, and not just those of the United States. In addition one should see if
the United States has rivals in Africa and in what areas those rivalries exist. From
this it can be determined whether risk of conflict and instability increases as the US
military increases its commitment in Africa.
This is especially important for the South African Department of Defence, which
has a strategic objective to ‘promote peace, security and stability in the region and the
continent’. Will increased US military activities in our continent assist the attainment
of this strategic objective or will it contribute to instability? Is AFRICOM a ‘threat’
or an ‘opportunity’ and what should be done about it?
This paper will now set out to determine if the establishment of AFRICOM by
the United States is a threat or an opportunity to African security. It will examine the
National Security Strategy of the United States, specifically highlighting Africa
related issues. From this and other important statements by key role players in the
 South African Journal of International Affairs 313

US administration, it will be possible to determine US national interests in Africa.

Official releases and announcements by various US government sources concerning
their reasons for establishing AFRICOM and what the Command’s purpose is in
Africa will then be analysed in order to determine consistency with their actual
interests.
In addition, recent US military operations or initiatives in Africa will be examined
with a view to establishing operating patterns or trends. Potential rivals of the United
States in Africa will then be discussed, with a view to predicting the likelihood of a
clash between the United States and those rivals as well as trying further to determine
the true motive for the US military expansion in Africa. The opinions of other (non
US government) authors and observers will also be examined in order to get a
general idea of how acceptable the AFRICOM initiative is outside US government
circles, as well as soliciting further opinion on US motives in Africa. An assessment
as to the real reasons for the establishment of AFRICOM will follow. Likely
scenarios for conflict or intervention by the United States will then be determined
with a view to analysing whether these are a threat or an opportunity to the security
of the region. From this, security policy recommendations will be made to regional
stakeholders.

US national security strategy pertaining to Africa

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the publication of a US National Security
Strategy by 15 June of the year following the inauguration of a new president. No
president has ever met the deadline, however, and President Barack Obama, in office
since January 2009, is no exception; one is not expected this year.9 While several
policy pronouncements have indicated a change in tone from his predecessor, Obama
has not made marked changes in US security policy towards Africa as yet. The
overall policy that thus continues to guide the US Defense Department is that
articulated in the 2006 US National Security Strategy, issued by the administration of
George W. Bush.
On 1 June 2002, Bush delivered a speech to US Army cadets at West Point
Military Academy in which he said:
You graduate from this Academy in a time of war, taking your place in an American
Military that is powerful and honourable. Our war on terror is only begun. We must take
the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they
emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And
this nation will act.10
It was this speech that officially launched the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’, breaking
with hundreds of years of US tradition.
Africa features prominently in the US National Security Strategy of 2002, in
which it is stated:
In Africa Promise and Opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate
poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States * preserving human
dignity * and our strategic priority * combating terror. American interests and
American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for
an African continent that lives in liberty, peace and growing prosperity.11

This is a clear statement of intention by the United States to promote stability in

Africa as a means of preventing the spread of terrorism.12 Following on from this, the
314 D G Jamieson

US 2006 National Security Strategy has its own separate section on Africa in which it
states, ‘Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this
nation’.13 This also reflects new thinking in the United States and an emergence of
important interests in Africa, driven largely by US national security requirements.
This could well result in the US Defence Department’s dominance over other US
federal departments when it comes to African affairs.
The decision to establish a military Command under a four star general,
dedicated entirely to Africa, is further proof of the importance of Africa to US
national security. Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University in the UK, Paul
Rogers, in his weekly column on global security, compared the establishment of
AFRICOM on 9 February 2007 to the establishment of CENTCOM (Central
Command) back in the 1980s.14 CENTCOM had been established during the Reagan
administration as a reaction to heightened tensions and increased instability in the
Middle East. CENTCOM started as a ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ and gradually grew
until it became a fully-fledged major military command. Among CENTCOM’s
primary tasks is the securing of vital US oil sources in the Middle East during times
of conflict by means of military intervention.15 It is quite possible that AFRICOM
has a similar role in its own geographic area.
Since the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, US foreign and
national security policy continued to become more unilateral, more pre-emptive and
even belligerent. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq testify to this.16 Critics argue
that the United States pursued its own international agenda without regard to the
interests, views or concerns of the rest of the world. The realist response is that the
United States was acting as all states should and must act, in its own self-interests.17
The real problem is that the Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption took little account of the
threatening image that the United States now has abroad.18
In their quest to wage the war on terror, it was also inevitable that the US foreign
and security policies would begin to pay more attention to Africa, and it appears that
the continent is now firmly on the ‘Pentagon’s radar’. Could AFRICOM one day
become a key player in world security affairs like CENTCOM is now and, is the
global war on terror the only reason for its establishment? To answer these questions
we should first determine the national interests of the United States in Africa.

What national interests does the United States have in Africa?

‘If not in the interests of the State, do not act. If you cannot succeed do not use troops.’
Sun Tzu, circa 384BC19
It was Hans Morgenthau (1904
1980) who said ‘Using national interest defined as
power we look over the statesman’s shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we read
and anticipate his very thoughts’.20 In order to determine what the real intentions of
the United States are in Africa it is necessary to determine its national interests in the
region. Before that is done, however, one needs to bear in mind that the United States
is unlike any other state as it is in the unique position of being the world’s only
superpower. In the words of Gabriel Marcella, ‘nothing quite like it has ever
existed’.21 As such one must expect the United States to have a global perspective of
national security and act globally to counter threats. Superpower behaviour is
different to that of other nation states.
 South African Journal of International Affairs 315

When one analyses the March 2006 US National Security Strategy (NSS) one
notices that the continent receives specific mention in no less than eight places.22 This
is a new development from previous strategies. In the section on regions, Africa is
listed separately with specific emphasis on the following:
. Africa holds a growing geo-strategic importance.
. The US goal for Africa is a continent that knows liberty, peace, stability and
increasing prosperity.
. US security depends upon partnerships with Africans to strengthen fragile and
failing states.
. The United States seeks to promote democracy, good governance, market
reforms and reduce corruption.
In the section on ‘Defeating Global Terrorism’ the NSS mentions using military force
and other instruments of national power to ‘kill or capture terrorists, deny them safe
haven or control of any nation’. Further on the strategy keeps the option of ‘Conflict
Intervention’ open in the event that conflicts pose a grave threat to the broader
interests and values of the United States. It also states that the United States has a
‘moral obligation’ to intervene in the case of ‘genocide’. Further on, the NSS
highlights US oil dependence, noting that the United States ‘relies on international
sources for more than 50% of our needs’. The document further states that ‘the key to
ensuring [US] energy security is diversity in the regions from which energy resources
come’.
It is also useful to look at what US economists are saying. The emerging
importance of African oil is emphasised in a Bank of America report on 30 April
2006, which showed that Africa exceeded the Middle East as an oil supplier to the
United States for the first time in 2005 with 19% of US oil now being supplied by
Africa.23 The US National Intelligence council has predicted that this will rise to 25%
by 2015.24
The attraction for the United States of African oil is not only about supply
diversity. A quick glance at a world map shows the following additional benefits that
African oil has over alternative suppliers such as the Middle East:
. Most of Africa’s oil is offshore and easier to protect than in the volatile Middle
East.
. Although many oil producing parts of Africa are unstable, they are not under
threat of full blown conventional or even nuclear war, like regions of the
Middle East.
. Transport distances from Africa’s Atlantic Coast to the refineries on the east
coast of the United States are much shorter than from the Middle East, and the
US Navy can defend these routes more easily.
China is among the potential competitors for that oil in Africa and the 2006 National
Security Strategy is revealing in its advice given to China. It suggests that China
should ‘change her old ways of locking up energy supplies around the world’ or
‘seeking direct markets rather than opening them up’. The United States obviously
views China as the emerging power which will pose the greatest threat to United
States interests in Africa.
From the above one can come up with the following list of important US interests
in Africa:
316 D G Jamieson

. the promotion of democracy, stability and good governance;

. the prevention of regional conflicts, diseases and failed states;25
. access to African trade markets and safe passage of US goods around the
African coast;
. secure access to African raw materials, in particular African oil;
. bases from which to monitor, plan and conduct the global war on terror;
. denial of areas that can provide safe havens for terrorists; and
. the requirement to monitor China closely and counter the Chinese strategy if
necessary.
Now that US national interests regarding Africa have been determined, it will be
useful to examine what the United States is saying about its objectives as well as look
at what it is actually doing in Africa.

US official statements about its objectives in Africa versus US actions to date

On 7 February 2007 President Bush announced the establishment of AFRICOM
with these words:
This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to
create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa
Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of
Africa and promote our common goals for development, health, education, democracy,
and economic growth in Africa.26
Prior to the establishment of AFRICOM, US responsibility for conducting
operations in Africa had been divided up among several other military commands
such as Central, Pacific and European Commands.27 The fact that Africa was getting
its own Command further demonstrated the growing seriousness of the US military
intentions in Africa. However, the president’s words were very carefully chosen to
emphasise soft issues like development, health, education, democracy and economic
growth with no mention of the war on terror or securing mineral resources. This is
the theme that US Defense and State Department officials maintain whenever asked
about their intentions in Africa.
On 17 August 2007, Theresa Whelan, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defence for Africa, wrote an article for the Pretoria-based Institute of Security
Studies in which she described the way AFRICOM will operate. She emphasised the
fact that it would be a staff headquarters with minimal combat troops on site and
that it would, mostly, carry out co-ordinating and liaison functions,28 working in
partnership with African nations. She went on to describe AFRICOM’s mission
statement as follows:
US Africa Command promotes US National Security objectives by working with
African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the
area of responsibility. US Africa Command leads the in-theatre [Department of Defense]
response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and
strategies. In concert with other US government and international partners, US Africa
Command conducts theatre security cooperation activities to assist in building security
capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, US Africa Command
conducts military operations in order to deter aggression and respond to crises.29

While Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan was at pains to stress the non-intrusive
nature of AFRICOM, its official mission statement is quite wide in scope. The words
 South African Journal of International Affairs 317

‘to deter aggression’ are quite interesting considering they are being used by a foreign
power operating in Africa. The questions that should be asked are aggression against
whom and by what threats?
The US government is obviously concerned about the way the establishment of
AFRICOM will be viewed by African countries and it has been going to great
lengths to highlight the ‘partnership’ aspects. On 8 February 2008 General William
‘Kip’ Ward, the Commander of AFRICOM, issued a joint statement with Acting
Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Mull. This statement was aimed at ‘dispelling
the myths about AFRICOM.’ In the statement they stress how a secure and peaceful
Africa is in ‘the best geopolitical interests of the United States’ and that the intent is
to ‘build mutual trust, respect and confidence with our partners in Africa.’ They also
specifically stated that AFRICOM is not exclusively geared to fighting terrorism and
countering an increasing Chinese presence in the region. In congressional testimony
noted in the statement, Ryan Henry, then principal deputy undersecretary for policy
for the US Department of Defence, said that the ‘United States, China and other
countries share a common interest in a stable, secure and rising Africa. Though we
differ on means, we look forward to cooperating with China’.30
This theme continues with every AFRICOM announcement or press release. There
is a tendency to officially underplay or even deny that AFRICOM was established to
protect US supplies of oil or other raw materials, counter China’s expansion or fight
the war on terror. The official ‘party line’ remains, ‘building partnerships for security
co-operation, stabilising and assisting African countries and organisations.’ This
approach implies that the US government believes that appearing non-intrusive and
less military is critical to AFRICOM’s success. Their recent actions in Africa will now
be assessed against their statements to see if they are as low key as stated.
The two most significant US military efforts currently going on in Africa are
‘Operation Enduring Freedom * Trans-Sahara’ and ‘Combined Joint Task Force
Horn of Africa’. It must be noted that several NATO and non-NATO member states
support the United States in these particular operations, e.g. Germany and Pakistan.
These two operations are primarily focussed on the US ‘Global War on Terror’.31 In
other words, although these operations list humanitarian and security co-operation
functions among their missions, they actually exist primarily to combat Islamic
terrorists in the North African and Horn of Africa regions.32
For the above missions over 1 500 US troops are based at Camp Lemonier in
Djibouti. In addition US Special Forces have been sighted on operations in Sudan’s
Darfur region. It must be noted that China has commenced oil exploration in Sudan
and that US firms are increasingly active here too.33 This Horn of Africa experience
could provide a blueprint for future US deployments and engagement elsewhere. Camp
Lemonier may prove to be a prototype for future US strategic positioning of troops
around the world. The United States already ‘pre-positions’ military equipment at key
‘hub’ bases, such as Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean. These ‘hubs’ could
support a network of forward bases, similar to Camp Lemonier, close to potential
flashpoints in areas of political instability and possible terrorist threat.
This new US force posture addresses fighting an offensive war on terrorism over
the long-term utilising a pre-emptive military doctrine. As US Army Brigadier
General Mastin Robeson noted: ‘Anytime you have a global threat, it requires a
global presence.’34 In fact, AFRICOM Commander General William Ward backed
this up in his 13 March 2008 address to the United States Congress35 in which he
describes his strategic approach to Africa as being based on the principle of ‘Active
318 D G Jamieson

Security’. This is further described as ‘a persistent and sustained level of effort

oriented on security assistance programs that prevent conflict and foster continued
dialogue and development’.
In May 2003, an Amphibious Task Group containing 3 000 US Marines deployed
off the coast of Liberia. Elements of this force made a brief raid into Liberia to
stabilise the country after Charles Taylor had departed36 and US troops have been
deployed for small-scale interventions in Mali, Chad and Mauritania in the past.37
During the December 2006
January 2007 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, the
United States supported Ethiopia by training elements of the Ethiopian forces and
providing intelligence as well as Special Forces. They also carried out air strikes on
suspected al Qaeda targets. It was hoped that the invasion would rid Somalia of its
radical Islamic rulers and stabilise the country. This was not to be, as lawlessness has
regrettably returned to Somalia and many Islamic extremists are still at large. In
addition there appears to be a fair amount of regional resentment of US involvement,
particularly their use of air strikes, which reportedly caused extensive collateral
damage.38
The United States has trained over 44 000 African Peacekeepers from 19
countries. This is over 80% of African Peacekeepers that are currently deployed on
UN and AU missions.39 This is the largest training contribution by any country.
On 30 January 2008, the AFRICOM official website announced the installation
of a ‘US Navy inspired’ coastal radar and Automatic Identification System (AIS)40
on the strategically important island of São Tomé. São Tomé, which is situated
100km offshore of Gabon, has high mountains that will allow the surveillance system
to cover a large part of the oil rich Gulf of Guinea, an area that has also suffered
recent incidents of piracy.41 This is an unprecedented development and directly
reflects the importance of monitoring the Gulf of Guinea to the US military. It is not
improbable that the Diego Garcia concept of ‘pre-positioning’ military supplies
could also be considered for São Tomé.
The US military has also recently introduced the concept of ‘African Partnership
Stations’ (APS). The first APS consisted of two amphibious ships, a fast sea lift
catamaran and a landing platform dock. With their embarked aircraft, boats and
personnel, these types of vessel provide a permanent maritime safety and security
presence in the Gulf of Guinea (see Figure 1). In addition they also provide large,
self-contained training platforms at sea which can be used to train African security
forces.42 This is the ideal concept of operations for AFRICOM forces in that
geographic area. The offshore APS gives them a safe, mobile base at sea without any
of the inevitable political baggage that would come from a continental African base.
They can easily boost the size of the APS if required and poise as required to
intervene anywhere in the Gulf of Guinea. At the same time they can monitor the
region continuously while using these platforms to build collateral goodwill by
conducting African training onboard.43 In that particular geographic area most US
interests (mainly oil) are offshore. This concept of ‘Sea Basing’ is very much in line
with the new US Maritime Strategy released in October 2007.44 This strategy states
that ‘permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has
unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast manoeuvre
space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to
enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflict’.
From mid 2007, incidents of piracy began to increase dramatically in the Gulf of
Aden and off the east coast of Somalia. The United States and coalition partner
 South African Journal of International Affairs 319

maritime task forces that were involved on ‘counter-terrorism operations’ increas-

ingly found themselves diverted to deal with piracy incidents. The situation
deteriorated so rapidly that counter-piracy operations have now become a full time
mission, with a large EU naval Task Force (Operation ATALANTA), the United
States and UK’s Task Force 151 as well as NATO’s Standing NATO Maritime Group
2 dedicated to this mission.45 In addition many other countries, including China,
Japan, India, Malaysia, Russia and Iran have dispatched naval forces to the region
resulting in a huge naval presence off North East Africa. There is some indication
that this naval presence is causing the pirates to extend their operations into more
southern waters, affecting the economies of Kenya and Tanzania as well as the Indian
Ocean island states of Mauritius and Seychelles.
While counter piracy operations are not being driven by AFRICOM per se, the
example of the rapid surge in piracy incidents off the failed state of Somalia
illustrates the way ‘foreign players’ can easily be sucked into a ‘security vacuum’.
Indeed Vince Crawley, a spokesman for AFRICOM, recently announced that the US
military has decided to base Maritime Patrol Aircraft and ‘Reaper’ unmanned air

Figure 1. Gulf of Guinea areas of interest to AFRICOM

Source: Compiled by author on information obtained from Cohen and Alasa, 2007, p. 3.
320 D G Jamieson

vehicles in the Seychelles islands as part of their counter piracy campaign.46 It

appears that Seychelles, a Southern African Development Community (SADC)
country, had invited AFRICOM to base forces on its territory in the absence of any
assistance from its African allies to counter the threat to its economy (largely
fisheries and tourism dominated) posed by pirate activities.
If one looks at the trend of recent US interventions in Africa one can see a pattern
emerging in which the US military has no hesitation to intervene ‘kinetically’47
wherever required. These interventions have all been for military strategic purposes
and not humanitarian reasons, which go somewhat beyond the ‘co-ordinating and
liaison’ functions emphasised by AFRICOM spokesmen to date. In addition, the US
military is increasing its tendency to forward deploy troops and equipment to
potential crises in Africa. The APS concept is a variation of this theme and firmly in
accordance of the latest US Maritime Doctrine.

What are other opinion makers saying about US military involvement in Africa?
In early 2003, press reports began to emerge of how then Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, were dominating and influencing US foreign
policy. This in turn raised concerns about the effectiveness of a defence dominated
foreign policy and the standing of the United States in the world.48 Rumsfeld and
Wolfowitz were key players in the US administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003
and had reputations for being single-minded foreign policy ‘hawks’. They were also the
architects of AFRICOM. Many people feel that this increased influence of the
Pentagon in the US approach to Africa will result in a heavy emphasis on military
security rather than the human security needs of the relatively poor African countries.
They fear a curtailing of some valuable existing aid programmes and a progressive
dominance of the military in relationships between Africa and the United States.49
Indeed many African affairs analysts remain unconvinced of the Pentagon’s good
intentions. They believe that the United States is in a race with China for control of the
continent with potentially harmful consequences for Africans.50 Africans do not want
to be caught up in a clash between two major powers. In SADC in general and South
Africa in particular the establishment of AFRICOM has not been favourably received.
Although they appear to be improving now, relationships between the South
African and US government were particularly strained in the recent past. In 2003 the
United States announced the suspension of military aid to 35 African countries,
including South Africa, for their refusal to sign an agreement which would absolve
US servicemen from prosecution by the International Criminal Court.51 In July 2007
South African Minister of Defence Mosioua Lekota did not even respond to a
request from the US embassy to meet with General Ward, AFRICOM’s comman-
der.52 Minister Lekota then went on to state publicly that Africa should ‘avoid the
presence of foreign forces on her soil’.53 Later still when Botswana’s President Festus
Mogae hinted that his country may be available as a site to establish the AFRICOM
headquarters, Minister Lekota was quoted in the media as saying that ‘any country
that wants to go against the decision’ to give the cold shoulder to AFRICOM should
‘consider what the implications might be’.54
Abdullah Alzubedi, Libya’s ambassador to South Africa, asked Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Defence Whelan how the United States could divide the world up into its
own military commands. ‘Wasn’t that for the United Nations to do?’ he asked. ‘And if
China, say, decided also to create an Africa Command, would that not cause conflict?’55
 South African Journal of International Affairs 321

Even rebel militants in the Niger Delta have spoken out against AFRICOM. The
oil rich Delta in Southern Nigeria is home to the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND). This is essentially a terrorist gang which steals oil from
pipelines, kidnaps or kills foreign oil workers and attacks oil facilities. Their aim is to
wrest control of the region’s oil wealth from the government and multinational
companies. They fear, probably justifiably, that they could become the first targets of
direct US military actions. ‘Of course, it is evident that oil is the key concern of the
United States in establishing its Africa Command’, Jomo Gbomo, a spokesman
for MEND said. ‘We will fight everyone who goes on the side of the Nigerian
government, regardless of whom.’56
Dr Jackie Cilliers, Director of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa,
believes that its own interests primarily motivate the United States. Although he feels
that these interests do not necessarily coincide with those of African countries, he
cautions against jeopardising military relations with the United States. He suggests
that countries should rather work to try and influence the United States into
changing from an obsession with the global war on terror to training and supporting
the continent’s own security forces. He strongly recommends that African countries
should engage with AFRICOM in this regard.57 In fact, he believes that South Africa
might be leading the SADC move against AFRICOM in order to maintain its own
hegemony in the region.
In order to promote good relations President Bush visited Benin, Tanzania,
Rwanda, Ghana and Liberia between 16 and 21 February 2008.58 It is noted that
Tanzania is a SADC country with historically strong Chinese connections and,
according to the South African press, the US president was particularly well received
there.59 Ghana and Liberia are, of course oil producers with Liberia being the only
African continental country to openly offer AFRICOM basing rights on its territory
so far.60
Most African observers firmly believe that the United States is redefining its
strategic national interests in an attempt to control the world’s dwindling oil supplies.
They believe that it is doing this under the guise of the global war on terror, but its
main real interest in Africa is actually security of oil supplies to the United States.61
In fact, Wafula Okumu of South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies recommends
that the United States should simply be honest with Africans regarding their real
intentions which he believes are: ‘the protection of their oil supplies and fighting the
global war on terror’.62
Additionally many Africans fear becoming victims of collateral damage in
attacks on US military bases or units in Africa, as happened in the 1990s during the
terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These attacks saw
large-scale damage to property and loss of many innocent African lives.63
Even in the United States, the AFRICOM initiative has encountered considerable
criticism. ‘This is nothing short of a sovereignty and resource grab,’ said Nicole Lee,
who heads Trans-Africa, the leading African-American group focusing on US
foreign policy on Africa. Lee feels that US claims that strengthening its military
presence on African soil will lead to greater peace and security on the continent are
simply untrue.64 Additionally, as recently as 13 March 2008, Representative Jim
Saxton of the US Congress House Armed Services Committee questioned the
wisdom of the establishment of AFRICOM based on its lack of acceptability to the
African Union and African governments.65
322 D G Jamieson

To be fair it must be mentioned that the Bush administration did more for
African humanitarian aid than any previous US administration and has been
credited with saving millions of lives in the war against AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria,66 as well as providing schooling for 29 million African children.67 This real
demonstration of goodwill is somewhat paradoxical but should not be ignored when
hearing out US intentions and missions for AFRICOM. It could be that many of
their intentions are genuinely benevolent.
The Obama administration seems to be bringing the United States even closer
to Africa. While the new administration has clearly adopted a generally less
confrontational approach than that of its predecessors, and is prepared to open
dialogue and negotiate even with sworn enemies, it is President Obama’s personal
links to Africa which might count in his favour. During a July 2009 visit to Ghana he
addressed that country’s parliament and made reference to how his father had grown
up in Kenya, and mentioned how ‘America will not seek to impose any system of
government on any nation’.68
Unfortunately for the United States however, it is apparent that many observers
throughout the world are highly sceptical of the publicly stated reasons for the
establishment of AFRICOM. The general consensus is that despite what the United
States is officially saying, AFRICOM actually reflects a redefining of US national
interests. As Professor Paul Rogers suggests in his 15 March 2007 article, three
concerns are pushing the United States to greater involvement in Africa: oil, China
and, the global war on terror.69 It is hard to disagree with him. What is very apparent
though, is that America’s lack of transparency with regard to its true motives is not
going down well in many African countries. With a few key exceptions, Africans do
not welcome AFRICOM on their territory.

Possible rivals in Africa and potential scenarios for conflict

Since 2000 China has increased or enhanced its military, political and economic
relations with many African countries, and today China imports over 30% of its
crude oil from Africa.70 According to the US National Intelligence Council’s 2020
Project report, China will need to increase its energy consumption 150% by 2020.
In this regard China worries about pressure from the United States, which they view
as having an aggressive oil policy.71
Visits to Africa by Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2006 and 2007 have both been
aimed at forging new co-operative ties, as well as creating new business and markets for
Chinese companies and their products.72 This has resulted in China ranking as Africa’s
third most important trading partner after the United States and France and ahead of
Britain. China succeeds in securing African raw material deals through the combina-
tion of low interest loans and infrastructure aid packages in return for oil or other
mineral contracts with those countries.73 The Chinese National Petroleum Corpora-
tion (CNPC) and two other large Chinese oil firms are currently active in 17 African
countries.74 The question that must be asked though is what chance is there of a
confrontation between China and the United States over African resources?
According to Yang Guang, Director of the Institute of West Asian and African
Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ‘China and the US do not have
strategic conflicts in Africa’.75 ‘Oil Analyst’ Gal Luft, supports this theory. He feels
that West Africa, in particular, is not likely to be a major point of conflict between
Chinese and US oil interests. He believes that China cannot match the technology
 South African Journal of International Affairs 323

used by Western countries in exploiting Africa’s offshore oil fields, particularly the
new deep fields. As a result he feels that Chinese companies will operate as buyers,
not investors.76 Additionally the US government is attempting to reduce the risk of
a conflict with China in Africa as they specifically discussed Africa during a 2008
Sino-American Defence Policy co-ordination meeting in Shanghai. Then Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, David Sedney, said that ‘China and the
US have undertaken to work together to address the many needs in Africa including
in the security field.’77
Except for the Sudan, where they have deployed several thousand ‘armed police-
men’ to protect their oil pipeline,78 so far China has not sent large numbers of troops to
Africa. This fact alone suggests that the chance of a military confrontation between the
United States and China in Africa is relatively low. Any US rivalry or even conflict with
China in Africa would likely take place in the economic and diplomatic arena. This is
probably not so much a threat to Africa as an opportunity to exploit healthy business
competition. Of course, in the event that China does send significant numbers of troops
to the continent, one would have to re-examine the military conflict assumption.
Britain and France, also major investors in Africa, have conducted military
operations in the continent on several occasions in the recent past. In February 2008,
France deployed troops to Chad to rescue French and other foreign nationals during
the recent attempt to overthrow the government, and France has troops permanently
based in Gabon and Djibouti. What is quite interesting is that on 18 November 2004,
the British and French governments released a joint statement at Lancaster House
concerning their involvement in Africa.79 In this statement they re-iterated the
importance to both countries of enhancing the European Union contribution to the
building of a better future for Africa. They also revealed plans for the development of
EU rapidly deployable battle groups. These battle groups would allow the EU to
respond quickly to a crisis in Africa while giving time for the AU or UN to prepare
a longer-term intervention.80 This implies that both France and the UK could also
intervene militarily in Africa, but while they are both economic rivals of the United
States in Africa, they are also important Trans-Atlantic trading partners and military
allies. Their military actions will, in all likelihood, complement AFRICOM and the
United States, not threaten it. Somewhat surprisingly the author has come across
no criticism of the EU battle group plan among Africans. This is in stark contrast
to their vociferous criticism of AFRICOM.
The most likely chance of a violent confrontation between US Forces and any
adversary is within the context of the global war on terror. There are two realistic
scenarios in this regard; the first is an attack on US bases on African soil by terrorists
(such as the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi embassy bombings in 1998) and the second
is US military actions against terrorists or their bases (such as those in Somalia after
Ethiopia’s recent invasion of that country). In both these cases there is a significant
chance of innocent Africans becoming casualties.
Another possible scenario for US military intervention could be one in which oil
production facilities in the Gulf of Guinea and Niger Delta were threatened by rebel
action. The author is of the opinion that in this case, US intervention would be highly
beneficial to African stability. MEND is the most prolific and violent of the armed
rebel groups and so far this gang has cost Nigeria an estimated $16 billion in lost
export revenues since 2005.81 As the Nigerian armed forces do not seem to be able to
adequately counter MEND’s activities, the US Navy could very well become involved
in this particular problem in the very near future.
324 D G Jamieson

AFRICOM: threats, opportunities and recommendations

‘We have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from
unstable parts of the world.’
President George W. Bush, 2006 State of the Nation Address82
The US military is undoubtedly in Africa to secure the national interests of the
United States. It is a credible argument, despite what US officials keep saying, that
these interests primarily concern securing African oil supplies, effectively conducting
the global war on terror in Africa, and to some extent, countering China’s rapid
expansion and influence in the continent. They are maintaining a positive public
relations image in this regard by stressing the humanitarian and aid side of the
AFRICOM mission, as opposed to the potential hard or kinetic (combat) military
missions. This public relations campaign is failing to some extent, as it has created an
element of mistrust. A question that must be asked is, ‘are they telling the truth?’ to
which the answer is very likely ‘no, not the whole truth’.
The most important question that must be answered, however, is whether
AFRICOM is a threat or an opportunity. It is both.
In terms of AFRICOM being a threat, considerations would include the following.
. The chance of any US military base or unit on African soil becoming a target
of terrorist attack and the possible collateral damage to African people and
property that may result from such an action. The likelihood of this is
considered medium based on the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in the 1990s.
. The possibility of a US clash with Chinese forces. The likelihood of this is
considered low, as the Chinese are not likely to deploy significant troop
numbers to Africa soon and neither side would benefit from a military
confrontation on foreign soil. Clashes with the Chinese will most probably be
on the economic (business) and diplomatic fronts. Of course this situation
would have to be reassessed if the Chinese started sending large numbers of
troops to Africa.
. That US initiatives in Africa could cause a rift in SADC, the AU or other
regional economic communities. This is a relatively high possibility when one
considers how Botswana considered offering AFRICOM basing rights despite
the vehement opposition of South Africa, how the US military is basing
Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Seychelles and
when one looks at how well Tanzania has co-operated with the United States in
return for a significant aid package. In addition, Liberia, an AU member, has
openly offered basing rights to AFRICOM. Will this undermine South Africa’s
influence in SADC, the AU and other regional economic communities? The
author is of the firm opinion that it will. This could even precipitate a break up
in SADC and the undermining of the AU, thereby threatening one of the
primary ways of achieving regional stability.
As far as opportunities go, considerations would be the following.
. That the presence of US military forces in Africa can be a powerful stabilising
force in some regions where they are deployed. This is particularly true in the
case of the Gulf of Guinea, which has suffered from piracy, kidnapping, oil
terrorism and general unrest, as well as off Somalia and the Seychelles, which
 South African Journal of International Affairs 325

have also felt the harsh effects of piracy. Regional navies do not necessarily
have adequate capability to counter these threats.83 An increased US military
presence in these areas would lead to better stability and this can only be highly
beneficial to the African countries that depend on oil exports or whose
economies have suffered as a result of piracy.
. That the US military could be utilised to provide training, logistical support
and transport for SADC, regional economic communities or AU peace-
keeping and humanitarian operations. This would take pressure off African
nations who are hampered by severely limited resources.
. That the presence of the US military in Africa can and should be exploited to
improve the general training and education of African military personnel. This
is one of the stated missions of AFRICOM, and cash strapped African nations
would do well to exploit this opportunity to the maximum.
Based on the threats and opportunities presented above, it would seem that African
nations should maintain their diplomatic and media pressure to prevent AFRICOM
bases being established on the continent. However, the APS concept, and even the
establishment of US bases on an island such as São Tomé, should be encouraged. In
this way it will be possible to exploit the US military presence for stability purposes
with reduced threat of collateral damage to Africans in the event of terror attacks on
US facilities.
It would also be strongly advisable to utilise the opportunities offered by the United
States in terms of training and any other military support available for African Peace
Support Operations. This will mean that many African countries will have to adapt
their position towards the United States and adopt a more conciliatory, accommodat-
ing approach. In this regard African countries should continue to engage with
AFRICOM and develop common policies which cover military co-operation with the
United States. South Africa would do well to take the lead in this effort but the United
States would also do well to comply with correct international protocol.84
AFRICOM’s involvement in the Seychelles has highlighted a key shortcoming in
terms of an African regional security approach. The lack of an effective SADC naval
capability off the Seychelles and Mauritius in the presence of an increasing piracy
problem is a situation that should not be allowed to continue. A strong SADC naval
force should be deployed there as soon as possible otherwise the security vacuum will
continue to be filled by non-regional powers. This could cause SADC to lose
credibility. It is no use that members of such organisations oppose the presence of
AFRICOM in the region if they are not prepared or able to take responsibility for
their own security.
Finally, if China starts establishing military bases or deploying large numbers of
troops to the continent it will be prudent to revisit the policy regarding opposition to
US bases on the continent.

Acknowledgements
This research paper was written by a programme member attending the South African
National Defence College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Executive National
Security Programme. The paper is a scholastic document and contains facts and opinions
which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not
necessarily reflect the opinion of any agency, including the South African Government or the
Department of Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the
express permission of the Department of Defence.
326 D G Jamieson

Notes on contributor
Captain Guy Jamieson joined the South African Navy in 1978. He is a weapon specialist and
has spent most of his career serving in the Strike Craft Flotilla. He was promoted to Captain in
January 2000 and was appointed as the Deputy Project Officer for the SAN Frigate project. He
currently serves as the Senior Staff Officer, Surface Warfare, in the Maritime Warfare
Directorate at South African Navy Headquarters in Pretoria.

Notes
1. Copson, 2001, p. CRS 13.
2. Ibid., pp. CRS 18
24.
3. A 2001 movie by this name depicted the downing of a ‘Black Hawk’ US military
helicopter in the battle to rescue embattled troops in Mogadishu. The movie was co-
produced and directed by Ridley Scott and based on the book of the same title by Mark
Bowden.
4. Campbell, 2008.
5. Copson, 2001, pp. CRS 18
24
6. This is the post 9/11 US strategy to combat militant Islamists.
7. Othieno, 2005, pp. 1
2.
8. Stars and Stripes, December 2006.
9. Reveron, 2009.
10. ‘President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech’, 2002.
11. US National Security Strategy, 2002.
12. The view is that unstable states can ‘fail’ thereby becoming havens for terrorist groups.
13. US National Security Strategy, 2006, p. 37.
14. Rogers, 2007.
15. Klare, 2001, p. 1.
16. These invasions were both planned and controlled by CENTCOM.
17. Hellis, 2006, Section I, Ch. 2, p. 19.
18. Buzan, 2004, p. 176.
19. Troxwell, 2006, Section II, Ch. 17, p. 223.
20. Quoted in Roskin, 1994, p. 4.
21. Marcella, 2006, Section II, Ch. 20, p. 263.
22. US National Security Strategy, 2006.
23. Department of Homeland Security, 2006.
24. Cohen and Alasa, 2007, p. 1.
25. Which can be exploited by terrorist organisations.
26. Whelan, 2007.
27. Whelan, 2007, p. 2.
28. Unlike other US Military Commands, AFRICOM has a civilian, State Department
Deputy.
29. Whelan, 2007.
30. Quoted in McKeeby, 2007.
31. Berschinski, 2007, p. 1.
32. Ibid., p. 9.
33. Bond, 2006, p. 115.
34. Quoted in Schofield, 2004.
35. ‘AFRICOM, Posture Statement’, 13 March 2008.
36. Bond, 2006, p. 115.
37. Ibid., p. 116.
38. Berschinski, 2007, pp. 42, 43.
39. Hadley, 2008.
40. ‘AFRICOM, Posture Statement’, 13 March 2008.
41. Based on navigation warnings received by the author when he commanded the Frigate
SAS AMATOLA on a deployment to the region in June 2006.
42. AFRICOM official website, http://www.c6f.navy.mil/APS/ (date accessed 7 March 2008).
43. On 5 March 2007 the USS SWIFT was used as a platform to train 30 Ghanaian
midwives.
 South African Journal of International Affairs 327

44. ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’, 2007.

45. Cowan, 2009, p. 7.
46. Thompson, 2009.
47. Kinetic operations involve violent military force against opposition forces.
48. Marcella, 2006, Section II, Ch. 20, p. 273.
49. Klare, 2001, p. 1.
50. Mbachu, 2007.
51. Grobbelaar, 2003, pp. 2
3.
52. This may have been merely an issue of protocol. The author has determined that the
South African Department of Defence opinion is that a US cabinet minister should have
initially met with Minister Lekota, not a serving military officer who is two levels down
the chain of command.
53. Pham, 2007.
54. Ibid.
55. Fabricius, 2007, p. 3.
56. Mbachu, 2007.
57. Fabricius, 2007.
58. ‘Bush arrives in Tanzania bearing gift to fight poverty’, 2008.
59. On 17 February 2008, President Bush announced a $700 million aid package to
Tanzania.
60. BBC News, 2008.
61. Othieno, 2005, p. 9.
62. Taylor, 2007.
63. These attacks are believed to be the work of al Qaeda.
64. Mbachu, 2007.
65. ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Ghanaian Parliament’, 2009.
66. Geldof, 10 March 2008, pp. 19
23.
67. Geldof, 3 March 2008, p. 23.
68. Extract released by the Whitehouse on President Obama’s speech in Accra, Ghana on 11
July 2009, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art3206 (date accessed 26 September
2009).
69. Rogers, 2007.
70. Engdahl, 2007.
71. Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, 2004, p. 62.
72. Mbachu, 2007.
73. Hanson, 2008.
74. Bond, 2006, p. 73.
75. Hanson, 2007.
76. Colombant, 2004.
77. Sedney, 2008.
78. Prins, 2007, p. 13.
79. Franco-British summit Communiqué, 2004.
80. Ibid.
81. Cohen & Alasa, 2007, p. 7.
82. Ibid, p. 1.
83. This is based on the author’s own personal experience as the Captain of the Frigate SAS
AMATOLA which deployed to the region in May/June 2006.
84. Discussions should initially be held at US/South African cabinet minister level before the
Commander of AFRICOM conducts his calls and discussions.

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